I.
Philippine Constitutional System The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents
Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30
Ponente: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
The Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines was approved on August 24, 1970 and
began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. On
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation
No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day,President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to
the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating
funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against
the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
“respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that
said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law
because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of
guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of
the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by
the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the
purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress “ and “there is no proper submission to the
people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15,
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from
deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be
held were known or announced officially.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in
Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying
that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably
not later than January 15, 1973.”
in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent
motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday
noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing “on
January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.”
While the case was being heard, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1102.
“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in
municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities.
The said Citizens Assemblies were established to broaden
the base of citizen participation in the democratic process
and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to
express their views on important national issues.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-
36142, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered
voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice
and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the
present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. Javellana
alleged that the President ordered “the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his
Cabinet, and that the latter are acting without or in excess
of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
Constitution. He construed that the President is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve
the proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and
that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution
was not a free election, hence null and void.
The Issue:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-
justiciable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance)
conformably to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution
acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification)
by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given
by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or
agreement by keeping quiet or by not making
objections.)
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in
force?

Decision and Ratio:
The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the
petition but when the crucial question of whether the
petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion,
together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the
1973 Constitution.
1. The Court held that the issue is political and
“beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
2. Court held that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one
way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters. However, it is conceded that
the doctrine stated in some American decisions to
the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court.”
3. On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to
DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their view that
“The effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question
posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are
relevant and unavoidable.
4. On the fifth question of whether the new
Constitution of 1973 is in force:
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the
Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “As to
whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the
light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and
intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’
Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein
were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
requirements thereof.
However, the fact that there was voting and that the
majority of the votes were for considering as approved
the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the
people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes
in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its
political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said
Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
ratified.”
Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11,
1970
RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443
September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar
Facts:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory
relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by
petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both
members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running
as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices
their rights as such candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed
Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a
Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional
amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on
the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance
with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969,
Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No.
2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
“shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among
the existing representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as
those required of members of the House of
Representatives,” 1 “and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Resolution.” 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body,
enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions
Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the
entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied
in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B.
Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec.
8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
Issue:
1. Whether the Congress has a right to call for
Constitutional Convention;
2. Whether the parameters set by such a call is
constitutional.
Decision:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional
Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore,
specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed
as constitutional.
Ratio:
– Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12
of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full
authority to propose amendments, or call for convention
for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained
by Resolution 2 and 4
– Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution
4 and is enough that the basis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales
is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and vice
versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of
delegates I other provinces with more population.
– Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to
qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety
mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling
elections and to allow them to devote more time to the
Constituional Convention.
– Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral
process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity
since candidates must now depend on their individual
merits, and not the support of political parties. This
provision does not create discrimination towards any
particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Fernando “ I find it difficult to reconcile the
decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political
parties and civic, professional and other organizations is
concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an individual
to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common
objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within
if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty
ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has
an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the
Malolos Constitution.
Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The
COMELEC then, upon its approval
1. set the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country,
2. caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and
3. instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also,
Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the
Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to
the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the
People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the
lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the
President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond
the power of people’s initiative. The respondents argued
that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the
COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of it.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to
call for People’s Initiative to amend the
constitution specifically to lift term limits of
elected officials.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can take
cognizance of the case
Decision:
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative.
Ratio:
Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a)
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law
where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard”
tests.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective
and cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with
respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should
be dismissed.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that “. . .
R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution.” It ought to be so for
this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law
which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and
Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled “An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local
Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact
Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any
Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative
Body.” Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505
5 expressly included people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution.
Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition
had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7
of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the
proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack
of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked
the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people’s initiative.
2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
Decision:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply
with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s
initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave
abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative
signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the
nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear
distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of
the constitution may propose only amendments to the
constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive
is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the
result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17
to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
vividly explain the meaning of an amendment “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition,”
LAWYER’S LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748,
May 22, 1986
Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption
of power by stating that the “new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate
Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted
to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated
below.
1. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972
withdrew the petitions and manifested that they
would pursue the question by extra-judicial
methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino
3. The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the
eleven members of this Court, as reorganized,
have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October
24, 1986
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no
respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution,
which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom
it refers, he then asks the Court “to declare and answer
the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said
Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to,
.…
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction
and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or
to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it
is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action.
Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and
provides for the extension of their term to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides
for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the
first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the
legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the
claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by
this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
tlie present government. All the eleven members of this
Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
(Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972
[People’s Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc.
vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990
[Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
De Leon vs Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J
Facts:
In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay
Captain along with the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On
February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov.
Benhamin B. Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as
new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with
the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing
the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the other
petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject
Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents
from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The
petitioners maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer
have the authority to replace them under the 1987
Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6)
years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982.
Issue:
Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?
Ruling:
The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay
Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and
the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining
respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of
petitioners’ position subject of this petition.
Ratio
The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on
the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that
time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus
superseding all previous constitution as provided in
Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it
is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable
to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no
question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of
the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are
fully applicable to the petition at bar
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS:
1 Abueva vs Wood, 2 US vs Bull
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY:
1 Marbury vs Madison, 2 Angara vs Electoral Commision, 3
Tanada vs Cuenco
ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924
JOHNSON, J
The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence
Commission. The creation of the commission was ratified
and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of
March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners are members of
the House of Representatives and four are members of the
Senate of the Philippine Islands and they all belong to the
democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel
Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued
as well are the Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and
the Secretary of the Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court
by the petitioners for the writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit
them to examine all the vouchers and other documentary
proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and
expenditures made out of the funds of the Independence
Commission.
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
provided for a standing appropriation of one million
pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in
the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray
the expenses of the Independence Commission, including
publicity and all other expenses in connection with the
performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be
considered as included in the annual appropriation for the
Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of
P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act
hereafter approved may not make any specific
appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no
part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or
payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence
Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds
from being squandered, and to prevent any investments
and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes
of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing
requested the respondents to permit them to examine the
vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the
expenditures and payments made out of the funds
appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit
the petitioners from examining said vouchers and
documentary proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address
the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not
subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman
of the Independence Commission, are mere agents
of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be
controlled or interfered with by the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of
the subject of the action because section 24 of the
Jones Law provides that: “The administrative
jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether
of funds or property, and all vouchers and records
pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the
expenses of the Commission of Independence should be
shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and
administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.
The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910
Facts:
On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged
in the transport of animals named Standard commanded
by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was
found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677
heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and
proper suitable means for securing the animals which
resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to
have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to
be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be
filed because neither was it said that the court sitting
where the animals were disembarked would take
jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under
Philippine laws, like the ship involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense
committed on board a foreign ship while inside the
territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa,
which the Philippines would have no jurisdiction,
continued until it reached Philippine territory which is
already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Defendant is
thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes
committed in a foreign ship on the high seas, but the
moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. Every
state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. The Supreme Court of the United States
has recently said that merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would
subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they
visit, so long as they remain.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60
(1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named
forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit
court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic
Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to
take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas
Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and
sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of
this opinion), but they were not delivered before the
expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of
Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an
appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State,
James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.”
Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts
of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of
the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the
Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last
act required from the person possessing the power has
been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury
became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the
individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing
the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace
in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States,
affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to
the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a
refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for
which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional
and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide
on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the
Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it
had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the
Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the
Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this
court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be
shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be
necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to
issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is,
in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied.
Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order
that is issued from a court of superior jurisdiction that
commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal
Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from
performing, a particular act, the performance or omission
of which is required by law as an obligation.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60
(1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named
forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit
court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic
Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to
take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas
Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and
sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of
this opinion), but they were not delivered before the
expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of
Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an
appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State,
James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.”
Issues
Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts
of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of
the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the
Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last
act required from the person possessing the power has
been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury
became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the
individual who considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing
the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace
in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States,
affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to
the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a
refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for
which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional
and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide
on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the
Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it
had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the
Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the
Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this
court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be
shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be
necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to
issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is,
in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied.
Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order
that is issued from a court of superior jurisdiction that
commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal
Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from
performing, a particular act, the performance or omission
of which is required by law as an obligation.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No.
L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of
Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions N0.8 confirming the election of the members
of the National Assembly against whom no protest had
thus far been filedo. Praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on
the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further
check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-
thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on
the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
Conclusion:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power
into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies,
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect
to contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia
to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration,
which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly
were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed
not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of
the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of
its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix
the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had been
filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot
deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should
be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935
can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests
against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in
the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of
the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will
come from the majority party). This is still valid provided
the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally
sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may
set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules
comply with the Constitution.

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the

Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista
Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada
who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal
on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have
to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority
party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since
there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled
in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the
Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that
if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as
a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance
in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court
cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political
question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the
bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the
issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The

Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide
upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by
Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question.
Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from
the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?