The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences by Richard Whitley

Review by: Randall Collins

Theory and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Mar., 1988), pp. 291-299
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 291

It goes without saying that Bendix's memoir is at once an act of filial piety -
the need to redeem an unredeemable past that the 6migr6 feels even more
- and an attempt to subject his own life to the
acutely than the rest of us
rational ordering of sociological theory. But it is also a revealing account of the
genesis of what is clearly another, though certainly not the last, fruit of the bit-
tersweet German-Jewish symbiosis. Bendix's oeuvre must be seen as one of the
latest contributions of a secular German Jew striving to salvage the legacy of
emancipation; out of the dialogue with his father, his formative experience of
Nazism, his American education and American political perspective, Bendix
has fashioned a defense of the Enlightenment heritage of rationality, indi-
vidualism, and order in the international setting of the late twentieth century.

David Sorkin
Oxford Centrefor Hebrew Studies

The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences, by Richard

Whitley (Oxford and New York: The Clarendon Press, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1985).

This is the most advanced theoretical analysis yet written in the sociology of
science. It draws on two decades of research in this burgeoning field: Hag-
strom's and Kuhn's pioneering studies, Hargens's comparisons among disci-
plines, Gaston's British versus American physicists, Edge and Mulkay's radio
astronomers, the ethnomethodological studies of biological laboratories by
Latour and Woolgar and by Knorr, not to mention all the contributions in the
Sociology of the Sciences Yearbooks, of which Whitley is managing editor.
Where most other work has attempted to capture the social nature of science,
Whitley stresses that the sciences are quite different from each other, and that
we can best understand their inner nature by comparison. Whitley throws his
net particularly wide, because for him "science" is a generic term for any field
of intellectual production that is controlled by peer reputations in careers
striving for originality. Thus the humanities, sociology, and so forth figure as
important end-points in his comparisons. Using organization theory, Whitley
synthesizes the more specific studies into a model that tells us why intellectual
life takes so many different forms across the world today.

I am afraid, though, that many readers may have trouble with this book. The
style is very abstrarct, unrelieved by metaphor or imagery; sentence after sen-
tence links one abstract noun or gerund ("work system," "organizational fluidi-
ty,""hierarchical ordering") to another via pallid verbs of implication or corre-
lation. The exposition is rather repetitive, taking each point from conceptuali-
zation to typology to causality; while the actual sciences explained get only
cryptic mention at the end, often buried away in footnotes at the back of the
book. This is the kind of book in which it very much helps to know what the

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292

author is talking about beforehand, in order to make one's way through it. But
it is substantively the state of the art, and hence very worth the effort; so I pro-
vide here a reader's guide.

Whitley uses the tradition of organizational theory, developed by Woodward,

Thompson, and Perrow, which derives the variety of organizational structures
from characteristics of the tasks, together with problems of coordination. I had
applied this model briefly to the sociology of the sciences in my Conflict
Sociology (1975, chapter 9). What I called "task uncertainty" Whitley takes as
one of his main dimensions, but he subdivides it into two forms:

Technical task uncertainty is the extent to which researchers can be relatively

sure of coming up with results. This is like having a Kuhnian paradigm that
reduces work to routine "puzzle-solving" except that Whitley stresses the
socially constructed side here. This kind of task uncertainty is low especially if
research results are visible - that is to say, they can be recognized by practi-
tioners as unambiguously relevant for the kind of science they are doing.
Modern chemical labs have this kind of low uncertainty, whereas frontier
problems in mathematics have high uncertainty of coming up with results.

Strategic task uncertainty, on the other hand, relates to the theoretical rather
than empirical side of research; it is the degree to which different scientists
pursue related or unrelated lines of work, and hence is an uncertainty about
whether one's work will be taken up by the larger community. Modem physics,
as well as neo-classical economics, has this kind of theoretical integration (and
hence low strategic uncertainty), whereas engineering or Artificial Intelligence
are fields that are split among many different problems and approaches, and
hence theoretical recognition is uncertain.

Whitley similarly subdivides the coordination dimension into functional

dependence, the reliance of researchers on others for equipment and intellec-
tual inputs in order to do their work; and strategic dependence, reliance on the
professional group for validation of what they have done, and hence for their
intellectual reputation. Philosophers have low functional dependence because
they usually can supply their own pencils and paper, but high strategic depen-
dence because their ideas make sense only within their professional com-
munity. Conversely, biochemists are very dependent for getting access to
expensive lab equipment, but escape professional control to the extent they
can sell their own products directly to the public.

Figure 1 summarizes what Whitley proposes are the causes and results of these
kinds of uncertainty and dependence. Generally speaking, fields with high
technical task uncertainty have rather small, personalistic networks, communi-
cating in diffuse, imprecise statements (books and long articles). Whitley
thinks much of sociology is a good example of this. The opposite situation,

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Context Main determinants

lay influence on problem choice _ technical task uncertainty -

c
and competence standards (visibility and predictability
of research findings)
f I.
work controlled by personal
patronage /

I I
variety of funding agencies _. strategic task uncertainty
and audiences
\ (integration of research
multiple (vs. single) prestige ,
strategies and goals
hierarchies controlling \ among groups)
resources
r,
abundance (availability and _. functional dependence .
expense) of resources (reliance on group for
research equipment and
concentrated control of means - intellectual resources)
of intellectual production
and dissemination
Wk

plurality and diversity of _ strategic dependence

audiences (reliance on group for
validation and reputation)
lay (vs. professional) control
over competence standards
4

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294

where technical task uncertainty is low, produces an impersonal intellectual

environment, where one communicates in the terse, formal symbols of "hard
science." (The part of sociology that has standardized its research into com-
puter analysis of survey data would fit this end of the model.)

Strategic task uncertainty operates at a different level, affecting the amount of

theoretical diversity in the field, and the local autonomy versus central control
in the way scientific groups operate. The two types of uncertainty are partly
linked; it is hard to have much certainty at the strategic (theoretical) level, if the
empirical research is highly uncertain, but fields with tight little research pro-
jects nevertheless can vary a great deal as to their higher theoretical integra-
tion.

As indicated in Figure 1, technical task uncertainty is one of the causes of

strategic task uncertainty, but not vice versa. Whitley does come up with an
anomaly, though, modem economics, in which there is very strong theoretical
domination but great uncertainty at the level of empirical application. That is
because neo-classical economics has a strong consensus on the marginal utility
model of market transactions, embodied in a standard form of mathematical
argument and graphical presentation. But this theoretical agreement does not
carry over into empirical or practical applications, where economists are
notoriously disunited and frequently unsuccessful in their predictions. (Whit-
ley notes the anomaly but does not explain how it came into existence; I revert
to this below, as a symptom of the limitations of Whitley's model.)

Functional dependence brings in the materialist side of Whitley's scheme. Big,

expensive equipment like cyclotrons or astronomical observatories give the
group and its elites great power of the individual researcher; this results in
enforcing standardization and specialization. Strategic dependence comes
when intellectuals are insulated from lay audiences and work in esoteric areas
that only other specialists can understand. As a result, they focus on theoreti-
cal issues and hotly debate the importance of their approaches, because their
research takes on significance only if it is integrated into the concerns of the
dominant hierarchy. Here theory spells organizational centralization.

Whitley gives a series of contextual conditions that determine the degree of

these uncertainties and dependences. Most important seem to be the expense
and concentration of resources, the variety of funding agencies and audiences,
and whether lay persons and their "commonsense" concepts influence either
tasks or recognition. There are also some feedback loops, which Whitley does
not spell out, but that doubtless push various sciences even more deeply into
the rut in which they started. For instance, when intellectuals are highly depen-
dent on each other, they are very self-consciousness of their collective identity
as scientists, and emphasize formal/technical communications, while haughtily
rejecting the relevance of lay opinions. This makes the intellectuals even more
cut off in an esoteric community and dependent upon it.

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 295

One mightthinkthe end resultwould be everythingpushingtowardtwo polar

types: a personalistic,lay-oriented"crafts"style at one end, and a "scientific
bureaucracy"at the other. But Whitley shows that things are not so simple.
Cross-classifyinghigh and low on each of his four dimensionsresultsin a grid
of sixteen types. Nine of these, however,are theoreticallyimprobable.As we
have alreadyseen, technical task uncertaintyconstrainsstrategictask uncer-
tainty,but not vice versa.And there seems to be a correlationbetween tech-
nical task uncertaintyand functionaldependence(the double dotted arrowsin
Figure 1), because strong group inputs into researchmake outcomes more
standardizedand predictable,and predictabletasks are a prerequisitefor high
intellectualdependence on others' prior work. This leaves seven cells, with
most of the variabilityprovidedby the two "strategic"dimensions.Actually,on
theoreticalgroundsone mightthinkthatonly six of these are possible.But as I
noted, Whitley has the peculiar case of economics, which he calls a "partit-
ioned bureaucracy": strategicdependence and strategictask uncertaintyboth
foster the more rigid,bureaucraticform at the upper,theoreticallevels of the
field (the apparatusof indifferencecurves and marketforces), while technical
task uncertaintyand functional dependence foster decentralizationand ad-
hoceryat the empiricalend (forecastingbusinesstrendsand proposinggovern-
ment policies).Twentieth-centuryeconomics thus turnsout to be not only the
most peculiarof the social sciences, but the strangestintellectualorganization
in the whole universe.

Other than this, Whitley'stypology unfolds ratherneatly between two polar

types and variousintermediaries.At the end where all uncertaintiesare high
and dependenciesare low, there is fragmentedadhocracy,as in literatureand
sociology; at the other end is conceptually integrated bureaucracy, the domain
of the high lords of moder physics. This explains why physics is so much
takenas the ideal, both by theoristsin the sociology of science, and by would-
be positivistsin the aspiringperiphery.But physics, especially in its nuclear
particleEstablishment,has a set of materialand social conditions that would
be hardfor most aspiringfields to match.Most other sciences fall somewhere
in the middle. Near the informal/craftsend is polycentricoligarchy,the inter-
nally integratedbut externallyconflictingschools of pre-WWII continental
philosophy,psychology,or British anthropology.Turningup the degree of
functionaldependence we get professionaladhocracy(the nineteenth-century
field sciences, current Artificial Intelligence research,bio-medical science),
and then polycentricprofession(molecularbiology, mathematics).Nearest to
the physics end stands chemistry, a technologically integrated bureaucracy, its
uncertaintiesare down to a low level and functionaldependenceis high,but its
close connectionwith industrialapplicationsprovidesa pluralityof audiences
and input from lay concerns that keeps the field more decentralizedand less
theoreticallyoriented.

Whitley'spanoramais an impressiveone, thoughI do thinkthere is room for

improvement.He cites the empiricalstudies of the varioussciences only cur-

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296

sorily and in an impressionisticway,so it remainsto be seen by more system-

atic comparisonsto what extent the model holds up. I suspect the theoretical
principlesmay be good, but some of the particulardisciplines are misclassi-
fied. Whitley refers severaltimes to the humanities,for example,as instances
of "fragmentedadhocracy,"but I don't think this is an accuratecharacteriza-
tion of muchof what is done by historiansor literaryscholars,who seem to me
to be followinghighly routinizedskills on very specializedtopics, deliberately
removed from lay concerns. Whitley also' seems to idealize too much the
smoothnessof bureaucraticcoordinationwithinphysicsand astronomy;judg-
ing from what we know about mass-productionbureaucracies,one would
expect that therewould be considerableconflictsbetweenformaland informal
sides of the organization.But these are problemsfor furtherresearch,that can
be clarifiedby more precise informationon exactlywhat these intellectualsdo
in theirworkand how they negotiatewith others.

More serious is the way Whitley'smodel deals, or fails to deal, with change.It
is strikingthat Whitley'sdrawshis materialsentirelyfrom the sciences in the
nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,that is, after theirmajoremploymentbase
had become universities,althoughhe also notes the effects upon their organi-
zational structuremade by the subsequentrise of industrialemploymentand
governmentfunding.But it is difficultto see, usingWhitley'svariables,how the
naturalsciences could have gotten establishedin the first place (or how eco-
nomics could have acquiredits peculiarconfiguration).Moreover,his modern
sciences seem to be stuckeither at the end of routine"normalscience,"or in a
non-paradigmsituationof permanentuncertainties.Bureaucraticallycentral-
ized fields such as physicshave such powerfulresourcehierarchiesthat,Whit-
ley declares,they are unlikelyto admit the existence of Kuhnian"anomalies,"
let alone succumb to crisis and revolution(p. 129). At the other end, 'frag-
mented adhocracies"like sociology and politicalscience are too embeddedin
commonsense lay standardsof reference,have too many vested interests in
decentralizedpower, and have too pluralisticaudiences ever to acquire any
theoreticalintegration(pp. 143, 187). Maybe"scientificrevolutions"are more
possible in some of the intermediatetypes of organization,but if so it remains
for someone else to tease this out of Whitley'sscheme.

I suspect the necessaryrevisionin the theorywill have to go to a deeper level.

Consider the feedback loops that I proposed above:the attainmentof a for-
malized, self-enclosed field furtherreinforcesdependence on the group; or
conversely,theoreticaldiversityand local autonomyreinforcesstrategicuncer-
tainty.If we look at Figure 1 closely,we can see that at least some of the condi-
tions thatWhitleylists as "context"are also presenton the side of "outcomes:"
work control by personal patronage,for example, or multiple prestige hier-
archies.(In Figure 2, I present a revised schematicversion that stresses this
feedback.)That means the numberof genuinelyexogenousconditions,factors
that can interveneautonomouslyto affect the uncertaintyand dependence of

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 Figure 2.
Context

* pragmatic success
of past intellectual - *
empirical disc
models

personal patronage

lay influence

variety of funding sources

multiple prestige hierarchies

abundant resources functional dependence

concentrated means of
intellectual production
and dissemination

plural audiences strategic dependence

lay stndards

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298

intellectual work, are relatively few. They come down to the nature of audi-
ences, funding sources, and the abundance and control of material resources.
A theory of scientific revolutions, or of fundamental structural changes in
intellectual fields, will have to work more thoroughly with organizational struc-
tures at these levels - that is, the dynamics of schools, politics, leisure classes,
and the like, which are background resources for the internal networks of intel-
lectuals. (I would add that the sheer number of intellectuals competing in a
field also has a powerful effect.)

The other feature that Whitley omits is on the cognitive level. Technical task
uncertainty is one of the fulcrums of the system. But it is hard to believe that
this is affected by no other autonomous condition than the extent to which lay-
persons influence choice of problems and standards. Doesn't the nature of
existing knowledge itself determine the amount of uncertainty about the out-
comes of a research project? If I have a workable theory or a well-established
technique, I can be confident that some new application will yield good results;
if no one has had any success at some topic, then my payoffs are likely to be
iffy too. This is the "puzzle-solving" capacity of paradigms, an aspect of
Kuhnian theory that has tended to be ignored in our drive to an omni-con-
structivism. But this may be the most crucial feedback link of all. (I have added
this as an additional loop in Figure 2, marked by *.) The past history of a field
gives it intellectual resources (or lack of resources), that in turn affect its social
structure, via the organizational variables that Whitley spells out.

This additional factor helps explain something about Whitley's "anomalous"

case of economics. Somehow (I don't think it came about from the causal
conditions Whitley has listed to the left of "strategic task uncertainty") Anglo-
American economics achieved a great deal of theoretical consensus. But the
neo-classical theory, despites its elegance and its mathematical formalization,
is not very successful empirically; it is more like a construction of pure mathe-
matics (and pure ideologies) than a fruitful research paradigm in the Kuhnian
sense. In old-fashioned language, it doesn't capture much of the real world. In
their everyday predictions and policy advice, economists have to fall back on
empirical extrapolations and ad hoc assumptions, and hence don't put up
much of a united front, for all their consensus of fundamental theory. Stepping
back from the spectacle of economics to the issues it raises for the sociology of
science, I would urge we need to attend also to (1) the intellectual history that
led up to a theory becoming accepted and (2) whether that theory raises or
lowers the level of uncertainty in actual research findings. Knowledge itself has
to become part of the sociological explanation.

Whitley is more inclined toward organizational theory than most sociologists

of science working today. This is one field that has been heavily influenced by
ethnomethodology, and hence we have a good many close observational
studies of exactly what scientists do in laboratories, how they write up their

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 299

results,and how they conversewith one another.Whitleydoes not adopt such

a microfocus, nor does he use the rhetoricof discourseand the explicitreflex-
ivity that has been made prominentby Mulkay,Knorr,Latour,Woolgar,and
others.But he does share with them the programof absolute social construc-
tion, in whichideas are treatedas nothingmore thanvehicles for actors'reali-
ty-construction.Whitleyin effect denies that ideas can vary in their succesful-
ness for findingpatternsin the materialworld,or for practicalactionto change
that world. Reintroducingthis intellectualelement into the theory is at least
partof whatit needs to makeit dynamic,capableof accountingfor intellectual
change.

RandallCollins
Universityof California,Riverside

William J. McGrath, Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of

Hysteria, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Jean-Paul Sartre,
The Freud Scenario, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

It is approachinga century since the seminal works of psychoanalysis- The

Interpretationof Dreams,the ThreeEssays,the first attemptsto explainjokes,
slips, works of art, and neurotic symptoms as analogous to dreams - were
published.In thattime, psychoanalysishas gone througha series of intellectual
upheavals- e.g. ego psychology,object relations,the mother-infantrelation-
ship, and contemporarytheories of cultureand symbolism.Never restrictedto
medicine, its thought is alive in every intellectualdiscipline concerned with
humanaction.Yet, the fundamentalnatureof the theory is still in dispute and
its place withinthe historyof thoughtopen.

These two worksmay help elucidate the difficultyinvolvedin writingthe his-

tory of psychoanalysis.Freud'sDiscoveryattempts to trace in Freud'sinner
emotionaland intellectuallife, as well as in Austrianpoliticaland culturalhis-
tory, the roots of psychoanalysis.It draws creativelyupon previouslyunpub-
lished and little utilized sources, such as Freud'sfamilyBible and high school
records. No previous student had had the benefit of McGrath'sprodigous
knowledgeof late nineteenth-centuryAustria.McGrath,however,fails to cap-
tureFreudas a personor the basis content of the theory,i.e. the concept of the
unconscious.

Sartre'sscenario,by contrast,commissionedin 1958 for a filmby John Huston

(never made on the basis of this scenario),is mostly based on Ernest Jones's
biography,Freud's correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, and Freud's pub-
lished writings.It makes no pretense at objectivity and rearrangesfactual
detailsin accordwith cinematicand dramaticconventions.But, throughan act
of imagination,Sartregives us one of the best portraitsof the man, and of the

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