Agrarian Law – Atty.
Peoro
1. CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Constitutional Provision
a. ART. II, SEC. 10
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
b. ART. XIII, SECS. 1-2
Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments.
SECTION 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Jurisprudence
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents. Maximo Calalang
in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams,
Fragante and Bayan City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public
policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how
long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise
of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. —
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment
greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle
of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition
of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D.
Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of
Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from
7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in
pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of
the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid,
with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be
limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and
control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was
observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by
Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders
of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules
and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from
along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic
by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said
law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and
to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said
in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to
things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known
to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe
that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has,
to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative
and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in
the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful
interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in
the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired
by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater
authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum
of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in
the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the
police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public
health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46
Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of
the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and
care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to
be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
2. HISTORY / BG OF AGRARIAN REFORM
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AGRARIAN REFORM
A. Constitutional Provisions
1. ARTICLE II, SEC. 21
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.
2. ARTICLE XII, SEC. 1
SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key
to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
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3. ARITICLE XIII, SEC. 4-8
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of
all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to
participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide
support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland
and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall
receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds
of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and
privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands
shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
B. Land Classification
1. ARTICLE XII, Sec. 3, 1987 Consti
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefor.
2. Sec. 20, LGC
Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. -
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when
the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined
by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%);
and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the
conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation
of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
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(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to
prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances
which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided.
That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall
be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete
application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be
deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
3. P.D. 705, Sec. 3
Section 3. Definitions.
(a) Public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purposes and which are not.
(b) Permanent forest or forest reserves refer to those lands of the public domain which have
been the subject of the present system of classification and determined to be needed for forest
purposes.
(c) Alienable and disposable lands refer to those lands of the public domain which have been
the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest
purposes.
(d) Forest lands include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest
reservations.
(e) Grazing land refers to that portion of the public domain which has been set aside, in view
of the suitability of its topography and vegetation, for the raising of livestock.
(f) Mineral lands refer to those lands of the public domain which have been classified as such
by the Secretary of Natural Resources in accordance with prescribed and approved criteria,
guidelines and procedure.
(g) Forest reservations refer to forest lands which have been reserved by the President of the
Philippines for any specific purpose or purposes.
(h) National park refers to a forest land reservation essentially of primitive or wilderness
character which has been withdrawn from settlement or occupancy and set aside as such
exclusively to preserve the scenery, the natural and historic objects and the wild animals or
plants therein, and to provide enjoyment of these features in such a manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future generations.
(i) Game refuge or bird sanctuary refers to a forest land designated for the protection of game
animals, birds and fish and closed to hunting and fishing in order that the excess population
may flow and restock surrounding areas.
(j) Marine parks refers to any off-shore area inhabited by rare and unique species of marine
flora and fauna.
(k) Seashore park refers to any public shore area delimited for outdoor recreation, sports
fishing, water skiing and related healthful activities.
(l) Watershed reservation is a forest land reservation established to protect or improve the
conditions of the water yield thereof or reduce sedimentation.
(m) Watershed is a land area drained by a stream or fixed body of water and its tributaries
having a common outlet for surface run-off.
(n) Critical watershed is a drainage area of a river system supporting existing and proposed
hydro-electric power and irrigation works needing immediate rehabilitation as it is being
subjected to a fast denudation causing accelerated erosion and destructive floods. It is closed
from logging until it is fully rehabilitated.
(o) Mangrove is a term applied to the type of forest occurring on tidal flat along the sea coast,
extending along streams where the water is brackish.
(p) Kaingin is a portion of the forest land, whether occupied or not, which is subjected to
shifting and/or permanent slash-and-burn cultivation having little or no provision to prevent
soil erosion.
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant,
the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in
forest lands.
(r) Dipterocarp forest is a forest dominated by trees of the dipterocarp species, such as red
lauan, tengile, tiaong, white lauan, almon, bagtikan and mayapis of the Philippine mahogany
group, apitong and the yakals.
(s) Pine forest is a forest composed of the Benguet Pine in the Mountain Provinces or the
Mindoro pine in Mindoro and Zambales provinces.
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
(t) Industrial tree plantation is any tract of forest land purposely and extensively planted to
timber crops primarily to supply the raw material requirements of existing or proposed
processing plants and related industries.
(u) Tree farm refers to any tract of forest land purposely and extensively planted to trees of
economic value for their fruits, flowers, leaves, barks, or extractives, but not for the wood
thereof.
(v) Multiple-use is the harmonized utilization of the numerous beneficial uses of the land, soil,
water, wildlife, recreation value, grass and timber of forest lands.
(w) Selective logging means the systematic removal of the mature, over-mature and defective
trees in such manner as to leave adequate number and volume of healthy residual trees of the
desired species necessary to assure a future crop of timber, and forest cover for the protection
and conservation of soil and water.
(x) Seed tree system is partial clearcutting with seed trees left to regenerate the area.
(y) Healthy residual is a sound or slightly injured tree of the commercial species left after
logging.
(z) Sustained-yield management implies continuous or periodic production of forest products
in a working unit with the aid of achieving at the earliest practicable time an approximate
balance between growth and harvest or use. This is generally applied to the commercial timber
resources and is also applicable to the water, grass, wildlife, and other renewable resources of
the forest.
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
(bb) Lease is a privilege granted by the State to a person to occupy and possess, in
consideration of a specified rental, any forest land of the public domain in order to undertake
any authorized activity therein.
(cc) License is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources as in any
forest land, without any right of occupation and possession over the same, to the exclusion of
others, or establish and operate a wood-processing plant, or conduct any activity involving the
utilization of any forest resources.
(dd) License agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources
within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of
others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and
rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.
(ee) Permit is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any
limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity with any forest land without any right
of occupation and possession therein.
(ff) Annual allowable cut is the volume of materials, whether of wood or other forest products,
that is authorized to be cut regularly from the forest.
(gg) Cutting cycle is the number of years between major harvests in the same working unit
and/or region, within a rotation.
(hh) Ecosystem means the ecological community considered together with non-living factors
and its environment as a unit.
(ii) Silviculture is the establishment, development reproduction and care of forest trees.
(jj) Rationalization is the organization of a business or industry using scientific business
management principles and simplified procedures to obtain greater efficiency of operation.
(kk) Forest officer means any official or employee of the Bureau who, by the nature of his
appointment or the function of the position to which he is appointed, is delegated by law or
by competent authority to execute, implement or enforce the provisions of this Code, other
related laws, as well as their implementing regulations.
(ll) Primitive tribe is a group of endemic tribe living primitively as a distinct portion of a people
from a common ancestor.
(mm) Private right means or refers to titled rights of ownership under existing laws, and in the
case of primitive tribes, to rights of possession existing at the time a license is granted under
this Code, which possession may include places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old
clearings, but excludes production forest inclusive of logged-over areas, commercial forests
and established plantations of forest trees and trees of economic value.
(nn) Person includes natural as well as juridical person.
4. C.A. 141, sec. 2
Section2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided
shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of
the lands commonly called "friar lands'' and those which, being privately owned, have reverted
to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and
disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be
enacted.
6
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
C. R.A. 6657, as amended by R.A. 9700
Republic Act No. 6657 June 10, 1988
AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the
nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner
cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.
To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights
of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be
undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity
and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm
workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention
limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the
right of small landowners, and shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as well as
cooperatives and other independent farmers' organizations, to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial production, marketing
and other support services.
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform, or stewardship, whenever applicable,
in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain, under lease or concession, suitable to agriculture, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates, which
shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
By means of appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance
of economic-size family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small
landowners.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore.t
shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services. The State shall
also protect, develop and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a
just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land ownership
has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural lands have the obligation to cultivate directly
or through labor administration the lands they own and thereby make the land productive.
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform
program to promote industrialization, employment and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for lands shall contain features that shall
enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace.
The State may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the
development of capital-intensive farms, and traditional and pioneering crops especially those
for exports subject to the prior rights of the beneficiaries under this Act.
Republic Act No. 9700 August 7, 2009
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP),
EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS,
INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. - It is the policy of the State to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the
nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner
cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.
7
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
"The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human
and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets: Provided, That the conversion of agricultural lands into industrial, commercial or
residential lands shall take into account, tillers' rights and national food security. Further, the
State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
"The State recognizes that there is not enough agricultural land to be divided and distributed
to each farmer and regular farmworker so that each one can own his/her economic-size family
farm. This being the case, a meaningful agrarian reform program to uplift the lives and
economic status of the farmer and his/her children can only be achieved through simultaneous
industrialization aimed at developing a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
"To this end, the State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and
operate vital industries.
"A more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of
landowners to just compensation, retention rights under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657,
as amended, and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers
and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their
lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
"The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and
retention limits set forth in this Act, taking into account ecological, developmental, and equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the
right of small landowners, and shall provide incentive for voluntary land-sharing.
"As much as practicable, the implementation of the program shall be community-based to
assure, among others, that the farmers shall have greater control of farmgate prices, and easier
access to credit.
"The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as well as
cooperatives and other independent farmers’ organizations, to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing
and other support services.
"The State shall recognize and enforce, consistent with existing laws, the rights of rural women
to own and control land, taking into consideration the substantive equality between men and
women as qualified beneficiaries, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof, and to be
represented in advisory or appropriate decision-making bodies. These rights shall be
independent of their male relatives and of their civil status.
"The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform, or stewardship, whenever applicable,
in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain, under lease or concession, suitable to agriculture, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.
"The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own agricultural estates,
which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
"By means of appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance
of economic-size family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small
landowners.
"The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities,
to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It
shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services. The State shall
also protect, develop and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a
just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
"The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land ownership
has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural land have the obligation to cultivate directly
or through labor administration the lands they own and thereby make the land productive.
"The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform
program to promote industrialization, employment and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for lands shall contain features that shall
enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace.
"The State may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the
development of capital-intensive farms, and traditional and pioneering crops especially those
for exports subject to the prior rights of the beneficiaries under this Act."
8
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
D. Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan) 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who
both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established
by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre
as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area
of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application
for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by
its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982
could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to
its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that
the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack
of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to
be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
9
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on
the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the
land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right
to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16
years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by
the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference
to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when
the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not
of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part
of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all
lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the
1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided
by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department,
not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
10
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of
national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation
to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen
of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public
Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order
for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no
legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the
full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
11
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete
title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means
that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the
ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue
of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying
the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that
the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period
of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation
and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land
to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are
also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any
of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain
and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof
that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier -
the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a
law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
12
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-
REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER
OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, 
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP,
LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also
home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved
the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-
829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants 
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did
not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
13
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2)
these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less
fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for
tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly
Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222)
in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and
5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to
acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the
land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name.
It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then appealed
to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands
they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for
right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on
their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession
of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of
pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on
their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay
into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the
first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right
over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant
to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in
order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
14
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their
occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER
THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30
YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC
6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE
THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right
to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended
and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by
then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of
the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification
with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior
to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of
the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of
public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding
the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts
of ownership.49
15
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing
possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must
be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule
was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral,
and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands
by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning
of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular
Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis
Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public
lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. 68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December
1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894.
However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the
land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from
the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration
of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section
8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been
"officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
16
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing
that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have
the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It
should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner
through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in
each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. 91 This was
the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an
act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases
of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No.
926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal
provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary
to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that
all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the
public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would
have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber
or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for
judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot
apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to
avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified
and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification
was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for
non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect
that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as
we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not
sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural
today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in
17
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 106 ipso
courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the name.
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall
be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours) "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
of each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
domain.97
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to of the government and the friar lands."
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification. Hence,
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot.
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered
This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

18
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem
to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly
stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land.
Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to
public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No.
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s
do not negate its character as public forest. authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112 classifying lands of Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do Development.
not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of
trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify
particularly instructive:
Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land No. 1801.
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land"
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive
other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in
of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island,
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro,
and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach
and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes
resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and
is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
is susceptible of private ownership.
mineral lands.121

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural.

19
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent
such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public
forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No.
705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul
of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of
the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land
of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the
land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of
Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring,
we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and
which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does
not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest"
under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as
needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim
of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified
land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill
of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. 129Where the
land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands.
Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
20
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element
of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants
were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince
this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their
occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay
Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the
Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.
no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become
more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken,
and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence
of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are
emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into
other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There
is one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar
bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is

21
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
G.R. Nos. L-20589-90 March 21, 1968
ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, 
vs.
VICTORIANO DE LOS
SANTOS, TOMAS DE LOS SANTOS and THE COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS,respondents.
R. E. Paredes & S. K. Maranan for petitioner.
Gregorio San Agustin for respondents V. de los
Santos and T. de los Santos.
Nostratis & Fajardo for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
FERNANDO, J.:
This petition for the review of a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations represents
still another attempt to assail the validity of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1955, 1 which empowers a tenant "to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy
to the leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop-sharing arrangement to another of
the share tenancy." Such attempts in the past on the part of landowners were singularly
unsuccessful, its validity having been consistently upheld. A similar fate is in store for the effort
of petitioner-landowner in this case. The decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations must be
upheld.
Two petitions were filed by now-respondents Victorino de los Santos and Tomas de los
Santos before respondent Court of Agrarian Relations on April 28, 1961, manifesting their
desire, as tenants of herein petitioner-landowner, Ernesto del Rosario, to take advantage of
Section 14 and to adopt the leasehold system provided, thus changing their previous status as
tenants. In the answer submitted on May 5, 1961, the validity of the above legal provision was
challenged. It was not until October 26, 1962, that a decision was rendered by the Court of
Agrarian Relations, rejecting the claim of unconstitutionality of the above section as without
merit and declaring the relationship between respondent tenants and petitioner-landowner
to be one of leasehold tenancy effective as of the agricultural year 1961-1962 in a joint decision
on the two petitions filed before it. From the aforesaid joint decision, this petition for review
was filed. As in the case of the proceedings before the Court of Agrarian Relations, a single
opinion suffices to dispose of the matter and to reaffirm once again the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
1. Tenancy legislation is a manifestation of the deep and earnest concern to solve an age-
old problem that has afflicted Philippine society, with its roots going back to the nineteenth
century. The framers of the Constitution mindful of the then growing feeling of dissatisfaction
with the ability of the government to cope with the poverty and misery of the vast majority of
our people inserted the protection to labor 2 and social justice 3 provisions of the Constitution.
Thus they left no doubt about the validity of remedial legislation intended to minimize, if not
to do away entirely with, the oppressive condition that usually was associated with agricultural
labor. In no sphere of governmental activity then could there be less receptivity to claims on
the part of those adversely affected that thereby their property rights were not given the
respect the Constitution affords. More specifically as far as the social justice principle is
concerned, there is the translation into reality of its significance as popularized by the late
President Magsaysay: He who has less in life should have more in law.
In the second year of his term, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955 was passed. The
particular provision, once again assailed in this litigation, as previously mentioned, vested in
the tenants "the right to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to leasehold
tenancy and vice versa and from one-crop-sharing arrangement to another of the share
tenancy." 4 Its validity was first sustained in De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations. 5
This Court, through Justice Labrador, spoke of the objective of the law thus: "The purpose
of this Act, according to Section 2 thereof, is 'to establish agricultural tenancy relations
between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate
protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an equitable division of the
produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to
greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to
encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural
communities.'"
Its justification in the light of our history was stressed in this wise: "The history of land
tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the people.
It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as a saviour
of the tenant class, which for generations has been relegated to a life of bondage, without
hope of salvation or improvement, enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful
condition of the tenants of Central Luzon. It was in Central Luzon also that the tenants forming
the PKM organization of tenants and, during the war, the Hukbalahap, rose in arms against the
constituted authority as their only salvation from permanent thraldom. According to statistics,
whereas at the beginning of the century we had only 19% of the people belonging to the tenant
class, after 60 years of prevailing, the percentage has reached 39%. It is the desire to improve
the condition of the peasant class that must have impelled the Legislature to adopt the
provisions as a whole of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and particularly Section 14 [thereof]."
The opinion in the De Ramas decision, after setting forth that the legal question posed
was whether there was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of an existing
contract, explained why the answer must be in the negative. Thus: "Obligations of contracts
must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised, as in this
case, to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to
the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary or oppressive." The De Ramas decision
was subsequently followed in several cases. 6
Then in Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 7 in sustaining once again the validity of
the above Section 14, this Court, in an opinion by the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion, declared: "We find no cogent reason to depart from the view we have so far
adhered to, which is in consonance with our consistent jurisprudence on the police power of
the State." As distinguished from the De Ramas holding, the objection to the validity of Section
14 in this case was premised not only on the alleged impairment of an existing obligation but
likewise on the transgression to the freedom of contract concept which is embraced in the
22
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause. Its validity then as a police power measure is formulation of the above principle as set forth in Lapina v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 18 in an
now beyond question. 8 opinion by Justice Dizon, is to the effect that its finding of fact must be accepted "unless it is
shown to be unfounded or arbitrarily arrived at, or that the [Court] had failed to consider
It thus appears indisputable that reinforced by the protection to labor and social justice important evidence to the contrary." There is no occasion therefore to consider further the
provisions of the Constitution, the attribute of police power justifies the enactment of issue of whether or not the ejectmennt of now respondents-tenants would lie.
statutory provisions of this character. That public interest would be served by governmental
measures intended to aid the economically under-privileged is apparent to all. Nor is the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations now under review is
means relied upon to attain such a valid objective unreasonable or oppressive. Considering affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
that in the adjustment or reconciliation of the conflicting claims to property and state
authority, it suffices that there be a rational basis for the legislative act, it is easily
understandable why, from the enactment of the Constitution with its avowed concern for
those who have less in life, the constitutionality of such legislation has been repeatedly upheld.

Thus prior to the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955, there were previous statutes which
likewise passed the test of validity in earlier decisions. The first decision of importance
is Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations. 9 In that case, the argument that the then Tenancy
Law 10 was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts was considered by
the court to be without any force as outside of the fact that the contract entered into between
the petitioner and the husband of the respondent during his lifetime and the respondent
herself after his death was without a fixed period, the work being accomplished from year to
year, the Constitution ordains the promotion of social justice and the protection to labor,
specially to working women. Then came Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 11 which sustained the
retroactive effect of an amendatory act 12 to then tenancy statute as against the contention
that there was a violation of the non-impairment clause. This constitutional provision is no bar,
according to this Court, for legislation affecting existing conditions enacted by the State in the
proper exercise of the police power.

The unanimous opinion of this Court in the recently decided Genuino v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, 13 with its unqualified approval of the power of Congress to abolish share tenancy,
as reflected in the latest legislation on the subject, 14 as against the contention that with the
limitation on the freedom of contract there is a deprivation of property without due process
of law, evinces unmistakably the firmness with which it adheres to the view that the police
power is of sufficient amplitude and scope to free from the taint of constitutional infirmity
legislation intended to ameliorate the sad plight of Filipino tenants and agricultural workers.
Thereby, this Court has manifested its fidelity to the constitutional intent so obvious from a
cursory glance at the applicable provisions of the Constitution. That will explain why every
challenge hurled against the validity of this particular provision was, from the outset, doomed
to futility.

2. In addition, another issue which according to the petition for review is "now squarely
raised before this [Court] is whether or not the use of a tractor of a land-owner in addition to
his carabao and farm implements is a ground for a disqualification of said land-owner to
undertake the personal cultivation of his own land and the ejectment of his tenants" pursuant
to the Agricultural Tenancy Act? 15 That point would have been deserving of further inquiry
were it not for the express finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations that respondent, now
Petitioner before this Court, "does not have the bona fide intention to cultivate the landholding
in question personally." 16 That is a finding of fact supported by substantial evidence, and as
such, binding upon this Court. It cannot therefore be disturbed on appeal. 17 The latest
23
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA
C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO,
CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, 
vs.
 The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS,
DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO
and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental, petitioners, 
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO
and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO,
CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, 
vs.
 subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for
his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily
and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing
amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the
son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth.
Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining
soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of
the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of
this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding
centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973,
the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction
to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant
from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These
include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the
above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No.
24
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics
for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive
public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year
of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless
gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The
different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be
explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these
lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution,
for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform
to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the
same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They
invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 andManotok v. National Food
Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in
money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives
the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection
clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems
on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of
other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the
owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so
violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even
the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of
just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under
the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial
intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is
premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them
do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide
for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought
in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the
determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment.
As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was
merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the
imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers
from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner
of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant
on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the
allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
25
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree
that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could
do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the
estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and
Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts
collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for
the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse.
The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised
and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such
payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof
provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount
to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of
current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be
defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation
may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and
part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be
mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to
make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar
areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters
have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate
group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over
the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were
granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and
that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount
appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an
initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the
maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has
not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he
is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for
the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and
a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show
that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also
suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling
the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the
payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only
money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking
of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is
actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
26
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate
from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation
of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued
to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the
inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands
consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the
motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for
the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted
pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress
is convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land
landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the
he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered
Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on
amortization payments.
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a
motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
the transfer of his land to the private respondents. resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with
the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.
The petitioner now argues that:

G.R. No. 78742

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied
by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers
The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation
rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

27
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than
7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that
the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have
already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on
Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum
Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474),
Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on
Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or
to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D.
No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures,
the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover,
the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the
exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is
especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the
government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless
not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason
that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul
the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the
legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and
caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was
enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session
en banc.11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,
we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although
they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then
applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act
invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning
and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of
these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
28
Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
categorically resolve. And so we shall. invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section
4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
II Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were
both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have
when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does
title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R.
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be
No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a
suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some
letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word
portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No.
was law during that time.
131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP
Law. 18
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply
with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform
published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however,
have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that
Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation
of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
reform. mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to
one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and
lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to
Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this
be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of
action.
Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had
not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then
solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay
Congress. in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene

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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board
should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when
the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision,
and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the
courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24for example, where a law required the transfer of
all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent
value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the
property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under
the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge
of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the
police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence
of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining
rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court
held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed
a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives
the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State
of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state
merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the
public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power
and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former
like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose
has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the
University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following
significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain
powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as
encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available
for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the
less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression
of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the
pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive
growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has
contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably
with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent
domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas
in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent
domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise
of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the
owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office
building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of
the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was
that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it
although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While
insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain
compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly
mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was
explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to
the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal.
Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to
others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation,
it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention
limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they
excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the
retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these
petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed
violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just
compensation as required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of
the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made
by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the
requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power
only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the
interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the
interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to
be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question
that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration
to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of
Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable
to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the
parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to
assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the
abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically,
the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by
the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any
event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the
CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion.
We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has
been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion
in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement
of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be
construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may
not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP
the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands
is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate
laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we
believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's
river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north
of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of
navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is
conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and
there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason
why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No.
6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure
is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning
of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a
mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual
taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the
good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be
employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue
a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed
is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific
reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by
the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation
for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v.
Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing
that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment
of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever
was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power
to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task
would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due
process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that
a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of
the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as
the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and
its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for
the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the
courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its
predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in
the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over
the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed
the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all
factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although
the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the
said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance
with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or
as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-
five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable
at any time.
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent
(30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,
physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th)
year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full
or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the
Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions
in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares
of stock owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale
industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the
financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated
is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is
possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation
. 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at
the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than
just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The
market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but
not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the
weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is
payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time
and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of
eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon
both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a
reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money,
which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the
power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other
valuable advantage. 49(Emphasis supplied.)
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid
in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise
of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose
does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the
present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we
are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will
guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been
the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount
of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called
for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption
that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that
the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional
if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay
in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may
therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided
for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully
with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of
value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as
that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the
new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project
even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment
should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries.
Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were
also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands
to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions
we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses
during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we
shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands
expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the
land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing
it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of
value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the
payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the
landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent
to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and
small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it
is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need
for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be
like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not
seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded
by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the
earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to
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register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for
tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be
ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided
for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted
principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain
Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of
entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v.
McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to
the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York
said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land
was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority
the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property
is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not
pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is
such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to
him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section
2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21,
1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No.
27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This
should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although
we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on
the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners
have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that
they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are
on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
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Agrarian Law – Atty. Peoro
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they
be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should
be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the
better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of
agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls
and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On
the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment,"
and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot
expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best
we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long,
fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now
glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and
disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his
servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his
portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living.
And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes
for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities
and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against
all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment
of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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