CBD Case No.

176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta
charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical
conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No.
7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil
Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a
piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No.
38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and
civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum
of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the
said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were
declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was
received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied
upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number
to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP
No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.

Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the
scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might
obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:

Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted
to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas,
that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy
in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of
the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to
stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso
M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00
as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every
lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No.
of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread
on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining
with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which
we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the

applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to
make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not
in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider
for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose
chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210
NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
 apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission
to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met
at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is
presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only
to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character.
All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the
fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only
those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of
the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to
appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes
the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that
his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his
community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not
be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
 admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at
the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the
Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002,
resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and
that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial
Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated
June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration
and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE
SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE
MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE
CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed,
may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision
of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of
a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court
of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September
25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts"
as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before
inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the
crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance
of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private
complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that
therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except
in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to
an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such
that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty.
Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP
dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of
one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the
USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the
actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of
an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is
but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of
the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership
in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members,
which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy
of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged
in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits
that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that
he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law.
Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that
he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working
abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of
the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject
to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy
a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If
the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means
to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
 The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the
lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have
been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the
situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime,
petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the
amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil

A.......- Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
B.......- Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
C.......- Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil
Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of
which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
 Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not
only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are
also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66,
Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17,
1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his
name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14,
1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion
for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he
has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same
O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as
above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of
Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the
Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was
never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that
he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income
taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member
to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that
he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and
penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest
belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of
"IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked
and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
 ....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted
that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly
made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of
law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in
the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for
his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was
his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however,
that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of
taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for
disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does
not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of
his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements
and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and
other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the
rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in
cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the
loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
 (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.