ADOPTION
adoption.
1. G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of
Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption
of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother
for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
married there and now has 2 children by her
second marriage and no longer communicates
from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed
away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their
written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report
recommending for the adoption and narrated that
Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with
the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits
of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent
to the adoption.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for adoption may
be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee’s biological mother.
Ruling: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides
that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if
the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to
his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may
be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit
the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal
to perform the filial and legal obligations of love
and support. Merely permitting the child to remain
for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
2. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Facts: In Aug. 2000, Catindig filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle
name Astorga be changed to “Garcia” (her
mother’s surname), and that her surname Garcia
to “Catindig” (his surname).
In Mar. 2001, the trial court granted his petition,
thereby freeing Stephanie from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and
legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the FC, the
minor shall be known as “Stephanie Nathy
Catindig”.
In Apr. 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration, praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother “Garcia” as her middle
name.
In May 2001, the trial court denied the motion on
the ground that there is no law allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of her biological
mother as her middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon
adoption by her natural father, may use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle
name?
Ruling: Yes. As correctly submitted by both
parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mother’s surname shall be Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an
added. illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of should not be allowed to do so.
the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter.

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the

members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code
recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.
In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.

Adoption is defined as the process of making a

child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted

is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article
V of RA 8552.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,

it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the
father.

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being

humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
The interests and welfare of the adopted child are
of primary and paramount consideration, hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
RULE 108
3. G.R. No. 132980, March 25, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner,  vs.
GLADYS C. LABRADOR, respondent.
 
Doctrine: Summary proceedings provided under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of
the Civil Code may be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. Substantial or
contentions alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is
observed.
Facts: Respondent Gladys Labrador filed with the
RTC of Cebu City a Petition for the correction of
entries in the record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo,
her niece. In her Petition, respondent alleged the
following:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, married, a
resident of 493-17, Archbishop Reyes Ave.,
Barrio Luz, Cebu City, where she can be
served with the processes of this Honorable
Court;
2. Respondent Local Civil, Registrar of
Cebu City is impleaded herein in his official
capacity; he can be served with summons
and other processes of this Honorable
Court in his office at the City Health
Department, Cebu City;
3. Petitioner is the sister of Maria Rosario
Cañon who is presently residing in .the
United States of America;
4. Sometime in 1986, petitioner's sister,
Maria Rosario Cañon, had a common law
relationship with a certain Degoberto
Erasmo, and during such cohabitation,
petitioner's sister begot two (2) illegitimate
children, one of which is SARAH ZITA B.
ERASMO, who was born on April 27, 1988,
as shown in her birth certificate, a copy of
which is hereto attached as ANNEX "A";
5. During the registration of the birth of
SARAH ZITA, petitioner's sister told the
respondent Local Civil Registrar that she
was not legally married to the father of
SARAH ZITA;
6. However; herein respondent erroneously
entered the name of Sarah Zita in her birth
record as SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO, instead
of SARAH ZITA CAÑON. Not only that, the
name of petitioner's sister, being the
mother, was also erroneously written by
the herein respondent as Rosemarie Cañon,
instead of Maria Rosario Cañon;
7. In order to straighten the record of birth
of SARAH ZITA ERASMO and pursuant to
Article 176 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of the mother . . .
[t]here is a need to correct the entry in the
record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO to
SARAH ZITA CAÑON and to correct the
name of her mother as appearing in her
birth certificate from ROSEMARIE CAÑON to
MARIA ROSARIO CAÑON.
When Respondent Labrador testified, she repeated
the allegations in her Petition. She stated that
Sarah Zita Erasmo was her niece because Maria
Rosario Cañon, the mother of the child, was her
(respondent's) sister. On cross-examination,
respondent explained that she was the one who
had reported the birth of Sarah to the local civil
registrar, to whom she had erroneously given
"Rosemarie" as the first name of the child's
mother, instead of the real one, "Maria Rosario."
Labrador explained that her sister was more
familiarly known as Rosemarie; thus, the error.
Respondent likewise averred that Rosemarie and
Maria Rosario were one and the same person, and
that she had no other sister named Rosemarie. She
added that Maria Rosario was abroad where she
lived with her foreigner husband.
Issue: Whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may
be used to change the entry in a birth certificate
regarding the filiation of a child.
Ruling: No.
Rule 108 Inapplicable
Petitioner contends at the summary proceedings
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article
412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct
or change clerical or innocuous errors. It argues
that Rule 108 "cannot be used to modify, alter or
increase substantive rights, such as those involving
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which
respondent desires to do. The change sought will
result not only in substantial correction in the
child's record of birth but also in the child's rights
which cannot be effected in a summary
action." We agree.
This issue has been resolved in Leonor v. Court of
Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor
filed a petition before the trial court seeking the
cancellation of the registration of his marriage to
Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among
others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from
the "non-observance of the legal requirements for
a valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's
ruling granting such petition, the Court held, as
follows:
Doctrinally, only errors that can be
canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not
material or substantial ones like the
validity of a marriage. A clerical error is
one which is visible to obvious to the
understanding; error made by a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing
or some harmless and innocuous change
such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a mis-statement of the
occupation of the parent.
Where the effect of a correction in a civil
registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate
to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial
proceeding. . . .
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary
procedure under Rule 108, and for that
matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code
cannot be used by Mauricio to change his
and Virginia's civil status from married to
single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate.
Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry
in a civil registry will change the status of a
person from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," as in
Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in
summary proceedings.
In  Republic v.  Valencia,  we likewise held that
corrections involving the nationality or citizenship
of a person were substantial could not be effected
except in adversarial proceedings.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject
matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving
the nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary
proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties, contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application,
one [in] which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.
Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for a
substantial correction or change of entries in the
civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other person who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing,
not merely a summary proceeding, be conducted.
In the present case, the changes sought by
Re s p o n d e n t L a b r a d o r w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y
substantial: first, she sought to have the name
appearing on the birth certificate changed from
"Sarah Zita Erasmo" to "Sarah Zita Cañon," thereby
transforming the filiation of the child from
legitimate to illegitimate. Second, she likewise
sought to have the name of Sarah Zita's mother,
which appeared as "Rosemarie" in the child' birth
record, changed to "Maria Rosario." Pursuant to
Valencia, an adversarial proceeding is essential in
order to fully thresh out the allegations in
respondent's petition.
Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have
been parties to the proceeding. After all, it would
affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional
and other rights. In fact, the change may also
embarrass her because of the social stigma that
illegitimacy may bring. The rights of her parents
over her and over each other would also be
affected. Furthermore, a change of name would
affect not only the mother but possibly creditors,
if any. Finally, no sufficient legal explanation has
been given why an aunt, who had no appointment
as guardian of the minor, was the party-petitioner.
True, it would seem that an adversarial
proceeding was conducted — the trial court set
the case for hearing and had the notice of hearing
published in a newspaper of general circulation in
Cebu City once a week for three consecutive
weeks; a hearing was actually conducted, during
which the resepondent and the petitioner were
represented; the respondent was able to testify
and be cross-examined by the petitioner's
representative.
But such proceeding does not suffice. In  Labayo-
Rowe v. Republic, Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a
petition seeking to change an entry in her child
Victoria Miclat's birth certificate. Alleging that she
had never been married to her daughter's father,
she wanted to have her civil status appearing on
the certificate changed from "married" to "single."
This Court ruled that the trial court erred in
granting Labayo-Rowe's petition, because the
proper parties had not been impleaded; nor had applied  16  Respondent Labrador was not able to
the proceedings been sufficiently adversarial, viz.: prove the allegations in her petition.
In the case before Us, since only the Office
of the Solicitor General was notified Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of
through, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Family Code, which states that "illegitimate
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e Re p u b l i c o f t h e children shall use the surname[s] . . . of their
Philippines as the only respondent, the mothers." But to enforce such provision, the
proceedings taken, which [are] summary in proper recourse is an adversarial contest. It must
nature, are short of what is required in be stressed that Rule 108 does not contemplate an
cases where substantial alterations are ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. By
sought. Aside from the Office of the its nature, this recourse seeks merely to correct
Solicitor General, all other indispensable clerical errors, and nor to grant or deny
parties should have been made substantial rights. To hold otherwise is tantamount
respondents. They include not only the to a denial of due process to third parties and the
declared father of the child but the child whole world.
as well, together with the paternal
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary
rights would be adversely affected thereby.
All other persons who may be affected by
the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit
from her parents would be substantially
impaired if her status would be changed
from "legitimate" to "illegitimate".
Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting
from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation
that she will bear thereafter. The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all
other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule-making authority under
Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules
"shall not diminish, increase or modify,
substantive rights." Said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which
would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code.

Even granting that the proceedings held to hear

and resolve the petition before the lower court
were "adversarial," it must be noted that the
evidence presented by the respondent was not
enough to fully substantiate her claim that Sarah
Zita was illegitimate. Her evidence consisted
mainly of her testimony and a certification from
the civil registry of Cebu City that such office had
no record of a marriage between Rosemarie/Maria
Rosario Cañon and Degoberto Erasmo. Unlike in
o t h e r c a s e s w h e r e Va l e n c i a w a s