SoeietYof PeWbum Eftgineem

SPE 39727

Facility Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Offshore Oil & Gas Industry
Kunu Harmony, M. SC, Mech. Eng., MBA, MNISP, MFPAN, MAIChE, Chevron Nigeria Limited

C.apyr!gnt 199S Society of Petroleum Engineem, Inc

management. Risk is a term that describes the probability
This paper ws prepafad for presentation at the 199S SPE Asia Pacfic Conference on
Integrated Modelling for Asset Management held In Kuala Lumpur, MalaPIa, 23-24 March
that a specified hazardous event will occur and the severity
1996 of the consequences of that event.
This paper ws wlacfed for presentation by an SPE Program Commi(tee follw’ng raview
of onformation conmTned In an abstmct submlttd by the author(s) Contents of the paper,
as presented. have not been rwwed by the society of Petroleum Engineers and are
Also, hazard represents a potentiat risk to personnel.
sublccf to correcbon by the author(s) me material, as presented, does not necessarily property or productivity and need to be measured so that
reflect a,~y poslbon oi the Society of Petroleum Eng#neers, I& ofhcers, or members Papers
pt.?sented at SPE maet,ngs are S“bjact to publlcatoon review by Edltortal Commltiees of appropriate action can be taken to minimize the size.
CneSOC!e~ ot Petfoleum Englnsars Elactron#c reproduction, dtstr!butlon, or storage of any
part of th~s paper for commercial purposss wfhout the Written consent of the ~Iaty of
Petroleum Engmeem IS proh!bit~
abstracl of not more than ~ wrds,
Permission to reprdduce m print IS restricted to an
illustrations may not be copIsd The abstract must
Risk management in itself addresses the value judgments
conta,n consprcuti ~knowfedgmefit of mere and by Mom the paper was presented involved in establishing acceptable level of risk and
Wr!te L!brar!an SPE. P O Box 83%343, Richardson, TX 75063-3636, U S.A , f~ 01-972.
952-9435 methods of handling identiled risk. Risk assessment is
classified here into two parts (a) Risk estimation and (b)
Risk evaluation. The former is the estimation and
Abstract assessment of the measures of severity and probabilities
including their uncertainties. While the later is the extra
This program is operational in Chevron Nigeria Limited efforts required to decide on the importance of a particular
value of risk evaluated which support the value judgment.
and was introduced as a framework for integrating risk
In the past few years the need for facility risk assessment in
assessment within a risk management system. Also, the
risk assessment program was developed to provide a process the workplace has become an annual practice in Oil and
Gas operational areas of chevron Nigeria limited than in the
for rapid screening of risk in order to focus attention on risk
previous years. This has resulted in a major drop in
levels that need to be eliminated or minimized. The article
examines the principles and techniques of risk assessment numbers of fires, spills etc. incidents recorded per year.
and risk management. and it illustrates their applications,
In other to attain a minimal or zero incidents, a risk
[l also describes how these techniques are used to prioritize
assessment program was developed. This is the base for the
dccislons in preparing an effective ranking of risks within
development of the information gathered during a risk
Che\ron Nigeria offshore facilities. Risk assessment
assessment, which has several applications and
flowcharts. Hazard identification and risk assessment
implications. This ranges from replacing certain
checklist were generated as a rapid guide to evaluation of
equipment, modification of existing process, addition of
the level of risks and to decide which risks would need
protective devices, developing and implementing procedure
more detailed analysis. The hazard identification has the
for maintaining, monitoring etc. of process in the facility
following parameters as areas of concern Viz.: - Hazardous
and sometimes used as a feedback to the design engineers
substances, Mechanical, Radiation, Electrical, work
for a new facility or upgrade.
Environment and Work activities Hazards, The risk
assessment checklist includes details safe condition and
Case Studies
working mechanism of Pumps, Instrumentation, Pressure
vessel. Storage tanks, Fired heaters, Exchangers,
This section describes how we applied the methodology in
Emergency Response Program, facility Layout / Sitting etc.
the risk assessment program of Chevron Nigeria limited to
the Escravos Gas plant. The checklists applied to the gas
Introduction
plant were equally applied to the production platform
Risk :lssessment process consists of both identi~lng risk except in areas were we have specific process. However,
the procedure for determing the ranking of the facility in
:}nd cs[inlating the probability and magnitude of potential
IOsscs. The likelihood and consequences to people, question whether Gas or Oil Production is the same and is
consequence of the restits from the checklist. The
company assets and the environment are the main reasons
checklists were adapted from Hazan checklists used for U.
that prompt the development of a formal management
process for risk assessment toward loss prevention and risk ,,, S. Refineries. (See Appendix A)
2 [KunuHarmony]
Gas Plant FaciIity and The Model Used
The Escravos Gas plant is the first major project to gather
and utilize Nigeria’s offshore gas resources for local
irtdustriaJ use and export. The project is designed and built
to gather and compress associated gas from two oil
production fields (Okan and Mefa). This compressed gas is
piped onshore to a liquid extraction plant which removes
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and condensate and later
exported through a pipeline to an offshore Floating Storage
and Off-loading vessel (FSO), The remaining dry gas is
sold to the Nigerian Gas Company ~GC) for transmission
and resale to end-users in the local economy.
The three major components of the EGP are the Offshore
Facilities, the Onshore Gas Plant and the Floating Storage
and Off-loading @SO) vessel.
(i) Offshore Facilities
The offshore facilities gather and compress gas directly
from two CNL’S oil production fields. The gas is taken
from the Okan production platform and its two satellites to
the Gas Gathering and Compression Platform (GGCP).
The GGCP performs gas-Iiquid separation, the dehydration
and compression prior to transmission to the onshore gas
plant
Some of the technical highlights of the offshore (GGCP)
facilities are as follows:
Located 12 kilometers offshore Escravos in the 6 metres of
water.
8-leg. 7.500 tone structure with three levels and eight
topside modules.
Height: 66 metres from seabed to crane top.
Jacket base ar= of about 650 square metres.
Three 14,000- Horsepower Gas Turbine Compressors.
Liquid separation and gas dehydmtion systems included.
20-person Quarters platform.
Emergency Flare. 50 metres high from sea bed to top.
(ii) Onshore Plant
The onshore gas plant is built adjacent to the Escravos
Tank Farm and Terminal. the company’s primary
operations base in Niger Delta. In the onshore gas plant,
the gas IScooled to remove liquids, and the dry gas sold to
the Nigeria Gas Company (NGC), The liquids are
composed of a butane/propane mix and a pentane and the
heavier stream, The major equipment units of the Onshore
Gas P1ant are:
One 1.700-horsepower Turbo-Expander Compressor.
Two 12,000- horsepower Gas Turbine Compressors.
Deethanizier and Debutaninezier fractionation System.
LPG Storage Spheres and Shipping Pumps.
Molecular Sieve Dehydration System.
Cold Box for a Iow Temperature Heat Exchange,
Hot Oil Furnace and Circulation System.
Computerized Distribution Process Control System.
112
[SPE 39727
Floating Storage & Off-loading Vessel (FSO)
The FSO whose capacity is about 54,000 cubic metres
(340,000 barrels), is moored some 32 kilometers offshore
Escravos where it receives all the LPG horn the Onshore
gas plant. It supplies refrigerated LPG cargo to the e~rt
vessels with the application of temperature floating off-
loading hoses. The features include the following
Helideck for day and night operation.
Overall length: 172,1 metres (565 feet) fabricated from ”steel
Width: 36metres(118 feet).
Gross tonnage- 40,000 metric tons
Application of low temperature floating off-loading hoses.
Methodology
The risk assessment implementation was carried out by
filling the checklists for the system operations, the physical
facility layoutisitting, emergeney response and human
factor effect, Also, during the study reference was made to
process and instrument diagrams of the facilities.
In the risk assessment of the facilities, gas leakage, oil spills
and fire outbreaks will be the three of the contributors into
the probability riik assessment applied. The methodology
involves the application of a probabilistic approach to
ensure that the risk exposure of the facility is ranked
reasonable practicable. This guides the basis for
recommendations to eliminate risk or achieve low risk
level.
In hazards identification the possible hazards that cotid be
present were equally considered. The type of ha-mrds
considered during the assessment includes the following:
■
Hazardous Substances
● Toxic Materials
● Flammable Materials
● Biological Substances
● Other Hazardous substance
■ Work Environment
● Vibration and Noise
● Poor Lighting
● Hot ambient temp
m Radiation Hazards
● Ionizing & Non-ion radiation
● Electromagnetic effect
● Lesser
■
Electrical Hazards
● Direct and indirect
● Source of Ignition
● Short Circuit Hazards
m Mechanical Hazards
● Impact Hazards
● Cutting Hazards
● Falling Hazards
 IISPE 397271 [FACILITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS lNDUSTRYl

● High Pressure Process And average weighting value of Low Risk= (4+0)+2
“ Work Activities
e Poor workplace design WA(~R)=2 --------A-3
● Poor visual ability
* Repetitive actions But the Probability factor was calctiated as Pr = Average
● Work Stress Weighting Value of class divided by tie sum of the three
average weighting vales.
Assessment Procedure
The procedure for the risk assessment exercise was initiated i.e. Pf = WA+ (~wA) --------A-4
by first defining the primary steps to accomplish the job.
The steps are as follows: witere~wA= 12+7+2=21 --------A-5
* Identification of the risk e~ents that could lead to
significant 10SS, By applying equation A-4, the probability factors for HR
* Calculation of Risk (High Risk), MR (Moderate Risk) and LR (Low Risk) were
* Initialing attemate protection and prevention then obtained as:
strategies.
* Estimation of variation in the probability and
consequences
12+21
In ident@ing the risks main process components and
operating standards were looked into using the checklists. =0.57
With the Yeflo results from filling the chec~ists, the
equipment or process ex~sure level was determined. This Similarly,
was achieved by using thr= classes of exposure levels- Pm) = W*(MR)
+ ~ WA ----A-7
.7 —..
+ High Exposure (High Risk-HR) with 10 to 14 points 7+21
+ ~fediutn Exposure Medium Risk-MR) 5 to 9 points
+ Low Exposure (Low Risk-LR) with Oto 4 points =0.33 and
also
The three classes have certain degree of severity and are
used in final ranking of the facilities, which defines specific Pa~) = WALR)+ Z WA ----A-8
objectives regarding personnel safety, property conservation
and environmental impact. Such ranking were analyzed 2+21
for:
4.10
● Process Safety Equipment
● Fire and Gas Exposure and Where X(Pm) + PM) + PmR)) = 1 (The three classes are
● Site Specific Safety Factors assumed to be mutually exclusive).

A final ranking of the facilities was awarded after the whole The final ranking (F,) of the facility was chosen as the
assessment and the procedures for achieving this is discuss highest of Fro), F@) and F@), Where F<HR),F-) and
below. FmR) are the cumulative ranking obtained in the overall
checklists for high risk, moderate risk and Iow risk
Introduction and Application of Probability Factor respectively.
The probability factors (Pr) used for the three classes of
exposure are PqHR)=0.57, Pw) =0.33 and PmR) ‘O. 10. Mathematically this is define as
Considering the average weighting factor of the classes
points. the probability factors were derived. F, = (Cumulative of WA for a particular cIass of
risk x The Probability factor for that same class of
A\erage weighting value of High Risk= (14+10)+2” Risk)
Hence.
w~)” 12 --------A- I
F@), = ~WA(HR)X Pm) ---------–A-9
Similarly. average weighting value of Moderate Risk =
(9+5 )+2 In this case P~~, = 0.57

w~~)= 7 --------A-2 Similarly,

113
 4 [KunuHarmony] [SPE 39727

Fro), = XWW) XPw, ---------A-1O Escravos for their mntributions and encouragement.

and Pm)= 0.33 Nomenclature

F, = Facility Ranking
Fmj, = ZW~) x P-) —-—----A-1 1 F.~, =High Risk, Facili~ Ranking
F. ~ =Moderate Risk, Facility Ranking
F.o) =hw Risk, Facility Ranking
And also Pm)= 0.10 HR = High Exposure @S)
= Moderate Exposure (Risk)
LR = hw Exposure (Risk)
ResuIts Pf = Probability Factor
A total of 190 factors were assessed during the exercise and P, ~) = High Risk Probability Factor
this involves 10 Merent processes. Pm) = Moderate Risk Probability Factor
P, q = hw Risk Probability Factor
PROCESS ASSESSED –10 W* = Avemge Weighting value
w ~~) = Average Weighting value
@ Facili@ Layout -12 W A-) = Average Weighting value
V3 Compressors -16 w ~@) = Average Weighting value
....
h Storage Tanks -16
‘-
.—.. Instrumentation – 22
m Pumps -17 References
1? Fired Heater -18
@ Pressure Vessels – 16 1. Frederic B. Clarke, ‘Tire Hazard Assessment.”
= Emergency RespoN -17 Hondbookfor Fin ProtectionEngi”neenng,2ti cd., (1 995]
~ Exchangers -7 National Fire Protection Association Quincy, MA,
D Human Factors -49 Section 10/Chapter 6.

Table 1.1 shows the summary of @ts of the assessment.
It aslo shows the derivation of ranking for the entire
fmility, At the end of the ranking, the ficility was ranked
moderate expowre (M’R), with rank of 5.28. Table 1,
Chart 1 and 2 shows the summary of the assessment.
fir the assessment exercise a final report w written and
27 recommendations made out from the 10 processes of 190
factors considered. From the recommendations made by the
team after assessment, it was concluded that those risks
classified as moderate risk shodd be addressed immediawly
and there shodd be tier risk assessment ~er the
upgrade (phase II) of the Gas Plant to re-assess the situation
after the recommendations made are implemented,
2. John R. Hall Jr., “Fire Risk Atudysis.”Handbookfor Fire
Protection En&”neen”ng,2d d., (1995) National Fire
Protection Assoeiatiq Quincy, MA. Section 10/C!hapter
7.
3. Haxd RaafaL “Risk Assessment and Risk Management
practical Applieations.” A paper presented at the Hamrd
Control in the Work Place Cotimce. The Royal Society
of Medicine, Wimpole Street London WI (October 3,
1995).
4. Benmebare~ S & Gray, T.: “Risk Assessment of New
Added Facility at an Offkhore Gatherin~ing
Plant.” A paper presented at the International Cdmce
on Heal~ Safety & Environm ent. Society of Petroleum
Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana (9-12 June 1996).

It was also recomrnendd that through mntinuous effective 5. Nickey B.B, And Chapman,C. B., ” EvaluatingFire
maintenance planning and implementation with proper PreventionEffectivenessthrougha probability mcdel~
Ope.ratiOd pd~ and by R@W -OllS, Fire Technology,Vol. 15,No. 4, NOV. 1979,pp. 291-306
management codd en- that the risk present within the
6. Hamrd AnalysisChecklist fm U.S Refineries.
facilities can be kept within a low risk level.
7. ChevronNigeria Limited (1996) Facility Risk Assessment
-Ure, Guideline 1996, Nigeria.
Acknowledgment
My profound thanks go to the Stiety and Environmental 8. Chevron Nigeria Limiti (1997) EGP Facility Risk
SupeMsors, RA. Gemeinhardt and Hugh Fraser for the ~ent Finrd RepoK Dec. 1997
review comments and enmuragement to publish this paper.
I am grate~ to CNL Safety Engin&rs and Environmental 9. “Standard Terminolo~ of fire standards” ASTM-176-90,
Specialist. members of EGP risk assessment team all in Amerim Smiety of Testing and materials, Philadelphia,
PA, 1990.
Escravos. I am also grate~ to Prof. B. A.labi of university
of ~adan and Dr. P. Ajayi of Chevron Nigeria Clinic - 114
..

115
000
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❑ OO

116
 -—.——
—.
. . ,.. -.— — ..-

-.

117
 APPENDIX A

Risk Assessment
Checklist: Compressors
Checklist Type: 11
EGP - Escravos Nigeria
1~

[ Questions 1-1 Comments I

Is adequate fire water coverage available for the compressorarea in the lu~
event of fire at or near the compressor?

Is there adequate emergency access to the compressorin the event of fire ~—l ~1
or other emergency at or near the compressor?

Can the compressorbe safely isolated in an emergency? ln~

If emergency isolationvalves (either manual, automatic, or remotely

operated) are providedto isolate the compresor in an emergency, are the
emergency isolationvalves appropriatefor the processservice and location
of the vaives [review requirements for fire-rating of isolation valves; fail-sati
position of isolation vafves; and fireproofing of valve actuator, power cables,
and instrument cables of the isolation va/ves]?

1
If emergency isolationvaives are provided, has inadvertent failure of the
isolationvalves been evaluated [consider va/ves closing and va/ves fail to
close when demandedi?

For installationswhere critical setvice equipment (e.g., air-cooled heat

exchangers or power/instrumentcables) is located above a compressor
handlingflammable material, is the critical equipment adequately proteoted
in the event of fire at the compressor [review requirements fir tfreprooffng
and installation of fixed water or fixed steam deluge]? I

If fixed water or fixed steam deluge is provided in the event of fire at or II I

near the compressor,can the valve or station that actuates the fixed deluge
be operated safely [oonsider location of valve/station or the ability to opetife
valve/station remotely]?

Have flexible piping components (e.g., hoses, expansion joints, and tubing)
been reduced or eliminated where possible? If flexible piping components
are installed, are they designed for maximum pressure and temperature?
Are flexible connectionsIooated to minimize damage and possiblerupture
due to mechanical imoact and fire?

HR = High Risk
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk

118
Have leaks (at mechanical seal, flanges, etc.) to the atmosphere been
~~
evaluated for compressor located in buildings or shelters?

For compressor installations where minor leaks are known to occur (e.g.,
1~~
mechanical seal, packing or distance piece leaks), are the leaks vented to a
safe location? - -
I

For compressor installations using an engine driver (gas or diesel driven)

~~
are the air intake and exhaust lines vented to a safe location?

Are compressor “run” indicatom (running lights or other process indicatom) ~ ~1

Drovided at a manned location for critical service compressors?

:ancittl se~ice compressors be shut off from a safe location in a timely ~ ~1

If emergency isolation valves (either manual, automatic, or remotely ~~

operated) are provided, are procedures in place for the routine testing of the
emergency isolation valves?

1
For critical service compressor, are preventative maintenance procedures
in place to ensure continued operation of the compressors, and reduce the
likelihood of equipment failures that may result in hydrocarbon or toxic
material releas”es?

For compressor installations with auxiliary systems (e.g., lube oil, seal oil, ~~
and vibration) are procedures in place for the routine testing of alarms and
shutdowns?

Emergency Response
Checklist:
Questions 1~1 comments I
Are the field instruments that are monitored by operations personnel on a 1~~
routine basis easily accessible to ensure reading of information in
accordance with recommended frequency
J

Are all operating valves accessible during normal or emergency operation? 1~~

—
Are manually operated valves positioned to allow proper operation without 11 I
possible muscle strain?

Is access adequate at alfialve

manifolds (including battery or plot limit) for
~1 “--- I
both routine and emergency operation and for maintenance?

.—
HR = High Risk ‘
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk
119
Are elevated valves accessible during normal or emergency operation (i.e.,
~~
access provided by ladders/platform or chain operator)?

Are valve chain operators properly maintained?

1~~

Can critical valves or equipment be closed or shut off from a safe location in ~] ~[
a timely manner?

Can critical alarms and shutdown interlocks be tested while the unit is on-
1~~
line?

Do alarm indicators (e.g., lights, horns, or whistles) adequately notify field

1~~
personnel of upset or emergency conditions? Does the alarm indication
alert all potentially affected-employees?
I

Are emergency shutdown switches guarded against inadvertent operation

“ ~~
[consider /ocation, switch o~mtjon, and guards or coven]?

Are remote startup/shutdown switches clearly labeled and protected from

~~
Inadvertent operation?

Are remote m’tches for different systems separated by sufficient distance to ~[

~
prevent operation of the wrong system during stressful situations?

Is emergency lighting (light fixtures on the emergency power circuit)

1~-
adeoljate in the 11nit9

‘Are drain valves located to allow monitoring of the draining process and
~~
ensure the safety of ~ersonnel? I

Are the units of similar instruments consistent (e.g., do the pump seal flush
~~
rotameters all display flow in either gpm or gph)?

Are field instrument indicators routinely checked for accuracy?

1~1 “-”1
Are field instrument ranges appropriate for the service (e.g., avoid using a O- \—[ I I
2500 psig pressure gage on a 100 psig system)?

Are control valves and associated instrumentation accessible by

~-
maintenance personnel?

Are field instruments that are logged during routine duties displayed in the same
units as the routine duties list (i.e., mental conversion of units is avoided)?
~1 ‘“-I
HR = High Risk
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk 120
 Does the process control system console layout allow for rapid response to
upset situations ‘~~

—
Do the process control system displays adequately present the process
~~
information I

Do the process control system displays for similar equipment (e.g., parallel
~1
trains or similar equipment in series) present the information in a unique
manner to avoid confusion? I
Do the process control system displays provide adequate feedback to
‘--” -- ~~
operations personnel to confirm operator actions?

Are control boards laid out to minimize possibility of operator response etior l—] ~[
durina stressful situations?

Are board-mounted shutdown switches or buttons sufficiently

‘~~
distinguishable/separated from alarm acknowledgment buttons to avoid
inadvertent o~eration?

Are emergency shutdown switches guarded against inadvertent operation

[consider location, switch oprafion, and guards or covers]?
I II I

Are control system display targets (touch screens) adequately spaced to

]~-
Prevent accidental o~eration?

Are the control system display symbols consistent and meaningful?

1~~1

Are critical alarms prioritized to alefl operations personnel of upset situations ~1

~
that require immediate response?
—
.A.

Are “nuisance” alarms (repetitive alarms that operations personnel ignore or

~~
acknowledge without investigating) re~aired in a timely manner? I

Are equipment ‘run” indicators (running lights or other process indicators)

~~
and valve position indicators provided at a manned location for critical I
euui~ment. valves. and instm-ments? I
. ,. ,.-,
.——.
Is the lighting adequate in the control room [review direct and indirect
/ighting]? Is the emergency lighting (light fixtures on the emergency power
~1 =-”’”1

circuit) adequate in the control room?

\ Are all equipment Iabels-(eg,, vessels, piping, valves, instrumentation, etc.) I ~1

-
.,-
HR = High Risk
..
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk 121
 easy to read (clear and in good condition)?
I

Are ail equipment labels correct and unambiguous?

1~~

Are all equipment labels located close to the items that they identify?
1~~

Are the equipment labels consistent with nomenclature used in procedures?

1~~

Are all components that are mentioned in procedures (e.g., valves) labeled
~~
or otherwise identified?

Do switch labels identify discrete positions (e.g., ON or OFF, OPEN or

~~
CLOSE)?

Are signs (e.g., emergency exit, restricted entry, etc.) located in visible
1~~
locations? Are the signs easy to read (clear and in good condition)?

Are pipelines and conduit banks cleady labeled at pointswherethey become ~1 ~1

invisible (e.g., routed underground)?

Are procedures in place to ensure that alarm set points are not changed
~~
without proper review and authorization?

Are procedures in place to communicate process control system or safety

~~
shutdown system changes to all affected employees?

Do the procedures provide guidance on the expected response required of

~~
operations personnel when the alarm is received?

Are procedures in place to ensure routine testing of critical alarms and

~~
shutdown interlocks?

Are procedures in place to ensure communication between operating crews

~~
regarding instruments that are bypassed or out-of-service?

Are procedures in place to ensure that instruments that are deliberately

~~
disabled during operation are placed back in service

Are procedures in place to ensure that control valve bypasses

1~~

Are hypothetical emergency situation drills periodically performed?

1~~

HR = High Risk
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk 122
Does the location of emergency equipment (e.g., fire gear, SCBA, acid suits, ~1 ~[
etc.) allow for rapid access and use? Does the location of first aid supplies
allow for rapid access and use? 1

Checklist: Exchangers
I Questions 1~~ Comments

Is adequate fire water coverage available for the heat exchanger area in ~~
the event of fire at or near the heat exchanget?

Is there adequate eme~ency access to the heat exchanger in the event of ~] ~1

fire or other emergency at or near the heat exchanger?

For installations where critical service equipment (e.g., air-cooled heat ~=

exchangers or power/instrument cables) is located above mechanical
equipment (pumps or compressors) handling flammable material, is the
critical equipment adequately protected in the event of fire at the pump or
compressor [review requirements for tirepofing and installation of fixed
water or fixed steam deluge]?

Is there adequate clearance around the heat exchanger to allow ~~

maintenance personnel access (for cleaning of the exchanger and/or
removal of the tube bundle)?

Are air cooler fan “run” indicators (fan running lights or other process ~~
indicators) provided at a manned location for critical service air-cooled heat
exchangers?

~Are the exchanger inlet, outlet, and bypass lines or valves cleafly labeled? I ~1 ~1

Is the heat exchanger’s minimum pressurizing temperature (MPT) clearly

communicated and understood by operations and maintenance personnel?
1~1~

HR = High Risk
MR = Moderate Risk
LR = Low Risk

123