The Communication Research Matrix: An Alternative Approach to Kuhn's Conception of

Paradigms
INTRODUCTION
If scientific progress is the goal of academic enterprise then it logically follows that the
vitality of any field should be measured in the strength of its concepts. Indeed, at the heart of
every discipline or field is a set of concepts that help to assist and support their primary
theories and explanations by laying the foundation for their existence. As DeFleur (1998)
points out, “A theory can be regarded as a description of how something works” (p. 18), and
as a result, “It is not possible to develop or even describe theory without stating and defining
its concepts” (p. 19). In that regard, concepts and the process of their formation (concept
formation), play an integral role in the construction, maintenance, and evolution of any and
every scholarly field or discipline, by allowing scholars to measure the efficiency, practicality,
and reliability of their theories. As Gerring (1999) so efficiently puts it, “Indeed, concept
formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor. It is impossible to conduct work
without using concepts” (p. 358-359). For the field of mass communication, this is
particularly true because of its highly interdisciplinary nature that borrows from a variety of
fields including sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, and
linguistics. In that regard, many of the field’s concepts are also interdisciplinary in nature,
because they do not originate from within the field itself, but are taken from elsewhere and
then applied and repositioned for our field’s particular needs (Berger, 1991). In these
instances, concepts are often “stretched” or “scrunched” (Gerring, 1999) through selective
readings and applications (Vogel, 2012). For example, Vogel (2012) highlights the concept of
paradigms in organization studies as one example of conceptual mutation that’s happened
through interdisciplinary sharing.

Another reason concepts must remain an explicit priority is due to the field’s inherent focus
on technology (Sapienza, Iyer & Venstra, 2015). This intertwined relationship with
technology ensures that the field’s concepts must continually evolve at a similar pace with
technology itself or risk only offering partial or incorrect explanations in the process. In that
regard, the field’s concepts must continually be checked, tested, and updated in order for the
field to perform at its optimal level of efficiency. Chaffee and Metzger’s (2000) canonic text
“The end of mass communication?” serves as a perfect example here, because it questioned
the concept of mass communication in light of the rise of digital media. There are a number
of concepts available to scholars to track the progression of the field, and as such, they should
be considered meta-concepts (concepts referencing concepts). In the field of mass
communication specifically, they include paradigms, definitions, canonic texts, milestones,
and citations. Like most tools, they each have a specific function and task to fill for the field’s
progression. While none of these approaches are comprehensive in themselves, they each
provide their own unique insight, albeit partial, into the field. It is also for that reason why
scholars rely on multiple concepts simultaneously to create an overall picture when
conceptualizing communication or communication research. Paradigms being perhaps the
most important concept out of the group, are ironically also the least understood. There are a
variety of reasons for this including both ambiguity and vagueness of the concept and term,
the politicization of the concept where it is often used as a means to an end, and finally,
because Kuhn never meant for his concept to be utilized in the social sciences. As a result of
these recognitions, this article proposes a new way of thinking about communication research
that offers an alternative to status quo conceptions of the field. Its intent is to bypass the
problematic nature of paradigms and provide a simple and easy framework for
conceptualizing research. For novice scholars, it can serve as a paradigmatic cheat-sheet
allowing the user to initially avoid asking dogmatic epistemological, axiological, and
ontological questions in favor of focusing on the research design itself.

PARADIGMS: PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES OR PHILOSOPHICAL PARADOXES?

Thomas Kuhn, introduced the idea of paradigms to the academic world in, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (hereafter referred to as Structure), which originally published in 1962.
Since then, the concept of paradigms have been increasingly utilized in both the “social” and
“natural” sciences. Google Scholar indicates that Kuhn’s Structure has been cited more than
79,000 times and recognitions such as this has led scholars to the conclusion that he is one of
the greatest scientific philosophers of the 20th century. (Anderson, 2001; Bird, 2004;
Hanson,1973). Likewise, Vogel (2013) argues that Kuhn’s concept of paradigms and
scientific revolutions are one of the most “influential philosophical ideas of the 20th century”
(p. 34). According to Jensen and Neuman (2013), Kuhn’s work has also been highly
influential in the field of mass communication, specifically his conceptions of paradigms,
paradigm shifts, and revolutionary science (p. 230). The number of communication scholars
who cite Kuhn when discussing paradigms are significant and include: Burelson (1989),
Jensen & Neuman (2013), Krippendorf (1989), Lang (2013A & 2013B), Loblich & Schue
(2011), Myers (2001), Narula and Pearce (1986), Neuman (1989), Neuman & Guggenheim
(2011), Perloff (2013), Potter, Cooper & Dupagne (1993), Scolari (2002 & 2012), Sillars
(1989), Strate (2010), White (1983), and Yum (1989).

This article will outline three potential problems with the concept of paradigms, especially
when used for conceptualizing the field or synthesizing communication scholarship
systemically. First, that Kuhn never meant his concept of paradigms to be applied to the social
sciences (Walker, 2014; Berkelaar, 2008), and perhaps more importantly, actually urged
scholars to halt using the term altogether in his later writings. As a result, paradigms have
been misapplied to the field with potentially grave consequences. Of particular concern is the
field’s insistence to refer to Kuhn’s definitions and categories of paradigms, despite most
utilizing a different conception of the concept (exemplar conceptions vs. set of assumption
conceptions). This, in part, helps to explain why the field seemingly cannot move past entry-
level debates over what a paradigm is or their total number because as a field, we are utilizing
multiple conceptions of the concept, that have drastically different meanings and applications.
Second, this paper will argue that paradigms are not a comprehensive framework for
measuring theoretical progress of a field or for conceptualizing the field as a whole, in part,
because they were meant specifically for scientific disciplines and not overarching academic
fields. If Kuhn’s conception of paradigms is being correctly utilized, then it would logically
imply that paradigms are not the best concept for conceptualizing the field or for research
design purposes, because they have no mechanism for handling situations where multiple
paradigms are in play or the negotiation process that must happen between them. This alone
should beg the question of paradigm’s utility to the field – The same criterion Kuhn insisted
be used to measure the worth of his theoretical idea (Horgan, 2012).

Third, this paper will argue that paradigms have become politicized in the field, and as a
result, have led to significant conceptual problems because they are being used more to define
the primary distinctions between “rival” schools of thoughts, rather than conceptualizing the
field as a whole. In essence, many scholars are applying the concept structurally backward—
Paradigms should first and foremost, explain the similarities of a scientific community, not
the primary distinctions between rival schools of thought housed within it.
HISTORICAL OVERIVIEW

Kuhn did not actually coin the word “paradigm,” but simply used it in a novel and
unprecedented manner, and by effect, created a new meaning for the term through its new use.
Essentially, he simply added another definiens to an already existing term found in the
English lexicon. While many consider Structure a critical examination of the philosophy of
science (which it is), it can also be read as an explication of paradigms as a concept. From a
linguistic standpoint, Kuhn’s use of the term was both ambiguous and vague. This distinction
is important because it helps illustrate the concept’s problematic nature, as well as offer
unique insight into its conceptual evolution. It is vague in the sense that he used “paradigm”
in multiple ways and it is also ambiguous because he never offered an explicit definition in
Structure, but rather implicitly operationalizes the term by outlining several of its key
attributes. Each of these items alone probably wouldn’t have had much of an effect on the
concept, but their synergy when coupled together created a recipe for disaster. In regards to
the term’s vagueness, Masterman (1970) argues that Kuhn actually used the term in 21
different ways in Structure alone, although to be fair, she then categorized those different uses
into three broad categories. While Kuhn disagreed with the exact number, he was sympathetic
to his critics and also acknowledged that he was too liberal with the term initially (Kuhn
1977a; 1977b, Horgan 2012). Kuhn tried to clarify his intended meaning of “paradigm” on a
couple occasions post-Structure published. In “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research” he replaces it with “theory” when referencing its more commonly utilized meaning
of “set of assumptions” (p. 267) and footnotes this distinction for further emphasis and
clarification (Kuhn, 1977b). Another great example is Kuhn’s “Second Thoughts on
Paradigms” which attempts to explicate his intended usage for the term. Here, he admits that
he had an imperfect understanding of the term when writing Structure and calls for the halting
of the terms use. He writes: Return finally to the term “paradigm”…I allowed the term’s
application to expand embracing all shared group commitments, all components of what I
now wish to call the disciplinary matrix. Inevitably, the result was confusion, and it obscured
the original reasons for introducing a special term. But those reasons still stand…This paper
has, above all, been an effort to isolate, clarify and drive home those essential points. If they
can be seen, we shall be able to dispense with the term “paradigm,” though not with the
concept that lead to its introduction. (p. 318-319)

According to Horgan (2013), Kuhn felt so strongly about this that he recommended replacing
the term with exemplars in subsequent editions of Structure, but it “never caught on” and
Kuhn eventually gave up. Horgan quoting Kuhn writes, “If you got a bear by the tail, there
comes a point at which you’ve got to let it go and stand back” (no page number available).
For the field of mass communication, the three primary disagreements revolve around
defining what a paradigm is, how many exist in the field of mass communication, and
identifying what stage of paradigmatic evolution the field is currently at. Potter, Cooper,
Dupagne (1993) provide an excellent account regarding the diversity of opinions and
disagreements surrounding paradigms in our field. They report that there are, at least, four
different ways to conceptualize paradigms, and correspondingly, six different views about the
paradigms underlying mass media research (p. 318-319). They provide the field’s literature
base as evidence and point to many inconsistencies found between scholars on the subject.
Specifically, they identify different schools of thought on paradigms, which include those
who argue that there are three sequentially-ordered paradigms (Hall, 1982; Lowery and
DeFleur, 1988), those who believe in three coexisting ones (Craig, 1989), those who believe
in only one paradigm (Giddens, 1989), and those who believe in none (Krippendorf, 1989;
Rosengren, 1989) (p. 319). Adding authors who have published on the subject since Potter et
al.’s piece would include Hardt (1999), Jensen and Neuman (2013), Lang (2013a & 2013b),
McQuail (2013), Neumann & Guggenheim (2011), and Perloff (2013). Despite these
additional contributions, there seems to be even less agreement now than when Potter et al.,
published their piece. Perhaps this is best illustrated with the recent Lang-Perloff debates, in
which Lang (2013A & 2013B) argues that media effects is in crisis and a new psychological
approach is emerging to replace it the dominant paradigm (p. 11-12). Perloff (2013) directly
refutes Lang’s argument by denouncing the field is in a Kuhnian crisis (p. 325) and instead
argues that the field should stick to its present course (p. 329).

DEFINITIONS

Considering that almost all concept formation in the social sciences is language based, it is
imperative in any theoretical exercise that primary and secondary terms are carefully
considered and explicated (Gerring 1999; Chaffee 1991). In a theoretical exercise such as this,
it is imperative that we outline the multiple uses of the term “paradigm” in the field of
communication and provides examples of each. Additionally, it will demonstrate where the
separate meanings conceptually overlap, but also their primary differences and where they
conceptually depart from one another. Moving forward, this paper will use the term
“paradigm” when referencing the concept in general and not any of its particular uses. In
cases where a specific meaning is being referenced, this paper will follow Hayakawa &
Hayakawa’s (1990) suggestion of numbering the term to indicate which meaning is being
referred to. For example, we will use the terms paradigm1 when referring to “exemplar”
meanings, paradigm2 for the meaning of “as set of beliefs/assumptions for a scientific
community”, and paradigm3 for when referencing it as a “set of assumptions.” In doing so,
this paper will take a critical first step in explicating the desired meaning of the term and
ensure clarity for both reader and writer.

THE THREE MEANINGS OF “PARADIGM” IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In this section, we will briefly outline the three primary ways that scholars use the term
“paradigm” in the social sciences from a linguistic perspective. Recognizing that concepts can
be partially explicated through observing their relationship to other terms, we will also pay
close attention to each conception’s relationship to the term “dominant paradigm”. For clarity,
we will start with Kuhn’s suggested use of the term, which we are referring to as paradigm1
or paradigms as exemplars. Paradigm1 as a term is significantly more precise than either
paradigm2 or paradigm3, in part, because it utilizes a stipulative definition. As such, it is the
hardest definition to meet because it use mandates the required attributes of exemplar status, a
belief or assumption held by a discipline, and exclusivity to said group being met. Kuhn,
himself, recommended this use of the term if it was to be used at all. Examples of use are
infrequent, but include Kuhn (1977A) and Burelson (1989). The intended use of paradigm1
makes its relationship with the term “dominant paradigm” conceptually problematic.
According to Kuhnian logic, the term “dominant paradigm” becomes a tautology or what
Fiske (2008) would call a “wretched redundancy” because there should only be one paradigm
for any scientific community. As a concept, it leads us even further from Kuhn’s conception
of paradigm1, because it conceptually suggests that there can be multiple paradigms in any
scientific community. From this perspective, the term “dominant paradigm,” is at best,
redundant, and, often, conceptually misleading too. The second use of the term is
substantially more common and it can defined as a set of beliefs or assumptions for a
scientific community. Many authors use the term in this manner and they include Lang
(2013A & 2013B) and Rosengren (1983). The theoretical range of this term is significantly
broader than paradigm1 because it does not need to meet exemplar status, nor does it require
exclusivity to only one group for its use. In that regard, most definitions tend to be lexical.
Unlike paradigm1 as “exemplars” conceptions there is nothing conceptually problematic
with utilizing the term “dominant paradigm” with paradigm2. When conceptualizing
paradigms as a set of assumptions or beliefs of a scientific community there is a need for
another concept to measure when multiple paradigms come into conflict. As such the concept
of dominant paradigm allows for multiple paradigms to be considered and measured at the
same time.

The third use of the term is the broadest and only conceives of it as a set of assumptions or
beliefs. Based on this definition, the concept of paradigm3 can be applied to most theories and
worldviews in the field as it does not require the additional attribute that it be held by a
scientific community like stricter meanings. The subtraction of this attribute allows it to be
applied to theories and concepts because it is no longer something that must be held by a
scientific community, but rather it can be applied to other concepts. In laymen’s terms, it
essentially starts encroaching on the ground of “meta” conceptions when conceived in this
way because it is often used in a similar manner. The brevity of this usage is reflected in the
literature base considering the number of concepts and theories that have been labeled having
a paradigm. Examples include users and gratifications (Biocca, XXXX), writing-process
(Kent, 1999), civic communication (Blummer & Coleman, 2013), cultivation (Morgan et al),
framing (Reese, 200X), content analysis (Stemple III), media power (Freedman, 2015),
development (Narula and Pearce, 1986), network (Yum, 1989), and gender (Deming, 1989).
Out of this select group, certain scholars are significantly more conscious of their use of term
“paradigm” than others. For example, Reese (2006) notes that framing is not an actual
paradigm, but only operates similar to one. Yum or Freedman who argue that they are only
using the term in its broadest of broad meanings. And finally, Bioca (XXXX) uses quotation
marks around the term in order to convey that he is using the term in only the broadest sense.
In each of these instances, there is a recognition around the use of the term and an
understanding that their use is partial in nature. With it comes a greater clarity of intended
meaning.

PARADIGMS AS PARTIAL CONCEPTIONS OF A FIELD

Paradigms are not a comprehensive framework for measuring theoretical progress of a field or
for conceptualizing the communication research as they are meant specifically for scientific
disciplines and not overarching academic fields. Kuhn clarified this by writing in “Second
Thoughts” that: “…the usages of paradigms in the book [Structure] divide into two sets which
require both different names and separate discussion. Our sense of “paradigm” is global
embracing all the shared commitments of a scientific group; the other isolates a particularly
important sort of commitment and thus is a subset of the first” (p. 294). Kuhn referred to the
latter as part of a “disciplinary matrix” that scholars use to conceptualize a discipline, but also
to measure its progression. This is further clarified in a footnote which reads, “Unfortunately,
most readers…have missed what was for me its central function and use “paradigm” in a
sense that is close with “disciplinary matrix.” I see little chance of recapturing “paradigm” for
its original use, the only one that is philologically at all appropriate” (p. 307). Kuhn argues
that anomalies often provide the critical test to paradigms. As they begin to build up in any
scientific community, the mounting phenomenon that cannot be explained through the
existing paradigm often point to its futility and requires change. In the field of
communication, cultivation theory provides one example of an anomaly. Despite its
popularity and longevity as a theory, it fits neither the current media effects nor the
critical/cultural paradigm (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2013). It fails to meet media
effects paradigm due to its almost untestable nature as a theory and because, as a theory, it
rejects the notion that communication can be conceived of synchronically, i.e., as a specific
act of communication that can be tested and measured. It also fails to meet the necessary
requirements for the critical/cultural paradigm because its primary interest isn’t exploring
issues of power nor does it require praxis or agency out of the researcher. Perhaps a more
accurate statement would be then that: Critical/Cultural and Cultivation are not mutually
exclusive concepts theoretically, but there also hasn’t been any significant union between the
two. Furthermore, there is the issue of self-recursive nature of paradigms that is often
overlooked. Perhaps somewhat ironically, if all research carries a set of assumptions with it,
then so does the concept of paradigms, and as a result, these meta-assumptions (assumptions
about assumptions) must also being taken in account when utilizing paradigms. If not,
scholars risk making additional assumptions regarding how other people conceptualize
paradigms, and correspondingly, their role and function within the field. This is conceptually
problematic, because it automatically accepts the premises of paradigms without then
accounting for those assumptions and how they interact with all the other assumptions also
housed within the set. In that regard, the self-recursive nature of paradigms demonstrates that
any “set” of assumptions also carries another set of assumptions to govern those. In this
particular case, it’s, first and foremost, the acceptance of paradigms as a theoretical tool for
the conceptualization of the field and/or the operationalization of communication in the
research design process.

POLITICIZED PARADIGMS

Paradigms have become politicized in the field, and as a result, have led to significant
conceptual problems for the field. Often times, they are being used more to define the
primary distinctions between “camps”, rather than conceptualizing communication research
as a whole. Perhaps this distinction is best illustrated in Stanfill’s (2012) article “Finding
Birds of a Feather: Multiple Memberships and Diversity without Divisiveness in
Communication Research.” In it, he argues that the field of communication is a “contentious
and divided field” that focuses on “academic speciation,” which is loosely defined as
classifying communication scholars to one and only one category membership. He uses the
examples of referencing communication scholars as quantitative, cultural, or mass
communication, which in his mind, obscures more than it clarifies the field’s focal point due
to its “assumption of—or even demand for— uniformity within species” (p. 4). This desired
uniformity often characterizes scholars who uses similar methodologies and/or critical
frameworks as if they shared all assumptions, a fact which is obviously not true. There is just
as much diversity within the framework of feminism as there are between the major schools
of thought housed within the communication field. For example, there are several types of
feminism which include liberal, radical, cultural, socialist, etc. Among these, there can be
major differences in conceptualizing the root causes of patriarchy, as well as solutions to the
problem. Liberal feminists are significantly more likely to work within the system to promote
change, while radical feminists often denounce the system as the first step in creating change.
These differences are not insignificant and illustrates Stanfill’s point about the problematic
nature of speciation. While the field often labels both liberal and radical feminists simply
under the heading of feminism, this can be reductive as a liberal feminist might share just as
many assumptions with a media effects scholar as they would with a radical feminist. Stanfill
believes that speciation is one cause that has led to the politicization of paradigms and uses
the phrase “politically efficacious phantasm” to describe the phenomenon (p. 4).
THE ALTERNATIVE

This article is not the first to call for a reconceptualization of the field, nor is it the first to
suggest an alternative to current approaches. Over the years, several notable scholars have
actually suggested different conceptual alternatives that range from paradigmatic quadrants to
disciplinary matrixes (Stanfill 2014; Renckstorf & McQuail 1996; Kuhn 1977b). This
quadrant proposes four primary categories in which to filter communication research through
and they include psycho-synchronic, psycho-diachronic, socio-synchronic, and socio
diachronic types of communication research. Recognizing that these are completely novel
concepts with no heuristic value as of yet, it is important that we explicate our intended
meaning of each and offer the following stipulative definitions:

1. Psycho-Synchronic communication research: Studies that conceptualize communication

synchronically, i.e., generally as an act, and its theoretical focus pertains to the individual.
Types of studies might include content analysis of a presidential debate or a day-long
participant observation of a local organization.

2. Psycho-Diachronic communication research: Studies that conceptualize communication

diachronically, generally as a process, and its theoretical focus pertain to the individual.
Cultivation studies are often a perfect example here.

3. Socio-Synchronic communication research: Studies that conceptualize communication as

an act and its general interests pertain to society rather than that of the individual. Political
polling often falls into this category unless the study is conceived of diachronically.

4. Socio-Diachronic communication research: Research that conceptualizes communication

diachronically, i.e., as a process, and its theoretical focus pertains to society. Most critical
theories fall into this category.

In essence, it conceptualizes communication research along two primary dimensions. The first
deals with the question of conception and operationalization: How does the proposed study
conceive of and operationalize communication in its design and execution? Does it conceive
of it as an act or as a process and how is that being operationalized in the study? Recognizing
that there are multiple ways in which one can conceive of an act or process of communication
illuminates these should not just be thought of as polar opposites, but rather as fluid concepts
that can be placed on a continuum. The quadrant’s second dimension concerns itself with the
theoretical inquiry being explored. It asks if the project’s focus is more sociological or
psychological in nature. If the focus is more on the individual than that of society then it can
be said to have a psychological focus. If on the other hand, its interest lies more with society
that that of the individual then it can be said to have a sociological focus. This is wonderfully
illustrated by Renckstorf and McQuail (1996) who also create a visual matrix to classify
communication research. The primary difference between their matrix and ours is simple:
Their matrix is primarily concerned with the ontological and epistemological positions
underlying communication research, while ours is exclusively focuses on the
conceptualization process of communication. Thus, they classify communication research
along the criteria of actional theory vs. non-actional theory then juxtaposed with the criterion
of an objective vs. subjective view of reality. While Renckstorf and McQuail’s matrix
provides a supplement to existing paradigms, our matrix seeks an alternative to paradigms,
and as such, is more interested in conceptualizing communication research then explicating
the assumptions of existing paradigms2.
REASONS TO PREFER

There are several advantages to using this matrix when conceptualizing communication
research in the field of mass communication. The first is that it provides a more
comprehensive view of communication scholarship in its entirety. Paradigms on the other
hand, are in limited in that they can’t measure outside of their particular set of assumptions or
beliefs, i.e., they were not designed to measure the progress of a field with potentially
multiple paradigms2 that are both competing and non-competing at times. Furthermore, there
is little agreement as to what constitutes a paradigm, evidence of the multiple labels and
various terms used to describe the concept currently existing in the literature. This proposed
matrix, on the other hand, provides a unified and single set of terms to measure all of
communication research through. This, in and of itself, should go a long way in moving the
field in the proper direction. It moves us beyond the potentially problematic concept of
paradigms and moves the field onto more substantive grounding by focusing on the research
design itself. In that regard, it seeks to free us from a millennia of epistemological,
axiological, or ontological debates that more often than not seem unproductive and dogmatic.
The second reason to prefer this is because of its conceptual ease and utility. If utilized
correctly, it provides a concrete and visual explanation for scholars to understand, particularly
for students who still might be struggling to gain a grasp on the field as a whole. It is for this
reason why Lasswell’s graphic model of communication is often used to explain the
categories of communication in introductory communication courses—visual explanations are
often easier to understand especially when utilizing abstract and ambiguous concepts. For
scholars devoted to a particular paradigm2, it provides a new way of thinking about
conceptualizing communication research—one that can be used to test their traditional
conception provided through their preferred paradigm.

FINAL THOUGHTS

While perhaps a little melodramatic, it is fair to say that the field of mass communication is at
a crossroads and faces a difficult decision. From a conceptual perspective, we have two
choices. We can either chose to follow Kuhn’s conception of paradigms and accept that the
field has currently stretched it beyond his initial intent or we can discard of Kuhn’s
conception entirely and decide to stick with the more commonly utilized conception of
paradigm2 as “a set of beliefs or assumptions for a scientific community.” If we decide upon
the latter, it is important to note that the next step necessary would be to explicate it as a
concept independent of Kuhn’s conception of paradigms. It would require explicating a new
set of categories and definitions to support it as Kuhn’s do not apply to a field, but rather a
discipline. In doing so, this should help move us past, at least, some of the entry-level debates
that have continually surrounded the concept of paradigms since their introduction to our
field. This paper has positioned the proposed communication research matrix as one
alternative to Kuhn’s conception of paradigms. Inspired by Kuhn’s “disciplinary matrix” (his
own alternative to paradigms2 or 3), it seeks to construct and develop the conceptual tools
necessary for creating a matrix not just for a discipline, but for the field of communication. As
such it requires a new set of terms to re-conceptualize and categorize the field and its research
in new and potentially more fruitful ways. We recommend the terms psycho-synchronic,
sociosynchronic, psycho-diachronic, and socio-diachronic as new concepts to assist in the
process.