ABSTRACT

The current research attempts to impact of ownership structure on firm financial performance.

We checked the impact of ownership structure at their performance base. Examine data from

2010 to 2014 the correlational and regression approach is used to find the relationship between

two dependent variables and independent variables of both family ownership and non-family

ownership. By applying this model the result shows that family owned firms have greater

performance and returns than non-family owned firms. The results shows that due to the better

performance of family ownership as compare to non-family ownership the investors must invest

in family businesses rather than non-family businesses.

 Chapter 1

Introduction
 Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm’s Financial Performance

1.0 Introduction

The family controlled firm or family possession is the most widely recognized type of business

association in the world. A number of studies clarifies that family possession is focal in many

nations.

The aim of this research is to study the impact of demographic sample differences on empirical

research related to the characteristics of family businesses. Various studies, analyze contrasts

between family and non-family firms, have for the most part disregarded that firm demographics

(area, size, age, industry) can twist bivariate examination of administration.

What’s more, execution attributes of both gatherings of firms. Since numerous observational

studies uncovered that family firm’s contrast from non-family firms regarding firm size and age

and that they work in different commercial ventures and areas, some methodological concerns

were put forward in the writing.

The most straightforward type of business took after by world is family claimed or family

controlled firms. Distinctive creators have diverse criteria to characterize the family and non-

family firm. Family firms are vital wellspring of development and monetary improvement.

Family firms are the foundation of Pakistan economy. All world creating nations and created

nation’s economies depend on family firms. Numerous nations have extensive rate of enlisted

firms. As indicated by Yasser 2011 Like United kingdom is a created nation has 75% of enlisted

family firms and India is fall in creating nation having 95% enrolled family firms. Numerous

researchers have diverse perspectives about family proprietorship and non-family possession

firms on the grounds that it is enormous issue to characterize the family firms. Researchers have

set distinctive criteria to clarify the family firms. For instance if the 33% organization shares had
relatives that is fall in family firms generally the organizations is fall in non-family firms. As

indicated by another researcher family firm is, when part of relatives are working in one business

and key position likewise have a relative In that circumstance it is fall in family firms else it is

fall in non-family firms. Distinctive researchers have diverse results concurring their

examination as to efficiency, proficiency and benefit of family firms and non-family firms

(Zulfiqar & Ammar Fayyaz, 2014).

Family-claimed firms have higher profits for resources and profitability than nonfamily-

possessed firms. Family-claimed firms by and large have returns on resources that are 1.6 rates

focuses higher, overall revenues that are 1.1 rate focuses higher, and survival rates that are 2.5

rate focuses higher than non-family-possessed firms. These distinctions are significantly more

grounded for firms in which the two driving shareholders are hitched. The higher returns, overall

revenues, and survival rates in family-possessed firms are combined with more noteworthy

liquidity, or money saves. We observe that family-possessed firms fund a greater amount of their

advantages withheld income and depend less on outside obligation in respect to non-family-

claimed firms.

A firm delegated a family firm when the family has most of the shares and sees the firm’s family

firm. Non-family firms were characterized as firms that don't see themselves as family firms, and

in which a family does not possess most of the shares. This definition is consistent with

Westhead's (1997) definition.

Family firms likewise have lower working expenses, for example, worker compensation, in

respect to non-family-possessed firms. Lower wages, particularly for youthful firms, disclose

near 30% of the liquidity stores of family-possessed firms, and 33% of the benefit scattering.

These examples are predictable with the perspective that family-claimed firms deal with their
money all the more conservatively, spending less of their profit as wages and other working

expenses and holding a greater amount of their income in the firm. The more noteworthy money

stores of family-possessed firms may help them to better climate stuns and signal security to

suppliers, clients, and workers, which may empower them to keep net revenues high and expand

their survival rates. In any case, the progressive money and spending approaches of family-

possessed firms are additionally connected with lower rates of venture and development. (Sharon

Belenzon & Rebecca Zarutskie Z June 26, 2012).

Organizations assess the rate of benefits that are financed by the borrowings. On the premise of

this assessment, firms utilize the borrowings proportion in capital blend of the organization

furthermore use to judge the criticalness of budgetary danger of the companies. The bring down

the obligation proportion; the organization's condition is better. In the study there are two

variables: performance of organization can be measured by the arrival on resources. The ROA

proportion shows better utilization of benefit by firm in particular time period. ROE proportion is

utilized to figure the benefit owing to customary shareholder as rate of organization's value.

Higher ROE speaks to the better money related remaining of the organization (Brown and Caylor

2009).

The significance of family firms all through the world has spurred copious hypothetical and

observational writing, as highlighted in late studies (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and

Cannella, 2007; Martikainen, Nikkinen and Vähämaa, 2008).

They contend the significance of family firms in the beginning phases of a country's economic

advancement their still huge part in all nations as capital markets create. Moreover, highlight the

pervasiveness of family firms in many economies, giving careful consideration to the amassing

of corporate control in the hands of extremely affluent families and the uncommonness of
possession scattering ( Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung 2005.

The possession control focus together with family benevolence prompts lower execution in view

of the nonattendance of business sector components, hazard avoidance, one-sided judgment and

lower observing (Oswald, Muse & Rutherford, 2009).

As needs be, experimental results on the execution of family firms have been blended.

Distinctive positions and examination streams propose that family proprietorship and control is

great, awful or immaterial (Peng & Jiang, 2010).

A family business may be a business affiliation done which decision making may be affected

Toward different eras of a family related Eventually Tom's scrutinizing blood then again

marriage who need guide almost recognized for the firm through heading on the other hand

proprietorship.

For family organizations individuals put resources into the world to have their own business.

Family business can be in type of these orders, through executives of the board, Chief Executive

Officers and supervisors of the organizations from families. Execution of the family possessed

organizations rely on numerous components, for example, financial states of the nation, political

states of the nation and so forth. Family-claimed or controlled organizations represent more than

80% of all organizations in the U.S. family organizations have turned into a critical component in

the corporate economy. This may be on the grounds that family firms were built up quite a while

prior and have demonstrated execution track records. Both researchers and professionals

recognize the effective foundation of family-controlled firms (Ding, Shujun;Wu, Zhenyu ,Journal

of business Ethics; Aug2014, vol 123 issue 2,p183).

A portion of the universes biggest family run organizations are Wal-Mart (united states),Samsung

Group (Korea), Tata bunch (India), and Foxconn (Taiwan).which were established and possessed
by families, have been more focused and predominant in the commercial center. Family claimed

organizations represent more than 30% of organizations with deals over $1 billion.

(Carlock,Randel s; Elizabeth Florent-Treacy 2007).

In a family business, two or more individuals inside of the administration group are drawn from

the owning crew. Family organizations can have proprietors who are not relatives. Family

organizations might likewise be overseen by people who are not individuals from the crew. Be

that as it may, relatives are regularly included in the operations of their family business in some

limit and, in littler organizations, normally one or all the more relatives are the senior officers

and directors. In India, numerous organizations that are now public companies were once family

businesses. One of the benefits of family firms is the feeling of being in control of their fate. By

working some place one has an individual stake, prompting a more prominent sentiment

freedom. For the most part, family firms appear to have a more extended perspective of their

business. Along these lines, family owner managers may have different perspectives towards

their partners, including workers and clients that may influence the nature of their item. Then

again, the organizations and its items influence the character of family gatherings. Any deformity

in the items may think about themselves. Along these lines, family firms may think that it’s ugly

to go for transient monetary profits that will discolor the organization's picture.

A non-family business is a business in which any one can take a section in business, or in which

choice making is not affected by numerous eras of a family related by blood or marriage. Non-

family firms have oftentimes been accounted for to become speedier than family firm.

An inquiry which essentially emerges is whether family organizations perform superior to

anything non-family organizations, and why. The impact of family association is here and there

alluded to as "family impact". Much scholastic consideration has been given to this subject, yet
tragically with blended results. This paper addresses the inquiry what is the flow cutting edge in

the examination on the connection between family association and firms' execution. (Ondrej

Machek ,Martin Brabec & Jiri Hnilica).

The most widely recognized kind of a firm with concentrated possession is the particular case

that is controlled by an individual or a family where a definitive proprietorship rests with the

individual or a crew. already various examines were finished with the broadly held firms (i.e.

firms that don't have an identifiable "single" proprietor and are together keep running by all

shareholders who delegate executives to run the firm) in the spotlight (favero, Giglio, honorati

and panunzi 2006).

A large portion of the organizations around the globe have an overwhelming shareholder who

runs the firm The prevailing shareholder turns into the substance of the firm. The firm, its

victories and disappointments, its highs and low, get to be connected with that overwhelming

shareholder. That predominant substance can be an individual, Government, a remote speculator

or a family (sraer & Thesmar 2006).

A firm keep running by a family is the one where the family is the predominant shareholder who

claims and/or controls the firm. The family may possess the firm in light of the fact that one of

the relatives established the firm, or the family took it over from another person (as an aftereffect

of a securing or merger). Each kind of firm has notable qualities and attributes. One of the

attributes that are regularly connected with family firms is that they demolish the firm esteem.

This is one perspective; there are other people who think generally like Anderson and reeb

(2003) who trust that vicinity of family in the firm prompts an enhanced execution. Examination

has demonstrated that organizations with concentrated possession are not just predominant in

US, UK, Western europe and other created economies but on the other hand are exceptionally
normal in creating economies like Thailand and Pakistan (Ghani and Ashraf (2005). Pakistan, as

expressed, is a creating economy and it has likewise encountered the surge in firms with

concentrated proprietorship. The term that is transcendently used to depict the family controlled

firms is "business Groups" as portrayed by Ghani and Ashraf (2005). Various reasons have been

advanced to legitimize the presence of firms with in gatherings. one reason that is advanced by

them is that gatherings are great at disposing of the risk postured by blemished business sector

data and that they stay united and receive a portfolio approach that permits the constituent

"sister" firms to advantage under the "Gathering umbrella". Society can be huge variable in

nation like pakistan where family relational unions alongside connection, group, race and

religion assume a critical part in forming the hierarchical structure of a firm (Ghani and Ashraf,

2005).

Family organizations convey the heaviness of monetary riches creation in many economies. In

the U.S., Canada and Slovenia, family organizations represent around 80 to 90 percent of the

business undertakings and around 50 percent of the livelihood and GNP (Phan et al. 2005; Dun et

al., 2007).

In nations, for example, those in South and East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, family

organizations are turning out to be considerably more common, with a greater part of private and

publicly exchanged firms either possessed or controlled by families (see Weiping et al 2010).

The pervasiveness of family organizations in many economies has required various research and

level headed discussions in the expansive family business writing. Existing exploration analyze

and contrasts the execution suggestions in the middle of family and non-family firms

furthermore examines how the particular attributes of family business influence firm execution,

particularly those identified with administration structure (see Weiping et al. 2010 for subtle
elements). Family organizations change in the modes and degrees of family inclusion. Endeavors

to catch the shifting methods of family association have indicated a few essential administrations

attribute, for example, family possession, family inclusion in administration, and family control

of the board (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).

1.1 Problem statement

In the modern era most of the firms bear the dilemma of privacy involvement in decision making

but the family owned firm have not faced such problem. The study intends to undertake a

comparison between family and non-family firms. It is very difficult to compare both family and

non-family owned firms. Only through corporate governess it can be compared. But in this study

we cannot adopt the corporate governess. The study aims to distinguish family run firms from

non-family firms by comparing their performances over a period of time (i.e. 2010-2014).

1.2 Objectives of Study

The most fundamental and vital aim of the research is to determine whether type of ownership

has any effect on the firm value. The term “ownership type”, in this study, refers to only family

and non-family ownership. The main focus of this study is as follow;

 Develop understanding of family owned and non-family owned firms.

 To analyse and compare profitability or performance of family owned and non-family

business.

There are several factors that the study intends to correlate with performance of a firm. The

effect of each of those factors on performance of family and non-family firms is analysed. It is

pertinent to mention that size of a firm is a factor that can have an impact on the firm’s overall

performance. Another aspect that the study examines is whether age has anything to do with firm

performance.
1.3 Significance of study

This study helps the investors to understand the ownership pattern practices in the capital market

of Pakistan. It also helps the manager to solve the agency conflict with the shareholder and have

to take sound decision about their corporate policies namely their dividend and debt decisions.

The investors to take decisions about their ownership pattern and they will find it easy to decide

that what are the growth & the return opportunities in both these types family owned & non

family owned firms.

1.4 Research Questions

 Does family owned firms gain more profit than non-family owned firms?

 Does family owned firms & non family owned firms perform better than each other?

1.5 Limitations of study

Our study cannot be made hundred percent precise & accurate because the complete distinction

between family owned firms & non family owned firms is not possible either on shareholding

pattern or corporate governess pattern. In the context and content of topic the research can be

conducted in the global prospective but due to the shortage of time, academic requirement and

cost study is delimited in the boundaries of Pakistan. Another reason is that we take only few

variables for checking the firm performance but there are a lot of other variables which are best

for measuring the family and non-family business performances. And third limitation is that we

derive data of five years only for our research but if we take many others year’s data then maybe

we do the research in better way. We take only listed companies but there are more others

companies which are performing better than listed companies. If we take also some non-listed

companies then may me there comes good result then our research. There is a large population

and we take a small sample size but if we take large sample then there may be a result comes
different. Some of our chosen firms are not showing their correct annual reports and also we

don’t have an access to find out the firm’s annual reports so it is a limitation for us to do our

research.

1.6 Chapter summary

Chapter one describes about the overview of the whole research study. The overview briefed

about the introduction and background of the study, research problem, research objectives,

significance of the study, objective of the study, limitations of study.

 Chapter 2

Literature review
2.0 Literature

Every single world has parcel of consideration about however in Pakistan has little living up to

expectations about the family and non-family possessed firms. We need to talk about Pakistani

setting too. How the connection of the family and non-family firms concerning operation and

dealings. Interior and outer administrator how include with the operations and dealings (Julie C.

Dekker et al. 2012).

Draw the components from the organization hypothesis, the hypothesis for a good fit for the

property and make a fund hypothesis and uniquely that person who build up the proprietorship

structure of the firm. These essayists clear the idea of office expense. Also, clear the association

regarding control issue like partition control (Jensen & Mackling 1976).

It is a common impact in their circumstance between the business sector valuation of the

proprietorship and the firm. Business sector cost of any business whether impact might it is sold

and might thus be affected of likelihood of offer by the way of the proprietor (Demsetz, 1983:

Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In any business association of family goes to lower efficiency.

(Holderness and Sheehan 1988)

How Corporate Governance impacts the family and non-family firms. This study speaks the truth

Pakistani firms. Family possessed firms are assumed an imperative part in Pakistan. Indeed, even

family possessed recorded firms are spine of the economy of the Pakistan. In any case, in

Pakistan has little meeting expectations about the family and nonfamily firms. He is chipping

away at 792 recorded organizations in Pakistan Stock trade. What's more, concentrate on the

execution concerning the Corporate Governance (Qaiser Rafique Yasser 2011).

Concentrate on the efficiency distinction in the middle of family and nonfamily possessed

business. Amid most recent 20 years in every one focus on the productivity difference between
family and nonfamily owned business. During last 20 years in all the words has very much

increase attention for scholars or writers towards the ownership firms. What is method

adopted to give the rights allocation and where and who is owners (Erling Barth et al. 2004).

Focuses on financial performance of non-family businesses and family businesses. She is

studying with Pakistani context. In manufacturing sector play very important role and she study

about manufacturing sectors. Most businesses starting from family businesses. Common form in

the world and also very common form in Pakistan. She collects four years data of 62 non-

financial firms these firms are listed in Karachi stock exchange in Pakistan (Shamaila Jabeen et

al. 2012).

Carmen Galva et al. (2011) emphasis on efficiency of the family and nonfamily possessed firms

like Erling Barth et al. (2004) talk about above about the Spanish firms recorded in stock trade.

Think about the connection between the family and nonfamily recorded firms on the bases of

execution and Behavior, what these organizations needs for shape either that is family firms or

either non-family claimed firms. In this study he gathers the information from 1990 to 2004 of

the Spanish recorded firms.

About Mexican recorded firms in the stock trade. In this study bring two inquiry up in begin of

the study that is critical inquiry, one is family organizations and second question is firm

execution. One side is family organizations and the other side is extremely hard to keep up the

execution of the firm (JM San Martin-Reyna 2012).

This study has a principle issue on corporate account. It is diverse from earlier studies about that;

the fundamental issue is an effect of administration on execution of the organizations. Center the

impact of corporate administration in light of the fact that it is a raising body nowadays. In this

study US 1000 organizations use as a confirmation and from these 1000 organizations draw a
specimen arbitrarily of 100 little level of open constrained organizations (Danny Miller et al.

2007).

In our study, we characterize family-claimed firms as those having no less than two shareholders

that are relatives. Therefore, our emphasis is on family ties between proprietors, as opposed to

family ties in the middle of representatives as well as in the middle of present and future

proprietors. While these last connections in the middle of proprietors and other firm partners

might likewise be corresponded with firm sort and administration style, they are not perceptible

in our information and are consequently past the extent of our study. Family-claimed firms are

predominant and are financially important in our information, as measured by livelihood, deals,

and resources. Family-possessed firms speak to 20% of firms in our example of 210,464

organizations, and 30% of the 130,802 organizations with no less than two shareholders. Family-

possessed firms are predominant over all commercial enterprises, embodying up to half of firms

in such industry fragments as car repair and farming, and as meager as 10% in industry portions,

for example, bookkeeping and publicizing. We locate a significant offer of family-claimed firms

in both high-and low-tech commercial enterprises. For example, near 30% of the organizations in

chemicals are family-possessed, which is fundamentally the same to the offer of family-claimed

firms in building development (28%).

Our examination shows that family proprietorship is connected with more steady and fluid, yet

slower developing, youthful firms. Family-possessed firms have higher profits for resources and

benefit than nonfamily-claimed firms. Family-claimed firms all things considered have returns

on resources that are 1.6 rate points higher, net revenues that are 1.1 rate focuses higher, and

survival rates that are 2.5 rate focuses higher than non-family-possessed firms. These differences

are significantly more grounded for firms in which the two driving shareholders are hitched. The
higher returns, net revenues, and survival rates in family-claimed firms are combined with more

prominent liquidity, or money saves. We observe that family-possessed firms fund a greater

amount of their advantages withheld income and depend less on outside obligation in respect to

non-family-claimed firms.

Family firms likewise have lower working expenses, for example, worker compensation, in

respect to non-family-claimed firms. Lower wages, particularly for youthful firms, disclose near

30% of the liquidity stores of family-possessed firms, and 33% of the productivity scattering.

These examples are predictable with the perspective that family-claimed firms deal with their

money all the more conservatively, spending less of their profit as wages and other working

expenses and holding a greater amount of their income in the firm. The more prominent money

stores of family-possessed firms may help them to better climate stuns and signal strength to

suppliers, clients, and representatives, which may empower them to keep net revenues high and

build their survival rates. In any case, the moderate money and spending strategies of family-

claimed firms are likewise connected with lower rates of venture and development. Deals

development rates of family-claimed firms are all things considered 1.7 rate focuses lower than

for non-family firms, and 11 rate focuses lower for firms less than 10 years old (example

middle). These lower development rates combined with the higher profit for resources of family-

possessed firms recommend that they could put their trade holds in for money firm resources and

gain higher returns in respect to non-family-claimed firms, yet pick not to do as such (Sharon

Belenzon & Rebecca Zarutskie 2012).

It has been noticed that the most widely recognized sort of a firm with concentrated possession is

the particular case that is controlled by an individual or a family where a definitive

proprietorship rests with the individual or a crew. beforehand various inquires about were
finished with the broadly held firms (i.e. firms that don't have an identifiable "single" proprietor

and are mutually keep running by all shareholders who name chiefs to run the firm) in the

spotlight (favero, Giglio, honorati and panunzi 2006).

The majority of the organizations around the globe have a predominant shareholder who runs the

firm). The overwhelming shareholder turns into the substance of the firm. The firm, its triumphs

and disappointments, its highs and low, get to be connected with that overwhelming shareholder.

That predominant element can be an individual, Government, a remote financial specialist or a

family (sraer & Thesmar2006).

A firm keep running by a family is the one where the family is the prevailing shareholder who

possesses and/or controls the firm. The family may claim the firm on the grounds that one of the

relatives 96 established the firm, or the family took it over from another person (as an aftereffect

of a securing or merger). Each sort of firm has particular attributes and qualities. one of the

qualities that are typically connected with family firms is that they destroy the firm esteem

(holderness and sheehan 1988).

This is one perspective; there are other people who think generally like Anderson and reeb

(2003) who trust that vicinity of family in the firm prompts an enhanced execution. exploration

has demonstrated that organizations with concentrated possession are not just pervasive in us,

UK, Western Europe and other created economies but on the other hand are extremely normal in

creating economies like Thailand (Wiwattanakantang(2001)) and Pakistan (Ghani and Ashraf

(2005)). Pakistan, as expressed, is a creating economy and it has likewise encountered the surge

in firms with concentrated possession. The term that is transcendently used to depict the family

controlled firms is "business Groups" as portrayed by Ghani and Ashraf (2005). Various reasons

have been advanced to legitimize the presence of firms with in gatherings. one reason that is
advanced by them is that gatherings are great at dispensing with the risk postured by blemished

business sector data and that they stay united and embrace a portfolio approach that permits the

constituent "sister" firms to advantage under the "Gathering umbrella". society can be enormous

variable in nations like Thailand (Wiwattanakantang, 2001) and Pakistan (Ghani and Ashraf,

2005) where family relational unions alongside connection, group, race and religion assume an

essential part in forming the authoritative structure of a firm. Wiwattanakantang (2001) has

demonstrated that Thai firms structure linkages keeping in view various elements conspicuous

amongst which is between family relational unions. Pakistani society is very little distinctive on

the grounds that race, religion and political affiliations play a vital (once in a while definitive)

part in deciding a company's standpoint and progressive system.

As specified prior family firms in Pakistan work as "Gatherings". These Groups go about as a

solitary element that has various constituent firms which the gathering has obtained either

through merger, securing, cross-shareholdings and interlocked directorships (Ghani & Ashraf

2005 and Naqvi & ikram 2004).

Family organizations are among the longest-lived associations on the planet with some going

back to the 6th century, having weathered the ascent and fall of different state administrations,

subsidence’s including the dull ages, about all the "immense" wars, maladies and starvations, and

different emergencies (e.g.,James, 2006; Landes, 2006).

In any case, the wellsprings of their life span are not surely known. We realize that family is a

vital driver of their life span and manageability (Pieper, 2007).

In any case, proof demonstrates that family impact can likewise have adverse impacts for the

business and the family aggregate (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, &

Scholnick, 2008).
In this way, the accompanying inquiries may be asked: Why do some families organizations

survive and flourish while such a variety of others fall flat? What methods for dealing with the

family business are fruitful? What are the vital ramifications of taking a survival versus a

development introduction? Arrive any qualities of family inclusion that cultivate or repress life

span? Do family objectives (mental and money related) for business impact key introduction?

Family association in possession, administration and administration makes family organizations

not the same as non-family organizations (Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005).

Family can add assets to the business in different routes, through money related, work, scholarly,

social, and trust capital encouraging the choice making and administration forms, in this manner

giving family business an edge over its rivals. The sources from where these assets rise up out of,

the courses in which they change after some time, and the methods through which they can be

supported and safeguarded are not all around investigated (,Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007;

Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Milton, 2008).

Family organizations have the uncommon trademark that proprietorship is held by the

individuals from a family or kinfolk related gathering. Accepting relatives are adjusted in their

qualities and hobbies, have an abnormal state of union, and no outside proprietors (open or

irrelevant proprietors) this gathering can focus the rate of return they require from the business

(Adams, Manners, Astrachan, & Mazzola, 2004) and, subsequently, focus the company's expense

of-value and given the common cost and level of obligation, the company's expense of-capital

(McConaughy, 1999).

This may have a few positive key ramifications: for instance, in light of the fact that the edge of

return for a given danger is lower, a bigger number of undertakings and opportunities can be

checked than would be considered by organizations applying a business cost-of equity. In this
''more extensive net'' the possibilities of discovering an open door with long haul positive result

may increment. Since families have a tendency to contribute for the long haul and the

consistency of danger and return diminishes significantly as time goes on, the possibilities of

such undertakings having an above expected return might likewise increment.

Elements that presumable influence financing and venture choices in family business incorporate

family culture, family attachment, age and size of the family and firm, individual and family

hazard introductions, entrepreneurial qualities, capital structure including level and sort of

obligation (short-versus long haul), and family and business objectives (Naldi, Nordqvist,

Sjo¨berg, & Wiklund, 2007).

Family organizations are characteristically known for traditionalist arranging and natural

extension which could confine their development contrasted with non-family ventures. Then

again, late proof demonstrates that family organizations are not short of procuring bigger

(family-and non-family) organizations to sustain their development, (for example, Hansel’s

securing of Metro AG, Porsche’s takeover of Volkswagen, or Fiat's obtaining of generous

Chrysler resources). In terms of development through internationalization, the outcomes are

blended. Some examination and for the most part story confirmation recommend that family

organizations are moderately ease back to internationalize (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006; Graves &

Thomas, 2006; Okoroafo, 1999).

Experimental proof shows, on the other hand, that family organizations are found to contend

effectively in worldwide markets (Zahra, 2003), some notwithstanding being worldwide business

sector pioneers in their corners (Simon, 2009).

Late research recommends that family impact, and family proprietorship specifically, has a

curvilinear impact on the internationalization of family organizations: moderate levels of

possessions are identified with more elevated amounts of internationalization whereby low and

abnormal amounts of proprietorship are identified with lower levels of internationalization

(Sciascia, Mazzola,Astrachan, & Pieper, 2010).

The greater part of examination explores execution contrasts between traded on an open market

family and non-family firms. To be sure, a late meta-investigation demonstrated that publically

exchanged family firms beat non-family firms (Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens and van

Osterhout 2011).

Nonetheless, as proposed by prior exploration (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella,

2007), this impact can be clarified by the organizer impact. As needs be, more research is

essential on the obliging elements that decrease execution in the middle of first and later era

firms. Here, the family firm culture built up by the author may assume an essential part. What

components of the way of life serve as helpful components that may encourage move and what

components of the family firm culture make inactivity? Moreover, we don't indisputably know

whether the execution distinction exists between private family and non-family firms. Littler

firms may be considerably more inclined to seek after non-monetary objectives as a feature of

their general society, which may not so much be correlative with financial execution objectives,

as examination on unbalanced unselfishness shows (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz,

2001).

In the meantime, the advantages of a stewardship society in family firms may counterbalance

some negative impacts and improve execution (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Eddleston &

Kellermanns, 2007). The cutting edge may confront a noteworthy decision about whether they go

into the family business (Zellweger, Sieger, & Halter, 2011).

Then again, the cutting edge may choose to make an autonomous new firm or get to be
entrepreneurial inside of a company. The companies ‘culture relating to development may drive

these choices, as it gives a scenery to extra elements including individual decision, limit of the

family firm to bolster all the more relatives, and so forth. Besides, the effects of a fizzled family

firm on the entrepreneurial endeavors of the cutting edge merit exact consideration. A fizzled

family firm may remove a course to business as well as prompt a lamenting process and make

hesitance to seek after an entrepreneurial vocation. While examination has attracted

consideration regarding section into business enterprise by the posterity of business people, at

present, we know minimal about how these way out procedures influence the following

generation (Shepherd, 2003).

The part of family systems may give a valuable device to consider the association of cutting edge

relatives and family firm execution, as these systems offer access to business opportunities.

These systems may offer the new era chances to substantiate themselves or give access to fund

start-up circumstances (Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Wu, 2011).

Yet, with a specific end goal to better comprehend the conduct of the new era of relatives, both

the entreprenuring society of the family and the entrepeneuring society of the firm and their

potential association impacts should be concentrated on (see additionally Hoy & Sharma, 2010;

Nordqvist & Melin, 2010).

In fact, family firm proprietors are prone to give numerous opportunities to the new era and are

liable to encourage open doors for them. Case in point, late research demonstrates that in the

event of a deal, the family firm would be sold at a huge rebate to relatives contrasted with non-

relatives (Zelleweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, in press).

What's more, as not all relatives may work in or own the same association, a gander at the

general arrangement of firms and the interrelationships amongst them, could yield intriguing
experiences. By and large, trans-generational business in family firms has begun to increase

colossal interest (e.g., Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Niedermeyer, Jaskiewicz, & Klein, 2010;

Slavato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010) and has focused on hierarchical society as a main thrust (i.e.

Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010).

There is no broad agreement on the most proficient method to characterize a family firm, rather a

few unique definitions exist (Casillas & Acedo, 2007; La Porta et al., 1999). A late research

report on family business in Europe reasoned that there exist more than 90 different definitions

of what a family firm really is (Mandl, 2008).

Most definitions have, on the other hand, in like manner that they identify with proprietorship,

control, and administration of the firm. Case in point, Villalonga and Amit, (2006), characterize a

family firm as a firm that has the originator of the firm, a blood relative, or an in-law going about

as a CEO or as a square holder, though La Porta et al., (1999) utilization different levels of

control (10 and 20 percent of voting rights) when characterizing family firms.

Astrachan and Shanker, (2003) set up three criteria for family firms. The main paradigm alludes

to the proprietorship share that the organizer family has in the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a;

Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The second foundation alludes to whether the family has vital control

of the firm (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). The third rule considers the family's contribution in the

administration of the firm and aim to keep the firm inside of the family (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz,

2004).

A few procedures of corporate control influencing associations' accomplishment of targets, and

among them is the proprietorship structure. It is a critical strategy, especially in firms claimed by

a family or by a gathering of families. This is on account of the organizations' targets are

interrelated with those of the family and proprietors who are maintaining so as to ensure the
family motivation the autonomy of their organization Jensen and Meckling (1976) .

It is a typical conviction that the arrangement between the controlling family's hobbies and the

other shareholders' hobbies is predominant in family organizations, attributable to the family's

overwhelming possession and their long haul presence (Wang, 2005).

This prompted various studies that analyzed the connection between family proprietorship and

firm execution. Notwithstanding, the outcomes have so far been vague (Sciascia & Mazzola,

2008).

Jensen and Meckling (1976) prescribed that family firm is a decent model to decrease this kind

of expense as proprietor's enthusiasm, focusing on family relations, is regularly adjusted to the

administrator's enthusiasm of focusing on both productivity and game changer (Villalonga &

Amit, 2006).

This will constantly bring about the boost of shareholders' riches (Seifert, Gonenct, & Wright,

2005). In the same vein, Anderson and Reeb (2003) uncovered that family organizations in the

U.S. Beat their non-family partners while Lee (2006) confirm that family firms showed prevalent

execution in the setting of income, wage development, and net overall revenue in the long haul.

In a related study, Maury (2006) examined the relationship between family possession and firm

execution of eleven Western European nations and uncovered that family proprietorship

emphatically influences firm productivity as far as ROA, especially in economies having

stringent regulations. Likewise, Barontini and Caprio (2006) exhibited that family firms recorded

in eleven Continental Europe nations have unrivaled execution regarding ROA and Tobin's Q.

Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) show comparable discoveries in the connection of Canada. They

uncovered that family creation has a positive part in quality creation. In Chile, Martinez, Stohr,

and Quiroga (2007) additionally gave proof on the outperformance of open recorded family
firms regarding company's gainfulness (ROA). In the connection of Asian nations, a few studies

give confirmation of the prevalent execution of family organizations (Saito, 2008; Amran & Che-

Ahmad, 2010). Family firms in Arab nations are no special case to the outperformance (see for

instance Al-Dubai, Ku Ismail, & Amran, 2014).

The value of the organizations can be expanded through productive administration of family

claimed business. On the off chance that the whole control of the business is just in one hand it

can diminish the centrality of the business (Pindado et.al 2008) . Created nations advance family

claimed business in light of the fact that they can deal with their business viably and produce

benefits for their kin. However some legitimate powers are likewise there to protect the

privileges of other individuals too. At the point when relatives are overseeing and controlling

every one of the operations of a family claimed business at exactly that point these sorts of

organizations can be viable ( Maury 2006).

Non straight connection between the family claimed business and Nonlinear relation between

the family owned business and business controlling other than family members and when the

family associate are controlling all business activities or having command of the firm,

performance is superior than outsiders management of business( Anderson et.al 2003).

Pakistan is a developing country and it is seen that the family owned businesses are performing

better than the non-family member’s management of the firm. Various firms are assessed from

2004 to 2009 for this purpose. Return on asset and return on equity are used to measure firm

performance. Din et.al (2011) they reported positive relation between family ownership

and efficiency of the firms for the period of six years (2004 to 2009) listed at Karachi

Stock Exchange-100 index in Pakistan. They used ROA, ROE to evaluate the efficiency of the

firms. Our contribution to the literature is that we will examine the impact of family ownership
on firm performance in the manufacturing as well as financial companies listed on Karachi

Stock Exchange 100 index. Many researchers have assessed the linkage between family owned

businesses and the efficiency of the firm by using different techniques. Some researchers found

positive association between family owned businesses and the efficiency of the firm. Some found

negative relation whereas some found mixed results. Control of family members in family

owned businesses encourage people to increase the performance of the firms taking their

personal interest in the business. If management of the firm is having shares of the firms, the

efficiency of the firms will be higher because there action will directly affect the goals. Having

shares of the firm’s management can demolish the firm as well because of their actions (Naqvi

hammad & Naveed ahmed 2014).

It is important to study family firms because they are common among public firms not only in

developing countries, but also in developed countries (La Porta et al., 1999). 44% of firms in

Western Europe are controlled by families ( Faccio and Lang 2002). Several recent studies have

found a relationship between family firms and firm performance across countries. However, the

results are mixed. It is important to generate stylized facts on family firm from different

countries, because various characteristics of the country, for example, the legal system, affect

family firms (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).

Family firms are not uniform, especially after the founder retires, when a variety of structures

may come into play. For example, after founder retired, his descendant can choose to run the

business or to hire the professional nonfamily manager. In addition, the founding family could

choose between making seasoned equity offering (SEO) or not. SEO may boost expansion of the

business, but lower the ratio of family ownership and undermine the ascendance of the founding

family. In order to take the characteristics of family firms into account, we classify family firms
by ownership, management, and number of generations of the founding family, and estimate the

relationship between the various categories of family firms and firm value (Takuji Saito

2008).less controlling other than relatives and when the family partner are controlling all

business exercises or having order of the firm, execution is unrivaled than pariahs administration

of business (Anderson et.al 2003).

Pakistan is a creating nation and it is seen that the family possessed organizations are performing

superior to the non-relatives administration of the firm. Different firms are surveyed from 2004

to 2009 for this reason. Return on resource and profit for value are utilized to quantify firm

execution. Clamor et.al (2011) they reported positive connection between family proprietorship

and proficiency of the organizations for the time of six years (2004 to 2009) recorded at Karachi

Stock Exchange-100 list in Pakistan. They utilized ROA, ROE to assess the productivity of the

organizations. Our commitment to the writing is that we will analyze the effect of family

possession on firm execution in the assembling and additionally money related organizations

recorded on Karachi Stock 33aExchange 100 file. Numerous analysts have evaluated the linkage

between family possessed organizations and the effectiveness of the firm by utilizing distinctive

systems. A few scientists discovered positive relationship between family claimed organizations

and the proficiency of the firm, some discovered negative connection while some discovered

blended results. Control of relatives in family possessed organizations urge individuals to build

the execution of the organizations taking their own enthusiasm for the business. On the off

chance that administration of the firm is having shares of the organizations, the proficiency of the

organizations will be higher on the grounds that there activity will specifically influence the

objectives. Having shares of the organizations administration can wreck the firm too in light of

their activities (Naqvi hammad & Naveed ahmed 2014).

It is essential to study family firms on the grounds that they are regular among open firms not

only in creating nations, additionally in created nations (La Porta et al., 1999). 44% of firms in

Western Europe are controlled by families ( Faccio and Lang 2002). A few late studies have

found a relationship between family firms and firm execution crosswise over nations. Be that as

it may, the outcomes are blended. It is essential to create adapted truths on family firm from

diverse nations, on the grounds that different attributes of the nation, for example, the lawful

framework, influence family firms (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).

Family firms are not uniform, particularly after the organizer resigns, when a mixed bag of

structures may become an integral factor. Case in point, after organizer resigned, his relative can

decide to maintain the business or to procure the expert nonfamily chief. Furthermore, the

establishing family could pick between making seasoned value offering (SEO) or not. SEO may

support development of the business, yet bring down the proportion of family possession and

undermine the ascendance of the establishing gang. With a specific end goal to consider the

attributes of family firms, we arrange family firms by possession, administration, and number of

eras of the establishing family, and assessment the relationship between the different classes of

family firms and firm esteem (Takuji Saito 2008).

 Chapter 3

Research methodology
3.0 Research methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides clear view of type of study, research design, population of the study,

analysis techniques, data collection methods, research instruments, research tools and research

procedure.

3.2 Type of the study

The nature of study is exploratory. This research is about impact of ownership structure on firm

financial performance.

3.3 Research design

Research design tells a clear view of how a research is done. This research is depending on base

of quantitative approach.

3.4 Research procedure

3.4.1 Hypothesis and model

3.4.1.1 Hypothesis

Ho: Family owned firms & Non Family owned firms has no impact on firms financial

performance.

H1: Family owned firms has impact on firm’s financial performance.

H2: Non family owned firms has impact on firm’s financial performance.
3.4.1.2 Research Model

Figure: 1.1 Research Model

(Independent variables) (Dependent variables)

Family owned Firm

performance

Return on assets
Return on equity

Non family owned

3.4.1.3 Model Summary

In this model firm performance is dependent variable which has two proxies first is return on

assets and second is return on equity both are for showing performance of family and non-family

owned firms. And independent variables are family owned and non-family owned. With this

diagram we are checking the impact of ownership structure and non-family ownership structure

on firms financial performance.

3.4.1.4 Model specification

Structural equation modelling is used to find out the relationship between ownership structure

and performance of family owned & non-family owned firms of Pakistani Textiles industry. Two

regression models are prepared to ensure the connection between ownership structure and firm

performance. The base models of the study take the following form:

ROE= λ1+ λ2 (FO) + λ3 (NFO) + ε

ROA= λ1+ λ2 (FO) + λ3 (NFO) + ε

Where,

λ = constant coefficient

FO= Family owned

NFO= Non family owned

ε = Error term

3.5 Population and sampling

3.5.1 Target population is the population of this study consists of Textiles industry of Pakistan.

These companies are listed under Karachi stock exchange.

3.5.2 Sampling technique

Sampling is referred to a subset of population which is used for measurement, observation to

present information about the population. To select the companies from the population, non-

random sampling technique is used.

3.5.3 Sample Size

The sample of the study is 10 textiles businesses listed in KSE, in which 5 are Family owned

businesses & 5 are Non-family owned businesses. These companies are followings.
Table 1

S.No Name of family owned Companies

1 Sally textiles mills limited

2 Mian textiles mills limited

3 Samin textiles mills limited

4 Kohinoor textiles mills limited

5 Maqbool textiles mills limited

Table 2

S.NO Names of Non Family owned companies

1 Sepphire textiles mills limited

2 Crecent textiles mills limited

3 Idress textiles mills limited

4 Mahmood textiles mills limited

5 Blessed textiles mills limited

3.6 Sampling framework

3.6.1 Data Collection

The secondary data is used in this empirical study to compare the performance of Family & Non

family owned firms of textile industry of Pakistan. Information is derived from the annual

reports and balance sheet of the target companies of Textiles sectors. This data is from 2010-

2014.
3.7 Data analysis techniques

In this study statistical Techniques are used for analysis is Pearson’s Coefficient of Correlation in

order to examine the relationship between ownership structure and Performance of Family

ownership & Non Family ownership. To check the impact of Family ownership & non-Family

ownership on performance Regression analysis is used.

3.8 Chapter summary

This chapter provides a clear view on how and from where the data has been collected for this

study. Moreover it shows how data is interpreted and which tools & techniques are used to

measure the correctness of the variables related to this study.

 Chapter no 4

Data analysis and discussion

4.0 Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter shows a clear view of the finding of the study after interpretation of the data. It will

also show the reliability of results, and what they show. Different statistical techniques will find

the correlation and check the impact of independent variables over the dependent variables.

4.2 Correlation Analysis for Family Owned Firms

Table 1: Correlations

ROA ROE OS

Return on Assets 1

Return on Equity .482* 1

ownership structure .532** .293* 1

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Note.N = 25; Return on Assets; Return on Equity; ownership structure;

* p < .05, ** p < .01

The relationship between the variables is presented in Table 1. Return on asset is positive and

significantly co-related with ownership structure with the value ( r=.532) at the level 0.01.

Return on equity is positive and significantly co-related with ownership structure with the value (

r=.293) at the level 0.05. Return on equity is positive and significantly co-related with Return on

Assets with the value ( r=.482) at the level 0.05.

4.3 Correlation Analysis for non-Family Owned Firms

Table 2: Correlations

ROA ROE OS

Return on Assets 1

Return on Equity .596* 1

ownership structure .362* .212* 1

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Note.N = 25; Return on Assets; Return on Equity; ownership structure;

** p < .01

The relationship between the variables is presented in the Table 2. Return on assets is positive

and significantly co-related with ownership structure with the value ( r=.362) at the level 0.05.

Return on equity is positive and significantly co-related with ownership structure with the value (

r=.212) at the level 0.05. Return on equity is positive and significantly co-related with Return on

Assets with the value ( r=.596) at the level 0.05.

4.4 Regression Analysis for family owned Business

Table 2 : Regression analysis

Step I
β R² Change in R²

ownership structure .003

Step II
.393 (p=.006)
Return on assets
.293 (p=.156)
Return on equity
 .046 .086

Above result shows regression analysis for outcomes and performed in two steps to formally test

the hypothesis. In 1st step, results show that Return on assets has positive significant impact on

ownership structure So hypothesis 1 accepted (β=.393, p=.006). Return on equity has positive

insignificant impact on ownership structure(β=.293, p=.156).So hypothesis II accepted.

4.5 Regression Analysis for non-family Owned Business

Table 2 : Regression Analysis

Step I
Β R² Change in R²

ownership structure .131

Step II

return on assets .307( p=.075)

return on equity .466( p=.310)

.045 .131

Above result shows regression analysis for outcomes and performed in two steps to formally test

the hypothesis. In 1st step, results show that Return on assets has positive insignificant impact on

ownership structure So hypothesis H1 accepted (β=.307, p=.075). Return on equity has positive

insignificant impact on ownership structure (β=..466, p=.310).So hypothesis H2 accepted.

4.6 Hypothesis testing

H0 Rejected

H1 Accepted

H2 Accepted

4.7 Findings

Results of correlation shows that ownership structure has negative impact on return on

assets and return on equity in case of both family owned firms and non-family owned

firms financial performance. Results prove that the relationship between ownership

structure, Return on assets and return on equity has positive impact in both family owned

and non-family owned firms. In Both family and non-family ownership structure the

relationship between return on assets and return on equity is positive and significant.

The regression results show that there is positive impact of ownership structure on firm

performance. In family owned firms the impact of ownership structure has positive

impact on return on assets and return on equity and highly significant. In non-family

owned firms the impact of ownership structure has positive impact on return on assets

and significant. But impact of ownership structure has positive impact on return on equity

and insignificant.

The results show that there is an impact of ownership structure on firm performance. In

family owned firms there is a greater impact whereas in non-family owned firms there is

less impact than family owned firms. If family ownership is adopted in any firm then its

outcome will be greater rather than non-family ownership.

40
4.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter of the study implied various inferential statistical techniques such as

correlation and regression in order to interpret the data and conclude the results. It also

did a detailed examination of the results after interpreting the data.

41
 Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

42
5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is the last part of the research. Discussion and summary will be made based

on the results obtained by previous chapters. This chapter will discuss how the objectives

of study are meeting and in which context this study is similar are different to previous

studies. On the basis of results, this chapter will provide a deep insight for impact of

ownership on firm’s performance. It will also give recommendations to the companies,

society and coming researchers.

5.2 Conclusion

This project has made an effort to investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm’s

financial performance. Four variables were putted in this research, where return on assets

(ROA), return on equity (ROE) are used to measure financial performance as dependent

variables and ownership structure in which family owned and non-family owned are used

as independent variables. Previous studies on ownership structure and firm performance

on textiles sectors utilized different variables for performance measurement like Carmen

Galva (2011) .This research was conducted on a sample of ten textiles firms of Pakistan

in which five are family owned and five are non-family owned from period 2010-2014.

By using inferential statistics such as regression and correlation, relationship between

ownership structure and firm’s financial performance was showed. The result from the

analysis has shown that ownership structure has significant relation with firm’s financial

performance in both family owned and non-family owned firms.

43
The regression results show that impact of ownership structure on return on assets is

highly significant in case of family owned firms. And impact of ownership structure on

return on assets is insignificant in case of non-family owned firms.

The impact of ownership structure on firm financial performance is greater in case of

family owned firms as compare to non-family owned firms. These findings matches with

previous studies Sharon Belenzon & Rebecca Zarutskie June 26, 2012.

5.3 Recommendations and suggestions

The area which we choose is so broad. In future much research can be done. Researchers

can do further research for adopting different other valuable variables. We chose only

ROA & ROE for checking the performance of family and non-family owned firms. We

think that cooperation’s among family businesses would enhance the probability of

success. We found that non-family businesses are not individually profit increasers. We

suggest that the investors should invest in assets of family owned firms because return on

assets have positive relation and highly significant. We also suggests all the investors to

invest less in non-family owned firms because the impact of ownership structure with

return of non-family owned firms is insignificant and less than family owned. We

recommend that future researchers should increase the sample size and time period to get

more precise result. They should incorporate other measures to explore the impact of

ownership structure on firm’s financial performance.

44
References

Audretsch, B., Hülsbeck, M., & Lehmann, E E (2010). The benefits of family ownership,

control and management on financial performance of firms . UO Working Paper Series,

No. 05-10. PP(1-35).

Atemnkeng, Johannes T., & Emmanuel, Mbebeb F., (2013) Comparative Business

Practices and Productivity Performance between Family and Non-family Firms. ICBE-RF

Research Report No. 48/13 PP(1- 58).

Ahmed, N., Nadeem, M., Ahmad., & Hamad , N., A Comparison study between

manufacturing firms And financial firms in Pakistan. Arabian Journal of Business and

management Review (Nigerian Chapter) Vol. 2, No 8 , 2014. PP(1-6).

Amran, N. A., & Ahmad, A. C. (2010). Corporate governance mechanisms and

performance: Analysis of Malayian family and non family controlled companies. Journal

of Modern Acconting and Auditinf,6(2), 1.

Abdullah, S., Izah Ku Ismai, K., & Afza Amran, N., Family Involvement in Ownership,

Management, and Firm Performance: Moderating and Direct-Effect Models. Asian Social

Science; Vol. 10, No. 14; 2014 PP(1-13).

Al Dubai, S. A. A., Ismail, K. N. I. K., & Amran, N. A. (2014). Family Involvement in

Ownership, Management, and Firm Performance: Moderating and Direct-Effect

Models. Asian Social Science, 10(14), p193.

Astrachan, J., & Pieper, T., Journal of Family Business Strategy. PP(1-04).

Burkart, M., Pannunzi, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58,

2167-2201.

45
Bertrand, M., Kramarz, F., Schoar, A., & Thesmar, D. (2006). Politicians, firms and the

political business cycle: evidence from France. Unpublished working paper. University of

Chicago.

Burkart, M.; Panunzi, F.; Shleifer, A. (2003): Family firms. In: Journal of Finance, 58,

2167–2210.

Belenzon, S., & Zarutskie ,R., (June 26, 2012). Married to the Firm? Family Ownership,

Performance, and Financing in Private Firms. Duke University, Fuqua School of

Business. PP(1-44).

C. Galve-Górriz and Vicente Salas-Fumás: Family ownership and firm performance, The

effect of productive efficiency and growth constraints: Innover Revista de.

Chami, R., 1999, What’s different about family business?, Working Paper, University of

Notre Dameand the International Monetary Fund.

Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. A. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family

and non‐family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence .Entrepreneurship

Theory and Practice, 28(4), 335-354.

Carlock,Randel s; Elizabeth Florent-Treacy 2007.

Church ,R.A. (1969). Kenricks in hardware: A family business, 1791-1966.Newton

Abbott: David & Charles.

Ding, Shujun;Wu, Zhenyu ,Journal of business Ehtics; Aug2014, vol 123 issue 2,p183.

Villalonga, B. and R. Amit, How do family ownership, control and management

affect firm value? Journal of financial economics, 2006. 80(2): p. 385-417.

Demsetz, H., 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law

46
 and Economics 26, 375–390.

Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and

consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.

Daily ,C.M ., and Dollinger , M.J . (1993). Alternative Methodologies for identifying

Family- Versus Nonfamily-Managed business. Journal of small business Management,

31,PP.79-90.

D. Miller Isabelle Le Breton-Miller b, Richard H. Lester c, Albert A. Cannella J: Are

family firms really superior performers?: Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (2007) 829–

858.

Ehrhardt, O., E. Nowak, and F. M. Weber. 2004. Running in the family: The evolution

of ownership, control, and performance in German family-owned firms 1903-2003.

Eklund, J., Palmberg, J., & Wiberg, D., Family Ownership and Returns on Investment.

JEL Codes: G30, C23, K22, L25 PP(1-26).

E. Barth, Trygve Gulbrandsen, Pal Schøne: Family ownership and productivity:the role of

owner-management: Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 107– 127.

Favero, C. A., Giglio, S., Honorati, M., & Panunzi, F. (2006). The performance of Italian

family firms.

Gallo, M.A., & Estapé, M.J. (1992). Family business among the top 1,000 Spanish

companies. IESE research paper, N° 231.

Gomez-Mejia, L. M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez, 2001, The role of family ties in

agency contracts, Academy of Management Journal 44, 81-95.

Gomez-Mejia,L. M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez, 2001, The role of family ties in

agency contracts, Academy of Management Journal 44, 81-95.

47
Holderness, C.G., Sheehan, D.P., 1988. Role of majority shareholders in publicly held

corporations:an exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20,317–346.

Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency

costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305– 360.

Julie C. Dekker Nadine Lybaert, Tensie Steijvers, benoit depair and Roger Mercken:

Family firm typs based on the professionalization Contruct: SAGE Family Business

Review 26 (1) 81-99.

Jorissen, A., & Laveren, E., Difference between family and non family businessess.

‘Real’ versus ‘Sample-based’ differences. JEL-codes: M13, G30, C14 . PP(1-26)

J.M.San Martin-Reyna, Jorge A Duran-Encalada: The relationship among family

business, corporate governance and firm performance. ELSEVIER Journal of family

business strategy 3 (2012) 106-117.

Kets de Vries (1993). The Family Firm: The Good and The Bad News,Organizational

Dynamics, Winter, 59-71.

Lee, J., (2006). Family firm performance: Further evidence. Family Business Review,

19(2), 103–114.

Lumpkin, G.T., Martin, W., Vaughn, M., 2008. Family orientation: Individual-level

influences on family firm outcomes. Family Business Review 21, 127–138.

Machek, O., Brabec, M., & Hnilica, J., Measuring Performance Gaps Between Family

and Non-Family Businesses: A Meta-Analysis of Existing Evidence .PP(1-11).

Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2005). Dividend taxation and corporate governance.Journal of

Economic Perspectives, 163-180.

Martínez, J. I. (2003). Family Business in Chile. Family in business 11, 20-23.

48
Mishra CS, Randoy T, Jenssen JI (2001). The Effect of Founding Family Influence

on Firm Value and Corporate Governance, Account., 12(3): 235-259

McConaughy, D., Walker, M., Henderson, G., & Chandra, M. (1998). Founding family

controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7, 1-19.

McConaughy, D. L., Matthews, C. H., and Fialko, A. S., 2001, “Founding Family

Controlled Firms:Performance, Risk, and Value,”Journal of Small Business Management,

39: 31-49.

Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from

Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), 321-341.

Morck, R.; Yeung, B. Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrep. Theory

Pract. 2003,27, 367–382.

Nordqvist, M., & Melin, L. (2010). Entrepreneurial families and family

firms.Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 22(3-4), 211-239.

Nauman Khan, M., & Khan, F., (2011) does ownership matter? A study of family and

non family ownership in Pakistan. problems of management in The 21st century Volume 2,

2011 PP(1-95).

Oswald, S. L., Muse, L. A., & Rutherford, M. W. (2009). The influence of large stake

family control on performance: is it agency or entrenchment?. Journal of Small Business

Management, 47(1), 116-135.

Pindado, J., Requejo, I., & de la Torre, C., (2008). Does family ownership impact

positively on firm value? Empirical evidence from Western Europe. Universidad de

Salamanca. PP(1-34).

Perez-Gonzalez, F., 2006. Inherited control and Örm performance. American Economic

49
 Review 96:1559-1588.

Saito, T., (2008) Family Firms and Firm Performance: Evidence from Japan .WIAS

discussion Paper No.2007-005 PP(1-49).

Shamila Jabeen, Dr Ahmad Kaleem and Sadaf Ehsan.: Financial performance of Family

firms. Journal of basic and applied scientific Research 2(10), 2012.

Wrighta, F., & Kellermanns, F., (2011) Journal of Family Business Strategy. Volume 2

issue 4 ,December 2011. PP(1-13).

Westhead, P. (1997). R&D ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of technology‐based firms located on

and off Science Parks. R&D Management, 27(1), 45-62.

Yeh YH, Lee TS, Woidtke T (2001). Family Control and Corporate Governance:

Evidence from Taiwan, Int. Rev. Fin., 2(1/2): 21-48.

Zulfiqar, M., & Ammar Fayyaz, M., (2014). A Review of Family Ownership and Non-

Family Ownership Firms’ Performance, Productivity, and Profitability. International

Journal of Management & Organizational Studies, Volume 3, Issue 4, December,

(2014/ISSN), 2305-2600.

50