1. Land Bank v CA G.R. No.

221636

Facts:
This eminent domain case is about the correct mode of appeal.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected the land of private respondents Heirs of
Manuel Bolanos (the heirs) to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (the bank) valued the property in the amount of
P1,620,750.72. The heirs rejected the valuation, and they filed a case for determination of just
compensation before Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The SAC ordered revaluation of the
property which the bank complied with and gave a revaluation amounting to P1,803,904.76
which was upheld by the SAC.

The heirs filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 before the Court of Appeals (CA). The bank
countered and filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the heirs availed a wrong mode of appeal.
The CA dismissed the bank's motion on the ground of liberality in construction of the Rules of
Court and claimed that the rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
thus requiring strict and rigid application may have to give way to the need to aptly dispense
substantial justice in the normal course. The bank filed for reconsideration but was denied.

The bank elevated the case to the Supreme Court (the Court) contending that the CA committed
a grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the long-standing rule that appeals from the decision
of SAC must be via petition for review under Rule 42. The heirs, on the other hand, argued that
the exercise of liberality by the CA is in keeping with the need of the landowner to be paid
pursuant to the value for value exchange while citing SC rulings affording amplest opportunity
for proper and just determination of cause, free from technicalities.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court the Court should relax technicalities in favor of liberal construction

Ruling:
The Court granted the motion of the bank.

The Court, in citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, ruled that the reason for adopting
a petition for review under Rule 42 when appealing eminent domain cases from SAC is the need
for absolute dispatch in the determination of just compensation.

Just compensation, under the aforesaid case, means not only paying the correct amount but also
paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer consequences
of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping
with the nature of a petition for review. Furthermore, unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for
review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites
before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to
deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in ordinary
appeal.

Although the Court applied liberal construction of the rules of procedure in a number of cases,
they stressed that it can only be invoked in proper and justifiable cases and circumstances. There
was no justifiable reason from the CA and the heirs. The bare invocation of "interest of
substantial justice" need to be backed by proper and justifiable circumstances.

Procedural rules should not belittled simply because non-observance may result in prejudice to
substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justified by harping on policy of liberal
construction.

2. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Narciso Kho

Facts:
Private respondent Narciso Kho (Kho) entered into a verbal agreement to purchase lubricants
from Red Orange Trading (Red Orange), represented by Rudy Medel (Medel). Red Orange
insisted that it would only accept a Land Bank manager's check as payment. Kho then opened a
savings account at the Land Bank of the Philippines (Bank) with initial deposit of
P25,993,537.37. Kho then purchased Land Bank Managers Check No. 07410, leveraged by
Kho's Land Bank account. Kho then sent a photocopy of the Manager's Check to Red Orange,
through Medel, as proof of available funds for the purchase of lubricants. Unfortunately Kho and
Red Orange's business deal did not push through.

Circa January 2006, the Bank received a call from the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
regarding Check no. 07410 being encashed by Red Orange. The Bank confirmed the check, and
the BPI proceeded with encashment of the check. The Bank then informed Kho about the
encashment of the check. Kho went to the Bank holding in his hands Check no. 07410. The Bank
discovered that what was deposited and encashed with BPI was a spurious copy of the check.
Kho demanded cancellation of the check and the release of his remaining money amounting to
P995,207.27. The Bank, represented by the Bank's branch manager Lorena Flores (Flores),
refused Kho's request because Flores had no authority to do so. Multiple demands ensued, yet the
Bank refused.

Kho filed a complaint with trial court (RTC) for specific performance against the Bank. The
Bank countered that Kho was negligent because he handed a photocopy of the manager's check
and that act was the proximate cause of his loss. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that,
citing Associated Bank v. CA, the failure of Kho to exercise ordinary care and to inform the
Bank that his (Kho) transaction with Red Orange did not push through substantially contributed
to the making of the forged check and precludes Kho from asserting forgery.

When Kho elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA set aside the RTC decision
and remanded the case for further proceeding because the Bank's investigation in determining
whether there was fraudulent negotiation of manager's check no. 07410 - which said
investigation was not yet available - was crucial to the resolution of the case. The RTC's ruling
on Kho's negligence preempted the Bank's investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bank is liable for Kho's P25,000,000.00 loss

Ruling:
The Supreme Court (Court) ruled in favor of Kho and ordered the Bank to pay P25,000,000.00
plus interest from the filing of the complaint.

The Court did not agree with the Bank's contention that the proximate cause of Kho's loss was
his own negligence in giving a photocopy of manager's check and his failure to inform the Bank
of the failed business deal with Red Orange. The Court explained that "proximate cause" - a
mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent - is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The Bank, according to the Court,
was negligent in clearing a counterfeit check, adding the fact that the signatories of the genuine
check were the Bank's officers themselves. The Bank did not exert the highest diligence in
confirming the legitimacy of the check being encashed at the Bank of the Philippine Islands
before clearing the encashment.

The Court did not agree with the contention of the Bank and the RTC that kho is precluded from
invoking forgery. The Court ruled that a drawer or depositor of the bank is precluded from
asserting forgery if the drawee bank can prove drawer's failure to exercise ordinary care and if
this negligence substantially contributed to the forgery or perpetration of the fraud.

Kho's act of giving Medel a photocopy of the check may have allowed the latter to create a
duplicate but this cannot excuse the Bank's failure to recognize that the check itself is a fake
instrument. Also, the Bank itself furnished Kho the photocopy of the check without objecting to
Kho's intention of giving the photocopy to Medel.

The business of banking is imbued with public interest; it is an industry where the general
public's trust and confidence in the system is of paramount importance. Banks, in general, are
expected to exert highest degree of diligence. They are obligated to treat their depositor's
accounts with meticulous care, always keeping in mind the fiduciary nature of the relationship.

3. Liamkaichong vs Land Bank of the Philippines

Facts:
This is a case about the proper remedy in eminent domain cases of just compensation.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) sent petitioner Jocelyn
Limkaichong (Limkaichong) notices of land valuation and acquisition of 4 lands. The valuation
amounted to a combined P656,374.31, which Limkaichong rejected. The DARAB conducted
summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation, which it affirmed
the original valuation of the lands basing on existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.
Limkaichong then filed with the trial court (RTC) a complaint for fixing just compensation;
prayed that the DARAB valuation be set aside and declared null in void; and the price of the
lands be fixed based on fair market value.

Respondents Department of Agararian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (Bank)
filed motion to dismiss stating that Limkaichong failed to timely appeal the DARAB order and
which said failure rendered said order final and executory. Limkaichong, on the other hand,
insisted that the RTC was not barred from acquiring jurisdiction because her cause of action was
anchored on respondent's violation of right to due process by taking her property without just
compensation, for the DARAB valuation being too low and was arbitrarily arrive at, and adding
that the RTC should have accord her the same treatment accorded to other landowners who had
been given the chance to be heard on their claim of revaluation despite belated filing of
complaints for just compensation.

The RTC, however, granted DARAB's motion to dismiss ruling that Limkaichong's complaint
against the DARAB's valuation order should have been filed within 15 days from notice of
assailed order and further dismissed Limkaichong's claim that the case was anchored on violation
of due process and just compensation. Limkaichong moved for reconsideration but was
dismissed.

The Court of Appeals (CA), upon special civil action for certiorari by Limkaichong, affirmed the
ruling of the RTC dismissing the civil case because the RTC ruling was a final order and that the
remedy invoked by Limkaichong was incorrect, rather should have been an appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in dismissing the civil case on the ground of belated filing
of appeal which made the DARAB decision final and executory.

Ruling:
The RTC should have proceeded on the civil case, the DARAB decision being not final and
executory.

The Court reversed the decision of the CA and directed the RTC to resume the proceedings for
determination of just compensation.

There's no question that Limkaichong filed the complaint with the RTC for determination of just
compensation after more than two and a half months and - basing on Philippine Veterans Bank
case that assailing DARAB's valuation order must be brought before the RTC within 15 days -
such failure have rendered the DARAB's valuation order final and executory, making it a
sufficient ground for dismissal of complaint.

The Court, however, ruled that since the Philippine Veterans Bank case was promulgated when
the case of Limkaichong was already in progress, the Philippine Veterans Bank case should be
applied prospectively and should not affect the case of Limkaichong. The effect, therefore, is that
Limkaichong's cause of action at the RTC for proper valuation of expropriated property (the civil
case) should be allowed to proceed. Hence, Limkaichong's complaint to recover just
compensation was properly brought in the RTC.

4. Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing Manila | GR 215551, September 16, 2015

Note:
** what was indicated in the case list is the Decision August 17, 2016 of the Supreme Court
- the Court's decision on Motion for Recon.
** The digest below is based on the Court's 2015 Decision which discussed disability
benefits more extensively than the 2016 Decision.

Facts:
Petitioner Jakerson Gargallo (Gargallo) was hired by Dohle Seafront Crewing (Dohle Manila.
Gargallo as a wiper on board a vessel. While working, Gargallo had an accident which broke his
left arm. Gargallo was then repatriated and immediately went for surgery as per advice of The
Dohle Manila's company doctor, Dr. Cruz. Gargallo, after surgery, returned multiple times to the
company doctor for his regular checkups and was subsequently declared fit to work. Gargallo
then went to consult an independent doctor, Dr. Garcia, which declared him unfit to work.

Gargallo then filed a complaint, without medical certification from the independent doctor,
against Dohle Manila seeking disability benefits claiming that he remained permanently unfit to
work as per his independent doctor. Dohle Manila countered and claimed that: (1) Gallo failed to
comply with the agreed procedure under POEA-SEC on joint appointment by the parties of a
third doctor requirement, whose findings shall be considered final with respect to Gargallo's
disability; and (2) that the filing of the case was premature since Gargallo was still undergoing
medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ordered Dohle Manila to pay for Gargallo's permanent total disability,
the LA giving more credence to the independent doctor's findings. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of LA. When Dohle Manila moved the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), the CA ruled that Gargallo's claim was premature considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint: (1) Gargallo was still under medical treatment by the
company doctor; (2) that no medical assessment yet has been issued by said doctor since the
allowable 240-day treatment period has not yet lapsed; and (3) the complaint was not
accompanied by certification by Gargallo's independent doctor.

Issue:
Whether or not Gargallo is entitled to permanent disability benefit
Ruling:
The entitlement of overseas seafarers to disability benefits is a matter governed by law and
contract, and not only by medical findings. The pertinent laws are Articles 197 to 199 of the
Labor code and the pertinent contracts are: POEA-SEC; the CBA; and employment agreement.

Under the POEA-SEC: (1) the company doctor is given a total of 240-days to provide treatment
and thereafter make a declaration of the seafarer's disability, thus it is only upon the lapse of 240
days when that the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled; and (2) that in case an
independent doctor disagrees with the assessment of the company doctor, a third doctor may be
nominated jointly by the parties and the decision of the third doctor shall be final and binding on
both parties. In case of non-compliance of the third doctor requisite, the certification of company
doctor shall prevail over the independent doctor and shall militate against the claim of the
seafarer.

From the date of repatriation to the date of filing of the case: the 240-day period has not lapsed
and that Gargallo was still under medical treatment by company doctor which had not yet issued
any assessment; that petitioner had not yet to secure any certification from his independent
doctor regarding his disability; and a third doctor has yet to be consulted. It is well-settled rule
that the seafarer's non-compliance with mandated conflict-resolution procedure under POEA-
SEC militates against Gargallo's claims and results in the affirmance of the fir to work
certification by the company doctor.

In the absence of a third doctor's assessment, the company doctor's findings should prevail over
the findings of the independent doctor. The company doctor having examined, diagnosed, and
treated Gargallo multiple times, while the independent doctor examined him only once. The
assessment of the company doctor should be given more credence for having been arrived at
after months of medical attendance and diagnosis.

Nonetheless, the Court ruled that Gargallo is entitled to income benefit for temporary total
disability, as per the Labor Code, during the treatment period which is computed from Gargallo's
repatriation to his last company doctor visit, for a total of 194 days.

5. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 210940, September 06, 2016

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rules 64 of Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the decision and resolution of COA relative to the payment of Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses (EME), medical expenses, rice allowance, and provident fund (other
benefits) to the members
of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in the total amount of P4,314,683.99.

On 14 May 1947, the SSC of the Social Security System (SSS) granted the new compensation
package for its members including medical benefits, rice allowance, and a provident fund. These
benefits were incorporated in the SSS Manual on Personnel Policies, Rules and Regulations.

On 22 september 1999, he SSC issued Resolution No. 790 granting EME to its members at
similar rates then given to members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). EME
included, but was not limited to, expenses incurred for meetings, seminars, conferences, official
entertainment, and public relations. In the same resolution, the SSC further approved additional
budgetary appropriations in the amount of approximately P 4.49 million to cover the payment of
EME. It also covered the increase in EME of its Chairman to P750,000.00 per year, which was
the rate being given to his counterpart in the GSIS.
On July 4, 2007, the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate Government Sector (LAO-CGS)
of the COA issued ND No. SSS-2007-02 (2004) disallowing the total amount of P4,314,683.99.
Both resolution by the SSC were disallowed when found in the audit as an
”iregualr”expenditures.

SSS filed for reconsidreation however the COA-LSS denied the said request, SSS appealed
before the COA which denied the same as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, SSS
filed petition to the Court.

Issue:
Whether the members of the SSC are entitled to the EME, medical benefit, rice allowance and
the provident fund.

Ruling:
No. The benefits for SSC members are specifically enumerated, the COA concludes that the said
benefits are exclusive in consonance with the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Thus, it contends that SSC members cannot receive any amount other than the per
diems and reasonable transportation and representation allowances (RATA). The SSS believes
that it may grant additional benefits to SSC members because the SS Law empowers it to adopt
its own budget within the limits provided by the said law and because it was exempted from the
coverage of the SSL.

The Court upholds the position of the COA. The nature of the funds possessed by the SSS is
crucial in the resolution of the present issue. In SSS v. COA the Court expounded that the funds
of the SSS were merely held in trust for the benefit of workers and employees in the private
sector, to wit:ChThis Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being
administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers and employees
in the private sector xxx the provisions of the SS Law empowering the SSC to allocate its funds
to pay for the salaries and benefits of its officials and employees are not absolute and unrestricted
because the SSS is a mere trustee of the said funds. In other words, the salaries and benefits to be
endowed by the SSS must always be reasonable so that the funds, which it holds in trust will be
devoted to its primary purpose of servicing workers and employees from the private sector.
Following the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the express mention of
one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others; the COA was correct in disallowing
the disbursements in question as they were not among those enumerated in Section 3(a) of the SS
Law. Verily, the SSS cannot grant additional benefits to SSC members other than the reasonable
allowances specified by the law. To do so would be contrary to the intentions of Congress for the
SS Law to categorically enumerate the benefits to be received by SSC members. It must be
remembered that the objective of the law was to provide reasonable and adequate compensation
to SSC members. Petition denied.

6. JESUS B. VILLAMOR vs. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION [ECC]

and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 204422
Facts:
The petitioner was employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI). On November 3,
2006, he was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due to dizziness associated with
numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. His Cranial Computed Tomography (CT) scan
revealed that he had an "acute non-hemorrhage infarct on the right pons/basal ganglia." After
more than a week of confinement, petitioner was discharged from the said hospital with
diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1; Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic
Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia; Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids
[cholesterol triglycerides, or both] carried by lipoproteins in the blood).

Petitioner filed before respondent SSS, claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the
EC TID benefits under the EC law for his CVD or stroke, Infarct Hypertension. SSS granted his
claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law. However, it denied his claim for EC TTD benefits
on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his working conditions.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his claim to respondent Employees' Compensation Commission
(ECC). The decision of SSS was affirmed by ECC, due to his failure to adduce substantial
evidence that his stroke was work-related. Respondent ECC ruled that petitioner's illness was a
"result of complications expected from a progressive disease, atherosclerosis, enhanced by major
risk factors such as history of cigarette smoking and findings of dyslipidernia."

Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to his claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626

Ruling:
Yes. VVCCI employed petitioner as a waiter. It then transferred him to the Sports Department as
Sports Dispatcher, and later, promoted him as Sports Area In-Charge. His Identification Card
and SSS Employees' Notification Form B-30050 both prove his claim that his position at the club
is not a mere clerk, but is a Sports Area-In-Charge. In fact, his Job Description proves that his
work is not limited to issuing vouchers and receipts to club members xxxi t is clear that contrary
to the findings of the respondents SSS and ECC, petitioner's job is not a mere clerk issuing
vouchers or receipts. His duties and responsibilities as Sports Area In-Charge are obviously
laborious and stressful since he is tasked to cater to the needs of all club members and their
guests, and to coordinate with the other departments of the club regarding their needs. He also
receives the complaints and requests of club members and their guests, and ensures that these
complaints and requests are properly addressed. To do all these, he has to move around the club
and deal with the club members and their guests. Obviously, he has to endure both physical and
mental stress in order to perform his duties.

The Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that for an illness or disease to be
compensable, "[it] must be a result of occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions." In the case of stroke and
hypertension, both are compensable since they are listed as occupational diseases under Nos.
1955 and, respectively, of Annex "A" of the said rules. As to the findings of respondents SSS
and ECC that petitioner is a chronic smoker and drinker, the Court finds that it should not bar
petitioner's claim for compensation, whether or not such findings are true.

The nature of petitioner's work and his medical results are substantial evidence to support his
claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as amended. Petition granted.

7. Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit

GR No. 213453 ; 29 November 2016

Facts:
Petitioner PHIC issued several grants of allowances to its employees including the Collective
Negotiation Agreement Signing Bonus (CNASB) of P5000 each to all qualified employees, the
Welfare Support Assistance (WESA) of P4000 each in lieu of subsistence and laundry
allowances to its health workers, the Labor Management Relations Gratuity (LMRG), and the
Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to personnel absorbed from the PMCC. Such payments
would total to around P87,699,144.

Respondent COA disallowed such grants for the following reasons:

- the CNASB was contrary to the doctrine of SSS v. COA
- the WESA was still subject to the approval of the Office of the President
- the LMRG was a duplication of the Performance Incentive Bonus (PIB)
- the COLA must be collected from the PMCC and not PHIC

PHIC filed an MR but was denied. The disallowance was sustained by the COA, hence this
petition.

PHIC contends that at the time of the original payment of the CNASB wherein the DBM
sanctioned the budget for such grant, the ruling on SSS v. COA had not been laid down by the
Court. The doctrine of such decision must be applied prospectively.
PHIC also contends that the WESA was done in accordance with Sec. 22 of RA 7305. COA's
contention that the Health secretary did not approve such grant is incorrect as RA 7875 states
that the Board of Directors of the PHIC includes the Health secretary as an ex-officio member.
Since the PHIC resolution was passed unanimously, then the health secretary complied with the
participation requirement.

PHIC also contends that the LMRG is not a duplicate of the PIB as the former was done in
compliance of RA 7875 while the latter was done in accordance with EO 486. The two grants
differ in their requirements, amounts, and manner of computation.

PHIC also contends that although it was not clear who the COLA payment for 1989-1995 must
be taken from, RA 7875 had already transferred all functions of the defunct PMCC to PHIC. It
must therefore necessarily include the responsibility to pay the COLA.

Issue:
W/N the COA’s disallowance of the four grants was valid?
Ruling:
The burden of proving the validity or legality of the grant of allowance or benefits is with the
government agency granting the allowance.

PHIC's claim of fiscal autonomy allows it to fix its personnel compensation not exceeding 12%
of the total contributions to the program. This is incorrect as it assumes that such limitation is
the only restriction to the agency's powers. It also incorrectly assumes that the DBM's approval
is only required in cases wherein national budgetary support is needed. As a GOCC, it is subject
to the command structure of the DBM as shown in PCSO v. COA. Although it may fix the
compensation and benefit scheme of its employees, it is subject to the review of the DBM. To
allow the PHIC unbridled discretion without any review from the DBM would constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power.

As the SSL is self-executing, the standardized salaries of government employees are already
inclusive of all allowances except for transportation allowance, clothing/laundry allowance,
subsistence allowance, hazard pay, foreign service allowance. When a grant of allowance is not
among the exceptions, such allowance is considered already given to the employee in their basic
salary. An unauthorized issuance and receipt of such allowance would constitute double
compensation. The COLA, not being an exception, is considered to be a part of the employee's
salary. Late publication of the DBM circular regarding the COLA would not affect its execution.
Furthermore, PHIC failed to show that the employees between 1989-1995 that a diminution in
pay occured due to the standardization of the salaries.

The argument that the LMRG is different from the PIB is also incorrect. Although a GOCC is a
self-sustaining government instrumentality, it is not automatic that its discretion on
compensation is absolute. There being no statutory authority given to the PHIC to issue the
LMRG, it must be considered part of the standardized salary of the employees, hence leading to
double compensation.
As for the CNASB, as the respondent was not able to show proof to justify the disallowance of
this grant, the Court sides with PHIC. The DBM's power over PHIC is only to make sure that
the compensation and benefits adhere to the guidelines prescribed by law. It appears that the
CNASB was paid in 2001, when the DBM circular still sanctioned such prior to the doctrine
provided for in SSS v. COA. There is no evidence to the contrary.

As for the WESA, this grant was sanctioned by both the SSL but also through statutory authority
(Magna Carta of PHWs). The Secretary of Health, even as ex-officio member of the Board of
Directors of the PHIC, is still held to have been able to determine the rates of subsistence and
laundry allowance as there is no prescribed form for such officer to do so.
For the WESA, CNASB, and COLA, it is understood that the PHIC acted in good faith albeit
under an incorrect interpretation of the law. Absent any showing of bad faith with such grants of
allowance, the presumption of regularity stands. However for the LMRG, even in assuming that
there is no bad faith per se, the PHIC's granting of such allowance without authority by the law
and in contravention thereof is tantamount to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Thus,
those responsible for granting the LMRG must refund said grant.
8. GSIS v. Apolinario Pauig
GR No. 210328 ; 30 January 2017

Facts:
Respondent Pauig, the Municipal Agriculturist of San Pablo, Isabela, began his service in
government in 1964 as an emergency laborer on casual status. He eventually became permanent
employee and then became a member of the GSIS in 1977. Upon reaching the age of 65 in 2004,
he complied with the mandatory retirement. Upon fixing his retirement papers, the GSIS issued
his record of having a total of 27 years of service (1977-2004). Pauig wrote a complaint
claiming that his service from 1964-1977 was erroneously omitted. GSIS claimed that in that
period, no premium payments were remitted which excludes it from the computation of
retirement benefits.

Pauig filed a case to the RTC which ruled in his favor. A subsequent MR by GSIS was denied.

Issue:
W/N the 1st fourteen years from 1964-1977 should be included in the computation of retirement
benefits?

Ruling:
NO. Retirement benefits are given to reward government employees for allotting the best years
of their lives to the service of the country. Pauig claims that such laws must be liberally
construed in the employee's favor due to their service. Although the Court recognizes that the
retirement benefits are given to reward the contributions of the government employees, such
contributions are not determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as
beneficiaries in the retirement benefit system. The Court states that liberal construction cannot
be used when the law is clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for construction.

The RTC decision stated that as the word 'service' did not distinguish between permanent or
temporary, no such difference shall be recognized. However, CA 186 or the Government
Service Insurance Act of 1936 clearly states that the membership and scope of the system shall
cover regular and permanents employees of the government. It expressly includes regular and
permanent employees and expressly excludes casual, substitute, or temporary employees from its
retirement insurance plan. As the nature of Pauig's employment from 1964-1977 is that of a
casual employee, it cannot be included in the computation of his retirement benefits.

9. CRISTINA BARSOLO vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

FACTS: Cristina’s deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo, "was employed as a seaman by
various companies from 1988 to 2002." From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel served
as a Riding Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine Ltd.,
(Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in 2006.
When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as his
cause of death. Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was work-related, Cristina filed a
claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security
System. The Social Security System, on June 27, 2007, denied her claim on the ground that there
was no longer an employer-employee relationship at the time of Manuel's death and that "[h]is
being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness."
The Court of Appeals ruled that while there was no doubt that myocardial infarction was a
compensable disease,Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between Manuel's work and
the illness that brought about his death. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that
Manuel's habit of smoking, which dates as far back as 1973, may have contributed to the
development of his heart ailment.
ISSUE: Is Cristina entitled to compensation for the death of her husband Manuel
HELD: No. Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of
cardiac injury during the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her
husband's employment caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing
heart ailment. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died on
September 24, 2006, four years after he disembarked from MV Polaris Star. Other factors have
already played a role in aggravating his illness. Due to the considerable lapse of time, more
convincing evidence must be presented in order to attribute the cause of death to Manuel's work.
In the absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this Court cannot
assume that the illness that caused Manuel's death was acquired during his employment with
Vela.
To emphasize, it is not refuted that myocardial infarction is a compensable occupational illness.
However, it becomes compensable only when it falls under any of these three conditions, which
should be proven by substantial evidence:
a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof
that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature
of his/her work.
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be
followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal
relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms
and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different major causative factor, which
could explain his illness and eventual death, defeats petitioner's claim.
10. Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Lorenzo Musni, et al.
G.R. No. 206343
February 22, 2017
FACTS:
Lorenzo Musni (Musni) was the compulsory heir of Jovita Musni (Jovita), who was the owner of
a lot in Comillas, La Paz, Tarlac. Musni filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City a
complaint for reconveyance of land and cancellation of TCT against Spouses Nenita Sonza
Santos and Ireneo Santos (Spouses Santos), Eduardo Sonza (Eduardo), and Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank). Musni alleged that Nenita falsified a Deed of Sale, and caused the
transfer of title of the lot in her and her brother Eduardo's name. Then the spouses Santos and
Eduardo mortgaged the lot to Land Bank as security for their loan. Musni said that he was
dispossessed of the lot when Land Bank foreclosed the property upon Nenita and Eduardo's
failure to pay their loan. Later, the titles of the lot and another foreclosed land were consolidated
in anothet TCT, under the name of Land Bank. Musni also claimed that Nenita and Eduardo was
convicted for falsification of a public document which he filed against them before the MTC of
Tarlac.
Land Bank countered that the transfer of the title in its name was because of a decision rendered
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, and that its transaction
with the Spouses Santos and Eduardo was legitimate, and that it verified the authenticity of the
title with the Register of Deeds. Further, the bank loan was secured by another lot owned by the
Spouses Santos, and not solely by the lot being claimed by Musni. Land Bank prayed that it be
paid the value of the property and the expenses it incurred, should the trial court order the
reconveyance of the property to Musni.

On June 27, 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision, in favor of Musni. It relied on the fact that
Nenita was convicted of falsification of the Deed of Sale. The trial court found that Musni did
not agree to sell the property to the Spouses Santos and Eduardo. In addition, the amount of
Musni 's indebtedness was an insufficient consideration for the market value of the property.
Lastly, the sale was executed before the loan's maturity.The trial court also found that Land Bank
was not an "innocent purchaser for value. The institution of the criminal case against Nenita
should have alerted the bank to ascertain the ownership of the lot before it foreclosed the same.
Land Bank and Nenita separately moved for reconsideration, which were both denied by the trial
court in an Omnibus Order. Land Bank and Spouses Santos separately appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In its appeal, Land Bank reiterated that "it has demonstrated, by a preponderance of
evidence, that it is a mortgagee in good faith and a subsequent innocent purchaser for value; as
such, its rights as the new owner of the subject property must be respected and protected by the
courts. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Musni. Land Bank moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and an innocent purchaser for value;
and
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the award of damages.

HELD:

I. No. Petitioner is neither a mortgagee in good faith nor an innocent purchaser for value.
Petitioner's defense that it could not have known the criminal action since it was not a party to
the case and that there was no notice of lis pendens filed by respondent Musni, is unavailing.
Had petitioner exercised the degree of diligence required of banks, it would have ascertained the
ownership of one of the properties mortgaged to it. Where "the findings of fact of the trial courts
are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and,
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this
Court."
Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the findings of the trial court, that petitioner is neither a mortgagee in good faith nor an
innocent purchaser for value.

II. No. Petitioner is not entitled to the award of damages. In its Decision, the trial court ordered
respondents Nenita and Eduardo to pay petitioner damages in the amount equivalent to the
appraised value of the property being claimed by respondent Musni. The Court of Appeals
deleted the award. It considered the grant of award as a partial extinguishment of the real estate
mortgage, which is not allowed. Since the mortgage is indivisible, the Court of Appeals nullified
the real estate mortgage involving the two properties, and deleted the award.

Although the Court of Appeals' basis for deleting the award is erroneous, this Court affirms the
removal on a different ground since petitioner did not seek relief from the Court with clean
hands. Petitioner may have incurred losses when it entered into the mortgage transaction with
respondents Spouses Santos and Eduardo, and the corresponding foreclosure sale. However, the
losses could have been avoided if only petitioner exercised the required due diligence.
11. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SPOUSES ESTEBAN AND CRESENCHIA
CHU
G.R. NO. 192345, 29 March 2017

Facts:
Respondents were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in San
Antonio, Pilar, Sorsogon which were acquired by the government pursuant to its Agrarian
Reform Program. The said lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) at
P177,657.98 and P269,928.57.

Respondents rejected LBP’s valuation. Hence, summary administrative proceedings were

conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) to determine
the just compensation.

On 11 April 2003, the PARAD issued two separate Decisions re-computing the valuations
arrived at by the LBP. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. LBP then filed a
Petition for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC of Sorsogon City.

On 21 September 2005, the RTC issued a Decision fixing the just compensation at
P2,313,478.00 for the R.A. 6657 acquire property and P1,155,173.00 for the P.D. 27 acquired
property. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

On appeal, the CA modified the RTC’s ruling with the following decisions:
a. The formula used by the PARAD in computing the valuation for the P.D. 27 acquired
land is correct. However, the amount used for the ASP is erroneous. It is only P35.00, not
P350.00;
b. The formula, which is Land Value= AGP x ASP x 2.5 (or Average Gross Production x
Actual Support Price x 2.5)remains applicable to P.D. 27 acquired lands notwithstanding
the passage of R.A. 6657;
c. The interest at the rate of 12% per annum must be imposed to compensate for the
delay;

For property acquired under R.A. 6657:

d. Section 17 and Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1998 must be considered in fixing just determination.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed a serious error of law in its decisions.

Ruling:
Here, the judgment arrived at the PARAD and the RTC, which ruling affirmed in toto and with
modifications by the CA, as to R.A. 6657 acquired property was to some extent based on a
misapprehension or erroneous appreciation of facts. As regards to the rulings of the PARAD and
the CA and the RTC on the P.D. 27 acquired property, their findings are conflicting.
Additionally, the PARAD’s and the CA’s reliance on P.D. 27 and its implementing rules are now
applicable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The 18 January 2010 Decision and
24 May 2010 Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Land Valuation Case Nos.
LV-30-’03 and LV-48-‘03 are hereby REMANDED to the RTC of Sorsogon City. Branch 52 for
the determination of the just compensation strictly in accordance with the guidelines set forth in
this Decision. SO ORDERED.

12. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HEIRS OF ANTONIO MARCOS, SR.

G.R. NO. 175726, 22 March 2017

Facts:
The deceased Antonio Marcos, Sr. was the owner of two parcels of agricultural land or
landholdings located at Malbog, Pilar, Sorsogon. On 03 April 1995, pursuant to R.A. 6657, the
authorized representative of the Heirs of Marcos offered to sell the landholdings to the Republic
of the Philippines through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The said lands were
valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) at P195,603.70 and P79,09.26.

The Respondents accepted the valuation of the LBP. While the payment of the purchase price is
pending, the DAR brought the matter of valuation to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator Sorsogon requesting the
summary administrative proceedings be conducted to determine the just compensation for the
landholdings. After the said proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered decisions. LBP
filed a Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation for the landholdings with the
RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

On 23 January 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favour of the Respondents. LBP filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

LBP appealed to the CA arguing that the decision of the RTC failed to consider the documentary
evidence showing that the contract of sale over the landholdings was perfected and that the RTC
erred in adopting the valuation of the properties for the purpose of fixing the value of the
landholdings. The CA ruled in favour of the Respondents.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA or SAC may disregard the valuation factors under Section 17 of R.A.
6657
2. Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) may abrogate, vary or
alter a consummated contract between the government and the Respondents

Rulings:
1. The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57
of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program.
The factors under Section 17 of R.A. 6657 were already translated into basic formula by the
DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of the R.A. 6657. The said factors and
the DAR formula provide the uniform framework or structure by which just compensation for
property subject to agrarian reform should be determined. Hence, aside from considering the
factors provided by law, the court should apply the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series
of 1998 in the computation of just compensation.

2. The implementation of R.A. 6657 is an exercise of the State’s Police Power and Power of
Eminent Domain. It was also settled that the taking of private property by the Government in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Thus,
acquisition of lands under the CARP is not governed by administrative rules intended to ensure
that the rights of the landowners to just compensation are respected.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution dated 26 May 2006 and 06 December 2006 of the CA are REVERSED. The Civil
Case is REMANDED to the RTC Sorsogon City, Branch 52 from trial on the merits with
dispatch. The trial judge is DIRECTED TO OBSERVE strictly the procedures in determining the
proper valuation of the subject property. SO ORDERED.

13. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PHIL-AGRO INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 193987
March 13, 2017

Facts:
The subject of this petition is 19 parcels of land situated in Baungon, Bukidnon, with an
aggregate area of 267.0048 hectares, registered under the name of the respondent. These
landholdings were then placed under the compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The petitioner offered
an initial valuation of ₱ 2,139,996.57 for the subject landholdings but this offer was rejected by
the respondent. A summary hearing was then conducted before the DAR Adjudication Board for
the valuation of the subject landholdings.
On January 4, 1999, the respondent filed an Amended Complaint against the DAR Secretary and
the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) praying for the fixing and payment of not
less than ₱26,700,000.00 as just compensation.

The parties agreed to the creation of a commission to determine the fair market value of the
subject landholdings on June 7, 2000.

The respondent's nominated commissioner submitted the amount of ₱63,045,000.00 based on the
findings of the Asian Appraisal Company, Inc., which used the valuation factors of CARP. The
nominated commissioner of the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted a lower amount of
₱11,640,730.68 which was based on the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Valuation
of Land Voluntarily Offered or Compulsory Acquired Pursuant to R.A. 6657. However, based on
the following factors: physical attributes of the subject landholdings, soil type, terrain,
adaptability to various crops, accessibility to roads and propertiesin the area, and expert opinions
of the Municipal Assessor, Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Agriculturist of Baungon,
Bukidnon, the Chairman of the Commission appraised the subject landholdings in the amount of
₱20, 589,373.00.

On November 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgement adopting the Chairman's report.
However, it was modified by the CA by reducing the value to ₱11,640,730.68 and awarded
interest of 6% per annum as damages for the delay in the payment of just compensation reckoned
from the date of compensable taking on September 16, 1992 (Certificates of Land Ownership
Award were issued), plus 12% legal interest per annum on the amount of such compensation.

Both the petitioner and the respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.

On September 30, 2010, the CA rendered an Amended Decision wherein the motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit and the motion for partial reconsideration was
granted. Moreover, the CA modified their previous decision ordering the petitioner to pay 1%
per annum instead of 6% per annum. The petitioner was unsatisfied, hence filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Amended Decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of 1% per annum on the amount of just compensation counted from
September 16, 1992 is proper.

Ruling:
The petition is partly granted. The compensation, to be considered as just, must be fair and
equitable. Moreover, the landowners must have received it without any delay. The requirement
of the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional
compensation determined by it or by the DAR.

As to the proper reckoning point of legal interest, the Court ruled that just compensation should
be determined at the time of the property's taking. In this case, it should be reckoned from the
issuance date of the CLOA which is September 16, 1992.

It has already been 25 years but the respondent has not yet received the full amount of just
compensation that was due. The long delay therefore entitles them to the payment of interest to
compensate for the loss of income due to the taking.

Wherefore, the petition is Partly Granted. The Amended Decision dated September 30, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby Affirmed with Modification, ordering the petitioner to pay the
respondent ₱11, 640, 730. 68 for the just compensation of the subject landholdings and legal
interest, reckoned from the time of taking on September 16, 1992, shall be pegged at the rate of
12% per annum. In addition, beginning July 1, 2013, just compensation shall earn interest at the
new legal rate of 6% per annum until fully paid.

14. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO,

Respondents
G.R. No. 199141
March 8, 2017

Facts:
Jose Tapulado, now deceased, was the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-17535) P-2788 with an area of 17 .8393 hectares located in
Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur, and OCT No. (P-4518) P-1277 with an area of 11.1359 hectares
situated in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands under the coverage
of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27;
and in 1978, awarded them to the farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive any
compensation from the government.

It was just on March 24, 1980, that the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
computed the value of the subject lands, placing them at P38,002.47 or P1,315 .00 per hectare.

The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado (Tapulados), rejected the valuation of the subject lands
after the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the value of the subject
lands. They filed a petition to the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the
determination and payment of just compensation.

Issue:
Can the Tapulados demand for the computation of just compensation with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Landbank of the Philippines (LBP)?

Ruling:
Yes. Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the
government since 1972, it has no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the
computation of the just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because
the basis for the RTC determination of just compensation was not clear.

In the determination of just compensation, the R TC should be guided by the following:

(1) Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the
emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries.

(2) Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
Nevertheless, while it should take into account the different formulas created by the DAR
in arriving at the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before
it do not warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the
reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a
reasonable just compensation.
 (3) Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per
annum from the time of taking and 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until
fully paid.

15. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM

OFFICER, G.R. NO. 200369, 1 MARCH 2017

Facts:
Union Bank offered parcels of land with areas of 1,083,250 and 260,132 square meters located at
Barangay Bunggo, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
137846 and T-156610 of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) arrangement under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. After the DAR and Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) inspected the properties, DAR offered the amounts of ₱2,230,699.30 and
₱716,672.35 as just compensation. Union Bank did not agree with the valuation; thus, the DAR
Regional Director requested LBP to open trust accounts in the name of Union Bank.

n the meantime, the DAR started issuing Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in the
names of private respondents as agrarian reform beneficiaries for the land covered by TCT No.
T-156610. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) transmitted 74 CLOAs to the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna for registration. The DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) transmitted another 115 CLOAs to the same register of deeds. The land covered
by TCT No. 137846 was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.

Union Bank then filed a "Motion to Withdraw Voluntary Offer To Sell On Property from CARP
Coverage" in the land valuation proceedings for the land covered by TCT No. T-156610 pending
before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV. The RARAD would
later provisionally dismiss the proceedings after Union Bank filed a letter request with the DAR
to withdraw the VOS and to exempt the properties from CARP.

Union Bank submitted a request letter to the DAR that its VOS be withdrawn and that the
properties be exempted from CARP coverage. Union Bank alleged that the properties had a slope
exceeding 18% and were undeveloped, thus, exempt from CARP pursuant to Section 10 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The said request was denied by DAR Secretary
Nasser C. Pangandaman based on the failure of the Union Bank to prove by substantial evidence
that the properties were both undeveloped and had a slope gradation of more than 18% because
the slope map and land capability map submitted by Union Bank were not certified by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). After the DAR Secretary denied its
motion for reconsideration, Union Bank filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court
of Appeals (CA). CA denied the petition, agreeing with DAR Secretary’s decision. The CA
subsequently denied Union Bank's motion for reconsideration.
Union Bank filed two separate Petitions, first is for cancellation of CLOAs against the Regional
Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO), PARO, MARO, and 28 agrarian reform beneficiaries of the
land covered by TCT No. T-156610; and the second petition for cancellation of the CLOAs, this
against 141 agrarian reform beneficiaries. Both petitions are filed before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna. Both petitions were dismissed on
the same ground of being premature in view of Union Bank's pending request for withdrawal of
its VOS and exemption from CARP with DAR and that "there must first be a positive act from
the Secretary of the DAR or his authorized representative declaring said property as
excluded/exempted from coverage." Union Bank’s motion for reconsideration in both cases were
dismissed.

Union Bank appealed both cases (separately) to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), which was denied for lack of merit. The DARAB, in both cases,
sustained the PARAD's dismissal of Union Bank's petition for cancellation of the CLOAs. After
denial of Union Banks’s motion for reconsideration by the DARAB in both cases, Union Bank
elevated both cases (separately) to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43, but was
denied for lack of merit. The CA found that "the record is bereft of any evidence showing that
petitioner and private respondents agrarian reform beneficiaries had tenancy relations." It also
ruled that cancellation of the CLOAs can only be effected after the DAR Secretary
administratively declares that the land is exempted or excluded from CARP coverage. Since the
DAR Secretary was yet to make such determination when Union Bank filed its petition with the
PARAD, the PARAD correctly dismissed the petition for being premature. The CA subsequently
denied Union Bank's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has jurisdiction over
petitions for cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) involving parties
who do not have a tenancy relationship.
2. Whether the factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform can be questioned in a
petition for review on certiorari.

Rulings:
1. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by law. Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229 vested upon the DAR
primary-jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through EO No.
129-A, the power to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and
jurisdiction over the implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional
offices. Consistent with the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall
within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that involve agrarian disputes.
Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an "agrarian dispute" as any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of the term "agrarian dispute," it follows that not
all cases involving agricultural lands automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
DARAB.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the
PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be a prima facie showing
that there is a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.

In the absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank and the agrarian reform
beneficiaries, the PARAD/DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the
CLOAs. Union Bank's postulate that there can be no shared jurisdiction is partially correct;
however, the jurisdiction in this case properly pertains to the DAR, to the exclusion of the
DARAB.

2. Only questions of law may be put in issue in a petition for review under Rule
45. Corollary to this is the doctrine that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally
accorded respect and even finality by this Court, especially when these findings are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The weighing of pieces of evidence properly falls within the sound
discretion of the DAR Secretary. In the absence of any clear showing that he acted in grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with his exercise of discretion.

16. AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC. V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. NO. 194137,
21 JUNE 2017

Facts:
Maria Rezell C. De Ocampo (De Ocampo), Accounts Officer of SSS, investigated and
discovered that the hotel was delinquent in its payment of contributions for the period from June
1999 to March 2001. She visited Ambassador Hotel, where a certain Guillermo
Ciriaco (Ciriaco) assisted her. De Ocampo then informed Ciriaco of the hotel's delinquency. She
showed him the assessment, billing letter, and letter of authority. De Ocampo also requested for
the records of previous SSS payments, but the same could not be produced. Thus, she told
Ciriaco that Ambassador Hotel had to comply with the said request within fifteen (15) days. Due
to the failure of Ambassador Hotel to present the required reports and to fully pay their
outstanding delinquency, a final demand letter was issued and sent via registered mail and was
also personally served by De Ocampo, which was received by Norman Cordon, Chief Operating
Officer of Ambassador Hotel.

Pilar Barzanilla of Ambassador Hotel went to the SSS office and submitted a list of unpaid
contributions from June 1999 to March 2001. De Ocampo went back to the hotel to seek
compliance with the demand letter. The representatives of the hotel requested that the
delinquency be settled by installment. They also submitted a collection list, the audited financial
settlement and the request of installment to the SSS. Ambassador Hotel, however, did not tender
any postdated checks for the installment payments. De Ocampo concluded that based on the
actual assessment and documents submitted, the unpaid contributions of Ambassador Hotel from
June 1999 to March 2001 amounted to ₱303,459.00. Further, as of January 2, 2005, the hotel is
liable for penalties in the amount of ₱531,341.44.

Yolanda was elected as President of Ambassador Hotel on April 25, 1998, however, she was not
able to perform her functions until April 10, 2001 due to grave coercion and grave threats of
Simeon Nicolas Chan (Simeon), former President of Ambassador Hotel.

The RTC held that Yolanda could not be held criminally liable for the non-payment of SSS
contributions because she was not performing the duties of the hotel's president from June 1999
to March 2001. However, the acquittal of Yolanda did not absolve Ambassador Hotel from its
civil liabilities. Thus, the Ambassador Hotel must pay SSS in the amount of ₱584,804.00 as
contributions for SSS Medicare and Employee Compensation, including 3% penalties thereon.
Aggrieved, Ambassador Hotel filed an appeal insofar as the civil liability is concerned. The CA
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. Ambassador Hotel moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the CA Decision.

Issues:
1. Whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Ambassador Hotel.
2. Whether the Ambassador Hotel was deprived of due process when the lower court
declared it liable to SSS even though it is not a party to the case.

Rulings:
1. Yes, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Ambassador Hotel.
Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282 explicitly provides that "if the act or omission penalized by this
Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its
managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the
offense." Thus, a corporation cannot invoke its separate judicial entity to escape its liability for
non-payment of SSS contributions.

To acquire jurisdiction over the corporation in a criminal case, its head, directors or partners
must be served with a warrant of arrest. To reiterate, the law specifically disregards the separate
personality between the corporation and its officers with respect to violations of R.A. No. 8282;
thus, an arrest on its officers binds the corporation.

2. The Ambassador Hotel was not deprived of due process when the lower court declared it
liable to SSS. There is no requirement to implead Ambassador Hotel as a party to the criminal
case because it is deemed included therein through its managing head, directors or partners, as
provided by Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282.

It is a basic rule that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Necessarily, when the Information was filed
with the RTC, the civil action against Ambassador Hotel for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the non-remittance of SSS contributions was deemed instituted therein.
As the jurisdiction over Ambassador Hotel was obtained, it became a party in the case and it was
given fair opportunity to present its evidence and controvert the prosecution's evidence. In fine,
the RTC's jurisdiction over Ambassador Hotel continued in spite of Yolanda's acquittal.

17. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RURAL BANK OF HERMOSA

GR. NO. 181953 JULY 25, 2017
Facts:

Respondent is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in Saba,
Hermosa, Bataan, with a total area of 2.1718 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-114713 and T-114714. Respondent voluntarily offered to sell the same to the government
but only the subject land was acquired, and placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, as amended.

Petitioner the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the subject land at P28,282.09 using
the formula under Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. (AO) 17,
Series of 1989, as amended by DAR AO 03, Series of 1991, i.e., LV = (CNI x .70) + (MV x
.30), but respondent rejected the said valuation, prompting the LBP to deposit the said amount in
the latter's name.

After the summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation, the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of Dinalupihan, Bataan rendered a Decision in DARAB
Case No. 035-92 adopting the LBP's valuation. Respondent moved for reconsideration, which
was, however, denied in an Order.

Dissatisfied, respondent filed before the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a
petition seeking the determination of just compensation for the subject land, or in the alternative,
to be allowed to withdraw its voluntary offer to sell should the valuation arrived at be
unacceptable to it.
The RTC found the LBP's valuation as too low and unrealistic, and based on a mere government
valuation policy and not on its market value as reflected on the tax declarations for the two (2)
parcels of land. It gave credence to the testimony of the geodetic engineer who made the
relocation survey and claimed that he would be willing to pay the price of P30.00 per sq. m.
therefor considering its accessibility to the national road and its location which is a mere ½
kilometer away from a school and about 50 meters away from a Catholic church.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the RTC's valuation fixing the
just compensation for the subject land at P30.00 per sq. m.
Ruling:
Yes. "Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, such as in this
case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation
should be determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657," as amended.

"For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking," or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) are issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries. In addition, the factors
enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the
land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment
made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.

It is well to emphasize that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Thus,
the "justness" of the enumeration of valuation factors in Section 17, the "justness" of using a
basic DAR formula, and the "justness" of the components (and their weights) that flow into such
formula, are all matters for the courts to decide.
In the present case, the CA merely upheld the just compensation fixed by the RTC which
considered only the nature of the land's use, and its assessed value based on the tax declarations,
without a showing, however, that the other factors under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended,
were taken into account or otherwise found to be inapplicable, and completely disregarded the
pertinent DAR formula contrary to what the law requires. On this score alone, the CA clearly
erred in sustaining the RTC's valuation as having been made in accordance with Section 17 of
RA 6657, as amended.

18. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIGUEL OMENGAN

GR. NO. 196412 JULY 19, 2017
Facts:

Respondent Miguel Omengan was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Ileb,
Nambaran, Tabuk City, Kalinga with an area of 10.001 hectares and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10172.

On March 20, 2000, respondent received a notice of coverage from the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) placing the subject property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Field investigation was then conducted and the property was initially valued by
petitioner at Php 219,524.98.
Respondent rejected the offer. DAR requested petitioner to deposit in the respondent's name the
amount of the initial valuation. Thus, on December 12, 2000, petitioner deposited the sum of Php
219,524.98 in cash and agrarian reform bonds.

On March 10, 2005, DAR, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, requested the Office
of Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for Kalinga for preliminary determination of just
compensation.
In a Decision, the PARAD noted that since the property was taken in 2000, the unit market value
(UMV) for the year 2000 which is Php 18,940/ha as certified by the Municipal Assessor of
Tabuk, Kalinga should have been applied instead of the 1994 Schedule of Base UMV of Php
15,780/ha used by petitioner. The PARAD further noted that the selling price of palay per kilo in
2000 as certified by the National Food Authority (NFA) in the amount of Php 10 should have
been used in the computation of the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) and not petitioner's baseless
valuation of Php 6.50/k.Finally, the PARAD sustained petitioner's valuation of the idle portion of
four has, the same not having been contested by respondent.
On the ground that the subject property is considered as one of Tabuk City's potential growth
area for urban expansion, the RTC-SAC granted an additional valuation of Php 40,000 per ha or
an additional MV of Php 400,000, for a total just compensation of Php 706,850 for the 10.001
hashe ground that the subject property is considered as one of Tabuk City's potential growth area
for urban expansion, the RTC-SAC granted an additional valuation of Php 40,000 per ha or an
additional MV of Php 400,000, for a total just compensation of Php 706,850 for the 10.001 has.
Issues:
(1) whether the formula for determining just compensation prescribed under DAR A.O. No.
5-98 was complied with
(2) whether the CA correctly imposed a six percent (6%) interest on the amount of just
compensation pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 13-94
Ruling:
(1) In determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC necessarily works within the parameters
set by law and as such, should take into account the formulae provided by DAR. Be that
as it may, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, are not
strictly bound to apply the DAR formulae to its minute detail when the situation does not
warrant the formula's strict application. The RTC, in the exercise of its judicial function
of determining just compensation, cannot be restrained or delimited in the performance of
its judicial function of determining just compensation as to do so would amount to a
derogation of its judicial prerogative. the RTC-SAC granted an MV of Php 40,000 per ha
for the entire area or an additional Php 400,000 to be paid as just compensation because it
took into consideration the property's potential to be an area ideal for urban expansion.
 Such additional valuation cannot be sustained as the measure of the value of the property
should be at the time when the loss resulted, i.e., as of the time of taking in March 2000.
What is more, such additional valuation cannot be considered "just" for lack of reliable
and actual data to support the same. Trial courts are reminded, time and again, to be
circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering
that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.

(2) There is no need to resolve whether DAR A.O. No. 13-94, which is specifically made
applicable to lands covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, also applies to lands
covered by R.A. No. 6657 as case law settles and instructs that the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated property amounts to an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. In the instant case, the interest is to be imposed only on the balance of
the final just compensation, i.e., the final just compensation (Php 500,820.125) less the
amount of the initial valuation (Php 219,524.98) or Php 281,295.145. Since petitioner's
initial valuation had been contested, and it has been subsequently determined that the
expropriated property had been undervalued, an interest on the balance or the difference
between the amount already paid and the final just compensation is proper.

19. Philippine National Bank vs. Jumelito T. Dalmacio

G.R. No. 202308. July 5, 2017

Facts:
Dalmacio was a utility worker and Martinez was a communication equipment operator, they
were hired by National Service Corporation, a subsidiary of PNB. Years later, Dalmacio became
an Information Technology (IT) officer of PNB, while Martinez became a Junior IT Field
Analyst. PNB implemented their redundancy program and in effect on September 15, 2005,
Dalmacio and Martinez were dismissed. A complaint was filed for illegal dismissal, under
payment of separation pay and retirement benefits, illegal deduction, and nonpayment of
provident fund.

Labor Arbiter Rioflorido ruled that PNB complied with the law and jurisprudence in terminating
the services of the complainants on the ground of redundancy. This decision was appealed but
NLRC affirmed and ruled that there is no showing of bad faith on PNB’s part in undertaking the
redundancy program. Dalmacio and Martinez filed for an MR but was denied so they filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA who affirmed the NLRC Resolution and stated that
“principles of justice and fair play call for…the subtraction of the GSIS Gratuity Pay is
inappropriate, therefore the same should be returned.”

Issue:
W/N PNB validly implemented its redundancy program?

Ruling:
YES, PNB validly implemented its redundancy program.
It bears stressing that the LA, the NLRC, and the CA, all ruled that PNB validly effected its
redundancy program. The CA held that it found by the labor tribunals, the redundancy program
was an exercise of a sound business judgment which We ought to respect and is beyond the
ambit of Our review powers absent any showing that it is violative of the Labor Code provisions
or the general principles of fair play and justice.

Such being the case, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when
they coincide with those of the LA and, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded
respect and even finality by this Court. Thus, absent a showing of an error of law committed by
the court or tribunal below, or of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, or a
demonstrable lack of basis for its conclusions, this Court may not disturb its factual findings.

One of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee is redundancy. It exists when the
service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the
demands of the business enterprise. A position is redundant when it is superfluous, and
superfluity of a position or positions could be the result of a number of factors, such as the over-
hiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a particular line or
service previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.

It has been ruled that an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees that are
necessary for the operation of its business. For the implementation of a redundancy program to
be valid, however, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice
served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least
one month prior to the intended date of termination of employment; (2) payment of separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service; (3) good faith in abolishing
the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to
be declared redundant and accordingly abolished, taking into consideration such factors as (a)
preferred status; (b) efficiency; and (c) seniority, among others.

PNB’s redundancy program was neither unfair nor unreasonable considering that it was within
the ambit of its management prerogative. Petitioner, being an IT officer whose job is to maintain
the computer system of PNB, his position has become patently redundant upon PNB’s
engagement of the contract service with Technopaq. He was duly informed of PNB’s move to
contract the services of Technopaq and as a result thereof, there were positions that were
declared redundant.
20. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Susie Irene Galle
G.R. No. 171836. October 2, 2017

Facts:
On September 22, 2014, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) argued that it was improper for the
Supreme Court to declare null and void the DARAB’s Decision which fixed just compensation
on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of 1993, the time of taking of
the subject property. The DARAB decision is already final and executory and thus beyond
judicial review, even by the Supreme Court.

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise insisted that the DARAB Decision is correct;
that the 1991 valuation is accurate since the actual taking of Galle's property for purposes of
fixing just compensation may be said to have occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage
was served upon Galle; that a property valuation discrepancy of three years is not significant in
the determination of just compensation due to the owner of expropriated property.

CA stated that in the crucial choice of the applicable formula for determination of the land value
of the subject properties, it is needed to ascertain whether the 3 factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.

The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) factor

This refers to the difference between the gross sales (AGP x SP) and total cost of operations
(CO) capitalized at 12%, expressed in the following equation form:

It is to be noted that DAR did not comply with Sec. 16 of RA 6657 which states that there needs
to be a notice to acquire the land to the owners and an actual inspection by LBP and DAR. Also,
LBP already stated that in November 1995, a re-evaluation of the Galle property was made by
LBP taking into consideration the factors under DAR AO 06-94, where the valuation was
Php7,534,063.91. LBP would now insist that the applicable order is AO 02-09. No explanation
was given by LBP for their sudden shift to AO 2 instead of AO 6 in their determination of just
compensation. This change of theory of the case results in undue surprise to the opposite party,
and offends the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

Issue:
W/N DAR AO 06-94 should be the basis for computing just compensation?

Ruling:
YES, DAR AO 06-94 should be the basis for computing just compensation.
DAR AO 02-09 seeks to strengthen the comprehensive reform program and provides for the
continuing acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands covered under CARP for a period of
5 years under various phases, and the simultaneous provision of support services and the delivery
of agrarian justice to Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs). Out of that coverage are Galle's
properties which had already been taken as far back as 1993.

Galle's properties were compulsorily acquired. Yet, the date of coverage of her properties has
remained uncertain. Nowhere in the records is it shown that Galle had been notified. A notice of
land valuation dated August 25, 1992 in the amount of P6,083,545.26 was allegedly offered and
it further states that the Notice of Acquisition is dated January 21, 1991 or 19 months earlier,
contrary to the law's mandate.

Court opines that the failure of DAR to notify the landowner as mandated by law had effectively
and unduly prevented the landowner from submitting the required statement of income and other
proofs to show the clear 􏰀financial condition of the estate. Securing and unduly relying on
indirect, tangential, and largely secondary information de􏰀finitely create a significant impact on
the CNI factor and its reliability and fairness.

Considering that CNI factor is not present, it is proper to use the following formula in AO 6, as
amended, in computing just compensation for Galle: When the CNI factor is not present, and CS
and MV are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

Applying the formula LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1), the value of the property would be:

The just compensation due to Galle be set at Php397,680,657.315. The Supreme Court
consistently defined just compensation as 'the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator,' and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due
process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

The Court would like to emphasize that while the agrarian reform program was undertaken
primarily for the bene􏰀t of our landless farmers, this undertaking should, however, not result in
the oppression of landowners by pegging the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, although the
taking of properties for agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, it
should not be carried out at the undue expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection
under the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.

Eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government.

However, such power is not boundless; it is circumscribed by two constitutional requirements:
"first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." The taking of private lands under the agrarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In computing the just
compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the 'value
of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment. The time of
taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such
as when title is transferred to the Republic. The ultimate determination of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings remains a judicial prerogative