Baytan vs. COMELEC G.R. No.

153945 February 4, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytanwere on their way to register for the M
ay 1998 elections when they met thenewly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Z
one II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.

Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, pe
titioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew.

Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC AssistantExecutive Director Jose Pio O. Joson
requesting for advice on how to canceltheir previous registration.

Petitioners’ Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the ProvincialElection Supervisor, Atty. Juani
to V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who,subsequently, recommended filing an information for double registra
tionagainst petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. Petitionersmoved for reconsiderati
on, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when itrecommended the prosecution of p
etitioners for double registration despitelack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement
of cancellation of previous registration.

HELD:

No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on differentdays and in different precincts wit
hout canceling their previous registration.Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ c
laim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson anapplication to
cancel their previous registration. This letter was sent aftertheir second registration was accomplished a
nd after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a highe
rofficial.Moreover, petitioners’ claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantialcompliance with the
Election Code’s requirement of cancellation of previousregistration are matters of defense best ventilate
d in the trial proper ratherthan at the preliminary investigation.The established rule is that apreliminary i
nvestigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustivedisplay of the parties’ evidence. It is for the pr
esentation of such evidenceonly as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has beencommitted and the accused is probably guilty thereof
FLORES vs.COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of
votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by
private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total. Flores
appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes
cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered
invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate
for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second
place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no
power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a
protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections "on questions of fact shall be
final and non-appealable". In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance
of the petitioners appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests
are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No.
6679?

Held:

The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground,
to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall "Exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction . Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section
9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.