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Cadalin vs.

POEA

FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign
principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in
several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their
overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the
complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

ISSUE:
o Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law
on prescription that shall be the governing law

HELD:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of
process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum. This
is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country
of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one
form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even
though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section
provides:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippine Islands.”

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the
one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
Bank of America vs. American Realty Corporation

o When foreign laws, despite having been duly presented and proven, may not be given application

FACTS:
Petitioner Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA while private
respondent American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation.

On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), organized under the laws of
England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were later restructured, the
restructured loans secured by two real estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party mortgagor. When
the corporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection before foreign courts, without impleading ARC
as party-defendant. While these civil suits are still pending before the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines. The properties
were sold at public auction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages against BANTSA.

The trial court ruled in favour of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
o Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
o Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favour of private respondent ARC, as
third-party mortgagor, is proper

HELD:
Available Remedies
THEORIES OF PETITIONER:
1. A waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of 2 requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection
should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
2. Under English law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
1.

REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE: A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor
either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy
is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office
of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the
debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party
mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property.

Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who
secures the fulfillment of another‘s obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the
principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract—loan—remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default
of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of
an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan.
In the instant case, petitioner’s contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final
judgment therein should concur, is untenable.

PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding
the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is judicial
notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved xxx, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

Award of Damages

As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the award of actual or compensatory
damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted
a clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
BANK OF AMERICA vs AMERICAN REALTY CO. 321 SCRA 659
“In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign law, Philippine law prevails”

Facts:

The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate mortgage by the respondent. Upon the
loan maturity, the corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts
(England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the
office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan,Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public auction. The
respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially
despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent
is not made a party on the collection case before the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were
filed in foreign courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate
action is filed in the Phils to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law governing in the principal
agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of money. The court rendered
judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection of a sum of money in foreign courts
constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors before foreign courts constitutes a waiver of
the remedy of foreclosure.

RULING:

The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides that “if two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others.” A mortgagor creditor may pursue two remedies either to institute against the mortgage debtor
a personal action for collection of money or foreclosure of a mortgage but cannot avail of both remedies. In Phil. jurisdiction
these remedies are alternative and not cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar to avail of the other remedy. Plaintiff
cannot split up a single cause of action by filing both remedies as expressly prohibited by the rules on civil procedure.

On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should apply to the principal agreements that states that the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money, the court held that a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded, the court will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local
or domestic or internal law. This is the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION.

Granting however that the English law is applicable in the Phil. court, such law is contrary to sound and established public
policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single cause of action, thus still cannot be applied by the court in the
case.

It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the country upon which the case is filed. Therefore the filing of a
collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for the remedy of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
VALLES vs. COMELEC

o Principle of jus sanguinis


o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO

o Dual allegiance. vs. Dual citizenship


o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: repudiation of other citizenship
FACTS:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the
highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in
view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.

In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that
he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from
running for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration
and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen


o Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship
clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children
are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.

LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”

The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.

PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation
of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that
“a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty
over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our
SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared
in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

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