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Despite the historic achievement, the sorry state of the federation where law
and order has disappeared and corruption is ubiquitous, and where economy
and utilities have faltered, would prompt the electorate to question the real
value of electoral democracy. Has electoral democracy been able to deliver
jobs to the unemployed, and food to the poor? A quick economic recap of the
past five years is in order.
The Zardari government took over from General Musharraf who reluctantly
relinquished control after it became apparent that a showdown between the
General and political forces was imminent. What started with a great promise
turned quickly into a major disappointment? Within months, the naïveté of
the new government was evident as one sector of the economy was
mismanaged after the other. While the Musharraf regime posted 6 per cent to
8 per cent economic growth rates, the Zardari government couldn’t muster
even a 4 per cent GDP growth.
It is, however, true that the good fortune did not favour the elected
governments. Whereas, the Musharraf regime enjoyed the dividends of a
rapidly growing global economy in which the Americans and the Europeans
were keen to shower cash for Pakistani mercenaries and bounty hunters, the
Zardari government came to power in 2008 when the global economies
experienced the worst economic recession since the great depression of the
30s. The demand for Pakistani goods declined and investment flows dried up,
thus starving Pakistani industries.
And while the economic growth was dismal at best, the stock markets in
Pakistan continued to reach new heights. Even with the worsening of law and
order and a near complete collapse of the power sector that crippled the
manufacturing sector, the KSE 100 index continued to grow, fuelled most
likely by ‘irrational exuberance.’
The PPP’s performance was indeed disappointing. However, the assertion that
incompetence was so acute that extra-constitutional steps are justified rests on
spurious statistics and hyperbole.
Pundits report that it incurred more debt than all previous governments
combined. This is an evocative and hair-raising but meaningless comparison.
Firstly, nominal debt values cannot be compared over time since inflation has
reduced rupee values significantly since 1947. A small debt from 1950 equals a
debt several times larger today in real terms.
Good economists compare debt ratios over time, eg, annual debt-servicing
levels compared with exports and/or tax revenues. World Bank databases
show that Pakistan’s external debt service-to-export ratio deteriorated from 10
per cent in 2006 to 15pc by 2010 but improved to 9pc in 2011. However, it was
worse (26-40pc) in certain years under Musharraf, Sharif and Zia!
The Pakistan Economic Survey shows that the public debt-public revenue
ratio deteriorated from 404pc in 2008 to 474pc in 2011 before improving to
419pc. It once touched 589pc under Musharraf!
Would the 2008-2013 performance still be the poorest, and that too poor
enough to justify extra-constitutionalism, once the impact of these factors is
removed? This determination requires rigorous econometric analysis which
unfortunately is unavailable. Off-hand, the latter outcome is extremely
unlikely.
Critics claim that this was Pakistan’s most corrupt government by spuriously
highlighting Pakistan’s post-2008 deterioration on Transparency’s corruption
perception index rankings. However, Pakistan’s rankings could deteriorate
even because of decreased corruption perceptions in other countries.
Pakistan’s corruption trends can only be gauged through its own absolute
scores over time on this index, which journalists rarely report. Pakistan’s
scores have fluctuated between 2.1 and 2.6 (out of 10) since 1999.
The worst score within this narrow band occurred under Musharraf. Media
reports about astronomical corruption increased after 2008, though without
court convictions, they must be treated with caution. Transparency reports
Rs18 trillion of post-2008 corruption, media headlines scream. However,
reading further, one discovers questionable inclusions, which represent weak
economic performance rather than corruption.
Despite inheriting these issues, it could have resolved them instead of making
some of them worse eg, by initiating poor-friendly taxation given the
persistent stagflation; holding early, credible elections in Balochistan; and
tackling militants forcefully. However, this comparison with non-democratic
eras is legitimate when comparing the virtues of democracy with non-
democratic alternatives.
Ironically, these previous eras include the 30 years of three dictators who
promised “genuine” democracy. The credit for this advancement goes to all
major parties in proportion to their parliamentary strength.
Coming from those who suffered grievously during 2008-2013, e.g., the
bottom 25pc or the Hazaras, such dismissal makes sense. Coming from the
majority which escaped acute suffering, especially those who boast endlessly
of having longer-term perspectives than illiterates, it reflects shocking short-
sightedness.
Such advancement only will eventually produce the good governance that can
resolve immediate issues effectively.
Tax-to-GDP ratio: When the PPP came in power in 2008, the tax-to-
GDP ratio was 10 per cent and the plan was to increase it by one per
cent each year so that by 2013 it would be a healthy 15 per cent. At
present, the ratio is less than nine per cent, which would rank Pakistan
among the worst in the world. This helps explain why the present
government has been unable to deliver in terms of investment in social
sectors and infrastructure projects. There is no rocket science here —
you either increase the revenue side or reduce the non-development
expenditure or ideally a combination of both.
Budget deficit: Last fiscal year, the budget deficit was at an all-time high
of approximately seven per cent but even more alarming is the forecast
for the present fiscal year, which is expected to see a budget deficit in
the range of eight to nine per cent. What does that mean for the
economy? In terms of actual rupees, it means a deficit of more than two
trillion, which will largely be filled in through borrowing from the
central and commercial banks. It has adverse effects too. This will
crowd out the private sector simply because the commercial banks
would not have much to offer to the private sector and in any case, it is
much easier to lend to the government without taking any risk.
Investment-to-GDP ratio: In 2008, this was 23 per cent, which has now
come down to 12.5 per cent — the worst for more than 30 years. A 10
per cent drop in this ratio simply means approximately 20 billion
dollars in terms of lost investment.
The numbers speak for themselves. All other indicators are also negative.
Public debt has more than doubled in the last four years. State
institutions such as Pepco, PIA, the Railways and the Pakistan Steel are
all making huge losses (around Rs400 billion every year). Pakistan is
facing the worst energy crisis in its history and no improvement is
evident. The privatisation process is almost at a standstill.
The economic situation is grim, to say the least and there is a general
perception that the situation is unlikely to improve, since no structural
reforms are planned and in any case, it is too late to initiate any such
reforms.
With such a miserable economic performance, any chance of the PPP being
returned to power in the next election looks almost impossible.