Risk Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01104.

Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis

Approach for Emergency Response

Xuewei Ji,1,2 ∗ Wenguo Weng,1 and Weicheng Fan1

Emergency response is directly related to the allocation of emergency rescue resources. Effi-
cient emergency response can reduce loss of life and property, limit damage from the primary
impact, and minimize damage from derivative impacts. An appropriate risk analysis approach
in the event of accidents is one rational way to assist emergency response. In this article, a
cellular automata-based systematic approach for conducting risk analysis in emergency re-
sponse is presented. Three general rules, i.e., diffusive effect, transporting effect, and dissipa-
tive effect, are developed to implement cellular automata transition function. The approach
takes multiple social factors such as population density and population sensitivity into con-
sideration and it also considers risk of domino accidents that are increasing due to increasing
congestion in industrial complexes of a city and increasing density of human population. In
addition, two risk indices, i.e., individual risk and aggregated weighted risk, are proposed to
assist decision making for emergency managers during emergency response. Individual risk
can be useful to plan evacuation strategies, while aggregated weighted risk can help emer-
gency managers to allocate rescue resources rationally according to the degree of danger in
each vulnerable area and optimize emergency response programs.

KEY WORDS: Cellular automata; domino effect; emergency response; risk analysis; social factors

1. INTRODUCTION exposure to disaster impacts. In an effort to minimize

Disasters occur frequently, taking the form of
floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, terrorism, and
nuclear and hazardous material accidents.(1–3) These
emergency situations can result in great loss of life
and property. Public awareness of hazards, emer-
gencies, and disasters has increased as the cost of
disasters has increased dramatically. Rapid popula-
tion and economy growth in the most hazardous geo-
graphical areas of the country have created increased
1 Center for Public Safety Research, Department of Engineering
Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China.
2 School of Aerospace, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China.
∗ Address correspondence to Xuewei Ji, Center for Public Safety
Research, 4F, Section 1, the West Main Building, Tsinghua Uni-
versity, Beijing, P. R. China; 100084; tel: +86-10-62792402;
jixuewei00@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn.
the potential and subsequent impact of disasters on
life and property, emergency response has received
more and more attention.(4,5)
Emergency response is “applying science, tech-
nology, planning, and management to deal with ex-
treme events that can injure or kill large numbers of
people, do extensive damage to property, and dis-
rupt community life.”(3) Emergency response is di-
rectly related to the supplies of manpower and ma-
terial resources for preventing accidents in an urban
area, as well as the quantum of monetary resources
to be committed for the purpose. Efficient emer-
gency response can reduce loss of life and property,
limit damage from the primary impact, and minimize
damage from derivative impacts. An appropriate risk
analysis approach in the event of accidents is one ra-
tional way to conduct efficient emergency response.
Risk is defined as the likelihood that an event will

1247 0272-4332/08/0100-1247$22.00/1 
C 2008 Society for Risk Analysis
1248
occur at a given location within a given time pe-
riod and inflict casualties and damage.(6,7) For about
10 years, many methodologies have been developed
to undertake a quantitative risk assessment, e.g.,
MCAA (maximum credible accident analysis),(8)
FTA (fault tree analysis) study,(9) or any other ex-
ercise in loss prevention and safety implementation
whose essential inputs come from the probability and
the enormity of the likely accidents. However, it has
been found that a risk analysis approach to serve
emergency response during accidents is still missing
in literatures. The methodologies mentioned above
cannot be applied to emergency response.
First, as we know, emergency response is urgent
and the emergency managers need to know the risk
of an accident scene as soon as possible. Accuracy
and rapidity are two crucial factors for risk analysis
that can determine success or failure of the emer-
gency response. Accident modeling is the foundation
of risk analysis, so simulating the accident spread-
ing accurately and rapidly is very important. Em-
pirical formulas(10,11) or partial difference equations
(PDEs)(12–14) are usually used to model accidents in
risk analysis in previous studies. However, an empir-
ical formula method is simple but not very accurate,
while the PDE method is accurate but computation
time consuming. One needs to develop an approach
that is both accurate and rapid.
Second, the common feature of some method-
ologies described above is that the accident impact is
usually assumed to propagate outward from the ac-
cidental epicenter in a radically symmetrical fashion.
With this basic assumption, the impact areas of these
accidents are denoted with circles. The areas corre-
sponding to, say, 100%, 50%, and 25% probability of
death due to an accident are bounded by circles of
increasing radii, with the accident site serving as the
center of the circles. But in real situations, the condi-
tions prevailing in the neighborhood of the accident
epicenter are rarely homogeneous. The area of im-
pact of an accident shall have an irregular shape.
Third, recently, domino accidents are more com-
mon on account of increasing congestion in indus-
trial complexes and increasing density of human
population around such complexes.(15) However, the
domino effect is often neglected or is badly dealt
with due to lack of related scientific support during
emergency response. The explosion in Jilin chemical
plant of China in 2005 leading to a series of emer-
gencies, which formed an emergency chain, is the
best example. Therefore, in this complex emergency
response decision-making process, a systematic risk
Ji, Weng, and Fan
analysis approach incorporating the domino effect is
very necessary.
Furthermore, it is important for the emergency
managers to realize that not only technical aspects
but also political, psychological, and social processes
all play an important role in risk analysis during
emergency response.(4) Without doubt, some social
factors such as population density and population
sensitivity can directly affect emergency response.
During emergency response, a sparsely populated
area with high individual risk may be not the area in
most need of rescue resources. In contrast, the area
with high individual risk and dense population is the
most dangerous area and needs more attention. The
constitution of the population is of great importance
due to the vulnerability variation of different popu-
lation groups to the hazards, such as children, elderly
people, and patients. Accordingly, incorporation of
some social factors into risk analysis is necessary.
Based on the above considerations, a cellular
automata-based systematic approach is presented to
assist emergency response. The approach can fore-
cast the risk of a single accident as well as a chain
of accidents (domino effect) and deal with hetero-
geneous environmental conditions. It can also sys-
tematically consider multiple factors such as popula-
tion density and population sensitivity. To meet the
requirements of accuracy and rapidity during emer-
gency response, a cellular automata (CA) method is
adopted. After analyzing the spreading mechanism
of various accidents, three common rules (diffusive
effect, transporting effect, and dissipative effect) are
proposed to define cellular automata transition func-
tion. Besides, two risk indices are adopted, e.g., in-
dividual risk and aggregated weighted risk, to assist
decision making for emergency managers. Individual
risk can be used as prewarning information to help
the people who are likely to be affected to select the
appropriate escape routes. Aggregated weighted risk
can help emergency managers to allocate rescue re-
sources rationally according to the degree of danger
in each vulnerable area and optimize emergency re-
sponse programs.
CA is a class of automata defined on the simula-
tion space divided into discrete areas called “cells,”
and was developed by John von Neumann and
Stanislaw Ulam in the United States.(16,17) Though
the purpose of developing CA was said to model
a self-reproducing machine or to understand the
mechanism of a neural system, it is currently being
employed in diverse fields such as architectural de-
sign, ecology, epidemiology, environmental hazard
Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis 1249

management, genetics, medical sciences, road traffic ∂φ   ∂ 2φ ∂φ


flow modeling, cryptography, image processing, ur- = i 2 − Ui + Sφ , (4)
∂t i=x,y,z
∂i ∂i
ban dynamics modeling, and others.

where i represents the coordinates in which the pro-

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND cesses are considered.
A physical quantity called accident intensity is Accident intensity spreading is dominated by
defined here to express the common characteristic two ingredients: “inner factor” and “outer factor.”
of various accidents, which describes the ability of The dynamics of propagation of the intensity is first
an accident to cause losses to life and property. It controlled by the diffusive effect, which is the inner
expresses different meanings in different accidents, factor. This implies that intensity flux liberated from
such as blast waves and shrapnel in explosions, gas the accident epicenter travels outward to the adjoin-
concentration in toxic gas dispersion, and so on. The ing cells and once each of these incident cells become
risk assessment here is performed by evaluating in- saturated with the intensity, they in turn begin to act
dividual risk for each cell and aggregated weighted as new intensity sources and the intensity flux begins
risk for a cluster of cells where population density to diffuse from these cells into their respective neigh-
and population sensitivity are taken into considera- borhoods. The intensity gradient, which expresses
tion. Population density reflects the population mag- different meanings in different accidents, is the driv-
nitude per unit area, and population sensitivity in- ing force governing this outward propagation of the
dicates the constitution of the general population. intensity flux. It means concentration gradient in
Individual risk (t+1 IRij ) is deemed to be a function of toxic gas dispersion and temperature gradient in heat
accident intensity (t+1 AIij ) and population sensitivity spreading and so on. According to common sense,
(PSij ), while aggregated weighted risk (t+1 AWRij ) de- accident spreading is also influenced by some outer
pends on individual risk (t+1 IRij ), population density factors. For example, wind and terrain slope will af-
(PDij ), and population sensitivity (PSij ). They can be fect the distribution of the toxic gas concentration
expressed as follows: and temperature difference between the ambience
  and the accident hazards will result in convection. We
t+1
IRij = f t+1 AI ij , PSij (1) say that the intensity propagation is also governed by
t+1  the transporting effect. The dissipative effect is also
t+1
AWRij = f IRij , PDij , PSij . (2) an important outer factor, which perhaps changes the
way of the intensity spreading. While spreading, bar-
2.1. Cell Accident Intensity State Analysis riers such as building, river, trees, and sedimentation
may all weaken the accident intensity.
In most accidents, such as fires and gas disper- Based on above analysis, three common rules
sion, the phenomenon of accident intensity spread- can be extracted, i.e., diffusive effect, transporting ef-
ing in an isotropic medium can be expressed by the fect, and dissipative effect, which the accident inten-
following equation: sity spreading obeys. Three generalized coefficients
     
∂ϕ ∂ ∂ϕ ∂ ∂ϕ ∂ ∂ϕ are defined to illustrate the three rules:
= x + y + z
∂t ∂x ∂x ∂y ∂y ∂z ∂z
∂ ∂ ∂ (1) Diffusive coefficient (): the ability of inten-
− (Uϕ) − (Vϕ) − (Wϕ) + Sϕ , (3) sity spreading from high intensity to low in-
∂x ∂y ∂z
tensity. It is the intrinsic attribute of the ac-
where ∂ϕ/∂t is the rate of transfer per unit space, ϕ is cident intensity spreading.
intensity of spreading accident,  is the diffusive co- (2) Transporting coefficient (τ ): the ability that
efficient describing transmissivity or conductance of environment transports the intensity.
the medium, U, V, and W are the convective coeffi- (3) Dissipative coefficient (α): the ability that
cient describing the degree of convection, and Sϕ is outer factors weaken (strengthen) the
the source intensity of accident epicenter. The term intensity.
∂
∂x
(x ∂ϕ
∂x
) + ∂∂y ( y ∂ϕ
∂y
∂
) + ∂z (z ∂ϕ
∂z
) expresses diffusive
effect and the term ∂ x (Uϕ) + ∂∂y (Vϕ) + ∂z
∂ ∂
(Wϕ) ex- The three general coefficients are critical for sim-
presses transporting effect. The above equation may ulation results, and they may be functions of other
be generalized as: physical quantities in some complex scenarios. They
1250 Ji, Weng, and Fan

 t+1 
express different meanings in different accidents. For t+1
AI ij = t AI ij + τ neighbor AI neighbor − t+1 AI ij
example, the diffusive coefficient expresses gas dif- neighbor
fusive coefficient in toxic gas dispersion, while it → →
means thermal energy diffusive coefficient in heat  r · Uij t+1 
= AI ij +
t
n AI neighbor − t+1 AI ij ,
spreading. rneighbor
neighbor
Under two-dimensional situations, “Moore (7)
neighborhood,” which comprises of eight immediate →
neighbors to each cell, is used. The amount of where rneighbor and r are respectively scalar and vec-
the accident intensity in a cell ij(t+1 AIij ) at time tor indicating the distance between neighborhood
step t + 1 would depend on the magnitude of the cells and target cell, n is the distance impact factor,
→
intensity present in the cell at the time t (t AIij ), and Uij is a vector indicating the direction of accident
the magnitude of the intensity present in neigh- spreading.
borhood cells at the time t + 1 (t+1 AINeighbour ),
(3) Dissipative effect rule.
and attributes of the cell and its neighborhood
cells’ ( i j , τ i j , α i j ). The attributes of each cell We regard the dissipative effect as a “barrier,”
include accident intensity state, natural factors, and which is considered to be a property of the cell. The
hazardous factors. Natural factors refer to wind effect of barriers is likely to be anisotropic, e.g., the
velocity, wind direction, barriers, and so on. Haz- effect of a wall as a barrier to toxic dispersions de-
ardous factor expresses whether there are potential pends on wind direction. The anisotropy of barriers
hazardous sources in the cell or not, which may is not discussed here, and an isotropic effect of bar-
cause derivative accidents. The transition function riers is assumed. That is to say, if there is a “barrier”
to compute accident intensity is established as in the cell ij, the accident intensity increases or de-
follows: creases certain amount of quantity linearly. The rule
  based on the above assumption is expressed as:
t+1
AI ij = f t AI ij , t+1 AI Neighbor , ij , τij , αij . (5)    
t+1
AI ij = 1 − t+1 αij f t AI ij , t+1 AI Neighbor , ij , τij ,
(1) Diffusive effect rule. (8)
where αij is positive if barriers weaken the intensity,
Two types of neighbors depending upon their
and negative otherwise.
orientation around the central cell—the adjacent
Incorporating above three rules, the cell transi-
neighbors and nonadjacent neighbors—are consid-
tion function can be set up:
ered.(18) Thus:  
   t+1
AI ij = t AI ij + 1 − t+1 αij
t+1
AI ij = t AI ij + ij ωa t+1
AI adjacent − t+1 AI ij ⎡
adjacent   
 t+1  × ⎣ij ωa t+1
AI adjacent − t+1 AI ij
+ ij ωb AI nonadjacent − t+1 AI ij , adjacent
nonadjacent  t+1 
(6) + ij ωb AI nonadjacent − t+1 AI ij
nonadjacent
where ωa is the adjacent neighbor’s weight to the tar- ⎤
→ →
get cell and ωb is the nonadjacent neighbor’s weight.  r · Uij t+1 
The two coefficients obey the following relationships: + AI neighbor − t+1 AI ij ⎦ .
rn
ωa > ωb, ωa + ωb = 1. neighbor neighbor

(2) Transporting effect rule.
In this approach, the transporting effect is sup-
posed to be only affected by the cell, the line between
whose center and the target cell’s is not orthogonal
with the transporting force direction. The distance
between neighborhood cells and target cell is also an
impact factor. Thus:
(9)
2.2. Domino Effect Analysis
To study the domino effect, the cells are sorted
into two categories, general cells (cellg ) and haz-
ardous cells (cellh ). General cells are the cells that
do not contain the potential hazardous source, and
the hazardous cells are the cells that contain the
Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis
potential hazardous source and serve as potential
seed cells. The domino effect is performed through
two levels.(15)
At the first level, a screening of all the hazardous
cells is done in order to identify hazardous cells and
general cells. Then, we need to determine whether
certain hazardous cell can cause accidents accord-
ing to the accident intensity the cell has perceived.
For this purpose, three methods have been proposed
in the literatures: (1) vulnerability threshold mod-
els (the physical effect on the secondary target is
higher than a threshold value for damage and then
domino effect happens);(19–21) (2) propagation func-
tions based on empirical decay relations for physical
effects;(22) (3) propagation functions based on spe-
cific probabilistic models.(23,24)
At the second level, a more detailed analysis is
conducted to compute the intensity states of all cells
under domino effect. After obtaining the intensity
states of all cells resulting from the primary accident
at a time t, we further judge which cell can be served
as the seed cell based on the method referred at the
first level. In the next time step, simulation is per-
formed based on the propagation occurring from all
seeds. With time going by, we will analyze the tertiary
accident, the quartus accident, and so on in the same
way. In the approach, the vulnerability threshold
model is used. The domino effect can be expressed
as:
If t AI ij > AI threshold
ij , t+1 AI ij = accident epicenter
 
otherwise t+1 AI ij = f t AI ij , t+1 AI Neighbor , ij , Uij , αij .
(10)
2.3. Individual Risk and Aggregated Weighted
Risk Analysis
Accident intensity provides a basis for systematic
comparison of different exposure. However, in case
of emergency response, the emergency managers are
more concerned about human lives rather than ac-
cident intensity itself. Furthermore, accident inten-
sity from different phenomena, e.g., thermal heat
flux and toxic concentration is not directly compa-
rable. On the other hand, the type of health dam-
age that an exposure might cause provides a common
basis that allows direct comparison.(25) In the pro-
posed approach, we will only consider death proba-
bility of an exposed individual. The probability can
be calculated from the physical effects and the es-
timated time of exposure using probit models for
1251
human vulnerability.(26,27) The probit function for fa-
tal injuries can be expressed as:
 
t+1
Pij = (5 − m/σ ) + (1/σ ) ln t+1 AI nij × t , (11)
where t+1 Pij is the probit value, m is the mean value
of the intensity fatal to population, and σ is the stan-
dard deviation, both of which are from experiments
on animals or the historical data.
Based on the assumption that the strength of the
human body to accident intensity is normally dis-
tributed with mean value of 5 and standard deviation
of 1,(25) the probability of loss of life in cell ij on re-
ceiving certain accident intensity AI ij is given by:
 t+1 Pij −5  2
1 u
t+1
IRij = √ exp − du. (12)
2π −∞ 2
The approach proposed here to treat a sensi-
tive population is based on the assumption that the
mean value of intensity fatal to a sensitive population
is lower than the mean value of intensity fatal to a
normal population, and also that the standard devia-
tion σ of the distribution for a sensitive population is
lower than the standard deviation for a normal popu-
lation. Suitable probit function can be generated for
the estimation of individual risk to a sensitive popu-
lation through adjusting σ and m.(28)
The overall individual risk due to contempo-
rary exposition to different types of physical ef-
fects (e.g., a toxic release and a fire, and so on)
is also considered. It is calculated as a combina-
tion of each related individual risk. The combination
can be performed by different strategies. Individual
risk is actually probability value; thus probabilistic
rules are required for the combination. Four methods
have been reported elsewhere.(29) In the approach,
one can choose one or several methods to compute
the overall individual risk referring to detailed dis-
cussions by Cozzani et al. (2005).
Aggregated weighted risk (AWR) is cited to de-
scribe the risk of a cluster of cells. It expresses “the
relationship between individual risk and the number
of people suffering from a specified level of harm in
a given population from the realization of specified
hazards.”(30) The factor of population density varies
spatially and temporally, that is to say, different cells
have different population density states at different
times. Aggregated weighted risk is calculated by mul-
tiplying population density inside a certain area (A)
with its IR ij level in cell ij. The effect of protection
due to buildings is not accounted for here, so the re-
sults are conservative.
1252
t+1
AWR A = t+1
IRij × PDij (t + 1)d A (13)
A The algorithm evaluates the intensity state of each
2.4. Algorithm of the Systematic Approach
An algorithm of the systematic approach has
been developed (Fig. 1), where simulation starts at
t = 0 and T is the maximum time, user defined. The
study area is divided into a two-dimension lattice of
cells, and the attributes (hazardous factors, natural
factors, and social factors) of each cell are identi-
fied. Seed cells that can cause the primary accidents
Ji, Weng, and Fan
are selected and accident scenarios are developed.
cell in the matrix with respect to the neighborhood
cells, taking into account diffusive effect, transport-
ing effect, and dissipative effect. After obtaining the
intensity state of each cell, we judge whether some
cell contains a potential hazardous source; if yes,
we judge whether the intensity of the cell exceeds
the threshold; if yes, we take the cell as a seed cell in
the next time step. Otherwise, we directly do the next
simulation. During each simulation step, we will take
population density state and population sensitivity
Fig. 1. Algorithm of the cellular
automata-based systematic risk analysis
for emergency response.
Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis
state into consideration. And then, we can get indi-
vidual risk state in each cell and aggregated weighted
risk in a cluster of cells at time t + 1.
The algorithm is run synchronously for every cell
present in the lattice. The emerging scenario includ-
ing domino effect in the subsequent time step is au-
tomated. The algorithm is run repeatedly in order to
generate the scenarios for all subsequent time steps.
This is pursued until the number of time steps be-
comes larger than the user-defined constant. Conse-
quently, the algorithm is able to generate real-time
individual risk and aggregated weighted risk at the
end of every time step.
3. APPROACH APPLICATION: AN
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
3.1. Hypothetical Accident Scenarios
To illustrate the application of the systematic ap-
proach, we made simulations on a fictitious city based
on THU-CPSR city model, which was designed to
simulate a real city with the scale of 5,250 × 4,410 m.
There are two commercial buildings, 10 residential
buildings, two workshops, three LNG gas contain-
ers, and a petrochemical industry in the city. There
Fig. 2. THU-CPSR city model.
1253
are river and virescence areas to separate the indus-
trial and residential areas. Therefore, the model can
represent a complex city with a cluster of potential
hazardous sources and heavy population density. The
city model is shown in Fig. 2.
The fictitious city is divided into uniform grids
of 35 × 35 m. As illustrated in the article, the pur-
pose of the approach proposed here is for risk anal-
ysis during emergency response. According to Abra-
hamsson,(31) the process of risk analysis has a lot of
uncertainty and the more detailed spreading simula-
tion might not play a greater role for the results of
risk.(31) Therefore, the size of cell needs not be too
small. Besides, in our city model, the attribute of each
cell is homogeneous when the size is 35 × 35 m. If the
size is larger, the attribute of some cells may not be
homogeneous. This will bring great trouble for the
computations and may affect the precision of the re-
sults. Taking the above analysis into consideration,
we think that the size (35 × 35 m) is appropriate in
our example.
L, M, and N (see Fig. 2) are potential hazardous
sources that may cause pool fires. The vulnerable ar-
eas are A to J (see Fig. 2), which represent residential
areas with heavy population. A hypothetical scenario
1254
is used to illustrate the application of the approach.
A gasoline leak in one of the gasholders formed a liq-
uid pool at M and flashing of the liquid gasoline re-
sults in a pool fire. If the thermal intensity at L and N
exceeds the threshold value (10 KW/m2 is used here),
derivative pool fires may happen.
During a fire incident, the dominant form of en-
ergy that causes maximum damage is the thermal
intensity, which propagates via conduction, convec-
tion, and radiation. Therefore, accident intensity ex-
presses thermal intensity in this situation. For pool
fires, there is an initial unsteady phase in which the
burning rate accelerates, a steady state where equi-
librium is achieved, and finally a dying down phase
in which the accident intensity dissipates to zero. The
amount of thermal intensity is influenced by factors
such as pool diameter, flame lip effects, the amount
of fuels, and so on. In most pool fires, it passes
very quickly from unsteady state to steady state.(32,33)
Therefore, only the steady state is considered here,
and thermal intensity from pool fire is considered to
be constant, i.e., 100 KW/m2 .
A constant heat value distribution in space
would be expected from a pool fire having a constant
thermal intensity, but the constant value cannot be
achieved as soon as the fire reaches the stable state. It
needs time for each cell to achieve the constant state
in the steady state. This time is vital for emergency
response. If efficient emergency rescue is performed
during this time, the loss of life and property may be
reduced and a domino effect may also be avoided.
In our approach application, the process will be dis-
cussed.
3.2. Methods
When heat flux passes from the source to the
receptor, significant attenuation of intensity occurs.
The atmospheric conditions are the main factor to
affect diffusivity. Therefore, the following expression
for diffusive parameter has been proposed:(34)
ij = 2.02 × (Pij × r )−0.09 , (14)
where:
 
5328
Pij = 1013.255 × (RHij ) × exp 14.4144 −
Tij
(15)
and r is the length scale of the cells, T ij the ambient
temperature in K at cell ij, and RH ij is the relative-
humidity in cell ij. The weight term for the adjacent
neighbors has been taken as ω a = 0.88 and ω b = 0.12
Ji, Weng, and Fan
for nonadjacent neighbors in this example. The exact
values need to be calibrated based on experiments.
If a strong wind oriented from northeast to
southwest were assumed, the amount of intensity
transported into the cell ij from the northeast neigh-
bors would be more than that from its southwest
neighbors compared to the conditions in the absence
of any wind currents. Transporting effect is affected
by wind in our case study. Here, we do not consider
the effect of wind on pool fire. Instead, we consider
the effect of wind on thermal energy spreading. The
effect of this factor depends on the distance between
neighbor cell and “seed cell” and the direction of
wind. Thus, the magnitude of the transporting coeffi-
cient may be expressed as:
1
τij = uij , (16)
rn
where r is distance from neighbor cell to the “seed
cell,” n is an exponent, and u ij is the directional
constant associated with the specific direction. The
numerical values assigned to these directional con-
stants are selected according to the importance and
degree of the directionality. In this example, we
have assigned to the exponent value 1 for simplic-
ity and we assume the direction of wind is northeast.
So we have une > un = ue > 0, unw = use = 0, usw <
uw = us < 0.
Now, we turn to dissipative effect. Unlike in
the case of an absolute vacuum, the participating
media may attenuate the released thermal inten-
sity due to absorption and scattering. Referring to
Section 2, an isotropic effect of barriers is assumed.
The dissipative coefficients used here obey the prin-
ciple that different objects have different dissipative
ability. The exact values need to be obtained from
experiments.
According to F. P. Lees,(32) the mean value of
the intensity fatal to normal population m is 7.775,
the standard deviation σ is 0.3903. The individual
risk is computed with Equations (11) and (12). The
aggregated weighted risk in the residential areas A
to J were mainly analyzed. The aggregated weighted
risk can be calculated using Equation (13). Table I
presents the information about the population den-
sity, and the total number of the population of each
residential area. We regard population density as
constant in the example for simplicity. The combina-
tion of site monitoring and a GIS database can be
used to obtain the real-time data of population den-
sity in practical application.
Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis
Population
Residential Density
Area No. (no./km2 )
Table I. Population Density and the
Total Number of Population in Each A 31,020
Residential Area B 29,388
C 31,020
D 31,020
E 33,469
3.3. Results and Discussions
The results under homogeneous conditions and
heterogeneous conditions were computed to illus-
trate the CA method’s advantage in treating hetero-
geneous conditions. Here, homogeneous conditions
mean that there exist no intercepting objects in all
cells (α i j = 0). Heterogeneous conditions arise when
there are intercepting objects in some cells and the
conditions are different in different cells. Domino ef-
fect under the two conditions was also analyzed.
Fig. 3 gives the thermal energy varying with time
at potential hazardous sources L and N. A significant
difference of thermal intensity value can be observed
under the two conditions. The thermal intensity un-
der homogeneous conditions is higher than that un-
der heterogeneous conditions at the same time. For
example, at t = 600s, the thermal intensity under ho-
mogeneous conditions is 5.17 KW/m2 and its coun-
terpart is 3.32 KW/m2 at L. A similar conclusion can
Fig. 3. Domino effect analysis. Derivative accident occurs when
the thermal intensity at potential hazardous sources (L and N) is
not less than 10 KW/m2 .
1255
Population
Total Number Residential Density Total Number
of Population Area No. (no./km2 ) of Population
4,484 F 17,143 1,323
4,132 G 4,082 1,323
3,648 H 14,694 1,188
4,750 I 14,694 1,512
5,248 J 14,694 1,584
be obtained at N, and the two values are 8.84 and
6.61 KW/m2 . Due to the impact from the intercepting
objects, time to cause derivative accidents is also dif-
ferent and the existence of intercepting objects can
delay the time. Under homogeneous conditions, L
and N can cause derivative accidents at t = 1005s and
t = 697s and the results are 1425 and 975s under het-
erogeneous conditions.
The contours of thermal intensity were also com-
puted (Fig. 4). The results under homogeneous con-
ditions are regular curves, while the impact of hetero-
geneous conditions on the results can be seen, which
makes the curves not smooth and is closer to real-
ity. One can also conclude that designing isolated
areas to separate an industry area and a residential
area, and different industry areas is advantageous to
reduce accident impact and prevent domino effect.
Comparing the two groups of figures, one can see that
the existence of river and virescence areas greatly re-
duces the thermal intensity. For example, in the area
G thermal intensity has been more than 10 KW/m2
without intercepting objects, but under heteroge-
neous conditions the value is less than 10 KW/m2 at
t = 800s (Figs. 4(C) and 4(D)). At t = 800s, thermal
intensity at N is over 10 KW/m2 and a secondary ac-
cident has happened under homogeneous conditions
(Fig. 4(D)). Due to the absorption of buildings, the
intensity is less than 10 KW/m2 at L and no secondary
accident happened at t = 800s (Fig. 4(C)). The po-
tential hazardous source L received nearly 10 KW/m2
thermal intensity at 1000s (Fig. 4(F)), and the tertiary
accident will occur soon, while the counterpart inten-
sity is only about 5 KW/m2 (Fig. 4(E)), which can-
not cause any derivative accident. Besides, according
to the results, one can determine emergency rescue
time. At t = 975s, the secondary accident occurs at N.
So if emergency rescue power is sent to N during this
time, a secondary accident may be prevented. If not,
at least one can delay the time of the secondary hap-
pening to obtain more time for people evacuation.
Individual risk is analyzed and the simulation re-
sults of individual risk contours are discussed (Fig. 5).
1256
From contours of individual risk, one can obtain the
real-time information about the distribution of in-
dividual risk. As expected, for an emergency man-
ager, individual risk is much more practical than ac-
cident intensity during emergency response. For ex-
Ji, Weng, and Fan
Fig. 4. Contours of thermal intensity
under two conditions at different times.
At t = 0, the accident happened at M.
Figs. A, C, E, and G represents the
results under heterogeneous conditions
and Figs. B, D, F, and H represents the
results under homogeneous conditions.
ample, at t = 800s (Fig. 5(B)), although the thermal
intensity in most of the residential areas is more than
1 KW/m2 , the individual risk is much less than 1 ×
10−6 . Therefore, the manager can easily judge that at
this time most of the residential areas are safe (we
Cellular Automata-Based Systematic Risk Analysis 1257

Fig. 5. Contours of individual risk under

heterogeneous conditions at different
times. At t = 0, the accident happened at
M.

Table II. Aggregated Weighted Risk in the 10 Residential Areas at Different Times

600s 800s 1200s 1600s 2000s 2600s

A 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.05801328

B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.03297678 70.69564293
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00007334 0.45263844
D 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000102 0.00110798 0.20017541 34.11987993
E 0.00000238 0.00072004 0.18783947 4.60474650 98.56040847 1126.08295703
F 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00008104 0.01595472 0.70950394 27.93128237
G 0.00462710 0.07861287 1.46759059 9.16648734 35.34787203 115.56288804
H 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00007405 0.01880954 3.57464209
I 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00005910 0.02229424 1.22450960 46.84007340
J 0.00000000 0.00001079 0.01515049 1.31135140 24.86859071 316.95609140
1258
think that individual risk less than 1×10−6 is safe).
At t = 1200s (Fig. 5(C)), the individual risk around
building G is more than 1 × 10−6 , and the area is not
safe anymore. With time going by, the unsafe area
expands gradually. At t = 2600s (Fig. 5(D)), almost
all residential buildings are in danger except building
A. Besides, according to the contours of individual
risk, emergency managers can issue prewarning in-
formation to guide the people to evacuate. If one ne-
glects tertiary accidents, it is a good strategy to guide
people to evacuate to the northwest area. However, a
high risk source L exists in the north and it will cause
an accident at t = 1425s. Comprehensively consider-
ing these factors, a west side evacuation is strongly
recommended (Figs. 5(E) and 5(F)).
Aggregated weighted risks in the 10 residential
areas were also computed at different time. The re-
sults are given in Table II. Some significant conclu-
sions can be obtained to help emergency managers
allocate emergency rescue resources. For example,
the AWR is very low in all the 10 areas at t = 600s and
t = 800s. At t = 1200s and t = 1600s, the AWR at area
E, G, and J is much higher than that at other areas,
especially area G where the AWR is the highest. At
t = 2000s, the area E is the most dangerous area. Af-
ter t = 2000s, nearly all areas have high AWR. Based
on above analysis, the following resources allocation
strategy is advised: (1) at the first half an hour of
emergency response, more rescue resources should
be sent to E, G, and J; (2) after that, D, F, H, and I
gradually need more resources.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Emergency response is applying science, tech-
nology, planning, and management to deal with ex-
treme events. Developing a meaningful model ca-
pable of conducting emergency response is an ar-
duous task that requires the contributions of many
individuals from several disciplines. The cellular
automata-based systematic risk analysis approach for
emergency response presented here is a preliminary
attempt to contribute to the gigantic efforts.
In this article, three cellular automata transition
rules, which work through diffusion, transport, and
dissipation mechanism, are proposed. The approach
can take multiple factors into account such as physi-
cal and social characteristics of the site and can also
handle domino accidents. As an outcome, two risk
indices are proposed to assist emergency managers
to make decisions. The potential application of the
Ji, Weng, and Fan
proposed approach for risk analysis and emergency
response has been illustrated with an example. The
results demonstrate that the CA method can easily
treat heterogeneous conditions, and give an irregular
shape of the area of impact of an accident, which is
much more realistic assessment for risk analysis. Be-
sides, according to the results, we conclude that indi-
vidual risk is useful to plan evacuation strategies and
aggregated weighted risk can help emergency man-
agers to allocate rescue resources rationally and op-
timize emergency response programs.
In reality, before the approach is brought to bear
on any complex problems, there are three issues mer-
iting special attention. First and foremost, it must
be emphasized that cellular automaton is a compu-
tational tool, whose effectiveness depends upon its
accurate calibration on the basis of data from exper-
imental results as well as those from past accident
histories. Research in these areas has been continu-
ing across the world but needs greater impetus. Be-
sides, discussion of the size of the cells is also needed
according to real problems in the future research.
Secondly, the process of emergency response is very
complicated, and some other social factors may also
affect the results of risk assessment, such as impor-
tant facility density, transportation system density,
rescue power distribution, and so on. The detailed
discussion of those factors should be conducted in
future research. Last but not least, the merit of the
approach should be judged in real-life scenarios, al-
though it is hard. It is a good way to validate and
improve the approach in future emergency response
drills. The data gathered from real cases are also
meaningful for this purpose.
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