VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she

subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits,
1ST CASE 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective
November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute
and disprove these findings. 2
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay
vs. her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of
SALAZAR, respondents. P50,000.00. 3

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent. reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2)
years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
ROMERO, J.:
respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years'
backwages.
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with
Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems
analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close. The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in
conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and
decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment
Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning
and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing,
unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to
prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that
the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does,
Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial
not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was
Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering
asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection
Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report
of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or
also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit
misfeasance committed by the employee.5
for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to
defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner
GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.1 Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to
due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private
respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar
ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly
violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving
company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of
her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to
inform her employer. But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that
her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the
9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property
submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the
compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was
unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution
has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights
to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of
several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not
surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights
designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern
in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and
Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role
and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and
a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
provided by law.10(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article
an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State
may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor
which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent
of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and
afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded
them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they are
organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision
and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not
just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the
special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity of
emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to
be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has
assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence
labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been
translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or
unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other
hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find,
application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even
went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that
amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full
protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much
less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only
to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and
payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status
before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore
to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the
latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has
not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside
looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years
of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to
the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that
it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would
be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any
prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on
that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages
and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. .
. ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature
is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there
may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should
be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position
where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to
adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles:
where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust
and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension
office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position
to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial
establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary
purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's
right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from
the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with
his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst
is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if
reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and employee.
Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR
points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving
themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of
Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed
to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance
did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very
far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties
revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing
basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval
and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of
trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be
convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions
and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together
in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be
with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was
probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion
derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay and (b) its Resolution dated February 22, 1993,
inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged which denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.
thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said
report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang
Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for purposes of succession.
evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first, second and third
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had districts of the Province of Albay were elected and proclaimed as members of the
already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:
opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided.
Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged
culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view of his
prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as FIRST DISTRICT
well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to
have been unlawfully dismissed. Name No. of Votes Garnered

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations 1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is 2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages 3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes
equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.

SECOND DISTRICT
This decision is immediately executory.

1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes

SO ORDERED. 2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes
2ND CASE
THIRD DISTRICT
G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes
JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner, 2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
vs. 3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES CALISIN, respondents. 4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes

Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.

(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-
Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the
governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana's position as
vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post
QUIASON, J.: being contested by petitioner and private respondent.

This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian
to section 2, Article IX of the Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated January 22, 1993, which certified 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second
respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang ranking member. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes
obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a
the district. permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-
governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian
Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department of member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
Interior and Local Government designated private respondent as acting Vice-Governor ranking Sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-
of the province. governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
Sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution which was
denied on February 22, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, this petition.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in
the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues election. (Emphasis ours)
that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually
voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the
number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three Sanggunian
registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning members:
candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner
would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member. ——————————————————————————————
NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
Petitioner gives the following illustration: of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
Candidates
——————————————————————————————
1. for private respondent. ALBAY

107,216 (actually voted) CALISIN,

—————————— x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40% JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
129,793 (registered voters)
VICTORIA,
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30) JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd

2. for petitioner MARCELLANA

JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
121,423 (actually voted) ——————————————————————————————
—————————— x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84% (Rollo, p. 14)
154,665 (registered voters)
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of
(Rollo, p. 9). the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of
registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to
We are not persuaded. merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).

The Local Government provides:

In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 206 SCRA 710 (1992), we held that:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
 . . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, The Facts
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the
verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech mayoralty race of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local
is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words elections. In the poll’s conclusion, Garcia was proclaimed winner for having garnered
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or 31,138 votes as against Payumo’s 13,292. The Office of the Election of Dinalupihan
will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The then released to Payumo a certified copy of the printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of proclamation
used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of of the winning mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed COCP reflected the
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est signatures and thumbprints of the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no (MBOC).3
departure. . .
On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest4 with the Regional Trial Court,
Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan (RTC), docketed as Election Protest No. DH-001-13, citing
which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the the alleged prevalence of fraud and irregularities in all the clustered precincts of
legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law. Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines’
unreliability, casting doubt on the results of the counting and canvassing of
Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the votes.5 Anent the timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013,
COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1993. the proclamation date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until
May 25, 2013, within which to challenge the election results. He added that since May
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. 25, 2913 falls on a Saturday, he filed his protest on the immediately succeeding working
day, Monday, May 27, 2013.6
SO ORDERED.
In answer,7 Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the dismissal
of Payumo’s protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed mayor on May 14, not May
3RD CASE 15, 2013, as indicated in the manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
(manual COCP)8 issued by Dinalupihan’s MBOC. She, thus, argued that the election
G.R. No. 216691 July 21, 2015 protest was filed beyond the mandatory ten-day (10-day) reglementary period for filing
an election protest, which, as she claimed in this case, lasted only until May 24, 2013,
MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, Petitioner, a Friday. On the ground of belated filing, Garcia urged the RTC to dismiss the election
vs. protest outright.9
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO
III, Respondents. On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary determination of the
affirmative defense of prescription. Members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan took the
DECISION witness stand and testified that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 at around
5:00PM.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Nature of the Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in conjunction with Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, praying for the annulment of the September 10, 2014 1 and January 29,
20152 Resolutions of public respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), acting
through its First Division and En Banc, respectively, in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014.
The assailed rulings reinstated the election protest of private respondent Jose
Alejandre Payumo III (Payumo) and effectively reversed the trial court’s ruling that it
was filed out of time.
Giving credence to petitioner’s assertion, the RTC, through its Order 10 dated February
18, 2014, dismissed Payumo’s protest for being barred by the statue of limitations. The
fallo of the Order reads.11
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by protestant Jose Alejandre
P. Payumo III on May 27, 2013 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed one day
beyond the non-extendible period provided under Rule 2, Section 7, in relation to Rule
2, Section 12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.
SO ORDERED.
In disposing the case, the trial court cited and relied on the individual declarations of
the Chairman and the two members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, as well as
on the manual COCP, as sufficient proof that Garcia’s proclamation took place on May
14, 2013.12
Undaunted, Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec, docketed as EAC (EAL)
No. 11-2014, alleging that he cannot be faulted for relying on the May 15, 2013 date
indicated in the printed COCP since it was the official Comelec document signed by all
the members of Dinalupihan’s MBOC; that the manual COCP was only received by
Garcia, and no one else; and that he had no representative when Garcia was allegedly
proclaimed the winner.
Rulings of the COMELEC
The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted Payumo’s
appeal thusly:13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated
February 17, 2014 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial
Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 5 is hereby ordered to proceed with the adjudication
of RTC-EP Case No. DH-001-13 and resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Ratiocinating in the following wise:14
Evidently, appellant could not be faulted for not relying on the COCP dated May 15,
2013 because that was the only document officially furnished him. He was unaware of
the alleged Manual COCP dated May 14, 2013. The election officer himself admitted to
the trial court that he could not remember if he had posted a copy of the May 14, 2013
Manual COCP on the bulletin board of the Sangguniang Bayan as required by Comelec
Resolution No. 9648. Neither did he furnish a copy thereof to the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Treasurer.
Additionally, the Comele First Division relied on the case of Federico v.
Comelec15 (Federico) and held that the 10-day reglementary period ought to be
reckoned from the time a party became in good faith of the issuance of the COCP,
which in this case, according to public respondent, is May 15, 2013, as indicated in the
printed COCP Payumo received.16
On reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, by its assailed Resolution dated January
29, 2015, affirmed the holding of the First Division and disposed Garcia’s motion in the
following wise.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Ban RESOLVES to DENY
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Protestee-Appellee Maria Angela S. Garcia for
failing to show any reversible error on the part of the First Division UPHOLD its
Resolution dated 10 September 2014 granting Protestant-Appellant Payumo’s Appeal.
SO ORDERED.
As held by the En Banc:
It would be tantamount to injustice should the 10-day period to file the Election Protest
in this case be reckoned or counted from May 14, 2013, the date indicated in the Manual
COCVP as Protestee-Appelle Garcia’s proclamation as winner since its copy was not
even furnished to Protestant-Appellant Payumo. Clearly, Protestant-Appellant
Payumo’s only source of information as to the date of the proclamation of Protestess-
Appelle Garcia was the printed COCVP. It indicated 15 May 2013 as the date of
Protestee-Appellee Garcia’s proclamation as winner. Thus, his reliance on 15 May
2013, as the reckoning date of the 10-day period to file his Election Protest was in good
faith.18
Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
Succinctly put, the issue in extant case boils down to whether or not Payumo’s election
protest was filed out of time. On the main, Garcia contends that the reckoning date of
the 10-day reglementary period is from the actual date of proclamation, which is May
14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013,
and assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia insists the
proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the
printed COCP he received.
Respondent Comelec’s Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that
Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2015 because the printed COCP, which was
furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec likewise alleged that Garcia failed to
establish that Payumo had a representative present at the exact moment Garcia was
proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not have known that
Garcia was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.
Garcia’s Proclamation Date
Pivotal in resolving whether or not Payumo’s election protest is barred by the statute of
limitations is ascertaining when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia as the winning mayoralty
candidate. The significance of verifying this proclamation date is underscored by Rule
2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec. 7 of the same rule, A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC,19 otherwise
known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving
Elective Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently state:
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contest. – the court shall summarily dismiss,
motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of
the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section
10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
(d) The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or
petition for quo warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid
within five (5) days from the filling of the protest.
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or
petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
counted from the date of proclamation.
Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period
deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither
be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked.
The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of
which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.20
Aware of the repercussions that befall an election protest belatedly filed, the private
parties herein advance two conflicting dates whence the reglementary period should
reckon. But between the two proposed reckoning date, May 14, 2013, as claimed by
petitioner, appears to be the correct date of proclamation.
As can be recalled, the RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion hearing to determine
the timeliness of the election protest. Records reveal that during the said proceeding,
the members of the MBOC testified in the following manner: 21
Court:
Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal Treasurer Lani
Penaflor. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of the Motion to Resolve Affirmative
Defense on the ground that the protest was filed out of time will be resolved base on
the answers that you will give this afternoon. So, the first question of the Court is that,
when did you officially proclaim the winning candidate, the protestee, Maria Angela S.
Garcia? You give your answers one by one. So, for Election Officer Mr. Miguel, what is
your answer?
Leonilo Miguel:
Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.
Court:
What time?
Leonilo Miguel:
At almost 5:00 o’clock, sir.
Court:
So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor, as part of the
members of the [MBOC] of Dinalupihan, when did you officially proclaim Maria Angela
Garcia as the winning mayor of Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Lani Penaflor:
Can I give my statement, sir?
Court:
Please give up (sic).
Lani Penaflor:
I, Lani Penaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that our functions
based on general instructions and minutes on the consolidation, canvass and
transmission of votes cannot proceed on the second step due to the problem occurred
on the memory card of precinct No. 15 of Brgy. Bangal, we resulted to only 98.75% of
votes canvass as of May 14, 2013. Due to this situation, the legal counsel of candidate
Herminia Roman and Renato Matawaran cited Resolution 9700 and used it as basis to
proclaim the winner since votes cast on precinct no. 15, Brgy, Bangal, will not affect the
result and raking of local candidates. The members who waited for the instructions of
Atty. Rafael Olano, Regional Election Director who will proceed to the process of
Resolution 9700 and request threshold that this group canvass to be used for the
preparation of Manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the winning
candidate. I do also certify the I signed last May 14, 2013 the Manual Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of the winning candidates pursuant to Comelec Resolution
No. 9700. On May 15, 2013 the password has been received and the CCS will then
proceed to the second step of the general instruction and steps presented on the CCS
laptop. Afterwhich the CCS then automatically proceed on the generation and printing
of CEF No. 29, COCP and other documents related thereto. I again certify that last May
15, 2013, signed the generated reports by the CCS, one of which is CEF No. 29,
Certificate of Cancass and Proclamation of winning candidates in compliance with the
general instruction. Then we proceed on electronically transmitting the result after
signing all the documents as prescribed by the GI and generated by the CCS. I
assumed that our Election Officer strictly follows the rule on the investigation of
Comelec election forms and reports set forth by the Commission on Elections. Thank
you.
Court:
Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the [MBOC],
Dinalupihan, Bataan, when did you proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor
for Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Socorro Sacdalan:
We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May 14, 2013. Sir.
Court:
What time, if you recall?
Socorro Sacdalan:
At around 5:oo o’clock p.m., sir.
As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of
the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears
on the printed COCP.
What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Penaflor (Penaflor), vice-
chairperson of the MBOC, conveys an explanation for the discrepancy between the
dates appearing on the manual and printed COCP’s- that on May 14, 2013, at around
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Garcia was proclaimed the winner after 98.75% of votes
were already canvassed; that the proclamation was done in light of the fact that the
number of voters in the unaccounted clustered precinct could no longer affect the result
of the recently concluded polls; that the lowering of the threshold was approved by the
Regional Election Director; and that the manual COCP was prepared reflecting the
result of the elections.
The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Penaflor, is consistent with
Comelec Resolution No. 9700,22wherein the Commission resolved, among others, that:
1. The Municipal, City. Provincial, District, and Regional Boards of Canvassers
shall proclaim the winning candidates on the basis of the last "Group Canvass
Report" generated by the CCS. By manually preparing a Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates. supported by a copy of
the last generated "Grouped Canvass Report", even if not all results are
received by their respective CCS: Provided, That, the standing of the
candidates will not be affected by the results not yet transmitted to, and
received by, the CCS, without prejudice to the ranking of the winning
candidates. For this purpose, attached as Annex "A" is the format of the
Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation to be manually prepared by the
boards of canvassers;
2. The Regional Election Directors are approve requests of boards of
canvassers in their respective regions to lower the canvassing threshold to
enable said boards to generate the certificate of canvass for transmission to
the next level of canvassing, For this purpose, the National Support Center
shall provide all Regional Election Directors with the "ADMIN USERNAME"
and corresponding "PASSWORD" needed to lower canvassing threshold, and
the appropriate instructions on how to set the lowered coming from the said
board.
Apparently, contrary to Payumo’s assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec
document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered, In fact, clear from the
language of the Resolution is that the winners, in such instances, are proclaimed "by
manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate,"
the format for which is appended to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. It is incorrect to
state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for ascertaining the date
of Garcia’s proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP which contains the
true and exact date of Garcia’s proclamation – May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP.
Payumo’s reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be
sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes
necessary only for purposes of transmitting the results to the next level canvassing,
and not for proclaiming the winning candidates, insofar as local government units
whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP,
in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the
date the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC claimed,
the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified.23 And as justified by the
MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day
after the actual proclamation, because that was only when they were able to retrieve
from the Regional Election Director the username and password for generation the
document, denominated as CEF 29.24
As aptly concluded by the RTC.25
The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the proclamation of
protestee [herein private respondent] was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the
issuance of the manual certificate of canvass and proclamation on the same date, is
sufficient proof that protestee’s proclamation was in fact done on May 14, 2013 and not
on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of canvass and proclamation already on May
15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the proclamation already been done on May 14,
2013, but only to comply with the "official format" of the COMELEC, according to
Municipal Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had
already been accomplished with the manually written document.
Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on
May 14, 2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo’s election protest, dated May 27,
2013, was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period and ought to be dismissed
outright.
The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case
Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed
nullified the proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of
Santo Tomas, Batangas even though private respondent Osmundo Maligaya
(Maligaya) filed the election protest more than ten (10) days after such fact. There, the
Court reckoned the 10-ady prescriptive period not from the date of proclamation but
from the date of proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of the event,
rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in Federico that
Payumo adamantly urges that We apply.
The argument is specious.
Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC provides:
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or
petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
counted from the date of proclamation.
The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. – A sworn petition contesting the
election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.
As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day
period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of
notice. As the elementary rule in statutory construction goes, when the words and
phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is
says.26 This is known as the plain-meaning or verbal egis rule, expressed in the Latin
maxim "verba legis non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there should
be no departure."27 Since the afore-quoted provision, as couched, us clear and free
from ambiguity, its literal meaning must be applied without attempted interpretation. 28
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to
deduce – every candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be
vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes and would, therefore, enlist the aid of
volunteer pool watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or document
possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at or, at the
very least, would send representatives to the to the canvassing areas to ensure the
proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are
electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact
moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned.
True, Federico appears to have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251 of the Omnibus
Election Code but that is only due to the peculiarities of the said case. It must be
stressed that Our ruling in Federico was based on considerations not in all fours with
the case at bar.
Recapitulating Federico, the MBOC of Santo Tomas, Bantangas, on May 11, 2010,
printed a COCP showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." (Edna) as the winning mayoralty
Candidate. The prompted Maligaya to file a Petition to Annul Proclamation against
Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010. However, the petition was later withdrawn, as agreed
upon by the parties, leading to the case’s dismissal. Unknown to Maligaya, a second
print-out of the COCP was then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same date "May 11,
2010," crediting the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico after the latter
allegedly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate. Federico, through the second print-
out, was then declared the winning mayoralty candidate. Claiming that Maligaya only
found out this fact on May 27, 2010, he filed an election protest against Federico on
June 1, 2010.
Affirming the Comelec’s ruling that the election protest against Federico was timely
filed, the Court ratiocinated thusly:29
It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the
issuance of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this
regard, the Court believes that the actions taken by Maligaya after the elections and
the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly indicate that he was telling
the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file a petition questioning
the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of
Federico. The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:
5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it
was Edna Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged
proclamation of respondent Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another
petition on June 1, 2010, this time against Federico, to annul his proclamation. The
June 1, 2010 petition was filed within ten days from the knowledge of the alleged
proclamation of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya
believed in good faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did
not initially know that there was a COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is
also a proof that petitioner did not dilly daily in protecting his rights. There simply is no
reason and it runs counter to human conduct for Maligaya to file a petition for annulment
of proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico who was
proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that Court:
the proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made
surreptitiously.1âwphi1 Had Maligaya known of the proclamation of Federico, he Question from the Court. Which exact place you said you proclaimed Maria Angela
should have outrightly filed the petition for annulment of proclamation against Federico. Garcia at 5:00p.m. on May 14?
But because it was made without any notice to the herein private respondent, he only
knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June 1, 2010. Private respondent did
not certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed Leonilo Miguel:
period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown above, the COCVP
of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En Banc did not At the session hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the interest of herein private respondent
Maligaya. Court:

To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that petitioner Federico therein So, Atty. Pomer, do you have any other questions?
could not have validly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas,
Batangas, and that as a non-candidate in the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be
declared and proclaimed the winner. Thus, the nullity of the substitution consequently Atty. Pomer:
led to the nullity of the proclamation.30 Here lies the difference.
Yes, Your Honor. Were there other winning candidates that you proclaimed on that
More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two occasion aside from the protestee?
different proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was
surreptitiously made were essential in Our ruling therein. This is in stark contrast with Leonilo Miguel:
the case at bench where there was only one proclamation, which was, by no means,
clandestinely made. Here, there is no dispute that there was only one mayoralty
Yes, sir. We proclaimed the vice-mayor and the eight (8) councilors.
candidate proclaimed winner. Thus, the only issues pertain to when such proclamation
was done, and which document accurately reported the same. In addition, there was
no allegation whatsoever of a surreptitious proclamation for Garcia’s proclamation was, Court:
in fact, publicly announced. As culled from the records, the members of the MBOC
testified that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 in a well-attended ceremony.31 Same, May 14, 5:00 o’clock?

Atty. Pomer: Leonilo Miguel:

When you said you raised the hand of the winning candidate, protestee, Maria Angela Yes, sir.
Garcia, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 14, 2013, were there persons present?
Atty. Pomer:
Leonilo Miguel:
So, the proclamation tool placed (sic) in the session hall. Was that in the same place
Yes, sir/ the canvassing took placed (sic)?

Atty. Pomer: Leonilo Miguel:

Would you know if among those who were present there was a representative from the Yes, sir.
protestant, Payumo?
Atty. Pomer:
Socorro Sacdalan:
And that during the canvassing, there were watchers and lawyers of the candidates
I am not aware if there are representatives of the protestant because there were many present, is it not?
persons, people inside the center.
Leonilo Miguel:
Yes, sir.
Indeed, there is a substantial distinction between the extant case and Federico which,
in the latter, prevented Maligaya, through no fault of his own, from filing an election
protest within the period prescribed.
Petitioner Payumo cannot be deemed to have acted in good faith
Further constrasting the case at bar with Federico, herein petitioner Payumo’s claim of
good faith in relyin on the printed COCP fails to persuade.
"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no techinal meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.
It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry.32
Here, knowledge of Garcia’s May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo since
he was represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili) during the canvassing
proceeding, as per the minutes prepared by the MBOC. 33Hornbook doctrine is that
notice to the agent is notice to the principal.34 And as appearing in the minutes, several
representatives were fielded by the Liberal Party, the political banner under which
Payumo filed his candidacy, to monitor the results real-time.35
May 13-14, 2013
1. Atty. Mary Kristine Reyes Chu NUP/Ma. Angela Garcia – Albert Garcia
2. Atty. Lowell John J. Fetizanan Nationalist Peoples Coalition Party
3. Atty. Norby Caparas Herminia B. Roman
4. Atty. Honey Lynco Liberal Party
5. Fernando P. Manalili Liberal Party (Jojo Payumo)
6. Ramon Alfonso T. Munez Liberal Party
7. Bohjee Bobby A. Yap Liberal Party
8. Bro. Roy Quiambao PPCRV
9. Reymond Fontailla Paralegal
10. Janette Oftana Watcher
11. Harold Cacacho Watcher
12. Carlos Caringal Lawyer
Noteworthy is that apart from Manilili, Payumo had other representatives present during
the canvassing on May 13-14, 2013. Thus, even if we entertain Payumo’s postulation
that Manilili did not stay long enough to witness the canvassing proceedings from start
to finish, and that he was allegedly not present at least during Garcia’s proclamation,
we, nevertheless, still cannot give credence to petitioner’s claim of good faith. Payumo
cannot plausibly feign ignorance of Garcia’s proclamation since knowledge of such fact
is attributable to him not only through Manalili, but also through the other party
representatives. Consequently, Payumo is then barred from otherwise claiming that
Garcia was proclaimed mayor on May 14, 2013.
Moreover, the fact that Payumo only received a copy of the printed, and not the manual
COCP, is of no moment. For as the losing candidate, he is not, under the Comelec
rules, even entitled to be furnished a copy of the COCP. Section 30 of Comelec
Resolution No. 964836 provides that insofar as the electoral candidates are concerned,
only the winners are entitled to a copy of the COCP, viz:
Sec. 30. Distribution of COCP and SOVs. – The Board shall generate and print
sufficient copies of the COCP and one (1) copy of the SOV to be distributed as follows:
a. MBOC/CBOC
1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) of the
commission;
2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall, supported by
SOVP;
3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC;
4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod;
5. To the Municipal Treasurer;
6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor; Winning Candidate for Vice- Mayor; and
7. To each winning Candidate for members of the Sangguniang
Bayan/Panlungsod.
The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its literal
interpretation is that only the winning candidates have the demandable right to be
furnished a copy of the COCP. Second, it amplifies the general rule that the prescriptive
period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from notice
through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates are not even required to be
served a copy of the COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more
vigilant in monitoring the results of the elections for them to be conscious of the deadline
for filing an election protest, should they opt to contest the results.
In sum, the Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting
an election period should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from
the date of notice. Absent any circumstances analogous to the factual milieu of
Federico, a relaxation of the rules will not be warranted.
Finally, as regards the MBOC’s alleged disregard of the requirement under Comelec
Resolution No. 9648 to post copies of the COCP in the designated areas, and to serve
them to the other winning candidates, needless to say that they do not and could not
invalidate Garcia’s proclamation. Neither do they toll the 10-day period to file an election
protest in this case since Payumo is still deemed aware of the results by way of notice
to his agent or agents. Instead, these alleged omissions merely expose the members
of the MBOC to possible liability should it be proven that they deviated from procedure,
which issue is not yet ripe for Us to decide.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
September 10, 2014 and January 29, 2015 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the February 17, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan,
dismissing Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo III’s election protest for being barred by
the statute of limitations is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________________________
RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA
4TH CASE
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City
who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as
Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in
view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the
recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition
for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted
the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay
recall election was without COMELEC approval.2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled
the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter
through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a
reply.3
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that
the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May
1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a
regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may
be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before
the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular
local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to
have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away,
or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted
in harmony with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth
but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election.
The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement
in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving
the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
5TH CASE
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF
LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF
CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE
OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF
QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF
LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG,
CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA,
CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY
OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF
BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY
OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF
LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG,
CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA,
CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY
OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE
OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU;
and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF
LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG,
CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA,
CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY
OF TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas 2 assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However,
the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws 10)
on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13 th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by
the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the
Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code
tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing
issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have
legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood
Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as
Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful
expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to
political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law
specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where
the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending
in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009.
Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No.
29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11 thCongress. This
Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved
Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their
respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common
provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income
requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates
from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009.
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11 th Congress. The
13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law
only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier
law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only
one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the
Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including
the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any
other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation
of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The
clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in
the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed
in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect
on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required
that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code
are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local
government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there
can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should
not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100
million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just
distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the
language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the
law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners.19 If the language
of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the
legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to
respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress
passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that
any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA
9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11 th Congress.
However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could
have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to
the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA
9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.
Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other
law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply
with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of
Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or
regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all without
discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law
or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the
11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the
11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11 th Congress
on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the
11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills
enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in
one Congress become functus officioupon adjournment of that Congress and must be
re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective
authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13 th Congress, the bills had to start
from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the
first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the
Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished
Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of
the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the
House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be
resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end
of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next
session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the
term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as
well as the deliberations during the 12 th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved
resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance.
They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an
exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such
exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause.
Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be
assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government
Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision
merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009."
This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or
guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11 th Congress that municipalities
with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income
requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection
clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities
had cityhood bills pending in the 11thCongress when RA 9009 was enacted. This
is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption
from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose
of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly
situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not
have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the
increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many
municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These
municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent
municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition
will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must
not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in
the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may
be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing
establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on
its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest
of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as
against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do
not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or
welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was
aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence
of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which
might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with
the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while
the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found
in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the
Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398,
9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
MENS LEGISLATORES
6TH CASE
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION
BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura
v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then
Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas
(Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there
is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over
the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would
not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the
donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by
their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving
sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon
to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage
applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia
Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made
while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court,
after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954
decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate
response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation
between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as
contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically
raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that
defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation
was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962,
noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by
their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix
Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a
Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel
of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by
defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect
immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife
between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and
done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died
intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned
out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made
between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and
Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They
became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed
of donation had been executed." 6

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8
speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the
then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the
Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there
is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent
to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party
over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1),
‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone
of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9 reconsidered its decision and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement,
any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers
of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law
which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be
attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a
reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of
Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los
tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the
complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the
rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question
recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
7TH CASE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez,
Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-
Appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition seeking to
adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth
Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz Vasquez. He claims that they are also his
children but without the benefit of marriage and he desires to adopt them to promote
their best interest and well-being. Since at the hearing of the
petition Petitioner acknowledged that they are his natural children, the Solicitor General
opposed the petition on the plea that he could not legally adopt them for the reason that
Article 338 of the new Civil Code which allows a natural child to be adopted by his
natural father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child.
At first the court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for reconsideration, the court
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage
was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the
Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and out of this
relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He
claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine
citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt
them in order that no one of his relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He
averred that he had no child with his former wife and acknowledged said minors as his
natural children.
Article 338 of the new Civil Code provides that a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother. The Solicitor General interprets this provision in the sense that
in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should
not mediate between them an acknowledgment of the status of natural child by the
father or mother as otherwise the adoption would be repugnant to Article 335 of the
same Code which denies adoption to one who has an acknowledged natural child. And
since Petitioner has expressly admitted in open court that the minors subject of this
proceeding are his natural children, he is therefore disqualified to adopt under the law.
We do not agree to this interpretation. Apparently, Article 338 above adverted to merely
refers to the adoption of a natural child and not to one who has already been
recognized, but there is nothing therein which would prohibit the adoption of an
acknowledged natural child even if the law does not expressly say so. The reason for
the silence of the law is obvious. That law evidently intends to allow adoption whether
the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to
unrecognized children, as contended, then the provision of Article 338 would be of no
useful purpose because such children could have been validly adopted even without it.
And we say so because a natural child not recognized has no right whatever 1 and
being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under Article
337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural child because,
his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot be made under the
general principles governing adoption (2 Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore need
of an express provision allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural child as an
exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated in the article we are considering.
The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new
Civil Code which provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot
adopt and considering that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his
children, he contends that he is disqualified from adopting them under that article. We
believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that article for
he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be adopted. A
cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the
adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it
does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has acknowledged them
as his natural children.
It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary
because there already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity
and filiation which is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through
legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural
child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great
advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status.
And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been
adopted precisely to encourage adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147
N. W. 378). Under this modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish
the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status.
It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as “a juridical act which creates between
two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation” (4 Valverde, 473).
The cases cited by the Solicitor General are not in point. 2 In said cases
the Petitioners had legitimate children of their own and so their petitions were denied.
They are indeed disqualified from adopting under the law. In the present case
however, Petitioner does not have any legitimate children and his main desire is to give
a legitimate status to his four natural children. This attitude, far from being opposed,
should be encouraged. This is in keeping with the modern trend of the law concerning
adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, supra).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
DURA LEX SED LEX
8TH CASE
G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General
Florencio Villamor for appellee.
PARAS, C. J.:
Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of
illegal possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following
information:
That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of
Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep and have his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester,
12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs having
obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and
ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the
appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953,
which reads as follows:1awphi1.net
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm,
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been
appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of
crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his
possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with
twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his
hazardous mission.
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time
all activities and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the
Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility
therein existing.lawphi1.net
It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides,
as shown at lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The
appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category
of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with
costs de officio. So ordered.
9TH CASE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and Appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor General F .R. Rosete and
Solicitor O. C . Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW; WHEN
A LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED. — The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; LICENSE REQUIREMENT; SECRET
AGENT NOT EXEMPT; CASE AT BAR. — As secret agent is not included in the
enumeration in Section 897 of the Revised Administrative Code of persons who are not
prohibited in Section 878, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4, from possessing "any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor,
or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition," appellant is not exempt from the
requirement of license.
3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. MACARANDANG OVERRULED. — Reliance of
the accused in the case at bar on People v. Macarandang, 106 Phil. 713, where a
secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a `peace officer’
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 897,"
is misplaced. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court to set aside the clear and
explicit mandate of a statutory provision.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is
whether or not the appointment to and the holding of the position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated
August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersigned accuses MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further
amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day
of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the
outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was
found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or
license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law
whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by
the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a
question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question
to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the documents so that he
could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the
accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned
in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila
without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the
correspondent authority?" The accused now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his
appointment ‘as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste, then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also
addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City
on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent; 3 a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of
Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the
above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a
secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and
the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.
The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision
must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be unlawful for
any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors,
or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered" when such firearms are
in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties." 6 ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is
not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 7 The
conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would
rely on People v. Macarandang, 8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on
the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put
him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is
not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was
held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
10TH CASE
G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year
and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus
Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela,
Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was
issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1)
mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect
that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the
said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special
agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of
his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was
found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of
and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case
underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused assigned
three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to
Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special
agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts
him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic
Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal
possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took
cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense charged because under
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in
all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense
charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than
one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment
and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over
Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than
six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such
imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But considering that the
offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is
penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or
more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic
Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction 2. ID — When such an allegation is made but not proven, the court is justified in
of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the dismissing the case without inquiring into the right of the defendant to retain the office.
same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed
as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed,
appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his
personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that
it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because
it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in
appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm
also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you
are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in
the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a
civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer'
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879."
The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on
August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession
of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero
is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st day of
December, 1903, in the town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, the plaintiff and the
defendant were candidates for the office of municipal president of the said town; that
as a result of the said election the plaintiff was elected to the said office by a majority
of 100 votes, and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant has usurped said office
and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the exercise
of said office. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illigalities alleged to
have been committed during the election. The prayer of the complaint is to the effect
that judgment be entered against the defendant, excluding him from the exercise of
such office and that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be
given possession thereof, and for such other and further relief as the facts in the case
would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.
The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various witnesses, all and
each of whom testified to facts which, if true, would more or less gravely affect the
legality of the election. Not a single witness, however, confirmed the allegations
contained in the complaint, to the effect that the plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100
votes at the said election, nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the
plaintiff that he, as a result of the said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to
the office of municipal president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.

In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before the defendant
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS had presented his, the court, on the latter’s motion, acquitted the defendant, imposing
the costs upon the plaintiff. The court based its action upon the following grounds: (1)
11TH CASE That the plaintiff could not maintain the action brought by him because he had failed to
establish his alleged right to the exercise of the office in question; and (2) that there
EN BANC was no necessity to inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the said office for the
reason that this question had already been determined by the provincial board after a
[G.R. No. 2122. September 13, 1905. ] consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to irregularities committed
during the last election held at Laoag for the office of municipal president and other
PEDRO T. ACOSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID FLOR, Defendant-Appellee. municipal officials, and for the further reason that the presumption is that a person
holding a public office was duly appointed of elected thereto.
W .A. Kincaid, for Appellant.
The plaintiff excepted to this ruling of the court, moved for a new trial, and thereafter
Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, for Appellee. brought the case to this court for review. An examination of the evidence of record
supports the finding of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff has failed to prove
SYLLABUS in any way, shape, or form that he was entitled to the office in question, as alleged by
him in his complaint. There is no dispute upon this question. The appellant, himself,
1. ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICER. — A private person can not maintain when the motion of the defendant to dismiss was argued, and from the decision of
an action for the removal of a public officer unless he alleges that he is entitled to the which he appealed to this court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right
same office. (Secs. 197 to 216, Code of Civil Procedure.) to the exercise of the office in question. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions.) And on page
52 of his brief, he also assumes that he had been unable to establish his alleged right
to the office in question.
The question that we have to decide, therefore, is whether, notwithstanding what has
already been said, and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show that
he had any right to the office of municipal president of Laoag, he can maintain an action
such as this for the purpose of excluding the defendant from the exercise of said office
on account of illegalities alleged to have been committed in the elections.
The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the
provisions of sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action
may be brought and the persons against whom they may be brought, goes on to
determine with careful distinction those who have the right to maintain such action.
Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any
province, when directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any
such action; and when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the two preceding sections can be established by proof, he must
commence such action."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a
province, may, at his own instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the
court in which the action is to be commenced, or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the
action upon the relation of and at the request of another person; but, if the action is
brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer bringing it
may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by
the party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before
commencing it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action,"
provides as follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held
and exercised by another, may bring an action therefor."cralaw virtua1aw library
If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action
for usurpation of public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on
a subject of such far-reaching importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for
this purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically
provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring such actions; and
it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned
in the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well- known rule of law
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred to three
sections only mention the Attorney- General, the provincial fiscal, and the individual
claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held and exercised by another. It is to be
inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not claim to have such a
right can not bring an action for usurpation of public office.
This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that when the
action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set fort the name
of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the
same. Why should this be required as an essential requisite if it were not necessary
that the individual bringing the action should claim the right to exercise the office in
question?
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial
fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring such action, and in but one case does the
law authorize an individual to bring such an action, to wit, when that person claims to
have the right to the exercise of the office unlawfully held and exercised by another.
Aside from this case an individual can not maintain such action. The law, in our opinion,
does not allow of any other construction. If an individual, whether or not he has the right
to the office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to maintain
such an action, it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently
superfluous. It would be a useless and redundant provision of the code.
As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action relating
to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and
at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no such right,
the action may be dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which it may
proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is destroyed as is the case here.
This is what actually happened in this case. After all of the evidence presented by the
plaintiff had been introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that he had failed
to establish in any way, shape, or form that he had any right to the office of municipal
president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint without foundation
for such allegation. Consequently the judge very properly acquitted the defendant of
the complaint.
The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into the right of
the defendant to the office in question and that no other question can be raised or
investigated until this point has been determined, and alleges that the question of the
right of the plaintiff to the said office does not arise until it has been determined that the
defendant is not entitled to the exercise of such office. In support of his contention he
relies upon the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for usurping an
office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled
thereto, with an averment of his right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully
in possession of the same; and judgment may be rendered upon the right of the
defendant, and also upon the right of the person so averred to be entitled, or only upon
the right of the defendant, as justice requires."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have
first passed upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff.
In our opinion this should be done at the same time and in the same judgment. It is
immaterial what method the court may follow in the statement and determination of the
questions in the rendition of his judgment because even though the court may pass
upon the right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant afterwards, or vice
versa, this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not fail to
state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all of this, of
course, presupposes that the action has been properly brought and duly prosecuted to
a judgment. This, at the same time, presupposes that the plaintiff had a right to maintain
his action upon the evidence submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute
a suit without a cause of action. Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively
proven that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential
conditions required by law in order to bring and maintain such action, his complaint
should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of the
defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office, unless
the action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the law.
It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right of the
defendant when the justice of the case so demands. This is true, but this only refers to
cases where the action is brought by the Attorney- General o* by the provincial fiscal,
as the case may be. In such cases it is not necessary that there be a person claiming
to be entitled to the office alleged to have been usurped, because although be no such
person, as in the case of a vacant office, for instance, the fiscal could and even should
bring such action against the person usurping the office in accordance with the
provisions of sections 200 and 199, respectively, as the case may be. The manner in
which judgment should be rendered according to section 202 perfectly meets the
various cases provided for in the three preceding sections; and it becomes the duty of
the court to pass upon the rights of the defendant only whenever it is not an essential
requisite for the due prosecution of the action that there be a person claiming to be
entitled to the office thus usurped, something which only happens where the Attorney-
General or the fiscal of any province brings the action against the usurper.
As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity of the
election of the defendant, for the reason, among others which it is not necessary to
state here, that the defendant has no right to maintain such an action as this.
The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After the expiration of
twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be
remanded to the court from whence it came for further proceedings in accordance with
the law. So ordered.
12TH CASE
G.R. No. 181517 July 6, 2015
GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
petitioners Green Star Express, Inc. and Fruto Sayson, Jr. brought before the Court,
assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 17, 2007 and
its Resolution2 dated January 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824. The CA nullified the
Resolution dated May 5, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, in Civil Case No. SPL-0969, and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
The following are the antecedents of the case:
On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (
URC) owned figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s
(Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus
driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina
Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68.
NURC denied any liability therefore and argued that the criminal case shall determine
the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without
prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the
R TC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one
who received the summons. On February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.
On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It
ruled that there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the
summons by NURC. The dispositive portion of said Resolution thus reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby
DENIED.3
Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the case to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari. On September 17, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC ruling,
hence:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions, dated May 5, 2004 and dated July 26, 2004, of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil Case No. SPL-0969, are hereby NULLIFIED
and a new one rendered granting Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, dated February 3,
2004. Private Respondents' Amended Complaint for Damages filed against Petitioner
Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation is accordingly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, Green Star and Sayson moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
The lone issue is whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting
the trial court with jurisdiction.
The petition is benefit of merit.
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic
private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be
said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.5
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was
received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio.1âwphi1 It argues that under Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of summons
upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like
NURC, summons may be served only through its officers.6 Thus:
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.7
This provision replaced the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
read:
Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.8
In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager,
a corporation’s assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary
of corporate executives, retained counsel, and officials who had control over the
operations of the corporation like the assistant general manager or the corporation’s
Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as
"agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service
of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized, 9 The rule now
likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead
of merely "secretary"; and "treasure" instead of "cashier." 10 It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned
provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person excludes all others, or expression unions est exclusion alterius. Service must,
therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in the rules.11 If the revision
committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language.12
Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January
22, 2004. Green star claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo.
The general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the
Sheriff’s Return.13 The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the
time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star
further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign
and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf.
However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of
NURC’s motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an
affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented
as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit
first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is
not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not
vadily acquire jurisdiction over NURC,14 although the corporation may have actually
received the summons.15 To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the
rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice. 16
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard
and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative
or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient
of due process. Corporations would be easily deprived of their right to present their
defense in a multi-million peso suit, if the Court would disregard the mandate of the
Rules on the service of summons.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 17, 2007 and Resolution dated January 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13TH CASE
G.R. No. 172087 March 15, 2011
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE
MARIO BUÑAG, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Public Respondent,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in behalf, or under the
authority of Respondent.Public and Private Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, dated
April 17, 2006, of petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), seeking the declaration of nullity of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9337 insofar as it amends Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, by excluding petitioner from exemption from corporate income tax for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner further seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue
Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law.
The undisputed facts follow.
PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A2 on January
1, 1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B3 (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-
A) was issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a
franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the gross revenue. 4 Thereafter, on June 2, 1978,
P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption. 5
To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR, P.D. No.
18696 was issued. Section 13 thereof reads as follows:
Sec. 13. Exemptions. — x x x
(1) Customs Duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. - All
importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships, barges,
aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia, including accessories or
related facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of the casinos, the proper and
efficient management and administration thereof and such other clubs,
recreation or amusement places to be established under and by virtue of this
Franchise shall be exempt from the payment of duties, taxes and other
imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or charges of any kind or nature.
Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by any
corporation having existing contractual arrangements with the Corporation, for
the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be used to service the operations
and requirements of the casino, shall likewise be totally exempt from the
payment of all customs duties, taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of
fees, levies, assessments or charges of any kind or nature, whether National
or Local.
(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges, or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this
Franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in
any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax of five
percent (5%)of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the Corporation from
its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly
to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies,
fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established, or
collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority.
(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from
the operations conducted under the franchise, specifically from the
payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of
charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of and extend to
corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies), or individual(s) with
whom the Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in
connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be
conducted under this Franchise and to those receiving compensation
or other remuneration from the Corporation as a result of essential
facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to
the Corporation or operator.
The fee or remuneration of foreign entertainers contracted by the Corporation
or operator in pursuance of this provision shall be free of any tax.
(3) Dividend Income. − Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,
in the event the Corporation should declare a cash dividend income
corresponding to the participation of the private sector shall, as an incentive
to the beneficiaries, be subject only to a final flat income rate of ten percent
(10%) of the regular income tax rates. The dividend income shall not in such
case be considered as part of the beneficiaries' taxable income; provided,
however, that such dividend income shall be totally exempted from income or
other form of taxes if invested within six (6) months from the date the dividend
income is received in the following:
(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate activity
that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the Corporation; or any
other corporation with whom the Corporation has any existing
arrangements in connection with or related to the operations of the
casino(s);
(b) Government bonds, securities, treasury notes, or government
debentures; or
(c) BOI-registered or export-oriented corporation(s).7
PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No. 1931, but it
was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in September
1984.
On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424,8 otherwise known as the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income
tax, except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation,
the Social Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The
provisions of existing special general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all
corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government,
except the Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security
System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are
imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity.9
With the enactment of R.A. No. 933710 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at
issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration
of GOCCs that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax, thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The
provisions of existing special general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all
corporations, agencies, or instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government,
except the Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security
System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), and the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable
income as are imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in
similar business, industry, or activity.
Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition11 assailing
the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in particular:
1) Section 4, which imposes a 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods
and properties; Section 5, which imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods;
and Section 6, which imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease
of properties, all contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%.
The said provisions were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive authority to fix
the rate of taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution on due
process, as well as of Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
section provides for the "no amendment rule" upon the last reading of a bill;
2) Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, or the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Section 28
(1), Article VI of the Constitution; and
3) other technical aspects of the passage of the law, questioning the manner
it was passed.
On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.12
On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16--
2005,13 specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT
imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as
amended by R.A. No. 9337. The said revenue regulation, in part, reads:
Sec. 4. 108-3. Definitions and Specific Rules on Selected Services. —
xxxx
(h) x x x
Gross Receipts of all other franchisees, other than those covered by Sec. 119 of the
Tax Code, regardless of how their franchisees may have been granted, shall be subject
to the 10% VAT imposed under Sec.108 of the Tax Code. This includes, among others,
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and its licensees or
franchisees.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
PAGCOR raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION [CLAUSE]
EMBODIED IN SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR
BEING REPUGNANT TO THE NON-IMPAIRMENT [CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN
SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT RR 16-2005, SECTION 4.108-3, PARAGRAPH (H) IS NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE BASIC LAW, RA 8424,
SECTION 108, INSOFAR AS THE SAID REGULATION IMPOSED VAT ON THE
SERVICES OF THE PETITIONER AS WELL AS PETITIONER’S LICENSEES OR
FRANCHISEES WHEN THE BASIC LAW, AS INTERPRETED BY APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, DOES NOT IMPOSE VAT ON PETITIONER OR ON
PETITIONER’S LICENSEES OR FRANCHISEES.14
The BIR, in its Comment15 dated December 29, 2006, counters:
I
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 AND SECTION 13 (2) OF P.D. 1869 ARE BOTH VALID
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF LAWS THAT SHOULD BE
HARMONIOUSLY CONSTRUED TOGETHER SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO ALL OF
THEIR PROVISIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
II
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1 AND SECTION
10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
BIR REVENUE REGULATIONS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL
UNTIL STRICKEN DOWN BY LAWFUL AUTHORITIES.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), by way of Manifestation In Lieu of
Comment,16 concurred with the arguments of the petitioner. It added that although the
State is free to select the subjects of taxation and that the inequity resulting from
singling out a particular class for taxation or exemption is not an infringement of the
constitutional limitation, a tax law must operate with the same force and effect to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in a similar situation. Furthermore, according to
the OSG, public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted RR
No. 16-2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D. No.
1869 in relation to R.A. No. 9337.
The main issue is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax
and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.
After a careful study of the positions presented by the parties, this Court finds the
petition partly meritorious.
Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it
has been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. Petitioner
argues that such omission is unconstitutional, as it is violative of its right to equal
protection of the laws under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,17 this Court expounded the meaning and scope of equal
protection, thus:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection
clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
xxxx
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification
is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without
violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.18
It is not contested that before the enactment of R.A. No. 9337, petitioner was one of
the five GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax as shown in R.A. No.
8424, Section 27 (c) of which, reads:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The
provisions of existing special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all
corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government,
except the Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security
System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are
imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity.19
A perusal of the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting of the
Committee on Ways on Means dated October 27, 1997 would show that the exemption
of PAGCOR from the payment of corporate income tax was due to the acquiescence
of the Committee on Ways on Means to the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from
such tax.20 The records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting reveal:
HON. R. DIAZ. The other thing, sir, is we --- I noticed we imposed a tax on lotto
winnings.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Wala na, tinanggal na namin yon.
HON. R. DIAZ. Tinanggal na ba natin yon?
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Oo.
HON. R. DIAZ. Because I was wondering whether we covered the tax on --- Whether
on a universal basis, we included a tax on cockfighting winnings.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. No, we removed the ---
HON. R. DIAZ. I . . . (inaudible) natin yong lotto?
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Pati PAGCOR tinanggal upon request.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER. Yeah, Philippine Insurance Commission.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Philippine Insurance --- Health, health ba. Yon ang request ng
Chairman, I will accept. (laughter) Pag-Pag-ibig yon, maliliit na sa tao yon.
HON. ROXAS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if in the revenue gainers if we factored in an
amount that would reflect the VAT and other sales taxes---
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. No, we’re talking of this measure only. We will not ---
(discontinued)
HON. ROXAS. No, no, no, no, from the --- arising from the exemption. Assuming that
when we release the money into the hands of the public, they will not use that to --- for
wallpaper. They will spend that eh, Mr. Chairman. So when they spend that---
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. There’s a VAT.
HON. ROXAS. There will be a VAT and there will be other sales taxes no. Is there a
quantification? Is there an approximation?
CHAIRMAN JAVIER. Not anything.
HON. ROXAS. So, in effect, we have sterilized that entire seven billion. In effect, it is
not circulating in the economy which is unrealistic.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE. It does, it does, because this is taken and spent by government,
somebody receives it in the form of wages and supplies and other services and other
goods. They are not being taken from the public and stored in a vault.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER. That 7.7 loss because of tax exemption. That will be extra income
for the taxpayers.
HON. ROXAS. Precisely, so they will be spending it.21
The discussion above bears out that under R.A. No. 8424, the exemption of PAGCOR
from paying corporate income tax was not based on a classification showing substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, but to reiterate, the exemption was granted
upon the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from the payment of corporate income
tax.
With the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 9337, amending R.A. No. 8424, PAGCOR
has been excluded from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from paying
corporate income tax. The records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated April
18, 2005, of the Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1950 and
House Bill No. 3555, show that it is the legislative intent that PAGCOR be subject to
the payment of corporate income tax, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). Yes, Osmeña, the proponent of the amendment.
SEN. OSMEÑA. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons why we're even considering
this VAT bill is we want to show the world who our creditors, that we are increasing
official revenues that go to the national budget. Unfortunately today, Pagcor is
unofficial.
Now, in 2003, I took a quick look this morning, Pagcor had a net income of 9.7 billion
after paying some small taxes that they are subjected to. Of the 9.7 billion, they claim
they remitted to national government seven billion. Pagkatapos, there are other specific
remittances like to the Philippine Sports Commission, etc., as mandated by various
laws, and then about 400 million to the President's Social Fund. But all in all, their net
profit today should be about 12 billion. That's why I am questioning this two
billion. Because while essentially they claim that the money goes to government,
and I will accept that just for the sake of argument. It does not pass through the
appropriation process. And I think that at least if we can capture 35 percent or 32
percent through the budgetary process, first, it is reflected in our official income
of government which is applied to the national budget, and secondly, it goes
through what is constitutionally mandated as Congress appropriating and
defining where the money is spent and not through a board of directors that has
absolutely no accountability.
REP. PUENTEBELLA. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Chairman, follow up lang.
There is wisdom in the comments of my good friend from Cebu, Senator Osmeña.
SEN. OSMEÑA. And Negros.
REP. PUENTEBELLA. And Negros at the same time ay Kasimanwa. But I would not
want to put my friends from the Department of Finance in a difficult position, but may
we know your comments on this knowing that as Senator Osmeña just mentioned, he
said, "I accept that that a lot of it is going to spending for basic services," you know,
going to most, I think, supposedly a lot or most of it should go to government spending,
social services and the like. What is your comment on this? This is going to affect a lot
of services on the government side.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Mr. Chair, Mr. Chair.
SEN. OSMEÑA. It goes from pocket to the other, Monico.
REP. PUENTEBELLA. I know that. But I wanted to ask them, Mr. Senator, because
you may have your own pre-judgment on this and I don't blame you. I don't blame you.
And I know you have your own research. But will this not affect a lot, the disbursements
on social services and other?
REP. LOCSIN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if I can add to that question also. Wouldn't
it be easier for you to explain to, say, foreign creditors, how do you explain to them that
if there is a fiscal gap some of our richest corporations has [been] spared [from] taxation
by the government which is one rich source of revenues. Now, why do you save, why
do you spare certain government corporations on that, like Pagcor? So, would it be
easier for you to make an argument if everything was exposed to taxation?
REP. TEVES. Mr. Chair, please.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Can we ask the DOF to respond to those before we
call Congressman Teves?
MR. PURISIMA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Yes, from definitely improving the collection, it will help us because it will then
enter as an official revenue although when dividends declare it also goes in as
other income. (sic)
xxxx
REP. TEVES. Mr. Chairman.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Congressman Teves.
REP. TEVES. Yeah. Pagcor is controlled under Section 27, that is on income tax.
Now, we are talking here on value-added tax. Do you mean to say we are going
to amend it from income tax to value-added tax, as far as Pagcor is concerned?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). No. We are just amending that section with
regard to the exemption from income tax of Pagcor.
xxxx
REP. NOGRALES. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Congressman Nograles.
REP. NOGRALES. Just a point of inquiry from the Chair. What exactly are the functions
of Pagcor that are VATable? What will we VAT in Pagcor?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). This is on own income tax. This is Pagcor income
tax.
REP. NOGRALES. No, that's why. Anong i-va-Vat natin sa kanya. Sale of what?
xxxx
REP. VILLAFUERTE. Mr. Chairman, my question is, what are we VATing Pagcor with,
is it the . . .
REP. NOGRALES. Mr. Chairman, this is a secret agreement or the way they craft their
contract, which basis?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). Congressman Nograles, the Senate version does
not discuss a VAT on Pagcor but it just takes away their exemption from non-
payment of income tax.22
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. 23 The burden of proof rests upon
the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so
claimed.24 As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the
claimant.25 Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported
by clear legal provision.26
In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of
corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section
27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the
exemption. The legislative intent, as shown by the discussions in the Bicameral
Conference Meeting, is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the
omission or removal of PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of corporate
income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 27 Thus, the express mention of the
GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax excludes all others. Not being
excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming within the purview of the
general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the maxim:
exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. 28
PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the
legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of
the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment
of corporate income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based
on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by
legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without
violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the
grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own
request to be exempted.
Petitioner further contends that Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 9337 is null and void ab
initio for violating the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Petitioner avers that
laws form part of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying
so. Petitioner states that the private parties/investors transacting with it considered the
tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement
for their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its
exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the
main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus,
the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution, only as to the removal of petitioner's exemption from the payment of corporate income
which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The tax, which was already addressed above by this Court.
non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant
parties.29 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract to Section 7 (k) thereof, which reads:
between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.30
Sec. 7. Section 109 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
As regards franchises, Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution 31
provides that no
franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so Section 109. Exempt Transactions. - (1) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (2)
requires.32 hereof, the following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

In Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna,33 the Court held that a franchise xxxx
partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.34 The pertinent portion of the case states: (k) Transactions which are exempt under international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory or under special laws, except Presidential Decree No. 529.37
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in
special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR’s charter, P.D. No.
carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly 1869, is a special law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes.
contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and
where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No.
agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government 9337, which retained Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424, thus:
bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the
government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without [R.A. No. 9337], SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code (R.A. No. 8424), as amended,
impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are is hereby further amended to read as follows:
not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes
the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the SEC. 108. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties. —
Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor
provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. — There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-
operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such
added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or
privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when
exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties: x x x
the common good so requires.35

xxxx
In this case, PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling
casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.,
basketball, football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial (B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate. — The following services
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. 36 Under Section 11, Article XII of the performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to zero percent
Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by (0%) rate;
Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the
provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by xxxx
withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect
any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
impairment clause of the Constitution.
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the
supply of such services to zero percent (0%) rate;
Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting
PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. Nowhere in R.A.
x x x x38
No. 9337 is it provided that petitioner can be subjected to VAT. R.A. No. 9337 is clear
As pointed out by petitioner, although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section
108 of R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did
not amend the portion of Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services
performed by VAT-registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under
special laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory
effectively subjects the supply of such services to 0% rate.
Petitioner's exemption from VAT under Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424 has been
thoroughly and extensively discussed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite
(Philippines) Hotel Corporation.39 Acesite was the owner and operator of the Holiday
Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. It leased a portion of the hotel’s premises to PAGCOR. It
incurred VAT amounting to ₱30,152,892.02 from its rental income and sale of food and
beverages to PAGCOR from January 1996 to April 1997. Acesite tried to shift the said
taxes to PAGCOR by incorporating it in the amount assessed to PAGCOR. However,
PAGCOR refused to pay the taxes because of its tax-exempt status. PAGCOR paid
only the amount due to Acesite minus VAT in the sum of ₱30,152,892.02. Acesite paid
VAT in the amount of ₱30,152,892.02 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, fearing
the legal consequences of its non-payment. In May 1998, Acesite sought the refund of
the amount it paid as VAT on the ground that its transaction with PAGCOR was subject
to zero rate as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity. The Court ruled that PAGCOR
and Acesite were both exempt from paying VAT, thus:
xxxx
PAGCOR is exempt from payment of indirect taxes
It is undisputed that P.D. 1869, the charter creating PAGCOR, grants the latter an
exemption from the payment of taxes. Section 13 of P.D. 1869 pertinently provides:
Sec. 13. Exemptions. —
x x x x
(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income
or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National
or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this Franchise from the Corporation;
nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation,
except a Franchise Tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenue or earnings derived
by the Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall be due and
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes,
levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or
collected by any municipal, provincial, or national government authority.
(b) Others: The exemptions herein granted for earnings derived from the operations
conducted under the franchise specifically from the payment of any tax, income or
otherwise, as well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of
and extend to corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom
the Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in connection with the
operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise and to
those receiving compensation or other remuneration from the Corporation or operator
as a result of essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to the
Corporation or operator.
Petitioner contends that the above tax exemption refers only to PAGCOR's direct tax
liability and not to indirect taxes, like the VAT.
We disagree.
A close scrutiny of the above provisos clearly gives PAGCOR a blanket exemption to
taxes with no distinction on whether the taxes are direct or indirect. We are one with
the CA ruling that PAGCOR is also exempt from indirect taxes, like VAT, as follows:
Under the above provision [Section 13 (2) (b) of P.D. 1869], the term "Corporation" or
operator refers to PAGCOR. Although the law does not specifically mention PAGCOR's
exemption from indirect taxes, PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt from such taxes
because the law exempts from taxes persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in
casino operations. Although, differently worded, the provision clearly exempts
PAGCOR from indirect taxes. In fact, it goes one step further by granting tax exempt
status to persons dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations. The unmistakable
conclusion is that PAGCOR is not liable for the P30, 152,892.02 VAT and neither is
Acesite as the latter is effectively subject to zero percent rate under Sec. 108 B (3),
R.A. 8424. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, by extending the exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR,
the legislature clearly granted exemption also from indirect taxes. It must be noted that
the indirect tax of VAT, as in the instant case, can be shifted or passed to the buyer,
transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services subject to VAT. Thus, by
extending the tax exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in
casino operations, it is exempting PAGCOR from being liable to indirect taxes.
The manner of charging VAT does not make PAGCOR liable to said tax.
It is true that VAT can either be incorporated in the value of the goods, properties, or
services sold or leased, in which case it is computed as 1/11 of such value, or charged
as an additional 10% to the value. Verily, the seller or lessor has the option to follow
either way in charging its clients and customer. In the instant case, Acesite followed the
latter method, that is, charging an additional 10% of the gross sales and rentals. Be
that as it may, the use of either method, and in particular, the first method, does not
denigrate the fact that PAGCOR is exempt from an indirect tax, like VAT.
VAT exemption extends to Acesite
Thus, while it was proper for PAGCOR not to pay the 10% VAT charged by Acesite,
the latter is not liable for the payment of it as it is exempt in this particular transaction
by operation of law to pay the indirect tax. Such exemption falls within the former
Section 102 (b) (3) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended (now Sec. 108 [b] [3] of R.A.
8424), which provides:
Section 102. Value-added tax on sale of services.- (a) Rate and base of tax - There 14TH CASE
shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross
receipts derived by any person engaged in the sale of services x x x; Provided, that the G.R. No. L-48468-69 November 22, 1989
following services performed in the Philippines by VAT registered persons shall be
subject to 0%.
xxxx ORLANDO PRIMERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the
supply of such services to zero (0%) rate (emphasis supplied). Luis R. Reyes for petitioner.

The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for in P.D. 1869 and the
extension of such exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino
operations are best elucidated from the 1987 case of Commissioner of Internal PARAS, J.:
Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc., where the absolute tax exemption of the
World Health Organization (WHO) upon an international agreement was upheld. We Before the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Orlando Primero was charged with
held in said case that the exemption of contractee WHO should be implemented to the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.
mean that the entity or person exempt is the contractor itself who constructed the
building owned by contractee WHO, and such does not violate the rule that tax
exemptions are personal because the manifest intention of the agreement is to exempt The complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:
the contractor so that no contractor's tax may be shifted to the contractee WHO. Thus,
the proviso in P.D. 1869, extending the exemption to entities or individuals dealing with That on or about 5:30 P.M., November 12,1975 in the municipality of
PAGCOR in casino operations, is clearly to proscribe any indirect tax, like VAT, that Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the abovenamed accused, did then and
may be shifted to PAGCOR.40 there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, while armed with a deadly
weapon (bayonet) and by means of force and intimidation and with
Although the basis of the exemption of PAGCOR and Acesite from VAT in the case of lewd designs committed lascivious acts upon the person of the
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel Corporation was undersigned complainant at Brgy. Pindangan 2nd, Camiling Tarlac
Section 102 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, which section was retained as by then and there embracing, touching and fondling the breast and
Section 108 (B) (3) in R.A. No. 8424,41 it is still applicable to this case, since the private parts of the undersigned against the complainants' will.
provision relied upon has been retained in R.A. No. 9337. 421avvphi1
CONTRARY TO LAW.
It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails, because the said rule Camiling Tarlac. (Decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo)
or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. 43 RR No. 16-
2005, therefore, cannot go beyond the provisions of R.A. No. 9337. Since PAGCOR is
While the Provincial Fiscal, filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Deadly
exempt from VAT under R.A. No. 9337, the BIR exceeded its authority in subjecting
Weapon, to wit:
PAGCOR to 10% VAT under RR No. 16-2005; hence, the said regulatory provision is
hereby nullified.
That on or about November 12, 1975, at about 5:30 in the afternoon,
at Barangay Pindangan 2nd, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9337,
of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding
Court, the said Orlando Primero did then and there Willfully,
petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of
unlawfully and feloniously carry outside of his residence a deadly
government-owned and controlled corporations exempted from corporate income tax
weapon, to wit: a bayonet, 19-1/2" long, which was not then being
is valid and constitutional, while BIR Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 insofar as it
used as a necessary tool or implement to earn a living or being used
subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the National
in connection therewith, but was used in the commission of the crime
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act No. 9337.
of Acts of Lasciviousness for which he was charged in Crim. Case
No. 1184 of this Honorable Court.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
Contrary to Law.
 Tarlac, Tarlac, February 19, 1976. (p. 29, Rollo)
The aforementioned offenses were jointly tried for having been committed on the same
occasion.
The evidence for the prosecution, as found by the respondent appellate Court is as
follows:
During the time material to this case Angelita Maycong was about 24
years old, single and a resident of Pindangan II, Camiling, Tarlac (p.
16, tsn., August 5,1976).
On or about November 12, 1975, on their way home from Tarlac
where they joined a parade (p. 30, tsn., August 30, 1976), Angelita
Maycong and one Elena Garcia saw Orlando Primero emerge
suddenly from the talahib along their path, brandishing a bayonet at
them (p. 17, tsn., August 5, 1976). Elena Garcia ran away (p. 6, tsn.,
August 30,1976). Angelita Maycong descended on the 'pilapil' to her
left side and also tried to run away (p. 18, tsn, August 5, 1976).
Unfortunately, Angelita stumbled, as a result of which, Orlando
grabbed her and pinned her down on the ground (Ibid), He held her
neck with his right hand and held her breasts with the left hand and
kissed her right cheek (pp. 19, 20, tsn., August 5,1976). Fighting
back, she kicked Orlando near his organ and struck him with left hand
(p. 20, Ibid.; p. 27, tsn., August 5,1976). In the struggle, Angelita was
able to get the bayonet (p. 2, Ibid).
In the meantime, Elena Garcia shouted for help (p. 20, tsn., August
5, 1976). Angelita also shouted for help (p. 20, Ibid).
Upon seeing the bayonet in the possession of Angelita, Orlando
Primero ran away (p. 23, tsn., August 5, 1976). Not long after, the
father of Angelita Maycong, who was then tending his farm from
where he heard the shouts for help, arrived (Ibid). Having teamed of
the attempt made on the honor of her daughter, father and daughter
reported the matter to the Barrio Captain (Ibid). The bayonet was
surrendered to the police force of Camiling, Tarlac. (pp. 3-5,
Solicitor's Brief) (Decision, p. 10, Rollo).
The defendant, in turn, claims that the filing of these two (2) criminal accusations was
motivated by revenge. He testified that he and the complainant were sweethearts who
were engaged to get married. He lived in the house of the complainant for three (3)
months where he was practically treated by the father of the complainant, Florentino
Maycong, as a son-in-law helping in the farm work and in the daily chores in the house.
However, the planned marriage did not take place because the complainant's family
wanted an ostentations ceremony which he (defendant) could not afford. As an
alternative, defendant suggested to complainant that they elope but the latter refused.
Subsequently, the defendant left the complainant and married another woman, a
decision which was allegedly resented by the complainant.
Furthermore, defendant raises the defense of alibi. It is argued that at the time the
incident was allegedly committed, he was in Paniqui, Tarlac harvesting palay with some
other farm laborers. He maintained that he worked there from 6 o'clock in the morning
to past 6 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 1975. The foregoing testimony of the
defendant was corroborated by Cipriano Sudaria and Teodoro Cayabyab.
After trial, the lower court convicted the defendant of the two (2) offenses charged in
the two (2) separate informations and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Orlando Primero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. I 1 84 of the offense of Acts of
Lasciviousness punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, he is hereby sentenced to a term of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional, medium period, and in Crim. Case
No. 1195 on the charge of Illegal Possession of a Deadly Weapon,
punishable under PD 9, he is further sentenced to a prison term of
TEN (10) YEARS which is the maximum term imposed by the law,
with cost.
The bayonet, Exh. A, is ordered confiscated and once this decision
becomes final, the same shall be forwarded to the 184th PC
Company, Paniqui, Tarlac for disposition according to law. (p. 12,
Rollo)
On appeal, the respondent Court rendered a decision, * the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, affirming the judgment of conviction in both offenses
but modifying the penalty imposed by the lower court, We hereby
sentence the defendant to the following:
1. As regards to the accusation of acts of lasciviousness the
defendant is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Six (6) Months of
Arrests Mayor to Four (4) Years of Prision Correccional; and
2. As regards the violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 the defendant
is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Five (5) Years as
minimum to Ten (10) Years as maximum. The bayonet, Exhibit A is
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. (pp. 1516, Rollo)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
The respondent Court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.
 II
The respondent Court failed to pass upon the contention that
bayonet is not one of the weapons the carrying of which outside one's
residence is punished under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9.
III
The respondent Court erred in its non-consideration of the defense
of alibi interposed by the defendant.
After a careful perusal of the entire record of this case, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the respondent Court.
With regard to the issue of credibility, We cannot acquiesce with the argument raised
by the petitioner that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, being close relatives,
(father and niece) of the complainant, should not be given weight and should be
considered biased and self-serving. Be it remembered that mere relations cannot
militate against the credibility of a witness. Neither could it distort the testimony due
from such witnesses. In point is the ruling in the case of People v. Libed reported in 14
SCRA 410:
The fact alone of relationship to the victim does not destroy a witness'
credibility. It is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the
deceased would callously violate their conscience ... by blaming it on
persons whom they know to be innocent thereof.
In this regard, it is relevant to restate herein that the trial court, which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to have the hallmarks of truth and credibility.
Thus, the trial court pertinently observed:
The Court is inclined to believe the claim of the complainant. Angelita
Maycong, her father Florentino Maycong, and her companion Elena
Garcia, appear to be credible witnesses. They impressed the Court
as being innocent farm folks, and while appearance may be
deceiving, their story is not incredible and was entirely believable,
Being an unmarried woman and in the prime of her maidenhood (she
was 25 years of age when she testified on August 5,1976), what
reason would Angelita have for unnecessarily exposing herself if
indeed the story of the accused violating her honor was not true. Her
story was corroborated in material aspects by the two other
witnesses, her companion Elena Garcia and her father Florentino
Maycong. (Decision, p. 12 Rollo)
Accordingly, it need not be emphasized that the trial court's finding that the testimonies
of the witnesses were reliable, being supported by evidence of record, should be given
credence. Thus, on matters of credibility the findings of the trial court are accorded the
highest respect (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166;
People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141; People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137; Guita v. CA,
139 SCRA 576).
Anent the second issue, We regret to say that the same is bereft of merit. It is worth
noting that the dispositive portion of the respondent Court's decision makes mention of
violation by the petitioner of P.D. No. 9 for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and wherein the
bayonet was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. It goes without saying that
the Court of Appeals would not have sustained the trial court's finding of petitioner's
guilt as to the charge of illegal possession of deadly weapon were it not convinced that
a bayonet is a "bladed, pointed or blunt weapon" decreed unlawful under P.D. No. 9.
It can not be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a statute
is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention
appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is only an auxiliary
rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application—neither is it conclusive.
It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not
otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose
of the legislature (Statutory Construction, Martin, sixth edition, 1984, pp. 71-72). Where
a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons
or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other ... things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriusshould not be invoked
(Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it cannot be convincingly argued
that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon, possession of which outside
of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be illegal. True enough, if the carrying
outside one's residence of such weapons as fan knife, "balisong" or club, which are
less deadly than the bayonet, are prohibited under the law, there is no logical reason
why the bayonet should be exempted from the prohibition.
Finally, as regards the defense of alibi, not only is it a weak defense but also it cannot
prevail over the positive Identification of the accused and by credible prosecution
witnesses (People v. Obenque, 147 SCRA 448; People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA 427;
People v. Canturia, 139 SCRA 280). Moreover, defendant failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the incident.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.