NIBC2019 Presentation - Tapestry Inc

“Luxury will be always
around, no matter what

happens in the world.”
~Carolina Herrera
Advisory Team
Mark Brophy
Phone : (709) - 699 - 0195
Email : mark.brophy@mail.utoronto.ca
Jordan Li
Phone : (647) - 524 - 1447
Email : jordan.li@mail.utoronto.ca
Jennifer Li
NYSE: TPR Phone : (647) - 821 - 9924
New York, NY Email : xxje.li@mail.utoronto.ca
United States Srishti Singh

Phone : (647) - 770 - 5686
Email : srishti.singh@mail.utoronto.ca
Strategic Committee Assessment

Tapestry Inc. February 5th, 2019
SOURCES : TAPESTRY 2018 Financial Statements, Bloomberg, Thomson ONE Reuters, FactSet, NIBC 2018 1
TEAM PROFILE
Mark Jordan Jennifer Srishti

Brophy Li Li Singh
Mark is currently in his fourth year at Jordan is currently in his fourth year Jennifer is currently in her third year Srishti is currently in her second year
the University of Toronto, at the University of Toronto, at the University of Toronto, at the University of Toronto
specializing in finance and majoring specializing in finance and majoring specializing in finance and majoring specializing in financial economics,
in economics. He will be joining in economics. He will be joining in economics. She actively competes alongside a minor in mathematics
Scotiabank in Calgary as an BlackRock in Toronto as an in case competitions across Canada and statistics. She most recently
Investment Banking Analyst within incoming Full-Time Analyst under including: the Bank of Canada’s completed an internship at Empire
the Energy group. Mark also the Institutional Client Business Governor’s Challenge and University Life Insurance & Investments
previously interned as a Summer group. Jordan also previously of Waterloo’s Stock Pitch Challenge. alongside the Operations &
Analyst at Scotiabank and Deloitte. interned at BlackRock in New York On campus, Jennifer is currently an Analytics team. On campus, Srishti is
On campus, Mark is the Co- in the Fundamental Active Equities Associate at Gordon Investment currently an Associate at Gordon
President of Gordon Investment group. On campus, Jordan is the Research. Investment Research.
Research. Co-president of Gordon Investment
Research.
mark.brophy@mail.utoronto.ca jordan.li@mail.utoronto.ca xxje.li@mail.utoronto.ca srishti.singh@mail.utoronto.ca

(709) – 699 – 0195 (647) – 524 – 1447 (647) – 821 – 9924 (647) – 770 – 5686
Toronto, Canada Toronto, Canada Toronto, Canada Toronto, Canada
Education Education Education Education

• University of Toronto • University of Toronto • University of Toronto • University of Toronto
(B.Com Finance and Economics) (B.Com Finance and Economics) (B.Com Finance and Economics) (B.Sc Financial Economics)
Expected Graduation (2019) Expected Graduation (2019) Expected Graduation (2020) Expected Graduation (2021)
Key Experiences Key Experiences Key Experiences Key Experiences

• Scotiabank GBM • BlackRock • UW 2018 Stock Pitch Competition • Empire Life Insurance & Investments
(Incoming Analyst, Calgary) (Incoming Analyst, Toronto) (Semi-Finalist, Waterloo) (Summer Analyst, Toronto)
• Deloitte LLP • BlackRock • Gordon Investment Research • Gordon Investment Research
(Summer Analyst, Toronto) (Summer Analyst, New York) (Associate, Toronto) (Associate, Toronto)
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Company Over view Va l u a t i o n C o n t i n u e d …
Company Overview 6 Valuation Analysis 20
Business Model and Objectives 7 Comparables Overview 21
Operating Forecast 8 Precedents Overview 22
Capital Structure 9 DCF Overview 23
Shareholder Ownership 10 LBO Overview 24
Industry Overview Strategic Advisor y

Industry Overview 12 Recommendation Summary 26
Key Industry Trends 13 Recommendation I: Debt Issuance & Share Repurchases 27
Supply Chain & Distribution Analysis 14 Recommendation II: MCM Worldwide Acquisition 28
Competitive Landscape 15 Recommendation III: Salvatore Ferragamo Acquisition 29
Competitor Industry Merger Activity 16 Industry Corporate Finance Activity 30
Va l u a t i o n Appendix
Historical Share Price 18 Team Overview 32
Valuation Football Field 19 Additional Information 36
Executive Summary
• Tapestry, Inc. (TPR:NYSE) is an American fashion conglomerate that engages in the provision of luxury
accessories and lifestyle brands with rights to the brands Coach, Kate Spade and Stuart Weitzman.
Company • Tapestry operates through retail, internet and wholesale, globally. Growth is forecasted to be driven by
Overview •
geographic & portfolio expansion and synergies from strategic acquisitions.
We anticipate sales to grow at a 3.9% CAGR over the projection period from modest store growth and a
higher average unit retail price.
• Tapestry operates in the Luxury Fashion industry which has experienced intense competition over the past
few years. The industry adopted expansion in emerging markets and diversification in product offerings.
Industry • Within the past decade, there has been a noticeable trend throughout the industry, tapping into emerging
Overview •
market expansion, shift of demographic focus to millennials, and a transition towards e-commerce channels.
The Luxury fashion industry witnessed a consolidation trend in the past decade with luxury brands looking
for accretive transactions to boost market presence and expansion strategies.
• Tapestry’s stock has fell ~30% over the past year and is current trading at 9.0x EBITDA, a discount to Luxury
& Retail segment averages.
Valuation • Market-based valuation methodologies suggest Tapestry is slightly undervalued relative to its closest peer
comparable companies and past transactions.
• A discounted cash flow analysis indicates meaningful upside potential from Tapestry’s strong free cash flow
generation capabilities.
• Given Tapestry’s current financial and operational positioning, Gordon Investment Research has concluded
with three strategic recommendations to enhance shareholder value:
Corporate 1. Issue an additional $500m (USD) of senior unsecured debt maturing in 10 years to repurchase equity.
2. Acquire MCM Worldwide to strengthen presence in Asian market, grow in Emerging Markets, diversify
Advisory consumer mix through Millennials, and maintain management expertise of leather bag segment.
3. Acquire Salvatore Ferragamo to strengthen positioning among Asian consumers, target male
consumers to diversify consumer mix and achieve cost synergies for the footwear business.
C O M PA N Y O V E R V I E W
Company Overview
Tapestry, Inc. (TPR:NYSE) is an American holding company that engages in the provision of luxury accessories
and lifestyle brands with rights to the brands Coach, Kate Spade and Stuart Weitzman.
Highlights 52 Week Share Performance*

*Share Price indexed as of 22nd January, 2019
- History: Founded as Coach in 1941 out of a family-run workshop in Manhattan by Dawn Hughes and is
headquartered in New York, NY.
TPR-US S&P500
- Valuation: Given attractive international and margin expansion opportunities, TPR improved in most
valuations over 2018. Kate Spade also garnered a bullish outlook for the long-term. 125
- Strategy: Began as Coach, it proceeded on to operate under the TPR name globally with 3 brands
under its holding company, through channels including licensing and wholesale. TPR has also 115
incorporated data analytics and ecommerce to enhance efficiency and improve retail experience.
105
- Execution: TPR is committed to deliver strong revenue and operating income growth in FY2019 and
FY2020 with focuses on brand innovations and global growth. 95
- Industry: The Luxury Fashion Industry has faced a consolidation trend over the past few years with the
transition into the new Millennial market driving sales significantly. 85
- Competition: Faceing competition against fashion conglomerates such as LVMH, Kering, Michael Kors,
75
Ralph Lauren and one-off brands.
- Corporate Finance Transactions: Coach acquired Stuart Weitzman in 2015 for $574M and Kate Spade in 65
2017 for $2.4B, aiming for diversification through these acquisitions and gaining market share. Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 Jan-19
- Ownership: Vanguard Group (10.24%), T. Rowe Price (9.93%), BlackRock (5.29%) Source: Bloomberg
Key Management Revenue Mix (2018) | % | Gross ($M) Trading Statistics

Management brings experience, creativity Coach 72 $4,222 52-Week Price Range (US$) $32.30 - $54.64
and vision to the company. Kate Spade 22 $1,285 Price ( January 31st, 2019 ) $38.71
Stuart Weitzman 6 $374
Key Valuation Statistics ($M)
8.4% Coach 6.4%
Enterprise Value $11,239 Revenue (FY18) $5,880
21.8%
Market Cap $10,534 EBITDA (FY18) $1,252
2017 Kate Spade 2018
LTM P/E* 19.6x EBITDA Margin 21.3%
Victor Luis Todd Kahn Kevin Wills*
71.8% LTM EV/EBITDA* 8.8x Net Debt/Total Equity 10.81%
91.6% Stuart
CEO President CFO Weitzman Cash $904.7 Total Debt $1,601
*Kevin Wills announced his departure Source: FactSet Source: FactSet
Business Model and Objectives
Tapestry’s brand portfolio of Coach, Kate Spade and Stuart Weitzman operate through retail, internet and
wholesale, globally. Growth is forecasted to be driven by expansion and synergies from strategic acquisitions.
Revenue Drivers Cost Drivers
Overall cost structure is controlled compared to peers and the shift towards online
shopping might impact the inventory costs as store traffic declines.
• Purchases – ( 32.5% ) TPR does a major part of its sourcing overseas for lower
prices and maintains long-standing relationship with its vendors
• Selling, General and Administrative – ( 50.6%) TPR includes all costs relating to
distribution, product development, advertising and marketing under this category.
Coach : Coach has experienced stronger sales growth since FY2017 but has also been Integration and Acquisition Costs – Tapestry’s most recent transaction of Kate Spade
pressured by increasing competition and technology integration. was supplemented with certain charges associated with inventory, payments etc. The
company estimated to incur approximately $50M in FY2019E.
Kate Spade : Since acquisition, Kate Spade realized expanded margins due to
synergies, and ecommerce growth saw acceleration as well. Foreign Exchange Changes – Due to the global sourcing and distribution, FX rates
impact the retail prices as well as the supply costs for TPR, resulting in a decreased
Stuart Weitzman : Revenues growth declined due to supply chain disruption but is consumer demand.
expected to improve from the slowdown as the distribution gets back on track.
(Million USD) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E
Coach 4,192 4,147 4,114 4,222 4,348 4,457 4,568 4,673 4,771
Coach Revenue Growth - (1.1%) (0.8%) 2.6% 3.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1%
Kate Spade - - - 1,285 1,445 1,619 1,797 1,967 2,115
Kate Spade Revenue Growth - - - - 12.5% 12.0% 11.0% 9.5% 7.5%
Stuart Weitzman - 345 374 374 385 416 443 465 484
Stuart Weitzman Revenue Growth - - 8.4% 0.1% 3.0% 8.0% 6.5% 5.0% 4.0%
Total Revenue 4,192 4,492 4,488 5,880 6,178 6,491 6,808 7,106 7,370
Revenue Growth - 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 3.7%
Operating Income 618 654 787 671 905 1,092 1,225 1,318 1,384
Operating Forecast
Operating Cash Flows Summary Global Store Build by Brand
Coach Kate Spade Stuart Weitzman
1,014 965 962 987 973 973
⎻ We anticipate revenue growth to be in the mid-single digits in the near term resulting 954
1000
from international expansion, increased AURs, greater brand recognition, and product
diversification into Men’s segment.
⎻ We expect EBIT margins to improve over the coming years from the Kate Spade 500 407 431
acquisition synergies, enhanced operational efficiency with Kate Spade and Stuart 342
245 251 267 274
Weitzman, and a slight portfolio shift to higher margins products. 132 146
54 75 81 103
0
0
DCF Su mmary - Operati n g Cash f l ows
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
C a shflow For e ca st
* All dolla r a mounts in millions 2 0 16 2 0 17 2 0 18 2 0 19 E 2 0 2 0 E 2 0 2 1E 2 0 2 2 E 2 0 2 3 E Geographical Revenue
Coach revenues 4,147 4,115 4,222 4,348 4,457 4,568 4,673 4,771
Kate Spade revenues - - 1,285 1,445 1,619 1,797 1,967 2,115 $6,000 United States Japan Greater China Other
Stuart Weizman revenues 345 374 374 385 416 443 465 484
T ota l Re ve nue s 4,49 2 4,48 8 5 ,8 8 0 6 ,17 8 6 ,49 1 6 ,8 0 8 7 ,10 6 7 ,3 7 0
Revenue growth 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 3.7% $4,000
Billions USD
Coach COGS (1,298) (1,260) (1,290) (1,326) (1,350) (1,375) (1,402) (1,431)
Kate Spade COGS - - (574) (542) (567) (602) (639) (679)
Stuart Weizman COGS (142) (148) (163) (173) (183) (193) (200) (206) $2,000
T ota l C OGS (1,441) (1,40 7 ) (2 ,0 2 6 ) (2 ,0 41) (2 ,10 0 ) (2 ,17 0 ) (2 ,2 41) (2 ,3 16 )
Coach SG&A (1,825) (1,815) (1,847) (1,900) (1,908) (1,951) (1,986) (2,028)
Kate Spade SG&A - - (773) (759) (809) (853) (925) (986) $0
Stuart Weizman SG&A (170) (211) (214) (215) (212) (221) (230) (237) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: TPR Financial Statements
Corporate SG&A (403) (268) (349) (358) (370) (388) (405) (420)
T ota l S G& A
Coach EBIT
(2 ,3 9 8 ) (2 ,2 9 4) (3 ,18 3 ) (3 ,2 3 2 )
1,024 1,040 1,084 1,122
(3 ,2 9 9 ) (3 ,414) (3 ,5 46 ) (3 ,6 7 1)
1,199 1,243 1,285 1,312
Total EBITDA & Margin
Kate Spade EBIT - - (62) 145 243 341 403 451 EBITDA EBITDA Margin
Stuart Weizman EBIT 33 16 (3) (3) 21 29 35 41 $3,000 30%
25% 25% 26% 26% 26%
Corporate SG&A (403) (268) (349) (358) (370) (388) (405) (420) 23% 22% 24% 23% 24%
T ota l E BI T 654 787 671 905 1,0 9 2 1,2 2 5 1,3 18 1,3 8 4 $2,500 21% 25%
20% 2,024 2,072
1,859 1,949
EBIT growth 5.7% 20.5% (14.8%) 34.9% 20.7% 12.1% 7.6% 5.0% $2,000 1,664 1,784 20%
EBIT margin 14.5% 17.5% 11.4% 14.6% 16.8% 18.0% 18.6% 18.8% 1,504
$1,500 1,297 15%
Add: Total D&A 211 213 260 278 292 313 334 339 1,147
964 978 1,086
Add: Stock-based compensation 96 77 81 114 120 126 131 136 $1,000 10%
Add: Integration and restructuring activities 18 9 135 - - - - -
E BI T D A 9 7 8 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,2 9 7 1,5 0 4 1,6 6 4 1,7 8 4 1,8 5 9 $500 5%
EBITDA growth 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 13.1% 16.0% 10.6% 7.2% 4.2%
EBITDA margin 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.0% 23.2% 24.4% 25.1% 25.2%
Capital Structure and Liquidity
Tapestry primarily funds its operations through common equity and has access to debt financing at low rates.
Capital Structure Liquidity Analysis
⎼ Tapestry has a debt-to-equity ratio of ~0.14, closely inline with the

average of its closest comparable companies.
Tapestry Inc. Trading Volume
⎼ Tapestry has access to debt financing at attractive rates offering a cheap
source of capital. 25,000,000
⎼ The company has access to a $900 MM revolving credit facility provided 20,000,000
by a syndicate of banks with maturity in May of 2022.
15,000,000
Capital Structure Overview 10,000,000
Capital Structure 5,000,000

Total Capital Leases 7
0
Market Cap 11,282
Mar-16
Sep-16
Mar-17
Sep-17
Mar-18
Sep-18
Jun-16
Dec-15
Jun-17
Dec-16
Jun-18
Dec-17
Dec-18
Total Debt 1,600
Debt Breakdown Volume SMAVG (15)

TPR 4 ⅛ 07/15/27 600 Source: Bloomberg
TPR 4 ¼ 04/01/25 600

Liquidity Ratios FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018
TPR 3 07/15/22 400
Current Ratio 2.28 3.00 2.63 5.24 2.59
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000
Quick Ratio 1.63 2.42 2.07 4.62 1.87
Available Credit Facilities
Cash Ratio 1.07 1.83 1.60 4.09 1.33
Amount Drawn 36
Cash & ST Inv/Current Assets 46.82% 60.87% 60.72% 78.00% 51.39%
Amount Available 900
CFO/Current Liabilities 121.29% 112.30% 91.76% 113.27% 106.24%
$0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 Source: FactSet
Shareholder Ownership
Given the lack of shareholder activists, dispersion in shareholder concentration and the high percentage of
shares held by traditional institutional advisors, the chances of a challenge to strategic opportunities are low.
Commentary Investor Type
⎻ Gross Common Share Count: 289,796,000
⎻ Top 15 Institutional Holders represent ~48.98% of total outstanding shares Inst. Ownership (92.44%)
⎻ Largest institutional shareholders include – (%OS / Activism Level): SHARES OS

 The Vanguard Group, Inc. – 10.24% / Very Low 289,796,000 Insider Ownership (0.20%)
 T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. – 9.93% / Medium
 BlackRock Fund Advisors – 5.29% / Low Unknown (7.36%)
 SSgA Funds Management, Inc. – 4.23% / Very Low
 SunAmerica Asset Management LLC – 3.87% / Very Low
SHORT FLOAT INSTITUTIONAL
 Wellington Management Co. LLP – 2.55% / Very Low INTEREST 99.8% OWNERSHIP
 American Century Investment Management – 2.47% / Very Low 2.0 DAYS / 2.3% FLOAT 92.6% OF FLOAT
 Renaissance Technologies LLC – 1.70% / Very Low

 Fidelity Management & Research Co. – 1.59% / Very Low
Investor Style
 Columbia Management Investment Advisers – 1.42% / Low
Fund of Funds Manager 0.12%
– Top 5 Insider ownership represents approximately ~0.13% of total shares Individual 0.20%
outstanding Broker 0.55%
 Victor Luis – 0.05% Bank Investment Division 0.55%
 Olajide James Zeitlin – 0.03% Sovereign Wealth Manager 1.07%
Private Banking/Wealth Mgmt 2.46%
 Ian M Bickley – 0.02%
Pension Fund Manager 3.98%
 Todd Kahn– 0.02% Hedge Fund Manager 7.78%
 Ivan M Menezes – 0.02% Investment Adviser 34.36%
Mutual Fund Manager 41.46%
Source: FactSet 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

% of Outstanding Shares
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Industry Overview
Tapestry operates in the Luxury Fashion industry which has experienced intense competition over the past few
years. The industry adopted expansion in emerging markets and diversification in product offerings.
Revenue by Segment Accessories dominate in mix of products Revenue by Major Segment

Accessories $118bn
• The industry generated majority of revenue from the
4.2%
Accessories (Handbags etc.) segment, followed by
11.1% Apparel $75bn
Apparels – comprising of ~1/3rd of total revenue.
Accessories • Major industry players diversify into Apparels and
Beauty $52bn
Beauty to expand growth horizons.
Apparel FY17 • The industry growth has been under pressure due to
Beauty
18.0% Total Revenue 40.8% high levels of external competition from e-commerce
Hard Luxury $32bn
$289bn and affordable retailers. Other $12bn
Hard Luxury • Consumer discretionary income is a large determinant
of demand for each of the segments within the Total Revenue $289bn
Other industry.
26.0%
• There has been a transition in the demographics of 5-yr revenue growth 4.7%
the customer profile, with a growing demand coming
from Millennials and younger consumers. Industry Characteristics
Source: Bain & Co.
China Leads the Emerging Market Potential Total Debt/EBITDA 2.9x

Revenue by Region EBITDA/Interest Expense 8.3x
• A large portion of demand growth is being derived
Europe from the Chinese consumers; other Asian countries Average EBITDA Margin 7.7%
have also seen growth in the industry space.
Americas • Developed markets such as Europe and Americas still Quick Ratio 1.4x
remain the majority portion of sales, but are strongly
Rest of Asia EV/Revenue 2.0x
driven by Asian tourists.
Japan • Luxury products remain in high demand, and e-
commerce opportunities in China can spur further EV/EBITDA 12.8x
China potential growth in the market for the fashion industry.
• Sourcing from countries like Philippines and Thailand Global Industry
Other to achieve economies of scale has helped improve
and expand distribution beyond the Americas and Total revenue 3-yr CAGR 8.1%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Europe, driving further margin expansions.
Source: Bain & Co.
5-yr revenue growth 4.4%
Key Industry Trends
Tapping Into the Emerging Markets Millennials & Gen Zs
$287B $362-412B
RoW 7% RoW 6%
Broad-based trends – China Millennials
Japanese 10% Japanese 8%
• Given the robust growth of the
& Gen Z Total Growth
Other Asian 11%
Other Asian 10%
global economy driven by Earlier ~ +130% 17-25E
European 14% emerging markets (China & Earlier
Generation $73B ~ $125B
European 18% India) over the course of the
American 17%
Generation
~ -30%
past few years, various
American 22% European and American - ~30%
fashion companies place
substantial weight on the There is an anticipated $73 billion to $125 billion USD growth between 2017 and
Chinese 46% •
Chinese 32%
consumers in these regions. 2025, primarily driven by a 130% increase from the younger customers –
generation Z and Millennials – while older customers are expected to be a -30%
• Many players (such as Coach), drag on growth for the personal luxury goods market.
in the high-end handbags and
Luxury Goods Luxury Goods
accessories segments locate
Consumption by Consumption by
their manufacturing factories
Nationality 2017 Nationality 2025E in emerging economies given E-commerce Opportunities
the cost-saving benefits.
$287B $362-412B The Fastest Growing Reshaping the Mission
• Uncertainties elevated for
RoW 7% RoW 5% Distribution Model for Traditional
Japan 7%
discretionary consumption in
Japan 8%
Asia amid the trade tension
Luxury Channels
M.China 8% • Online channels are Fashion
Rest of Asia 16% between U.S. and China.
gaining market share Online Physical stores are
Rest of Asia 18% Channel
•
against the brick- seeking ways to
M.China 22% • With a depreciating Yuan,
and-mortar stores distinguish
luxury goods overseas will be
Americas 32% (e.g. 86% growth for themselves through
more expensive for Chinese
Gucci’s sales). Airport Duty Free &
Europe 25% shoppers, possibly causing a
2017 Factory Stores.
decline in the international ~$26B USD
• The ongoing
demand in FY2019 (Yuan has
Europe 33% technological Global luxury new
Americas 25% dropped by 6.32% - LTM). •
innovation will keep 2018E store openings have
reinforcing ~$29B USD shrunk by 65%
Luxury Goods Luxury Goods consumers’ shopping through 2012 to 2018
Consumption by Consumption by experience. (~1000 openings VS
2025E
Regions 2017 Regions 2025E ~350 openings)
~$99B USD
Source: Bain & Co. Source: Bloomberg
Supply Chain & Distribution Analysis
Primary links within the Luxury Fashion supply chain include the procurement of raw materials, manufacturing
and distribution; Tapestry maintains control throughout the entire global supply chain process.
Initial Phase Mid-Chain End Consumer Channels
Distribution
Manufacturing 100%
80%
60%
Raw Material & Sourcing • Key raw materials include: leather, cotton, resin 40%
and synthetic rubber
20%
• Luxury fashion industry continues to see a shift
• Handbag and accessories primarily utilize towards outsourcing to independent 0%
leather and cotton; both declined 29.0% and manufacturers
11.4% respectively in the last 52 weeks • Luxury Fashion manufacturers are primarily Online Store Off-price Store
• Gold and Silver are primary inputs for jewelry located in Asia for less expensive industry Department Store Speciality Store
and hard luxury segments products
Monobrand Store
Tapestry Inc.’s Key Supplier and Customers
Suppliers Customers
• Alibaba Group Holdings SG&A: 1.15% • Macy’s Inc. REV: 1.49%

• JS Corp/KR COGS: 0.80% • Nordstrom Inc. REV: 1.09%
• PTC Inc. SG&A: 0.27% • LVMH REV: 0.63%
• Compass Group PLC COGS: 0.23% • Koninklijke Ahold REV: 0.58%
• Oracle Corp COGS: 0.13% • DSW Inc. REV: 0.38%
Source: Bloomberg
Competitive Landscape
2 Year Performance Financial Stats Company Overview Geography
190 − Created by merging the
165 fashion brand Louis Vuitton
Ticker: LVMH-IT and wine manufacturer Asia 37%
140
Stock Price: $296.77 USD Moët Hennessy in 1987
115
Market Cap: $149,932 M − Focuses on organic growth Europe 28%
90 FY19E Revenue: $57,546 M by investing and heavily
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 FY19E EBITDA: $15,092 M diversifies its offering to Americas 23%
stabilize profits and return
SPGLGUP Index (USD) MC FP Equity for shareholders
250
− Global luxury group
founded as a timber
210
Ticker: KER company in 1963 by Asia 40%
170
Stock Price: $478.13 USD Francois Pinault
130 Market Cap: $60,380 M − The company has strength Europe 35%
90 FY18E Revenue: $15,466 M on trendsetting fashion
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 FY18E EBITDA: $5,007 M concepts and unique theme Americas 19%
− Emphasizes on e-
SPGLGUP Index (USD) KER FP Equity
ecommerce (e.g. GucciApp)
180 − A high-end fashion

150 corporation founded in
Ticker: CPRI 1990 by Michael Kors and Americas 64%
120
Stock Price: $42.70 USD remerged in 2003
90 Market Cap: $6,414 M − The company has been Europe 23%
60 FY19E Revenue: $5,156 M innovating its products with
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 FY19E EBITDA: $1,148 M trend-leading fashion style Asia 13%
and penetrating into Asia
SPGLGUP Index (USD) CPRI US Equity
170
− Founded in 1967 by Ralph
145 Lauren as a premium
120
Ticker: RL channel focused on men’s Americas 56%
Stock Price: $115.69 USD ties in New York City
95 Market Cap: $9,342 M − Heavy investment in e- Europe 40%
70 FY19E Revenue: $6,212 M commerce platform as a
FY19E EBITDA: $976 M Asia 3%
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 strategic shift from
conventional stores
SPGLGUP Index (USD) RL US Equity
Competitor Industry Merger Activity
The Luxury fashion industry witnessed a consolidation trend in the past decade with luxury brands looking for
accretive transactions to boost market presence and expansion strategies.
Timeline of Deals & Events
Carlyle Group Dominion Diamond Luxottica LVMH acquires Michael Kors

LVMH acquires Kering acquires
takes control of sells Harry Winston merges with remaining interest in acquires Jimmy
Bulgari ($2.93B) Brioni ($817.2M)
Moncler ($631M) to Swatch ($1B) Essilor ($17.3B) Christian Dior ($10.6B) Choo ($1.39B)
2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2017 2018
PVH buys remaining PVH acquires Permira sells Michael Kors

interest in Tommy remaining interest in Hugo Boss successfully bids
Hilfiger ($3.2B) Calvin Klein ($3.61B) ($547.9M) for Versace (2.2B)
Blackstone buys JACK Tapestry acquires Stuart Tapestry acquires Kate

WOLFSKIN ($1.01B) Weitzman ($573.8M) Spade ($2.78B)
Drivers of M&A Activity
Quality companies with attractive brands have engaged in acquisitions to increase their global presence. Acquisition
Acquisition for Expansion activities in emerging markets (such as China and Japan) are also viewed as improving presence in such areas.
The M&A transactions have allowed companies to enter into diverse product categories such as footwear,
accessories etc. which enables them to gain market share and grow retail presence.
Consolidation to Diversify
The acquisition of manufacturers and distribution channels help companies to attain economies of scale, improve
Acquisition for Efficiency
efficiencies and control over the processes of operations.
VA L UAT I O N
Historical Share Price
TPR has become one of the major players in the luxury fashion market through brand improvement and has
experienced variations in share price in the past 5 years due to external and internal factors.
Share Price Performance

$60.00
May 1, 2018: Reported 3Q18 results,
Aug 14, 2018: Reported
highlighting execution issues with Stuart
4Q18 EPS beat of $0.60 vs.
Weitzman that are expected to continue into
Consensus $0.57. 124bps
2019
$55.00 gross margin expansion
Aug 15, 2017: Reported
4Q17 results with 150bps
Apr 28, 2015: Reported
gross margin deterioration
3Q15 EPS of $0.32, a 53%
$50.00 Y/Y decrease Nov 6th, 2018:
CFO Kevin Wills
Dec 16, 2016: Announced announces
Selena Gomez as the new departure from
$45.00 face of the Coach brand company
Sep 20, 2018:

Announced Michael
$40.00 B. Jordan as the
Global Men's Face
of Coach
Feb 6, 2018:
$35.00 Reported 2Q18
EPS beat of $1.07
vs. consensus of
Jan 6, 2015: May 8, 2017: $0.87
$30.00 Announced Announced the Oct 30, 2018:
acquisition of acquisition of Reported 1Q19 EPS
Jan 26, 2016: Reported
Stuart Weitzman Kate Spade New beat of $0.48 vs
2Q16 sales of $1.27B, a 7%
for $574MM York for $2.4B consensus of $0.45
Y/Y increase (c.c)
$25.00
Jan-15 Apr-15 Jul-15 Oct-15 Jan-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Oct-16 Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19
Valuation Football Field
Market-based valuations indicate Tapestry is slightly undervalued relative to its comparable companies and
transactions, whereas DCF analysis and analysts’ target prices show substantial equity appreciation potential.
Current: Target:
$38.71 $44.50
Precedent Transactions
LTM EV / EBITDA
LTM EV / Revenue
Public Comparables
NTM EV / EBITDA
NTM EV / Revenue
Min to 25th Percentile
25th Percentile to Median
Discounted Cash Flow Median to 75th Percentile

Perpetuity Growth Method
75th Percentile to Max
Exit Multiple Method
Analysts’Analyst
Target Price
Target Price
52-Week Trading Range

52-Week Range
$15.00 $25.00 $35.00 $45.00 $55.00 $65.00 $75.00

Implied Share Price
Valuation Analysis
Valuation Overview Historical Share Price
⎻ Tapestry shares are down ~30% since April 2018 as a result of Tapestry is currently trading at $38.71
management changes, supply disruptions at Stuart Weitzman, and a
$60.00 $3,500
broader equity sell-off. TPR S&P 500
⎻ Comparable Companies: Tapestry is fairly valued based on $50.00 $3,000

EV/Revenue and EV/EBITDA multiples of its closest comparable
companies.
$40.00 $2,500
⎻ Precedent Transactions: Tapestry appears to be fairly valued based on
a small universe of comparable transactions. Apr 27, 2018:
$30.00 5-Year High $2,000
⎻ Discounted Cash Flow: Tapestry appears to be significantly
undervalued based on both, the exit multiple and perpetuity growth Sept 25, 2015:
methods. 5-Year Low
$20.00 $1,500
Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19
Historical Valuation Broker Estimates
⎻ A strong majority of analysts have “buy” recommendations for TPR

LTM P/E LTM EV / EBITDA
60.0x 18.0x $75 100%
50.0x 15.0x $60 80%

57% 57% 57% 61% 61%
64% 64% 65% 65% 65% 65% 68%
70% 76%
$45 60%
40.0x 12.0x
EV / EBITDA
$30 40%
30.0x 9.0x
P/E
$15 41% 41% 40% 36% 36% 20%

33% 33% 32% 32% 32% 35%
20.0x 6.0x 32% 30%
24%
$0 0%
10.0x 3.0x
Apr-18
Sep-18
Nov-18
Mar-18
Aug-18
Jan-18
Jan-19
May-18
Jun-18
Oct-18
Dec-18
Feb-18
Feb-19
Jul-18
0.0x 0.0x
Feb-14 Feb-15 Feb-16 Feb-17 Feb-18 Sell Hold Buy 12 Month Price Target Current Price
Source: Bloomberg
DCF Overview
The DCF suggests that there is substantial equity upside as a result of the company’s strong free cash flow
generation potential and access to cheap sources of capital.
75th Percentile to Base Case Rationale
$85.00
Max Revenue CAGR: • Modest store & same store sales growth
Median to 75th 3.9% • Reduction in promotions
$75.00
Percentile • Further integration of Kate Spade
25th Percentile to EBITDA CAGR: • Synergies from Kate Spade
Implied Share Price
$65.00 Operational improvements in Kate Spade segment

Median 7.7% •
Min to 25th Upside Case Rationale

$55.00 Revenue CAGR: Larger contribution from Asian markets
Percentile •
4.7% • High single digit growth in Men’s segment
$45.00 EBITDA CAGR: • Greater Kate spade acquisition synergies
9.0% • Larger improvements in Kate Spade gross margins
DCF Target
$35.00 Downside Case Rationale
Revenue CAGR: • Low single digit growth in Coach & Stuart Weitzman sales
Current Share Price Slowdown in Chinese economy
$25.00 3.0% •
Base Upside Downside Base Upside Downside Less synergies recognized from Kate Spade acquisition
EBITDA CAGR: •
• Longer supply disruption in Stuart Weitzman segment
Exit Multiple Method Perpetuity Growth Method 5.5%
DCF Su mmary - B ase Case Cash f l ow F orecast

* All dolla r a mounts in millions 2 0 14 2 0 15 2 0 16 2 0 17 2 0 18 2 0 19 E 2020E 2 0 2 1E 2022E 2023E 2 0 2 4E 2025E 2026E
Free cash flows to the firm for valuation (FCFF) 779 722 445 532 825 888 932 1,0 2 3 1,0 8 7 1,17 8 1,2 46 1,3 2 8 1,3 8 5
E nte r pr ise V a lue E BI T D A M ultiple E nte r pr ise V a lue Pe r pe tua l Gr ow th WAC C Assumptions
EBITDA multiple 10.2x
Terminal year EBITDA 2,072 Valuation date 31-Jan-19
Revenue muliple 2.1x 10-yr US government bond rate 2.7%
Terminal year Revenue 7,993 Perpetual cashflow growth rate 2.50% Expected market return 11.4%
Present value of terminal value 10,289 Present value of terminal value 8,982 Market risk premium 8.7%
Present value of forecast FCF 6,149 Present value of forecast FCF 6,149 Beta 0.97
E nte r pr ise V a lue 16 ,43 7 E nte r pr ise V a lue 15 ,13 0 C APM C ost of E quity 11.1%
Debt 1,601 Debt 1,601 Cost of debt 4.1%
Cash 905 Cash 905 Tax rate 21.0%
E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 15 ,7 41 E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 14,43 4 Afte r T a x C ost of D e bt 3 .3 %
Shares outstanding 289 Shares outstanding 289 Target gearing 11.5%
Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 4.5 4 Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 0 .0 1 WAC C 10 .2 %
Comparable Companies Overview
Tapestry appears to be trading slightly undervalued relative to its closest comparable companies based on
NTM EV/ EBITDA and NTM EV / Revenue multiples.
16.0x EV / EBITDA
13.6x EV / Revenue
14.0x
EV / EBITDA Average
12.0x 11.1x EV / Revenue Average
11.0x 10.6x 10.4x
10.0x 9.0x
8.5x
7.7x
8.0x
6.4x
6.0x
4.0x 3.5x
2.4x 2.3x 2.3x 2.2x 1.9x
2.0x 1.2x 1.4x
N/A
0.0x
Salvatore Burberry Richemont Kering Prada Tommy Hilfiger Ralph Lauren Michael Kors Tapestry
Ferragamo Corporation
Multiples Implied Share Price ⎻ Tapestry appears to be trading in-line with its closest luxury conglomerate
Minimum Max Minimum Median Maximum peers, at a discount to Luxury Accessories & Apparel segment peers, and at a
significant premium to its closest Upscale brands segment peers.
Luxury Conglomerates
1.4x 3.5x $27.07 $45.79 $69.89 ⎻ Tapestry is currently trading at 9.0x NTM EV/EBITDA and 2.0x EV/Revenue .
NTM EV / Revenue
NTM EV / EBITDA 6.4x 11.0x $22.03 $38.35 $39.58 ⎻ Companies in the Luxury and Retail fashion industry tend to trade at a
premium based on the following characteristics:
Luxury Accessories & Apparel 1. Established Presence in growing Asian markets
NTM EV / Revenue 1.2x 2.4x $21.47 $46.21 $46.79 2. Growing Millennial customer base
NTM EV / EBITDA 10.4x 13.6x $37.31 $40.23 $49.86 3. Ability to shift business models towards e-commerce platforms and
cheaper South Asian distribution channels to fuel higher margin
Upscale Brands premiums
NTM EV / Revenue 1.2x 1.2x $21.47 $22.11 $22.74 4. Maintenance of brand power – effective management of brand portfolios
to minimize revenue cannibalization and capture niche markets
NTM EV / EBITDA 7.7x 8.5x $27.04 $28.69 $30.35
Precedents Overview
Tapestry Inc. appears to be fairly valued based on most relevant precedent transactions within the last 7 years,
using LTM EV/ EBITDA and LTM EV/ Revenue multiples.
Transaction Date Acquirer Target
18.3x
July 25th, 2017
2.7x
April 25th, 2017 7.3x

1.7x
12.1x
January 16th, 2017
2.6x
10.5x
February 10th, 2015
2.3x
NA EV / EBITDA
November 16th, 2012 1.0x EV / Revenue
0.0x 4.0x 8.0x 12.0x 16.0x 20.0x
Drivers of M&A Activity

⎻ The Luxury Goods industry has seen a trend of consolidation over the past decade as luxury conglomerates seek to expand their portfolio of
brands through acquisitions.
⎻ Brands with a solid grasp on the Millennial market, with high margins, or with significant exposure to Asian markets tend to warrant larger
premiums.
⎻ Private Equity firms and other investment management companies have been active in the Luxury Goods space.
LBO Overview
Under the Leveraged Buyout analysis, Tapestry Inc. does not seem to be a probable LBO target, given most
scenarios result in a IRR below the typical 20% threshold required by financial sponsors.
LBO Viability Assumptions & Outputs
⎻ Macro Environment Conditions: Assumption Base Case Optimistic Case

 Rising interest rate environment – The Fed has increased rates 200bps ProForma Leverage 6.0x 7.0x
since 2015 . Interest rates are still near historically low levels. Senior / Junior Interest Rate 5.5% / 8.0% 6.5% / 10.0%
 Financial Sponsor Interest – Private Equity firms have been a key Exit Multiple 10.2x 12.5x
contributor in the M&A activity over the past decade in Luxury Fashion.
Premium Paid 25% 20%
⎻ Attractive Characteristics: Holding Period 6 Years 6 Years
 Efficiency enhancement opportunities – Recent acquisitions of Kate Spade Output Base Case Optimistic Case
and Stuart Weitzman offer opportunities to leverage Coach’s business Internal Rate of Return 17.9% 28.6%
model to optimize these brands’ cost structures.
Sponsor Equity 7,071 5,198
 Low Capital Expenditure Requirements – Capex as a percentage of sales
have been ~5% historically. TPR’s growth international growth strategy Senior / Junior Debt 4,540 / 3,243 5,188 / 3,891
can be funded at these levels.
Significant asset liquidity – TPR has high levels of A/R and inventories that

could used as collateral to secure more favorable financing terms. IRR Sensitivity
 TPR stock is down ~30% over the past year.
Exit Multiple
⎻ Challenges to Potential LBO 9.2x 10.2x 11.2x
 Historical volatility in FCF – From 2014 to 2016, FCF fell 43%. Base Case 15.7% 17.9% 20.0%
 Highly competitive industry – Luxury fashion is highly competitive and Premium: 20% 17.3% 19.6% 21.7%
brands are subject to rapid shifts in consumer tastes. Premium: 30% 14.2% 16.4% 18.4%
 IRR sensitivity analysis shows many cases in which IRR is below the 20% Leverage: 5.0x 14.3% 16.4% 18.2%
threshold typically required from financial sponsors. Leverage: 7.0x 17.5% 20.0% 22.3%
De ta ile d LBO Ca shflow S umma ry

Post-LBO T r a nsa ction
* All dolla r a mounts in millions 2 0 14 2 0 15 2 0 16 2 0 17 2 0 18 2 0 19 E 2020E 2 0 2 1E 2022E 2023E 2 0 2 4E 2025E
Pr ofor ma E BI T D A For e ca st 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,2 9 7 1,5 7 7 1,7 40 1,8 6 4 1,9 42 2 ,0 3 5 2 ,112
EBITDA Margin 31.2% 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.0% 24.2% 25.4% 26.1% 26.2% 26.6% 26.9%
Taxes (341) (209) (166) (168) (199) (176) (138) (176) (209) (237) (271) (300)
Capex (220) (199) (396) (283) (267) (306) (336) (376) (417) (390) (394) (379)
Change in Working Capital (178) 175 (23) (38) 111 87 (7) (7) (2) 0 (1) 6
C a shflow for D e bt S e r vice (post T a x e s, C a pe x , & WC ) 763 731 393 597 792 902 1,0 9 7 1,18 1 1,2 3 6 1,3 15 1,3 6 9 1,440
C O R P O R AT E A D V I S O R Y
Recommendation Summary
Given Tapestry Inc.’s financial and operational profile, the company is recommended to issue additional debt
and repurchase shares, or potentially acquire MCM Worldwide or Salvatore Ferragamo.
Recommendation I Recommendation II Recommendation III
Share Repurchases Acquire MCM Worldwide Acquire Salvatore Ferragamo
Pre Debt Issue

2019E ROE: 19.1%
WACC: 10.2%
z
Post Debt Issue
2019E ROE: 22.3%
WACC: 9.6%
Issue an additional $500m Rationale 1: MCM Worldwide Rationale 1: Salvatore

1 $USD of 10 year senior 1 derives ~70% of their revenue 1 Ferragamo derives ~47% of
unsecured debt from Asian markets revenue from Asian markets
Perform an equity repurchase Rationale 2: MCM Worldwide Rationale 2: The company

2 of common shares to adjust 2 has a focused consumer mix 2 provides a opportunity to tap
capital structure tilted towards millennials into men’s apparel market
Achieve a 320bps increase in Rationale 3: MCM has a strong Rationale 3: The company has
3 ROE & 60bps reduction in 3 e-commerce presence – 3 a product mix with ~42% in the
WACC notably through TMall in China footwear business
Recommendation I: Debt Issuance & Share Repurchase
Tapestry Inc. is recommended to issue $500m of unsecured senior debt maturing in 2029 to raise capital to
repurchase shares – ultimately driving shareholder value creation
Issuer Curve (Spread to Treasury) Post Debt Refinancing Analysis

• We anticipate debt refinancing to improve projected ROE metrics by
250.0 320bps in the near-term and ~100 bps long-run improvement
Return on Equity
225.0 Historical Forecasted
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Spread (BPS)
200.0 Pre Debt Refinancing 19.7% 12.3% 19.1% 21.1% 21.2% 20.3% 19.0% 18.3% 17.2% 15.9%
Post Debt Refinancing 19.7% 12.3% 22.3% 23.8% 23.6% 22.4% 20.8% 19.7% 18.4% 16.9%
175.0 Improvement (bps) 320 273 246 209 173 147 124 101
• Based on TPR’s strong FCF profile and low net debt, we believe new
150.0 debt investors would not demand a meaningful increase in default
spreads leading to a lower WACC and higher implied share price
125.0 based on the perpetuity growth method.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Years to Maturity 10.2% 9.6% $50.01 $52.40
Source: FactSet
WACC Implied Share Price
Long-Term Debt by Maturity Commentary
700 Given Tapestry Inc.’s current credit profile (see Appendix: Credit
600.0 600.0 •
600 Profile), the company is recommended to issue $500M (USD) of senior
500.0 unsecured debt maturing in 10 years to repurchase equity.
500
($USD Millions)
400.0
400 • From the corporate bond Issuer Curve, Tapestry is observed to require
a lower premium for longer dated securities based on the spread to
300 treasury at ~240 bps.
200
• Corporate debt issued at 10 years provides approximately 3 years for
100
11.4 debt repayment; which is highly serviceable with a FY18 FCF of $690
0 million and a projected 9.3% FCF CAGR from 2018 to 2026.
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Recommendation II: Acquisition of MCM Worldwide
• MCM derives 70% of its sales from Asia Pacific with the
Rationale I: strongest presence in China. This acquisition would result
in a higher penetration into the Chinese market for TPR
Asian Markets and will be able to bank upon existing consumer base of
MCM.
• The company has acknowledged the importance of

Rationale II: millennials in the luxury industry and appeals to the
younger demographics through its “New School” line. For
Millennials TPR, MCM’s acquisition would mean taking advantage of
MCM’s popularity among millennials.
Company Overview
• MCM Worldwide was founded by Michael
Cromer in Munich, Germany (1976), and was
MCM operated through TMall.com in China, given its large
Rationale III:
•
acquired by a South Korean fashion group,
presence in the country and through its website in some
known as Sungjoo Group in 2005.
• The company designs and manufactures E-commerce countries. With MCM’s ecommerce reach, TPR can gain a
significant boost in it sales in the existing MCM markets.
premium-quality backpacks, bags and leather
suitcases, distributing its market offerings through
wholesale & retail stores and online platforms in
select countries.
Rationale IV: • Given that MCM’s products are primarily focused on
leather-made bags and goods, it will allow Tapestry to
Geographic Exposure Cost utilize management & supply chain expertise and generate
cost synergies by lowering production costs of its leather-
• MCM generates approximately 70% of its sales in
Asia Pacific, roughly 30% in Europe, and the rest
Synergies based products.
in USA & Middle East.
• In 2011, the brand’s largest store was launched in
Hong Kong, China. Product Segments:
Women’s Men’s
Business Strategy • Bags • Bags
• The company has plans to expand into product • Apparel • Apparel
segments such as perfumes and accessories and
• Footwear • Footwear
increase sales by taking advantage of its presence
in China. • Accessories • Accessories
Recommendation III: Acquisition of Salvatore Ferragamo
• As the Asian region is Salvatore Ferragamo’s most profitable

geographic segment and given its familiarity with the
Rationale I: consumer preferences in that region (stores launched on
Asian Market JD.com), it will be beneficial for Tapestry to tap into the
emerging markets by leveraging Ferragamo’s Asian market
presence.
Rationale II: • The distinguished reputation of Salvatore Ferragamo’s

premium-quality men’s goods (footwear & belts) will help
Company Overview
Salvatore Ferragamo was created in Florence in
Specialize in Tapestry to foster the target male consumer’s needs to
achieve consumer mix diversification, meeting Tapestry’s
Men’s
•
1927. prospective strategic initiatives.
It is anticipated that more millennial men will enter the
The company designs, manufactures and markets
Product
• •
footwear, leather products & fragrances for men workforce, creating a promising market for TPR.
and women, worldwide.
Geographic Exposure
• Asia Pacific is considered as the main market for
Salvatore Ferragamo in terms of its global Rationale III: • Salvatore Ferragamo’s specialization in footwear will
generate cost synergies and production efficiency for
revenue (38.1%). Synergies in Tapestry in terms of raw materials and manufacturing,
Europe, North America and Japan account for given that Stuart Weitzman is facing supply and
Footwear
•
25.6%, 22.6% and 8.7% of the total revenue, distribution problems.
respectively.
Business Strategy Product Segments:

• Aiming to remake its brand to appeal to younger Women’s Men’s
customers.
• Handbags • Bags
• Maintaining and expanding its position in the
• Footwear • Footwear
Asian region as it helps the company offset its
declining sales in other markets. • Accessories • Accessories
• The shoe segment appears to be the company’s • Fragrances • Belts
priority with regards to strategic plans.
Industry Corporate Finance Activity
The luxury fashion goods industry has experienced transactions over the years aimed towards expansion of
market share. Competition has begun focusing on realizing operational synergies from acquired brands.
Past Financial Activities Strategies Prospective Corporate Activities
• Expansion into Luxury Hotel Segment

• Acquisition of BULGARI to grow brand
• Stake in New Guards Group
• Acquisition of Christian Dior • Consolidation for cost synergies
• Acquisition of Belmond Hotels
• Sale of Donna Karan to G-III • Divestment of unsuccessful endeavors
for unburdening
• Brand Diversification by acquiring

• Acquisition of Brioni similar brands • Acquisition of Valentino
• Sale of Volcom • Consolidation with conglomerates to • Acquisition of Patek Philippe
dominate market
• Sale of Puma • Merger with Richemont
• Expansion into footwear segment
• Global Footprint Expansion through

brand acquisition
• Acquisition of Jimmy Choo • Cost Synergies achieved in • Management has indicated focusing
manufacturing and distribution on their three brands for the near
• Acquisition of Versace term (3 years)
• Broaden demographics with brands
aiming at younger age groups
• Expansion into digital platforms to

increase consumer reach Repay Debt
• Share Repurchase •
• Value to Shareholders through Stock Repurchase Program
• Issuance of Debt •
repurchase programs and dividends
• Acquisition of Club Monaco • Dividend Increase
• Geographical Expansion by acquiring
companies globally
APPENDIX
TEAM PROFILE: MARK BROPHY
Professional Experience
• Maintained and updated the group’s weekly
Scotiabank Global Banking and Markets comparable companies set for global energy
companies
Incoming Investment Banking Analyst (Present)
Energy Group • Crafted pitchbooks for senior bankers detailing
Calgary, Canada industry trends and valuations primarily in the
Oil Field Services sector
mark.brophy@mail.utoronto.ca Investment Banking Summer Analyst (2018)
(709)-699-0195 Energy Group • Analyzed the impact of share repurchase
Toronto, Canada Calgary, Canada programs on changes in stock prices in the
Canadian Energy sector
Education & Skills
• B.Com (UofT) • Performed data entry in preparation for launch
Finance & Economics – CGPA 3.73/4.00 of a new online accounting services platform,
Deloitte LLP. ctrl by Deloitte
• CFA Level II Candidate
Summer Analyst (2016) Handled the transfer of client information to an
Awards & Achievements •
Private Audit online platform aimed to service small-to-
• Governors Challenge (2018) Toronto, Canada medium sized enterprises
Hosted by BOC – Runners Up
• RCFA M&A Competition (2018)

Hosted by TD Securities – 2nd Place
• Lead a team of Analysts and Associates in
• QFAC Stock Pitch Competition (2017) creating stock pitches, coverage reports, and
Hosted by Greentech Capital - Finalist industry primers
Gordon Investment Research (UofT)
• Actively mentor first- and second- year
Co-President (2017-Present) students in professional development with a
Toronto, Canada focus on careers in capital markets
• Teach weekly sessions in Excel and Financial

Modelling to 40+ undergraduate students
TEAM PROFILE: JORDAN LI
• Constructed automatic performance reports

BlackRock
highlighting fund performance and
positioning information including: sector &
Incoming Full-Time Analyst (2019)
attribution analysis, active holdings, and
Institutional Client Businesses
turnover summaries, linking through the
Toronto, Canada
internal Aladdin Database
jordan.li@mail.utoronto.ca Summer Analyst (2018)

• Co-led a team of 9 summer analysts to
(647)-524-1447 Fundamental Active Equity
create a portfolio targeted towards recent
Toronto, Canada New York, United States
graduates
Education & Skills
• Hosted capital markets seminar catered to
• B.Com (UofT) students, introducing topics including:
Finance & Economics – CGPA: 4.00/4.00 Macroeconomics, Financial Accounting,
Gordon Investment Research (UofT) Financial Modeling & Valuations, Asset
Management, and Mergers & Acquisitions
Awards & Achievements Co-President (2017-Present)
• Governors Challenge (2018) Toronto, Canada • Led a team of 14 members to research
Hosted by BOC – Runners Up North American equities, to create stock
pitches through extensive use of
• RCFA M&A Competition (2018) Bloomberg, FactSet and Thomson One
Hosted by TD Securities – 2nd Place
• UW Stock Pitch Competition hosted by

BMO – Finalist • Established and conducted microeconomic
lessons to over 100 students weekly in
Department of Economics (UofT)
• Toronto Railway Club Scholarship tutorial sessions
Teaching Assistant (2017-Present)
• Invigilated examinations and relevant tests
Toronto, Canada
throughout the year, ensuring that students
follow academic conduct
TEAM PROFILE: JENNIFER LI
• Co-led a team of 8 club candidates in the

Analysts Development Program
Associate (2018-Present)
• Performed investment research and analysis
Toronto, Canada
on several equities listed on NASDAQ and
xxje.li@mail.utoronto.ca NYSE alongside club members
(647)-821-9924
Toronto, Canada
Education & Skills
• B.Com (UofT)
Finance & Economics – CGPA: 3.72/4.00 The Governor’s Challenge Sponsored by Bank • Participated alongside 15 other students to
of Canada
create a presentation as advisors
Awards & Achievements surrounding monetary policy to the
Sub-team (2018)
UW Stock Pitch Competition(2018) Governing Council of the Bank of Canada
• Toronto, Canada
Hosted by BOM – Semi Finalist
• Dean’s List Scholar (2018)

UofT Mississauga
• UofT Entrance Scholarship (2016-2017)
UofT Scholar (2016-2017) • Authored an investment pitch on Altria

• UW Finance Conference Stock Pitch
Group Inc. (NYSE: MO), and determined a
target price through a weighted average of
Semi-Finalist (2018)
Discounted Cash Flow and Comparable
Waterloo, Canada
Companies Analysis
TEAM PROFILE: SRISHTI SINGH
Empire Life • Performed business analysis and reported

results using Microsoft Power BI
Summer Analyst (2018)
Operations & Analysis • Conducted Underwriting coordinator
Toronto, Canada responsibilities and ran proposals based on
srishti.singh@mail.utoronto.ca feasibility and situation analysis
(647)-770-5686
Toronto, Canada
Education & Skills
• B.Sc (UofT) • GIR hosts annual capital markets seminars

Financial Economics – CGPA: 3.98/4.00 and runs an Analysis Development Program
for students
Awards & Achievements Associate (2018-Present)
• Researched equities listed on North
Toronto, Canada
• Governors Challenge (2018) American exchanges to develop stock
Hosted by BOC – Runners Up pitches alongside fellow club members
• Dean’s List Scholar (2017-2018)
• UofT Joseph Alfred Whealey Scholar

(2018-2019)
• UofT Entrance Scholar (2017-2019) SickKids Foundation • Fundraised for the Hospital for SickKids
Active Volunteer (2018-Present) • Volunteered for GetLoud event which

Toronto, Canada collectively raised $2.3M
T E A M P R O F I L E : T E A M A CC O M P L I S H M E N T S
Experiences Skills, Achievements & Interests
• Scotiabank Global Banking & Markets (Calgary): Incoming IB Analyst

• Scotiabank Global Banking & Markets (Calgary): Summer IB Analyst • Fluent in English; Beginner Knowledge in French
• Deloitte LLP. (Toronto): Private Audit Intern • FactSet Financial Modeling, Bloomberg Market Concepts
• University of Toronto: Finance Lab Assistant • CGPA (3.73/4.00), Deans List, CFA Level II Candidate
Mark Brophy • Gordon Investment Research (UofT): Co-President
• BlackRock (Toronto): Incoming Analyst

• Fluent in Cantonese & English; Beginner Knowledge in French
• BlackRock (Toronto): Summer Investments Analyst
• Provincial Wrestler, TDSAA Football (2nd Place), RCM Piano (Level 9)
• University of Toronto: Economics Teaching Assistant
• CGPA (4.00/4.00), Deans List, Economics Honor Roll, UofT Scholar
• Gordon Investment Research (UofT): Co-President
Jordan Li
• Gordon Investment Research (UofT): Associate • Fluent in Cantonese, Mandarin & English
• Heart & Stroke Foundation (Toronto): Big Bike Event • FactSet Financial Modeling, Bloomberg Market Concepts
• City Council (Markham): Poll Attendant • CGPA (3.72/4.00), Deans List, Entrance Scholarship, UofT Scholar
Jennifer Li
• Empire Life Investments & Insurance: Operations Intern

• Fluent in English & Hindi
• Gordon Investment Research (UofT): Associate
• Actuarial Sciences (WIP), Bloomberg Market Concepts
• Heart & Stroke Foundation (Toronto): Seasonal Volunteer
• CGPA (3.98/4.00), Deans List, Economics Honor Roll, UofT Scholar
• SickKids Foundation: Seasonal Volunteer
Srishti Singh
Global Industry Trends
Within the mid-term, macroeconomic fundamentals remain and should sustain growth – however possible mild
recessions, government policies and political issues may act as a temporary headwind towards growth.
Outperform ‘17 VS ’18E Global Luxury Goods Outlook Underperform
China Asia Japan Europe Americas RoW
+18% +7% +3% +1% $90B $13B

1%
$26B $44B $25B $95B -1% -6%
• Consumers put high • Strong growth observed • Local discretionary • Europe is the origin and • Local consumption for • Consumer confidence
value on trendsetting in some Asian markets consumption appears to central hub for luxury luxury products remains has begun to decline and
luxury goods and tailored (Thailand, Singapore, & be soft, given its sluggish goods; both in design solid (32% of the global is relatively low to other
designs. Taiwan). economic conditions; origination and luxury goods market); yet geographic regions due
• Growth in China is • In 2017, Hong Kong & expected to continue in dominance of global possible short-term to lagging economies
considered the Lion’s Singapore represented 2018. sales. recessions may curb the worldwide.
share for the Luxury 4.7% & 5.6% of the • Luxury brands within the • The strengthening purchasing power and • The recent drop in oil
Goods space. global luxury store Japanese region are currency may affect the discretionary spending of prices have affected
• Chinese consumers are openings; possibly seeking new ways to purchasing power of US consumers. households’ disposable
expected to make up demonstrating future maintain & attract foreign visitors, as prices • The strengthening USD income, weakening local
around 45% of the market penetration customers to boost sales in Italy and France have may have adverse effects economics.
personal luxury goods opportunities within within this geography. gone up by 13.5% on tourists’ spending on • Political problems
market in 2018. these regions. • Brands are beginning to relative to the USD luxury goods. negatively impact the
• China is seeing a boom • Hong Kong and Macau – establish and develop (2017). • Increasing trend being tourism flow – notably
through e-commerce, a known as the “Shopping more efficient distribution • The current government observed where US within the Middle East
possible upside catalyst Heavens” – show models amidst the policies and political Luxury companies are and South America.
for the fashion sector. compelling sales growing tourism business issues present seeking product
performance, in Japan from Chinese uncertainties on diversification.
underpinned by Chinese tourists. consumer sentiment and
shoppers. luxury goods sectors.
Credit Profile
Tapestry Inc. maintains a solid credit profile, presenting opportunities to issue additional debt to repurchase
shares to enhance value for the firm and shareholders
Altman Z-Score Debt and Coverage Ratios
7.00 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018

6.00
5.00 Safe Zone Net Debt / EBITDA 0.36 0.28 0.55 0.22
4.00
3.00 EBITDA / Interest Expense 79.63 27.60 54.58 16.92
Grey Zone
2.00 35.76
Debt / Equity 32.66 52.62 49.33
1.00 High Default Risk Zone
0.00 Working Capital / Total Assets 0.36 0.28 0.55 0.22
Mar-15
Sep-15
Mar-16
Sep-16
Mar-17
Sep-17
Mar-18
Sep-18
Jun-15
Jun-16
Dec-15
Jun-17
Dec-16
Jun-18
Dec-17
EBIT / Total Assets 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15
Equity Value / BV Total Liabilities 4.66 5.23 4.84 3.92

Altman's Z-score Altman's Double Prime Z-score
Sales / Total Assets 0.90 0.92 0.77 0.88
5-Year CDS Spread (Last 6 Months) Commentary
130 55.00 • As of September 12th 2018, Moody’s reaffirmed Tapestry Inc.’s Baa2
senior unsecured ratings, and upgraded their outlook from negative to
125 50.00 stable – following the reduction in debt incurred from the Kate Spade
120 acquisition
45.00 • TPR’s ratings can be upgraded according to Moody’s if a successful
115 integration of Kate Spade is achieved; expanding margins and
40.00
110 sustaining a debt//EBITDA level below 2.25x.
35.00 • S&P and Fitch maintain a BBB- credit rating
105
• As of June 29th 2018, TPR had a Altman Z-score of and Altman Z”-
100 30.00 score of 5.68 and 5.76 respectively – both figures well above a 2.99
Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 level indicating a low probability of default
• Five year credit default swap spreads have mildly increased over the
Tapestry, Inc. - CDS 5Yr Mid (Left) Tapestry, Inc. - Price (Right) last 6 months following the recent market sell-off; probability of default
over 5 years is indicated to be less than 125 basis points.
Company Profile: LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE
Business Description Management Team
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton is a leading luxury Bernard Arnault CEO
goods company in the globe and the business offers a Jean-Jacques Guiony CFO
wide range of luxury products. Delphine Arnault Executive VP
Nicolas Bazire Senior VP
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton The company manufactures and markets wine & spirits Antionio Belloni Managing Director
(Dom Pérignon), perfumes (Christian Dior & Givenchy), Frederic Arnault Director
cosmetics (Nude & Benefit), leather goods (Givenchy & Chantal Gaemperle Director
Headquarters: Paris, France Christopher Hollis Director
Louis Vuitton), and watches & jewelry (Bulgari).
Employees: 128,637 Jean-Baptiste Voisin Director
Founded: 1987 Marc-Antoine Jamet General Secretary
Financial Information Business Segments & Product Lines
Market Cap: $149,932 M • Wine & Spirits : This segment is composed of brands such as Moët and Chandon, Dom Pérignon, Hennessy and
Cash: $5,780 M Belvedere to name a few.
Long Term Debt: $14,422 M
Revenue: $55,307 M • Fashion & Leather Goods : Brands included are Louis Vuitton, Christian Dior, Fendi, Loro Piana, Celine, Givenchy,
EBITDA: $13,245 M
FY 2019E Revenue: $57,546 M Loewe, Kenzo, Berluti, Marc Jacobs, Rimowa and Thomas Pink sold through retail, wholesale and licensing.
FY 2019E EBITDA: $15,092 M
FY 2020E Revenue: $60,979 M • Perfumes & Cosmetics : Parfums Christian Dior, Guerlain, Givenchy, Kenzo etc. are brands under this product
FY 2020E EBITDA: $16,099 M segment with flagship product lines for these brand names.
190
• Watches & Jewelry : This product segment boasts of Bvlgari, TAG Heuer, Hublot, Zenith and Chaumet with strong
contribution from Bvlgari and Hublot.
165
140 • Selective Retailing : This segment includes non-conventional segments that were not product offerings like the ones
115 above. Sephora, DFS, Starboard Cruise Services, Le Bon Marché are the business that are a part of this revenue
group.
90
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18
SPGLGUP Index (USD) MC FP Equity
Company Profile: Kering SA
Kering designs, manufactures and markets fashion and François-Henri Pinault Chairman/CEO
leather goods. Founded as a timber trading company, it Jean-Marc Duplaix CFO
transitioned to luxury goods in 1999 by purchasing a Jean Philippe Bailly COO
stake in Gucci Group. Gregory Boutte Chief Client & Digital Officer
Kering SA Beatrice Lazat Chief People Officer
The company specializes in ready-to-wear products, Roberto Vedovotto CEO - Eyewear
sports goods, shoes, jewelry and watches, on a global Patrick Pruniaux CEO – Girard-Perregaux
Headquarters: Paris, France Albert Bensoussan CEO – Watches & Jewelry
scale. It is the world’s third largest luxury group in the
Employees: 44,055 Claus-Dietrich Lahrs CEO – Bottega Veneta
world, behind LVMH and Richemont.
Founded: 1963 Francesa Bellettini CEO – Saint Laurent
Founder: François-Henri Pinault Jean-Francois Palus Managing Director
Market Cap: $60,380 M • Luxury Activities : This segment majorly includes brands like Gucci, Saint Laurent and Bottega Veneta with the
Cash: $2,308 M product categories of Shoes, Ready-to-Wear, Watches, Jewelry, Leather Goods to name some.
Long Term Debt: $5,638 M - Distribution Channel : The channels are either retail or wholesale with the former taking major share.
Revenue: $16,774 M - Geographical Breakdown : By region, a large portion of the revenue is derived from Europe and APAC.
FY 2018E Revenue: $15,466 M
FY 2018E EBITDA: $5,008 M - Brand Breakdown : Gucci contributes most to the segment revenues followed by Saint Laurent and
FY 2019E Revenue: $17,255 M Bottega Veneta
FY 2019E EBITDA: $5,706 M
• Sport and Lifestyle Activities : This segment includes primarily PUMA and other brands in product categories such as
shoes, accessories and apparel.
250 - Distribution Channel : Wholesale sales and other revenue are the main channel of distribution.
210
- Geographical Breakdown : By region, Europe and the Americas dominate the contribution to revenue.
- Brand Breakdown : PUMA is the major brand with 95% contribution to the revenue in this segment.
170
130 • Brand Portfolio : Saint Laurent, Gucci, Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga, Alexander McQueen, Christopher Kane, Brioni,
90 Boucheron, Pomellato, Dodo, Qeelin, Girard-Perregaux, Ulysse Nardin, Stella McCartney, Puma, Volcom
SPGLGUP Index (USD)
Company Profile: Capri Holdings Limited
Michael Kors was renamed to Capri Holdings to operate John D Idol Chairman/CEO
as a holdings company after the acquisition of Versace in Michael David Kors Chief Creative Officer
December 2018. Andrea Pesaresi President: Menswear
Thomas J Edwards CFO/COO/Treasurer
Capri Holdings Limited – Michael Kors The company, through its subsidiaries, Michael Kors, Francesca Leoni Chief Brand Officer
Jimmy Choo and now, Versace designs apparels and Pascale Meyran CHRO/SVP
accessories. It distributes and retails handbags, shoes, Krista A McDonough General Counsel/SVP
Headquarters: London, United Kingdom
watches, apparel, sunglasses and boots, globally. Cathy Marie Robinson SVP-Strategy
Employees: 8,166
Katina Metzidakis VP-Investor Relations
Founded: 1990
Claire Harries Ogle Secretary/Senior Counsel
IPO: NYSE 2011
Founder: Michael David Kors
Market Cap: $6,414 M Michael Kors Brand : The brand operates through the following segments in the product categories, Accessories,
Cash: $155.2 M Footwear and Apparel:
Long Term Debt: $760 M - MK Retail : Accounts for almost half of the revenues and includes sale of MK products through retail stores all over the
Revenue: $5,076 M world as well as e-commerce sites in certain countries such as United States and Canada.
EBITDA: $1,167 M
FY 2019E Revenue: $5,156 M - MK Wholesale : Includes the wholesale sales of MK products through department and specialty stores in the Americas
FY 2019E EBITDA: $1,148 M and internationally.
FY 2020E Revenue: $5,714 M - MK Licensing : This segment includes the royalties and advertising contributions earned on licensed products and use
FY 2020E EBITDA: $1,232 M of MK trademarks. Also comprises of the rights given to third parties to operate retail stores.
180
MK Collections : Michael Kors Collection luxury line , the MICHAEL Michael Kors accessible luxury line (focus on
accessories) and the Michael Kors Men line (expansion into the men’s market).
150
120 Jimmy Choo : Accounts for the worldwide sales of Jimmy Choo products through retail stores, e-commerce sites,
90 wholesale doors as well as licensing agreements.
60
Geographically, revenues are segmented into the 3 regions, namely the Americas, Europe/EMEA and Asia.
SPGLGUP Index (USD)
Company Profile: Ralph Lauren Corporation
Ralph Lauren began by creating men’s ties in NYC by Ralph Lauren Chairman/Chief Creative Officer
designer Ralph Lauren. It designs, markets and distributes David Lauren Chief Innovation Officer
men’s, women’s and children’s apparel, accessories, Patrick Louvet President/CEO
fragrances and home furnishings. Jane Hamilton Nielsen CFO
Ralph Lauren Jonathan Bottonmley Chief Market Officer
The company’s products are sold under various brands Alice Delahunt Chief Digital Officer
globally, through the channels of wholesale, retail and Janet Sherlock Chief Information Officer
Headquarters: New York, NY, United States Valerie Hermann President: Global Brands
licensing.
Employees: 12,800 Evren Dogan Kopelman CFO – Club Monaco
Founded: 1967 Avery S Fischer General Counsel
IPO NYSE 1997 Corinna Van der Ghinst Investor Relations
Founder: Ralph Lauren
Market Cap: $9,342 M • Wholesale Business : Wholesale is done through department stores, specialty stores as well as golf shops. The
Cash: $1,873 M primary products sold through this channel are apparel, accessories and home furnishings. The segments in this
Long Term Debt: $928 M channel are North America, Europe and Asia with Americas contributing the most. The largest key wholesale
Revenue: $6,253 M customer was Macy’s.
EBITDA: $979 M
FY 2019E Revenue: $6,216 M
FY 2019E EBITDA: $977 M • Retail Business : Selling directly to the consumers throughout the world through retail stores and digital commerce
FY 2020E Revenue: $6,350 M sites. The stores feature a range of apparel, accessories, watch and jewelry, fragrance and home products. Retail
FY 2020E EBITDA: $1,043 M channel is geographically segmented and into stores for various brands as well as e-commerce platforms.
170
• Licensing Business : RL grants product licenses to manufacture and sell products under their trademarks. Each
licensee pays royalties based upon sales and includes products like Men’s Apparel, Beauty Products etc.
145
120 All the above categories are reported as geographical segments combined under North America, Europe, Asia and other
non-reportable segments.
95
70
SPGLGUP Index (USD) RL US Equity
Side by Side Analysis: Tapestry Inc. and Salvatore Ferragamo
Key Metrics Tapestry Inc. Salvatore Ferragamo NewCo.
No. of Employees 20,800 83% 17% 4,183 24,983
Total Revenue $5,880 96% 4% $216.9 6,096.9
EBITDA $1,252 81% 19% $286.6

1,538.6
EBITDA Margin 21.3% 18.23%
Net Income $398 75% 25% $133.8 531.8

P / E (LTM) 19.6x 29.7x
Equity Value $10,534 75% 25% $3,414 13,948
Enterprise Value $11,239 77% 23% $3,295 14,534

EV / EBITDA (LTM) 8.8x 11.9x
17% 13%
Asia Pacific
31% 29% 33%
12% 37%
Geographic Mix Total Total Total Japan
(Revenue) $5,880 $1,113 $6,993 North America
9% Other
59% 23% 9% 29%
($USD in millions) (June 30th 2018) (September 30th 2018)

(Exchange Rates as of 2/3/2019; 1.14:1)
1.0x
4.0x
0.0x
2.0x
3.0x
5.0x
6.0x
8.0x
9.0x
7.0x
Kering 3.5x
Inditex 3.0x
LVMH 2.7x
Richemont 2.3x
NTM EV / Revenue
Tapestry 1.9x
Michael Kors 1.4x
L Brands 1.0x
Moncler 4.4x
Burberry 2.3x
Christian Dior 1.7x
Ted Baker 1.5x
Hugo Boss 1.5x
Hermes 7.3x
Brunello Cucinelli 3.3x
Luxottica 2.7x
Extended Comps Universe (1 of 2)
Tiffany & Co. 2.4x

Salvatore Ferragamo 2.4x
Prada 2.2x
Pandora 1.9x
Swatch Group 1.5x
Padini 1.5x
Tod's 1.4x
SOURCES : TAPESTRY 2018 Financial Statements, Bloomberg, Thomson ONE Reuters, FactSet, NIBC 2018
Steve Madden 1.5x
Ralph Lauren 1.2x
Tommy Hilfiger 1.2x
Marks & Spencer 0.6x
H&M 1.3x
American Eagle 0.8x
Gap 0.6x
Express, Inc 0.1x
Lululemon Athletica 5.1x

Nike 3.0x
Under Armour 2.1x
Adidas 1.6x
44
FarFetch 8.1x
Buckle 0.8x
Nordstrom 0.7x
Hudson's Bay 0.5x
Noni B
0.0x
5.0x
10.0x
15.0x
20.0x
25.0x
30.0x
Inditex 14.1x
Richemont 11.0x
Kering 10.6x
LVMH 10.5x
NTM EV / EBITDA
Tapestry 9.0x
L Brands 6.9x
Michael Kors 6.4x
Moncler 12.8x
Burberry 11.1x
Ted Baker 9.0x
Hugo Boss 8.0x
Christian Dior 6.4x
Hermes 19.2x
Brunello Cucinelli 19.1x
Salvatore Ferragamo 13.6x
Extended Comps Universe (1 of 2)
Luxottica 12.7x
Tiffany & Co. 10.4x
Prada 10.4x
Padini 10.1x
Tod's 8.8x
Swatch Group 7.0x
Pandora 6.0x
SOURCES : TAPESTRY 2018 Financial Statements, Bloomberg, Thomson ONE Reuters, FactSet, NIBC 2018
Steve Madden 11.3x
Tommy Hilfiger 8.5x
Ralph Lauren 7.7x
Marks & Spencer 5.5x
H&M 10.0x
American Eagle 6.4x
Gap 5.2x
Express, Inc 2.4x
Under Armour 26.5x

Lululemon Athletica 20.4x
Nike 19.8x
Adidas 12.0x
45
Hudson's Bay 11.5x

Nordstrom 6.4x
Noni B 5.4x
Buckle 4.7x
FarFetch
Comparable Companies Analysis (1 of 4)
Luxury Segment Comparable Universe
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2)

C ompa ny Na me M a r ke t E nte r pr ise T ota l C a sh & Re ve nue E BI T D A E a r nings Ne t D e bt / E V /Re ve nue E V /E BI T D A P/E E BI T D A C AGR Re ve nue C AGR E BI T D A WAC C
(1)
C a p. V a lue D e bt S -t I nv. NT M NT M NT M EV LT M NT M 2 0 2 0 E LT M NT M 2 0 2 0 E LT M NT M 3 -Yr H ist. 2 -Yr Fcst. 3 -Yr H ist. 2 -Yr Fcst. M a r gin (% )
(all figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where noted)
Eur poea n Lux ur y C ongl omer a tes
LVMH 144,873 155,374 13,147 4,253 57,263 14,823 7,936 5.7% 2.9x 2.7x 2.6x 11.2x 10.5x 9.8x 20.1x 19.8x 13.4% 7.7% 10.4% 6.6% 25.9% 10.8%
Kering 55,072 59,722 6,306 2,292 17,094 5,615 3,577 6.7% 3.4x 3.5x 3.2x 13.4x 10.6x 9.5x 21.2x 17.2x 39.1% 12.3% 6.2% 10.1% 32.8% 11.3%
Inditex 95,889 90,335 18 6,403 30,492 6,409 4,019 (7.1%) 2.9x 3.0x 2.7x 13.8x 14.1x 13.0x 23.5x 23.1x 6.9% 2.7% 9.6% 2.6% 21.0% 10.8%
Richemont 36,705 36,500 8,200 13,458 15,671 3,331 2,227 (14.4%) 2.5x 2.3x 2.1x 12.4x 11.0x 9.8x 12.4x 17.7x (7.5%) 8.1% 0.0% 13.5% 21.3% 7.2%
Ave r a ge (2.3%) 2.9x 2.9x 2.7x 12.7x 11.5x 10.5x 19.3x 19.5x 13.0% 7.7% 6.5% 8.2% 25.3% 10.0%
Amer i ca n Luxur y C ongl omer a tes

L Brands 9,107 13,388 5,794 1,515 13,275 1,927 746 32.0% 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 6.7x 6.9x 6.9x 11.8x 10.5x (1.8%) (7.4%) 3.3% 3.3% 14.5% 7.0%
Tapestry 11,282 11,632 1,601 1,250 6,176 1,286 821 3.0% 1.9x 1.9x 1.8x 10.5x 9.0x 8.3x 14.4x 14.9x 14.4% 7.5% 11.9% 4.8% 20.8% 8.0%
Michael Kors 6,573 7,288 874 163 5,116 1,143 763 9.8% 1.4x 1.4x 1.3x 7.1x 6.4x 6.0x 9.5x 9.7x (8.6%) 6.8% 2.4% 8.9% 22.3% 7.0%
Ave r a ge 14.9% 1.5x 1.4x 1.4x 8.1x 7.5x 7.1x 11.9x 11.7x 1.3% 2.3% 5.9% 5.7% 19.2% 7.3%
Lux ur y Appa r el
Christian Dior 67,283 95,461 14,135 7,586 56,905 15,010 3,445 6.9% 1.8x 1.7x 1.6x 6.9x 6.4x 5.9x 22.1x 21.5x 12.5% 7.8% 8.1% 6.8% 26.4% 7.9%
Burberry 9,336 8,202 30 915 3,491 737 441 (10.8%) 2.3x 2.3x 2.3x 10.6x 11.1x 10.5x 20.9x 21.2x (4.5%) (2.0%) (3.0%) (1.8%) 21.1% 14.2%
Moncler 8,362 8,019 104 394 1,823 628 393 (3.6%) 5.3x 4.4x 3.9x 16.3x 12.8x 11.3x 25.8x 23.8x 19.6% 13.5% 17.9% 12.8% 34.5% 11.9%
Hugo Boss 4,877 4,851 150 155 3,318 603 309 (0.1%) 1.5x 1.5x 1.4x 8.7x 8.0x 7.4x 18.7x 17.5x (5.6%) 8.9% 0.5% 4.7% 18.2% 8.1%
Ted Baker 1,039 1,182 164 17 792 131 76 12.5% 1.5x 1.5x 1.4x 9.3x 9.0x 7.9x 14.7x 13.6x 4.3% 14.1% 9.1% 2.9% 16.6% 12.3%
Ave r a ge 1.0% 2.4x 2.3x 2.1x 10.4x 9.5x 8.6x 20.4x 19.5x 5.2% 8.5% 6.5% 5.1% 23.3% 10.9%
Lux ur y Accessor i es
Hermes 57,275 54,013 61 2,932 7,371 2,806 1,672 (5.3%) 8.0x 7.3x 6.8x 20.2x 19.2x 17.7x 35.8x 36.9x 10.6% 8.7% 8.1% 8.2% 38.1% 7.6%
Luxottica 28,335 29,181 2,157 1,159 10,652 2,298 1,178 3.4% 2.8x 2.7x 2.6x 14.3x 12.7x 11.8x 23.2x 26.1x 1.6% 7.2% 1.1% 5.3% 21.6% 8.9%
Swatch Group 15,690 14,179 26 1,623 9,212 2,019 1,092 (11.3%) 1.6x 1.5x 1.5x 7.9x 7.0x 6.3x 16.5x 15.6x (1.4%) 10.3% (0.1%) 5.3% 21.9% 9.2%
Tiffany & Co. 11,093 10,820 1,004 1,291 4,506 1,042 593 (2.7%) 2.4x 2.4x 2.3x 10.3x 10.4x 9.6x 19.1x 22.2x (2.3%) 5.3% (0.8%) 6.5% 23.1% 7.2%
Prada 8,879 8,895 127 893 3,967 858 411 (8.6%) 2.5x 2.2x 2.2x 14.9x 10.4x 9.1x 35.0x 21.6x (16.2%) 15.6% (7.5%) 4.7% 21.6% 11.6%
Pandora 5,963 6,640 829 993 3,571 1,107 763 (2.5%) 1.8x 1.9x 1.8x 5.4x 6.0x 5.8x 7.2x 7.7x 5.9% 1.8% 11.7% 2.7% 31.0% 6.5%
Salvatore Ferragamo 3,968 3,853 96 212 1,621 282 148 (3.0%) 2.4x 2.4x 2.3x 14.1x 13.6x 12.1x 34.1x 32.2x (11.2%) 12.6% (0.8%) 4.8% 17.4% 12.0%
Brunello Cucinelli 2,305 2,327 89 63 695 122 64 1.1% 3.7x 3.3x 3.1x 21.2x 19.1x 17.1x 33.5x 40.7x 12.7% 11.4% 11.2% 9.8% 17.5% 11.0%
Padini 755 656 9 451 444 65 41 (67.5%) 1.6x 1.5x 1.4x 9.7x 10.1x 9.1x 18.5x 17.4x 18.2% 3.6% 14.7% 5.5% 14.6% 7.7%
Tod's 1,577 1,567 241 222 1,125 177 85 1.2% 1.4x 1.4x 1.3x 8.3x 8.8x 8.1x 18.9x 21.1x (10.2%) 8.9% (2.0%) 3.8% 15.8% 9.3%
Lux ur y S e gme nts Ave r a ge (2.5%) 2.6x 2.5x 2.3x 11.5x 10.6x 9.7x 20.8x 20.5x 4.1% 7.5% 5.1% 6.0% 22.6% 9.4%
T a pe str y 11,282 11,632 1,601 1,250 6,176 1,286 821 3.0% 1.9x 1.9x 1.8x 10.5x 9.0x 8.3x 14.4x 14.9x 14.4% 7.5% 11.9% 4.8% 20.8% 8.0%
Retail Segment Comparable Universe
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2)

C ompa ny Na me M a r ke t E nte r pr ise T ota l C a sh & S T Re ve nue E BI T D A E a r nings Ne t D e bt / E V /Re ve nue E V /E BI T D A P/E E BI T D A C AGR Re ve nue C AGR E BI T D A WAC C
(1)
C a p. V a lue D e bt I nve stm. NT M NT M NT M EV LT M NT M 2 0 2 0 E LT M NT M 2 0 2 0 E LT M NT M 3 -Yr H ist. 2 -Yr Fcst. 3 -Yr H ist. 2 -Yr Fcst. M a r gin (% )
(all figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where noted)
Upsca l e Br a nds
Tommy Hilfiger 8,478 11,067 3,081 494 9,589 1,295 723 23.4% 1.1x 1.2x 1.1x 9.6x 8.5x 8.0x 11.7x 14.1x 13.9% 9.8% 2.1% 6.3% 13.5% 8.0%
Ralph Lauren Corporation 8,961 7,553 596 2,004 6,213 983 558 (18.6%) 1.2x 1.2x 1.2x 9.0x 7.7x 7.2x 16.3x 18.7x (10.7%) 5.2% (7.0%) 1.8% 15.8% 7.5%
Marks & Spencer 6,076 8,084 2,295 221 13,312 1,473 511 25.6% 0.6x 0.6x 0.6x 8.4x 5.5x 5.6x 156x 11.9x (6.1%) (7.0%) (4.6%) (3.9%) 11.1% 6.6%
Steve Madden 2,819 2,580 - 245 1,744 228 167 (9.5%) 1.6x 1.5x 1.4x 12.7x 11.3x 10.1x 18.7x 17.9x 3.4% 9.6% 5.4% 6.1% 13.1% 10.0%
Ave r a ge 5.2% 1.1x 1.1x 1.1x 9.9x 8.3x 7.7x 50.8x 15.7x 0.1% 4.4% (1.0%) 2.6% 13.4% 8.0%
Ever yda y Br a nds

H&M 30,637 30,693 1,129 9,718 24,168 3,080 1,552 (28.0%) 1.3x 1.3x 1.2x 10.2x 10.0x 9.4x 19.7x 20.8x (10.2%) 6.5% 2.1% 4.1% 12.7% 5.7%
Gap 10,409 9,875 1,249 1,783 16,766 1,900 983 (5.4%) 0.6x 0.6x 0.6x 5.1x 5.2x 5.1x 10.9x 13.0x (10.3%) 1.0% (1.4%) 4.2% 11.3% 7.0%
American Eagle 3,712 3,299 - 414 4,024 519 264 (12.5%) 0.8x 0.8x 0.8x 6.3x 6.4x 5.9x 15.2x 18.0x 18.7% 5.5% 4.7% 5.8% 12.9% 7.1%
Express, Inc 458 288 67 236 2,136 122 27 (58.8%) 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 2.0x 2.4x 2.3x 11.5x 17.8x (13.1%) (4.7%) (0.6%) 0.6% 5.7% 8.5%
Ave r a ge (26.2%) 0.7x 0.7x 0.7x 5.9x 6.0x 5.7x 14.3x 17.4x (3.7%) 2.1% 1.2% 3.7% 10.7% 7.1%
Athl eti c Wea r

Nike 119,299 117,864 3,810 5,245 39,145 5,941 4,253 (1.2%) 3.2x 3.0x 2.8x 21.8x 19.8x 17.4x 30.2x 32.0x 2.7% 14.6% 5.6% 8.1% 15.2% 8.8%
Adidas 44,488 43,764 1,311 1,776 26,911 3,662 2,167 (1.1%) 1.7x 1.6x 1.5x 14.1x 12.0x 10.7x 23.4x 23.4x 26.3% 12.0% 10.0% 7.7% 13.6% 7.6%
Lululemon Athletica 17,546 16,555 - 991 3,229 812 481 (6.0%) 5.7x 5.1x 4.5x 23.9x 20.4x 17.7x 42.4x 52.5x 10.7% 26.1% 13.6% 17.9% 25.1% 9.8%
Under Armour 10,707 11,312 917 312 5,441 427 148 5.3% 2.2x 2.1x 2.0x 87.9x 26.5x 22.1x 191.9x 111.6x (12.7%) 22.7% 9.4% 5.2% 7.8% 12.0%
Fa shi on Reta i l er s
Nordstrom 8,930 10,486 2,737 1,181 15,966 1,629 615 14.8% 0.7x 0.7x 0.6x 6.8x 6.4x 6.2x 17.7x 17.9x (4.6%) 2.9% 4.3% 3.4% 10.2% 7.6%
Hudson's Bay 1,210 3,831 2,674 70 7,228 333 (252) 68.0% 0.4x 0.5x 0.5x 67.8x 11.5x 11.3x NA NA (22.6%) 0.1% 15.0% (18.9%) 4.6% 6.0%
FarFetch 6,663 6,279 - 384 777 (116) (146) (6.1%) 16.3x 8.1x 6.3x N/A N/A N/A NA NA NA NA 59.8% 30.8% (15.0%) NA
Buckle 936 720 - 216 891 153 98 (30.0%) 0.8x 0.8x 0.8x 4.4x 4.7x 4.9x 9.6x 11.1x (18.2%) (3.4%) (7.4%) (1.3%) 17.1% 5.4%
Noni B 207 179 15 59 641 33 8 (24.4%) 0.6x 0.3x 0.3x 6.4x 5.4x 3.1x 12.9x 13.3x NA 45.3% 42.2% 56.3% 5.1% 6.2%
Ave r a ge 4.5% 3.7x 2.1x 1.7x 21.3x 7.0x 6.4x 13.4x 14.1x (15.2%) 11.2% 22.8% 14.1% 4.4% 6.3%
Re la te d S e gme nts Ave r a ge (3.8%) 2.3x 1.7x 1.6x 18.5x 10.2x 9.2x 39.2x 26.3x (2.2%) 9.1% 9.0% 7.9% 10.6% 7.7%
C umula tive Ave r a ge (3.0%) 2.4x 2.1x 2.0x 14.5x 10.4x 9.5x 28.2x 22.9x 1.5% 8.2% 6.8% 6.8% 17.4% 8.7%
T a pe str y 11,282 11,632 1,601 1,250 6,176 1,286 821 3.0% 1.9x 1.9x 1.8x 10.5x 9.0x 8.3x 14.4x 14.9x 14.4% 7.5% 11.9% 4.8% 20.8% 8.0%
Sources: Bloomberg, Company Information

(1) Enterprise Value is defined as market capitalization, plus total debt and minority interests less cash and short-term investments; ignores equity investments
(2) Based on analyst consensus forecasts
Refined Comparables Universe - Luxury
Com pany Nam e Yes EV/Rev Yes EV/EBITDA Valuation Rationale
Incl.? NTM Incl.? NTM
Eurpoean Luxury Conglomerates

LVMH No 0.0x No 0.0x Roughly 15 times larger TPR.
Kering Yes 3.5x Yes 10.6x Similarities in Portfolio of brands and prducts, Customers and end markets, and geographical revenue breakdow n. Simlilar EBITDA Margins.
Inditex No 0.0x No 0.0x Too large. Roughly 9 times as large as TPR. Less exposure to asian markets relative to TPR.
Richemont Yes 2.3x Yes 11.0x Simiilar EBITDA margins. CFR has silimar revenue exposure to Asia as TPR.
Average Selection 2.9x 10.8x
American Luxury Conglomerates

L Brands No 0.0x No 0.0x Low er price point products. More focused on apparel and cosmetics vs. Luxury Accessories. ~88% U.S. exposure vs. ~59% for TPR
Tapestry No 0.0x No 0.0x NA
Michael Kors Yes 1.4x Yes 6.4x Similar portfolio of products (Footw ear, Handbags, Watches, etc.) Similar EBITDA margins. Similar Size
Luxury Apparel
Christian Dior No 0.0x No 0.0x ~10 times larger by EV. Less exposure to U.S. (~25% vs. ~59%). CDI derives ~25% of revenue from w ines, spirits, perfumes and cosmetics
Burberry Yes 2.3x Yes 11.1x Similar size and geograhical exposure although BRBY has less exposrue to U.S. Similar Gross and EBITDA Margins. Similar products but BRBY has more exposure in mens goods.
Moncler No 0.0x No 0.0x Similar exposure to Asia, much less exposure in U.S. Much higher EBITDA margins. Similar Size. More focused on Apparel vs. Handbag/Accessories.
Hugo Boss No 0.0x No 0.0x Different geographical exposure. Similar Gross & EBITDA Margins. Greater focus on men's luxury apparel.
Ted Baker No 0.0x No 0.0x Much smaller by EV. Different revenue exposure by geography. Low er gross & EBITDA margins. Similar product offering. More focus on Apparel. Similar price point for Handbags.
Luxury Accessories
Hermes No 0.0x No 0.0x Similar exposure to Asia. Less exposure to U.S. Market (~13% vs. ~59%). Much higher EBITDA margins. Significantly higher price point on bags.
Luxottica No 0.0x No 0.0x Similar U.S. exposure (~58% vs. ~59%). Less Asia exposure. Similar EBITDA margins. Different product offerings (Eyew ear vs. Handbags)
Sw atch Group No 0.0x No 0.0x Different geographical exposure. Different product offering.
Tiffany & Co. No 0.0x No 0.0x Similar size & geographical revenue breakdow n. Similar EBITDA margins. Different product offerings (Primarily focused on Jew elery but offers some leather goods)
Prada Yes 2.2x Yes 10.4x Handbags sell at substantially higher price point. Similar products (Bags, Footw ear, ready-to-w ear). Similar size % EBITDA margins. More exposure to Asia, less to U.S. than TPR.
Pandora No 0.0x No 0.0x Different product offerings (Almost entiremly Jew elry). Similar Gross Margins, Larger EBITDA Margins. Less U.S. & Asia exposure vs. TPR.
Salvatore Ferragamo Yes 2.4x Yes 13.6x Similar Asia exposure. Less U.S. Exposure. ~80% of revenue is derived from Leather Goods & Footw ear. Similar price point for Footw ear. Much higher price point for leather goods.
Brunello Cucinelli No 0.0x No 0.0x Low er Gross & EBITDA margins. Different Geographical revenue exposure. Smaller by EV.
Padini No 0.0x No 0.0x Significanltly smaller by EV. Different Geoprahical exposure. Low er EBITDA margins.
Tod's No 0.0x No 0.0x Significanltly smaller by EV. Similiar Asia exposure. Much less U.S. Exposure.
Luxury Segm ents Selection 2.4x 10.5x
Tapestry 1.9x 9.0x
Refined Comparables Universe - Retail
Com pany Nam e Yes EV/Rev Yes EV/EBITDA Valuation Rationale
Incl.? NTM Incl.? NTM
Upscale Brands
Tommy Hilfiger Yes 1.2x Yes 8.5x Similar size. ~50% revenue generated in US. Similar product offerings. More apparel-focused. Portfolio of brands including Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger. Significant Millennial customer base
Ralph Lauren Corporation Yes 1.2x Yes 7.7x Similar size by EV. Similar U.S. exposure, significantly less exposure to Asia. Low er Gross & EBITDA Margins. Offers Apparel, Handbags, Shoes, & Accessories
Marks & Spencer No 0.0x No 0.0x MKS generates ~61% of U.K revenue from food sales. TPR doesn't have exposure to food industry.
Steve Madden No 0.0x No 0.0x Steve Madden generates 66% of total revenue from footw ear. Significantly low er margins than TPR.
Everyday Brands
H&M No 0.0x No 0.0x H&M sells its clothing & accessories at a low er price point, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins, & different exposure to macro variables (i.e disposable income)
Gap No 0.0x No 0.0x GAP sells its clothing & accessories at a low er price point, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins, & different exposure to macro variables (i.e disposable income)
American Eagle No 0.0x No 0.0x AEO sells its clothing & accessories at a low er price point, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins, & different exposure to macro variables (i.e disposable income)
Express, Inc No 0.0x No 0.0x EXPR sells its clothing & accessories at a low er price point, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins, & different exposure to macro variables (i.e disposable income)
Average Selection #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Athletic Wear
Nike No 0.0x No 0.0x Athletic Wear targets different markets, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR
Adidas No 0.0x No 0.0x Athletic Wear targets different markets, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR
Lululemon Athletica No 0.0x No 0.0x LULU products are sold at higher price point than other Athletic w ear companies. It has similar EBITDA but low er historical Gross Margins than TPR/ Different end markets.
Under Armour No 0.0x No 0.0x Athletic Wear targets different markets, has low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR
Fashion Retailers
Nordstrom No 0.00 No 0.00 Much low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR. More diverse product offering than TPR.
Hudson's Bay No 0.00 No 0.00 Much low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR. More diverse product offering than TPR.
FarFetch No 0.0x No NA Much low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR. More diverse product offering than TPR.
Buckle No 0.0x No 0.0x Much low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR. More diverse product offering than TPR.
Noni B No 0.0x No 0.0x Much low er Gross & EBITDA Margins than TPR. More diverse product offering than TPR.
Related Segm ents Selection 1.2x 8.1x
Cum ulative Selection 2.1x 9.9x
Tapestry 1.9x 9.0x
Selected Industry Multiple 2.1x 9.9x

Tapestry Metric (2019E) $6,176 $1,286 Note: Use "Incl.?" column to indicate w hether a company should be included in the valuation [0 - No; 1 - Yes]
Total Enterprise Value 12,806 12,754
- Total Debt 1,601 1,601
- Preferred & ST Inv 0 0
+ Cash 905 905
Equity Value 12,109 12,058
Shares Outstanding (m ) 289 289
Fair Value Share Price $41.96 $41.78
Appendix: Discounted Cash Flow – Base Case (1 of 4)
Coach revenues 4,806 4,192 4,147 4,115 4,222 4,348 4,457 4,568 4,673 4,771 4,867 4,964 5,054
Kate Spade revenues - - - - 1,285 1,445 1,619 1,797 1,967 2,115 2,242 2,343 2,413
Stuart Weizman revenues - - 345 374 374 385 416 443 465 484 501 516 526
T ota l Re ve nue s 4,8 0 6 4,19 2 4,49 2 4,48 8 5 ,8 8 0 6 ,17 8 6 ,49 1 6 ,8 0 8 7 ,10 6 7 ,3 7 0 7 ,6 0 9 7 ,8 2 3 7 ,9 9 3
Revenue growth (12.8%) 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 3.7% 3.2% 2.8% 2.2%
Coach COGS (1,509) (1,283) (1,298) (1,260) (1,290) (1,326) (1,350) (1,375) (1,402) (1,431) (1,445) (1,464) (1,491)
Kate Spade COGS - - - - (574) (542) (567) (602) (639) (679) (717) (750) (772)
Stuart Weizman COGS - - (142) (148) (163) (173) (183) (193) (200) (206) (212) (217) (221)
T ota l C OGS (1,5 0 9 ) (1,2 8 3 ) (1,441) (1,40 7 ) (2 ,0 2 6 ) (2 ,0 41) (2 ,10 0 ) (2 ,17 0 ) (2 ,2 41) (2 ,3 16 ) (2 ,3 7 5 ) (2 ,43 1) (2 ,48 4)
Coach SG&A (1,865) (1,963) (1,825) (1,815) (1,847) (1,900) (1,908) (1,951) (1,986) (2,028) (2,059) (2,090) (2,123)
Kate Spade SG&A - - - - (773) (759) (809) (853) (925) (986) (1,034) (1,073) (1,098)
Stuart Weizman SG&A - - (170) (211) (214) (215) (212) (221) (230) (237) (243) (247) (252)
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (358) (370) (388) (405) (420) (434) (446) (456)
T ota l S G& A (2 ,17 7 ) (2 ,2 9 1) (2 ,3 9 8 ) (2 ,2 9 4) (3 ,18 3 ) (3 ,2 3 2 ) (3 ,2 9 9 ) (3 ,414) (3 ,5 46 ) (3 ,6 7 1) (3 ,7 6 9 ) (3 ,8 5 6 ) (3 ,9 2 8 )
Coach EBIT 1,432 946 1,024 1,040 1,084 1,122 1,199 1,243 1,285 1,312 1,363 1,410 1,440
Kate Spade EBIT - - - - (62) 145 243 341 403 451 491 520 543
Stuart Weizman EBIT - - 33 16 (3) (3) 21 29 35 41 46 51 53
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (358) (370) (388) (405) (420) (434) (446) (456)
T ota l E BI T 1,12 0 6 18 654 787 671 905 1,0 9 2 1,2 2 5 1,3 18 1,3 8 4 1,46 6 1,5 3 5 1,5 8 0
EBIT growth (44.8%) 5.7% 20.5% (14.8%) 34.9% 20.7% 12.1% 7.6% 5.0% 6.0% 4.7% 2.9%
EBIT margin 23.3% 14.7% 14.5% 17.5% 11.4% 14.6% 16.8% 18.0% 18.6% 18.8% 19.3% 19.6% 19.8%
Add: Total D&A 189 192 211 213 260 278 292 313 334 339 342 344 344
Add: Stock-based compensation 84 95 96 77 81 114 120 126 131 136 141 144 148
Add: Integration and restructuring activities 108 60 18 9 135 - - - - - - - -
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,2 9 7 1,5 0 4 1,6 6 4 1,7 8 4 1,8 5 9 1,9 49 2 ,0 2 4 2 ,0 7 2
EBITDA growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 13.1% 16.0% 10.6% 7.2% 4.2% 4.9% 3.8% 2.4%
EBITDA margin 31.2% 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.0% 23.2% 24.4% 25.1% 25.2% 25.6% 25.9% 25.9%
DCF Su mmary - Segmen ted Operati n g Metri cs
Total Revenue Growth (12.8%) 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 3.7% 3.2% 2.8% 2.2%
Coach Revenue Growth (12.8%) (1.1%) (0.8%) 2.6% 3.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.8%
Kate Spade Revenue Growth -% -% -% -% 12.5% 12.0% 11.0% 9.5% 7.5% 6.0% 4.5% 3.0%
Stuart Weizman Revenue Growth -% -% 8.4% 0.1% 3.0% 8.0% 6.5% 5.0% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.0%
Coach % of Total Revenues 100.0% 92.3% 91.7% 71.8% 70.4% 68.7% 67.1% 65.8% 64.7% 64.0% 63.5% 63.2%
Kate Spade % of Total Revenues -% -% -% 21.8% 23.4% 24.9% 26.4% 27.7% 28.7% 29.5% 29.9% 30.2%
Stuart Weizman % of Total Revenues -% 7.7% 8.3% 6.4% 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6%
Total EBIT Growth (44.8%) 5.7% 20.5% (14.8%) 34.9% 20.7% 12.1% 7.6% 5.0% 6.0% 4.7% 2.9%
Coach EBIT Growth (33.9%) 8.3% 1.5% 4.3% 3.5% 6.9% 3.6% 3.4% 2.1% 3.9% 3.5% 2.2%
Kate Spade EBIT Growth -% -% -% -% -% 68.0% 40.6% 18.1% 11.7% 9.0% 5.9% 4.4%
Sturat Weizman EBIT Growth -% -% (52.3%) -% -% -% 38.4% 21.2% 17.9% 12.0% 10.8% 3.0%
Total EBIT Margin 14.7% 14.5% 17.5% 11.4% 14.6% 16.8% 18.0% 18.6% 18.8% 19.3% 19.6% 19.8%
Coach EBIT Margin 22.6% 24.7% 25.3% 25.7% 25.8% 26.9% 27.2% 27.5% 27.5% 28.0% 28.4% 28.5%
Kate Spade EBIT Margin -% -% -% (4.8%) 10.0% 15.0% 19.0% 20.5% 21.3% 21.9% 22.2% 22.5%
Stuart Weizman EBIT Margin -% 9.4% 4.1% (0.7%) (0.8%) 5.0% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5% 9.2% 9.9% 10.0%
EBITDA Growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 13.1% 16.0% 10.6% 7.2% 4.2% 4.9% 3.8% 2.4%
EBITDA Margin 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.0% 23.2% 24.4% 25.1% 25.2% 25.6% 25.9% 25.9%
DCF Su mmary - F i n an ci n g Cash f l ows
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,2 9 7 1,5 0 4 1,6 6 4 1,7 8 4 1,8 5 9 1,9 49 2 ,0 2 4 2 ,0 7 2
Purchases of PPE (220) (199) (396) (283) (267) (306) (336) (376) (417) (390) (394) (379) (361)
Provision for income taxes (341) (209) (166) (168) (199) (176) (216) (243) (263) (277) (298) (312) (318)
Working capital and other adjustments (178) 175 (23) (38) 111 87 (7) (7) (2) 0 (1) 6 6
Fr e e C a shflow s / C a shflow s for D e bt S e r vice 763 731 393 597 792 902 9 46 1,0 3 7 1,10 1 1,19 2 1,2 5 6 1,3 3 9 1,3 9 9
Interest expense 2 (6) (27) (28) (74) (66) (66) (66) (66) (66) (49) (49) (65)
Issuance / repayment of long-term debt 140 756 (15) 712 - - - (11) - (400) - - (153)
Sale (purchase) of investments (484) 106 (388) 876 478 - - - - - - - -
Acquisitions 10 (515) (21) 35 (2,242) - - - - - - - -
C a shflow Ava ila ble for E quity D istr ibutions 43 1 1,0 7 2 (5 8 ) 2 ,19 2 (1,0 45 ) 836 880 960 1,0 3 5 727 1,2 0 7 1,2 9 0 1,18 1
Equity issuance / repurchase (525) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Dividends (incl. distributions of cash balance) (377) (372) (375) (378) (384) (545) (558) (565) (571) (585) (597) (621) (635)
Ne t C a shflow s (47 1) 700 (43 3 ) 1,8 14 (1,43 0 ) 291 323 395 46 5 142 6 11 668 5 46
E nding C a sh Ba la nce 592 1,2 9 2 859 2 ,6 7 3 1,2 43 1,5 3 4 1,8 5 7 2 ,2 5 1 2 ,7 16 2 ,8 5 8 3 ,46 9 4,13 7 4,6 8 3
E nding D e bt Ba la nce 141 1,0 3 7 1,0 2 2 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 2 3 1,7 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,16 9
E nding Ne t D e bt Ba la nce (45 1) (2 5 5 ) 16 3 (9 3 9 ) 49 1 200 (12 3 ) (5 2 9 ) (9 9 4) (1,5 3 6 ) (2 ,146 ) (2 ,8 14) (3 ,5 14)
Adjuste d I nte r e st E x pe nse (for de bt sizing only) 6 27 28 74 66 66 66 66 57 49 49 45
Net Debt to EBITDA - (0.3 x) 0.2 x (0.9 x) 0.4 x 0.2 x (0.1 x) (0.3 x) (0.6 x) (0.8 x) (1.1 x) (1.4 x) (1.7 x)
EBITDA / Notional Interest Expense - 150.6 x 36.3 x 38.2 x 15.5 x 19.6 x 22.8 x 25.3 x 27.2 x 32.4 x 39.7 x 41.3 x 46.5 x
Basic shares outstanding (millions) 278 276 278 281 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Diluted shares outstanding (millions) 280 277 279 283 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289
Diluted adjusted earnings (loss) per share $ 2.79 $ 1.45 $ 1.65 $ 2.09 $ 1.38 $ 2.30 $ 2.81 $ 3.17 $ 3.43 $ 3.61 $ 3.88 $ 4.07 $ 4.15
Dividend per share (diluted) $ 1.34 $ 1.34 $ 1.34 $ 1.34 $ 1.33 $ 1.89 $ 1.93 $ 1.96 $ 1.98 $ 2.03 $ 2.07 $ 2.15 $ 2.20
Equity cashflow per share (diluted including debt drawdown $ 4.83 $ 6.50 $ 4.36 $ 9.78 $ 1.83 $ 4.61 $ 5.77 $ 7.12 $ 8.79 $ 7.94 $ 11.49 $ 13.89 $ 13.75
DCF Su mmary - Val u ati on Resu l ts
Free cash flows to the firm for valuation (FCFF) 779 722 445 532 825 888 932 1,0 2 3 1,0 8 7 1,17 8 1,2 46 1,3 2 8 1,3 8 5
E nte r pr ise V a lue 16 ,43 7 E nte r pr ise V a lue 15 ,13 0 C APM C ost of E quity 11.1%
E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 15 ,7 41 E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 14,43 4 Afte r T a x C ost of D e bt 3 .3 %
Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 4.5 4 Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 0 .0 1 WAC C 10 .2 %
Discounted Cash Flow: Assumptions – Base Case (1 of 2)
Ope ra ting
Assumptions
CAGR/Avg Long- Justification
Ke y M e tr ics
Term
Total Revenue TPR's overall revenue growth will be fueled by modest store growth, particularly in China, further integration of Kate
3.9% Spade and the large millennial customer base it brings, reductions in promotions, and further expansion into Men's.
(CAGR '18-'26)
TPR intends to close underperforming Coach stores while opening new stores at a modest rate, particularly in China. We
Coach Revenue anticipate this course of action to translate into low single digit sales growth over the projection period. Coach's investment
2.3%
(CAGR '18-'26) is Men's will help fuel revenue growth as well. We are also assuming modest Average Unit Retail (AUR) improvement
through reductions in promotions.
We anticipate Kate Spade to grow revenues in the mid-to-high single digit range over the projection period. This is a
Kate Spade Revenue
7.6% result of modest store growth in Americas, Europe, and China, increased marketing & brand awareness in China, and
(CAGR '18-'26)
modest Same Store Sales (SSS) growth from reductions in discounts, translating to a higher AUR.
Stuart Weitzman Revenue We anticipate revenue growth to be in the high single digits in the near term as recent distribution issues alleviate. Over
4.4% the projection horizon, we believe growth will moderate to the low-single digits range.
(CAGR '18-'26)
Total EBIT Margin We expect reductions in promotions, cost synergies, economies of scale, and slight shift in product mix toward higher
18.3% 19.8% margin products to lead to EBIT margin improvements for Tapestry over the projection period.
(Avg '19-'26)
Coach EBIT Margin We anticipate further pullback from Coach's wholesale channel and reductions in promotions will lead to modest EBIT
24.7% 28.5% margin expansion over the projection period.
(Avg '19-'26)
Short-term EBIT margin expansions are a result of ~$100 MM in synergies from the transaction. We expect TPR's long
Kate Spade EBIT Margin
18.2% 22.5% history of experience with Coach to allow further optimization of Kate Spade's cost structure leading to modest
(Avg '19-'26)
incremental improvements in EBIT margins over the projection period.
Stuart Weitzman EBIT Margin Increased focus on Stuart Weitzman handbags will lead to modest margin expansion as Handbags become a larger
6.6% 10.0% portion of segment revenues than have been in the past. Improvements in distribution will also improve EBIT margins.
(Avg '19-'26)
Total EBITDA We anticipate EBITDA growth to be in the mid-to-high single digits over the projection period as a result of modest
7.7% revenue growth, acquisition synergies, and operational improvements from economies of scale.
(CAGR '18-'26)
Total EBITDA Margin Improvements in EBITDA margin over the projection period are a result of anticipated top line revenue growth, cost
24.7% 25.9% synergies from the Kate Spade acquisition, and a shift in product mix toward higher margin products.
(Avg '19-'26)
Capex (% of revenue) We expect Capital Expenditures to remain within ~$300 MM to ~$400 MM range over the projection period to fund its
5.2% modest store growth strategy.
(Avg '19-'26)
Discounted Cash Flow: Assumptions – Base Case (1 of 2)
Va lua tion
Assumptions
Key Metric Justification
Ke y M e tr ics
(1) We determined Levered Betas for TPRs closest comparables based on regression of daily stock returns over past two
Beta 0.97 years with most relevant market index (2) Unlevered each beta (3) obtained the average of the unlevered betas (3)
relevered the average beta at TPRs target capital structure to get the implied levered beta for TPR.
United States 10 Year T-Bond Yield on valuation date, January 31st 2019
Risk-free rate 2.7%
Based on TPR's long term debt issuances in March 2015: $600MM 4.25% Senior Notes Due 2025 & $600 MM 4.125%
Cost of debt (pre-tax) 4.1% Senior Notes Due 2027. Also takes closet comparable debt issuances into consideration: Capri Holdings $450MM 4.0%
Senior Notes Due 2024 (Issued October 2017),
We believe TPR will grow in line with the overall economy at roughly 2.5% in perpetuity
Perpetual growth rate 2.5%
Exit Multiple based on the average NTM EV / EBITDA trading multiples of Tapestry's closest competitors.
Exit multiple 10.2x
Discounted Cash Flow: Assumptions – Beta & Sensitivity
Beta
Market Value Market Value Debt-to-Equity Marginal Tax Unlevered

Com pany Nam e Levered Beta
of Debt of Equity Ratio Rate Beta
Kering 1.248 $4,282.1 $61,068.7 7.0% 33% 1.19

Richemont 0.989 $9,084.0 $40,350.1 22.5% 9% 0.82
Michael Kors 0.924 $759.6 $10,294.3 7.4% 21% 0.87
Burberry 1.031 $17.9 $8,430.8 0.2% 19% 1.03
Salvatore Ferragamo 0.711 $57.7 $3,527.7 1.6% 24% 0.70
PVH 1.015 $3,155.0 $9,579.2 32.9% 21% 0.81
Ralph Lauren 1.008 $928.0 $11,072.8 8.4% 21% 0.95
Prada 0.892 $1,116.6 $10,138.1 11.0% 24% 0.82
Average 0.90
Mean Unlevered Target Marginal Relevered

Tapestry Relevered Beta
Beta Debt/Equity Tax Rate Beta
TPR Levered Beta 0.90 0.1 21% 0.97
Sensitivity Analysis
Exit Multiple Perpetuity Grow th

$54.54 8.2x 9.2x 10.2x 11.2x 12.2x $50.01 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0%
12.20% $42.60 $45.66 $48.72 $51.78 $54.84 12.20% $37.98 $38.54 $39.14 $39.76 $40.42
11.20% $44.99 $48.26 $51.53 $54.80 $58.07 11.20% $42.43 $43.16 $43.95 $44.77 $45.65
10.20% $47.55 $51.05 $54.54 $58.04 $61.53 10.20% $47.97 $48.96 $50.01 $51.14 $52.34
9.20% $50.30 $54.04 $57.78 $61.52 $65.26 9.20% $55.07 $56.44 $57.90 $59.49 $61.19
8.20% $53.25 $57.26 $61.26 $65.26 $69.27 8.20% $64.48 $66.45 $68.58 $70.92 $73.48
Appendix: Discounted Cash Flow – Upside Case (1 of 4)
Coach revenues 4,806 4,192 4,147 4,115 4,222 4,390 4,535 4,671 4,802 4,927 5,045 5,161 5,270
T ota l Re ve nue s 4,8 0 6 4,19 2 4,49 2 4,48 8 5 ,8 8 0 6 ,2 6 0 6 ,6 2 9 6 ,9 8 8 7 ,3 3 3 7 ,6 5 8 7 ,9 6 6 8 ,2 47 8 ,47 3
Revenue growth (12.8%) 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 6.5% 5.9% 5.4% 4.9% 4.4% 4.0% 3.5% 2.7%
Coach COGS (1,509) (1,283) (1,298) (1,260) (1,290) (1,339) (1,365) (1,401) (1,431) (1,463) (1,493) (1,523) (1,555)
Kate Spade COGS - - - - (574) (547) (584) (620) (661) (706) (752) (797) (829)
T ota l C OGS (1,5 0 9 ) (1,2 8 3 ) (1,441) (1,40 7 ) (2 ,0 2 6 ) (2 ,0 6 2 ) (2 ,13 6 ) (2 ,2 17 ) (2 ,2 9 8 ) (2 ,3 8 4) (2 ,46 7 ) (2 ,5 47 ) (2 ,6 18 )
Coach SG&A (1,865) (1,963) (1,825) (1,815) (1,847) (1,910) (1,927) (1,976) (2,022) (2,064) (2,104) (2,142) (2,187)
Kate Spade SG&A - - - - (773) (768) (818) (856) (932) (1,000) (1,063) (1,114) (1,158)
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (363) (378) (398) (418) (437) (454) (470) (483)
T ota l S G& A (2 ,17 7 ) (2 ,2 9 1) (2 ,3 9 8 ) (2 ,2 9 4) (3 ,18 3 ) (3 ,2 5 9 ) (3 ,3 40 ) (3 ,45 4) (3 ,6 0 6 ) (3 ,7 45 ) (3 ,8 7 4) (3 ,9 8 6 ) (4,0 9 6 )
Coach EBIT 1,432 946 1,024 1,040 1,084 1,141 1,243 1,294 1,349 1,399 1,448 1,497 1,528
Kate Spade EBIT - - - - (62) 163 267 385 455 515 573 620 645
Stuart Weizman EBIT - - 33 16 (3) (2) 21 36 43 51 59 66 68
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (363) (378) (398) (418) (437) (454) (470) (483)
T ota l E BI T 1,12 0 6 18 654 787 671 939 1,15 3 1,3 17 1,42 9 1,5 2 9 1,6 2 6 1,7 13 1,7 5 9
EBIT growth (44.8%) 5.7% 20.5% (14.8%) 40.0% 22.8% 14.2% 8.5% 7.0% 6.3% 5.4% 2.6%
EBIT margin 23.3% 14.7% 14.5% 17.5% 11.4% 15.0% 17.4% 18.9% 19.5% 20.0% 20.4% 20.8% 20.8%
Add: Total D&A 189 192 211 213 260 282 298 321 345 352 358 363 364
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,3 3 6 1,5 7 4 1,7 6 8 1,9 10 2 ,0 2 3 2 ,13 1 2 ,2 2 9 2 ,2 8 0
EBITDA growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 16.5% 17.8% 12.3% 8.0% 5.9% 5.4% 4.6% 2.3%
EBITDA margin 31.2% 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.3% 23.7% 25.3% 26.0% 26.4% 26.8% 27.0% 26.9%
Stuart Weizman Revenue Growth -% -% 8.4% 0.1% 5.0% 8.0% 7.5% 6.0% 5.5% 4.5% 4.0% 3.0%
Sturat Weizman EBIT Growth -% -% (52.3%) -% -% -% 72.0% 19.3% 17.2% 15.0% 13.5% 3.0%
Stuart Weizman EBIT Margin -% 9.4% 4.1% (0.7%) (0.5%) 5.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 12.0%
EBITDA Growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 16.5% 17.8% 12.3% 8.0% 5.9% 5.4% 4.6% 2.3%
EBITDA Margin 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.3% 23.7% 25.3% 26.0% 26.4% 26.8% 27.0% 26.9%
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,3 3 6 1,5 7 4 1,7 6 8 1,9 10 2 ,0 2 3 2 ,13 1 2 ,2 2 9 2 ,2 8 0
Purchases of PPE (220) (199) (396) (283) (267) (310) (343) (386) (431) (405) (412) (399) (383)
Working capital and other adjustments (178) 175 (23) (38) 111 87 (6) (7) (3) (2) 1 8 8
Fr e e C a shflow s / C a shflow s for D e bt S e r vice 763 731 393 597 792 930 996 1,112 1,18 9 1,3 0 9 1,3 8 9 1,48 8 1,5 5 0
Acquisitions 10 (515) (21) 35 (2,242) - - - - - - - -
C a shflow Ava ila ble for E quity D istr ibutions 43 1 1,0 7 2 (5 8 ) 2 ,19 2 (1,0 45 ) 864 930 1,0 3 5 1,12 3 8 43 1,3 40 1,43 9 1,43 2
Ne t C a shflow s (47 1) 700 (43 3 ) 1,8 14 (1,43 0 ) 307 350 43 7 5 13 19 4 686 754 701
E nding C a sh Ba la nce 592 1,2 9 2 859 2 ,6 7 3 1,2 43 1,5 5 1 1,9 0 1 2 ,3 3 8 2 ,8 5 1 3 ,0 45 3 ,7 3 1 4,48 5 5 ,18 7
E nding D e bt Ba la nce 141 1,0 3 7 1,0 2 2 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 2 3 1,7 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,2 7 3
E nding Ne t D e bt Ba la nce (45 1) (2 5 5 ) 16 3 (9 3 9 ) 49 1 18 3 (16 7 ) (6 15 ) (1,12 9 ) (1,7 2 3 ) (2 ,40 9 ) (3 ,16 3 ) (3 ,9 14)
Net Debt to EBITDA - (0.3 x) 0.2 x (0.9 x) 0.4 x 0.1 x (0.1 x) (0.3 x) (0.6 x) (0.9 x) (1.1 x) (1.4 x) (1.7 x)
Free cash flows to the firm for valuation (FCFF) 779 722 445 532 825 9 16 982 1,0 9 8 1,17 5 1,2 9 5 1,3 7 9 1,47 8 1,5 3 6
E nte r pr ise V a lue 17 ,9 7 2 E nte r pr ise V a lue 16 ,6 0 7 C APM C ost of E quity 11.1%
E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 17 ,2 7 5 E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 15 ,9 10 Afte r T a x C ost of D e bt 3 .3 %
Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 9 .8 6 Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 5 5 .13 WAC C 10 .2 %
Appendix: Discounted Cash Flow – Downside Case (1 of 4)
Coach revenues 4,806 4,192 4,147 4,115 4,222 4,327 4,427 4,515 4,596 4,679 4,754 4,825 4,898
T ota l Re ve nue s 4,8 0 6 4,19 2 4,49 2 4,48 8 5 ,8 8 0 6 ,114 6 ,3 41 6 ,5 6 2 6 ,7 7 9 6 ,9 8 1 7 ,16 0 7 ,3 19 7 ,45 0
Revenue growth (12.8%) 7.2% (0.1%) 31.0% 4.0% 3.7% 3.5% 3.3% 3.0% 2.6% 2.2% 1.8%
Coach COGS (1,509) (1,283) (1,298) (1,260) (1,290) (1,324) (1,355) (1,382) (1,406) (1,432) (1,455) (1,477) (1,499)
Kate Spade COGS - - - - (574) (594) (613) (629) (641) (642) (684) (680) (697)
T ota l C OGS (1,5 0 9 ) (1,2 8 3 ) (1,441) (1,40 7 ) (2 ,0 2 6 ) (2 ,0 9 7 ) (2 ,15 1) (2 ,18 7 ) (2 ,2 2 4) (2 ,2 5 4) (2 ,3 2 1) (2 ,3 43 ) (2 ,3 8 5 )
Coach SG&A (1,865) (1,963) (1,825) (1,815) (1,847) (1,895) (1,939) (1,978) (2,013) (2,049) (2,082) (2,113) (2,145)
Kate Spade SG&A - - - - (773) (777) (813) (845) (872) (906) (921) (948) (972)
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (355) (361) (374) (386) (398) (408) (417) (425)
T ota l S G& A (2 ,17 7 ) (2 ,2 9 1) (2 ,3 9 8 ) (2 ,2 9 4) (3 ,18 3 ) (3 ,2 40 ) (3 ,3 15 ) (3 ,3 9 5 ) (3 ,47 3 ) (3 ,5 5 8 ) (3 ,6 2 2 ) (3 ,6 9 1) (3 ,7 5 7 )
Coach EBIT 1,432 946 1,024 1,040 1,084 1,108 1,133 1,156 1,177 1,198 1,217 1,235 1,254
Kate Spade EBIT - - - - (62) 42 107 182 267 340 376 433 444
Stuart Weizman EBIT - - 33 16 (3) (19) (4) 16 24 29 32 35 35
Corporate SG&A (312) (328) (403) (268) (349) (355) (361) (374) (386) (398) (408) (417) (425)
T ota l E BI T 1,12 0 6 18 654 787 671 777 875 980 1,0 8 1 1,16 9 1,2 17 1,2 8 5 1,3 0 8
EBIT growth (44.8%) 5.7% 20.5% (14.8%) 15.8% 12.7% 11.9% 10.4% 8.1% 4.2% 5.6% 1.7%
EBIT margin 23.3% 14.7% 14.5% 17.5% 11.4% 12.7% 13.8% 14.9% 16.0% 16.7% 17.0% 17.6% 17.6%
Add: Total D&A 189 192 211 213 260 275 285 302 319 321 322 322 320
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,16 5 1,2 7 8 1,40 3 1,5 2 5 1,6 19 1,6 7 2 1,7 43 1,7 6 6
EBITDA growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 1.5% 9.7% 9.8% 8.7% 6.1% 3.3% 4.2% 1.3%
EBITDA margin 31.2% 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 19.1% 20.1% 21.4% 22.5% 23.2% 23.3% 23.8% 23.7%
Stuart Weizman Revenue Growth -% -% 8.4% 0.1% -% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Sturat Weizman EBIT Growth -% -% (52.3%) -% -% -% -% 54.5% 20.2% 9.8% 8.8% 1.5%
Stuart Weizman EBIT Margin -% 9.4% 4.1% (0.7%) (5.0%) (1.0%) 4.0% 6.0% 7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 8.0%
EBITDA Growth (35.8%) 1.4% 11.1% 5.6% 1.5% 9.7% 9.8% 8.7% 6.1% 3.3% 4.2% 1.3%
EBITDA Margin 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 19.1% 20.1% 21.4% 22.5% 23.2% 23.3% 23.8% 23.7%
E BI T D A 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,16 5 1,2 7 8 1,40 3 1,5 2 5 1,6 19 1,6 7 2 1,7 43 1,7 6 6
Purchases of PPE (220) (199) (396) (283) (267) (303) (328) (362) (398) (369) (371) (354) (336)
Working capital and other adjustments (178) 175 (23) (38) 111 117 0 (11) (8) (12) 9 (3) 6
Fr e e C a shflow s / C a shflow s for D e bt S e r vice 763 731 393 597 792 830 780 838 906 1,0 0 6 1,0 6 5 1,12 5 1,17 3
Acquisitions 10 (515) (21) 35 (2,242) - - - - - - - -
C a shflow Ava ila ble for E quity D istr ibutions 43 1 1,0 7 2 (5 8 ) 2 ,19 2 (1,0 45 ) 764 7 14 760 8 41 5 40 1,0 16 1,0 7 6 808
Ne t C a shflow s (47 1) 700 (43 3 ) 1,8 14 (1,43 0 ) 2 48 226 288 369 90 524 562 326
E nding C a sh Ba la nce 592 1,2 9 2 859 2 ,6 7 3 1,2 43 1,49 2 1,7 18 2 ,0 0 6 2 ,3 7 5 2 ,46 5 2 ,9 8 9 3 ,5 5 2 3 ,8 7 8

E nding D e bt Ba la nce 141 1,0 3 7 1,0 2 2 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 3 4 1,7 2 3 1,7 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,3 2 3 1,0 16
E nding Ne t D e bt Ba la nce (45 1) (2 5 5 ) 16 3 (9 3 9 ) 49 1 2 42 16 (2 8 4) (6 5 2 ) (1,143 ) (1,6 6 7 ) (2 ,2 2 9 ) (2 ,8 6 2 )
Net Debt to EBITDA - (0.3 x) 0.2 x (0.9 x) 0.4 x 0.2 x 0.0 x (0.2 x) (0.4 x) (0.7 x) (1.0 x) (1.3 x) (1.6 x)
Free cash flows to the firm for valuation (FCFF) 779 722 445 532 825 8 16 766 824 892 992 1,0 5 4 1,115 1,16 1
E nte r pr ise V a lue 13 ,9 49 E nte r pr ise V a lue 12 ,7 0 5 C APM C ost of E quity 11.1%
E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 13 ,2 5 2 E quity V a lue (M a r ke t C a p) 12 ,0 0 8 Afte r T a x C ost of D e bt 3 .3 %
Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 45 .9 2 Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 41.6 1 WAC C 10 .2 %
Appendix: Precedent Transactions Analysis (1 of 2)
Broad Precedent Transactions Universe
(2)
T a r ge t Buye r T r a nsa ction LT M E V /LT M
(1)
C ompa ny T ype C ompa ny T ype EV D a te Ye a r Ra tiona le I mpl, E V Re ve nue E BI T D A Re ve nue E BI T D A
(all figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted)
Versace Luxury Apparel, Footwear, & Accessories Michael Kors American Luxury Conglomerate 7,288 September 25, 2018 2018 Expand Luxury product offerings 2,154 NA NA
Perry Ellis Upscale Apparel Randa Accessories Retailer NA July 2, 2018 2018 Brand Acquisition 550 888 54 0.6x 10.2x
Jimmy Choo Luxury Footwear & Accessories Michael Kors American Luxury Conglomerate 7,288 July 25, 2017 2017 Expansion into Luxury Footwear 1,355 510 74 2.7x 18.3x
Christian Dior Luxury Apparel Semyrhamis Investment Holding Company NA April 25, 2017 2017 Brand Acquisition 79,420 46,248 10,954 1.7x 7.3x
Luxottica Luxury Accessories/Eyewear Essilor Eyewear Company 50,008 January 16, 2017 2017 Majority Stake Investment 25,423 9,686 2,094 2.6x 12.1x
Hugo Boss Luxury Apparel PFC and Zignago Consultancy/ Industrials NA February 10, 2015 2015 Public Investment 7,838 3,348 747 2.3x 10.5x
The Jones Group Fashion Retailer Sycamore Private Equity NA December 19, 2013 2013 Private Investment 2,201 3,848 226 0.6x 9.7x
Loro Piana Luxury Apparel LVMH European Luxury Conglomerate 155,374 July 8, 2013 2013 Brand Acquisition (Majority Investment) 3,217 810 4.0x NA
Cole Haan Upscale Footwear & Accessories Apax Partners Private Equity NA November 16, 2012 2012 Private Investment 561 535 1.0x NA
Brioni Luxury Menwear Kering European Luxury Conglomerate 59,722 July 29, 2011 2011 Brand Acquisition 817 245 3.3x NA
Jack Wolfskin Outdoor Apparel & Equipement Blackstone Private Equity NA July 21, 2011 2011 Private Investment 1,006 437 2.3x NA
Moncler Luxury Apparel & Lifestyle Eurazeo Private Equity NA June 6, 2011 2011 Private Investment 1,358 627 149 2.2x 9.1x
Jimmy Choo Luxury Footwear & Accessories JAB Luxury Luxury Goods Holding Company NA May 22, 2011 2011 Brand Acquisition 932 210 49 4.4x 19.0x
Volcom Everyday Apparel, Footwear & Accessories Kering European Luxury Conglomerate 59,722 May 2, 2011 2011 Brand Acquisition 516 333 33 1.6x 15.6x
Bulgari Luxury Jewelry & Accessories LVMH European Luxury Conglomerate 155,374 March 6, 2011 2011 Brand Acquisition 5,303 1,434 197 3.7x 26.9x
Bulgari Luxury Jewelry & Accessories LVMH European Luxury Conglomerate 155,374 March 6, 2011 2011 Brand Acquisition 6,017 1,701 237 3.5x 25.4x
Moncler Luxury Apparel & Lifestyle Carlyle Private Equity NA August 5, 2008 2008 Private Investment 631 596 1.1x NA
Ave r a ge 2 .4x 14.9 x
T a pe str y 1.9 x 10 .5 x
(1) Current EV
(2) EV/LTM multiple should be calculated based on Transaction EV
Appendix: Precedent Transactions Analysis (2 of 2)
Refined Precedent Transactions Universe
C ombine d E ntity
E V /Re ve nue E V /E BI T D A
T a r ge t I ncl.? LT M I ncl.? LT M Re le va nce to T a r ge t V a lua tion
(all figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted)
Versace No No
Perry Ellis No 0.00 No 0.00 Not very relevant because the deal never closed
Jimmy Choo Yes 2.7x Yes 18.3x Sells its footwear at a similar price point to Stuart Weitzman. Similar customers & end markets.
Christian Dior Yes 1.7x Yes 7.3x Sells luxury apparel, accessories, & bags. Also offers cosmetics & jewelry. Products sell at higher price than TPR
Luxottica Yes 2.6x Yes 12.1x Sells luxury brand eyewear including brands such as Coach, Michael Kors
Hugo Boss Yes 2.3x Yes 10.5x Sells luxury apparel, accessories, & bags. Women leather handbags priced similar to TPR. More focused on apparel.
The Jones Group No 0.00 No 0.00 Portfolio of brands that offer similar products to TPR (Apparel, Handbags, Accessories) but at lower price point
Loro Piana No 0.00 No Primarily apparel-focused. Offers Men's & Women's handbags at higher price point. Also sells footwear.
Cole Haan Yes 1.0x No Sells Handbags, Accessories, & Footwear to both men & women. Handbags & footwear sold at a lower price point.
Brioni No 0.00 No Primarily apparel-focused. Sells some footwear. Primarily customer demographic is men vs. women for TPR.
Jack Wolfskin No 0.00 No Not relevant. Targets a different market, outerwear & equipment vs. luxury leather goods for TPR.
Moncler No 0.00 No 0.00 Not relevant. Primarily apparel focused. Small revenue exposure in America (16.5% vs. 59%)
Jimmy Choo No 0.00 No 0.00 Sells its footwear at a similar price point to Stuart Weitzman. Similar customers & end markets.
Volcom No 0.00 No 0.00 Not relevant. Different target markets (Everyday vs. Luxury). Different market conditions.
Bulgari No 0.00 No 0.00 Not relevant. Primarily Jewelry-focused. Leather goods sell at much higher price point. Different market conditions.
Bulgari No 0.00 No 0.00 Not relevant. Primarily Jewelry-focused. Leather goods sell at much higher price point. Different market conditions.
Moncler No 0.00 No Not relevant. Primarily apparel focused. Small revenue exposure in America (16.5% vs. 59%)
No 0.00 No 0.00
Average 2.1x 12.0x
Tapestry 5,972 1,106
I mplie d E nte r pr ise V a lue
T ota l E nte r pr ise V a lue $ 12 ,410 $ 13 ,3 2 8
- Debt 1,601 1,601
- Preferred & Other 0 0
+ Cash 905 905
E quity V a lue $11,713 $12,632
S ha r e s Outsta nding (millions) 289 289
Fa ir V a lue S ha r e Pr ice $ 40 .5 9 $ 43 .7 7
Leveraged Buyout Overview (1 of 3)
Assume d LBO T ra nsa ction S umma ry
Use of Funds S our ce of Funds
Tapestry 11,235 69.4% Senior Debt 4,540 28.1%
Parent Equity Premium (25%) 2,809 17.4% Junior Debt 3,243 20.0%
Equity Value 14,044 86.8% Revolver - -%
Debt Retired / Assumed 1,734 10.7% Assumed Debt - -%
Transaction Costs 405 2.5% Total Debt 7,782 48.1%
Sponsor Equity 7,071 43.7%
Excess Balance Sheet Cash (Shortfall) 1,329 8.2%
T ota l Funds Use s 16 ,18 2 10 0 % T ota l Funds S our ce s 16 ,18 2 10 0 %
E quity C a shflow s 2 0 19 E 2020E 2 0 2 1E 2022E 2023E 2 0 2 4E 2025E
Proforma Revenue Forecast Annual Revenue % Growth 0.5% 6,524 6,842 7,141 7,407 7,647 7,862
Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution Annual Margin Improvement 1.0% 73 77 80 83 86 89
Proforma EBITDA Forecast Average EBITDA Margin 26.0% 1,577 1,740 1,864 1,942 2,035 2,112
Cashflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, & WC) 1,097 1,181 1,236 1,315 1,369 1,440
Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) (509) (462) (405) (338) (260) (196)
Repayment of LBO Debt (588) (719) (831) (977) (1,109) (1,244)
Operating Cashflow for Equity - - - - - - -
LBO Sponsor Equity (7,071) - - - - - -
Sales Proceeds (based on 10.8x LTM EBITDA multiple) - - - - - - 22,815
(-) Exit Transaction Costs Current $38.93 - - - - - - (228)
(-) Remaining Debt at Exit Offered $48.66 - - - - - - (2,315)
(+) Excess Cash Premium 25% - - - - - - -
(+) Residual Cash Flows - - - - - - -
Ne t E quity C a shflow s I RR 19 .19 % (7 ,0 7 1) - - - - - 2 0 ,2 7 2
Outsta nding D e bt Ba la nce 2 0 19 E 2020E 2 0 2 1E 2022E 2023E 2 0 2 4E 2025E
Junior Debt Repayment (588) (719) (831) (977) (128) -
Junior Debt Ending Balance at 8.0% 3,243 2,655 1,936 1,105 128 - -
Senior Debt Repayment - - - - (981) (1,244)
Senior Debt Ending Balance at 5.5% 4,540 4,540 4,540 4,540 4,540 3,559 2,315
Revolver Debt Repayment - - - - - -
Revolver Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% - - - - - - -
Assumed Debt Repayment - - - - - -
Assumed Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% - - - - - - -
T ota l D e bt E nding Ba la nce 7 ,7 8 2 7 ,19 5 6 ,47 6 5 ,6 45 4,6 6 8 3 ,5 5 9 2 ,3 15
Debt/EBITDA 6.0x 4.6x 3.7x 3.0x 2.4x 1.7x 1.1x

Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense 0.0x 2.2x 2.6x 3.1x 3.9x 5.3x 7.4x
Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense 0.0x 4.4x 4.7x 4.9x 5.3x 5.5x 7.4x
De ta ile d LBO Ca shflow S umma ry
* All dolla r a mounts in millions 2 0 14 2 0 15 2 0 16 2 0 17 2 0 18 2 0 19 E 2020E 2 0 2 1E 2022E 2023E 2 0 2 4E 2025E
Standalone Revenues 4,806 4,192 4,492 4,488 5,880 6,178 6,491 6,808 7,106 7,370 7,609 7,823
Revenue Synergies - - - - - - 32 34 36 37 38 39
Pr ofor ma Re ve nue For e ca st 4,8 0 6 4,19 2 4,49 2 4,48 8 5 ,8 8 0 6 ,17 8 6 ,5 2 4 6 ,8 42 7 ,141 7 ,40 7 7 ,6 47 7 ,8 6 2
Revenue Growth (12.8)% 7.2% (0.1)% 31.0% 5.1% 5.6% 4.9% 4.4% 3.7% 3.2% 2.8%
Standalone EBITDA 1,501 964 978 1,086 1,147 1,297 1,504 1,664 1,784 1,859 1,949 2,024
Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution - - - - - - 73 77 80 83 86 89
Pr ofor ma E BI T D A For e ca st 1,5 0 1 964 978 1,0 8 6 1,147 1,2 9 7 1,5 7 7 1,7 40 1,8 6 4 1,9 42 2 ,0 3 5 2 ,112
EBITDA Margin 31.2% 23.0% 21.8% 24.2% 19.5% 21.0% 24.2% 25.4% 26.1% 26.2% 26.6% 26.9%
Taxes (341) (209) (166) (168) (199) (176) (138) (176) (209) (237) (271) (300)
Capex (220) (199) (396) (283) (267) (306) (336) (376) (417) (390) (394) (379)
Change in Working Capital (178) 175 (23) (38) 111 87 (7) (7) (2) 0 (1) 6
C a shflow for Debt Service (post T a x e s, C a pe x , & WC ) 763 731 393 597 792 902 1,0 9 7 1,18 1 1,2 3 6 1,3 15 1,3 6 9 1,440
Interest Expense on Existing Debt 2 (6) (27) (28) (74) (66) - - - - - -
Senior LBO Debt Interest Expense - - - - - - (250) (250) (250) (250) (250) (196)
Junior LBO Debt Interest Expense - - - - - - (259) (212) (155) (88) (10) -
M a nda tor y D e bt S e r vice (I nte r e st E x pe nse ) 2 (6 ) (2 7 ) (2 8 ) (7 4) (6 6 ) (5 0 9 ) (46 2 ) (40 5 ) (3 3 8 ) (2 6 0 ) (19 6 )
Debt/EBITDA 6.0x 4.6x 3.7x 3.0x 2.4x 1.7x 1.1x
Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense 2.2x 2.6x 3.1x 3.9x 5.3x 7.4x
Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense 4.4x 4.7x 4.9x 5.3x 5.5x 7.4x
FC F for LBO D e bt Re pa yme nt 765 724 366 568 7 18 836 588 7 19 831 977 1,10 9 1,2 44
Repayment of LBO Debt - (588) (719) (831) (977) (1,109) (1,244)
Re sidua l C a shflow a fte r LBO D e bt S e r vice - - - - - -
LBO Pur cha se
Excess Cash on Balance Sheet 1,329 - - - - - -
Equity Issuance for LBO 7,071 - - - - - -
Senior LBO Debt Issuance 4,540 - - - - - -
Junior LBO Debt Issuance 3,243 - - - - - -
LBO Purchase Price (16,182) - - - - - -
Equi ty I RR C a l cul a ti on
LBO Sponsor Equity (7,071) - - - - - -
Sale Proceeds - - - - - - 22,815
Transaction Costs (Exit) - - - - - - (228)
Repayment of Debt - - - - - - (2,315)
Excess Cash - - - - - - -
Residual Cashflows - - - - - - -
LBO Assu mtion s
K e y Le ve r s V alu e s J u stific ation
Debt capacity based on recent LBO transactions. Growing proportion of US LBOs leveraged at 7x or
Debt/EBITDA 6.0x
higher (Source: S&P LCD)
Interest Rates An LBO would likely push TPR into non-investment grade territory. As such, senior debt providers
5.5% / 8.0%
(Senior / Junior) would likely demand L + 300 bps while Junior debt providers would require L + 600 bps.
Based on premiums paid by financial sponsors in similar historical transactions. Also factors in recent
Premium 25.0%
decrease in TPR's share price.
Based on NTM EV / EBITDA trading multiples of Tapestry's closest comparable companies.
Exit Multiple 10.2x
TPR has a stong FCF profile and low capital requirements which could allow a financial sponsor to take
Revenue Increase 0.5%
advantage of revenue enhancement opportunities.
EBITDA Assumes a financial sponsor could further improve the company's cost structure and eliminate some
1.0%
Margin Improvement SG&A overhead.
G I R : O U R S TO R Y
WE ARE THE PREMIERE EQUITY RESEARCH CLUB AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
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Toronto, teaching at the Rotman School of Management and being well
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We provide over 20 hours of Valuation & Financial Modelling training every academic year through our Analyst Bootcamp
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“Luxury will be always
around, no matter what
happens in the world.”
~Carolina Herrera
Advisory Team
Mark Brophy
Phone : (709) - 699 - 0195
Email : mark.brophy@mail.utoronto.ca
Jordan Li
Phone : (647) - 524 - 1447
Email : jordan.li@mail.utoronto.ca
Jennifer Li
NYSE: TPR Phone : (647) - 821 - 9924
New York, NY Email : xxje.li@mail.utoronto.ca
United States Srishti Singh

Phone : (647) - 770 - 5686
Email : srishti.singh@mail.utoronto.ca
Strategic Committee Assessment

Tapestry Inc. February 5th, 2019

NIBC2019 Presentation - Tapestry Inc

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“Luxury will be always

around, no matter what

United States Srishti Singh

Strategic Committee Assessment

Mark Jordan Jennifer Srishti

mark.brophy@mail.utoronto.ca jordan.li@mail.utoronto.ca xxje.li@mail.utoronto.ca srishti.singh@mail.utoronto.ca

Education Education Education Education

Key Experiences Key Experiences Key Experiences Key Experiences

Business Model and Objectives 7 Comparables Overview 21

Operating Forecast 8 Precedents Overview 22

Capital Structure 9 DCF Overview 23

Shareholder Ownership 10 LBO Overview 24

Industry Overview Strategic Advisor y

Key Industry Trends 13 Recommendation I: Debt Issuance & Share Repurchases 27

Competitive Landscape 15 Recommendation III: Salvatore Ferragamo Acquisition 29

Competitor Industry Merger Activity 16 Industry Corporate Finance Activity 30

Valuation Football Field 19 Additional Information 36

Highlights 52 Week Share Performance*

Key Management Revenue Mix (2018) | % | Gross ($M) Trading Statistics

Revenue Drivers Cost Drivers

Capital Structure Liquidity Analysis

⎼ Tapestry has a debt-to-equity ratio of ~0.14, closely inline with the

Capital Structure Overview 10,000,000

Capital Structure 5,000,000

Debt Breakdown Volume SMAVG (15)

TPR 4 ¼ 04/01/25 600

$0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 Source: FactSet

Commentary Investor Type

⎻ Gross Common Share Count: 289,796,000

⎻ Largest institutional shareholders include – (%OS / Activism Level): SHARES OS

 Renaissance Technologies LLC – 1.70% / Very Low

Source: FactSet 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Revenue by Segment Accessories dominate in mix of products Revenue by Major Segment

China Leads the Emerging Market Potential Total Debt/EBITDA 2.9x

Initial Phase Mid-Chain End Consumer Channels

Tapestry Inc.’s Key Supplier and Customers

• Alibaba Group Holdings SG&A: 1.15% • Macy’s Inc. REV: 1.49%

180 − A high-end fashion

Timeline of Deals & Events

Carlyle Group Dominion Diamond Luxottica LVMH acquires Michael Kors

2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2017 2018

PVH buys remaining PVH acquires Permira sells Michael Kors

Blackstone buys JACK Tapestry acquires Stuart Tapestry acquires Kate

Drivers of M&A Activity

Share Price Performance

Sep 20, 2018:

25th Percentile to Median

Discounted Cash Flow Median to 75th Percentile

52-Week Trading Range

$15.00 $25.00 $35.00 $45.00 $55.00 $65.00 $75.00

⎻ Comparable Companies: Tapestry is fairly valued based on $50.00 $3,000

Historical Valuation Broker Estimates

⎻ A strong majority of analysts have “buy” recommendations for TPR

50.0x 15.0x $60 80%

$15 41% 41% 40% 36% 36% 20%

$65.00 Operational improvements in Kate Spade segment

Min to 25th Upside Case Rationale

DCF Su mmary - B ase Case Cash f l ow F orecast

April 25th, 2017 7.3x

November 16th, 2012 1.0x EV / Revenue

0.0x 4.0x 8.0x 12.0x 16.0x 20.0x

Drivers of M&A Activity

LBO Viability Assumptions & Outputs

⎻ Macro Environment Conditions: Assumption Base Case Optimistic Case