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Abstract
Today’s Austria, both as a territory and as a people, has undergone several dramatic
systemic changes since 1900, in political as well as socio-economic terms. As the ad-
ministrative centre of the Cisleithanian part of the Dual Monarchy, it was particularly
affected by the fall of the Habsburg dynasty. The Republic of Austria, created in 1918-
20 as a parliamentary democracy under the watchful eye of the peacemakers in Paris,
lasted only until 1933/34, when an authoritarian regime took over. This dictatorship,
which ruled under a corporate constitution, survived until March 1938, when Austria
was incorporated into the Third Reich.
Liberation and restitution as a democratic republic followed Allied victory in May
1945, along with a long decade of quadripartite occupation. In May 1955 Austria re-
gained its full sovereignty and continued its impressive consolidation as a successful
small, neutral state. Joining the European Union in 1995 marked the latest major in-
stitutional transition. These multiple breaks and changes are examined here in terms of
their impact on the organisational development of three important ministries – For-
eign Affairs, Defence, and Interior – whose organization and membership reflected the
foreign and security policies of the various political stages under study. This analysis
reveals the existence of a far greater degree of continuity than discontinuity. Changes
in administrative structure and in elite personnel proved on the whole to be less radical
than might have been expected and, when implemented, as in 1938 and 1945, their
effects were only short-lived.
Die Bewohner Österreichs in den nach dem ersten Weltkrieg etablierten Grenzen haben im
Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts vergleichsweise viele systemische, vorwiegend politische und so-
178 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
Austria, it has been claimed, is a nation without a history, and Austrian history is a
history without a nation. Indeed, it can be argued that there is a marked discontinuity
between the Austria and the Austrians of today and the Austria and the Austrians of
only a century ago. Austrian history from the end of the 19th century to the begin-
ning of the 21st century has been filled with ethnic confusions, multiple paradoxes and
pervasive skepticism, which is why Austrians in the present are still insecure about and
uncomfortable with their past and heritage. Outside observers even today speak of “a
lack of national and cultural self-confidence”1.
This can also be explained by the fact that during the last century Austria was twice on
the brink of becoming a failed state: between 1918 and 1922, and again between 1945
and 1947. Both of these phases of despair and misery came after world-wide conflagra-
tions and led to distinctive republican periods, namely, the First Austrian Republic of
1918-1934/38 and the Second Austrian Republic from 1945 until the present day. The
first republican experiment ended in failure as a consequence of internal and external
pressures. The second opportunity, provided by the victors of World War II, eventually
led to an almost miraculous recovery and a remarkable prosperity that was unforesee-
able during those early years of almost total crisis. As conditions improved, particularly
during the 1950s and 1960s, Austrians developed a new identity as a small, neutral na-
tion-state which enjoyed the advantage of being situated at the crossroads between East
Institutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th Century 179
and West. Throughout the long 20th century the Austrian people had to endure bitter
regime changes, which were marked by the following caesuras: 1918, 1933/34, 1938,
1945, and 1955. All these transitions brought substantial institutional changes, most of
them constitutionally grounded.
This chapter analyses these institutional changes from two crucial perspectives: foreign
policy and security structures. These two fields of public life are best represented by
three ministries, namely the Foreign, Defence, and Interior Ministries, which will be
separately discussed. It should be noted that the sources relating to these three minis-
tries vary considerably. Regarding the field of security, that is, in the Defence and Inte-
rior Ministries, special attention will be given to the respective intelligence structures.
This is not only because these represent an interesting and under-researched area, but
also because it serves as a revealing case of institutional change. This chapter will thus
focus on (1) the institutional changes brought about by the above-mentioned caesuras
and (2) the role elites played in these transitions. We will show that despite dramatic
systemic changes in the 20th century, bureaucratic structures and their respective elites
were somewhat surprisingly marked more by continuity than discontinuity.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
180 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
or less forced upon the country as a consequence of the State Treaty in 1955 – has be-
come a central element of Austrian identity2.
Membership in the European Union since 1995 has increased Austria’s self-confidence
and international status; it has also proved highly advantageous for Austrian industry,
commerce and finance. It has, however, not significantly affected the institutional land-
scape of Austria’s federal, regional or local administrations.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
182 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
the start of World War I the number of embassies had risen to ten and the number of
legations to 23, but by November 1918 these numbers had shrunk to four and twelve
respectively8. In this context the work of military attachés provided the link between
foreign and intelligence policies. They played a strategic role during the entire 20th
century, but their work was regarded as especially important during World War I9.
Beginning in November 1920, the Austrian Federal Government was made up of fed-
eral ministers rather than state secretaries. In the following years, however, Austria had
no Foreign Minister in its own right (except for a short period in 1935) as this post was
taken over by other ministers, including the Federal Chancellor himself. Organization-
ally speaking, the Foreign Office generally followed the pre-1918 pattern, except that
the number of departments was considerably smaller. In 1923, the Austrian diplomatic
and consular organization consisted of 15 legations, 6 consulates-general, 7 consulates
and 3 passport offices, as well as numerous honorary consulates. However, the strict
distinction between a consular and a diplomatic career soon disappeared as most em-
ployees were now recruited from the lower gentry15.
Around this time, the Austrian government even debated whether Austria needed for-
eign missions at all and whether a form of economic representation would not do the
job as well. Eventually, it was not the network of missions which was done away with
but rather – in the context of a reorganization of several Austrian ministries – the For-
eign Ministry itself. The background to this restructuring measure was that the financial
and economic situation of the country had been deteriorating and was only saved by a
loan from the League of Nations, the so-called Geneva Protocol. This loan, however,
carried conditions, such as strict control over Austria’s budget and finances by a League
of Nations Commissioner, who enforced stringent cuts in public spending. One of the
reforms the Commissioner imposed was the abolition of the Federal Ministries of the
Interior, Justice, Food Supply and Foreign Affairs. Instead, a Federal Chancellery and
six Federal Ministries were established. Although Foreign Affairs was integrated into
the Federal Chancellery, its direction was entrusted to a Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs. After 1923 the respective Federal Chancellor assumed this post. Another result
of the League of Nations’ conditions was a considerable reduction in the network of
diplomatic representations abroad. The low point was reached in 1926, after which a
slow but steady expansion began. The dramatic development of international relations
in the early 1930s also contributed to the expansion of Austria’s presence abroad as
many Austrian ex-patriates succumbed to Nazi propaganda and demanded a greater
presence on the international stage16.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
184 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
German authorities made sure that they received the lists of Austrian citizens in all
respective host countries17. The palace of the former Foreign Office remained empty
for two years until Vienna’s Gauleiter (head of a Nazi province), Baldur von Schirach,
established his office there.
There were conspicuously few National Socialists among the Austrian diplomatic corps
and the Nazi authorities arrested and sent to concentration camps a number of its mem-
bers, among them well-known diplomats and politicians such as Erich Bielka, Theodor
Hornbostel, and Richard Steidle. A number of Austrian functionaries stationed abroad,
such as Georg Alexich in The Hague, Georg Franckenstein in London and Ferdinand
Marek in Prague, refused to follow Berlin’s order to return home and preferred instead to
remain in their host countries. Other Austrian diplomats chose to continue their career in
the Nazi Foreign Service, but in general did not obtain important posts. Only 17 career
diplomats and 12 low-ranking officials were admitted to the German Foreign Office18.
In contrast to the First Republic, from 1945 on Austrian authorities attempted to es-
tablish a dense network of missions around the world. Although Austria was under the
strict control of the four Occupying Allied Powers, the so-called Zweites Kontrollab-
kommen [Second Control Agreement] of June 1946 granted Austria the right to estab-
lish diplomatic contacts with the United Nations and other states. Under Karl Gruber’s
tutelage (until 1953) a total of 46 Austrian representations were established. By 1948,
Austria sponsored more missions than before World War II. The first ambassadors to be
appointed since 1916 were posted to Paris and Washington in 1951, London in 1952,
and Moscow in 1953. This took place at the request of the respective occupying powers
and, in the words of the Austrian diplomat Josef Schöner, Austria hesitated to follow
the common trend to replace the “exclusive club of legations” with the “mass organiza-
tion of embassies”22.
In 1953, the former Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl took over the post of Foreign
Minister and in 1955 negotiated the Austrian State Treaty which restored Austria as
a fully sovereign country. An Austrian Foreign Ministry was finally created in the late
1950s. The reason was less the need for a Foreign Office as such, but rather a political
deal between the two coalition parties. The elections of May 1959, which resulted in a
relative victory for the Austrian Social Democrats, required the transfer of one ministry
from the Conservative Party to the socialists. Since there was no spare ministry avail-
able, a new one was created. Austrian career diplomat and future Federal Chancellor
Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983), thus became the first Foreign Minister to rule over a for-
eign ministry in its own right23.
The expansion of the network of foreign missions more or less came to an end by 1959,
but new missions still had to be opened thanks to new international developments,
above all decolonization in Africa and elsewhere. In 1964 a Diplomatic Academy was
established as a successor to the former Consular Academy, and served as a post-gradu-
ate training centre for Austrian and foreign diplomats. As the Foreign Ministry grew,
foreign cultural matters and economic co-operation were moved to the Ballhausplatz.
The establishment of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) is the most recent in-
stitutional change in the Foreign Ministry. Curiously enough, the Austrian Foreign Of-
fice had to wait until 2003 to get a telephone circuit of its own. Before that it had had
to use the overloaded line of the Federal Chancellery24.
In 2005 the Austrian Foreign Ministry moved from its venerable address at Ballhausplatz
2 to Minoritenplatz 8. It was a nostalgic good-bye to the Ballhausplatz, the offices of the
Foreign Ministry of a major European power for two centuries. Today, the Ministry is of-
ficially called the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and was led by
from 2004 to 2008 by Ursula Plassnik, the second woman to hold this post following her
immediate predecessor Benita Ferrero-Waldner (both from the Conservative Party). At
the end of 2008 she ceded her place to the present Minister, Michael Spindelegger.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
186 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
For this reason most scholarly literature focuses more on the role of the General Staff
than on that of the Ministry, which is a significant problem in researching the institu-
tional history of the Austro-Hungarian military administration.
Up to 80 percent of top-ranking officers were educated at the Theresianische Mil-
itärakademie [Theresian Military Academy] in Wiener Neustadt, whose excellent
reputation attracted mainly young men from wealthy, urban families29. Most officers,
however, were educated at cadet schools and remained in the lower ranks. As wages in
the Austro-Hungarian armed forces were low, officers were expected to invest part of
their personal assets in their representative duties. Unlike the situation in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the profession of an officer was of the petite bourgeoisie and thus a
considerable number of officers were deeply in debt30. Only the leading positions were
occupied by members of the high nobility and confidants of the Emperor. The officers
were to become the reliable backbone of the Austro-Hungarian army in the First World
War and contributed to the sometimes astonishing performance of the armed forces.
Apart from the Ministry of War other authorities were in charge of military units, de-
ployed either by the Ministry of Defence for the Hungarian half of the realm or by the
counterpart of the same name for the Austrian half. These so-called Landwehr formations
represented a militia, which in case of war was to be entrusted mainly with defensive tasks.
The fact that about 80 percent of the officers were native German speakers clearly reflects
the domination of the Germans over other national groups. This most uneven distribu-
tion of power had already become a key element of tension towards the end of the 19th
century, and was to play a central role in the disbandment of the armed forces.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
188 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
The latter deeply suspected the former of being monarchist, which in most cases was
not true33. However, the K.u.K.-officers encountered huge problems adapting to the
new situation. Carl Vaugoin, the central figure in the Ministry of Defence from 1922
onwards, succeeded in turning the ‘red’ Ministry of Defence into a conservative insti-
tution, whose structure mirrored that of the old Ministry of War34. Both parties then
formed their own Parteischutzorganisationen [Party Security Organisations] as para-
military organisations. The conservative Heimwehr and the Social Democratic Repub-
likanischer Schutzbund faced each other down on numerous occasions, and in so doing
undermined the state’s exclusive right to wield firearms.
Other causes of friction included conservative dominance in both the Ministry of De-
fence and the Ministry of the Interior, which did not please Vienna, the Social Dem-
ocrats’ stronghold. Frequent demonstrations led to excesses of violence in which the
Federal Army could not intervene. For example, in 1927 the situation escalated to the
point that the Palace of Justice in Vienna was burned, yet the Mayor of Vienna and the
Minister of Defence refused to deploy the army. In the early 1930s the balance of power
shifted in favour of the conservatives. Federal Chancellor Dollfuss displaced Vaugoin in
September 1933 and administered the Ministry until March 1934, by which time the
Austrian Civil War had provoked some 700 casualties35. Unlike the events of 1927, the
Austrian Army was fully involved in the civil war fighting. Images of artillery firing at
the Karl-Marx-Hof, one of the most ambitious social housing projects of ‘Red Vienna’
and a working class symbol, still persist in the Austrian historical memory.
In the three years before the Anschluss, the federal army was once more reinforced. Nev-
ertheless it surrendered practically without resistance when the far superior German
army invaded the country on 12/13 March 1938. One could hardly question that from
1934 to 1938 the Ministry of Defence served as little more than an instrument of the
respective governments.
Wehrkreise [military districts] while Austrian military intelligence units were absorbed
by the Wehrmacht and the intelligence they had collected was confiscated.
When war started on 1 September 1939, former Austrian units were engaged from
the beginning. Between 1939 and 1945 a total of 1.2 million Austrians served with
the Wehrmacht; a sixth of them lost their lives. It is quite clear that they were mainly
loyal soldiers, and their dedication to Hitler was often remarkably high, as is shown by
the above-average number of decorations awarded to Austrians. They earned a total of
326 Knight’s Crosses and more than 200 men from the Ostmark reached the rank of
general36. Furthermore, the Austrian contribution to the administration of German-oc-
cupied Europe was highly influential37.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
190 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
former officers of the Wehrmacht were indispensable to the formation of a new federal
army, opinions diverged on the details. While the Conservatives opted for the suspen-
sion of the civil rights of soldiers during military service, the Social Democrats wanted
to maintain the franchise for members of the army41. This debate was deeply rooted in
the history of the First Republic, when military forces were repeatedly involved in the
violent conflicts between the two parties and their supporters. The federal army had
traditionally backed the conservatives, which led the socialists to conclude that they
had to strengthen their position in the armed forces. They decided that only with a
significant percentage of Social Democrats among the soldiers and officers could the
military’s neutrality be assured. This principle was known as Proporz [proportional rep-
resentation] and became a fundamental characteristic of the federal army.
The end of the Allied Occupation in 1955 brought not only sovereignty and neutrality
but also new problems. Austria’s geopolitical position in the midst of Cold War Europe
was considered crucial by both the eastern and western camps, and permanent neutrality
on the Swiss model required adequate security measures. Neutrality had to be defended
according to the clauses of the Austrian neutrality law42, and the protection that the
former occupying powers had provided needed urgently to be replaced. However, main-
taining a standing army led to unforeseen costs which in turn hindered Austrian rearma-
ment efforts. Other limits were imposed by the State Treaty itself, which prescribed in
detail the maximum number of men at arms, tanks, heavy weapons and such like.
The Ministry of Defence was re-established on 11 July 1956, and it immediately took
control over the military units at its disposal, principally the Provisorische Grenzs-
chutzabteilungen [Provisional Border Patrols] which had been called B-Gendarmerie
before. The first Minister of Defence, Ferdinand Graf, was a conservative politician
and former sergeant of the Wehrmacht. His Undersecretary Karl Stephani was a Social
Democrat and former lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, while the officer appointed to the
post of Generaltruppeninspektor [Inspector General of the Army] was Colonel Erwin
Fussenegger, a former member of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht43.
Fussenegger’s career had been clearly marked by the era of fascism, and his appointment be-
hind the Social Democrats’ backs provoked conflict. A main opponent of Fussenegger was
the former general of the Federal Army of the First Republic, and activist in the Austrian
Resistance during the war, Emil Liebitzky. The latter had contributed to the deployment
of the B-Gendarmerie and to the preparation of the new Ministry of Defence44. Liebitzky
finally realised that – in line with developments in other ministries – a new beginning
which excluded the so-called ‘wartime generation’ was almost impossible45. Although Fus-
senegger’s power declined gradually he remained in office until the Hungarian Revolution
broke out in October 1956, after which these political debates surfaced once again46.
Scholarly literature on the Austrian Federal Army and the Ministry of Defence, scarce
as it is, refers to three periods of Austrian defence policy during the Second Republic.
Institutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th Century 191
The first, summarized above, saw the establishment of a new defensive force from 1956
to 1961. The second period between 1961 and 1970 witnessed consolidation and re-
form as the newly created structures struggled to adapt fully to the geopolitical situa-
tion of Austria47. This phase was initiated by the appointment of the conservative Karl
Schleinzer as Minister of Defence. Not only did he restrict the powers of the Inspector
General of the Army, he also initiated a strategic change. Whereas the Federal Army
had previously prepared and trained for defensive action in the case of war, Schleinzer
proposed a new doctrine centering on a single annihilating strike, aimed at indirectly
extorting support from foreign (that is NATO) forces48.
The Social Democrats’ electoral victory in 1970 led to a radical shift in direction, thus
precipitating the third phase. Austria’s inability to survive in the case of an escalation of
the Cold War shaped defence policy during the government of Bruno Kreisky (1970-
83)49. The longstanding debate about whether to favor a professional army, or one
based on a militia, led to the hybrid which the reformed Austrian Federal Army of the
mid-1970s represented. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War the era of “area defence” terminated. Apart from the arguments over the
budget that had emerged in the 1960s, the Ministry of Defence faced new problems,
including securing the borders, participation in international peacekeeping missions,
and engagement in civil defence and disaster management50.
Military Intelligence
Although the end of the Monarchy was followed by the disintegration of the Eviden-
zbureau, a new authority by the same name was created at the State Office for Army
Affairs55. The former intelligence network, which had spanned the whole of Central
Europe, also lingered on until it was disbanded in April 1920. Official statements claim
that the St.-Germain Peace Treaty did not allow military intelligence activity, though
it is possible that the poor financial situation of the First Republic, or its diminished
importance in international affairs, was responsible for the abandonment of military
intelligence on Austrian soil by 192056. Nevertheless, a new military intelligence agency
was founded in Vienna only four years later , and was named the Abteilung 1 [Depart-
ment 1]57. This new authority expanded quickly and about 200 people were working
for it by the mid 1930s. A main focus of its activities was Nazi Germany, where it oper-
ated with great success. In 1937, it managed to get a copy of the German invasion plan
concerning Austria, but this information was not properly exploited58.
When Austria became part of the Third Reich after the Anschluss its intelligence units
were disbanded, among them Abteilung 1. Its agenda was taken over by the German
Gestapo (Secret State Police) and the SD (Secret Security Service)59. The Austrian
Ernst Kaltenbrunner became chief of the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), which
was later to incorporate the Abwehr. SS-Officer Wilhelm Höttl was another infamous
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
192 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
Austrian who worked for the SD in southeastern Europe. Höttl later worked for Amer-
ican intelligence during the early years of the Cold War60.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Austria became a kind of international mar-
ketplace for intelligence concerning the two ideological blocs61. Though there existed no
Austrian military intelligence during the ten years of Allied occupation, probably more
Austrians than ever before became involved in such activities thanks to employment by
foreign intelligence organizations62. Before an Austrian military intelligence unit was again
created in 1956, the Austrian State Police (StaPo) had taken over much of its activities.
Even today very little is known about Austrian military intelligence, except for its name
and some of its structure. It consists of the Heeresnachrichtenamt (HNaA, Army Intel-
ligence Service), which concentrates mainly on developments in neighbouring coun-
tries63. The HNaA appears to be one of the best-informed agencies at work in the re-
gion, especially in regard to the Balkans64. Since 1985 another institution has existed,
the Abwehramt [Army Defence Service], which is much smaller and concentrates on
counter-intelligence. It cooperates closely with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und
Terrorismusbekämpfung [Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter-Terrorism]
of the Ministry of the Interior. It is assumed that each military agency employs between
400 and 500 personnel; their aggregate budget is estimated at 50 million euros65.
As we shall see below, intelligence has not only been undertaken by the Ministry of
Defence, but also by the Ministry of the Interior. Particularly during the First Republic
responsibilities were often shared between these two authorities.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
194 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
the eve of the German invasion, he became Chancellor for a short time. German military
strength permitted the Nazis to immediately seize key positions in the bureaucracy, the
economy, the police and the armed forces. In a first round of arrests, they eliminated al-
most the whole ruling class of the Austrian Corporatist State71.
Nazi Period
Germany’s annexation of Austria in 1938 led to the substitution of Austria’s former elites
at virtually all levels. Nazi operatives replaced Interior Ministry civil servants, especially
senior officials or chief officers72. However, and perhaps surprisingly, Austrian Nazis did
not automatically profit from the regime change. Membership in the party was not an
automatic guarantee of employment under Nazi rule73.
Control of the Austrian police passed immediately to the German Reich and Nazi lead-
ers established a new structure for the police and security forces based upon the German
model74. Step by step, the entire Austrian administrative structure was integrated into the
German Reich, which eliminated any trace of the former independent Austrian Republic.
Until the end of the war, all former Austrian administrative institutions, especially those
concerning internal security, were tightly under the control of Berlin.
Nazi Otto Rösch and the influential socialist politician Karl Blecha, who was forced to
resign in 1989 after his alleged involvement in illegal arms dealing and insurance fraud.
Since 2000 the conservatives have administered the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Fol-
lowing Ernst Strasser, who was responsible for a large police reform package and a reorgan-
isation of departments and agencies, the first woman, Liese Prokop, headed the Ministry
from 2004 to 2006. Since July 2008, Maria Fekter has been in charge of internal affairs.
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
196 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
The reorganization and rearmament of the Austrian military and intelligence services in
1933 was accompanied by a reorganization of the respective civilian services. The authori-
tarian government of Federal Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß expanded State Police activi-
ties as a means of repressing political opponents. A Staatspolizeiliches Büro [State Police
Bureau] was instituted in the Federal Chancellery, which was soon transformed into the
Staatspolizeiliches Evidenzbüro [StE or State Police Evidence Bureau] of the General Di-
rectorate for Public Security. In 1934 Major-General Maximilian Ronge became its head.
Following this centralization of State Police activities under the Federal Chancellery, it
was prohibited to report any State Police matters to other authorities. This especially af-
fected the ZESt, which became less and less significant. In 1935 the StE was reorganized
as the Zentralevidenzstelle [Central Evidence Bureau], which was in charge of the whole
country. In addition to the main tasks of political intelligence and counterespionage this
authority coordinated all military and civilian intelligence services in Austria82.
As noted above, all Austrian intelligence units ceased to exist after the Anschluss, and the
Gestapo became the Nazi regime’s instrument for fighting its opponents and executing its
racial policy. The Gestapo was a ‘state within a state’ and fully devoted to Nazi ideology
while the SD was an espionage and counterespionage service which compiled reports on
the political situation and popular opinion in the greater Reich. The division of responsi-
bilities between Gestapo and SD was not always clearly defined83.
Although the Allied powers did not allow the formation of an Austrian army during the
occupation period, they agreed to the reestablishment of the Austrian State Police. In the
Ministry of the Interior, Maximilian Pammer was appointed as head of the Staatspolizeili-
ches Büro [State Police Bureau], which was a part of the General Directorate for Public
Security. However, the communist State Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior ap-
pointed his fellow party member, Heinrich Dürmayer, to be in charge of the strategically
important Viennese State Police Department. Dürmayer immediately replaced former
Nazi, Gestapo or SS members with communists. In 1947, the Social Democratic, and
strictly anti-communist, Minister of the Interior, Oskar Helmer, replaced Dürmayer with
Oswald Peterlunger.
In the aftermath, the political outlook of administrative elites in the Staatspolizeilicher
Dienst [State Police Service] was changed by appointing, installing or promoting Peter-
lunger’s anti-communist cronies. An intensive exchange of information with the western
Allied powers was also established. In addition to inquiries about war criminals, the Staat-
spolizei [State Police] increasingly engaged in the observation of suspicious associations
and groups, in preventive surveillance and control of state enemies, and in the fight against
foreign espionage activities.
The Austrian State Police has achieved noticeable success over the last decades, but a number
of scandals have brought it into the headlines84. Since 1993, a parliamentary commission
has controlled the State Police, which was reorganized in 2002 as the Bundesamt für Ver-
Institutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th Century 197
Notes
1
S. Beller, A Concise History of Austria, Cambridge 2006, p. 314.
2
A. Gémes, G. Ragossnig, Austria’s Neutrality and European Integration. A Conflict between International
and National Spheres of Law, in G. Lottes, E. Medijainen, J. Sigurdsson (eds.), Making, Using and Resisting
the Law in European History, Pisa 2008, pp. 235-255.
The best contributions on this topic are R. Agstner, Abschied vom Ballhausplatz, in “Wiener Geschichts-
3
blätter”, 2005, 1, pp. 58-81; R. Agstner, An Institutional History. The Austrian Foreign Office in the Twenti-
eth Century, in G. Bischof, A. Pelinka, M. Gehler (eds.), Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context, New
Brunswick 2006, pp. 39-57. For the inter-war years, a good overview of institutional aspects concerning
the Austrian Foreign Office can be found in A. Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918-1938. Bilaterale
Außenpolitik im europäischen Umfeld, Vienna 1996, pp. 314-329. For the post-World War II period, several
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
198 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
institutional aspects are included in M. Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik. Von der al-
liierten Besatzung bis zum Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts, Innsbruck 2006, 2 vols.
In 2005, the Ministry moved around the corner to Minoritenplatz 8. The name Ballhaus [ball house]
4
stems from a kind of tennis which had been played at this location in the past and not from the famous
balls of the Vienna Congress. For a history of the Ballhausplatz see A. Wandruszka, M. Reininghaus, Der
Ballhausplatz, Vienna 1984; F. Engel-Janosi, Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz, Graz 1963.
For a general treatment of institutional and foreign policy issues before 1867 see T. Fellner, Die Geschichte
5
der Ministerien vom Durchbruch des Absolutismus bis zum Ausgleich mit Ungarn und zur Konstitutionalisie-
rung der österreichischen Länder 1852 bis 1866, Vienna 1970; K. Olechowski-Hrdlicka, Die gemeinsamen
Angelegenheiten der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie. Vorgeschichte - Ausgleich 1867 - Staatsrechtliche
Kontroversen, Vienna 2001.
W. Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War,
6
West Lafayette 1999, p. 18 ff; J. Schöner, Der österreichische Diplomat, in K. Braunias, G. Stourzh, Diplo-
matie unserer Zeit, Vienna 1959, pp. 247-264, at p. 252f; F. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy among the
Great Powers, 1815-1918, New York 1990, p. 14 ff. See also K. Menger, Beamte. Wirtschafts- und sozialge-
schichtliche Aspekte des k.k. Beamtentums, Vienna 1985.
I. Diószegi, Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz: studies on the Austro-Hungarian common foreign policy, Buda-
7
pest 1983.
Agstner, History cit., p. 39. See also the detailed accounts in Godsey, Redbout cit.; E. Matsch, Der Auswär-
8
Ungarns 1906-1914, Munich 203, p. 307 f; V. Moritz, H. Leidinger, G. Jagschitz, Im Zentrum der Macht.
Die vielen Gesichter des Geheimdienstchefs Maximilian Ronge, Vienna 2007, p. 65.
10
E. Matsch, Die Auflösung des österreichisch-ungarischen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1918/1920, in MOESTA,
1977, 30, pp. 288-316; Id., November 1918 auf dem Ballhausplatz. Erinnerungen Ludwigs Freiherrn von
Flotow, dem letzten Chef des österreichisch-ungarischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, Vienna 1982; Suppan, Jugos-
lawien cit., p. 316.
11
Agstner, Abschied cit., p. 61; Schöner, Diplomat cit., p. 254.
12
Ibid., p. 256.
13
Agstner, History cit., p. 41.
14
Suppan, Jugoslawien cit., p. 314 ff.
15
Agstner, History cit., p. 42.
16
Id., Abschied cit., p. 62f; Schöner, Diplomat cit., p. 255.
17
Agstner, History cit., p. 64. See also: O. Rathkolb, The Austrian Foreign Service and the “Anschluss” 1938,
in “German Studies Review”, 1990, 1, 13, pp. 55-84; Id, Liquidierung des Bundeskanzleramtes, Auswärtige
Angelegenheiten durch die ‘Dienststelle des Auswärtigen Amtes in Wien’ im März ‘38, in F. Kreissler, Fünfzig
Jahre danach – Der “Anschluß” von innen und außen gesehen, Vienna 1989, pp. 174-188.
18
For their careers see M. Keipert, P. Grupp, G. Keiper, M. Kröger (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch des deut-
schen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1971-1945, Munich 2000-2005, 5 vols.
19
J. Schöner, Wiener Tagebuch 1944/45, Vienna 1992, p. 163; C. Wildner, Von Wien nach Wien, Vienna
1961, p. 250.
20
G. Bischof, The Making of a Cold Warrior: Karl Gruber and Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945-1953, in “Aus-
trian History Yearbook”, 1995, 26, pp. 99-127.
21
Agstner, History cit., pp. 50f.
22
Schöner, Diplomat cit., p. 259.
Institutional Change in Austrian Foreign Policy and Security Structures in the 20th Century 199
23
B. Kreisky, Im Strom der Erinnerungen. Der Memoiren zweiter Teil, Berlin 1988, p. 63.
24
Agstner, Abschied cit., p. 74.
25
http://aeiou.iicm.tugraz.at/aeiou.encyclop.v/v326164.htm, accessed 8 August 2008.
26
http://www.burghauptmannschaft.at/php/detail.php?ukatnr=12186&artnr=7076, accessed 8 August 2008.
27
For most of these research fields there exists very little scholarly literature in languages other than German.
Exceptions are G.E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, West Lafayette 1976; E. May (ed.), Knowing
One’s Enemies. Intelligence Assessment before the two World Wars, Princeton 1984; D. Lieven, Empire. The
Russian Empire and Its Rivals from the 16th Century to the Present, London 2003.
28
P. Urbanitsch, A. Wandruszka (eds.), Die bewaffnete Macht, Vienna 1987, p. 144 f; J.C. Allmayer-Beck, E.
Lessing, Die k. (u.) k. Armee 1848-1914, Munich 1974.
29
Ibid., p. 100.
30
Ibid., p. 101f.
31
L. Jedlicka, Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien. Die militärpolitische Lage Österreichs 1918-1938, Graz
1955, pp. 9 ff.
32
W. Aichinger, Österreichs wehrpolitische Lage in der Zwischenkriegszeit, in “ÖMZ”, 1985, 2, pp. 112 ff.
33
Bundesministerium für Heerwesen (ed.), Österreichisches Bundesheer, Vienna 1929, pp. 66 ff.
34
Jedlicka, Heer cit., p. 58 ff; E. Steinböck, Die Organisation des Österreichischen Bundesheeres von 1920-
1938, in “Militaria Austriaca”, 1991, 7, pp. 9f.
35
Jedlicka, Heer cit., p. 90 ff. See also L. Jedlicka, R. Neck (eds.), Vom Justizpalast zum Heldenplatz. Studien
und Dokumentationen 1927-1938, Vienna 1975.
36
On the careers of Austrian generals in the Wehrmacht: M. Stein, Österreichs Generale im Deutschen Heer
1938-1945, Bissendorf 2002. On soldiers: M.K. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler’s War, New York, 1986,
pp. 23 ff; L. Höbelt, Österreicher in der Deutschen Wehrmacht, 1938-1945, in “Truppendienst”, 1989, 5, p.
432 ff.
P. Berger, Kurze Geschichte Österreichs im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna 2007, p. 218.
37
On key problems of future defence policy see W. Blasi, E. Schmidl, F. Schneider (eds.), B-Gendarmerie,
38
Waffenlager und Nachrichtendienste. Der militärische Weg zum Staatsvertrag, Vienna 2005.
F. Schneider, Der Weg zum österreichischen Wehrgesetz von 1955, in Blasi, Schmidl, Schneider, B-Gendar-
39
Institutionalizing Diplomacy
200 Siegfried Beer, Andreas Gémes, Wolfgang Göderle, Mario Muigg
A. Gémes, Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Between Solidarity and Neutrality, Pisa 2008, pp.
46
31 ff.
M. Rauchensteiner, Das Bundesheer der Zweiten Republik (=Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Muse-
47
Rauchensteiner (eds.), Schild ohne Schwert. Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955-1970, Graz - Vienna -
Cologne 1991, p. 132.
Bach, Streitkräfte cit., pp. 527 ff.
49
A. Pető, Agenten für den Doppeladler. Österreich-Ungarns Geheimer Dienst im Weltkrieg, Graz 1998, pp.
52
48-56.
J. Reifberger, Die Entwicklung des militärischen Nachrichtenwesens in der k.u.k. Armee, in “ÖMZ”, 1976, 3,
53
pp. 213-223.
For a detailed study of the era of Ronge: Jagschitz, Leidinger, Moritz, Im Zentrum der Macht cit.
54
M. Muigg, Geheim- und Nachrichtendienste in und aus Österreich. 1918-1938, in: “SIAK-Journal”, 2007, 3,
55
p. 65.
Ibid., p. 66.
56
S. Beer, Von Alfred Redl zum “Dritten Mann”. Österreich und Österreicherinnen im internationalen Geheim-
60
dienstgeschehen 1918-1947, in “Geschichte und Gegenwart”, 1997, 16, pp. 3-25, pp. 7 ff.
A. Gémes, Spionagezentrum Österreich? Nachrichtendienste in Österreich während des Kalten Krieges, in
61
S. Beer, “Bound to Cooperate”. Austria’s Little-Known Intelligence Community since 1945, in “The Journal of
63
E. Hanisch, Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, Vien-
67
ganze Arbeit leisten…”. Der Austrofaschistische Staatsstreich 1934, Norderstedt 2004, p. 66f.
Jerabek, Enderle-Burcel, Verwaltungseliten cit., pp. 7, 13.
71
H. Hagspiel, Die Ostmark. Österreich im Großdeutschen Reich 1938 bis 1945, Vienna 1995, pp. 134-137;
74
H. Kadanik, NS-Verwaltung in Österreich 1938-1945, PhD Thesis, Graz 1994, pp. 150-156.
Hanisch, Schatten cit., pp. 395-398.
75
Ibid., p. 61.
78
G. Jagschitz, Die Politische Zentralevidenzstelle der Bundespolizeidirektion Wien. Ein Beitrag zur Rolle der
80
politischen Polizei in der Ersten Republik, in Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 1978, Vienna 1979, pp. 58-87.
Ibid., p. 69.
81
Ibid., p. 85.
82
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