1

Ernie Chamberlain
Point Lonsdale VIC 3225
ernestchris@tpg.com.au
Research Note 9/2019
13 May 2019

Department of Veterans’ Affairs

Australian War Memorial – Canberra.
Australian Army History Unit – Canberra.
ADFA/UNSW – Military Operations Analysis Team – Canberra.
Australian Army Military Intelligence Museum – Canungra.
National Vietnam Veterans’ Museum (NVVM) – Phillip Island
5RAR Association (President - Colonel R. Wainwright, Retd)

Vietnam War: The Battle of Bình Ba – June 1969: Enemy Aspects

References:
A. Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and
the Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2014. ISBN 978-0-9750350-5-4. Including 23
appendixes - 128,000 words.
B. Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their History
(1965-1989) – including the Battles of Binh Ba -1969 and Nui Le – 1971), Point
Lonsdale, 2017. ISBN 978-0-9750350-61. A translation of the 33rd Regiment’s 2016
History, with commentary – including nine annexes. 79,500 words.
C. Chamberlain, E.P., A Morale-Boosting Bulletin – for the 33rd NVA Regiment after
the Battle of Bình Ba June 1969 - Research Note 25/2018 (5RAR Association website
- 17 September 2018). Copy attached as Annex A to this Research Note.
D. Chamberlain, E.P., Research Note 2/2019, First Contact: 1st Australian Task Force (1
ATF) and the 33rd NVA Regiment, Operation Federal and the Tết Offensive –
February 1969, 9 February 2019.

“Đoàn 84C” – 33rd NVA Regiment

 2

Scope and Contents

With the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Bình Ba in early June 2019, this 48-page
Research Note summarises aspects of the References cited above – in particular the “33rd
Regiment’s “Their Story” (Reference A - published in 2014) and the analysis of the 33rd
Regiment’s version of “Their History” (Reference B – published in 2016). Both those works
cover in detail the Regiment’s formation in North Vietnam in February 1965, its deployment
down the “Trail”, and its battles in the Central Highlands in October-November 1965 against
the US 1st Air Cavalry Division. This May 2019 Note focuses on the 33rd Regiment’s
engagements with elements of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) in 1969 – principally the
Battle of Bình Ba in central Phước Tuy Province in early June 1969.
Perhaps of particular interest is the account of a 33rd Regiment “battalion-level
ambush” sited on Route 2 - just north of 1ATF’s Núi Đất base, that was planned to engage
the 1ATF Ready Reaction Force (the D/5RAR “Group”) as it deployed north to Bình Ba
village on 6 June 1969. Information on this “ambush” only “came-to-light” in 2012 - and had
not been included in earlier Australian publications. The 33rd NVA Regiment’s planned
“Route 2 ambush” was first described in Reference A (“Their Story”- 2014) – and advised to
Australian historians and veterans in April 2014.1
Contents listing: Scope and Contents – p.2; The Communists’ June 1969 Country-
wide “High Points” Campaign – p.3; 33rd NVA Regiment Activities – May 1969 – p.4; 33rd
Regiment Moves Towards Bình Ba – and Signals Intelligence (with a map) - p.6; The 33rd
Regiment’s Account – their 2016 History – p.10; The Plan: Disrupted by “Australian
Commandos” - and Changed – p.11; The Early June 1969 “High Point” Begins – p.15; The
Battle of Bình Ba Begins – and a Failed Ambush on Route 2 ? – p.17; The 33rd Regiment’s
Account of the Battle in “Their History” (2016) - p.19; The Battle – The Australian Accounts
– p.21; The Battle – 6 June 1969 – p.24; Bình Ba - 7 June 1969 – p.27; C-41 attacks Hòa
Long – and Operation Tong – p.28; The Aftermath – p.29; Casualties – p.31; 33rd Regiment
at Bình Ba – A Discussion – p.34; Post-script – p.38; High Point – Phase Two – p.40; The
33rd Regiment’s Achievements and Losses Summarized – p.43; The 33rd Regiment’s
Veterans’ Association – and Reunions (with photographs) – p.44; Annex A: A Morale-
Boosting Bulletin – Research Note 25/2018 – pp.46-48.

1
In April 2014, complimentary copies of “The 33rd NVA Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their Story”
(Reference A) – with covering letters noting the Route 2 “ambush” (ie at p.39 of Appendix 3 to Reference A –
see also pages 17-18 in this Note), were passed to Major General Murray Blake AO MC (Retd), Major General
J.P. (Paul) Stevens AO (Retd), Major General David M. Butler AO DSO (Retd), Brigadier Colin Khan DSO,
AM (Retd), Colonel Roger Wainwright (Retd), Lieutenant Colonel Fred Fairhead (Retd), and Major Ray De
Vere MC OAM (Retd).
 3

The Communists’ June 1969 Country-wide “High Points” Campaign

On 20 May 1969, the planned meeting on Midway Island scheduled for 10 June
between the US President Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thiệu was announced in
the American press.2 With the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
(PRG) also scheduled for early June3, the communist leadership planned a period of “High
Point” attacks across the South from early to mid-June 1969 “to emphasize the enemy’s
((NVA/VC’s)) continuing capability to conduct offensive action.”4 This required
adjustments to - and an intensification of, the ongoing operations of the communists’
“Summer-Autumn Campaign” and “Long Khánh Campaign” launched in the first week of
May 1969.5 To direct the “High Point” offensive activity in their Bà Rịa-Long Khánh
Province, Military Region 7 established a “Campaign Headquarters”.6 Within Phước Tuy
Province (the southern “half” of the VC’s Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province), a major attack was
2
“Nixon to Seek Joint Policy with Thieu in Midway Talk”, New York Times, Washington, 20 May 1969.
3
The PRG’s founding conference was held in the period 6-8 June, with the PRG’s formation formally
announced on 10 June 1969 – for background analysis, including photographs, see USOM, The Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Viet-Nam: Documents and Research Notes,
Saigon, January 1972, Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT) Item No.2310913001.
4
COMUSMACV. Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 – 30 June 1969), MACJ3-
051, Saigon, 20 August 1969, p.15. 1ATF reported: “On the evening of 5/6 June, the enemy opened the June
action period throughout the III CTZ with attacks which were probably stated to emphasise the enemy’s
continuing capabilities to conduct offensive action throughout South Vietnam, for the benefit of the Presidential
meeting at MIDWAY.” – 1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No. 22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Núi Đất.
“Sources indicated that the 5-9 June highpoint was regarded as the second most significant offensive period of
the Summer Campaign, as it was planned to coincide with the Midway Conference between Presidents Nixon
and Thieu on 8 June.” - see 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report – Lessons Learned: Period Ending 31
July 1969, 18 December 1969 – VCAT Item No.168300010477. On 18 June, Brigadier General W.E. Potts (J2 –
Intelligence, MACV) - briefed VIP visitors to MACV: “The enemy plans a three-month spring-summer
offensive, May-July, with at least one high point, a ‘brief surge of enemy activity’, per month. The first occurred
on the night of 11-12 May 1969. The second was on the night of 5-6 June 1969. Attacks by fire continue to be
the enemy’s primary method of attack … This 5-6 June high point reveals to us the enemy’s declining
effectiveness on the battlefield.” Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes 1968-1972 (Modern
Southeast Asia Series), Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, 2004., 2004, p.211.
5
A US Headquarters II FFV report later summarized that: “A Summer Offensive was launched by the enemy on
5 May, with highpoints consisting primarily of attacks by fire occurring twice during the months of May and
June and once during July. Losses inflicted on the enemy during June 1969 were the highest since May 1968.” II
Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December 1969,
p.19.
6
The “Campaign Headquarters” is mentioned four times in the D440 History (2011) - Đảng Ủy – Bộ Chỉ Huy
Quân Sự Tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Lịch Sử Tiểu Đoàn 440 Anh Hùng - Bà Rịa-Long Khánh (1967-1979), op.cit.,
2011, pp.90-92. A 33rd Regiment account also notes that the “Campaign Headquarters” directed the 33rd NVA
Regiment to assume the major occupation task at Bình Ba - see Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung
Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 – see Appendix 3 to Reference A. A
Party History – while not specifically mentioning a “Campaign”, related: “The Military Committee of COSVN’s
Headquarters directed the 33rd COSVN Main Force Regiment to coordinate with the Province’s D440 (ie 2nd
Battalion) and the Châu Đức District troops to counter-attack on Route 2.” - Trần Văn Khánh (et al), Ban … Bà
Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Tập II, 1954-1975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII). The
“Campaign Headquarters” is not specifically titled, but it was probably an element from Headquarters Military
Region 7 (although it is not mentioned in the Military Region 7 History). An official listing of the 39 NVA/VC
“campaigns” in the South during the War does not include a discrete “Bình Ba Campaign” – but does include a
“Long Khánh Campaign: 5 May – 20 June 1969” - see: Phạm Vĩnh Phúc Colonel (ed – et al), Operations in the
US Resistance War, NXB Thế Giới (The World Publishing House), Hà Nội, 2009, pp.87-90.
 4

planned against the village of Bình Ba7 – and the ambush of any 1ATF relief force, with
lesser attacks on both Hòa Long8 and Hội Mỹ villages.
33rd NVA Regiment Activities – May 1969
According to US technical intelligence sources, in early May 1969 the 33rd
Regiment9 moved from a base just west of the Mây Tào Mountains (vicinity YS 6893) to a
location (vicinity YT 3805) about nine kilometres south-west of Xuân Lộc Town – where it
remained until about 22 May.10 According to a rallier, on 17 May 1969, at about that location
(11 kilometres south-west of Xuân Lộc – YT 387020), two battalions of the 33rd Regiment
were hit by a B-52 strike and suffered heavy casualties.11 On 18 May 1969, well-coordinated
7
The village of Bình Ba (including the hamlets of Đức Mỹ and Đức Trung, but not including Suối Nghệ) – with
a total population of about 1,300, was centred at YS 449740 on the western side of Route 2, about 6.5
kilometres north of the 1ATF base at Núi Đất – see also footnotes 35 and 36. The village included a large
number of masonry and brick houses with tiled roofs, and many of villagers worked in the surrounding rubber
plantations and in the rubber processing facility in Đức Trung hamlet (YS 454748 – population 500) on the
northern edge of the village. Đức Trung was a “factory village” centred on the installations of the Gallia rubber
enterprise. The hamlet of Đức Mỹ (YS 445730) - a few hundred metres south of Bình Ba, had a population of
about 350. Suối Nghệ (YS 430715) was a resettlement village with a population of 1,040 - see also footnotes 33,
73, 75 and 87.
8
The D440 History (2011) combines the engagements at Bình Ba and Hòa Long as one battle – ie: “In this
battle, only our thrust against the enemy in the area of Ấp Bắc hamlet (Hòa Long) achieved a success close to
complete.” – Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), 2013,
p.68.
9
In the period 1966-1969, the 33rd Regiment was commanded first by Tô Đình Khảm, then Ma Văn Minh. By
May 1969, Ma Văn Minh had probably been re-assigned to the Military Region and may have been replaced as
the 33rd Regiment Commander by Nguyễn Văn Thường – Combined Documents Exploitation Center (CDEC)
Log 10-1962-69, and Đinh Văn Đạt was the Regiment’s political commissar with Hồ Minh/Sỹ Tường as an
assistant political officer. However, one 33rd Regiment History monograph indicates that Hoàng Cao Hỷ
replaced Ma Văn Minh as the Regiment Commander in 1969 - Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33
(A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010 –
(Appendix 2 to Reference A). The author’s discussions in 2012 and 2013 with 33rd Regiment veterans also
indicates that Hoàng Cao Hỷ was the 33rd Regiment Commander in June 1969 – see footnote 68 and
photograph at p.43; and footnotes 466, and 472 in Reference A.
10
The 33rd NVA Regiment was also reportedly identified south-west of Xuân Lộc Town on 11 May 1969 when
US forces contacted 33rd Regiment elements at YS 401993, 11 kilometres south-southwest of Xuân Lộc –
resulting in 18 NVA/VC killed, one PW, and ten individual weapons recovered. - 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.19-
69, 10-17 May 1969, Núi Đất.
11
Earlier - in the period 8-11 May 1969, following an engagement with the 43rd ARVN Regiment about 18km
north of Xuân Lộc Town (YT 475275) which was supported by B-52 strikes, a total of 221 enemy bodies (unit
not reported) were found, some in mass graves – 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.18-69, Núi Đất, 4-10 May 1969.
According to the rallier noted above – a local force guerilla present in the area of the airstrike, the 33rd
Regiment suffered 50 to 70 killed and 20 bunkers were destroyed - 1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.19-69, Núi Đất,
10-17 May 1969. Collateral information confirmed a B-52 strike in that area at that time. According to the
official Australian Army history: “In mid-May, signals intelligence had detected 33 NVA Regiment in the Hát
Dịch [sic] region moving towards Phước Tuy province. In response, American B-52s heavily bombed the
suspect area and SAS patrols subsequently sighted enemy carrying away their wounded.” – Ekins, A. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.205 and Endnote 27 at p.923: citing Lieutenant Colonel
(Retd) P.F. de Cure – Interview, pp.17-18, 50-51, 11 February 1994. However, this is not quite correct – as
signals intelligence (SIGINT) records indicate that the Headquarters of the 33rd Regiment moved from south-
east of Xuân Lộc in early May to the area YT 3805 (about seven kilometres south-west of Xuân Lộc) in mid-
 5

attacks on Xuân Lộc by the 5th VC Division - and on An Lộc (YT 3909) and Tân Lập (YT
4103) by the 33rd Regiment were reported by the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
(11ACR).12 During the period 20-25 May, the 33rd Regiment moved about 40 kilometres
from south-west of Xuân Lộc Town eastward to a position (vicinity YT 7506) about 30
kilometres east of the Town. On 24 May 1969, 11ACR engaged elements of the 33rd NVA
Regiment at YT 325024 - 12 kilometres north-west of Blackhorse (ie the major 11ACR base
at YS 4396), resulting in 15 enemy KIA13 ; and the 11ACR reportedly “contacted K9
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment between 28 May and 2 June east of Blackhorse base camp.”14
In the last week of May 1969, 1ATF reported that the 33rd Regiment was located
“south of Xuân Lộc (YS 569988)”, with a strength 1,130.15 Summarising the end of May and
the 1st of June, 1ATF noted that: “A large number of Main Force troops that moved through
the area from west to east during the period is [sic] believed to be from 33rd NVA Regiment
which has partially relocated from south-west of Xuân Lộc (YT 4408) to northwest of Base
Area 302.16 … Conclusions: The Main Force units to the north of the Province will probably
utilize the next week for rest, recuperation and refit activities, while continuing to avoid

May 1969 – ie moving away from Phước Tuy, but in the general area of the reported B-52 strike. On 25 May,
the Regiment was located 30 kilometres east of Xuân Lộc. For SIGINT-derived locations of the 33rd
Regiment’s movements from late May to early July 1969, see the following map (page 7 and footnote 22) – also
as Appendix 17 in Reference A. For earlier reporting on B-52 strikes in the Central Highlands in 1965 - and a
published eye-witness account, see footnote 74 in Reference A.
12
11ACR, Quarterly Evaluation Report, 24 July 1969. VCAT Item No. 3400112001: “After these attacks ((by
the 5th VC Division on Xuân Lộc and the 33rd Regiment on An Lộc and Tân Lập on 18 May 1969)), the enemy
retreated to War Zone D and the jungle areas east of the Blackhorse base, respectively. The 11th ACR contacted
K9 Battalion of 33 Regiment between 28 May and 2 June east of the Blackhorse base camp.” Subsequently
captured medical records indicated that the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment had attacked the 411th Regional
Forces Company at Tân Lập (YT 3908) on 18 May 1969 - 1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969.
13
1ATF Vietnam Digest No.20-69, 17-24 May 1969, Núi Đất. Two 12.7mm heavy machine guns and two
82mm mortars were also captured - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report for Period Ending 31
July 1969, 18 August 1969 - http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/506335.pdf .
14
According to 11ACR: “11ACR operations east of Blackhorse between 28 May and 7 June forced elements of
the 33rd Regiment from that area, easing pressure on Xuân Lộc.” - 11ACR, Quarterly Evaluation Report, 24
July 1969. On 28 May, 18 NVA/VC of the 33rd Regiment were reportedly killed at YT 560013; and on 29 May,
20 NVA/VC of the 33rd Regiment’s “D9” (ie 3rd Battalion) were killed at YS 569988. 11ACR reporting
summarised that in a 23-day coordinated operation with the 18th ARVN Division from 15 May 1969 in the
Blackhorse Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI), “contacts with the 33rd NVA Regiment resulted in
124 NVA/VC KIA.” – 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1969, 18
August 1969 – see the preceding footnote. A Hà Nội-based NGO recorded Lieutenant Bùi Thanh Khê (section
2ic [sic] in 1/33rd Regiment – b. 1950, Hải Hưng) and Phạm Văn Thi (platoon commander in 1/33rd Regiment
– b. 1942, Hải Hưng) – as killed on 27 May 1969, see MARIN website 2 May 2012 :
http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3767 .
15
1ATF, Vietnam Digest No.21-69, 24-31 May 1969. “South of Xuân Lộc” appears to be in error as the cited
grid reference is about 16 kilometres south-east of Xuân Lộc Town. This is an unusual assessment as the
Headquarters of the 33rd Regiment had been “fixed” by technical intelligence – ie signals intelligence, on 25
May 1969 in the vicinity of YT 7508 about 30 kilometres east of Xuân Lộc Town.
16
Base Area 302 was located in eastern Phước Tuy Province north of Xuyên Mộc Town. Its camps were
principally around the “96 Feature” (YS 6578) and the logistics focal point was north and east of the abandoned
village of Thừa Tích (YS 6181) on Route 328.
 6

1ATF and 11ACR operations. 33rd Regiment is expected to continue to attempt to move the
balance of its forces east of Route 2 into southern Long Khánh Province.”17

33rd Regiment Moves Towards Bình Ba – and Signals Intelligence

On 25 May 1969, the headquarters of the 33rd NVA Regiment was located by signals
intelligence in south-eastern Long Khánh Province - about 16 kilometres north of the Mây
Tào Mountains at YS 7508.18 Through its tactical signals intelligence unit – 547 Signal
Troop, 1ATF followed the deployment of the 33rd Regiment headquarters as it moved south-
west from Long Khánh Province towards Bình Ba village in Phước Tuy Province19 - as

17
1ATF, Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province: 232400H May - 012400H June 1969, 3 June 1969. When
completing this report, the 1ATF intelligence staff would have received the first signals intelligence (SIGINT)
indications that the 33rd Regiment was beginning to move south-east towards Phước Tuy Province.
18
At 1ATF, 547 Signal Troop – a dedicated SIGINT unit, intercepted NVA/VC communications and, through
airborne direction finding, was able to determine the location of NVA/VC radio transmitters. The Troop was
located adjacent to Headquarters 1ATF in the Núi Đất base with direct reporting access to the 1ATF
Commander and his principal operational and intelligence staffs. 33 rd Regiment’s radio communications to
higher headquarters and to its subordinate units were principally in morse code (HF band) and used the Chinese
102E 15-watt radio (range 2-12 MHz) and sometimes the US-manufactured AN/GRC-9 (2-12 Mhz, 1-15 watt).
The communications traffic was encrypted mostly in a code of four or five “short-figure” groups - Hampstead,
B., 547 Signals Troop in Vietnam: The Soldiers’ Perspectives – Deployment, Early Days and the Lead-up to
Long Tan, Toowoomba, July 2008. Their communications security was reportedly “impeccable” without any
“operator chatter”, and used a one-time pad (OTP) system that was “unsolvable” – Richards, T.J. Brigadier
(Retd), email to author, 1 May 2012. However, when combat was imminent, the Regiment’s cypher clerks were
reportedly sometimes withdrawn and lesser/simpler security codes used – but these were still quite complex. In
combat, units would often use lower-powered VHF FM radios - including captured equipment, for voice
communications with subordinate elements – which were less liable to interception. For equipment, procedures
and techniques, see the 9th VC Division 1966 annual communications report at CDEC Log 03-2865-67, VCAT
Item No. F034601031499; and a report on the 23rd Regiment at VCAT Item No.11271007002. While the
content of the 33rd Regiment’s HF radio communications could not normally be decrypted, the sites of
transmitters could be accurately fixed by airborne and ground-based radio direction-finding operations.
Reportedly, if coding material had not been delivered from COSVN, it was not uncommon for NVA/VC units to
employ lower-grade ciphers for extended periods – “manna from heaven for the SIGINT unit at Núi Đất.” –
Author’s discussions with 547 Signal Troop veterans, 2011-2013. Although messages could not be decrypted,
intelligence could be gleaned from the “externals” of messages and other factors. Aware of Allied intercept
operations, for security NVA/VC units relied principally on couriers - ie rather than radio communications,
whenever possible. Since 1965, COSVN had warned formations and units to ensure radio transmitters were
“remoted” or “displaced” several kilometres from the location of their headquarters. The 9th VC Division
reported that in 1966 one transmitter site had been struck five times by B-52 raids. Additional to their Chinese
short-range man-pack radios (the 71B and the later K-63 – range 25 kilometres), NVA/VC forces commonly
used captured radio equipment for voice communications, principally the US AN/PRC-10 and its replacement,
the more capable AN/PRC-25. The VHF FM PRC-25 had a range of up to eight kilometres (using the short
steel-tape aerial) and up to about 17 kilometres (using the long-whip aerial).
19
According to the Australian Official History (ie Fighting to the Finish, 2012) – in a section titled: “The enemy
mystery”, that History states “there seemed to be no rationale for their ((the enemy)) actions. Australian
commanders and intelligence officers were baffled. During the initial occupation of Binh Ba, 33 NVA Regiment
had apparently maintained radio silence, eluding task force signals intelligence.” - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.237. This statement appears to cite a 2007 monograph that claimed “strict
radio silence” enabled “elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment and D440 Battalion to occupy the village of Binh
Ba without warning.” - Tidey, B., Forewarned Forearmed: Australian Specialist Intelligence Support in South
Vietnam 1966-1971, Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No.160, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University, Canberra, December 2007, pp.49-50. However, this is not correct as 547 Signal
 7

indicated on the following map. Post-war, the Task Force commander – Brigadier C.M.I.
Pearson, wrote: “There was some skirmishing between the NVA advance units and 6RAR …
we continued to track the NVA force which, in the main, slipped past 6RAR the following
night.”20.
A 547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist has related21:
- “On 30 May 1969, the 33rd NVA Regiment was located by airborne direction-finding
equipment just inside Phước Tuy Province to the northwest [sic] of Xuyên Mộc.
- On 1 June 1969, 33rd Regiment was detected in cipher communications with VC
Military Region 7 and ‘fixed’ just to the west of the Sông Ray ((River)), but north of Xuyên
Mộc.

1ATF SIGINT Direction-finding (DF) Locations of 33rd Regiment’s Headquarters

29 April – 2 July 1969 22

Troop intercepted the 33rd NVA Regiment’s active communications throughout May and June 1969 as the
Regiment approached Bình Ba – see Chamberlain, E. Brigadier (Retd), “The Battle of Bình Ba: a baffling
mystery and SIGINT failure – No!”, The Bridges Review, Issue 1, Canungra, January 2013, pp.91-92 – ie an
Australian Intelligence Corps publication – see: Appendix 11 to Reference A.
20
Pearson C.M.I.. Major General (Retd), letter to LTCOL Ian McNeill (Retd) – official historian and author of
“To Long Tan” (1993), 7 March 1991. AWM File 92/1893.
21
The above information was provided in writing to the author in mid-March 2012 by a knowledgeable former
547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist who had served in the Troop throughout June 1969.
22
These are the DF locations of the Regiment’s principal HF radio (Chicom 102E – 15w). The map summarises
the “end-of-week” reporting locations. See Appendix 17 to Reference A for a DF locations map covering a
larger geographical area. The US 11ACR was based at Blackhorse (near Long Giao) south of Xuân Lộc Town –
see footnote 166 in Reference A, and footnotes 11, 12, and 13 for its operations in May and June 1969 - which
 8

- The real drama occurred on 3 June when we were able to brief the Task Force
Commander and the GSO2 Intelligence that HQ 33rd NVA Regiment had crossed the Sông
Ray ((River)) and was located to the north of 1ATF.23
- On 4 June, 547 Signal Troop was able to locate both the HQ of 33rd NVA Regiment
and its 1st Battalion at different locations north-west of the pro-Việt Cộng hamlet of Đức
Trung ((YS 453748)).24 We were unable to get the other two battalions of 33rd NVA
Regiment by direction-finding because, although they were receiving traffic, they did not
send any.
- On 5 June, the morning airborne direction-finding mission fixed the radio transmitter
of the Headquarters of the 33rd NVA Regiment near Đức Trung. All of this was briefed
immediately to the Task Force Commander by the 547 Signal Troop operations staff.”
Throughout late May to mid-June 1969, the radio transmitters of the VC’s 274 Main
Force Regiment25 – a formation of the 5th VC Division, had been “fixed” by signals
intelligence in their normal operating area far to the north-west – just outside Phước Tuy
Province in south-western Long Khánh Province and south-eastern Biên Hòa Province, and
274 Regiment’s communications “traffic did not indicate that it was preparing for combat.”26

ranged across seven provinces of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). The headquarters of 1ATF’s 6RAR/NZ was
deployed in FSB Virginia (YS 437801) six kilometres north of the centre of Bình Ba village and two kilometres
west of Route 2 – with its elements deployed on Operation Lavarack, see footnotes 36, 40, 41 and 138 in
Reference A.
23
A 547 Signal Troop analyst also recounted reporting to the senior 1ATF intelligence officer and his staff that:
“33 NVA Regiment had crossed the Song Rai [sic].” - Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack - Phuoc Tuy Province,
Vietnam, 1969”, Australian Army Journal, Vol VII, No.2, Winter 2010, p.94.
24
The village of Bình Ba on Route 2 was situated in the southern part of Đức Thạnh District. In 1969, the
village comprised three hamlets: Bình Ba (located centrally), Đức Mỹ (to the south) and Đức Trung (to the
north). Although the District’s population was 52% “Catholic”, Bình Ba village was 90% “Buddhist”. Đức
Trung was the site of the French-owned Gallia rubber plantation’s processing factory. See also footnote 7.
25
In early June 1969, USMACV reported 274 VC Regiment in the Hắc Dịch/Bình Sơn area in south-eastern
Biên Hòa Province – in the vicinity of YS 3583, with a strength of 900. However, a 1ATF intelligence
summary reported that “sensors have detected a movement south of the 274 th VC Regiment to the northern and
western borders of the Province” – Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province: 1-8 June 1969, Núi Đất, 10 June
1969. 6RAR/NZ had also reportedly contacted elements of the 274 th Regiment north of Bình Ba in early June
during Operation Lavarack - Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit.,
2010. Throughout early June 1969, SIGINT had “fixed” the 274 th Regiment in the far south-western corner of
Long Khánh Province in the vicinity of YS 3390. However, 6RAR/NZ engaged a large group of the 274th
Regiment on a resupply mission eastward to the 84 th Rear Service Group on 5 June 1969 near the Long
Khánh/Phước Tuy border (YS 473889). In his 2006 memoir, the commanding officer of the 274 th Regiment in
June 1969 – Nguyễn Nam Hưng (Nguyễn Văn Trịnh) makes no mention of that Regiment’s activities in early
June 1969 – but notes that he was hospitalized for an appendectomy operation in May 1969. - Nguyễn Nam
Hưng - Major General, Một Đời Chinh Chiến (A Life at War), Nhà Xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2006.
26
On the basis of signals intelligence, 547 Signal Troop advised the 1ATF commander and security-cleared staff
officers “that 274 Regt transmitters remained in their normal locations, and traffic did not indicate it was
preparing for combat. Due to the early warning time provided by the Troop, the Commander 1ATF had several
days to prepare and deploy his Ready Reaction Force to any location that the 33rd might attack.” - Hartley,
R.W. & Hampstead, B. V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2014, p.181.
Several years earlier – on 18 August 1966 during the Battle of Long Tân, 547 Signal Troop had similarly
advised the Task Force commander that 274 VC Regiment was inactive - emails to the author from Brigadier
 9

33rd Regiment troops crossing the Sông Ray River

Movement of the 33rd Regiment and D440 Battalion towards Bình Ba;
and C41 Company towards Hòa Long 27

(Retired) T. J. Richards – OC 547 Sig Tp (1966-67), 24 April 2012, 1 May 2012 (274 Regiment: “They
appeared to be on R&R”), and 12 July 2013.
27
The move of Châu Đức District’s C-41 Company to attack Hòa Long on 7 June is also indicated. These
deployments are also related at Appendix 11 to Reference A; and in Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 …, 2013,
pp.62-68.
 10

The 33rd Regiment’s Account – their 2016 History 28

The 33rd Regiment’s recently published history – in italics below, relates that:
“After the Long Khánh Campaign, the Military Region 7 Headquarters tasked the
Regiment to conduct independent operations in Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, the areas of Châu
Pha, Hắc Dịch, Phước Thái, Cầu Vạt … and to coordinate with D445 Battalion [sic - an error
throughout the Regiment’s 2016 History, should be D440 Battalion 29] local-force troops to
launch a campaign on Route 2 from the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector to the area of the Sông Cầu
River.30 Although our units faced many difficulties and did not have adequate food, the Bà
Rịa-Long Khánh Province Committee supported the Regiment. … The Province Unit
Headquarters (with Comrade Tư Lạc as Commander of the Province Unit) also assisted the
Regiment to overcome our food difficulties. The Province Committee allowed the Regiment to
collect green bananas in the southern section of Route 2 to alleviate the troops’ hunger. …
The Sub-Region31 and the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Committee tasked the Regiment to
attack an Australian mechanised battalion that was stationed in the Núi Đất area of Phước
Tuy Province (nowadays part of Long Phước village of Bà Rịa City).32
The Regimental Headquarters comprised: Cao Hỷ – Regimental Commander; Đinh
Văn Đạt – Political Commissar; and Vương Lưu – Chief-of- Staff. As soon as we arrived in
the area, the Regimental Headquarters discussed the plan to attack the 64th [sic- the “664th”]
Regional Force33 Company in Bình Ba village with the aim of luring the Australians at Núi

28
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment - North Vietnamese Army: Their History (1965-1989) – including the
Battles of Binh Ba -1969 and Nui Le – 1971), Point Lonsdale, 2017. ISBN 978-0-9750350-61. A translation of
the Regiment’s 2016 History, an “exegesis” with commentary – including nine annexes. 79,500 words.
29
Translator’s (Chamberlain’s) Note: The VC D445 Battalion was not involved in the June 1969 engagement at
Bình Ba village – see the D445 Histories of 1991 and 2004. Rather, the D440 Battalion was involved at Bình Ba
– as detailed in its 2011 History, see Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 Battalion, op.cit., 2013, pp.61-69.
30
Translator’s Note: The Sông Cầu River crosses Route 2 immediately north of the 1ATF base at Núi Đất.
31
Translator’s Note: The Bà Rịa Sub-Region was not established by COSVN until May 1971 – together with
the Thủ Biên Sub-Region.
32
Translator’s Note: As noted earlier at footnote 4, on 20 May 1969, the planned meeting on Midway Island
scheduled for 10 June between the US President Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thiệu was announced
in the US press. With the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) also scheduled for
early June, the communist leadership planned a period of “High Point” attacks across the South from early to
mid-June 1969 “to emphasize the enemy’s ((NVA/VC’s)) continuing capability to conduct offensive action.”
This required adjustments to - and an intensification of, the ongoing operations of the “Summer-Autumn
Campaign” and “Long Khánh Campaign” launched in the first week of May 1969. Within Phước Tuy Province
(the southern “half” of the VC’s Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province), a major attack was planned against the village
of Bình Ba and the ambush of any 1ATF relief force, with lesser attacks on both Hòa Long (1ATF Operation
Tong) and Hội Mỹ villages. For detail on the communists’ June 1969 “High Point/Summer Campaign”, see
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment …, op.cit., 2014, pp.50-52 (Reference A).
33
Translator’s Note: The Regional Forces (RF) were termed the Civil Guard/Civil Defence Force (Bảo An) until
1964 when they were retitled Regional Forces (Địa Phương Quân) and were transferred from the Ministry of
the Interior to the Ministry of Defence – together with the Dân Vệ (Self-Defence Corps) which later became the
Popular Force (PF - Nghĩa Quân ). Both the RF and the lesser-capable PF – collectively termed “Territorial
Forces”, were armed and uniformed. Throughout the War – and post-War, some Vietnamese communist
writings continued to refer to the Regional Forces as “Bảo An”. At the end of 1966, there were 17 Regional
Force (RF) companies and 46 Popular Force (PF) platoons in Phước Tuy Province (totalling 4,500 troops) –
together with an understrength ARVN battalion (1/43/10th Division) – ie later retitled the 18th Division –
McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.403. The locations of all ARVN – including RF and PF elements, in
Phước Tuy Province as at 30 November 1966 are recorded in the 1ATF report on ARVN, RF and PF
 11

Đất to rescue the Regional Forces and then wiping out the Australian force – in accord with
the direction of the Sub-Region and the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Committee.
The 64th [sic] Regional Force Company’s post in Bình Ba village was three
kilometres south of Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector – and 18 kilometres from the Phước Tuy Province
capital, and about 20 [sic] kilometres34 from the Australian’s base at Núi Đất. Bình Ba
village comprised three hamlets: Bình Ba Xăng, Bình Ba Làng35, and Hamlet 4 36 – and its
extensive rubber plantations bordered mature jungle.”

The Plan: Disrupted by “Australian Commandos” - and Changed

As described in the D440 Battalion History (2011), in late May 1969 D440 was in the
Xuyên Mộc area and had been tasked to interdict Route 23 – particularly in the area of the
major bridge at Cầu Trọng (YS 599637). However, it was ordered by the “Campaign
Headquarters” to abandon that task and move swiftly to the north-west to occupy Bình Ba
village and “to prepare for the battle to be launched in coordination with the 33rd
Regiment”.37
Describing the action in the Bình Ba area, a 33rd Regiment history monograph related
that: “according to the initial attack plan, 440 Battalion was to attack and seize the objectives
in the strategic hamlet at Bình Ba – including the post of the 664 Regional Forces Company,

Dispositions in Phuoc Tuy Sector, R92-1-2, Núi Đất, 31 December 1966 – see AWM95, 1/4/20, folio 40. In
mid-1967, the national strength of the RF was 253,664 and the PF 186,365 – with ARVN regular strength at
455,481. The 302nd Regional Force Battalion was formed in early 1971 and based at The Horseshoe feature
from June 1971 – for the larger Regional Forces Group (“Liên Đoàn”), see also footnote 488 in Reference A.
For detail on the RF, PF and PSDF – see Ngô Quang Trường - Lieutenant General, Territorial Forces, Indochina
Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C., 1981. There was no “664 Regional
Force (RF) Company” in the Bình Ba area. 655 RF Company – strength 106, was located in Đức Trung hamlet
(YS 446747 - the northern hamlet of Bình Ba village); and 626 RF Company – strength 98, was located at Suối
Nghệ (YS 434716) about two kilometres south of Bình Ba village.
34
Translator’s Note: The 1ATF base at Núi Đất was only about six-and-a-half kilometres south of Bình Ba
village.
35
Translator’s Note: Bình Ba Xăng and Bình Ba Làng were not terms used by 1ATF nor the Vietnamese
Government. However, captured maps drawn by a K6/D440 Battalion cadre that were recovered in January
1971 showed Bình Ba Làng at YS 4574 and Bình Ba Xăng YS 4474 ie one kilometre to the west. 1ATF,
Supplementary Intelligence Report, Núi Đất, 18-24 January 1971, 26 January 1971. Bình Ba Xăng was the area
of the hamlet of Đức Trung, and Bình Ba Làng was the main “residential” hamlet of Bình Ba to its south.
36
Translator’s Note: In mid-1969, the official Sài Gon Government administrative titles for the hamlets of Bình
Ba village were: Bình Ba – population 1,300; Đức Trung – about 800 metres to the north, population – 500; and
Đức Mỹ – population 350, about 350 metres to the south at YS 445730. The main village of Bình Ba was
centred at YS 449740 on the western side of Route 2, about 6.5 kilometres north of the 1ATF base at Núi Đất.
The village included a large number of masonry and brick houses with tiled roofs, and many of villagers worked
in the surrounding rubber plantations and in the rubber processing facility in Đức Trung hamlet (YS 454748) on
the northern edge of the village. Đức Trung was a “factory village” centred on the installations of the Gallia
rubber enterprise.
37
D440 sent a reconnaissance element northward up Route 328 – in company with a Bà Long Province group,
that was ambushed by Australian forces on 29 May 1969 at Thừa Tích village (YS 6180 – referred to by
communist elements as Bàu Lâm). The following day, D440’s second-in-command – Ba Kim, was killed by
Australian forces a few kilometres farther south at YS 612725. Soon after, 440 Battalion deployed northwards
towards Bình Ba, and on 3 June 1969, crossed to the west of Route 2 to its “Tre Base Area” (near Châu Lạc
hamlet of Xà Bang village).
 12

the police post, the office of the ‘Phoenix’38 quisling spies and the defensive positions of the
People’s Self-Defence Force (PSDF)39 – a company had the task to remain, hold on, and lure
the enemy forces at the Long Lễ and Đức Thạnh Sub-Sectors and the Australians at Núi Đất
to come to their aid and thus create the conditions for the 33rd Regiment to conduct an
ambush battle from the Sông Cầu hamlet [sic] up to Đức Mỹ hamlet. The remainder of 440
Battalion would attack the enemy in the area adjacent to Bình Ba village.”40 “The Châu Đức
local forces would have the responsibility for coordinated attacks in the area of Ấp Bắc
hamlet of Hòa Long Village.”41 The Campaign Headquarters chose 440 Battalion principally
because the cadre and soldiers of the Battalion were proficient, familiar with the terrain - and

38
The Phoenix (“Phụng/Phượng Hoàng”) programme – see USMACV, Phung Hoang Advisor Handbook,
Saigon, 20 November 1970, was targeted against the communists’ political infrastructure - ie termed the Việt
Cộng Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI – hạ tầng cơ sở, was the covert political and administrative organisation
that led the resistance movement – ie distinct from armed units. It included government, Party and Front
members – as well as lower-level functionaries. The VCI provided military elements with funds, food, recruits,
intelligence, refuge and guides. Politically, it prepared for an eventual assumption of power with an organisation
to replace the government of the Republic of Vietnam. VCI were defined by South Vietnamese Presidential
Decree Law 280-a/TT/SL of 20 December 1967. “Phoenix” was preceded by the US ICEX programme: MACV
Directive 381-41, 9 July 1967 (VCAT Item No.2234306060); and United States Mission in Vietnam, The Viet
Cong Infrastructure, Saigon, June 1970. The VCI were monitored by the Special Collection Plan Against the
Viet Cong Infrastructure and Guerrilla Forces: Nickname - BIG MACK, see MACV instruction MACJ212-2
dated 27 August 1970 – VCAT Item No. 2121015002. In October 1967, the MACV J-2 Order of Battle
Summary removed the “political” category (39,175 in May 19 67) from their enemy military threat assessments
and established a separate “VCI” category – assessed as 84,000 country-wide in October 1967 (ie to include the
previous “Self-Defense” and “Secret Self-Defense” categories - as these were: “by definition, ‘home-guards’
and low-level fifth-columnists” … “not a fighting force and are not considered a military threat” – MACV J-2
Monthly Order of Battle Summary, Saigon, 31 October 1967 – VCAT Item No.250011006. As at 31 January
1969, MACV estimated VCI strength countrywide as 83,000 – Office of the Secretary of Defense, Study:
Improving South Vietnam’s Internal Security Scene, Washington, 5 May 1970 - VCAT Item No.2121516002.
On 23 January 1971, COMUSMACV was briefed that: “Nationally, there are 3.4 VCI per 1,000 SVN
population.” - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes …, op.cit., 2004, p.524. Subsequently, the
MACV Summary of VCI Activities: 3-72, 9 June 1972, reported 63,295 VCI countrywide as at 15 November
1971 - VCAT Item No. F015800190914. The Summary included 830 VCI in Phước Tuy Province. For Phước
Tuy Province – see also 1ATF’s anti-VCI “Acorn operations”, in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the
Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.35-39.
39
The Sài Gòn Government’s People’s Self-Defence Force (PSDF - Nhân Dân Tự Vệ - often termed Phòng Vệ
Dân Sự by the communist side) was established in July 1968 after the mid-year General Mobilisation (ie post-
Tết 1968). Deployed in platoons in the villages and hamlets, the PSDF encompassed males aged 16-17 and 39-
50 years. See the PSDF Handbook – 1969, VCAT Item No.14040111001.
40
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, p.8 – see Appendix 3 to Reference A. The passage in the D440 History (2011) at pp.90-91 is
almost identical. The Sông Cầu stream crosses Route 2 at the bridge at YS 437692 – about 100 metres north of
the abandoned Ấp An Phú hamlet on the northern edge of the 1ATF base at Núi Đất. Đức Mỹ hamlet –
population 350, is to the north of the Sông Cầu, just to the west of Route 2 at YS 445736. The distance between
the Sông Cầu Bridge and Đức Mỹ hamlet is about 3.5 kilometres.
41
D440 History (2011), p.90. This sentence does not appear in Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung
Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 – see Appendix 3 in Reference A. For
the attack on Hòa Long; for the account in the Châu Đức History (2004) - see also footnotes 37, 96, and 99.
 13

the tactic of “attacking a post and destroying reinforcements” was 440 Battalion’s “forté”.42
However, according to the D440 Battalion History (2011) and 33rd Regiment history
monographs43, at dawn on 4 June, D440 was surprised by “an Australian commando
company” that swept into D440’s camp west of Route 2.44 Consequently, “the Campaign
Headquarters adjusted the plans for the force to attack Bình Ba. This now involved an
element of the 1st Battalion45 of the 33rd Regiment – led by Battalion commander Comrade
Triệu Kim Sơn46, being given the task of attacking the post – replacing 440 Battalion. …
However, because they had to repel the attack that came out of the blue, the Campaign
Headquarters changed the forces at the last minute. The 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment
was given the task of attacking Bình Ba – while 440 Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion and
was given the task of fighting the enemy at the reinforcement blocking position on Route 2
(the area adjacent to Bình Ba), together with the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment
commanded by Comrade Quách Thái Sơn.”47

42
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, pp.8-9 – see Appendix 3 in Reference A; as noted, the passage in the D440 History (2011), pp.90-
91 is identical.
43
This event is also noted by 33rd Regiment historians in Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57),
Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010, p.9 – see Appendix 2 to Reference A: “before commencing the operation, D440
had to fight against an enemy sweep into their base area, so the 33 rd Regiment assigned its 1st Battalion to
replace D440 in that urgent situation.”; and in Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd
Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9 – see Appendix 3 in Reference A.
44
1ATF’s 6RAR/NZ (Operation Lavarack) engaged several groups of enemy east of Route 2 and west and
north-west of Xà Bang village (ie in the vicinity of D440’s Tre Base Area – YS 4285) in the period 31 May-5
June 1969 – see 6RAR/NZ War Diary, AWM95, 7/6/22. “Commandos” – literally “biệt kích”, is a term used in
several Vietnamese communist military histories to describe regular Australian infantry troops in small-scale
operations – ie as well as Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron troops (who were also reportedly called “ma
rừng” – phantoms/ghosts of the jungle). The 33rd Regiment’s 2016 History (p.51.) – while mistakenly citing
“D445” instead of “D440”, similarly notes: “an Australian commando company attacked their Suối Tre base
near Châu Lạc hamlet (Xà Bang village, Châu Đức District). The Australian attack into the base camp squarely
struck the Battalion’s sentry positions and the defences of their reconnaissance group.”
45
The 1st Battalion – cover designator: Vĩnh Phú, was also known as the 7th Battalion – and J7. Its subordinate
companies also used the prefix “V” as a cover designator – CDEC Log 09-1659-69. According to captured
documents, its executive officer (2ic) in August 1969 – following the Battle of Bình Ba, was Senior Lieutenant
Bùi Đức Nhật (from 24 April 1969). According to a 1st Battalion operations cadre – Trần Văn Hợp, the 1st
Battalion’s strength on 2 September 1969 (ie “post-Bình Ba”) was 326 - and armed with: 103 AK-47s, 44
CKCs, nine light machine guns, two heavy machine guns, 11 B-40s, five B-41s, three 60mm mortars, and two
82mm mortars – CDEC Log 09-1636-69. A report by Senior Lieutenant Bùi Đức Nhật also noted that the 1st
Battalion also held 21 K-54 pistols - CDEC Log 09-1649-69.
46
Triệu Kim Sơn subsequently commanded the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment during the engagement with
1ATF’s 4RAR/NZ ANZAC in late September 1971 at Núi Sao/Núi Lê in late September 1971 in northern
Phước Tuy Province. In 1972-1977, he was the deputy commander of the 33 rd Regiment - Quá Trình Hình
Thành … Trung Đoàn 33, op.cit., 2010 – see Appendix 2 in Reference A. In 2013, Triệu Kim Sơn was
reportedly living in Vĩnh Phú Province in northern Vietnam.
47
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, p.9 – see as Appendix 3 to Reference A. This document – and the presence of the 2nd Battalion
under Quách Thái Sơn, is also cited in Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story …, op.cit.,
2012, pp.446-447. A passage in the D440 History (2011), p.91 is identical to that in the aforementioned “Lý
Lịch Di Tích …” document (see Appendix 3 in Reference A) - ie including reference to the 2nd Battalion task
under Quách Thái Sơn to set an ambush on Route 2. The presence of the 2 nd Battalion in central Phước Tuy is
 14

The 33rd Regiment’s 2016 History also notes that a block/ambush was planned for
Route 2 south Bình Ba: “At dawn on 5 June 1969, D445 Battalion [sic] crossed through the
jungle and changed places with the 7th Battalion of the 33rd Regiment in the position to block
enemy relief forces on Route 2 (the area adjacent to Bình Ba) – together with the 8th
Battalion.48 … Once we controlled the battlefield, the 7th Battalion would leave a company to
hold on and to lure the enemy at the Long Lễ 49 and Đức Thạnh Sub-Sectors and the
Australian forces at Núi Đất to dispatch relief forces – creating the conditions for the
Regiment to ambush the enemy from Sông Cầu hamlet to Đức Mỹ.50 The remaining elements
of D445 [sic] Battalion would strike the enemy in an area adjacent to Bình Ba. Châu Đức51
District troops and local village guerillas would be responsible for a coordinated attack in the
area of Ấp Bắc hamlet in Hòa Long village.”52
The Châu Đức History (2004) similarly makes reference to a planned “ambush”: “On
5 June 1969, the 33rd Regiment (a main force regional unit) and the Province’s 2nd Battalion
(D440) Battalion, conducted an ambush west of Inter-Provincial Route 2 from Đức Mỹ
hamlet to Bình Ba village and despatched a company to the centre of Bình Ba to attack the

also noted in an article by a former Australian 6RAR/NZ officer ie “the 2 nd Battalion ((of 33rd NVA Regiment))
((was)) to secure a base for their ((33rd Regiment’s)) safe withdrawal afterwards.” - Johnson, L., “Operation
Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province,Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit., 2010, p.94. The official Australian account of the
Battle of Bình Ba is in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.203-240. However,
that account does not specifically mention the involvement in the Battle of D440 Battalion in its main text (but
see Appendix 1 in Reference A, p.859) - nor is there any mention at all of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment
and a planned ambush by that unit on Route 2. For a reported post-engagement admonishment of Quách Thái
Sơn (the 2nd Battalion commander) by higher authorities, see footnote 184. In the period 1970-1971, he was
noted as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the 33rd Regiment - Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57) -
(The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57)), Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010 – see Appendix 2 in
Reference A. Quách Thái Sơn (b.1946 in Thanh Hóa Province) was killed on 27 May 1972 in an engagement at
Việt Cương hamlet, Châu Đức District - Phước Tuy Province.
48
In a footnote, the 2016 33rd Regiment History adds: “The 8th Battalion was led by its Battalion Commander –
Quách Văn [sic] Sơn.” Translator’s (Chamberlain) Note: ie Quách Thái Sơn. However note that the following
page in the 2016 History relates: “The 8th Battalion – under Comrade Đinh Ngọc Thập, was sited in the north on
Route 2 …”.
49 Translator’s Note: The Long Lễ District Headquarters and military Sub-Sector Headquarters was located in
Hòa Long village – immediately south of 1ATF’s base at Núi Đất.
50 Translator’s Note: As noted, the Sông Cầu stream crosses Route 2 below the bridge at YS 437692 – about
100 metres north of the abandoned Ấp An Phú hamlet on the northern edge of the 1ATF base at Núi Đất. Đức
Mỹ hamlet – population 350, is to the north of the Sông Cầu, on Route 2 at YS 445736. The distance between
the Sông Cầu Bridge and Đức Mỹ hamlet is about 3.5 kilometres.
51
Translator’s Note: The 2014 Châu Đức District History relates that: “In April [sic – ie not June] 1969, the
Bình Ba guerillas and the A57 ((ie 33rd Regiment)) troops attacked the Bình Ba post … a relief force of tanks
was sent from the Phước Tuy Sector [sic] … and a number of Bình Ba village guerillas were killed and captured
.” – Hồ Song Quỳnh (ed – et al), The History of the Châu Đức District People’s Armed Forces (1945 – 2014),
National Political Publishing House – The Truth, Hà Nội, 2014, p.143.
52 Translator’s Note: The attack on Hòa Long village is also described in the D440 Battalion History (p.90,
2011) – see Chamberlain, E.P. … D440.. op.cit., 2013, pp.63-68. See also Chamberlain, E.P.. The 33rd
Regiment …, op.cit., 2014, footnotes 261, 320; and also footnote 323 for the account in the The History of the
Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of Châu Đức District, 2004. While that 2004 Party
History of Châu Đức relates the attack on Hòa Long, the attack is not mentioned in the later Châu Đức Armed
Forces History cited above - ie Hồ Song Quỳnh (ed – et al), The History of the Châu Đức District People’s
Armed Forces (1945 – 2014), op.cit, 2014.
 15

post of the 664th Regional Forces unit with the aim or luring the Australians to provide
reinforcements - and for our elements to then ambush and destroy them.”53

The Early June 1969 “High Point” Begins

Citing US assessments54, 1ATF reported: “On the evening of 5/6 June, the enemy
opened the June action period throughout the III CTZ with attacks which were probably
staged to emphasise the enemy’s continuing capabilities to conduct offensive action
throughout South Vietnam, for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at MIDWAY. …
During the week, there were 122 enemy-initiated attacks in III Corps compared to 87 in the
preceding week. Of these, there were 33 significant mortar attacks and 27 rocket attacks
compared to 15 and 12 respectively the previous week. … Heaviest ground attacks occurred
in Tây Ninh by 272 VC Regiment and 88 NVA Regiment.”55
In the early hours of 5 June 1969, 1ATF’s 6RAR/NZ clashed with 33rd Regiment rear
service elements near the Phước Tuy/Long Khánh border about one kilometre west of Route
2 (YS 442888) – the Regiment’s first reported engagement with Australian forces in Phước
Tuy Province in June 1969.56 Later that morning, about five kilometres farther south-west (at
YS 424844), 6RAR/NZ attacked a defended bunker complex occupied reportedly by
elements of the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment and support elements – however, the
presence of the 1st Battalion was unconfirmed.57

53
Châu Đức History (2004), pp.173-174. That History also adds: “However, the Australians did not enter our
ambush as planned, and our company in the hamlet suffered heavy casualties – consequently tens of our cadre
and soldiers were killed, and we were forced to withdraw our troops. … At Long Lễ Sub-Sector, the Châu Đức
District troops entered and occupied Ấp Bắc hamlet of Hòa Long village and repelled eight counter-attacks by
the puppet troops.”
54
“In June ((1969)), activity continued at a high level with a high point on the night of 5 June when 62 indirect
fire attacks and three significant ground attacks were launched. This period of the summer campaign was
probably staged for the benefit of the Presidential meeting at Midway on 8 June to emphasize the enemy’s
continuing capability to conduct offensive action.” – COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second
Quarter 1969), MACJ3-051, 20 August 1969.
55
1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Núi Đất. More specifically, HQ 1ATF
concluded: “The occupation of Bình Ba (YS 4474) by elements of 1 Bn 33 NVA Regt, the Bình Ba Guerrillas
and the Bình Ba Village Committee was instigated as part of the current enemy high point.” – HQ 1ATF War
Diary, Enemy Situation 1-8 June 1969, 10 June 1969, para 2.e. (AWM95, 1-4-156, folio G32). However, the
VC Military Region 7 History (“MR7 50 years”) only notes COSVN Resolution 7/1969 directing four
campaigns in the Spring 1969-Spring 1970 period – ie no mention of a 1969 “High Point” campaign – see
Military Region 7 Headquarters (Quân Khu 7), 50 Năm Lực Lương Võ Trang Quân Khu 7 - The Armed Forces
of Military Region 7: 50 Years, Wattpad, 1995. A COSVN Directive 81/88 apparently refined their Summer
1969 Campaign. For NVA/VC “High Point” attacks in Tây Ninh Province in June 1969 – see US 25th Infantry
Division, Operational Report …, op.cit., 18 December 1969 – VCAT Item No.168300010477: “On 6-7 June –
“two nights of intensive engagements at FSB Crook (XT 055595) with 88th NVA Regiment resulted in 407
NVA KIA (BC).”
56
1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969; Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report -
Ops 14, 3 July 1969 – AWM95, 7/6/22, p.14. Earlier, in late February 1969, Australian troops (4RAR) had
clashed with the 33rd Regiment in Biên Hòa Province – see footnotes 195 and 196 in Reference A and more
detail in Research Note 2/2019: “First Contact …”, 9 February 2019 - ie Reference D.
57
Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit., 2010, pp.94-95 – cites
the presence of the 1st Battalion, but neither the 6RAR/NZ “Contact and Incidents Summary” - Appendix 1 to
Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969 (AWM95, 7/6/22) nor 1ATF intelligence reports
identified the NVA/VC force involved. However, it is highly probable that 6RAR/NZ had engaged a D440
Battalion camp – although the D440 accounts report the engagement as occurring on 4 June - see Chamberlain,
 16

A 33rd Regiment history monograph has related: “At about 4pm on 5 June, the 33rd
Regiment’s combat forces left their base (in the present-day Hắc Dịch area58) and were led
through the jungle by liaison cadres to the battle area. After four hours, our troops reached
their assembly area close to their objective on the Bình Ba battlefield and awaited their orders
to attack.”59 According to a captured VC document – a report by the commander of the C-195
Reconnaissance and Special Delivery Company of Military Region 7: “Action commenced
on the night of 5 June when Tây [sic]60 attempted to fire five rockets into the village. All
misfired/failed to fire.” C-195 then participated in the attack – with the “entire regiment”.61

E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013, p.62 including analysis at footnotes 148
and 149.
58
The Hắc/Hắt Dịch area was defined by USMACV as the area bounded by coordinates YS 1790 – YS 4690 –
YS 2572 and YS 4572, containing the jungle area south of the Bình Sơn Rubber Plantation and east of Route 15
to Route 2 with the Núi Thị Vải Mountains on the south. A later and more accurate map of the Hắc/Hắt Dịch by
the US 9th Infantry Division shows a 190 sq km area bounded by YS 2693 east to YS 4093, south to YS 4078
and west to 2478. In referring to the “Hắc Dịch area”, 33rd Regiment historians were probably only referring to
the area north-west of Bình Ba village. As noted, the 33rd Regiment had moved south-west from Long Khánh
Province into Phước Tuy Province, crossed Route 2 and established an assembly area several kilometres north-
west of Bình Ba village. As noted above, in two engagements on the morning of 5 June, 6RAR/NZ (Operation
Lavarack – with its support base at FSB Virginia located at YS 437801) engaged “A57” (ie 33rd Regiment)
elements near the Phước Tuy-Long Khánh border, resulting in a total of four enemy killed. – Appendix 1 to
Annex A, 6RAR After Action Report - Ops 14, 3 July 1969 – AWM95, 7/6/22, see the preceding footnotes 56
and 57. That evening (1930hrs 5 June), D Company of 6RAR/NZ reportedly engaged a 30-strong element of the
33rd Regiment moving westward at YS 473889 (about a kilometre east of Route 2, and about a kilometre south
of the Province border) – six NVA soldiers were killed and two wounded soldiers were captured. – 1ATF,
INTSUM No.157/69, Núi Đất, 6 June 1969. However, the NVA/VC force in that engagement was later
identified as elements of the 274th VC Regiment – Appendix 1 to Annex A, 6RAR/NZ After Action Report -
Ops 14, 3 July 1969.
59
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, p.9 – see Appendix 3 to Reference A. According to the Australian official history, the 1st Battalion
of the 33rd Regiment departed its “Initial Assembly Area” in the vicinity of YS 4076 at 3pm on 5 June and
moved to a “Forward Assembly Area” in the vicinity of YS 425750, departing that Forward Assembly Area at
3am on 6 June – Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, Map 7.3 (Top – Probable
Dispositions of 1 Battalion, 33 NVA Regiment, 5-7 June 1969), p.215. This information appears to have been
inferred principally from Khan, C.N. - Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69 – Operation
Hammer, Ấp An Phú, 11 June 1969 , Annex A – Intelligence Summary (9 June 1969) – AWM95, 7/5/27; Map 1
- Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown, 2009, p.347; and a
recovered sketch map (1:25,000 scale) – 1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969, para 7.
60
Possibly the chief-of-staff of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment.
61
According to that document – as reviewed in 1ATF INTSUM No.195/69, C-195 participated in the attack on
Bình Ba - together with the “entire regiment” (ie 33rd Regiment), and C-195 suffered 12 killed and 11 wounded
at Bình Ba. A few weeks after the Battle, the C-195 Company commander was killed by Australian forces
(5RAR) on 25 June 1969 at YS 294712 – 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Núi Đất, 14 July 1969. C-195 troops had
earlier been killed on 1 June 1969 at YS 409887 about 15 kilometres north-west of Bình Ba by Australian
6RAR/NZ elements – 1ATF, INTSUM No.157/69, Núi Đất, 6 June 1969. C195’s role may have included
liaison tasks between the Campaign Headquarters and the attacking force. Australian forces later killed the
commander (Lâm Văn Doi) of C-195 – the “Special Sapper Reconnaissance Company”, on 21 November 1969
at YS 438868 – together with the Military Region 7 Deputy Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Political
Staff - 1ATF, INTSUM No.326/69, Núi Đất, 22 November 1969.
 17

In Phước Tuy Province – about 20 kilometres south-southeast of Bình Ba village, at

0015hrs on 6 June, 25-30 82mm mortars rounds were fired into 9RAR’s Fire Support Base
Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hải Mountains. This appeared to be in support of an
attack by elements of the VC D445 Battalion on a Rural Development Cadre (RDC)62
compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN outpost (of the 2nd Battalion/52nd Regiment) in the
Hội Mỹ area on Route 44.
However, 1ATF “Confidential”-level reporting on the 33rd Regiment at the beginning
of the “High Point” was somewhat unclear. At the end of the first week of June 1969,
Headquarters 1ATF reported that: the 33rd NVA Regiment was located south of Xuân Lộc
(YS 4474), with a strength of 1,075 - “33rd Regiment is operating in a split configuration with
two battalions located in base areas east of Blackhorse and a third battalion west of Route 2
in north-west Phước Tuy Province. 33 Regiment will probably remain in its base area for a
time to refit and resupply after its actions in May. … On 6-7 June 1ATF and RF troops
engaged an enemy force at YS 440740 6.5 km north of Núi Đất … Enemy troops were
identified as belonging to 1-33 NVA Regt”.63

The Battle of Bình Ba Begins – and a Failed Ambush on Route 2 ?

At 0810hrs on 4 June, the Australian 6RAR/NZ liaison officer at the Đức Thạnh
District headquarters at Ngãi Giao advised 1ATF Headquarters that 33rd Regiment elements
were located at YS 563874 about 17 kilometres north-east of Bình Ba village and about four
kilometres south of the Phước Tuy/Long Khánh border.64
According to a 33rd Regiment history monograph: “On the night of 5/6 June, the 1st
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment – directly led by Comrade Bảy Tiểu65, the Battalion deputy
commander; and Comrade Miền - the Battalion political officer, opened fire and attacked the
objectives in Bình Ba village.”66 As noted earlier, the 1st Battalion was commanded by Triệu
62
The Rural Development (RD) Cadre (Cán Bộ Xây Dựng Nông Thôn) - earlier termed Revolutionary
Development Cadre, had been established on 4 January 1966 in “New Life” hamlets to train village self-defence
elements. See VCAT Item No.13510124002 and VCAT Item No.13510123005. The 59-man RD Cadre groups
(đoàn) in the villages – first deployed in May 1966, also progressed the Sài Gòn Government’s political, social
and economic programmes. The original RD Cadre group of 59 was scaled down to 30 with the Accelerated
Pacification Programme (see footnote 158 in Reference A), and to 10 at the beginning of 1971. For RD Cadre
organisation, numbers and activities in Phước Tuy Province to the end of 1966, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, pp.420-422. For detail on support by US and Vietnamese forces to “Pacification” – see USMACV,
Handbook for Military Support to Pacification – February 1968 (41 pages), Saigon, February 1969 – VCAT
Item No.13530108003.
63
1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No.22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Núi Đất (Confidential).
64
1ATF, G (OPS) Log Sheet 22, Serial 312. This report probably resulted from a 6RAR/NZ clash.
65
Bảy Tiểu (see Appendix 22 in Reference A) – is a nickname: ie “Seven Tiểu”. As with most Vietnamese,
NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel usually had two-word nicknames/aliases (aka)/
pseudonyms (tự, bí danh). Invariably, these comprised a number (from 2 to 10) – or occasionally “Út” (meaning
“youngest”) as the first word, followed by their given name. This reflected their “birth order” in their family
(with the father consider number “One”). For example, the nickname “Anh Hai” is “Brother Two” and “Tư
Nghĩa” is “Four Nghĩa”. Party members often also had a secure cover-name – ie an additional “full” Vietnamese
name of three words. See the 1965-1966 Military Region 1 (later Military Region 7) staff list that shows NVA
ranks, names, full cover-names, nicknames, “aka”s, and Party status - CDEC Log 03-1341-66.
66
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, p.9 – ie a 33rd Regiment history monograph, see Appendix 3 to Reference A.
 18

Kim Sơn.67 The 33rd Regiment commander was reportedly Hoàng Cao Hỷ.68 The D440
Battalion History (2011) related that: “On the night of 5 June 1969, the 1st Battalion of the
33rd Regiment opened fire and attacked its objectives in Bình Ba hamlet. Surprised by our
fierce attack, the enemy in Bình Ba village quickly disintegrated – with some fleeing and
others huddling down to await a relief force. We took complete control of the battlefield that
very night.”69 A 33rd Regiment soldier from its 1st Battalion – captured on 6 June, related that
on the morning of 4 June he had been told that his 1st Battalion was “going on a proselytising
mission” to Bình Ba, and “after entering the village, the unit divided into cells to work with
the local VC in the people’s houses. Just before the fighting started, he had heard local VC
broadcasting propaganda.”70
According to the Châu Đức District History (2004), local village guerrillas were also
involved in the occupation of Bình Ba village on 5 June 1969: “Comrade Nguyễn Thị Thiên –
the Secretary of the Bình Ba Village Party Committee, and a number of the village guerrillas
were killed - together with Comrade Bình – a member of the District Standing Committee
and Commander of the District Public Security element, while holding out against the
enemy.”71

67
See footnote 46. However, at a 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Reunion in Phúc Thọ (Hà Nội) in late July 2013,
Nguyễn Huy Thản declared that he had been the commander of the Regiment at the time of the Battle of Bình
Ba, was present at the Battle, and had “directly” led the 7th (ie the 1st Battalion). See: Tạ Tường Mạnh, Gặp mặt
CCB Trung Đoàn 33 anh hùng lần thứ 3 Hà Nội (Họp Mặt Truyền Thống Cựu Chiến Binh-Bạn Chiến Đấu
Trung Đoàn 33 – TP Hà Nội, Lần Thứ 3, Ngày 21/7/2013), 21 July 2013, published on 6 October 2013.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTv88UxE4pQ - 22.10 minutes.
68
There has been some confusion on who commanded the Regiment in June 1969 – eg: see the preceding
footnote for the claim by Nguyễn Huy Thản. Captured documents also suggested that Nguyễn Văn Thường may
have been the Regiment commander in mid-1969 – see footnote 209 in Reference A and the preceding footnote
9. Hoàng Cao Hỷ is recorded as the 33rd Regiment Commander in Tổ Chức Ban Chỉ Huy Trung Đoàn 33 Qua
Các Thời Kỳ (The Headquarters Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years) in Ban Liên Lạc Truyền
Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Quá Trình …,
op.cit., 2010 – see Appendix 2 and Appendix 16 in Reference A. In response to the author’s query, Võ Xuân
Thu confirmed with Lê Bá Lộc (both 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Association principals and members of the 2013-
2016 History Writing Team) that Hoàng Cao Hỷ was the Regiment’s commander at the time of the Battle of
Bình Ba and that Nguyễn Văn Thường was then the Regiment’s chief-of-staff. – email advice to the author from
Võ Xuân Thu, 23 November 2013. For Hoàng Cao Hỷ, see the photograph at p.42 and footnote 9 in this Note –
and also footnotes 466, and 472 in Reference A.
69
Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 …, op.cit, 2013, pp.64-65; and D440 History (2011) – ie Vietnamese – language
edition, pp.91-92.
70
1ATF INTSUM No.165/69, Núi Đất, 14 June 1969; L’Epagniol, J.L. Major, Interrogation Report, Núi Đất, 19
June 1969. The POW stated that his unit had entered Bình Ba village at about 0700hrs on 5 June [sic – but
probably 6 June] where “the unit split into cells to work with the local VC in the people’s houses. About
0800hrs, the local VC began broadcasting propaganda when gunfire started in all directions.”
71
Nguyễn Công Danh et al, Lịch sử … Châu Đức (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004. A member of the Bà Long
Military Proselytising Section was also killed in the Battle – 1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969.
 19

The 33rd Regiment’s Account of the Battle in “Their History” (2016) 72

The attack occurred as follows – the Regiment allocated a company from the 7th
Battalion to attack and seize the Bình Ba strategic hamlet; two companies were sited to
provide support and reinforcements for the company in the hamlets and to strike enemy
relief elements. The 8th Battalion – under Comrade Đinh Ngọc Thập, was sited in the north on
Route 2; and the 9th Battalion - led by Comrade Triệu Kim Sơn as the Battalion Commander
was located to the south between the hamlets of Bình Ba Làng and Bình Ba Xăng – ready to
strike the enemy coming down from the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector and to coordinate with the
8th Battalion in attacking any enemy relief force coming north from Suối Nghệ 73 and
attempting to break through.
On the night of 5 June 1969, the 1st and 2nd Companies attacked the hamlet of Bình
Ba Xăng; and the 3rd Company of the 7th Battalion was tasked to attack the hamlet of Bình
Ba Làng. At first, the 7th Battalion assembled in an area of rice fields along the edge of the
village to dig combat positions. At exactly H-hour, the Regiment opened fire on its objectives.
Surprised by our determined attack, the enemy in the strategic hamlet in Bình Ba village
were quickly routed – a number fled, and others huddled down to await a relief force. During
that night, we took complete control of the battlefield and captured prisoners for
questioning. The Headquarters raise the Liberation flag. Tân Phát (a section commander of
the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Armed Propaganda Group led by Comrade Huỳnh Thành Nhân) used
four loud-hailers to call upon the enemy in the hamlet to put their guns down, surrender, and
receive the leniency of the Revolution. However, a number of the remaining enemy in the
post were stubborn and continued to resist. Nguyễn Văn Bảy – the Battalion second-in-
command, ordered the companies to exploit the terrain and defend against enemy coming
from the direction of Bà Rịa. The 1st Company was deployed in outer positions, and the 2nd
Company was sited within the hamlet. The 3rd Company could not make contact – so, after
the engagement, Comrade Mộc (the Company Political Officer) withdrew back to our base.
At about 6 a.m. on 6 June 196974 – as anticipated, the Australian forces from Núi Đất
sent their tanks to rescue the situation. Comrade Bảy ordered that the enemy had to be
attacked and not allowed to advance.75 Nguyễn Văn Dụy – a soldier, and Nguyễn Văn Hoan

72
Prior to the 33rd Regiment/Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Military Headquarters “team” writing “Their History (1965 -
1989)” publication in the period 2014-2016, the 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Liaison Committee had been passed –
via Võ Xuân Thu, several complimentary copies of Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment – North Vietnamese
Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), 2014 (ie Reference A).
73
Translator’s Note: Suối Nghệ (at YS 430715) was a resettlement village with a population of 1,040.
74
Translator’s Note: On 6 and 7 June – as an element of the “High Point” offensive in Phước Tuy Province –
see footnotes 4 and 32, rockets were fired into the 1ATF base at Núi Đất - up to 15 107mm rockets impacted in
the base and in the vicinity on the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four impacted in the base on the
afternoon of 7 June – see footnotes 61, 112 and 120. According to 1 ATF: “These rockets were probably fired
by an element of 74 NVA Artillery Regiment” – 1ATF War Diay, Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province, 1
June to 8 June 1969, Núi Đất, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. (AWM95, 1/4/156, folio G32). Other rocket firings
attempted on 5 June by “Tây’s unit” in the Bình Ba area were reportedly unsuccessful – see Chamberlain, E.P.,
The 33rd Regiment …, op.cit., 2014, footnotes 269, 313, and 321.
75
Translator’s Note: The Regiment’s 2011 “Background Memorial History” related that an element of the
Regiment was tasked with “attacking any enemy relief force coming north from Suối Nghệ and attempting to
break through” to Bình Ba. According to a 33rd Regiment history monograph, the initial plan was for the “33 rd
 20

[sic] – a section second-in-command in the main position, used a B40 to fire on and damage
two M113s entering the hamlet. The enemy used their vehicles’ firepower to shoot into the
people’s homes as they knew that the Regiment’s forces were sited in those houses. Then,
the enemy’s helicopters attacked (at the time, we did not have our air-defence firepower
with us). At 10 a.m., we reported that our anti-tank ammunition was spent. The enemy’s
mechanised vehicles advanced in groups of two and three – and then grouped in a total of
about 13 vehicles. The Australian infantry followed their tanks, but they fought in a guerilla
style – forming small groups moving around on the jungle’s edge. They were supported by
aircraft and artillery in a massed attack, and we were completely surprised. At this stage,
neither the 8th Battalion nor the 9th Battalion were able to deploy, and the enemy in turn
came from behind and moved to surround Bình Ba Làng hamlet. From having the initiative,
the soldiers of the 7th Battalion were then on the defensive – in circumstances where they
had no pits or trenches in which to shelter. Communications had been lost, and – with the
enemy’s fierce and heavy firepower, our casualties grew by the minute, and we had
exhausted our anti-tank ammunition.
Faced with these difficulties, the Headquarters assigned our RCL Platoon and an
element of an infantry company from the D445 [sic] Battalion to break through from the
direction of Bình Ba Xăng. However, that very direction had also been blocked by the fierce
firing of the Australian tanks from the edge of the hamlet – wounding many of our men.
With these indications that the enemy could wipe us out on the battlefield, we took the
initiative to withdraw. The 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion in the hamlet reported to the
Regiment that the 2nd Company had suffered casualties and – surrounded by the enemy,
requested that a force break through to them. The Regiment radioed the 7th Battalion many
times, but their actions were too late and lacked resolve. Consequently, 50 soldiers of the 7th
Battalion were killed, including Comrade Nguyễn Văn Bảy – the Battalion second-in-
command, and Comrade Bùi Quang Miền – the deputy political officer of the Battalion.
Subsequently, the enemy used a bull-dozer to dig a deep pit in which they buried the bodies
of 53 of those killed in a mass grave (three of the dead comrades were from the armed
propaganda group).76* A number of our Bình Ba guerilla guides were also captured such as

Regiment to conduct an ambush battle from the Sông Cầu hamlet up to Đức Mỹ hamlet” - including on
Australian forces lured north from their Núi Đất base. That plan was similarly described in the D440 Battalion
History (2011). In the revised plan, the 2 nd (ie 8th) Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by Quách Thái
Sơn – and supported by elements of D440 Battalion, was to conduct the ambush. Several Vietnamese accounts
relate that the planned ambush was not initiated. The Australian relief force was “spread out in groups of two-
and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiment’s ambush – so the Regiment’s tactical headquarters
decided not to attack.” See: Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background
Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.8; “The enemy was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did
not fall into the Regiment’s ambush” – “bọn địch đi rải rác từng tốp 2-3 chiếc và không trúng vào đội hình phục
kich cua Trung đoàn.” - Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background
Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9; “The Australians did not enter our ambush as planned” – “Bọn Úc đi
không đúng đội hình phục kích …” – Châu Đức History (2004) - Nguyễn Công Danh & Lê Minh Nghĩa (et al),
Lịch sử … Châu Đức (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.172 – this account however is not repeated in the 2014
edition of the Châu Đức History ie: Hồ Song Quỳnh (ed – et al), The History of the Châu Đức District People’s
Armed Forces (1945 – 2014), op.cit., 2014. For further detail, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment …,
op.cit., 2014 (Reference A), pp.65-66 and Appendix 9 to Reference A.
76
* Translator’s Note: For clarity, the list of the 50 martyrs included in this footnote in the 2016 History was
included as Annex F to Chamberlain, E.P. The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their History (1965 –
 21

comrades: Nguyễn Văn Bé, Lâm Văn Bạch, and Hoàng Văn Thành (Thái). Comrade Nguyễn
Thị Xuân (Tư Thiên) – the secretary of the Party Chapter of the guerilla unit headquarters,
was also wounded in the face and taken to the Province hospital for treatment.77* These
were great losses for the Regiment, and a battle from which we gained experience and many
lessons.”

The Battle – The Australian Accounts

Early on the morning of 6 June 1969, an Australian aircraft conducted a routine low-
level reconnaissance flight up Route 2 without incident.78 At 0720hrs on 6 June 1969, two
Australian Centurion medium battle tanks (callsigns 20E, 8D) travelling north up Route 2
through Bình Ba toward the 6RAR/NZ Fire Support Base (FSB) Virginia (YS 437801) were
engaged in Bình Ba by small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG)79 fire.80 At 8.15am on
6 June, the 1ATF liaison officer at the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector/ District headquarters – about
four kilometres north of Bình Ba village, reported that Vietnamese Territorial Forces (ie
RF/PF) were engaging enemy elements on the south-western edge of Bình Ba village, and
that there were “an estimated two VC platoons – some in Bình Ba hamlet.”81 At 1ATF, the

1989) (including the Battles of Binh Ba – 1969 and Nui Le – 1971), 2017. The Official Australian Army History
– Fighting to the Finish (2012), p.225 states: “A total of 99 enemy were eventually reported killed in Operation
Hammer. Most were North Vietnamese soldiers of the 33 NVA Regiment; a further six were wounded but
escaped (as indicated by blood trails), eight were captured, one surrendered as a Hoi Chanh, and 28 male
suspects were detained. Fifty six of the enemy killed were credited to territorial troops, who had lost four killed
and seven wounded. ” For a detailed listing of the casualties and POWs (33 rd Regiment, D440 Battalion, C-195
Company, Châu Đức District Committee, Bình Ba Guerilla Unit, Bà Long Military Proselytising Section) –
including names and personal details, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment …, op.cit., 2014, pp.74-77 and
its Appendix 9 (14 pages) in Reference A. Comments on photographs of the interment of those killed are at
footnote 224 in Annex E to Chamberlain, E.P. The 33 rd Regiment …, Their History (1965 – 1989) … (including
the Battles of Binh Ba – 1969 and Nui Le – 1971), 2017 – ie Reference B.
77
* According to The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party, the Military, and the People of Bình Ba
Village (2010).
78
A Cessna 180D aircraft from 1ATF’s 161 Reconnaissance Flight flew a “route-checking” flight at first light
every morning.
79
The NVA/VC employed two types of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). The RPG-2 (B40) was an 80mm
(warhead), 1.84kg (warhead weight), shoulder-fired RPG with a maximum effective range against stationary
targets of 150m and capable of penetrating 180mm of armour. The RPG-7 (B41) was an 85mm (warhead),
2.25kg (warhead weight), shoulder-fired RPG with a maximum effective range of 500 metres and capable of
penetrating 300mm of armour. Both were also effective anti-personnel weapons – ie by fragmentation.
80
The leading tank - 20E, was struck by an RPG when passing through Bình Ba village, but drove north to the
Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector/District Headquarters (YS 464779 - about four kilometres farther north) – where the tank
commander reported the incident to Major Trần Văn Ngô (the Sub-Sector/District Commander) who deployed
Regional Force troops to investigate. The other tank - 8D, an armoured recovery vehicle, came under fire just
short of Bình Ba village, returned to the 1ATF base at Núi Đất, and reported to the HQ 1ATF staff. Both were
vehicles of B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment – for detail, see Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !, Big Sky
Publishing, Newport, 2012, Chapter 13 - “Bình Ba : Close-in Fighting”; Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to
the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.211; and Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story …, op.cit.,
2012, pp.440-442. The incident was not recorded in the HQ 1ATF Operations Log until 0830hrs.
81
HQ 1ATF, 6 June 1969, G (Ops) Log Sheet, Sheet 38, Serial 536 (AWM95,1/4/153). The VC were engaged
by Vietnamese Territorial Force elements (reportedly two platoons from the 655th Regional Force Company -
 22

Task Force Ready Reaction Force (RRF) – D Company of 5RAR commanded by Major M.P.
Blake, was briefed at 0900hrs and placed on stand-by.82 The RRF was to “clear an estimated
two enemy platoons from the village.”83 At about 1000hrs84, the Đức Thạnh District Chief –
Major Trần Văn Ngô, requested Australian APC assistance in clearing the enemy from Bình
Ba.85 At 1000hrs, the RRF – with the infantry mounted in M113A1 APCs, left the Núi Đất
base and moved north up Route 2 in “line ahead” - ie a single column, at “best speed”.86 The
column halted at Ấp Suối Nghệ (YS 434716 - about 2.5 kilometres south of Bình Ba village)
“to await further orders” - where they were joined by the RRF’s three Centurion tanks.87 With
the three tanks leading, the column88 continued north and – although engaged briefly from the
left of the road near Đức Mỹ hamlet (YS 445736), continued north to the southern edge of
Bình Ba village.89

based at YS 445746, 106-strong; and elements of 39th Popular Force (PF) Platoon – YS 453748, 32-strong);
with artillery support from the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector base (YS 464779).
82
The RRF comprised: D Company 5RAR (only 65-strong due to other commitments); a small artillery forward
observer group from 105th Field Battery (RAA); 13 M113A1 APCs of 3 Troop/B Squadron/3rd Cavalry
Regiment; and a composite troop of tanks from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment - initially three Centurion
tanks: Callsign 21 (2LT B. Sullivan), 22 (2LT D. Ritchie), 21C (CPL G. Bennett), and subsequently joined at
Bình Ba village by a fourth which had been under repair (22B - CPL B. Bennier). For detail see Cameron, B.,
Canister ! On ! Fire !, op.cit., 2012, Chapter 13 - “Bình Ba : Close-in Fighting”.
83
“D Coy (Ready Reaction Force) under operational control CO 6RAR …” - 5RAR Commander’s Diary
Narrative, 1000hrs 6 June 1969 - AWM95, 7/5/25.
84
According to the D440 Battalion History (2011): “At 6am on 6 June 1969 – just as we had planned, the
Australian forces from Núi Đất sent their tanks north to relieve Bình Ba.” – see Vietnamese edition, p.92.
85
HQ 1ATF, 1ATF Operations Log Sheet, Sheet 39, Serial 551, Núi Đất, 6 June 1969.
86
The mounted infantry moved at “best speed” up Route 2 to Đức Mỹ hamlet - ie not “spread out” (author’s
correspondence on 26 July 2012 with Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM (Captain in 1969) – the officer
commanding 3/B/3rd Cavalry Regiment. See also: Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The History of the
3rd Cavalry Regiment - South Vietnam 1965-1972, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, p.170.
87
The three tanks had left the 1ATF base through the western gate – and did not join the RRF main body until
Ấp Suối Nghệ - Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC OAM (commanding 3/B/3rd Cavalry Regiment in June 1969),
email to author on 26 July 2012.
88
The order-of-march was: the tanks – led by tank Callsign 21C, then the 13 APCs with the 5RAR mounted
infantry: “31 Section (three M113A1s) leading, followed by vehicle 30A (including Captain R. De Vere
RAAC, Major M.P. Blake RA Inf, Lieutenant J.P. Stevens RAA), 39J, 32 Section (three M113A1s), 30B, 39M,
and 33 Section (three M113A1s)”. The length of the column was about 850 metres – with the interval between
vehicles about 50 metres, “a bit tighter than normal road-running of 100 metres”. Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC,
OAM - emails to author, 26 July and 28 August 2012. The fourth tank – 22B (Corporal B. Bennier), did not
depart Núi Đất for Bình Ba until about 1100hrs – ie: “up Route 2 alone and unescorted an hour or so after the
main body of the RRF”, without incident – email to author from Dr D. Hay (crewman Centurion tank Callsign
22B), 26 July 2012.
89
Wary of the potential for an ambush against the RRF column, Captain R. De Vere again specifically briefed
the commanders of the armoured vehicles on counter-ambush action. “We did encounter one minor roadblock
((which we)) cleared by tank fire and rolled down the road with barely a pause; APC sections fired into the
flanks as they passed the area of the minor contact/failed ambush. APC crews did report some enemy bodies as
they passed the area. We proceeded without further incident until halting just short of Bình Ba.” - author’s
correspondence with Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM – commander of the APC element, 26 July 2012, 13
May 2019; and Centurion tank crew members – D. Ritchie, D. Hay, and K. McGuire. The tanks engaged the
enemy with both machine guns and canister fire – ie the twenty-pounder canister round contained about 580
large “pellets” (principally an anti-personnel weapon). For detail, see also: Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !,
 23

As noted earlier, according to a 33rd Regiment history monograph, the initial plan was
for the “33rd Regiment to conduct an ambush battle from the Sông Cầu hamlet up to Đức Mỹ
hamlet”90 – including on Australian forces lured north from their Núi Đất base. That plan was
similarly described in the D440 Battalion History (2011).91 In the revised plan, the 2nd
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by Quách Thái Sơn – and supported by elements
of D440 Battalion, was to conduct the ambush. Several Vietnamese accounts relate that the
planned ambush was not initiated ie:

- The Australian relief force was “spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles
and did not fall into the Regiment’s ambush – so the Regiment’s tactical
headquarters decided not to attack.”92
- “At 6am on 6 June 1969 – just as we had planned, the Australian forces from Núi
Đất sent their tanks north to relieve Bình Ba. However, as the enemy was spread
out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiment’s
ambush formation, the headquarters of the Regiment decided not to initiate the
ambush attack.”93
- “the Australians did not enter our ambush formation as planned.”94
- “At this stage, neither the 8th Battalion nor the 9th Battalion were able to deploy.”95

Big Sky Publishing, Newport, 2012, Chapter 13, “Bình Ba : Close-in Fighting”. According to one source, at
Đức Mỹ hamlet, the RRF “was fired on by a platoon-sized force from the left-hand ((western)) side of the road.
… the column did not stop.” On reaching Bình Ba “proper”, the RRF adopted a defensive position but “almost
immediately … 15 RPG rounds directed at the nearest tank … interspersed with small arms fire from the house
on the corner of the village.” - Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The History of the 3rd Cavalry
Regiment, op.cit., 2002, pp.170-171.
90
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011, p.8 – see Appendix 3 to Reference A. As noted earlier, the Sông Cầu stream crosses Route 2 under
the bridge at YS 437692 – about 100 metres north of the abandoned Ấp An Phú hamlet on the northern edge of
the 1ATF base at Núi Đất.
91
As noted earlier, the passage in the D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, pp.90-91 is almost identical to
that in the 33rd Regiment monograph – ie Background Memorial History, op.cit., 2011 – Appendix 3 to
Reference A.
92
“The enemy was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiment’s ambush”
– “bọn địch đi rải rác từng tốp 2-3 chiếc và không trúng vào đội hình phục kich cua Trung đoàn.” - Lý Lịch Di
Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9.
93
“The enemy was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiment’s ambush
formation.” – “bọn địch đi rải từng tốp 2-3 chiếc và không trúng vào đội hình phục kích của trung đoàn.” -
D440 Battalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and, in English in: Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 …,
2013, pp.65-66.
94
“The Australians did not enter our ambush as planned” – “Bọn Úc đi không đúng đội hình phục kích …” –
Châu Đức History (2004) - Nguyễn Công Danh et al, Lịch sử … Châu Đức (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.172.
That brief account states that the planned ambush by the 33rd Regiment and D440 Battalion was set “on the west
of Route 2, in the stretch from Đức Mỹ hamlet up to Bình Ba.” While it refers to “the Regiment”, it does not
specifically mention the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment - nor its commander, Quách Thái Sơn – ie unlike the
account in Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial
History), op.cit., 2011; and the D440 Battalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition.
95
This “oblique” reference in the 33rd Regiment’s “Their History” 2016 (p.54) probably implies that neither the
Regiment’s 8th Battalion nor its 9th Battalion were able to redeploy from ambush positions on Route 2 back to
Bình Ba to assist the “occupying” 7th Battalion.
 24

In summarising the beginning of the Battle, the official Australian history noted:
“Many questions about the battle were left unresolved. It was unclear why the enemy had
ventured so close to the task force base and remained so long in a village where they must
have known their presence would be challenged; and why they had engaged with such
determination an Australian reaction force supported by armour.”96

The Battle 97 – 6 June 1969 98

On reaching the southern edge of Bình Ba village, up to 15 RPG rounds were fired at
the leading elements of the 1ATF RRF. Meanwhile, at the urging of the District Chief –
Major Trần Văn Ngô, the inhabitants of Bình Ba were fleeing the village. At 1120hrs, the
RRF was granted clearance to enter the village from the east. According to the 5RAR After
Action Report99: “There was no opposition until they reached the centre of the village when
heavy RPG fire and small arms fire was received from the south of the village. During the
next two hours, the D Company group manoeuvred to contain heavy enemy RPG and small
arms fire from the south and south-west of the village.100 In this period, three of the tanks101
were hit with RPGs and one was disabled and five crewmen were wounded. D Company
consolidated in the centre of the village and used a Light Fire Team ((two UH-1H helicopter

96
Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.210. However, note the preceding footnotes
in this Note (footnotes 4, 32, and 54-55) - describing the early June 1969 “High Point”, “the Nixon-Thiệu
conference at Midway” and the “Campaign”. As noted, the official Australian account of the Battle of Bình Ba
is in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.203-240.
97
Australian historians have classified 16 of 1ATF’s engagements during the Vietnam War as “landmark”
battles. In order of the highest level of violence and casualties, these can probably be listed as the Battle of Long
Tân (18 August 1966) – the most violent; the Battle of Coral (mid-May 1968); the Battle of Balmoral (late May
1968); and the Battle of Bình Ba (6-8 June 1969). Hall, R. and Ross, A., “ ‘Landmark’ Battles and the Myths of
Vietnam”, pp.186-209 in Stockings, C., ANZAC’s Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History,
University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2012.
98
A local Communist Party History cites the date of the Battle as “20 July 1969” - when: “The Region’s 33rd
Main Force Regiment clashed with the enemy at Bình Ba and suffered heavy casualties with tens of cadre and
soldiers killed.” See: …, Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa - Vũng Tàu (1930 - 1975), History of the Bà Rịa-Vũng
Tàu Party Chapter, Chương VIII: Đánh Thắng Chiến Lược Việt Nam Hóa Chiến Tranh Của Mỹ - Ngụy (1969-
1972), Chapter 8: Defeating the US and Puppet Strategy to Vietnamize the War, 2011.
99
Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969. Beginning at
about 1100hrs, Vietnamese and Australian forces engaged an enemy force estimated at 90-strong in Bình Ba
village – 1ATF, SITREP, Núi Đất, 6 June 1969. Major secondary Australian sources on the Battle include:
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp. 210-240; Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds),
The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown, 2009; and Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings: The
History of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, op.cit., 2002; Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story .
of the Australian War, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012; and the booklet: 40 th Anniversary of the Battle of
Binh Ba – Vietnam 6-8 June 2009, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2009. This “armoured assault”
on the village was commanded by (then) Captain R. De Vere (3 rd Cavalry Regiment) - ie with the infantry
mounted in the APCs – see 40th Anniversary …, op.cit., 2009, p.11.
100
Second Lieutenant P.H.D. Rogers (Possum 22, 161 Reconnaissance Flight) - flying a Bell Sioux 47G-3B1
helicopter, reported that a group of about 60 enemy were withdrawing from the village toward the south-west.
Cameron, B., Canister ! On ! Fire !, op.cit., 2012, Chapter 13 - “Bình Ba : Close-in Fighting”. The enemy group
was “moving swiftly, and not tactically” – email to author from Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) P.H.D. Rogers, DFC,
25 August 2012.
101
By this stage, Centurion tank Callsign 22B (Corporal B. Bennier) - which had been under repair at the
Squadron’s Light Aid Detachment when the RRF departed Núi Đất – had moved up Route 2 to Bình Ba and
joined the initial three tanks in the RRF for the attack.
 25

gunships))102 on the south part of the village and towards Route 2 where the District Chief
had organised further evacuation ((of villagers)). At 1150hrs, B Company ((5RAR))103 was
dispatched ((from 1ATF)) to assist D Company … ((and)) initially blocked to the south. … D
Company then moved to the west of the village and lined up for an assault. A rocket cache
was located in the rubber west of the village. B Company moved to block from the east and
covered the north and south approaches by fire. PF104 troops remained in a block to the north
throughout the operation … ((and)) cleared the church in the north of the village. At approx
1420hrs105, D Company commenced to sweep towards the east, and heavy contacts occurred
immediately. … The enemy were firing from the houses and then withdrawing into the
tunnels.106 During this sweep, D Company suffered 1 KIA ((Private W.E. Teeling)) and 2
WIA. At 1830hrs, D Company completed this sweep and to the east of Route 2 opposite Bình
Ba. PF troops remained in blocks to the north and north-west of Bình Ba.
At approx. 1500hrs, B Company despatched one platoon to the north-east of Bình Ba
to control and screen civilians withdrawing north. Two VC were detained at this point. One
Chieu Hoi with a head wound reported in. One VC was also captured attempting to escape to
the east.”107

A 33rd Regiment soldier firing a Type 56/AKM/AK-47 Assault Rifle

102
Offensive air support for the RRF operations at the Battle included a Heavy Fire Team (three RAAF UH-1H
Bushranger gunships); and an O-2A Cessna Skymaster (Jade) fixed-wing observation aircraft fitted with 2.75”
rockets.
103
B Company (Major R.E. Harring) - mounted in M113A1 APCs and several M577 Armoured Command
Vehicles (ACVs). Captain T.H. Arrowsmith – a 3rd Cavalry Regiment officer, commanded the “ad hoc”
APC/ACV group.
104
This is probably a reference to Regional Force (RF) troops – as noted, both the Regional Force and the
Popular Force (PF) were termed “Territorial Forces” – see also footnote 33.
105
By this time, Australian armoured reinforcements had moved south down Route 2 from 6RAR/NZ’s FSB
Virginia (about six kilometres to the north) – 4th Troop (comprising three Centurion tanks: 24A – SGT J.
Browning, 24B – CPL J. Dziedic, 24C – CPL R. Hanham), and the 21st APC Section (SGT G. Wilson). These
tanks replaced the four Centurions that had deployed with the RRF.
106
In this phase of the operations, an enemy 75mm Recoilless Rifle (RCL) was recovered by Australian forces –
the only 75mm RCL confirmed as recovered in the Battle. This was probably a D440 Battalion equipment, see
the D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.93: “there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy
seized one of the two 75mm recoilless rifles, one of the Battalion’s principal fire support weapons.”
107
Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969.
 26

According to an account at a mid-2013 33rd Regiment reunion in Hanoi108, it was an

“unequal contest” against the Australians who had helicopters, tanks and armoured vehicles.
Their soldiers fought “hand-to-hand” with “hundreds of Australian troops” in a “10-hour”
battle from 8am to 6pm. The 1st Battalion headquarters was surrounded, but villagers assisted
them to escape. However, some were “captured by the enemy and tortured.”
The D440 Battalion account of the Battle included: “With the difficult situation faced
by our fraternal unit – and as ordered by the Campaign Headquarters, the ((D440)) Battalion
headquarters deployed a recoilless rifle platoon and part of an infantry company to break
through the enemy blockade from the direction of Bình Ba Xăng ((ie Đức Trung)) hamlet.109
However, this force was itself decisively attacked by Australian tanks right from the edge of
the hamlet, and many of our troops were wounded. Our combat troops were brave and set fire
to a M.118 [sic] tank, but were unable to break through the blocking position or defeat the
enemy’s frenzied counter-attack. Next, in the face of indications that the enemy could wipe
us out on the battleground, we took the initiative to withdraw. With a breaking of the enemy
blockade unsuccessful, there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy seized one of
the two 75mm recoilless rifles, one of the Battalion’s principal fire support weapons.”110
By about 6.30pm (1830hrs), the heaviest fighting had finished. The M113A1 APCs
under Captain R. De Vere (3rd Troop) returned to Núi Đất.111 D Company/5RAR and B
Company/5RAR – supported by tanks (4th Troop – Sergeant J. Browning) and APCs (a
composite group under Captain T.H. Arrowsmith – now including the 21st APC Section –
(Sergeant G. Wilson) remained in Bình Ba overnight.
In the period from 1525hrs to 1945hrs on 6 June, up to 15 rockets of unknown calibre
impacted in the Núi Đất base – some were noted as having been fired from the direction of
Bình Ba.112

108
Tạ Tường Mạnh, Gặp mặt CCB Trung Đoàn 33 anh hùng lần thứ 3 Hà Nội (Họp Mặt Truyền Thống Cựu
Chiến Binh-Bạn Chiến Đấu Trung Đoàn 33 – TP Hà Nội, Lần Thứ 3, Ngày 21/7/2013), 21 July 2013, published
6 October 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTv88UxE4pQ . This is a video of the 33rd Regiment’s
reunion held in Hà Nội on 21 July 2013. As noted, other accounts of the Battle of Bình Ba are included in the
history monographs published by the 33rd Regiment veterans, see Appendices 1 to 4 in Reference A.
109
This account of D440 Battalion’s involvement is also included in a 33rd Regiment history - Lý Lịch Di Tích
Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.10 – see
Appendix 3 in Reference A.
110
D440 Battalion History (2011), Vietnamese edition, pp.92-93.
111
The APCs “left in the late afternoon, probably around 1700hrs, to return to Núi Đất, but did not enter into
Núi Đất until well after 1800hrs as the base had come under rocket fire, and we were halted north of the base.” –
email to the author from Major (Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM – 28 August 2012.
112
1ATF Commander’s Diary – Narrative, and Duty Officers’ Log (AWM95, 1/4/153). Rockets were fired into
the 1ATF base at Núi Đất on 6 and 7 June - up to 15 107mm rockets impacted in the base and in the vicinity on
the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four or five impacted in the base on the afternoon of 7 June. According
to 1ATF: “These rockets were probably fired by an element of 74 NVA Artillery Regiment” – 1ATF, Enemy
situation in Phuoc Tuy Province, 1 Jun to 8 Jun 69, Núi Đất, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. As noted earlier, the rocket
firings that were attempted on 5 June by “Tây’s unit” into the Bình Ba area were reportedly unsuccessful –
(captured document – Officer Commanding C-195 Company – see footnote 61) - 1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69,
Núi Đất, 14 July 1969. The shelling of Núi Đất is also related in a 33rd Regiment account: “At the same time ((6
June)), the 33rd Regiment’s firepower – RCLs and 82mm mortars, attacked the artillery positions of the
Australian headquarters in Núi Đất with the aim of degrading the enemy’s combat power and forcing them to
recall their force and give up their intention of taking charge of the battlefield.” - Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng
Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.10 – see Appendix 3
 27

Bình Ba - 7 June 1969

At 0700hrs on 7 June, 5RAR’s D Company moved to link up with B Company. “At

0700hrs, an enemy company was observed moving towards the village at about 300 metres to
the south-west. The enemy were engaged by tank and small arms fire. … one enemy was
KIA (BC) and 6 enemy wounded (blood trails). … The western half of the village was swept
by midday with no opposition. Three enemy POW were located and evacuated. D Company
then stopped and waited for the PF [sic] troops to take over and complete the search of the
eastern half of the village.”113
According to the Australian official history: “At 6am, troops from B Company,
occupying a blocking position in the rubber to the south of the reaction force, noticed a
company in green moving towards them. Thinking they were Regional Force troops, the B
Company soldiers waved casually and received an acknowledgement. A moment later, both
sides recognised each other: North Vietnamese Army soldiers and Australians. The enemy
disappeared followed by a fusillade from artillery, tanks, APCs and small arms. No casualties
were inflicted on either side.”114
The NVA element may have been part of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd NVA Regiment
that had reportedly been tasked to ambush the 1ATF Ready Reaction Force on Route 2 in the
area from the Sông Cầu north to the hamlet of Đức Mỹ on the southern edge of Bình Ba
village.115 The 33rd Regiment Martyrs’ list includes: Đào Bạch Kim – a platoon commander
of the 2nd Battalion (D8), killed at Bình Ba on 6 June; Bùi Văn Lườn – a section 2ic of the 2nd
Battalion (D8), killed at Bình Ba on 8 June; and also probably Hoàng Văn Dẹm – a section
2ic of the 2nd Battalion, killed at Bình Ba on 6 June 1969. A further two soldiers from the 2nd

to Reference A. As noted above, an Australian officer wrote: The APCs “left ((Bình Ba)) in the late afternoon,
probably around 1700hrs, to return to Núi Đất, but did not enter into Núi Đất until well after 1800hrs as the base
had come under rocket fire, and we were halted north of the base. We actually observed the flight path of the
rockets and radioed the compass bearings to our Squadron Headquarters.” – email to the author from Major
(Retd) R. De Vere MC, OAM – 28 August 2012. The assessed location of the rocket-firing site was engaged by
Australian artillery (105th Field Battery - RAA) from the Núi Đất base. The artillery also fired in support of B
Company in the early evening, and fired H & I (harassing and interdiction) tasks into the Bình Ba area
throughout the night. Earlier, at 0015hrs on 6 June, 25-30 82mm mortar rounds were fired into 9RAR’s Fire
Support Base Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hải Mountains. This appeared to be in support of an attack by
elements of the VC D445 Battalion on a Rural Development (RD) Cadre compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN
outpost (of the 2nd Battalion/52nd Regiment) in the Hội Mỹ area. As noted, on the afternoon of 7 June, a further
five 107mm rockets impacted in the 1ATF Núi Đất base. A photograph of 1ATF personnel doing “crater
analysis” of a 107mm rocket impact in June 1969 is in the Australian War Memorial collection –
BEL/69/0359/VN.
113
Khan, C.N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969.
114
Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., p.222. The HQ 1ATF G (Ops) Log Sheet 51, Serial
733 recorded the incident occurring at 0645hrs at YS 445737 (in the rubber on the south-western edge of the
village) and involving “approx. 50” enemy. This appears to be the incident recounted in the 5RAR After Action
Report – ie see footnote 113 above. The 5RAR History notes: “At O600 hrs 7 June, some of B Company
((5RAR)), blocking in the rubber to the south, noticed a force of company strength moving towards them from
the south.” – Battle, M.R. and Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.55.
115
For the Sông Cầu Stream/River, see footnotes 4, 50, and 90.
 28

Battalion were killed a few kilometres north of Bình Ba at Việt Cương: Bùi Văn Sửu on 8
June, and Trương Văn Thực on 9 June 1969.116
At Đức Trung hamlet – about a kilometre north of Bình Ba village, 50 to 80 NVA/VC
were sighted and engaged – initially by Popular Force troops. A Regional Force element
cleared the area, but a 100-strong enemy force later returned and attacked the Popular Force –
killing four and wounding seven. 5RAR’s B Company and tanks swept the southern part of
the hamlet – but as civilians were noted in the northern area, the task was undertaken by
Territorial Forces (ie RF and/or PF) who forced the enemy to withdraw to the north-west.117
At 1500hrs, D Company swept the eastern end of Bình Ba – and this was completed
by 1715hrs. There was no activity overnight in the area.
The 33rd Regiment’s “Summary History” (2010) – see Appendix 1 to Reference A,
only relates that: “In attacks on hamlets at Bình Ba, Kim Long (Bà Rịa), the Regiment
destroyed 24 armoured vehicles forcing the enemy to withdraw to its defences at Núi Đất.”118

C-41 attacks Hòa Long – and Operation Tong

Neither the 33rd NVA Regiment nor D440 Battalion elements were involved in the
attack on Hòa Long village - immediately south of the 1ATF Núi Đất base, on 7 June 1969.
According to the Châu Đức History (2004): “At Long Lễ Sub-Sector ((ie in Hòa Long)), the
Châu Đức District troops entered and occupied Ấp Bắc ((Northern)) hamlet of Hòa Long
village and repelled eight counter-attacks by the puppet troops. At 2pm, the Australians
deployed infantry and tank ((xe tăng)) reinforcements and advanced deep into our battle
positions. The firepower of our unit’s B-40s destroyed two tanks ((xe tăng)) in the first
volley. One of our comrades was killed and two were lightly wounded.”119 1ATF reporting
related that Châu Đức District’s C-41 Company attacked Hòa Long village on 7 June 1969,
and the adjacent 1ATF Núi Đất base was shelled with five 107mm rockets.120 The 1ATF
Ready Reaction Force (C Company, 5RAR – with APCs and tanks) responded to the

116
Nguyễn Sỹ Hồ, Martyrs’ List, op.cit., 16 July 2013 – see Appendix 9 in Reference A.
117
Early on 7 June, at the Đức Trung rubber factory about 500 metres north of Bình Ba village, “up to eighty
enemy” were observed from the air – but soon after departed. At about 1300 hrs, an estimated 100 enemy
attacked a PF platoon in Đức Trung and B/RAR was deployed - but the enemy force “withdrew to the north-east
and north-west”. – Battle, M.R. and Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, pp.56-57.
118
Cựu Chiến Binh Trung Đoàn 33, Tóm Tắt … Trung Đoàn 33, op.cit., July 2010 – see Appendix 1 to
Reference A.
119
Châu Đức District History (2004) - Nguyễn Công Danh et al, Lịch sử … Châu Đức (1930-2000), op.cit.,
2004, p.175. See also the Hòa Long History - Đảng bộ xã Hòa Long, Lịch sử Đảng bộ xã Hòa Long (1930-
2005) – The History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), 25 April 2009. According to the diary
of Nguyễn Hoàng Mai – the commander of C-41 Company, “on 7 June, we fought in Hòa Long against six
attacks. In the final attack, there were Australians and armour – there were no aircraft. We killed 18 and
wounded three from the Sector PF and RD Cadre. One M41 [sic] tank was burnt out and one damaged, two
M113A1s were knocked out. Our casualties were two KIA, one CIA, one WIA, and one surrendered.” - Annex
A to 1ATF, INTSUM No.241-69, Núi Đất, 29 August 1969.
120
As noted earlier, rockets were fired into the 1ATF base at Núi Đất on 6 and 7 June - up to 15 107mm rockets
impacted in the base and in the vicinity on the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four impacted in the base on
the afternoon of 7 June. According to 1ATF: “These rockets were probably fired by an element of 74 NVA
Artillery Regiment” – 1ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province, 1 June to 8 June 1969, Núi
Đất, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. (AWM95, 1/4/156, folio G32). As noted, other rocket firings attempted on 5 June
by “Tây’s unit” in the Bình Ba area were reportedly unsuccessful (see footnotes 74 and 112).
 29

incursion into Hòa Long – ie Operation Tong (titled to complement D/5RAR’s earler
Operation Hammer at Bình Ba).121 1ATF reported six VC killed – four of whom were
credited to 1ATF forces.122

The Aftermath

Following an early morning sweep of Bình Ba on 8 June 1969, D Company returned

to Núi Đất at 1100hrs, with B Company following at 1540hrs. That morning, a detachment
from the 1ATF Civil Affairs Unit – with medical and engineer elements, deployed to Bình Ba
to assist its inhabitants.
The 5RAR After-Action Report for the Battle of Bình Ba 123 claimed 43 enemy killed
(1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment). 1ATF contemporary reporting identified the 1st Battalion
of the 33rd Regiment – together with the Regiment’s heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle
elements – and listed 71 enemy killed, six wounded and 12 POWs.124 Subsequently – a few
years after the Battle, 1ATF reported enemy casualties at Bình Ba as “51 NVA KIA (BC), 11
POWs”.125 According to a 5RAR Regimental History, the enemy casualty figure was later

121
See the 5RAR History – ie Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.58
and pp.352-353; Anderson, P., When the Scorpion Stings, 2002, op.cit., pp.179-181; and Ekins R. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.226-227.
122
For contemporary summaries, see, HQ 1ATF G (Ops) Log Sheet 69, Serial 987, 9 June 1969 (AWM 95,
1/4/153); and also HQ 1ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation 1-8 June 1969, 10 June 1969, para 2.g., (AWM95,
1/4/156, folio G32). The 5RAR Combat After-Action Report for Operation Tong noted that: “Fresh weapons
pits sufficient for 56 enemy were located … in the main area of contact; and documents captured and examined
at the contact site in Hòa Long indicated “at least three groups of enemy belonging to C-41, giving names and
weapons. The three groups had 8, 11 and 16 men respectively. This total of 35 was closer to the mark that the
200 reported by the VC PW.” “Certain ((ie definite)) enemy casualties” were “6 VC KIA” and “2 VC (captured
by RF)” – Ducker, C.H. Major (5RAR), Ấp An Phú, 11 June 1969 (AWM95, 7/5/27). The author (Chamberlain,
E.P., Lieutenant - 1969) interrogated a C-41 prisoner (Trần Văn Chiến) in Hòa Long on 8 June 1969. Australian
records also indicate that three female members of the C-41 Company Support Cell were captured in Hòa Long
on 7 June 1969: Lê Thị Nga, Nguyễn Thị Mỹ, and Nguyễn Thị Thu.
123
Khan, C. N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11 June 1969, p.3. “43
KIA (BC), 6 WIA (blood trails), 8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh.” Weapons recovered at Bình Ba were: 1 x 75mm RCL, 1
x RPD machine gun, 6 x AK-47, 3 x SKS, 1 x Garand rifle, 1 x Mosin Nagant rifle, 3 x K-54 pistols, 2 x RPG-7,
1 x RPG-2, 1 x 60mm mortar tube, 1 x 82mm mortar base plate and tripod. COMUSMACV also subsequently
reported “43 enemy KIA” in the Battle – COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1
April 1969 – 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969.
124
1ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No. 22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Núi Đất. Not all 12 prisoners were
necessarily processed by 1ATF. As noted in the footnote above, the report by the commander of 5RAR –
Lieutenant Colonel C.N. Khan, stated: “8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh”. Subsequent official Australian records indicated
that only the following POWs were captured at Bình Ba by Australian forces on 7 June 1969: “Nguyễn Văn
Dụy, Pte - C2/1/A/ 57B [sic - more probably 3/2/1/A57) , NVA; Bùi Văn Lai (sometimes incorrectly as “Bùi
Văn Lan”) – see also the following footnote , C2/B2/A1/D1/33 Regiment - wounded; Trần Văn Thanh - a
platoon leader, K1 Battalion/33 Regiment (hospitalised – died of wounds on 26 June 1969); Trần Voi, Pte – C-
25 Transport Coy, NVA; Lâm Văn Bach, Bình Ba Guerrilla Unit; and Hoàng Văn Thanh, Bình Ba Guerrilla
Unit.” – AWM98, 493 – HQ AFV (Barcode 904597). In mid-2013, Nguyễn Văn Dụy was living in Phúc Thọ
District, Hà Nội; but Bùi Văn Lai and Trần Voi had deceased in about 2011 – advice to author from 33rd
Regiment veterans (28 May 2013).
125
1ATF, INTSUM 268/71, Núi Đất, 25 September 1971. A “Bùi Văn Lai - b.1937 in Hà Sơn Bình Province” is
also listed in the 33rd Regiment’s Martyrs’ List as KIA at Bình Ba on 6 June 1969 (see Appendix 9 to Reference
A).
 30

amended to 126 killed after Popular Forces troops reportedly found many more bodies
beneath the rubble of destroyed houses in the village.126. The official Australian military
history cites a total of 99 enemy killed – 56 of whom were credited to Territorial Force troops
(RF and PF) who lost four killed and seven wounded. The official Australian military history
also notes: “6 wounded/escaped, PW 8, rallier 1, detainees 28”. 127 In 2009, at the 40th
Anniversary of the Battle, an Australian commemorative booklet assessed: “it seems that
more than 100 VC and NVA, possibly many more, lost their lives in the battle.”128 The US
Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam reported that: “One company of the 5th RAR plus
Regional Forces and Popular Forces cordoned the village, while another company, supported
by tanks and armored personnel carriers, assaulted the enemy in the village. Results of the
operation were 43 enemy killed, 8 prisoners and 8 small arms, 3 rocket launchers and 1
mortar captured.” 129
The commanding officer of 5RAR - Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan, reportedly
“continued to believe more than 30 years later that the attack on the Centurion was nothing
more than the result of poor fire discipline by a ‘wayward soldier’.”130
Documents recovered by Australian forces after the Battle included a 1:25,000 scale
map of the Bình Ba plantation area – with a headquarters element and a mortar position
shown in grid-square YS 4274.131
A Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History summarised the Battle and its aftermath:
“On 20 July [sic] 1969, the 33rd Regiment (a Regional Main Force unit) attacked the enemy
at Bình Ba and suffered heavy casualties – tens of our cadre and soldiers were killed. The
Australian commandos132 were deployed to ambush all the streams and re-entrants to
discover signs of our bases and call down artillery fire and heli-lift troops to surround us. Our

126
Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.346, p.350.
127
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, 2012, p.225 and p.736. Australian POW records show six
POW captured by Australian forces at Bình Ba: four members of the 33rd Regiment (including a platoon
commander of K1 Battalion) and two members of the Bình Ba Guerrilla Unit – see the preceding footnote 124.
In summary, NVA/VC histories, captured documents, and rallier reports indicate the following casualties: 33rd
Regiment: 53 killed; D440 Battalion: possibly 1 killed, or “about 60 casualties” (rallier Lê Văn Nhanh), or “two
WIA” – Annex A to de Cure, P.F. Major, D440 LF Battalion, HQ 1ATF – Núi Đất, 29 September 1969 ; C195
Company: 12 killed and 11 wounded; Châu Đức District Committee: 1 killed; Bình Ba Guerrilla Unit and
Village Committee: about 7 killed; Bà Long Province cadre: one killed.
128
40th Anniversary of the Battle of Binh Ba, op.cit., Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2009, p.17.
129
II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December
1969. For the Australian force, results were: “43 enemy KIA, eight prisoners, six AK-47s, three rocket
launchers, two K-54 pistols, one 82mm mortar base plate and bipod” – see: COMUSMACV, Quarterly
Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 – 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969,
Annex E, p.63.
130
Brigadier C.N. Khan, DSO AM (Retd) – see 40th Anniversary …, op.cit., 2009, p.10.
131
1ATF, INTSUM No.160-69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969. Captured documents included a promotion certificate for
Nguyễn Xuân Song [sic] – to “company commander in 57 Regiment” (ie the 33 rd Regiment), dated 27 May
1969 – signed by an MR7 cadre (Đang Quang). The 33rd Regiment Martyrs’ List includes “Nguyễn Xuân
Sang, BT, D7” (platoon commander - 1st Battalion, killed at the Battle on 6 June 1969). As noted, the recovered
documents included a 1:25,000-scale sketch map of Bình Ba village with a headquarters (no echelon indicated)
and a mortar position shown at YS 4274. 33 rd Regiment locations in Bình Ba and the vicinity are also depicted
at p.215 in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012.
132
For NVA/VC use of the term “commandos”, see footnote 44.
 31

elements in almost all the villages of the Province were attacked and driven out – we were
unable to stay with the people.”133
The fighting at Bình Ba in early June 1969 was not mentioned in MACV’s Monthly
Summary for June 1969 – ie in its “review of significant events in June 1969”, although
smaller actions - including the communists’ shelling of the Phan Rang airbase, were included
in that report.134

Casualties

The 2010 Bình Ba village Party History135 has only a few sentences on the Battle of
Bình Ba ie: “In April [sic] 1969, our village guerilla forces together with the troops of A57
((ie 33rd NVA Regiment)) attacked the Bình Ba post. The enemy sent their tanks from Núi
Đất to rescue the enemy. A very fierce battle ensued during which a large number of the
enemy were killed – while our forces suffered heavy losses. Our guerillas who were guiding
our main force troops were ambushed and all captured so we sought to engage the enemy
while withdrawing. In the battle, a number of our guerillas were killed and some captured
including Nguyễn Văn Bé, Lâm Văn Bạch, Hoàng Văn Thành (Thái), … Comrade Nguyễn
Thị Xuân (Tư Thiên) - the Party Chapter Secretary, our village guerillas, and the A57
element fought bravely - but she was wounded in the face and taken to the province hospital
for treatment. Ms Nguyễn Thị Xuân was a dedicated cadre and very brave in battle. …”

33rd NVA Regiment Memorial, Bình Ba village – with Stelae

133
Trần Văn Khánh (et al), Ban … Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Tập II, 1954-
1975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII).
134
HQ MACV Monthly Summary June 1969 – dated 4 October 1969. VCAT Item No.7390115001. The
Summary noted that: “During the first week of June, the enemy conducted a high point consisting of a number
of coordinated, widespread indirect fire attacks throughout the country and some ground attacks. In the most
significant ground action, 339 enemy soldiers were killed in two abortive attacks against a U.S. 25th Infantry
Division fire support base in Tay Ninh Province.”
135
Ban Chấp Hành Đảng Bộ Xã Bình Ba (The Executive Committee of the Bình Ba village Party Chapter),
Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Đảng Bộ, Quân và Dân Xã Bình Ba (1930-2010) (The History of the
Revolutionary Struggle of the Party, the Forces and the People of Bình Ba Village), Bình Ba 6/2010, p.108.
 32

33rd Regiment Museum Memorial Stelae (2)

A 2010 33rd NVA Regiment historical monograph summarised: “The enemy

concentrated a large force, while at that time we were in the process of developing our
combat strength – ammunition replenishment was not possible; there was no food, and we
had to eat bananas and jack-fruit in lieu of rice. Nevertheless, we still had to fight to the last
breath. Not counting those wounded in the battle, 53 of our comrades were killed at that
place. The enemy buried them in a large hole in the earth, and only recently have we been
able to recover their bodies and inter them in a cemetery.”136 The remains were “disinterred
and reburied in the Province martyrs’ cemetery in 1986”.137
The Regiment’s Martyrs’ Lists (see Appendix 9 in Reference A) include the names of
50 personnel who were killed at the Battle of Bình Ba in the period 6-8 June 1969. On the
Lists, a further four are noted as having been killed in the vicinity in that period.138 The
Martyrs’ Lists for the Battle of Bình Ba include the following senior cadre: Bùi Quang Miên -
the “DP” (ie Battalion 2ic) of the 7th (ie 1st) Battalion; Phạm Văn Khẩu - a Deputy Political
Officer; Lê Văn Trụ - a Company Commander; Hoàng Bùi Đông – a Company 2ic; and Lê
Văn Thục - a Company 2ic. Apart from 1st Battalion (ie D7) personnel, the Martyr’s Lists
also include four personnel from the 2nd Battalion (ie D8) and one from the 3rd Battalion (ie
D9) as having been killed at Bình Ba on 6 June 1969.139 Several soldiers from the Regiment’s
support companies were also reported as killed at the Battle - including: one from the C18 Air
Defence Company; four from the C19 Sapper/Engineer Company; and one from the C21
Reconnaissance Company).
Today - in Bình Đức hamlet of Bình Ba village, the 33rd Regiment memorial (khu
tưởng niệm) includes a museum and engraved stelae (bia) to the “53 fallen soldiers” of the
33rd Regiment. 33rd Regiment histories and other NVA/VC reports note 33rd Regiment

136
Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment
(A57)), Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010, p.9 – see Appendix 2 to Reference A. A senior office-holder in the 33rd
Regiment’s Veterans’ Association – Lê Bá Lộc (a former deputy commander and chief-of-staff of the
Regiment), has stated that: “at Bình Ba on 6-6-1969 … in a fierce and unequal battle … the soldiers of the 1st
Battalion (33rd Regiment) fought heroically to their last breath, and 53 soldiers of the 1st Battalion died
bravely.” - Hữu Minh, “Nước mắt ngày gặp lại”, Báo Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu điện tử, 10 August 2012.
137
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011 – see Appendix 3 to Reference B.
138
In the vicinity – eg at Việt Cương (vicinity YS 455749), Cao Su Bà Rịa (Bà Rịa District/Rubber Plantation),
and – farther afield: the Mây Tào Mountains (possibly died of wounds on 8 June).
139
D8: Hoàng Văn Dẹm; Đào Bạch Kim; Bùi Văn Lườn; and probably Hoàng Văn Vuông. D9: Bồ Xuân Cúc.
See Appendix 9 to Reference A.
 33

personnel killed at the Battle of Bình Ba as “50” or “53” or “55”.140 For lists of those killed in
the Battle – produced by the Regiment’s Veterans’ Association, see Appendix 9 to Reference
A.
Other NVA/VC casualties reportedly included:
- D440 Battalion – probably several, but unclear.141
- C-195 Unit/Company – 12 killed and 11 wounded.142
- Bình Ba Guerilla Unit - about 7.143
- Châu Đức District Committee - 1
- Bà Long Military Proselytising Section - 1.144

Australian casualties were one killed (Private W.E. Teeling – 5RAR) and 10 wounded
(two - 5RAR, two - B/3rd Cavalry Squadron, six - B/1st Armoured Regiment).145 Vietnamese

140
In 2009, a memorial article for the 33rd Regiment's Veterans’ Liaison Section stated: “The Regiment had
3,050 martyrs - including 2,008 who bravely fell on the Eastern Nam Bộ battlefield. In particular, in the fighting
to liberate Bình Ba in the 1969 Spring Campaign, close to 50 cadre and fighters bravely died." - Thanh Tùng,
"Lễ cầu siêu và dâng hương tưởng nhớ các anh hùng liệt sỹ Trung đoàn 33” (“A Buddhist Mass and Ceremony
to Remember the Heroic Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment"), Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Television, late August 2009. In a
2010 article, 33rd Regiment veterans related that at the battle of “Bình Ba on 6 June 1969 more than 50 members
of the Regiment fell in an unequal battle with the enemy.” - Lê Đình Thìn, “Trung Đoàn 33 – một thời hào hùng
…” – “The 33rd Regiment – an heroic time …”, Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (magazine), Vũng Tầu, 30 April 2010, p.18.
A subsequent article related that the 33rd Regiment suffered 50 killed at Bình Ba, and the Regiment had
destroyed “two Australian companies” – Hồng Quốc Văn “Gặp gỡ một chiến sĩ của Trung đoàn 33 Anh hùng” –
“Meeting a combatant of the heroic 33rd Regiment”, Báo cựu chiến binh online, 17 December 2010. In 2011, an
Australian television programme featured the 33rd Regiment memorial at Bình Ba, and a 33rd Regiment veteran
related that 55 of the Regiment’s personnel had been killed in the Battle, and 54 had been “bull-dozed” into a
mass grave by the Australian forces – Walker, M. (Director), “Private Terrence ‘Hippo’ Hippisley – Vietnam”,
In Their Footsteps, Channel 9, Melbourne, 12 June 2011. Memorial services are conducted at the complex in
Bình Đức hamlet of Bình Ba village – with 33 veterans from “North Vietnam” visiting on 25 July 2012 – Quang
Việt, “Đoàn cựu chiến binh trung đoàn 33 thăm chiến trường xưa Châu Đức”, Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Television, 25
July 2012. A Vietnamese NGO sought further details on the circumstances of the deaths of six 33 rd Regiment
personnel: Corporal Bùi Văn Đỗ (1/33 Regiment, b.1950, Hải Hưng) and Vũ Công Chiến (platoon 2ic 33rd
Regiment, b.1935, Hải Phòng) - killed on 6 June 1969; Phi/Phí Văn Phê (33rd Regiment, b.1950, Thái Bình)
killed on 8 June 1969; and Đào Bạch Kim (platoon commander 33rd Regiment, b.1944, Hà Tây) killed on 9 June
1969. - see MARIN http://www.nhantimdongdoi.org/?mod=chitiet&subcate=3&id=3767 .
141
A D440 Battalion platoon commander (Lê Văn Nhanh – commander 8th Platoon, 8th Heavy Weapons
Company) rallied in mid-July 1969 and stated that 440 Battalion had fought at Bình Ba on 5-6 June 1969 –
together with the 33rd Regiment, and that 440 Battalion has suffered “about 60 casualties including the
commander of C2 Company and two platoon commanders – and a 75mm RCL.” - 1ATF, INTSUM No.198/69,
Núi Đất, 17 July 1969. The account in the D440 Battalion History (2011) is unclear on the Battalion’s casualties
– an annex listing 561 of their personnel killed-in-action – noted as incomplete, does not specifically indicate
personnel killed at Bình Ba in the period 6-8 June 1969. However, two members were killed in “June 1969”:
Phạm Minh Quyết (6th Company) - Serial 199; and Ngô Xuân Lợi - Serial 261.
142
C-195 Reconnaissance and Special Delivery Unit of MR 7; captured document - 1ATF, INTSUM
No.195/69, Núi Đất, 14 July 1969.
143
According to the Châu Đức History (2004): “On 6 September [sic – but probably June] 1969, Comrade
Nguyễn Thị Thiên – the Secretary of the Bình Ba Village Party Committee and a number of the village
guerrillas were killed, together with Comrade Bình – a member of the District Standing Committee and
Commander of the District Public Security element, while holding out against the enemy. - Nguyễn Công Danh
et al, Lịch sử … Châu Đức (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004, p.174.
144
1ATF, INTSUM No.160/69, Núi Đất, 9 June 1969.
145
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.224.
 34

Regional and Popular Forces reportedly suffered four PF killed and seven wounded in Đức
Trung hamlet on 7 June 1969.
The Australian official history notes that in the Battle “four or five civilians” were
reportedly killed – “caught in the cross-fire”.146
South Vietnamese and Allied147 casualties for the first “High Point” in the
communists’ 1969 “Summer-Autumn Campaign” were reported in the Hà Nội media: “In
Eastern Nam Bộ, just between 5 and 10 June, the army and the people of the provinces north
and north-east of Sài Gòn … wiped out nearly 8,000 men …”.148

33rd Regiment at Bình Ba – A Discussion

There are contradictory reports on the presence of 33rd Regiment elements in the Bình
Ba area in the first two weeks of June 1969 – ie ranging from no presence to the full
Regiment.
The Battle of Bình Ba is only briefly mentioned in a “higher” Vietnamese history –
the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province Party History149 However, it is not included at all in several
others, including the Military Region 7 History150, the Đồng Nai Party History (1997,
2000)151, the Đồng Nai Monograph (2001)152 or the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Monograph (2005)153.
The reason for such omissions in unclear – perhaps the Bình Ba engagement was not

146
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.227. Following subsequent allegations of
an “atrocity” by Australian forces at Bình Ba, the Australian Minister for the Army stated that only three
civilians died and four were wounded in a population of 1,275.” – p.239. See also: Australian War Memorial,
Rebuilding Binh Ba, AWM Film F04344, silent, 23 MB.
147
“Allied” forces comprised US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). In mid-1969, US
forces reportedly numbered 538,933 (111 infantry battalions). FMWAF reportedly comprised: Australia – 7,649
(three infantry battalions); New Zealand – 556 personnel (an artillery battery), Republic of Korea - 50,289 (22
battalions); Thailand – 11,596 (six battalions); Philippines – 1,506; Republic of China – 31 personnel; Spain –
12 personnel. The Republic of Vietnam ARVN/Marines totalled 168 battalions. COMUSMACV, Quarterly
Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 – 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969.
Annex E. http://www.458seatiger.info/vietnam1969_report.PDF . For FWMAF, see also: Larsen, S.R.
Lieutenant General & Collins J.L. Brigadier, Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies – Department of
the Army, Washington, 1975.
148
Vietnam News Agency, “Dazzling Military Feats During June”, Nhân Dân, Hà Nội, 1 July 1969, p.3.
149
Trần Văn Khánh (et al), Ban … Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Tập II, 1954-
1975, op.cit., 2000, (Chapter VIII) – see earlier footnotes 6 and 133.
150
The MR7 History only includes a few sentences on activities in 1969 and makes no mention of a
“Campaign”, the “Long Khánh Campaign”, “High Point” operations in mid-1969, nor “Bình Ba” – see Military
Region 7 Headquarters (Quân Khu 7), 50 Năm Lực Lương Võ Trang Quân Khu 7 - The Armed Forces of
Military Region 7: 50 Years, Wattpad, 1995.
151
Trần Quang Toại (et al), Lịch sử Đảng bộ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam tỉnh Đồng Nai 1930 – 1995 - The
History of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Đồng Nai Province 1930-1995, Tập I, II , Nhà Xuẩt Bản Đồng
Nai, Biên Hòa, 1997 and 2000.
152
Trần Thị Minh Hoàng (foreword), Địa Chí Đồng Nai (The Đồng Nai Monograph), Nhà Xuẩt Bản Tồng Hợp
Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 2001. However – implying about September 1969, the Monograph states that: “In Long
Thành, the 33rd Regiment attacked and wiped out a Thai battalion at Bàu Cối”. – Vol III, Chapter VI, see also
footnote 197 in Reference A.
153
Thạch Phương & Nguyễn Trọng Minh (eds), Địa Chí Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Monograph),
Nhà Xuẩt Bản Khoa Học Xã Hội, Hà Nội, 2005.
 35

significant enough to mention, or – more likely, the lack of NVA/VC success at the Battle
precluded its inclusion.154
As noted earlier, the History of 5th VC Division (2005) – see Appendix 7 to Reference
A, makes no mention of 33rd Regiment elements operating in Phước Tuy Province in early
June 1969. Rather, that History relates engagements involving the 33rd Regiment in south-
eastern Long Khánh Province: “On 2 June, … The 33rd Regiment was ordered to secretly
deploy to the northeast of Gia Ray ((YT 6311)) and attack the forces of the 52nd Task Force
[sic] at Suối Cao – and afterwards, to ambush the enemy’s reinforcements to the west of
Route 3 ((ie Route 333)). On 5 June, we began the attack … The 33rd Regiment swiftly made
a forced march and attacked its objective on time as planned. … On 6 June, the 33rd
Regiment ambushed and destroyed an engineer company patrolling along Route 3 ((ie Route
333)). That afternoon, the enemy deployed the 2nd Armored Company and two companies of
the 52nd Task Force to break through and clear Route 3. The 33rd Regiment conducted a
blocking operation and attacked, destroying 11 armored vehicles and inflicting heavy
casualties on two enemy companies.”
A 1ATF study of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment notes: “In June 1969, the
battalions of the Regiment split for operational tasking. 3/33 was assigned an AO around Gia
Ray in Long Khánh and Bình Tuy Provinces. Lack of logistic support from the then 84 RSG
(now MR7 Rear Services) was probably the main cause for the split. Although under fairly
constant pressure, the Regimental Headquarters remained in the general Xuân Lộc/
Blackhorse area until December 1969.”155
A 2010 history monograph published by the 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Association –
see Appendix 2 to Reference A, relates that the Regiment “inflicted heavy losses on
Australian mechanised infantry at Kim Long ((north of Bình Ba, YS 459840)) and Bình Ba –
wiping out 24 vehicles and forcing the enemy to withdraw to their base. ((no date is
specified)) … and the Regiment had deployed “D1” (ie the 1st Battalion of the Regiment) to
replace D440 and had suffered 53 killed “on 6/6/1969 at Bình Ba”.156 A more brief - but
similar account, is related in a July 2010 “Summary History” 157 published by the 33rd
Regiment Veterans’ Association – see Appendix 1 to Reference A.
As noted earlier, a contemporary account – a captured C-195 Company document,
stated that the Company had: “participated in the June 1969 attack on Bình Ba with the
‘entire regiment’ (33 Regt).” and cited the Company’s casualties in that engagement. 158

154
Similarly, the failure of the 274th VC Regiment’s attack on a Thai Forces battalion position at Lộc An (YS
178918 – also cited as YS 166916) on 16 June 1969 is omitted from Vietnamese communist military and
political histories – see footnote 204 in Reference A and the following footnote 187.
155
HQ 1ATF, 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt, Annex F to 1ATF INTSUM No.122/71, Núi Đất, 2 May 1971. Identical to
the passage in the 33rd Regiment study by 1ATF of 21 September 1971 (Annex F to INTSUM No.264/71), this
3rd Battalion study by 1ATF does not mention the Battle of Bình Ba – 5-8 June 1969.
156
Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment
(A57)), Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010, p.2 and p.9 – see Appendix 2 to Reference A.
157
“In attacks on hamlets at Bình Ba, Kim Long (Bà Rịa), the Regiment destroyed 24 armoured vehicles forcing
the enemy to withdraw to its defences at Núi Đất.” - Cựu Chiến Binh Trung Đoàn 33, Tóm Tắt Truyền Thống
Trung Đoàn 33 …, op.cit., July 2010 – see Appendix 1 to Reference A.
158
1ATF, INTSUM No.195/69, Núi Đất, 14 July 1969.
 36

A Vietnamese unit history formally published in 2011 – the D440 History159 and the
33 Regiment’s “Background Memorial History”160 related that not only was the 1st Battalion
rd

of the Regiment at Bình Ba, but the “2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by
Comrade Quách Thái Sơn” was tasked to ambush the Australian RRF on Route 2 south of
Bình Ba. That ambush however was reportedly not initiated “as the enemy was spread out in
groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiment’s ambush formation, the
headquarters of the Regiment decided not to initiate the ambush attack.” A POW captured at
Bình Ba by 5RAR – Nguyễn Văn Dụy, stated that “while K1 ((the 1st Battalion)) was taking
part in a propaganda proselytizing program in the Bình Ba area, he heard that K2 Bn was
taking part in a battle.”161 An Australian account, also mentions the presence of the 2nd
Battalion in the area.162 However, as noted, the presence of the 2nd Battalion is not recorded
in the official Australian history, the 5RAR history, the 5RAR After-Action Report, nor
1ATF intelligence summaries. The location and the activities of the Regiment’s 3rd Battalion
in early June 1969 remain unclear.
As noted earlier, Australian SIGINT monitored the move of the 33rd Regiment’s
principal high frequency radio transmitter163 – ie presumably serving the Regimental
Headquarters, from south-eastern Long Khánh Province into Phước Tuy Province and its
subsequent withdrawal northward after the Battle – see the following marked sketch map.
Based on the foregoing, the balance of probabilities suggests that while the 1st
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was the principal NVA/VC force at the Battle of Bình Ba -
and the Regimental Headquarters, the 2nd Battalion, and regimental support elements were in
the Bình Ba area in the period 5-8 June 1969. It is probable that the 3rd Battalion remained in
Long Khánh Province and was involved in the engagements in the Gia Ray, Suối Cao and
Route 333 areas against ARVN 52nd Regiment elements – ie as related in the 5th Division
History (2005).164

159
D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and, in English in: Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 …, 2013,
pp.65-66.
160
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011 – see Appendix 3 to Reference A.
161
Interrogation Report – PW: Nguyễn Văn Dụy, Det 1 Div Int Unit – 1ATF, 19 June 1969. See also footnote
101, and footnote 551 in Reference A. See Dụy’s post-War “personal account” at Appendix 22 to Reference A.
162
The article relates that the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd Regiment of the 5th Division – together with the
local force D440 Battalion, was engaged by battalions of the Australian Task Force in the Bình Ba area (Phước
Tuy Province) in the period 5-11 June 1969. Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province – 1969”,
Winter 2010, op.cit., pp.89-114.
163
As related at footnote 19, the Australian Army’s official history states – incorrectly, that: “Australian
commanders and intelligence officers were baffled. During the initial occupation of Binh Ba, 33 NVA Regiment
had apparently maintained radio silence, eluding task force signals intelligence.” - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.237. That statement appears to cite a 2007 monograph that claimed “strict
radio silence” enabled “elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment and D440 Battalion to occupy the village of Bình
Ba without warning.” - Tidey, B., Forewarned Forearmed …, op.cit., 2007, pp.49-50. At endnote 207, Tidey
cites an S03 Intelligence (captain) at HQ 1ATF in mid-1969 as his source. See also Brigadier C.M.I Pearson’s
post-War letter of 8 May 2012 on “tracking” the 33rd NVA Regiment’s advance cited at footnote 20.
164
See the 5th VC Division History (2005) extract at Appendix 7 to Reference A, and also the 1ATF study of the
3 Battalion of the 33rd Regiment - footnote 155.
rd
 37

33rd NVA Regiment – Museum Display, Bình Ba Memorial

If 33rd Regiment elements – reportedly the 2nd Battalion, had set an ambush on Route
2 south of Bình Ba, why was an ambush not initiated ? Two Vietnamese sources have related
that the Australian RRF “was spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall
into the Regiment’s ambush.”165 However – after the RRF group (13 M113A1 APCs, three
Centurion tanks – a column about 850 metres in length) has passed through to Bình Ba
village, several more vulnerable 1ATF elements moved along Route 2 without incident. For
example, any NVA/VC elements in possible ambush sites south of Bình Ba did not engage:
the “fourth” Centurion tank ( Corporal B. Bennier) that followed the RRF up Route 2 as a
single vehicle (departing Núi Đất at about 1100hrs, 6 June); 5RAR’s B Company mounted in
APCs (Major R.E. Harring and Captain T.H. Arrowsmith - but without escorting Centurion
tanks, that departed Núi Đất at 1150hrs, 6 June); the RRF’s composite tank troop returning to
Núi Đất (in the late afternoon hours of 6 June); nor the original RRF APCs (Captain R. De
Vere) returning to Núi Đất (at about 1700hrs, 6 June).
33rd Regiment’s ambush elements either decided not to engage the Australian vehicles
- or may not have adequately established their ambush positions in time. However, Captain
R. De Vere has related an exchange of fire south of Bình Ba as the RRF moved north up
Route 2 late on the morning of 6 June ie: “We did encounter one minor roadblock ((which
we)) cleared by tank fire and rolled down the road with barely a pause; APC sections fired
into the flanks as they passed the area of the minor contact/failed ambush. APC crews did
report some enemy bodies as they passed the area. We proceeded without further incident
until halting just short of Bình Ba.”166 That brief encounter may have been with elements of
the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment. Also, as noted, a minor engagement occurred
subsequently at about 0600hrs on 7 June when an NVA force approached Bình Ba from the

165
See footnotes 92 and 93.
166
See footnote 89.
 38

south – and Vietnamese records indicate several 2nd Battalion soldiers were killed on that
day.167
Regardless, it is not yet clear why both the D440 History (2011)168 and the
“Background Memorial History”169 document have noted the presence of the 33rd Regiment’s
2nd Battalion - led by Quách Thái Sơn, in the Bình Ba area and cited its failure to initiate the
ambush south of the village – when all other published Vietnamese accounts appear to have
omitted any mention of a planned ambush by the 2nd Battalion.170
A senior 33rd Regiment veteran – Lê Bá Lộc171, has stated that the 2nd Battalion was
not involved in the Battle of Bình Ba itself, but that the Regimental Headquarters and the 2nd
Battalion was in the area/nearby.
Some aspects of the account of the Battle in the D440 History (2011) are also open to
question. That History notes the participation of D440 Battalion – ie: “Battalion Headquarters
deployed a recoilless rifle platoon and part of an infantry company to break through the
enemy blockade. … and many of our troops were wounded … With a breaking of the enemy
blockade unsuccessful, there was no time to collect weapons - and the enemy seized one of
our two 75mm recoilless rifles.”172 However, it seems remarkable that – according to the
D440 History, no D440 troops were killed at Bình Ba – noting that a D440 rallier later stated
that the Battalion suffered: “about 60 casualties including the commander of C2 Company
and two platoon commanders – and lost a 75mm RCL.”173

Post-script

Following the Battle of Bình Ba, the 33rd Regiment Headquarters withdrew
northwards – see the earlier SIGINT DF weekly summary map at page 7. The 1ATF
Commander – Brigadier C.M.I. Pearson directed 6RAR/NZ to interdict the withdrawing 33rd
Regiment elements, but was disappointed that no substantive engagement ensued.174

167
See footnotes 113-117.
168
D440 History (2011), Vietnamese edition, p.92; and in English in: Chamberlain, E.P., … D440 …, 2013,
pp.65-66.
169
Lý Lịch Di Tích Khu Tưởng Niệm … Trung Đoàn 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History),
op.cit., 2011- see Appendix 3 to Reference A.
170
As noted, the Châu Đức History (2004) also refers to the planned ambush – but does not mention the 2nd
Battalion ie: “However, the Australians did not enter our ambush as planned, and our company in the hamlet
suffered heavy casualties.” – op.cit., 2004, pp.173-174.
171
Lê Bá Lộc was the Regiment’s deputy chief-of-staff in the period 1969-1971; and deputy commander/chief-
of-staff in 1972-1975 – see Tổ Chức Ban Chỉ Huy Trung Đoàn 33 Qua Các Thời Kỳ (The Headquarters
Organisation of the 33rd Regiment in Past Years), op.cit., 2010. It is not wholly clear whether he joined the
Regiment before June 1969. For some years, Lộc has led the 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Liaison Committee (see
Appendix 4 to Reference A); and he was a principal of the 2014-2016 History Writing Team – ie Reference B.
172
Chamberlain, E., … D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2013, p.67.
173
Chamberlain, E., … D440: Their Story, op.cit., 2012, p.67, footnote 169. The 440 Battalion Martyrs’ List –
annexed to their History, specifically lists two members killed in “June 1969”, but no locations are mentioned
ie: Phạm Minh Quyết (6th Company) – Serial 199; and Ngô Xuân Lợi – Serial 261.
174
Post-War, Major General C.M.I. Pearson (Retd) wrote: “Although the information regarding the retreat of
this large force was passed to the unit ((ie 6RAR/NZ based out of FSPB Virginia near Route 2 - about six
kilometres north of the centre of Binh Ba village)) in the usual way, the enemy were able to side-step them as
they were occupied dealing with a smaller enemy group. This was the only occasion I can recall not using the
 39

On the afternoon of 11 June 1969, B Company of 6RAR/NZ assaulted a large

strongly-defended bunker system (at YS 392822) about 10 kilometres north-west of Bình Ba
village and about five kilometres north-west of 6RAR/NZ’s FSB Virginia (YS 437801)175 In
the fierce two-hour engagement – involving artillery and air support, the Australian company
commander was wounded. Soon after dark, the enemy unit – believed to be elements of the
2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment, withdrew northwards.176 Australian reports recorded nine
NVA killed – by body count177, but such casualties are not included in the 33rd Regiment’s
Martyrs’ List.178
On 12 June 1969, V Company of 6RAR/NZ observed about 200 NVA moving
northward carrying about 25 casualties in litters in the area of YS 398868 - about five
kilometres north of the 11 June contact described above. The NVA were engaged – including
with artillery and armed helicopter fire.179 “Bodies and documents identified 2nd Battalion 33
NVA Regiment supported by at least two heavy weapons companies.”180 A 33rd Regiment
document subsequently recovered by the 18th ARVN Division included that: “on 12 June
1969, J8 ((the 2nd Battalion/33rd Regiment)), K17 ((75mm RCL Company)) and K18 ((Sapper
Company)) failed to observe movement regulations, and were thus hit by airstrikes. They also
suffered losses in personnel and weapons. K20 ((Reconnaissance Company)) and J9 ((3rd
Battalion)) were also hit by airstrikes due to a lack of security. Six members of K20 were
KIA.”181
That recovered document also noted the Regiment’s casualties in the period “from 30
April to 20 June 1969”182 - that appear to have included casualties in the period of the Battle
of Bình Ba in early June 1969:

- “From 30 April – 20 June, various units failed to collect information on the

enemy; were ambushed nine times, and sustained 150 KIA, five MIA, one
captured; and lost 12 AKs, one B-40 and two K-54 pistols.

information provided by 547 Troop properly.” Major General C.M.I. Pearson – letter to the Defence Honours
and Awards Tribunal, 8 May 2012, and email advice passed to the author, early May 2012.
175
Byers, D.R., MC, B Company - 6RAR/NZ Contact After Action Report – 11 June 1969, Núi Đất – AWM95,
7/6/22. Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.232-233. Fairhead, F. Lieutenant
Colonel (Retd), A Duty Done, Linden Park, 2014, pp.86-87.
176
Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province,Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit., 2010, pp.98-99.
177
6RAR, Contacts and Incidents – Appendix 1 to Annex A to 6RAR After Action Report: 1-31 June 1969, Ops
14, 3 July 1969, Serial 52 (AWM95, 7/6/22).
178
Nguyễn Sỹ Hồ, Martyrs’ List, op.cit., 16 July 2013. For a summary of 2nd Battalion casualties recorded in
June 1969, see Appendix 9 to Reference A.
179
1ATF, INTSUM No.164-69, Núi Đất, 13 June 1969. See also 6RAR, After Action Report: 1-31 June 1969,
Ops 14, 3 July 1969, p.4, Serial 53. – noting captured documents that identified C17, C18 and C23 companies
(AWM95, 7/6/22).
180
Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province, Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit., 2010, pp.99-100. No
casualties are related in the 33rd Regiment Martyrs’ List for 12 June 1969 – see the summary at Appendix 9 to
Reference A.
181
CDEC Log 10-1940-69, Item 3. The locations of the airstrikes were not indicated. The report was probably
written by a 33rd Regiment Assistant Political Officer, Hồ Minh Tường.
182
CDEC Log 10-1940-69, Item 3. The author of the report appears to use both the “J” and “D” cover-
designators for the battalions of the Regiment.
 40

- “K22 ((Company)) and K16 ((82mm Mortar Company)) accidentally exploded

grenades wounding 11 members. A member of K22 took a grenade to go fishing,
but mistakenly caused an accident which wounded three men.”
- “some members of J7 ((1st Battalion)) headquarters and K20 ate canned fish, and
were poisoned ‘by the enemy scheme’.”
- “From 30 March to 20 June ((1969)), five members of D1, D2 and K10 of J8
wounded themselves, and one member of J7 committed suicide.”
- “From 8 May to 20 June ((1969)), the Regiment suffered 72 MIA; and D1 and D3
lost two B-41s, two B-40s, five K-54 pistols and 33 AKs.” These figures
presumably included the Regiment’s losses during B-52 strikes in May 1969183,
and at the Battle of Bình Ba in the period 5-8 June 1969.

Subsequently, the commander of the 33rd Regiment’s 2nd Battalion was reportedly
rebuked by his higher command for poor performance and withdrawing from the battlefield
in daylight.184 There were also reportedly “bitter recriminations” between Headquarters
Military Region 7 and the 33rd Regiment – and between Headquarters 33rd Regiment and its
battalions, over the failure of the Bình Ba operation.185

High Point – Phase Two

By 14 June 1969, 1ATF had received intelligence information indicating that the
second phase of the NVA/VC “High Point” would begin on 16 June 1969.186 On 16 June, the
274th VC Regiment attacked a Thai Armed Forces battalion position at Lộc An (YS 178918)
in Long Thành District of Biên Hòa Province, and the 274th Regiment suffered 212 killed.187

183
As noted earlier, B-52 missions comprised either four or six aircraft - with the usual bomb load of 51 750lb
bombs per aircraft. An “Arclight” – ie B-52, “target box” for a three-aircraft “cell” covered an area 1km x 3km.
184
Johnson, L., “Operation Lavarack – Phuoc Tuy Province,Vietnam – 1969”, op.cit., 2010, p.100 and endnote
31 referencing L. Johnson’s interview with D.M. Butler (Lieutenant Colonel - CO 6RAR/NZ, 1969) in August
2009 who cited 547 Signal Troop’s SIGINT intercepts. However, Major General Butler also had cited “captured
documents” as the source for the “commanding officer” ((implying the commander of the 2nd Battalion)) being
“severely censured for so dangerously exposing his battalion through his incompetence and lack of battlefield
discipline.” - Horner, D. & Bou, J., Duty First: A history of the Royal Australian Regiment, Allen & Unwin,
Second Edition, 2008, p.357. See also author Chamberlain’s email discussions with a knowledgeable 547 Signal
Troop linguist/analyst (27 March 2012) – the “original source”, who cited “rebukes” by the 33rd Regiment
Commander. The commander of the 2nd Battalion was Quách Thái Sơn, see footnotes 47, 48, 75 and 94.
185
The 33rd Regiment’s radio communications were invariably secure – ie by employing one-time-pad (OTP)
encryption (using HF transmissions on 102E radios – see footnote 18). However, at this time, a series of
messages in a lower-grade cypher were reportedly decrypted. The 33rd Regiment reportedly “believed that their
operational plans had been leaked from MR7 to the ARVN.” - Author’s correspondence with a knowledgeable
547 Signal Troop analyst/linguist – mid and late March 2012.
186
1ATF, INTSUM No.165-69, Núi Đất, 14 June 1969.
187
During the second VC “High Point” Phase, the 274th VC Regiment launched a major night assault on the
base defensive position of the Thai 2nd Battalion/1st Brigade/Black Panther Division – a two-company [-]
position (totalling 245 personnel) at Lộc An (YS 178918) in Long Thành District of Biên Hòa Province in the
early am hours of 16 June 1969. Reportedly forewarned of the impending attack by SIGINT information, the
Thai unit inflicted heavy casualties on the 274th Regiment – 212 VC were reportedly killed by body count -
1ATF, INTSUM No.167/69, Núi Đất, 16 June 1969. The Thai force had been forewarned of the VC attack by
 41

At that time, signals intelligence indicated that the 33rd Regiment Headquarters was probably
in south-western Long Khánh Province - about 20 kilometres east of Lộc An. However, three
33rd Regiment personnel have been listed as killed in the Lộc An/Bình Sơn area on 15 and 16
June 1969 – suggesting that the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment might have supported the
274th Regiment in the attack on the Thai position – or perhaps have been in the area and
suffered collateral casualties from US air and artillery support.188 However, the 5th Division
History (2005) asserts that: “At midday on 13 June, the enemy’s reconnaissance company
was destroyed by the 33rd Regiment at Vàm Khe Giao ((north of Gia Ray in Long Khánh
Province)), and we cut completely all contact between the 52nd Regiment and the
reconnaissance company - forcing the 52nd Regiment to deploy another battalion on a rescue
mission.” … On 16 June 1969: “The 33rd Regiment encircled the enemy’s 3rd Battalion to the
west of Suối Mơ. From daybreak, we concentrated our firepower on the enemy’s position.
Having been attacked by surprise, the enemy was extremely panic-stricken and attempted to
withdraw to the east. Resolved not to let the 52nd Regiment escape, the battalions of the 33rd
Regiment pursued the enemy and – in coordination with the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regiment
((ie 275th VC Regiment)), destroyed the enemy.”
The 5th VC Division’s account above of the 33rd Regiment’s actions in eastern Long
Khánh in mid-June 1969 does not correlate with Australian signals intelligence information
that placed the 33rd Regiment south-west of Xuân Lộc Town, about 30 kilometres east of Gia
Ray – see the preceding map at page 7. On 19 June, signals intelligence indicated that the 33rd
Regiment Headquarters was about five kilometres west of Xuân Lộc Town – and then moved
westwards into Biên Hòa Province.

signals intelligence-based information acquired by 1ATF’s 547 Signal Troop. The warning was hand-delivered
to the US advisors at the Thai Army Headquarters at Bearcat by Major Robert Payne (US Army – Retd, Special
Security Officer, II FFV) – email advice to author, 4 January 2014. Subsequently, captured documents identified
all three battalions of the 274th Regiment, the K21 Sapper/ Reconnaissance Company, and rear service elements
– 1ATF, Vietnam Digest 24-69, Núi Đất, 14-21 June 1969. According to Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam
(IIFFV), the “enemy attack against the 2-1st Infantry resulted in 212 enemy killed and 1 prisoner, 16 small arms
(AK-47s), 25 crew-served weapons, 823 grenades, and 6 mines captured. Friendly losses were 6 Thais killed
and 34 wounded.” – II FFV, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July 1969, 17 December
1969, p.28. The attack was reported in the Hà Nội media: “On 15 June, the PLAF of Biên Hòa Province
destroyed a battalion-size unit of Thai troops near Long Thành.” - Vietnam News Agency, “Dazzling Military
Feats During June”, Nhân Dân, Hà Nội, 1 July 1969, p.3. The Đồng Nai Party History records: “the 4th
Regiment ((274th Regiment)) attacked and destroyed two Thai battalions at Bình Sơn.” - Dương Thanh Tân (ed),
Lịch sử Đảng bộ ((Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam)) tỉnh Đồng Nai (1930-2000), Tập (Volume) II (1954-1975),
Chương (Chapter) IV, 2003. The attack is not mentioned at all in the 2006 memoir of the commanding officer of
the 274th VC Regiment - Nguyễn Nam Hưng - Major General, Một Đời Chinh Chiến (A Life at War), op.cit.,
2006. A study of the Lộc An engagement – including detailed interviews and maps, is at: 45th Military History
Detachment (US), Combat After Action Report, Defense of Loc An Base Camp – 16 June 1969, San Francisco,
3 July 1969. See also: Hart, S. with Chamberlain, E.P., “A Tactical SIGINT Success Story”, Pronto in South
Vietnam, January 2014, http://pronto.au104.org/547Sigs/547story3.html .
188
Bình Sơn village - and its adjacent rubber plantation, are located about four kilometres north-east of Lộc An
(YS 178918). Those reported killed were: Trần Văn Hào, soldier – 1st Battalion (ie D7), d. 15 June 1969 at Lộc
An; Bùi Văn Chấm, section commander – 1st Battalion (ie D7), d. 15 June 1969 at Bình Sơn; and Phan Ngọc
Đến, section commander – 1st Battalion (ie D7), d. 16 June 1969 at Bình Sơn. Nguyễn Văn Bảy was also killed
on 16 June 1969 – but the location is unclear. See: Nguyễn Sỹ Hồ, Martyrs’ List, op.cit., 16 July 2013, and
Appendix 9 to Reference A.
 42

Towards the end of June 1969, 1ATF reported that “the 33rd NVA Regiment is
considered to have moved out of the Province, and is now probably relocated north-west and
north-east of Blackhorse (YS 4396).189

33rd Regiment troops – with an NLF flag (a damaged photograph)

Hoàng Cao Hỷ, Commander of the 33rd Regiment 1968-1969

– including at the Battle of Bình Ba (a 2009 photograph)

189
1ATF, Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province, Núi Đất, 24 June 1969.
 43

The 33rd Regiment’s Achievements and Losses Summarized

Formally, the Regiment’s service is related principally in their published monographs

– and their 2016 History.
In late 2010, a 33rd Regiment veteran related that the Regiment had: “participated in
1,210 battles – both large and small, brought down one Sector, five Sub-Sectors, six Sub-
Sub-Sectors190, 235 posts – large and small, destroyed two convoys of vessels, 103 mortars
and artillery pieces, set fire to 133 aircraft and 1,345 military vehicles – including 601 tanks
and armoured vehicles, wiped out 32 battalions (including one American battalion and one
Thai battalion), 50 companies (including 21 American companies, two Australian companies,
two Thai companies), seized 2,454 weapons of various types, 32 radios, 20 military vehicles
and a large amount of other military equipment, and had wiped 30,047 enemy and captured
787.”191
At a reunion near Hà Nội on 21 July 2013, the Regiment’s achievements were
similarly recounted as “having fought in 1,210 battles (both large and small); killed 30,047
enemy; captured 787 Americans [sic]; destroyed 32 battalions and 50 companies; wiped out
235 posts; captured 2,454 weapons; destroyed 1,345 military vehicles; and liberated 475,000
people.192
As noted earlier, a 2010 33rd Regiment history monograph relates that “3,050
members of the Regiment had been killed, comprising:
- 718 comrades on the Central Highlands battlefields in the period 1965-1968;

- 2,008 comrades in Eastern Nam Bộ in the years 1969-1975; and

- 327 comrades on the South-Western Border in the period 1976-1979.193

190
The system of village-level Sub-Sub-Sectors (phân chi khu) was implemented across the Sài Gòn
Government’s Military Region III in early 1973 – and a conference was held at Vạn Kiếp (Bà Rịa) to launch the
programme. The Sub-Sub-Sectors were stablished at village level and commanded by a junior ARVN officer as
the assistant village chief for security and responsible for the PF, PSDF and the National Police – see Ngô
Quang Trường Lieutenant General, Territorial Forces, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military
History, Washington D.C., 1981, p.19. By late 1974, the ARVN staff had been increased to two officers and
four NCOs; and 2,200 Sub-Sub-sectors had reportedly been established. US Defence Attache, RVNAF
Quarterly Assessment – 1st Qtr FY 75, Saigon, 1 November 1974.
191
Interview with the venerable monk Đại Đức Thích Tâm Vượng in Trực Ninh District, Nam Định Province -
Hồng Quốc Văn “Gặp gỡ một chiến sĩ của Trung đoàn 33 Anh hùng” – “Meeting a combatant of the heroic 33rd
Regiment”, Báo cựu chiến binh online (War Veterans On-line Magazine), 17 December 2010.
192
Tạ Tường Mạnh, Gặp mặt CCB Trung Đoàn 33 …, 21 July 2013, published 6 October 2013.
193
Ban Liên Lạc Truyền Thống Trung Đoàn 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment
(A57)), Quá Trình …, op.cit., 2010, p.11. A Hà Nội-based website relates that a total of 2,181 personnel of the
33rd Regiment died in the “Anti-American Resistance War”. - Nguyễn Sỹ Hồ - see Appendix 9 to Reference A,
and the posting dated 9 October 2013 at:
http://teacherho.vnweblogs.com/mobile.php?op=ViewArticle&blogId=9313&articleId=435083 .
 44

The 33rd Regiment’s Veterans’ Association – and Reunions

In the post-War years, a 33rd Regiment Veterans’ Association was established with an
office in Vũng Tàu. About 200 of the 33rd Regiment’s veterans settled in the South, 150 of
whom are classified as invalids. Almost all were reportedly affected by Agent Orange.
Veterans have also established a 33rd Regiment construction-services and real estate company
in Hồ Chí Minh City.194 As mentioned earlier, in late July 2003, a 33rd Regiment Memorial
Area (Khu tưởng niệm) - with a stela (bia) to the “53 fallen soldiers” of the 33rd Regiment,
was inaugurated in Bình Ba village, and annual memorial ceremonies (Họp Mặt Truyền
Thống) are held on 27 July each year at the complex.195 The 33rd Regiment Veterans’
Association also has branches in northern Vietnam – including in Bắc Giang and Nghệ An
provinces. On 21 July 2013, a reunion and memorial ceremonies were held in Hát Môn
village of Phúc Thọ District, Hà Nội.196

Reunion at Phúc Thọ - 21 July 2013: Comrades Hải (Rear Services), Nguyễn Văn
Dụy (see below and footnotes 124, 161, 196) and Thản (see footnotes 490 and 495
in Reference A)

194
The company is titled: “Công Ty Cổ Phần Trung đoàn Ba ba” (The 33rd Regiment Joint Share Company)
Dương Minh Anh, “Công ty rất “lính” (“A very military company”), Sài Gòn Giải Phóng, Hồ Chí Minh City, 13
December 2005. http://www.sggp.org.vn/saigonthubay/nam2005/thang12/82643/
195
Anh Hồng & Kiến Giang, Khánh Thành Nhà Bia tưởng niệm các anh hùng liệt sĩ Trung đoàn 33, Bà Rịa-
Vũng Tàu, No. 3011, 29 July 2003, p.1. See also footnotes 67 and 108. Buddhist prayer ceremonies are also
held for 33rd Regiment martyrs – see: “Nguyễn Văn Ba, “Trung đoàn 33 Lễ Cầu Siêu liệt sĩ” (“33rd Regiment –
Buddhist Religious Ceremony for the Martyrs”), YouTube, April 2013 – Video, 28 April 2013.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flhv6O1trDI .
196
Tạ Tường Mạnh, Gặp mặt CCB Trung Đoàn 33 anh hùng lần thứ 3 Hà Nội (Họp Mặt Truyền Thống Cựu
Chiến Binh-Bạn Chiến Đấu Trung Đoàn 33 – TP Hà Nội, Lần Thứ 3, Ngày 21/7/2013), 21 July 2013, published
6 October 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTv88UxE4pQ . The reunion was attended by Nguyễn Văn
Dụy – b.1937, a veteran of the 1st Battalion, who had been captured at the Battle of Bình Ba (see the following
photographs and footnotes 124, 161 and 196). Dụy’s “personal account” is at Appendix 22 to Reference A.
 45

Nguyễn Văn Dụy, 33rd Regiment – POW, captured at Binh Ba village

Nguyễn Văn Dụy, 33rd Regiment Reunion, Phúc Thọ - 21 July 2013
 46

Annex A to
Research Note 25/2018

A Morale-Boosting Bulletin – for the 33rd NVA Regiment personnel

after the Battle of Bình Ba in early June 1969

Background: On 10 September 1969, the 199th US Lt Inf Bde killed a number of VC in an

engagement at YT 557333 in southern Long Khánh Province – including the 2ic of the 1st
Battalion/33rd NVA Regiment ie: Bùi Đức Nhật. They recovered a 33rd Regiment “News
Bulletin” titled: “Information/Propaganda and Training – Đoàn 84C” (Đoàn 84C – as with
“A57”, was a 33rd Regiment cover-name). Published quite soon after the Battle of Bình Ba in
early June 1969, several articles referred to combat against Australian troops.
.
Post-Bình Ba – A Bulletin to Boost 33rd NVA Regiment’s Morale

News Bulletin Cover – September 1969

The 33rd NVA Regiment’s Museum at Bình Ba, its history monographs, and its formal
history published in mid-2016 197 all acknowledge the Regiment’s defeat and heavy casualties at
the Battle - ie “50 soldiers of our 7th Battalion were killed.”
However, in the weeks after the Battle, the Regiment’s political cadre published a 14-
page News Bulletin extolling their victories in 1969. Several articles referred to combat against
Australian troops - eg claiming to have killed a total of 205 Australian troops to September 1969,
and having wiped out two Australian infantry companies – including a mechanised infantry
company at the Battle of Bình Ba.198 An account of the exploits of a 33rd Regiment “model

197
Published in April 2017 by Ernie Chamberlain in English - with a critical commentary and several
amplifying annexes including 1ATF signals intelligence (SIGINT) aspects – free-to-read on the Internet at:
https://www.scribd.com/document/346613212/The-33rd-Regiment-North-Vietnamese-Army-Their-History-
1965-1989-including-the-Battles-of-Binh-Ba-1969-and-Nui-Le-1971
198
One Australian soldier was killed in action at the Battle of Bình Ba – Private Wayne Teeling of 5RAR.
Based on 1ATF records and the Australian Official History, total Australian losses in engagements with the 33 rd
Regiment during the War probably numbered about nine KIA. ie: Operation Hammer (5RAR: 6-8 June 1969) –
one KIA, 10 WIA (99 NVA/VC KIA); Operation Lavarack (6RAR/NZ: 30 May -30 June 1969) – three KIA, 29
WIA (NVA/VC KIA 99); Operation Ivanhoe (3RAR, 4RAR: 19 September – 2 October 1971) – five KIA, 30
 47

rifleman” – Private Hoàn, specifically claimed that at the Battle of Bình Ba, the 33 rd Regiment
destroyed 22 armoured vehicles and killed 90 enemy.
The News Bulletin also included a “soldier’s derisive poem” recounting the 33rd
Regiment’s “victory” at the Battle of Bình Ba – see below. The poem was titled: “The rats’ 199
tails of the fleeing Australians exposed!” (ie a Vietnamese expression also meaning something
like – “Australian deficiencies and evilness revealed”).

The news has spread far and wide,

Some Australian soldiers have left their homes and come here,
Where there are rivers and streams, swamps and marshes,
High mountains, and low hills – all obstacles to them,
They crept and groped everywhere seeking our sanctuaries,
Their soldiers painted their faces and ambushed our tracks.
In the fires, the people’s houses were set aflame,
The fleeing Australians showed their true rats’ tails, and we laughed derisively,
Let’s tell the story from beginning to end,
In Long Đất District 200 everyone knew,
It was just the Australians that had to take the bitter pill,
In this time of death they fled seeking rescue,
This time the Australians met with the “VC”,
They felt heavy as if their limbs weighed a thousand kilos,
The “Royal” troops even took off their trousers,
Threw down their guns, cast away their ammunition, and fled afar,
Their deafening screams gave us headaches,
We ask whether the Australians have any capability remaining,
Is it true that they’ve eaten too much candy,
The ghosts of the Australian soldiers fear the mountains and rivers of our land,
The 19th Company ((the 33’s Sapper Company)) fought very skilfully,
The 5th Company ((the 1st Company of VC D440)) also joined hands with us very well,
The people of Long Đất are very appreciative,
Blossoms flower on a happy summer afternoon.

Thổ Giang ((poet’s name))

30 WIA (NVA/VC KIA 15). Some of those Australian casualties may have been inflicted by NVA/VC elements
other than the 33rd NVA Regiment. See: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.735,
p.736, and p.762. See also: Fairhead, F., A Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by the Royal Australian
Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, Linden Park, 2014, pp.86-91 and pp.156-159. For a detailed analysis
of the 33rd Regiment’s casualties during the War, see Annex F to Chamberlain, E.P. The 33rd Regiment – North
Vietnamese Army: Their History (1965-1989), 2017 – free-to-read on the Internet.
199
According to a 1968 article in the Australian Army Journal, “the term ‘Red Rats’ was affectionately
bestowed on the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province by the South Vietnamese peasants. Its
derivation stems from the red kangaroo which was initially painted on all the Task Force vehicles. As the
Vietnamese had never seen a kangaroo, and as there was therefore no comparable word for it in their language,
they inevitably called it ‘the red rat’.” Hutchinson, I. Captain (former GSO3 Ops, HQ 1ATF), “The ‘Red Rats’
and Phuoc Tuy”, Australian Army Journal, No.227, April 1968, p.3. The Sino-Vietnamese word for “kangaroo”
was “con đại thử” – literally: “great rat”; and this also contributed to the belief that the Australian Army symbol
was a red rat.
200
The poet is mistaken. The Battle of Bình Ba took place in VC Châu Đức District – not Long Đất District.
 48

Note: The Regiment’s soldiers would have been aware of their heavy losses – and such morale-
boosting hyperbole as included in the Bulletin was routinely disseminated by their political
officers. During the Vietnam War, over 3,000 of the 33rd Regiment’s soldiers were recorded by
the Regiment as killed or missing – with the Regiment’s average strength being only about 1,300.
Following the “fall of the South” in 1975, the Regiment also fought the Khmer Rouge in the
“South-West Border War” and later within Cambodia from 1978. The Regiment was deployed
back to “North Vietnam” in December 1979 – ie following the early 1979 Chinese “incursion”
into Vietnam (however the Regiment was not involved in any combat operations against the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army forces).

Note : The red kangaroo symbol was painted on many Australian military vehicles in
Vietnam – and also on road signs and unit signs. The red kangaroo – in the style as depicted
on the Australian penny, had also appeared on RAAF aircraft roundels from 1956.