K.
PETITIONS AND MOTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
1. LIGON VS. CA, GR NO. 107751, 1 JUNE 199S
FACTS:
Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
specific performance with damages against the
Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP).
RESPONDENT INK ALLEGATIONS:
 that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale
dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2)
parcels of land located at Tandang Sora,
Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which
IDP is the registered owner.
 The parties stipulated in the deed of sale
that the IDP shall undertake to evict all
squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within forty-five (45) days from the
execution of the contract.
 IDP failed to fulfill this obligation.
 Hence INK prayed that the trial court order
IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing
the subject lots of illegal occupants and to
pay damages to INK.
IDP ALLEGATIONS:
 that it was INK which violated the contract
by delaying the payment of the purchase
price and prayed that the contract of sale
be rescinded and revoked.
INK filed a MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT on the ground that there was actually
no genuine issue as to any material fact.
 On 12 September 1991 the trial court
rendered partial judgment,
 and on 7 October 1991 an amended partial
judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by
INK except the prayer for damages which
was to be resolved later.
RESPONDENT INK filed a motion in the same
case
 praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who
was in possession of the certificates of title
over the properties as mortgagee of IDP,
be directed to surrender the certificates to
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in
its name.
 INK alleged that the document could not be
registered because of the refusal and/or
failure of petitioner to deliver the
certificates of title despite repeated
requests.
PETITIONER LIGON filed an opposition to the
motion on the ground
 that the IDP was not served copy of the
motion,
 and the ownership of the INK over the
property was still in issue since rescission
was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim.
 She prayed that the motion be denied, but
should it be granted, the Register of
Deeds be directed after registration to
deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the
new certificates of title to her.
PETITIONER filed a Supplemental Opposition
 questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
because the motion involved the
registrability of the document of sale, and
she was not made a party to the main case.
TRIAL COURT
 granted the motion of INK and ordered
petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's
copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520
(176616) in open court for the registration
of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's
name and the annotation of the mortgage
executed in favor of petitioner on the new
transfer certificates of title to be issued to
INK.
 on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court
reconsidered its order by directing her to
deliver the certificates of title to the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
PETITIONER filed a petition for certiorari with the
COURT OF APPEALS
 Seeking the annulment of the two (2)
orders.
 But was dismissed. orders of the trial court
affirmed
SC PETITIONALLEGING that THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED:
 in ruling that it had jurisdiction over
petitioner;
 in upholding the orders of the trial court
even as they violated the rule prohibiting
splitting of a single cause of action and
forum-shopping;
 in holding that INK is the owner of the
property and entitled to registration of its
ownership; and,
 in holding that INK has a superior right to
the possession of the owner's copies of the
certificates of title.
IDP intervened
 alleging that prior to the issuance by the
trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its
legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for
 intervention informing said court that the
sale of the properties was not executed by
it but was made possible by a fake Board of
Trustees, hence, THE SALE IS VOID.
 The trial court denied the motion since
jurisdiction over the incident properly
belonged to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
 Conformably therewith, IDP brought the
matter before the SEC which later declared
that the sale of the properties was VOID.
 Thus, IDP banks on this favorable decision
in similarly seeking the nullification of the
questioned orders of the trial court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TC HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER (YES)
WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
(YES) Since it is a mere incident to the case filed
by INK and since it does not prejudice Ligon’s
rights as mortgagee. To grant the petition and
compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain
the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the
trial court is to encourage litigations where no
substantial rights are prejudiced
HELD:
APPLICABLE LAW
REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENT
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument
shall be registered by the Register of Deeds UNLESS the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of
the court for cause shown. In case the person in
possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new
certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument
which divests the title of the registered owner against
his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of
title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to
compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner
or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the
person withholding the duplicate certificate is not
amenable to the process of the court, or if for any
reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate
cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment
of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate
of title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
RTC HAS JURISDICTION
 Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, the
former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act, and all jurisprudence
interpreting the former law had established
that summary reliefs such as an action to
compel the surrender of owner's duplicate
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds
could only be filed with and granted by the
Regional Trial Court sitting as a land
registration court if there was unanimity
among the parties or there was no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of
any party in interest, otherwise, if the case
became contentious and controversial it
should be threshed out in an ordinary
action or in the case where the incident
properly belonged.
 Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided
that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest
therein and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions." The
above provision has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting
merely as a cadastral court.
 Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the
change has simplified registration proceedings
by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for
original registration but also over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions.
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-
90-6937 before the trial court was for specific
performance with damages based on a document
of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive
jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. When IDP,
the defendant in the trial court, did not question
the genuineness and validity of said deed of sale
and its obligations thereunder, the summary
judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs
sought by INK was also an exercise of its general
jurisdiction.
2. MOTION TO COMPEL THE HOLDER OF THE
DUPLICATE COT TO SURRENDER THE SAME TO
RD  NECESSARY INCIDENT TO THE CASE
 Hence, when INK filed a motion for the
issuance of an order from the same court to
compel the holder of the duplicate
certificates of title to surrender the same to
the Register of Deeds for the registration of
the deed of sale subject of the principal
action, the motion was a necessary
incident to the main case.
  When the sale of the property was upheld
by the court in its judgment and the
defendant was directed to comply with its
terms and conditions, the right of INK to
have the same registered with the Register
of Deeds could not be disregarded. To
assert and enjoy its right, INK should be
allowed to seek the aid of the court to
direct the surrender of the certificates
of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, they may
therefore take cognizance of this case
pursuant to such jurisdiction.
 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of
a petition which can be filed by one who
wants to compel another to surrender the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds,
this does not preclude a party to a pending
case to include as incident therein the relief
stated under Sec. 107, especially if the
subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with
the subject matter of the principal action.
 This principle is based on expediency and in
accordance with the policy against
multiplicity of suits.
SURRENDERING OF CERT BY LIGON DOES NOT
PREJUDICE HER RIGHT AS MORTGAGEE. LIEN
SUBSISTS.
 The records of the case show that the
subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner
appears in the certificates of title Nos.
26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the
trial court directing the surrender of the
certificates to the Register of Deeds in order
that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be
registered, cannot in any way prejudice her
rights and interests as a mortgagee of the
lots.
 Any lien annotated on the previous
certificates of title which subsists should be
incorporated in or carried over to the new
transfer certificates of title.
 This is true even in the case of a real estate
mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of
the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to
the fulfillment of the obligation for whose
security it was constituted.
 It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on
the property whoever its owner may be.
 It subsists notwithstanding a change in
ownership; in short, the personality of the
owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent
purchasers must respect the mortgage
whether the transfer to them be with or
without the consent of the mortgagee, for
such mortgage until discharged follows the
property.
 It is clear therefore that the surrender by
petitioner of the certificates of title to the
Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial
court will not create any substantial
injustice to her.
 To grant the petition and compel INK to file
a new action in order to obtain the same
reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial
court is to encourage litigations where no
substantial rights are prejudiced.
SC AFFIRMED CA
 2. DEL PRADO VS. CABALLERO, GR NO.149225, 3 MARCH 2010
FACTS:
CADASTRAL CASE JUDGMENT BY JUDGE REYES
RTC CEBU
 adjudicated in favor of Spouses Antonio L.
Caballero and Leonarda B. Caballero several
parcels of land situated in Guba, Cebu City,
one of which was Cadastral Lot No. 11909,
the subject of this controversy
ANTONIO CABALLERO moved for the issuance of
the final decree of registration for their lots.
 Consequently, on May 25, 1987, the same
court, through then Presiding Judge Renato
C. Dacudao, ordered the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
to issue the decree of registration and the
corresponding titles of the lots in favor of
the Caballeros
RESPONDENTS sold to petitioner, Carmen del
Prado for 40k, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of the
tax declaration covering the property.
 particularly described and bounded
 containing an area of 4,000 square meters,
more or less
(OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No. 11909, was
issued only on November 15, 1990, and entered in
the "Registration Book" of the City of Cebu on
December 19, 1990.
 technical description of Lot No. 11909
states that said lot measures about 14,457
square meters, more or less.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same
cadastral proceedings a "Petition for
Registration of Document Under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1529"
 in order that a certificate of title be issued
in her name, covering the whole Lot No.
11909.
 petitioner alleged that the tenor of the
instrument of sale indicated that the sale
was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in
which case, the vendor was bound to
deliver all that was included within said
boundaries even when it exceeded the area
specified in the contract.
RESPONDENTS OPPOSED
 on the main ground that only 4,000 sq m of
Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner.
 They claimed that the sale was not for a
cuerpo cierto. They moved for the outright
dismissal of the petition on grounds of
prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
 found that petitioner had established a
clear and positive right to Lot No. 11909.
 The intended sale between the parties was
for a lump sum, since there was no
evidence presented that the property was
sold for a price per unit.
 It was apparent that the subject matter of
the sale was the parcel of land, known as
Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a
portion thereof.
CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE RTC
 The CA no longer touched on the character
of the sale, because it found that petitioner
availed herself of an improper remedy.
  The "petition for registration of document"
is not one of the remedies provided under
P.D. No. 1529, after the original registration
has been effected.
 Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court
committed an error when it assumed
jurisdiction over the petition, which prayed
for a remedy not sanctioned under the
Property Registration Decree.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FILING THE
PETITION FOR REGISTRATION IN THE SAME
CADASTRAL CASE IS PROPER
HELD: NO. The Court held:
More importantly, we find no reversible error in the
decision of the CA. Petitioner’s recourse, by filing
3. NEW DURAWOOD CO. VS. CA, GR NO. 111732,20 FEB 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner-Corporation filed a Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Lost Owner's Duplicate
Certificates of TCT in the Regional Trial Court
 respondent Judge granted
SOMETIME IN MAY, 1991, PETITIONER
DISCOVERED
 that the original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-
140486 and 156454 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal had been
cancelled
 and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100,
200101 and 200102 had been issued in the
name OF RESPONDENT DURAWOOD
CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY,
INC.
 Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner -
after investigation - found out about the
reconstitution proceeding in the
respondent trial court.
PETITIONER FILED SUIT in the Court of Appeals
 praying for the annulment of the assailed
order in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by
respondent Judge.
 It also prayed for the cancellation of the
new certificates (TCT Nos. 200100, 200101
and 200102).
the petition for registration in the same cadastral
case, was improper.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein.
Such indefeasibility commences after one year
from the date of entry of the decree of registration.
Inasmuch as the petition for registration of
document did not interrupt the running of the
period to file the appropriate petition for review
and considering that the prescribed one-year
period had long since expired, the decree of
registration, as well as the certificate of title issued
in favor of respondents, had become
incontrovertible.
CA AFFIRMED RTC
SC PETITION
PETITIONER ALLEGATIONS
 that a reconstitution proceeding is one in
rem and thus jurisdiction can be acquired
only through publication and notice sent
pursuant to Section 13, Republic Act No. 26.
 It also alleges that fraud is manifest (1)
from the insufficient allegations of the
petition filed before the trial court, as it (the
petition) does not mention the names of
adjoining land owners and interested
persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of
loss attached to the petition.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
 aver that in 1990, these three lots were sold
by petitioner to Durawood Construction and
Lumber Supply, Inc. but the sale in their
favor could not be registered because "the
certificates of title. . . were lost."
 They also allege that the applicable law is
Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by
P.D. 1529, and not Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26,
and that fraud, in order to serve as basis for
the annulment of a judgment "must be
extrinsic or collateral in character", which is
 not the case in the action before the court a
quo.
 They also fault "(t)he deliberate failure of
Dy Quim Pong (petitioner's board chairman)
and his family, who constitute the majority
of the stockholders and directors of (herein
petitioner-corporation), to disclose the
whereabouts (of) there (sic) son, the
President and General Manager Francis
Dytiongsee . . . " who allegedly executed
the deed of sale of the lots and who
allegedly claimed that the owner's copies of
the TCTs were lost.
PETITIONER’S REPLY
 Contends that "the very procedure provided
under Sec. 109, PD 1529, which they
(private respondents) insist is the applicable
provision of law in the matter, was not
strictly followed . . ."
 It also argues that the owner's duplicate
copies of the TCTs were all along in the
custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom private
respondents should have sued to compel
him to surrender the same in order that the
alleged deed or sale in favor of private
respondent could be registered.
 Finally, petitioner claims that respondent
Wilson Gaw had no authority to institute the
petition for reconstitution in the trial court
because "(t)he Court of Appeals itself, in its
questioned resolution stated that said board
resolution (authorizing Gaw) was passed
without the required quorum."
ISSUE: WON THE COURT HAS JUSRISDICTION
TO ISSUE A NEW OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATE OF A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE IF IT S IS SHOWN THAT THE EXISTING
OWNER'S COPY HAS NOT, IN FACT AND IN
TRUTH, BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED
HELD:
NO. The Court has no jurisdiction to issue a new
owner's duplicate certificate of a Torrens certificate
of title if it s is shown that the existing owner's
copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost or
destroyed.
In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.9 this Court
ruled:
For your reference: (from the case)
APPLICABLE LAW
(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26:8
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of
the petition, filed under the preceding
In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals (195
SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous to
those involved in this case, this Court
already held that if a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession
of another person, the reconstituted title is
void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently
the decision may be attacked any time.
In the instant case, the owner's duplicate
certificates of title were in the possession of Dy
Quim Pong, the petitioner's chairman of the board
and whose family controls the petitioner-
corporation. Since said certificates were not in
fact "lost or destroyed", there was no necessity
for the petition filed in the trial court for the
"issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of
Title: . . ."
In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to
order the issuance of new certificates. Hence, the
newly issued duplicates are themselves null and
void.
It is obvious that this lapse happened because
private respondents and respondent judge failed to
follow the procedure set forth in P.D. No. 1529
which, as already stated, governs the issuance of
new owner's duplicate certificates of title.
Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that
"due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the
owner's duplicate "shall be sent by the owner as by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ."
(emphasis supplied). In this case, while an affidavit
or loss was attached to the petition in the lower
court, no such notice was sent to the Register of
Deeds.
Private respondents tried to convince the Court
that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee,
they had no other recourse but to file a petition for
reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however,
states that the remedy, in case of the refusal or
failure of the holder - in this case, the petitioner -
to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of
title, is a "petition in court to compel surrender of
the same to the Register of Deeds", and not a
petition for reconstitution.
section, to be published, at the expense of
the petitioner, twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette, and to be posted
on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of
the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. The court shall likewise
cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person
named therein whose address is known, at
least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. Said notice shall state, among
other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, if known, the
name of the registered owner, the names
of the occupants or persons in possession
of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date
on which all persons having any interest
therein must appear and file their claim or
objections to the petition. The petitioner
shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the
notice as directed by the court,"
(2) Section 109 P.D. 1529 (amending
R.A. 496):
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost
duplicate certificate. In case of loss or
theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of
title, due notice under oath shall be sent
by the owner or by someone in his behalf
to the Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land lies as soon as the loss
or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced by a person applying for the
entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered
owner or other person in interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner
or other person in interest, the court may,
after notice and due hearing, direct the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate,
which shall contain a memorandum of the
fact that it is issued in place of the lost
duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit
as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all
purposes of this decree.
A reading of both provisions clearly shows that
Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in
petitions for issuance of new owner's
duplicate certificates of title which are lost or
stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26
applies only in cases of reconstitution of last or
destroyed original certificates on file with the
Register of Deeds. This is expressly provided for
under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original of Torrens title.
- Original copies of certificates of title lost
or destroyed in the offices of Registers of
Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances
affecting the lands covered by such
titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed
in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not
inconsistent with this Decree. The
procedure relative to administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificate prescribed in said Act may be
availed of only in case of substantial loss
or destruction of land titles due to fire,
flood or other force majure as determined
by the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority: Provided, That the
number of certificates of titles lost or
damaged should be at least ten percent
(10%) of the total number in the
possession of the Office of the Register of
Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case
shall the number of certificates of titles
lost or damaged be less that five hundred
(500).
Notice of all hearings of the petition for
judicial reconstitution shall be furnished
the Register of Deeds of the place where
the land is situated and to the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority. No order or judgment ordering
the reconstitution of a certificate of title
shall become final until the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from receipt by the Register of
Deeds and by the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority of a notice of
such order or judgment without any
appeal having been filed by any such
officials." (As amended by R.A. 6732,
emphasis supplied)
4. REPUBLIC VS. TUASTUMBAN, GR NO. 173210, 24 APRIL 2009
FACTS:
PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE
RESPONDENT TUASTUMBAN
 filed a petition for reconstitution of the OCT
covering Lot No. 7129, Flr-133, Talisay-
Minglanilla Estate under Patent No. 43619
in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo,
with a total land area of approximately
3,633 square meters.
 OCT allegedly either lost or destroyed
during World War II.
 anchored her petition for reconstitution on
Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 264 (R.A. No.
26) which provides that an original
certificate of title may be reconstituted from
an authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued.
RTC
  found the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance and set the hearing of the
petition on 29 March 2000.
 directed the Branch Clerk of Court to
publish a copy of the Notice of Hearing in
the Official Gazette and to send copies
thereof to the owners of the adjoining
properties of Lot No. 7129, respondent’s
counsel, the Solicitor General, the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority and the Register of Deeds of Cebu
Province.
 Scheduled hearing- clerk of court
announced three times if there was no
opposition
 No one opposed the court
proceeded to receive respondent’s
exhibits to establish the jurisdictional
facts.
Lot No. 7129 was granted to the heirs of Sofia
Lazo via Patent No. 43619 issued on 21 July 1938
in accordance to the Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of Cebu City.
RESPONDENT CONTENTIONS
 she bought the property from the said
owners who are also her relatives, as
evidenced by an Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and
Deed of Absolute Sale.
 that since the time of purchase, she has
been occupying and possessing the land
and paying the realty taxes thereon.
 prayed for reconstitution of the title
covering the property since the title,
supposedly on file and under the custody of
the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province, had
either been lost or destroyed during World
War II as certified by said office.
 Cebu City Prosecutor Edilberto Ensomo,
representing the Office of the Solicitor
General, did not present any evidence
against respondent.
RTC ORDERED TO RECONSTITUTE THE LOST
OCT in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia
Lazo
CA REVERSED RTC
 no proper reconstitution can be done since
respondent did not utilize the sources of
reconstitution provided under Sec. 27 of
R.A. No. 26 in the order therein stated,
merely presenting as it did a Certification
from the CENRO that a patent had been
issued over Lot No. 7129 in the name of the
heirs of Sofia Lazo.
 respondent based her petition for
reconstitution on the following documents:
(a) Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with
Waiver of Inheritance Rights and Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 19 July 1999; (b)
CENRO Certification dated 31 May 1999
that Lot No. 7129 is patented in the name of
the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo;9 (c) Register
of Deeds Certification dated 31 May 1999
that no certificate of title covering Lot No.
7129 was issued in the name of the legal
heirs of Sofia Lazo and that all
deeds/records were either burned or lost
during the last World War;10 (d) Tax
Declaration covering Lot No.7129 in the
name of respondent;11 (e) Blue Print of
Advance Plan of Lot No. 7129;12 (f)
Technical Description of Lot No. 7129;13
and (g) Real Property Tax Clearance.
 held that respondent’s proffered evidence
fall under Sec. 2(f) of R.A. 26 which pertains
to "any other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title." Resort to the
sources under Sec. 2(f) is justified only
when the sources under Secs. 2(a) to (e)
are UNAVAILABLE.
 Respondent had failed to lay the basis to
warrant consideration of sources under Sec.
2(f).
 There was no proof of loss of the best
source for reconstitution which is the
owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of
title; therefore, the succeeding sources for
reconstitution cannot validly be considered.
MR
CA REVERSED ITSELF. AFFIRMED RTC
DECISION TO ORDER TO RECONSTITUTE TITLE
IN THE NAME OF HEIRS OF LAZO
 held that respondent has substantially
complied with the requirements for
reconstitution under RA 26.
 traced the ownership of Lot No. 7129 based
on the records of the Bureau of Lands, Friar
Lands Division, now the CENRO of the
DENR.
 Respondent’s alleged failure to prove
the loss of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title was held to be justified
by petitioner’s failure to deny or oppose the
allegation.
 As the allegation of loss was never
specifically denied, the averment in
respondent’s petition was deemed admitted
without need of evidence to prove the
same.
SC PETITION
PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS
 argues that the Certification from the
CENRO presented by respondent is
insufficient because Sec. 2(d) of RA 26
explicitly requires an authenticated copy of
the decree of registration or patent
pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued. What must be presented is
an authenticated copy of the decree or
registration patent and not a mere
certification that the patent has been
issued.
 concludes that since there was no evidence
presented showing that an OCT or TCT had
been issued prior to its alleged loss, there
can be no legal or factual basis for its
reconstitution.
 While there were certifications, technical
descriptions and tax declarations
presented, these are insufficient bases
under RA 26.
ISSUE:
whether the documents presented by respondent
constitute sufficient basis for the reconstitution of
title to Lot No. 7129.
HELD:
 NO, the documents presented by the
respondents does not constitute sufficient
basis for the reconstitution of title to Lot
No. 7129. Respondent anchored her
petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of RA
26.
 Respondent however failed to present an
authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued.
 She relied on the CENRO certification
which is however not the authenticated
copy of the decree of registration or patent
required by law.
 The certification plainly states only that Lot
No. 7129 is patented in the name of the
Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo. It is not even a
copy of the decree of registration or patent
itself but a mere certification of the
issuance of such patent.
 The respondents resorted to other
documents in sec 2(f), thus, reconstitution
will still not issue. Resort to other
documents in Sec. 2(f) must be employed
only when the documents earlier referred to
in Secs. 2(a) to (e) DO NOT AVAIL.
 These documents may prove only that Lot
No. 7129 was patented to Sofia Lazo and
her heirs and that the same was later sold
to respondent. It does not establish the
existence or issuance of a certificate of
title.
 At best, respondent’s evidence may prove
only that Lot No. 7129 was patented to
Sofia Lazo and her heirs and that the same
was later sold to respondent.
 Respondent failed to prove that an original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of
title actually existed. Lot No. 7129 may
have actually been registered and the
certificate of title thereto may have actually
been issued, but the fact remains that this
was not proven by the evidence presented
in this case.
 There is also the possibility that the
property had never been registered and
that the certificate of title never issued. In
that case, respondent’s remedy may be
another proceeding probably for the
registration of title to Lot No. 7129 and not
for reconstitution.
 Because reconstitution presupposes the
existence of an original certificate of title
which was lost or destroyed, if there is no
such original certificate of title, there is
actually nothing to reconstitute.
SC REVERSED CA. PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION NOT GRANTED.
For your reference:
GOVERNING LAW FOR JUDICIAL
RECONSTITUTION
 The governing law for judicial reconstitution
of titles is R.A. No. 26. Sections 218 and 319
of RA 26 enumerate the sources upon which
reconstitution should issue.
 Section 2 refers to source documents for
reconstitution of the original certificate of
title while Sec. 3 refers to sources for
reconstitution of transfer certificates of title.
 The requirements of Secs. 2 and 3 are
almost identical, referring to documents
from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his
predecessors-in-interest.20 In Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,21 the Court
ruled that "any other document" in Secs.
2(f) and 3(f) of RA 26 refers to documents
similar to those previously enumerated
therein, that is, those mentioned in Sections
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
 The Court reiterated this ruling in Heirs of
Dizon v. Hon. Discaya22 and Republic v. El
Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas. The
documents alluded to in Secs. 2(f) and 3(f)
must be resorted to in the absence of those
preceding in order. If the petitioner for
reconstitution fails to show that he had, in
fact, sought to secure such prior documents
and failed to find them, the presentation of
 the succeeding documents as
substitutionary evidence is proscribed.
 In relation to the foregoing, Secs. 1225 and
1326 of RA 26 requires compliance with
additional jurisdictional requirements.
Section 1527 thereof also provides when an
order for reconstitution should issue.
REQUIREMENTS FOR an order for
reconstitution to issue
From the foregoing, the following must be present
for an order for reconstitution to issue:
(a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed;
(b) that the documents presented by petitioner
are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title;
(c) that the petitioner is the registered owner
of the property or had an interest therein;
(d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and
(e) that the description, area and boundaries of
the property are substantially the same as
those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
PURPOSE
 The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land.
 The purpose of the reconstitution of title is
to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in
exactly the same way it has been when the
loss or destruction occurred.
 RA 26 presupposes that the property whose
title is sought to be reconstituted has
already been brought under the provisions
of the Torrens System.
Respondent anchored her petition for
reconstitution on Sec. 2(d) of RA 26.
 Respondent however failed to present an
authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued.
 She relied on the CENRO certification
which is however not the authenticated
copy of the decree of registration or patent
required by law. The certification plainly
states only that Lot No. 7129 is patented in
the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo.
 It is not even a copy of the decree of
registration or patent itself but a mere
certification of the issuance of such patent.
RESORTING TO OTHER DOCUMENTS IN SEC
2(F), RECONSTITUTION WILL STILL NOT ISSUE
 Even if we base respondent’s petition
on Sec. 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 as the Court
of Appeals did, and as respondent now
argues in this petition, reconstitution would
still not issue.
 Resort to other documents in Sec. 2(f) must
be employed only when the documents
earlier referred to in Secs. 2(a) to (e)
DO NOT AVAIL.
 Respondent reasons that she can only rely
on Sec. 2(f) because the required
documents enumerated in Secs. 2(a) to (e)
may only be procured from the Register of
Deeds which had already certified that all
such records were burned or destroyed in
the last World War.
RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE
ISSUANCE AND EXISTENCE OF THE COT
 The problem though is that respondent has
not established the issuance or existence of
the certificate of title covering Lot No. 7129
nor of the other documents enumerated in
Secs. 2(b) to (e) that would prove the
existence, execution and contents of the
certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted.
 There is nothing in the evidence she
presented that would show that Lot No.
7129 had been registered in the name of
the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo and that the
certificate of title in the name of the said
heirs over said property had been issued.
The following documents/ evidence did not
prove the existence of COT
1. The Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs
with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and
Deed of Absolute Sale presented by
respondent does not indicate that the
property was registered in the name of the
Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo.
2. tax declaration  Cannot be relied on to
proce the existence of COT; it merely prove
payment of realty taxes
3. CENRO certification only certified that
sales patent had been issued to the heirs of
Sofia Lazo.
4. Blue Print of Advance Plan and
Technical Description of Lot No. 7129
mere descriptions of Lot 7129
5. LRA report merely attests to the
correctness of the plan and technical
description which may subsequently be
used as basis for the inscription of the
 technical description in the reconstituted
title
5. BUNAGAN VS. CFI, GR NO. L-29073, 18 APRIL 1980
FACTS:
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DIONISIA ICONG and
her children all surnamed Ompad, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
reconstitution of the original certificate of title
covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the
name of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,
spouses,"
 and once reconstituted. to cancel the same
and another one issued in the name of
"Filemon Ompad married, of legal age, and
resident of Lapu-lapu City; Manuel Ompad,
widower, of legal age, and resident of Lapu-
lapu City; Arsenio Ompad, married, of legal
age, and resident of Lapu-lapu City;
Napoleon Ompad, married, of legal age, and
resident of Lapu-lapu City; and Dionisia
Icong,surviving spouse of Antonio Ompad, of
legal age and resident of Lapu-lapu City.
PETITIONER (Espiritu Bunagan) OPPOSED THE
PETITION
 that he is the owner of the lot in question,
having bought the same from Guadalupe
Lumongsod and Perpetua Inso, legitimate
heirs of the late Antonio Ompad;
 and that Dionisia Icong is merely a trustee of
the lot in behalf of Antonio Ompad.
 moved to dismiss the opposition, contending
that the said opposition constitute an
adverse claim against the rights of Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong which cannot be
entertained by the cadastral court.
THE CADASTRAL COURT (in favor of Private
Respondent Icong)
 ruled that it could not entertain the claim of
the oppositor which should be ventilated in
an ordinary civil action, and gave due course
to the petition.
 the court issued an order TO RECONSTITUTE
THE TITLE in the names of the original
.
owners — spouses Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong
 Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 was
issued in the name of "spouses Antonio Ompad
and Dionisia Icong." (from Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong, spouses to "spouses Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong)
PETITIONER Espiritu Bunagan filed an urgent
motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967 and
the original certificate of title No. RO-9675, by
substituting, as the registered owners of Lot 1660.
"Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Incong" instead of
"spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong"
 upon the ground that upon the evidence
presented (plan and technical description
and the certificate of the Clerk of Court) the
lot was adjudicated to "Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong" during the cadastral
proceedings, and not to spouses Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong.
DIONISIA ICONG filed her opposition,
 claiming that the issuance of the certificate
of title in the name of "spouses Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong" is warranted
under Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act which authorizes alteration or
amendment of the title upon proper petition.
RESPONDENT COURT DENIED THE MOTION
 Considering that the court, sitting as a
cadastral court, did not entertain the claim
of the oppositor which, according to then
Judge Jose N. Mendoza, 'may be ventilated in
a separate civil action' this Court, likewise,
cannot entertain the Urgent Motion to
Correct Order of Honorable Court dated June
17, 1967 and Entry of Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-0675 by the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-lapu City, for the same reason.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT SITTING AS A
CADASTRAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
GRANT THE URGENT MOTION TO CORRECT
ORDER OF TC AND ENTRY OF OCT
HELD:
NO. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a
certificate of title literally and within the meaning of
Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition.
The purpose of the reconstitution of any document,
book or record is to have the same reproduced,
after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in
the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.
If the certificate of title covering the lot was
decreed in the form of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia
Icong," as in this case, the reconstituted certificate
of title should likewise be in the name of the owners
as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate
of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that
should be made in the ownership of the property
should be the subject of a separate suit.
In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed
on December 19, 1966 is not merely for the
reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of
title. Dionisia Icong and her children also wanted
the correction of the name of the owners of the lot
from "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" to
"spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" which
involves a material change in the certificate of title,
a change which, not being consented to by the
herein petitioners whose interests are affected
thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary
proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in
Republic Act No. 26. A change of this nature raises
an issue which should be ventilated and decided in
an ordinary civil action.
The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is
authorized under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act is without merit. The proceedings
authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of in
view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for
such proceedings apply only if there is unanimity
among the parties or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in
interest.
It would result that the respondent Court committed
an error in re- registering Lot 1660 of the Opon
Cadastre in the name of "spouses A Antonio Ompad
and Dionisia Icong".
SC MODIFIED TC DECISION
 Affirmed insofar as the reconstitution of OCT
in the name of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia
Icong"
 6. RIVERA VS. CA, GR NO. 107903, 22 MAY 1995
FACTS:
Stemmed from a Complaint to quiet title and for
delivery of owner's duplicate of reconstituted title
filed by petitioner Marilou Rivera against
respondents, heirs of Claudio Gabalones and
Benita Roldan, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The reconstituted title involves a parcel of land
with an area of sixty (60) square meters at
Pagsanjan, Laguna.
 originally registered in the name of
deceased souses Claudio Gabalones and
Benita Roldan. Allegedly, the Gabalones
spouses sold the land to Generoso Reyes in
1947.
 The deed of sale was not presented to
prove the sale. Tax Declaration No. 4304 in
the name of the Gabalones spouses
appears to have been cancelled and a new
tax declaration was issued in the name of
Generoso Reyes for the year 1948.
REYES sold the land to spouses Rogelio Taiño and
Corazon Leron.
 The transaction was covered by a deed of
sale, duly registered with the Register of
Deeds of Laguna.
Spouses Taiño sold the land to PETITIONER
RIVERA
 The deed of sale executed by the parties
was also registered on September 11, 1981.
PETITIONER discovered that Paz Gabalones, one
of the heirs of spouses Gabalones (the original
owners of the land), filed a petition for
reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
title covering the subject land.
 petitioner failed to file an opposition to the
petition for reconstitution.
 The petition was granted and a
reconstituted title was issued.
PETITIONER THEN FILED AN AFFIDAVIT OF
ADVERSE CLAIM with the Office of the Register of
Deeds which was annotated on the title of the
land.
 She also filed a complaint with the RTC for
quieting of title and delivery of the
reconstituted title.
 the trial court rendered a Decision declaring
petitioner as the absolute owner of the
subject land.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT heirs appealed to the
Court of Appeals
CA
 reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding that petitioner had no equitable or
legal title over the subject lot.
ISSUE: WON THE NON-PRESENTATION OF THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE BETWEEN THE
ORIGINAL OWNERS AND GENEROSO REYES IS
FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE PETITIONER
HELD: YES
The respondent court did not err when it ruled that
petitioner's failure to present the deed of sale
evidencing the initial transfer of the subject land
from the original owners to Generoso Reyes was
fatal. Petitioner anchors her claim on the alleged
titles of her predecessors-in-interest, i.e., that the
land was initially sold by deceased Gabalones
spouses to Generoso Reyes, who sold it to spouses
Taiño and Leron, who later sold the same to her.
Petitioner also introduced in evidence two (2)
deeds of sale covering the subject lot: the first
deed was executed between Reyes and the Taiño
spouses, the second deed was executed by the
Taiño spouses in her favor. Significantly, the deed
of sale supposedly made by the Gabalones
spouses to Reyes was not presented in the trial
court.
We reject this submission. The fact that the title to
the lot was lost does not mean that the lot ceased
to be a registered land before the reconstitution of
its title. Reconstitution is simply the restoration of
the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition.
Indeed, the order granting reconstitution of title
confirms the fact that the subject land has been
previously registered and covered by a Torrens
title. As the subject land did not cease to be titled,
it cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
To hold otherwise is to wreak havoc on the stability
of our Torrens system.
SC AFFIRMED CA.

All that was introduced during the hearing to prove

this vital fact was a tax declaration in the name of
Generoso Reyes for the year 1948. The respondent
court correctly found this proof inadequate. In a
number of cases, we have ruled that a tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership.

Petitioner cites the case of Bautista v. Court of

Appeals, where it was held that tax declarations
are "strong evidence of ownership of land acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession." Petitioner's reliance on said
case is misplaced.

In the Bautista case, the subject lot was

unregistered land. Private respondent del Rio who
was applying for registration of a parcel of land
asserted ownership over said land and traced the
roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in
favor of his father from whom he inherited the
land.

In the case at bench, however, the subject land is

covered by a title and has been registered in the
name of the original owners, the Gabalones
spouses. It is also undisputed that, unlike in the
Bautista case, petitioner traces her roots of title to
a mere tax declaration in the name of Generoso
Reyes. The sale between the Gabalones spouses
and Reyes was not satisfactorily established.

PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE ACQUISITIVE

PRESCRIPTION
We also hold that the respondent court did not err
in ruling that petitioner cannot invoke acquisitive
prescription considering that the subject land was
not covered by any title when Reyes acquired it in
1947 up to the time the petition for reconstitution
was filed by private respondents in 1989. She
submits that prior to the reconstitution of private
respondents' title; she could acquire it by
prescription.
 7. REPUBLIC VS. MATEO, GR NO. 149025,13 AUG 2004
FACTS:
 spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Balanga,
Bataan a petition for "RECONSTITUTION
OF THE ORIGINAL COPY AS WELL AS THE
OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPY OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-38769" issued
on July 16, 1971 by the Registry of Deeds
of Bataan in the name of one Jose Tan.
 Covers two parcels of land
 that they acquired from Jose Tan the
above-described parcels of land by
purchase on September 3, 1978 by Deed
of Sale dated September 3, 1978;
 that the original copy of TCT No. T-38769
on file at the Registry of Deeds of Bataan
is missing and could not be located
despite efforts to do so, hence, deemed
lost;
 that while Lorenzo Mateo was in
possession of the owner's duplicate copy
of the title, "due to his frequent
reassignment as a former military officer
to different places from 1978 up to his
retirement on September 3, 1990, he
misplaced said title among his files,
although he has a xerox copy [thereof]";
 and that despite efforts to locate the
owner's duplicate copy of the title, the
same proved futile and is now deemed
lost.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 Carbon copy of deed of absolute sale
 Photocopy of TCT issued to Jose Tan
 Letter of Mateo to RD informing the later
that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
was lost
RTC DENIED
 Since this is a petition for the
reconstitution of a transfer certificate of
title the applicable provision is Sec. 3 of
Republic No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6732.
That section provides that:
SEC. 3, Transfer certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title;
(b) That co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's
duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title,
previously issued by the register of deeds
or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document,
on file in the Registry of Deeds, containing
the description of the property, or
an authenticatedcopy thereof, showing
that its original had been registered, and
pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document on file in the Registry of
Deeds by which the property, the
description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased, or
incumbered, or an authenticatedcopy of
said document showing that its original
had been registered, and
(f) Any other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
NONE OF THESE SOURCES HA[S] BEEN
PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS.
 It appears also that the original certificate
of title is still missing and has to be
reconstituted on the basis of the sources
enumerated in Sec. 2 of RA 26. Thus, the
authenticated decree of registration could
be a basis for the reconstitution of the
original certificate of title but not of the
transfer certificate of title. In this case, the
decree was issued in the name of Donato
Exchivarria; however, there is no
showing how the parcels of land in
question were transferred to Jose Tan.15
CA REVERSED RTC
 Since the provision contains the
qualification - "as may be available" - the
presentation of any of the sources
enumerated above is sufficient.
 The trial court erred in not giving weight to
the photocopy of the owner's duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
38769 (Exhibit "I") as a secondary
evidence falling under Section 3(a) or
even Section 3(f) as abovequoted.
SC petition: PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
  that "when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original
document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court," adding that mere
photocopies of documents are
inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule," it citing Heirs of Severa P.
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals . 19
 argues that before secondary evidence
may be admitted, the proponent must first
establish the former existence of the
instrument, citing Lazatin v. Campos et
al.20
 concludes that there being no showing
that the TCT previously existed, the
photocopy not having been
authenticated by the Registry of Deeds of
Bataan, admission of such copy violates
the best evidence rule, citing People v.
Sto. Tomas.21
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED DOES NOT
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF TCT
 The 1997 tax declarations (Exhs. "U" and
"U-1) as well as the tax receipts (Exhs. "K"
to "K-7") do not prove the prior valid
existence of TCT No. 38769 since these
evidence are recent documents that were
prepared after both original and owner's
duplicate of said certificate of title were
supposedly lost.
 Neither does the receipt dated March 8,
1973 prove the prior valid existence of
said TCT-38769. Said evidence, in fact, put
to doubt such claim. The receipt dated
March 8, 1973 (Exh. "T" - "T-3") shows that
the said certificate of title is of doubtful
origin since it was being investigated by
the National Bureau of Investigation.
Curiously, since the time the said title
was taken by the NBI in 1969, there
was no evidence of any effort from
Jose Tan, the alleged registered
owner, to cause its return to the
Bataan Registry of Deeds. Such
prolonged inaction may be deemed as an
implied admission of the title's dubious
origin.
 Reconstitution requires that the
subject title was validly existing at the
time of the loss. An invalid title
cannot be reconstituted.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in giving
evidentiary weight to the alleged photocopy of
the title as basis of its order for the reconstitution
of the original and owner's copy of the title.
YES.
SC REVERSED CA. PETITION FOR
RECONSTITION NOT GRANTED
 The Decision [of Judge Tizon] dated March
17, 1969, (Exh. "M") and the Decree dated
March 11, 1971 issued pursuant thereto,
do not constitute sufficient basis for
granting the reconstitution of TCT No. T-
38769 in the name of Jose Tan considering
that, at most, these documents tend to
establish the original registration of the
subject propertyin the name of Donato
Echiverri (sic).
 As correctly noted by the trial court
[Branch 2 of the RTC of Balanga], "there is
no showing how the parcels of land in
question were transferred to Jose Tan" (p.
5, Decision dated September 14, 1998).
The said order and decree, therefore,
establish only the prior existence of OCT
No. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769
in the name of Jose Tan.22 (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)
 The CA's reliance, as another basis of
reconstitution, on the March 17, 1969
certified photocopy of Judge Tizon's
decision awarding to Donato Echivarria
from whose OCT the TCT subject of
reconstitution was transferred does not lie
for, in the first place, as noted by the trial
court, "there is no showing how the
parcels of land were transferred to Jose
Tan," the Mateos' predecessor-in-interest.
 In fine, the Mateos have not
satisfactorily shown that the original
of the TCT has been lost or is no
longer available. On this score alone,
the Mateos' petition for reconstitution
fails.
 In any event, even assuming that the
original of the TCT was lost or is no longer
available, not only is the photocopy of the
alleged owner's duplicate copy thereof -
Exh. "1"26 partly illegible. When, where
and under what circumstances the
photocopy was taken and where it was
kept to spare it from being also "lost" were
not even shown. These, not to mention the
conduct by the Department of Justice and
NBI of an investigation behind the
issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and
lead this Court to rule against the
sufficiency of the Mateos' evidence and
 propriety of a grant of their petition for
reconstitution
for your reference:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, "AN ACT PROVIDING A
SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION
OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR
DESTROYED," which has been quoted by the trial
court in its decision, enumerates the sources-
documents-bases of a reconstitution of a transfer
certificate of title. To repeat, they are, in the
following order:
1. the owner's duplicate of the title
2. the co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's
duplicate of the title
3. a certified copy of the title previously
issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian
4. an authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the OCT was issued
5. a document, on file in the registry of
deeds, by which the property . . . is . . .
encumbered or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original
had been registered; and any other
document which, in the judgment of the
court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.

Since, except for the last above-
enumerated document, the Mateos
have failed to present any of the
other documents, the rule on
secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of
Rule 130 applies. Section 5 of the rule
provides:
SEC. 5. When original document is
unavailable. - When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on its part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.

As the immediately quoted provision of
the Rules directs, the order of presentation
of secondary evidence is: existence,
execution, loss, contents. The order may,
however, be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of
the proof offered as a predicate for the
admission of an allegedly lost document
lies within the judicial discretion of the
trial court under all the circumstances of
the particular case.23
 8. REPUBLIC VS. CA, GR NO. L46626, 27 DEC 1979
FACTS:
These two cases are about the cancellation and
annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose
originals are existing and whose reconstitution was,
therefore, uncalled for.
 Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate,
with areas of more than twenty-five and
twenty-four hectares, respectively, located
at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City,
are registered in the name of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as
shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
34594 and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.
 The originals of those titles are on file in the
registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were
not destroyed during the war. Even the
originals of the preceding cancelled titles for
those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name
of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in
the registry of deeds.
THE RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDING
Fructuosa Laborada filed a petition for the
reconstitution of the title covering the above-
mentioned Lot No. 915. Nov 1967
She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and
that the title covering it, the number of which she
could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil
Case No. C-677).
RTC: GRANTED
(a) Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer
certificate of title which was not available
and which was issued to Maria Bueza who
sold the lot to Laborada.
(b) directed the register of deeds of Caloocan
City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915
in the name of Laborada. The order of
reconstitution was not appealed. It became
final and executory.
RD: deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R)
2. ANOTHER CASE
 Francisca S. Bombast filed a petition dated
November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of
the title of another lot, the aforementioned
Lot No. 918.
RTC: GRANTED
 5 months before the issuance of
reconstituted title. Francisca Bombast sold
the lot to Herculano Deo (she used the same
address used by Laborada). TCT was issued
to Deo.
 On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A &
A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly
for P250,000. TCT was issued to the
company.
 On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two
petitions for the cancellation and annulment
of the reconstituted titles and the titles
issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos.
1784 and 1785).
 Judge Salvador, who had ordered the
reconstitution of
 After a joint trial of the two cases,
respondents corporation and Laborada filed
amended answers wherein they pleaded the
defense that they were purchasers in good
faith and for value.
RTC: Titles cannot be collaterally attacked -> the
reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the
same validity, force and effect as the originals
before the reconstitution"
CA: AFFIRMED
1. Reconstitution can no longer be set aside
2. if there were irregularities in the
reconstitution, then, as between two
innocent parties, the State, as the party that
made possible the reconstitution, should
suffer the loss.
The State appealed to SC.
ISSUE: WON the reconstituted titles are valid
HELD: NO
9. DIZON VS. DISCAYA, GR NO. 133502, 15 FEB 1999
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a petition dated June 26,
1991 for the reconstitution of TCT No. 75335
 Petitioners filed an Amended Petition dated
June 8, 1992 correcting the number of the
subject TCT from 75335 to 75355.
 Petition was dismissed for failure of
petitioners to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time. This was later
set aside.
 Petitioners presented documentary evidence
to show their compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements
RTC: DISMISSED
SC:
 CA erred in sustaining the validity of the
reconstituted titles which, although issued
with judicial sanction, are no better than
spurious and forged titles.
 The crucial and decisive fact, is that two
valid and existing Torrens titles in the name
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were needlessly reconstituted in the names
of Laborada and Bombast on the false or
perjurious assumption that the two titles
were destroyed during the war.
 One and the same judge (1) allowed the
reconstitution and then (2) decided the two
subsequent cases for the cancellation and
annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted
titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government
for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the
evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged
ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be
given any credence.
 The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases
Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because
they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and
beyond the purview of that law since the
titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in
the registry of deeds and do not require
reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory laws are
void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
NOT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH (COMPANY)
SC REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
 Failure to comply with the requirements of
Section 2 of Act 26.
 while the petitioners presented as Exhibit
"V" a Certification from the Land Registration
Authority that the property involved is
covered by Decree No. 4974, dated
December 23, 1910, the said certification is
not authenticated as required by RA 26.
 the evidence adduced by petitioners did not
suffice as a proper basis for reconstitution.
(relied on Sf)
ISSUES:
 Whether Section 3 of RA 26 governs the
petition for reconstitution of the petitioners?
YES
  Whether petitioners', presentation of the
documents enumerated in paragraph 5 of
LRC Circular No. 35 constituted a sufficient
and proper basis for reconstitution under
Section 3 (f) of RA 26? NO
HELD:
1. YES.
Petitioners are correct that Section 3 of RA 26
governs petitions for reconstitution of transfer
certificates of title, while Section 2 of the same law
applies when original certificates of title are at
stake.
This can be gleaned from the following provisions of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26:
Sec. 2. Original certificate of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available
 Be that as it may, the Decision of the
respondent court is right, under the
attendant facts and circumstances, because
the basis thereof is Section 2 (f) of RA 26,
which is the same as Section 3 of said law.
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26 are similar
provisions except for the following
differences, as indicated hereunder:
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that Section 2
differs from Section 3, as follows:
a. As to applicability — Section 2
applies to original certificates of title
while section 3 applies to transfer
certificates of title;
b. As to (d) of both Sections — While
Section 2(d) requires an
authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, section 3(d)
requires the deed of transfer or other
document in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the
property, or an authenticated copy
thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to
which the lost or destroyed certificate
of title was issued.
Petitioners predicate their petition for reconstitution
on Section 3(f) of RA 26. Since the respondent court
based the dismissal of the petition on Section 2(f),
which was an exact reproduction of Section 3(f), the
disposition of the case would still be the same, and
the dismissal in question would have been a sound
disposition, had Section 3(f) been applied.
 As stressed by the Solicitor General,
whether Section 2(f) or Section 3(f) is
applied to the case, the result would be
the same.
OTHER DOCUMENTS refer to those
enumerated in paragraph 5 of LRC circular
LRC CIRCULAR 5. In case the reconstitution is to
be made exclusively from sources enumerated in
Sections 2(f) and 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26 in
relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate
copy of the petition to be forwarded to this
Commission shall be accompanied by the following:
Paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 specifically
states that "[i]n case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in
sections 2(f) and 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26, in
relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate
copy of the petition to be forwarded to this
Commission shall be accompanied by the following:
..."
 it is clear that subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c)
of paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 are
merely additional documents that must
accompany the petition to be forwarded to
the Land Registration Commission (now
Land Registration Authority).
 There is nothing in LRC Circular No. 35 to
support petitioners' stance that the
documents therein enumerated are those
referred to in Section 3(f) of RA 26.
 Having failed to provide a sufficient and
proper basis for reconstitution, petitioners
cannot assail the respondent court for
dismissing their petition for reconstitution.
SC AFFIRMED
 10. REPUBLIC VS. IAC, GR NO. 68303, 1S JAN 1999
FACTS:
 The properties in dispute number three
undivided lots [Lot No. 465-A; Bsd-864, CAD-
159, Lot No. 2408-A, Psd-864 (Lot 2457-Cad.
99), and Lot No. 2410-B, Psd-864 (Lot 2461
Cad 99)] altogether consisting of a total of
1,024 hectares of ricelands.
 The title thereto stood allegedly in the name
of Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who died in 1936.
 The private respondent, Princess Kiram, a
niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the
original certificate of title (No. P-133) thereto
was destroyed as a consequence of a fire
that gutted the office of the Register of
Deeds of Sulu sometime in February, 1974.
 She likewise alleges that the owner's copy
thereof was lost on account of the same
misfortune. She filed for reconstitution of
title.
REPUBLIC OPPOSED on the grounds of:
(1) lack of proper publication; absence of proof
that Original Certificate of Title No. P-133
 was in force and in effect at the time of its
alleged loss; and 3) failure to comply with
the provisions of Republic Act No. 26.
RTC:GRANTED the application on the strength of
(1) certificate of publication in the Official
Gazette;
(2) the respective survey plans and technical
descriptions of the properties; and
The private respondent presented
 a copy of Act No. 3430, "An Act to provide
for the reservation of certain lands of the
public domain on the Island of Sulu, the
usufruct thereof to be granted to the Sultan
of Sulu and his heirs," among them, those
subject of the petition, as well as a copy of
proclamation No. 1530
ISSUE: WON the requirements for
reconstitution were complied with
HELD: NO
 the notices (of hearing) were not posted on
the main entrances of the provincial and
municipal halls of the locality in which the
lands are located.
Under Section 13, of Republic Act No. 26:
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the
petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice
issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on
the main of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated, at the provincial building and of the
municipal building at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. xxxx
THERE IS JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT
 such a mode of publication is a jurisdictional
requirement. failure on the part of the
applicant to comply with it confers no
jurisdiction upon the court.
Publication of notice in the OG not enough
 In addition, Republic Act No. 26 decrees that
such a notice be posted "on the main
entrance" of the corresponding provincial
capitol and municipal building, as well as
served actually upon the owners of adjacent
lands.
 Failure to comply with such requisites will
nullify the decree of reconstitution.
It shall be noted that a judicial reconstitution
of title partakes of a land registration
11. REPUBLIC VS. RAMOS, GR NO. 169481 , 22 FEB 2010
FACTS:
Respondents (heirs of Julio Ramos) filed a Petition
for Reconstitution of OCT No. 3613
proceeding. Thus, notice of the proceedings
must be done in the manner set forth by the
letter of the law.
 Order not proof of compliance
Failure to interpose an opposition is not
enough, there must be substantial
compliance with the reqts

private respondent has not sufficiently
shown her right to a reconstitution.

Neither Act No. 3430 nor Proclamation No.
1530 confers title to any party over the
properties mentioned therein. On the other
hand, Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act
Providing A Special Procedure For The
Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates of Title
Lost Or Destroyed," enumerates the sources
on which the reconstituted certificate of title
may be based.

The statutes relied upon by the private
respondent, so we hold, are not ejusdem
generis as the documents earlier referred to.
Furthermore, they do not contain the
specifics required by Section 12(a) and (b) of
the title reconstitution law.

The legislation adverted to are not enough
to support the petition.

The private respondent must have sufficient
proof that her predecessor-in-interest had in
fact availed himself of the benefits of the
land grant the twin statutes confer.

Proclamation No. 1530, moreover, does not
specifically name Sultan Kiram as the owner
of the lands reserved for resettlement. While
Act No. 3430 does, this measure was
enacted as far back as 1928. Since then,
the properties could have undergone
successive transfers.
Documents required

The documents alluded to under Sections
2(f) and 3(f), finally, must be resorted to in
the absence of those preceding in order.
There is no showing here that the private
respondent had in fact sought to secure
such prior documents (except with respect
to the owner's duplicate copy of title, which
she claims had been likewise destroyed) and
failed to find them. This endangers doubts,
indeed, about the existence of the alleged
title itself.
SC REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
 Stated that the late Julio Ramos,
grandfather of herein petitioners, is the
 original claimant of Lot No. 54 of the
Cadastral Survey
 They presented LRA Certification, RD
Certification to the effect that OCT No.
 the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3613 was lost
 Lot No. 54 is declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Julio Ramos
 That there is no document pending
registration with the Registry of Deeds of
Bataan affecting said Lot 54.
 Alleged that OCT No. 3613 may be
reconstituted on the basis of the approved
plan and technical descriptions and the Lot
Data Computation
 Respondent Reynaldo Ramos Medina
(Reynaldo), stated that owner’s copy of TCT
was lost during the Japanese occupation
RTC: GRANTED RECONSTITUTION based on the
approved Relocation Plan and Technical Description.
CA: DISMISSED
 Evidence presented are sufficient to grant
reconstitution
ISSUES:
1. WON the trial court acquired
jurisdiction in the reconstitution
proceeding
1. NO. The trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution.
RA 26
 lays down the specific procedure for the
reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens
certificates of title. It confers jurisdiction
upon trial courts to hear and decide petitions
for judicial reconstitution. However, before
said courts can assume jurisdiction over the
petition and grant the reconstitution prayed
for, the petitioner must observe certain
special requirements and mode of procedure
prescribed by law.
SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution xxx The petition
shall state or contain, among other things, the
following:
a) that the owner’s duplicate of the certificate
of title had been lost or destroyed;
b) that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had
been issued, the same had been lost or
destroyed;
c) the location area and boundaries of the
property
d) the nature and description of the building or
improvements, if any, which do not belong
to the owner of the land, and the names and
addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements;
e) the names and addresses of the occupants
or persons in possession of the property, of
the owners of the adjoining properties and of
all persons who may have any interest in the
property;
f) a detailed description of the encumbrances,
if any, affecting the property; and
g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have
been presented for registration, or if there
be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet.
RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION
 it did not contain an allegation that no co-
owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessees duplicate
had been issued or, if any had been issued,
the same had been lost or destroyed.
 The petition also failed to state the names
and addresses of the present occupants of
Lot 54.
 Because of these fatal omissions, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents’ petition.
 Consequently, the proceedings it conducted,
as well as those of the CA, are null and void.
WON Relocation Survey Plan and Technical
Description are sufficient evidence for
reconstitution of title
2. NO. Respondents failed to present
competent source of reconstitution.
 Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates in the
following order the sources from which
reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
certificates of title may be based:
Respondents predicate their Petition for
Reconstitution on Section 2(f) of RA 26.
 presented survey plan,22 technical
23
description, Certification issued by the
Land Registration Authority, 24 Lot Data
Computation,25 and tax declarations.26
 Unfortunately, these pieces of documentary
evidence are not similar to those mentioned
in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 of
RA 26, which all pertain to documents issued
or are on file with the Registry of Deeds.
 the survey plan and technical
description are not competent and
sufficient sources of reconstitution
when the petition is based on Section
2(f) of RA 26.
 Moreover, the Certification 31 issued by
the LRA stating that Decree No. 190622
was issued for Lot 54 means nothing.
  LRA CERTIFICATION: It cannot be  NON-SUBMISSION OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF
ascertained whether the decree granted or LOSS
denied Ramos’ claim.
 RD CERTIFICATION: it cannot be deduced SC SETASIDE
therefrom that OCT No. 3613 was actually
issued and kept on file with said office.

12. REPUBLIC VS. EL GOBIERNO DELAS LSLAS DE FILIPINAS, GR NO. 142284,8 JUNE 2005 NOT
GRANTED

FACTS:  Plan and tech description were verified

 respondent Severiana Gacho filed a correct thus recommended to grant
petition for reconstitution of lost certificate reconstitution
of title before the RTC
 that portion of lot was bought from the RTC: GRANTED
heirs of Tumulak CA:AFFIRMED
 alleged that the said Lot No. 1499 was  Considered the 1929 decision
owned by Tirso Tumulak (deceased) which (stating Lot No. 1499 in favor of
was adjudged to them by virtue of a Tirso)
decision
 Decree 365835 was issued to said Lot PETITIONER
1499, in the name of said Tirso Tumulak,  Lower court erred in granting the petition
married to Engracia Pongasi, but which for reconstitution on the basis of index of
decree was not salvaged from the last decree, sketch plan, certification, among
World War, but its existence appears in other documents, which documents are
Cadastral Records non-acceptable and insufficient bases for
 There is OCT in the name of said Tirso reconstitution under RA 26.
Tumulak
 the owner’s duplicate copy of the said TIRSO->CONCEPCION-
Original Certificate of Title issued to Lot >AGUINALDO/RESTITUTO->RESPONDENT
No. 1499, has been lost during the last GACHO
World War  There is sufficient evidence showing how
 no co-owner’s copy of said certificate of ownership had been transferred
title lost has been issued to a co-owner, ISSUE:
mortgagee, or lessee WON reconstitution be granted on the bases of a
 attached the approved plan of the land Xerox copy (decision), entry in the index of
(tracing cloth), technical description and decrees, sketch plan, certifications, technical
deed of conveyance in favor of petitioner description and deed of sale, which documents
are not acceptable sources for reconstitution
Respondent Gacho offered as bases for under RA 26.
reconstitution the following documents:
1. Xerox copy of the Decision dated March PETITIONER
31, 1929 in Exp. Cad. No. 17, Record No.  decree of registration was never
946 (Exhibit "I"). presented by respondent;what she
2. Index of decrees, (Exhibit "J"). presented cannot be considered as valid
3. Deed of Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs judgment;index of decree is not
with Sale dated February 12, 1979 (Exhibit authenticated
"K").
4. Affidavit of Conchita Oyao dated February THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED
22, 1996 (Exhibit "L").  would naturally not fall under Sec 2(a) to
5. Certification from the Register of Deeds, (e) of R.A. No. 26 but may be considered
Lapu-Lapu City, dated June 9, 1995 under Sec 2(f) of R.A. No. 26, as any other
(Exhibit "M"). document which, in the judgment of the
6. Sketch plan of Lot No. 1499 (Exhibit "N"). court, is sufficient and proper basis for
7. Certified Xerox copy of the technical reconstituting the lost or destroyed
description of Lot No. 1499 (Exhibit "N-1"). certificate of title.
 they are not enough bases for
LRA REPORT reconstitution of lost original certificate of
 Decree was issued for lot 1499 but it is no title.
longer available
NO PROBATIVE VALUE ON THE 1929
DECISION
 only a certain Geodetic Engineer certified
that the copy of the decision AND It was
not established that the Geodetic Engineer
is the public officer who is in custody
thereof. ->has no probative value.
INDEX OF DECREE
 showing that Decree No. 365835 was
issued for Lot No. 1499, as a basis for
reconstitution.
 the name of the applicant as well as the
date of the issuance of such decree was
illegible.
the plan, the technical description of Lot
No. 1499, RD certification
 these are not the documents referred to
under Section 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 but are
mere additional documents that will
accompany the petition to be forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority.
OTHER DOCUMENTS
 the "other documents" mentioned in
Section 3(f) of RA 26 refer to those
enumerated in paragraph 5 of LRC Circular
No. 35 dated June 13, 1983
MERELY ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS (LRC
CIRCULAR)
 that must accompany the petition to be
forwarded to the Land Registration
authority.
 GACHO WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF THE TITLE SOUGHT TO
BE RECONSTITUTED
SC REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
FOR REFERENCE:LRC CIRCULAR
5. In case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections
2 (f) and 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26 in relation to
section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of
the petition to be forwarded to this Commission
shall be accompanied by the following:
a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land
in tracing cloth, with two (2) print copies
thereof, prepared by the government
agency which issued the certified
technical description, or by a duly licensed
Geodetic Engineer who shall certify
thereon that he prepared the same on the
basis of a duly certified technical
description. Where the plan as submitted
is certified by the government agency
which issued the same, it is sufficient that
the technical description be prepared by a
duly licensed Geodetic Engineer on the
basis of said certified plan.
b) The original, two (2) duplicate copies, and
a xerox copy of the original of the
technical description of the parcel of land
covered by the certificate of title, duly
certified by the authorized officer of the
Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration
Commission who issued the technical
description.
c) A signed copy of the certification of the
Register of Deeds concerned that the
original of the certificate of title on file in
the Registry was either lost or destroyed,
indicating the name of the registered
owner, if known from the other records on
file in said office."
Section 2 of R.A. No. 2620 quoted in the Court
of Appeals decision enumerates the sources
as bases of reconstitution of the original
certificate of title. To reiterate, they are as
follows:
Sec. 2. Original Certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available,
in the following order:
a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of
title;
b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s
duplicate of the certificate of title;
c) A certified copy of the certificate of title,
previously issued by the Register of Deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
d) An authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued;
e) A document, on file in the Registry of
Deeds by which the property, the description
of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original has been registered; and
f) Any other document which, in the
judgment of the court is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available,
in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title;
(b) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's
duplicate of the certificate of title
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title,
previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
 (d) The deed of transfer or other document,
on file in the Registry of Deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its
original had been registered, and pursuant to
which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate
of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of
Deeds by which the property, the description
of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.

13. REPUBLIC VS. IAC AND SUSUKAN, GR NO.71835, 30 APRIL 1991

FACTS copied from a tampered one which erased
 On December 23, 1982 Mutalib Susukan the name of Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima as one
filed with the Court of First Instance (now of the registered owners.
Regional Trial Court) of Sulu a petition for  They presented certification from BL that
reconstitution of the destroyed Transfer decreed property registered in the names of
Certificate of Title No. 566 of the Registrar of Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang and
Deeds of Sulu Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima
 The petition alleges that Moro Indulang,  prayed that the reconstitution be held in
grandfather of Susukan, and Maharajah abeyance until the authentic copy of the
Sacandal are the registered owners of Lot decree covering said lot is secured from the
No. 133-B. Susukan along with his father and land registration office in Manila to be the
other relatives as well as the heirs of basis of reconstitution.
Sacandal possess and occupy the said lot.
 On February 8, 1974, the original copy of the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
certificate of title in the custody of the  the name of Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima be
Registrar of Deeds of Sulu was lost and included as one of the registered owners of
destroyed by fire but the owner's duplicate the said lot. Fiscal signed
copy remained in the possession of Susukan.
 It also alleges that the certificate of title is RTC: GRANTED CA:AFFIRMED
free from any lien or encumbrances; neither PETITIONER
was there a deed of instrument affecting  the act of the provincial fiscal in signing the
said lot and that no co-owner's, mortgagee's compromise agreement which was the sole
or lessee's duplicate copy of the title was basis of the judgment of the lower court in
ever issued. granting the petition for reconstitution is not
 On February 4, 1983, the Solicitor General binding because it violated the authority
entered his appearance and authorized the vested on the fiscal expressly provided for
provincial fiscal to represent the same.  the decision of the lower court was not
OPPOSITORS supported by substantial evidence since OD
 PR filed an opposition to the petition for of TCT presented not reliable source
reconstitution alleging that they are the RESPONDENTS
heirs of Moro Dayang Sitti Fatima, the third  maintain that the authority granted to the
registered owner of the subject lot. provincial fiscal in the notice of appearance
 The oppositors further allege that the was not violated
owner's duplicate copy in the possession of  there is substantial evidence in support of
Susukan is not the real or genuine copy of the decision of the trial court.
the certificate of title because the same was ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the act of the Provincial Fiscal of
Sulu in signing the compromise agreement dated
August 29, 1983, without first securing the approval
of the Solicitor General, is binding upon the petition
YES
(2) Whether or not there is substantial evidence to
support the decision dated August 13, 1985 of
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, which
affirmed the decision dated September 12, 1983 of
the trial court granting the petition for
reconstitution of T.C.T. No. 566 of the Registry of
Deeds of Sulu. YES
HELD:
1. YES. the act of provincial fiscal in signing
the compromise agreement was in
accordance with his duty to appear for and
protect the interests of the government in
court in petitions for reconstitution
1. The power or authority of the provincial fiscal by
himself and not merely in representation of the
Solicitor General, to appear for and protect the
interests of the government in reconstitution cases.
LRC CIRCULAR
1. All petitions for reconstitution shall be
directly filed in duplicate with the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the property is
situated serving copies thereof and its
annexes to the following:
a. The Registrar of Deeds concerned
b. The Director of Lands
c. The Solicitor General
d. The corresponding Provincial or City
Fiscal.
 the absence of any opposition on the part of
the government to the petition for
reconstitution shows that the government
has no contrary evidence
HELD# 2. The allegation of no sufficient bases
is not proved.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2 provides for the
sources or bases for reconstitution of certificates of
title
1. Susukan presented the owner's duplicate of
the certificate of title.
2. upon an objection raised by the oppositors
on the basis of the absence of the name of
one of the registered owners, said oppositors
presented two other documents, namely the
certificate from the Bureau of Lands and a
copy of the decision of the lower court to
prove not only the ownership of the third
registered owner but of all the registered
owners.
 These documents readily fall under
Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26.
SC AFFIRMED
14. REPUBLIC VS. CATARROJA, GR NO.171774, 12 FEB 2010
Facts:
 This is about a petition for reconstitution
of a lost original certificate of title in which
the respondents have been unable to
present evidence that such title had in fact
been issued by an appropriate land
registration court.
 Respondents Apolinario Catarroja,
Reynaldo Catarroja, and Rosita Catarroja-
Distrito (the Catarrojas) filed a petition for
reconstitution of lost original certificate of
title covering two lots in Zapang, Ternate,
Cavite, one with an area of 269,695
square meters and the other with an area
of 546,239 square meters.
 The Catarrojas alleged that they inherited
these lands from their parents, Fermin and
Sancha Catarroja, who reportedly applied
for their registration with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite sometime before the
last world war.2
 The Land Registration Authority (LRA)
issued a certification on August 3,
1998 and a report on February 4,
2002, confirming that the land registration
court issued Decree 749932 on May 21,
1941 covering the subject lots. However,
the copy was no longer available on
records.
 The LRA report verified as correct the
plans and technical descriptions of the
subject lots which had been approved
under LRA PR-19042 and LRA PR-19043.
RESPONDENTS Catarrojas
pursuant to the decree, the Register of Deeds of
Cavite issued an original certificate of title to
their parents.
 based on a certification issued by the
Register of Deeds, the original on file with
it was lost in the fire that gutted the old
Cavite capitol building
 The owner’s duplicate copy of the title had
been lost while with their parents.
RTC: GRANTED; CA: REVERSED THEN
AMENDED (GRANTED)
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in finding sufficient evidence
to grant the petition for reconstitution of title.
HELD:
R.A. 26 governs the reconstitution of lost or
destroyed Torrens certificates of title. Its Section 2
enumerates the following sources for the
reconstitution of such titles:
1. Admittedly, the Catarrojas have been
unable to present any of the documents
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) above.
Their parents allegedly lost the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title.
2. The LRA itself no longer has a copy of the
original decree or an authenticated copy
of it. Likewise, the Register of Deeds did
not have any document of encumbrance
on file that shows the description of the
property.
The only documentary evidence the
Catarrojas could produce as possible
sources for the reconstitution of the lost
title are those other documents described
in paragraph (f).
1. The Microfilm printouts of the Official
Gazette showing a notice of hearing ;A
certification issued by the LRA
2. The Register of Deeds also certified that
all their records were lost in the June 7,
1959 fire.; The Report of the LRA
3. An Affidavit of Loss
.
 The above documents of the Catarrojas
fall in the same class as those enumerated
in paragraphs (a) to (e).
 In Republic v. Tuastumban, the Court ruled
that the documents must come from
official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his
predecessors-in-interest. None of the
documents presented in this case fit such
description.
Catarrojas failed to show that they exerted
efforts to look for and avail of the sources
in paragraphs (a) to (e) before availing
themselves of the sources in paragraph (f).
 may be resorted to only in the absence of
the preceding documents in the list.
REQUIREMENTS for reconstitution:
(a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed;
(b) that the documents presented by
petitioner are sufficient and proper to
warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title;
(c) that the petitioner is the registered owner
of the property or had an interest therein;
(d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost or destroyed; and
(e) that the description, area and boundaries
of the property are substantially the same
as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
1. MICROFILM: not proof that a certificate of first, a decree issued under Section 37 that
title was in fact issued in the name of the dismisses the application and, second, a decree
Catarrojas’ parents. issued under Section 38 confirming title of
2. The publication in the Official Gazette only ownership and its registration.
proved that the couple took the initial step
of publishing their claim to the property. Without proof that OCT has in fact been issued,
3. Although the LRA’s certification and its they cannot claim Absent a clear and convincing
report confirmed the issuance of a decree, that their predecessors succeeded in acquiring
these documents do not sufficiently prove title to the subject lots.
that a title had in fact been issued to the SC REVERSED
parents of the Catarrojas pursuant to such
decree.
4. Significantly, Act 496 (the 1903 Land
Registration Act) which was then in force
recognized two kinds of decrees in land
registration proceedings:
 15. Republic vs CA, Spouses Dayao, G.R. No. 101690 August 23, 1995
Facts:

March 16, 1989  private respondents
filed with the RTC Petition for
Reconstitution of TCT No. T-304198, on the
ground that its original was among the
documents destroyed in the conflagration.

The trial court finds the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance and set
the hearing.

During the hearing, private respondents
submitted in evidence, among others, the
following "Certification of Publication"
issued by the Director of the National
Printing Office.

However, they did not submit nor offer in
evidence actual copies of the June 12,
1989 and June 19, 1989 issues of
the Official Gazette.

October 9, 1989  the trial court issued
an Order granting private respondents'
petition for reconstitution.

The Order was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on February 28, 1991. It held that:
o According to the Republic, the
certification of publication issued
by the National Printing Office is
not sufficient proof of publication,
the best evidence being the
presentation of the copies of the
Official Gazette where the notice
was included.
o However, the CA held that the
certification clearly states that the
notice was published in the June
12, 1989 and June 19, 1989 issues
of the Official Gazette, the second
notice being released for
publication on June 28, 1989. Be it
stressed that the official acts of
public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity and this
has not been overcome in this
case.
Issue:

Whether or not private respondents validly
complied with the requirements of notice
by publication, posting, and mailing and
the explicit provisions of L.R.C. Circular No.
35, Series of 1983.
Held:

Yes.

Petitioner argues that "the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for reconstitution of TCT No. T-
304198" because private respondents
failed to prove actual publication of the
trial court's Order setting the petition for
initial hearing. Petitioner posits the view
that "a mere certification of publication is
utterly inadequate to comply with the
jurisdictional requirement of
publication . . .; (t)he best evidence to
prove (the fact of publication) is the
presentation of the actual copies of the
Official Gazette . . ., duly marked and
offered as evidence in Court.

Reconstitution of title under RA No. 26 is
an action in rem, which means it is one
directed not only against particular
persons, but against the thing itself. Its
object is to bar indifferently all who might
be minded to make any objection against
the right sought to be enforced, hence the
judgment therein is binding theoretically
upon the whole world. The jurisdictional
requirements of publication, posting and
service of notice are provided in Section
13 of R.A. No. 26, as follows:
o Sec. 13. The court shall cause a
notice of the petition, filed under
 the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the
petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and
to be posted on the main entrance
of the municipality or city in which
the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the
municipal building at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing.
The court shall likewise cause a
copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing. . .
. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of
the notice as directed by the court.

Anent the publication requirement, R. A.
No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to
the trial court two things, namely that: (1)
its Order giving due course to the petition
for reconstitution and setting it for hearing
was published twice, in two consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such
publication was made at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. In the case at
bench, private respondents were able to
show both elements through the
certification of the Director of the National
Printing Office, a government official who
enjoys the undisputed presumption of
regularity in the performance of the
functions of his office. We note that, on
the other hand, mere submission of the
subject Official Gazette issues would have
evidenced only the first element.

Petitioner's reliance on the Best Evidence
Rule is erroneous. What must be proved
under Section 13, R. A. No. 26 is not the
content of the Order published in
the Official Gazette, but the fact of two-
time publication in successive issues
thereof at least thirty days before the
hearing date.

Petitioner next argues that "private
respondents failed to comply with Land
Registration Commission (L.R.C.) Circular
No. 35, Series of 1983.

Petitioner believes that "the report of the
Administrator of the NALTDRA (now LRCA)
and the comments and findings of the
Register of Deeds are conditions sine qua
non before a petition for reconstitution
could be granted so as to forestall, if not
eliminate, anomalous or irregular
reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificates of title." Thus, it argues,
private respondents' failure to show
compliance with these requirements is
fatal to their petition for reconstitution.

It is true that L.R.C. Circular No. 35, Series
of 1983 mandates the Land Registration
Commission Administrator and the
Register of Deeds concerned to submit
their reports and recommendations
regarding the petition for reconstitution to
the court. But, it attaches no concomitant
obligation on the petitioner to show
compliance by said officials. It would, thus,
be illogical in the case at bench to require
such showing by private respondents
before their petition may be acted upon.
16. Ragua vs CA, G.R. Nos. 88521-22 January 31, 2000
Facts:
Re: G.R. Nos. 88521-22

Eulalio Ragua, claimed to be the
registered owner, together with other co-
owners, filed with the CFI a petition for
reconstitution of Original Certificate Title
(OCT) No. 632 covering a parcel of land
with an area of 4,399,322 square meters,
as evidenced by plan bearing No. II-4816,
known as the Diliman Estate, situated in
the municipality of Caloocan, province of
Rizal. Attached to the petition was a
photostatic copy of OCT No. 632 and a
photostatic copy of the plan of the
property as surveyed.

Tuason filed with the CFI an opposition to
the petition alleging that:
o OCT No. 632 was fictitious and the
land was covered by TCT No. 1356
in the name of People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC).
o TCT No. 1356 originated from OCT
No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, registered in the name of
Tuason's predecessor-in-interest.
o the validity of OCT No. 735 had
been declared as beyond judicial
review in the case of Maximo
L. vs. Mariano Severe Tuason, 119
Phil. 612.

PHHC succeeded by the National Housing
Authority (NHA), filed with the same trial
court its opposition to Ragua's petition for
reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and averred
that:
o Ragua's petition did not comply
with the requirements of the law on
judicial reconstitution.
o that OCT No. 632 in the name of
Eulalio Ragua was fictitious, and
that the property was covered by
TCT No. 1356 in the name of PHHC.

During the pendency of the petition,
Sulpicio Alix applied for, and obtained
from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
 an administrative reconstitution of OCT
No. 632.

Tuason filed with the CFI of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of OCT No. 632
and subsequent transfer certificates of
titles (TCTs) originating therefrom, against
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
alleged:
o that Ragua and/or Alix knowingly
caused to be reconstituted
administratively in the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, a fake OCT
No. 632 covering 4,399,322 square
meters of land situated in Diliman,
Quezon City.

The Republic filed with the CFI its
opposition to the petition alleging that it
was owner of the land including the
buildings and improvements thereon, now
known as the Veterans Memorial Hospital
(VMH), acquired from the PHHC. The VMH
site was part of the land acquired by PHHC
from Tuason under TCT No. 1356,
originally covered by Tuason's OCT No.
735, the validity of which was judicially
recognized by the Supreme Court.

After due hearing, the court ordered to
reconstitute in the name of Eulalio Ragua
Original Certificate of Title No. 632.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the order of the trial court for the
reconstitution of OCT 632 in the name of
Ragua. It held that:
o the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the petition for reconstitution
for failure to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of
publication and posting of notices
provided under Republic Act No.
26, Sections 12 and 13. The Court
of Appeals ruled that
assuming arguendo that the trial
court had jurisdiction over the
petition, the evidence presented in
court to support the application
was dubious in character and
insufficient to justify the
reconstitution.
o the land in question was embraced
in OCT No. 735, issued in the name
of Tuason, the validity of which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in
several cases. The trial court could
not proceed with the reconstitution
proceedings without Tuason's title
and those originating therefrom
being annulled first.
Re: G.R. Nos. 89366-67

Petitioners Dufourt and Regalado were
owners of 45 and 55 hectares,
respectively, of the same parcel of land
known as the Diliman Estate, which was
subject of the petition for judicial
reconstitution of OCT No. 632, filed by
Eulalio Ragua. They alleged that:
o they acquired the property by
virtue of deeds of assignment
executed by Eulalio Ragua in their
favor. Petitioners' rights and
interests over the above property
have been confirmed by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
20701.

Petitioners filed with the CFI a motion for
execution of the judgment rendered by it,
contending that the judgment had become
final after the Register of Deeds and Land
Registration Commission failed to file an
appeal within the prescribed period.

The trial court denied the motion for
execution and approved the record on
appeal filed by the Republic of the
Philippines.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals,
a motion to dismiss the appeal, which the
court denied.

The surviving heirs of Ragua, assisted by
judicial administratrix Norma G. Aquino,
filed with this Court a manifestation
offering to execute deeds of donations in
favor of the government and its
instrumentalities, of all portions of the real
property actually occupied by offices
performing governmental functions,
including roads and parking areas.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings for reconstitution of
title due to non-compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements
prescribed for reconstitution of
tittles;
  Whether or not the evidence of the o The Court of Appeals held
sources of the title to be that the documents
reconstituted was sufficient basis submitted were dubious in
therefor. character and could not be
proper sources of
Held: reconstitution of OCT No.
632. This is a factual finding
 As to Jurisdiction: that we cannot review in
this review on certiorari.
o Petitioners did not comply
with the requirements set in
Section 12 (d), (e) and (g),  First: Regarding Plan
namely, the petition did not II-4816 and microfilm
state: of Plan II-4816, the
Court of Appeals
found that there
 (1) the nature and
were conflicting
description of the
reports regarding
buildings or
their authenticity as
improvements, if
there was showing of
any, which do not
splicing of the
belong to the owner
microfilm, which
of the land, and the
tainted its
names and
genuineness.
addresses of the
Consequently, Plan
owners of such
II-4816 cannot be
buildings or
considered as
improvements;
genuine evidence for
reconstitution.
 (2) the names and
addresses of the  Second: the
occupants of the
application for
adjoining property
registration of title of
and of all persons
Eulalio Ragua, duly
who may have any
certified by
interest in the
Commissioner
property; and
Noblejas did not
indicate that the
 (3) that no deeds or application was
other instrument approved. Hence, it
affecting the can not constitute
property have been proof of the title
presented for supposedly issued
registration subsequently.
Neither was there
 We have ruled that the failure to proof that such
comply with the requirements of application was
publication and posting of notices published in
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26, the Official
Sections 12 and 13 is fatal to the Gazette as required
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, by law.
non-compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements renders  Third: the
its decision approving the photographic copy of
reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and OCT No. 632 was not
all proceedings therein utterly null authenticated by the
and void. Register of Deeds.

 As to evidence:  Fourth: the copy of

Decree No. 6970,
can not be
 considered as
competent evidence
because only the
upper and lower
parts of the
document remain.
The document does
not show to whom
the decree was
issued or the
technical description
of the property
covered.

 Fifth: the tax

declarations covering
the property do not
prove ownership
over the land

o Consequently, we agree
with the Court of Appeals
that none of the source
documents presented was
reliable. We are convinced
that the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are
supported by sufficient
evidence and, thus, binding
on this Court.

 Moreover, petitioners filed the

petition for reconstitution of OCT
632 nineteen (19) years after the
title was allegedly lost or
destroyed. We thus consider
petitioners guilty of
laches.27 Laches is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it.

 The reconstitution of a title is

simply the reissuance of a new
duplicate certificate of title
allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition.30"
Consequently, as the purported
sources of the title to be
reconstituted were dubious, the
trial court erred in making use of
them for the reconstitution of the
title in the name of Eulalio Ragua.

 Reconstitution of Ragua OCT is

invalid.
 17.Pinote vs Dulay, G.R. No. L-56694 July 2, 1990
Facts:

Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother
Petra Pinote, filed in the CFI of Cebu a
verified petition for reconstitution of the
original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of
the Opon Cadastre, which, as shown by a
certified copy of the Municipal Index of
Decrees was supposedly adjudicated to
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, under
Decree No. 230607.

The petition alleged:
o that the original, as well as owner's
duplicate certificate of title, were
burned in the Opon municipal
building during World War II, and
the same could not be located
despite diligent search;
o that there were no annotations or
liens and encumbrances on the
title affecting the same;
o that no deed or instrument
affecting the property had been
presented for registration

The court set the case for hearing and a
copy of the notice of hearing was ordered
to be published in accordance with the
mandatory requirements.

It does not appear, however, that notices
were sent to each of the registered co-
owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro
and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their
heirs, so that they could have been heard
on the petition.

No opposition.

The Court issued an order directing the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to
reconstitute the original certificate of title
of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, in the
names of SATURNINO PINOTE, married to
Maria Igot, JUANA, IRINEO, PETRA(not
Pedro) and PETRONILO, all surnamed
Pinote.

Pursuant to the court's order, Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2355 of the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City was
issued in the their names.

Counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and
Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order, and sought the re-opening
of the proceedings and the rectification of
the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto's
main petition for reconstitution based on
the Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged
that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of
Irineo, Juana, Saturnino,Pedro, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court's
order of June 7, 1979 ordered the
reconstitution of the title in the names of
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of
Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that
they "learned of the error" only on
September 27, 1979 through their
counsel, who made the inquiry and
obtained a copy of the court order.

On December 2, 1979, the court issued an
order denying the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that:
o … the petition for reconstitution of
title wherein Lot 2381 of the Opon
Cadastre was allegedly decreed in
the names of Irineo, Juana,
Saturnino, Pedro and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote. During the
hearing of this petition, no
opposition was registered thereto
and the evidence adduced by the
petitioner shows clearly that an
original certificate of title covering
 subject lot was issued in favor of
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, co-
owners and brothers and sisters;
that the original, as well as the
owners' duplicate, was burned in
the Opon municipal building during
the last war; that there were no
annotations on this title affecting
the same; that the so-called index
of decree showing that Pedro
Pinote is one of the co-owners is
erroneous and it should instead
read as "Petra" since they are the
brothers and sisters; and that this
fact is also reflected in the extract
of the decision of the cadastral
court.
Issue:

Whether or not the reconstitution
proceedings should be reopened and the
order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979
should be rectified or amended.
Held:

No.

As the petition for reconstitution of title
was a proceeding in rem, compliance with
the requirements of R.A. 26 is a
condition sine qua non for the conferment
of jurisdiction on the court taking
cognizance of the petition. Considering
that both the petition and the court's
notice of hearing, referred to the
reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in
the names of the registered co-owners,
Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot,
Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had
jurisdiction only to grant or deny the
prayer of the petition as published in the
notice of hearing.

The court could not receive evidence
proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro,
is a registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The
reconstitution or reconstruction of a
certificate of title literally and within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes
restoration of the instrument which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition. The
purpose of the reconstitution of any
document, book or record is to have the
same reproduced, after observing the
procedure prescribed by law, in the same
form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.

The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is
hedged in by the four walls of the petition
and the published notice of hearing which
define the subject matter of the petition. If
the court oversteps those borders, it acts
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
the case.

On the basis of the allegations of the
petition and the published notice of
hearing, the heirs of Pedro Pinote had no
reason to oppose the petition for
reconstitution for the rights and interest in
Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote,
were not adversely affected by the
petition. It was only when Pedro's name
(and in effect, his interest in Lot 2381)
disappeared from the court's order of
reconstitution that his heirs had cause to
rise in arms as it were, and ask for the
reopening of the case.

There is no gainsaying the need for courts
to proceed with extreme caution in
proceedings for reconstitution of titles to
land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown
that this proceeding has many times been
misused as a means of divesting a
property owner of the title to his property.
Through fraudulent reconstitution
proceedings, he wakes up one day to
discover that his certificate of title has
been cancelled and replaced by a
reconstituted title in someone else's
name. Courts, therefore, should not only
require strict compliance with the
requirements of R.A. 26 but, in addition,
should ascertain the identity of every
person who files a petition for
reconstitution of title to land. If the
petition is filed by someone other than the
registered owner, the court should spare
no effort to assure itself of the authenticity
and due execution of the petitioner's
authority to institute the proceeding.
18. Republic vs CA, Spouses Dayao, G.R. No. 101690 August 23, 1995 (same as #15)
 19. Tahanan Development Corp vs CA, G.R. No. L-55771 November 15, 1982


There are three cases recently decided by de Bernal covering two parcels of
the Supreme Court that are directly land was null and void for failure to
related to and squarely Identified with the comply with the mandatory
petition at bar: requirements of Republic Act No.
o Director of Lands, vs. Court of 26 and held that TCT No. 42449
Appeals, et al., respondents, was fake and spurious.
Greenfield Development
Corporation, intervenor, Alabang o Alabang Development Corp. and
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, vs. Hon.
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors  Manuel F. Valenzuela, et al. 
trial of the petition for judicial ordered the reconstitution from
reconstitution had already been Decree No. 15170 and the plan and
concluded, the judgment thereon technical descriptions, the alleged
granting the reconstitution. certificate of title, original and
owner's duplicate copy over Lots 2
o The Director of Lands, vs. The and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 in
Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. the name of Manuela Aquial, was
Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents, null and void.
Greenfield Development
Corporation, intervenor, Alabang

The instant petition for review assails the
Development Corporation and validity of the same judgment ordering the
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors  reconstitution of the Certificate of Title,
the judgment of the lower court original and owner's duplicate copy, over
granting the petition for judicial the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same
reconstitution of Transfer plan, Plan 11-4374, in the name of the
Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the said Manuela Aquial.
Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the
name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda.

The Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs
of Manuela Aquial who died filed a petition
for judicial reconstitution of lost certificate
of title under Republic Act No. 26 and
alleged:
o That petitioners, by themselves
and thru their predecessors-in-
interest Manuela Aquial have been
and still are in the actual, public,
exclusive, adverse, continuous and
peaceful occupation of the afore-
described lands as owners in fee
simple since time immemorial,
devoting a small portion thereof to
agriculture;
o That the said original certificate of
title, original and owner's duplicate
copies, covering said lands have
been lost or destroyed in the last
World War II and diligent efforts to
locate the same have been all in
vain;

Notice of Hearing was issued.

The Director of Lands filed an Opposition
to the petition on the following grounds:
o That said Decree No. 15170 in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 was
issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason,
married to Maximina Geronimo,
and Eugenio T. Changco, married to
Romana Gatchalian, covering a
parcel of land with an area of 422
square meters.
o That it is very clear that no original
certificate of title had or has been
issued to Manuela Aquial covering
Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374; that
consequently, no original
certificate of title in the name of
Manuela Aquial has been lost; and
that therefore, this instant petition
for reconstitution of an alleged lost
original certificate of title has no
basis in fact and in law, there being
no title to be reconstituted under
Republic Act No. 26;
o That not all the jurisdictional facts
of the instant case have been
established and therefore, the
Court has not acquired jurisdiction
to hear and resolve the case under
Republic Act No. 26, for the reason
that petitioners thru counsel have
failed to serve notice of the petition
in this case to the owners of the
adjoining properties.

The trial court granted the petition for
reconstitution and held:
o That the documents presented by
the petitioners to establish the
existence of the prerequisites to
reconstitution of the title in the
name of their predecessor-in-
interests were either admitted or
not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo J.
Flores in representation of the
Director of Lands.
o That the authenticity of the Decree
issued in favor of petitioners'
predecessor having been
established, the Decree Exhibit X
'shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto' and 'shall be conclusive
upon all persons, including the
Insular Government and all
branches thereof,' and
'incontrovertible' after one year
from the issuance of the Decree
(Sec. 30, Act 496).
o That the requirements of Sections
5, 12, and 13 of Republic Act 26
have been complied with. The
Court has no reason to doubt the
credibility of the witnesses for the
petitioners, particularly the
government officials subpoenaed
who had occasion and reason to
know the facts they testified to,
being parts of their functions and
duties in their respective offices.

Petitioner Tahanan Development
Corporation filed with the Court a
quo verified Petition To Set Aside Decision
and Re-Open Proceedings and alleged:
o Oppositor, as the owner of lands
not only adjacent to, but in fact
overlapped by, the land supposedly
covered by the title sought to be
reconstituted, was entitled to
personal notice of the petition for
reconstitution; such requirement of
notice is jurisdictional, being
mandated by section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26, and the
consequence of failure to comply
therewith is that the court never
acquires jurisdiction to entertain
and hear the petition or render
valid judgment thereon.
 o Oppositor, as such adjoining owner,
was not given notice of the petition
for reconstitution; these
proceedings were instituted, set for
hearing, were heard and went to
judgment without Oppositor's
knowledge;

The Court of Appeals decided in favor of
the petitioner, ruling that respondent
Judge did not exercise sound discretion in
refusing to re-open the case below so that
Tahanan could protect its property rights
which could possibly be impaired by the
reconstitution.

However, upon motion of private
respondents, through a Special Division of
Five, respondent Court of Appeals granted
the Pascual's motion and reversed its
previous decision of November 16, 1979.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court properly
acquired and was invested with
jurisdiction to hear and decide
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P in the light
of the strict and mandatory provisions of
Republic Act No. 26.
Held:

No.

Republic Act No. 26 confers jurisdiction or
authority to the Court of First Instance to
hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. The Act specifically
provides the special requirements and
mode of procedure that must be followed
before the court can properly act, assume
and acquire jurisdiction or authority over
the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
Reconstitution must allege certain specific
jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing
must be published in the Official Gazette
and posted in particular places and the
same sent or notified to specified persons.
Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide
specifically the mandatory requirements
and procedure to be followed.

Upon a cursory reading of both the
petition for reconstitution and the notice
of hearing, it is at once apparent that
Tahanan has not been named, cited or
indicated therein as the owner, occupant
or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2,
title to which is sought to be reconstituted.
Neither do the petition and the notice
state or mention that Tahanan is the
occupant or possessor of a portion of said
Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure
is that Tahanan was never notified of the
petition for reconstitution and the hearings
or proceedings therein.

In complying with the above order, the
Pascuals simply filed an Amended Petition
and although they allegedly undertook
relocation survey on the subject land by
which the supposed adjoining owners and
claimants may be definitely ascertained as
well as the, actual occupation and
respected addresses, they only included
Pedro L. Flores as the occupant.

The amended Petition notwithstanding,
the omission of Tahanan as adjoining
owner and even as occupant of portions of
the supposed Pascual property is palpable
and conspicuous.

It is all too evident that the Pascuals in
refiling their Petition for Reconstitution in
October, 1977 docketed as Case No. 504-
P, had no intention to notify nor give
cause for notification and knowledge to all
adjacent or boundary owners, particularly
Tahanan.

The Notice of Hearing directed that copies
thereof be posted only in the bulletin
board of the Court of First Instance of
Pasay City and no more, whereas the law
specifically require that the notice of the
petition shall be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city on
which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and at the municipal
building at least 30 days prior to the date
of hearing. In the instant case as certified
to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de
Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted
on the bulletin board of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch
located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall
Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice
of Hearing was not posted at the main
entrance of the provincial-building in
Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main
entrance of the municipal building of
Muntinlupa where the land is now
comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in
the municipal building of Paranaque where
Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced.

The failure or omission to notify Tahanan
as the owner, possessor or occupant of
property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant
 or person having an interest, title or claim
to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares
more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the
failure or omission to post copies of the
Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of
the municipality on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at
the municipal building thereat, are fatal to
the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction
by the trial court.

In view of these multiple omissions which
constitute noncompliance with the above-
cited sections of the Act, the court ruled
that said defects have not invested the
Court with the authority or jurisdiction to
proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction
as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void. We hold that the mere
Notice that 'an interested parties are
hereby cited to appear and show cause if
any they have why said petition should
not be granted' is not sufficient for the law
must be interpreted strictly; it must be
applied rigorously, with exactness and
precision. We agree with the ruling of the
trial court granting the motion to amend
the original petition provided all the
requisites for publication and posting of
notices be complied with, it appearing that
the amendment is quite substantial in
nature.

Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26,
notice by publication is not sufficient but
such notice must be actually sent or
delivered to parties affected by the
petition for reconstitution.
20. ALABANG DEV'T CORP VS. VALENZUELA, GR NO.54094,30 AUG 1982
FACTS:
- Petitioners, Alabang Development
Corp.and Bagatsing are registered owners
of a huge parcel of land located in
Muntinlupa.
- that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 were the
subject of petition for Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan PCS 5878, LRC Record No.
6137 after approval by the Bureau of
Lands and the Land Registration
Commission on petition of Alabang
Development Corporation with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII
- that after hearing the Court issued an
order dated April 19, 1969, by virtue of
which the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued
among others sixty-seven (67) Transfer
Certificates of Titles
- that said parcels of land surrounded by a
high perimeter wall on their boundaries
were sold to innocent purchasers in good
faith for valuable consideration as part of
Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned
by petitioner Alabang Development
Corporation, many of whom were already
issued in turn the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title in their favor.
- that these innocent purchasers for value
have been in open, actual, adverse,
continuous, notorious and uninterrupted
possession of their respective lands since
1969.
- Respondents, Pascuals, were the parties
who instituted a reconstitution of lost title
case
- It was only filed in 1977
- Respondents claim that their title was lost
30 years earlier or during World War II
- Ther title was allegedly issued pursuant to
decree 15170 dated March 4, 1914
- As prayed for court issued on June 27,
1980, a temporary restraining order to
prevent the RD of Rizal from issuing a
reconstituted title to the respondents.
- Respondents allege that respondents filed
a belated intervention and motion for new
trial which were denied by the respondent
Judge, nd since neither of them appealed,
the petition for certiorari is now bared by
laches.
- That petitioner Alabang Development Corp
is an intangible Juridical Person incapable
of physical possession of the property and
petitioner Bagatsin is a known resident of
Manila is not in physical possession or
occupation of any property adjacent to the
property in question.
- that the question of boundary owners not
having been notified is a factual question
not determinable a priori but in a proper
action for ownership of any overlapping
- that if there is any "sensible question"
raised in the petition, the same is
ownership over the alleged overlappings
which cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in
a certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution
case "especially if a good issue is on the
validity of petitioners' titles
- "that non-joinder of some alleged owners
would render ineffective any judgment
petitioners may get in these proceedings
- that the existence of respondents' title is
indubitably established with the existence
of the corresponding decree in the Land
Registration Commission which was
examined and found authentic and
genuine by NBI and PC handwriting
experts, approved plans reproduced from
the microfilm, survey plan, and relocation
and verification plans in the Bureau of
Lands - all government document; and
that private respondents have been in
continuous possession of the land and
have been up to date in the payment of
land taxes thereof.
- After both parties submitted their
respective memoranda, Greenfield Dev’t
Corp. intervened because a portion of
what was being claimed in the
reconstituted title is part of their property.
- Petitioners are seeking help from the court
to stop the respondent Judge from
issuing/granting the reconstitution of the
lost title.
- RTC: Granted reconstitution
- The Court is called upon to allow such
intervention of an indispensable party "in
 view of the higher and greater interest of
the public and in order to administer
justice consistent with a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of the
respective claims of the parties and their
numerous successors-in-interest
- Petitioners went to SC through a petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the respondents complied
with the requirements required for
Jurisdiction in reconstitution cases.
HELD:
- The Supreme Court held that the petition
for reconsituttion did not meet the
required contents namely:
a. that the owner's duplicate of
the certificate of title had been
lost or destroyed;
b. that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate had been issued, or, if
any had been issued, the same
had been lost or destroyed;
c. the location, area and
boundaries of the property;
d. the nature and description of
the buildings or improvements,
if any, which do not belong to
the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or
improvements;
e. the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of
the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons
who may have any interest in
the property;
f. a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting
the property; and
g. a statement that no deeds or
other instruments affecting the
property have been presented
for registration, or, if there be
any, the registration thereof
has not been accomplished, as
yet.
- Upon examination of the subject petition
for reconstitution, the Court notes that
some essential data required in section 12
and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have
been omitted: the nature and description
of the buildings or improvements, which
do not belong to the owner of the land,
and the names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or improvements,
and the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may
have any interest in the property. Neither
do these data appear in the Notice of
Hearing. such that no adjoining owner,
occupant or possessor was ever served a
copy thereof by registered mail or
otherwise
- After passing upon the jurisdiction issue,
the Court cannot just let go unmentioned
its observation that the lots involved in
this reconstitution case are part of the
survey plan (Plan II-4373) allegedly
covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are
involved in the Bernal case. In other
words, these lots are covered by the same
survey plan and they are contiguous.
- On November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo
Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction
Section upon request of the interested
party, issued technical descriptions for
Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This document
was submitted to the Court as part of the
petition for reconstitution of title [pp. 1
and 2 of folio]) As to how the data were
reconstituted by the then Chief of
Reconstruction Section in the absence of
the original copy of the plan is not known.
This not our standard operating procedure
since we always issue technical
descriptions based on available approved
survey records.
- As the Court accepted and approved in
the Bernal case the above final report on
the relocation-verification survey of the
regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and
admitted it as evidence of the falsity of
the survey plan in question, there is no
reason for this Court not to use it likewise
as basis for reaching the conclusion that
Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the
same Survey Plan II-4374 are purely
imaginary and "do not actually exist on
the ground."
- Furthermore, the courts must likewise
make sure that indispensable parties, i.e.
the actual owners and possessors of the
lands involved, are duly served with actual
and personal notice of the petition (not by
mere general publication), particularly
where the lands involved constitute prime
developed commercial land including a
part of the South Superhighway.
- The Court stresses once more that lands
already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from their issuance under section 38
of the land Registration Act) cannot be the
subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed
by third parties without first securing by
final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles.
- In view of these multiple omissions which
constitute non-compliance with the above
cited sections of the Act, We rule that said
defects have not invested the Court with
the authority or jurisdiction to proceed
with the case because the manner or
mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void. We hold that the mere
Notice that 'all interested parties are
hereby cited to appear and show cause if
any they have why said petition should
not be granted' is not sufficient for the law
must be interpreted strictly; it must be
applied rigorously, with exactness and
precision. We agree with the ruling of the
trial court granting the motion to amend
the original petition provided all the
requisites for publication and posting of
notices be complied with, it appearing that
the amendment is quite substantial in
nature. As We pointed above, respondent
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed
to comply with all the requirements for
publication and posting of notices, which
failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
- The courts simply have no jurisdiction over
petitions by such third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that
are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners. The very concept
of stability and indefeasibility of
titles covered under the Torrens System of
registration rules out as anathema the
issuance of two certificates of title over
the same land to two different holders
thereof.
- TRO made permanent
- Judgment of reconstitution of title set
aside.
21. SERRA SERRA VS. CA, GR NO. 34080, 22 MARCH 1991
Facts:
- In December 1967, Hernaezes filed for
reconstitution of lost title before the CFI.
- The petition was supported by certification
from RD that no certificates of title has
been issued covering said properties.
- In April 1968, the petition was granted and
a reconstituted OCT was issued.
- These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled
upon the surrender of the Hernaezes
together with a declaration of heirship.
Thus new TCTs in their name were issued.
- Upon learning of the existence of the
above transfer certificates of title,
Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of
his co-heirs (Serras, for brevity), filed with
the Registry of Deeds an adverse claim
against the reconstituted certificates of
title in the name of the Hernaezes. They
also filed in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO
Records No. 163, a motion for cancellation
of said certificates of title (Annex "L"),
claiming that they are holders of valid
existing certificates of titles and that they
are in actual possession of the properties
covered by the reconstituted certificates
of titles since before the war.
- Serra Serras also filed a motion for
cancellation of certificates in the Cadastral
case.
- The udge denied the motion for
cancellation.
- Meanwhile the Hernaezes filed for a writ of
possession which was granted.
- Serra Serras filed for petition for certiorari
before the CA to cancel the certiifcates
and to restrain the writ of possession.
- While case was pending, a certain
Garaygay entered into a contract of
havest with the Hernaezes and thus took
sugarcanes from the land. Petitioners
sought the return of these sugarcanes.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the respondents are bound
by the order granting reconstitution
because notices have been published but
personal notice were not sent.
HELD:
- No. Because in petition for reconstitution
of titles, actual owners and possessors of
land involved must be duly served with
actual and personal notice of the petition.
- After studying the first petition carefully,
We hold that the issuance of the writ of
possession by Judge Abiera after the
motion for cancellation of the
 reconstituted certificates of title filed by
petitioners was dismissed and under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, was
not proper.
- Consequently, the lifting of the previously
issued writ of preliminary injunction by the
respondent appellate court, resulting in
the enforcement of the writ of possession
issued by the trial court and the
dispossession of the petitioners of the
subject properties was a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction.
- In a land registration case, a writ of
possession may be issued only pursuant to
a decree of registration in an original land
registration proceedings "not only against
the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone
adversely occupying the land or any
portion thereof during the proceedings up
to the issuance of the decree."
- It cannot however, be issued in a petition
for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
Reconstitution does not confirm or
adjudicate ownership over the property
covered by the reconstituted title as in
original land registration proceedings
where, in the latter, a writ of possession
may be issued to place the applicant-
owner in possession.
- A person who seeks a reconstitution of a
certificate of title over a property he does
not actually possess cannot, by a mere
motion of the issuance of a writ of
possession, which is summary in nature,
deprive the actual occupants of
possession thereof. Possession and/or
ownership of the property should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding.
- Hernaezes misled the court by:
a. Not specifying, contrary to the
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rep.
Act No. 26, the names and
addresses of the actual
occupants or persons in
possession of the property and,
instead of the real adjoining
owners, giving the names of
fictitious persons who naturally
could not be located and hence
NO notice was cause to be sent
to the herein movants-owners
who were completely ignorant
of the entire proceedings.
b. Surreptitiously hiding from the
Hon. Court the fact that these
same parcels of land were
formerly the subject of said
petitioner's attempt to include
them in the estate of Eleuterio
Hernaez under Spec. Proc. No.
2336, CFI Neg. Occ., but which
lots were found out by the court
to be properties of the movants
herein and said special
proceedings was dismissed;
that petitioners attempted, for
the second time, to claim
ownership and take possession
over these same lots by trying
to include them in the alleged
estate of Eleuterio Hernaez
under a second Spec.
Proceedings numbered 212-
5470, CFI, Neg. Occ., but which
special proceedings was also
dismissed by the court after it
was found out that the lots
alleged to compose the estate
of Eleuterio Hernaez were
owned by and titled in the
names of other persons, more
particularly Lots Nos. 1316
Kabankalan Cad., 2685 and 717
Ilog Cadastre which are owned
by and titled in the names of
the movants herein
- Moreover, petitioners were possessors
under a claim of ownership. Actual
possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the
property (Article 433, New Civil Code), not
summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
- Respondetns claim that petitioners and
boundary owners are bound because they
have been notified. But examination of
the recor reveal that they have not been
notified and that notice by publication is
not sufficient as regards actual possessors
of the property. As held in the case of
Alabang Developent v Valenzuela, in cases
 of reconstitution of titles, actual owners
and possessors of land involved must be
duly served with actual and personal
notice of the petition.
- The Court stresses once more that lands
already covered by the duly issued
existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from their issuance under Section 38
of the Land Registration Act) cannot be
the subject of petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles filed by third parties
without firstsecuring by final judgment
22. ANGAT VS. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 175788, 30 JUNE 2009
FACTS:
- Sometime in February 1999, Federico and
his sister Enriqueta both surnamed Angat
instituted a petition for reconstitution of
titles.
- They presented their duplicate copy of
TCT.
- Reason for the petition is that the old
capitol building where the Register of
Deeds holds office was burned to the
ground therefore the Original copy of their
TCT has been burned.
- Register of Deeds also issed a certification
that they do not have records anymore of
the Original TCT as it was burned in the
fire.
- Federico and Enriqueta complied with all
the notice requirements.
the cancellation of such existing titles. . .
The courts simply have no jurisdiction over
petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost
or destroyed titles over lands that
are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners.
- Petition is granted. Writ of possession is
declared Null and Void. Case was
remenaded to TC for hearing of the motion
for cancellation of reconstituted titles.
- OSG entered its appearance and
appointed Prosecutor Naic.
- In July 2000 Ternate Development
Corporation fled a Motion for leave to
intervene and a complaint-in-intervention.
They contend that a portion of the
property being claied is covered by their
TCT.
- RTC denied motion to intervene stating
that this amounts to a collateral attack
because the case is one of reconstitution.
It stated that a separate civil action should
be nstituted by TDC to assail the validity
of or annulment of the certificate of title.
- RTC: After trial on the merits granted the
reconstitution of the title.
- Republic appealed stating that RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over the
 reconstitution proceedings on the
following grouds:
a. no showing that the owners of
the adjacent properties were
duly notified according to
Sections 12 and 13 of Republic
Act No. 26; and
b. failure of Federico and Enriquita
to prove their valid interest in
the subject property covered by
TCT No. T-4399. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
72740.
- CA: reversed the decision and sustained
the arguments given by the OSG.
o Court of Appeals sustained the
arguments raised by the OSG, and
held that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Petition for
Reconstitution because the notices
of the 10 June 1999 hearing sent to
the owners of the adjoining
properties via registered mail were
returned without having been
served on them.
o The names of the owners of the
adjoining properties were taken
from the survey plan made in
1930, and it was not surprising that
by the time the notices were sent
in 1999, 69 years later, these
persons could no longer be located.
o If it were true that Federico
regularly visited the subject
property, he would know the
present owners of the adjoining
properties and accordingly sent
notices to them.
o The Court of Appeals also found
that Federico and Enriquita failed
to prove that at the time the
original copy of TCT No. T-4399 was
lost, they were the only lawful
owners of the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sending of notices to the
adjoining owners was indispensible.
HELD:
- Petitioners cite Puzon and holds that
notice to adjoining property owners is not
necessary where the basis for
reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate,
following Section 10, in relation to Section
9, of Republic Act No. 26.
Assuming arguendo that such notice is
mandatory, petitioners contend that they
were able to substantially comply with the
same, only that the notices they sent to
the adjoining property owners were
returned unserved.
- OSG contends that the RTC gravely erred
when it assumed jurisdiction over the
Petition for Reconstitution despite failure
by Federico and Enriquita to comply with
the notice requirements under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 26. It should be
recalled that notices to the adjoining
property owners were returned unserved
for various reasons. The OSG is adamant
in its stance that nothing but strict
compliance with the requirements of the
law will do, and failure to do the same
prevents the RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the Petition for
Reconstitution and voids the whole
reconstitution proceedings.
- the OSG maintains that Federico and
Enriquita were not able to show that they
were the only owners of the subject
property at the time of the loss of TCT No.
T-4399. Finally, the OSG asserts that the
Petition at bar deserves outright dismissal
considering that the appealed Decision of
the Court of Appeals had already become
final and executory.
- SC: Petition without merit
- First, the CA decision alrwady attained
finality for their failure to file a tiely MR or
appeal to SC.
- To acquire jurisdiction RA 26 Sec 2 and 3
lays down the requisites. Sec 2 or OCTs
and Sec. 3 for TCTs
- Sec. 10 and Sec. 9 lays down the
publication, posting and notice
requireents.
- In Puzon, we explained that when the
reconstitution is based on an extant
owner’s duplicate TCT, the main concern is
the authenticity and genuineness of the
certificate, which could best be
determined or contested by the
government agencies or offices
concerned. The adjoining owners or actual
occupants of the property covered by the
TCT are hardly in a position to determine
the genuineness of the certificate; hence,
 their participation in the reconstitution
proceedings is not indispensable and
notice to them is not jurisdictional.
- We find that Federico and Enriquita were
not able to prove that at the time the title
was lost, he and his sister were the only
lawful owners of the subject property.
- They, however, failed to establish the
chain of transfers of the subject property
from Mariano to their father, Gregorio; and
finally to them.
- They claim that they have been in
possession but upon examination there
were no imporvements or permanent
structures found.
- We also observe that Federico and
Enriquita failed to provide any explanation
why it took them 40 years from the
burning of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cavite on 7 June 1959, before
instituting the reconstitution proceedings.
23. PANGANIBAN VS. DAYRIT, GR NO. 151235,28 JULY 2005
FACTS:
- OCT 7864 covers 3 lots, 1436, 1441 and
1485
- OCT 7864 was in the names of Juan and
Ines
- Petitioners contend that they are the
lawful owners of lots 1436. They
acknowledge that lot 1485 and 1441 have
- The failure of Federico and Enriquita to
immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT
No. T-4399, and their procrastination for
four decades before actually filing their
Petition, had allowed laches to attach.
- Laches is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it.34
- SC not persuaded by the pieces of
evidence submitted.
- SC: should a petition for reconstitution be
denied for lack of sufficient basis, the
petitioner is not entirely left without a
remedy. He may still file an application for
confirmation of his title under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, if
he is, in fact, the lawful owner
- Petition Denied. CA decision denying the
reconstitution is affirmed.
been sold to Galo Sabanal and Pabl
Dagbay, respectively.
- Owner’s duplicate of OCT 7864 was lost
but Erlinda Pacurs, one of the heirs was
successful in obtaining a new Duplicate
OCT.
- A certain Cristobal Salcedo asserted
ownership over lot 1436 and sold it to
respondent.
 - Respondent upon learning that what she
bought was resgitered land, and being
unable to annotate the deed of sale at the
back of OCT 7864, fraudulently filed a
petition for reconstitution of title stating
that the tite of Erlinda had been lost in the
fire.
- While the petition named Erlinda, she was
not sent notices.
- The petition was grated and a duplicate
title was issued to respondent. This title
however contained an entry of adverse
claim by Erlinda.
- Respondent filed a third-party complaint
against the heirs of Salcedo in that they
should warrant that they are the true,
legal and rightful owners.
- RTC: ruled in favor of respondents.
o It declared that Dayrit (respondent)
is the real owner
o It declared that the OCT in
possession of erlinda is null and
void being obtained when they
were no longer owners thereof
o It declared that the OCT in
possession of Dayrit is the valid
one
o Ordered Register of Deeds to issue
TCT in the name of Dayrit.
- CA: Revered the decision of RTC holding
that it never acquired jurisdiction.
o It held that the reconstituted
certificate is itself void once the
existence of the original is
unquestionably demonstrated.
ISSUE:
- Whether the title in possession of Erlinda
is valid and whether the court acquired
jurisdiction given that the OCT was not
lost but was in fact in the possession of
Erlinda.
HELD:
- The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate
certificate of title in petitioners’
possession is valid and subsisting. This
Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v.
Court of Appeals28 that if a certificate of
title has not been lost but is in fact in the
possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
of a new title.29 Since the owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier
issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over respondent’s petition for
reconstitution of title. The duplicate
certificate of title subsequently issued to
respondent is therefore void and of no
effect.
- As to ownership:
o Per Section 46 of the Land
Registration Act, no title to
registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. This rule taken
in conjunction with the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title
leads to the conclusion that the
rightful owners of the property in
dispute are petitioners.
o it was error on the part of the trial
court to rule that respondent was
the owner of the subject property
and for the CA to have affirmed
such holding. We rule instead that
the successors-in-interest of Juan
and Ines are the legal owners of
the subject property, namely
petitioners herein.
- As to possession:
o On this point, the Court rules in the
negative. Petitioners are no longer
entitled to recover possession of
the property by virtue of the
equitable defense of laches. Thus,
petitioners’ argument that laches is
not applicable to them has no
merit.
o In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined
rule that even a registered owner
of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property
by virtue of laches
o Upon ocular inspection it was
established fromthe people
residing near the subject property,
more particularly Celso Velez, Nieto
Abecia and Paquito Nabe, that
Salcedo was the owner and the one
in possession of the land until 1978
when respondent became the
possessor thereof.
o Moreover, It was only in 1992 or
forty-five (45) years from the time
Salcedo took possession of the
 property that petitioners made an
attempt to claim it as their own.
o Elements of laches:
 conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation of which
complaint is made for which
the complaint seeks a
remedy;
 lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would
assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
 injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred.46

 delay in asserting the - Petition is denied, CA decision is affirmed.

complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a
suit;
24. MANOTOK VS. BARQUE, GR NO. 162335, 18 DEC 2008
FACTS:
- In June 11, 1988 fire gutted portions of the
Quezon City hall which affected the office
of the Register of deeds.
- Respondents Barque’s filed a petition with
LRA for reconstitution of their TCT.
- In support of their petition the Barque’s
submitted copies of the alleged owner’s
duplicate of their title, real-estate tax
receipts, tax declarations and plan
covering the property.
- Learning of the petition, Severino Manotok
IV, filed their oppositions thereto. They
claimed that the land being claimed by
Barque is covered by their reconstituted
title. They allege that the Burque title was
spurious.
- In June 1997, Atty. Benjamin Bustos , as
reconstituting officer of LRA, denied the
petition for reconstitution of Barque. He
likewise denined the motion for
reconsideration.
- LRA reversed the decision of Bustos
- It ruled that the reconstituting officer
should not have required the submission
of documents other than the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title as basis for
denying the petition and should have
confined himself to the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. The LRA further found
anomalies in the Manotoks’ title.
- Notwithstanding its conclusion that the
Manotok title was fraudulently
reconstituted, the LRA noted that only the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the
Manotok title as a Torrens title.
- Both parties appeled to the CA.
- CA: Denied Barque’s petition and affirmed
LRA decision but upon motion for
reconsideration granted the petition.
o RD was directed to cancel TCT of
private repsondents and the LRA is
directed to reconstitute petitioner’s
valid, genuine and existing
- In 2005, The SC First Division rendered
decision affirming the two decisions by the
CA.
- Manotok’s filed for Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
- They filed a motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration which
was likewise denied.
- Judgment was entered into the book of
judgments in May 2006.
- Barques filed for writ of possession or
execution. Manotok’s requested that the
case be referred to SC en banc a motion
for oral arguments.
- In 2006 Manahan’s intervened claiming
ownership of the property. They claim
that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente
Manahan was issued
- SC asked OSG to file its comment
- Case was schedule for oral arguments.
ISSUES:
- Whether a case where an entry of
judgment has already been made be
subject to hearing en banc.
- Whether the CA has the power to direct
annulment of Manotok title through the
petitions raised before it by Manoto and
Barque.
HELD:
- As to the procedural concerns:
 o Yes, this was a procedural
unorthodox but this is done on a
pro hac vice basis.
o It has been argued that the 2005
Decision of the First Division is
inconsistent with precedents of the
Court, and leaving that decision
alone without the imprimatur of the
Court en banc would lead to undue
confusion within the bar and
bench, with lawyers, academics
and judges quibbling over whether
the earlier ruling of the Division
constitutes the current standard
with respect to administrative
reconstitution of titles.
o The militating concern for the
Court en banc in accepting these
cases is not so much the particular
fate of the parties, but the stability
of the Torrens system of
registration by ensuring clarity of
jurisprudence on the field.
- As to power of CA to annul title:
o It cannot
o Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, also known as the
Property Registration Decree,
provides that "[a] certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral
attack […and] cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance
with law."
o Clearly, the cancellation of the
Manotok title cannot arise
incidentally from the administrative
proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence
from that proceeding revealed the
Manotok title as fake. Nor could it
have emerged incidentally in the
appellate review of the LRA’s
administrative proceeding.
o The RTC has "exclusive original
jurisdiction" over actions seeking
the cancellation of title to real
property is so cardinal in our
remedial law that it is reflected in
hundreds if not thousands of
examples in jurisprudence.
o LRA has no power to cancel title
thus CA in its appellate jurisdiction
may not cancel titles.
- As to administrative reconstitution of
Barque’s title:
o Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended
by Rep. Act No. 6732,
administrative reconstitution of
titles is permitted where the
certificates of titles have been lost
due to "flood, fire and other force
majeure."
o These provisions indubitably
establish that the administrative
reconstitution of Torrens titles is
intended for non-controversial
cases, or especially where the
subject property is not covered by
an existing title in favor of a person
other than the applicant
o If a petition for administrative
reconstitution is filed with the LRA,
and it appears from the official
records that the subject property is
already covered by an existing
Torrens title in the name of another
person, there is nothing further the
LRA can do but to dismiss the
petition.
o The only remedy is an action
before the RTC for the cancellation
of the existing title, whether by the
competing claimant or by the OSG
on behalf of the Republic.
- As to Manotok’s ownership:
o In the course of fully reevaluating
these cases, the Court could not
turn a blind eye on the evidence
and points raised against the
Manotok title. The apparent flaws
in the Manotoks’ claim are
considerable and disturbing
enough. The Court, as the ultimate
citadel of justice and legitimacy, is
a guardian of the integrity of the
land registration system of the
Philippines
o The conservative approach would
be to still affirm the continuing
validity of the Manotok title until
 the proper case for its cancellation Piedad Estate, which was a Friar
is filed with the regional trial court. Land.

o Case remanded to CA for reception o OSG directed to assist CA in the

of evidence. procurement of all relevant records
from the LMB and DENR, and to
o The primary focus for the Court of submit the same to the CA.
Appeals, as an agent of this Court,
in receiving and evaluating
evidence should be whether the
Manotoks can trace their claim of
title to a valid alienation by the
Government of Lot No. 823 of the

25. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON VS. RTC, GR NO. 88623, 5 FEB 1990

FACTS: - Castillo complied with the jurisdictional

requirements.
- In March 17, 1988 a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Jose M. Castillo covering a land
owned by Salome Castillo was presented
to the Register of Deeds.
- The registration of the deed cannot be
given due course because the original of
said certificate is missing.

- The RD filed for rconstitution of title on its

own initiative.
 - Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court in Malabon dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction because the notice
of the petition was not published in the
Official Gazette "at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A.
No. 26) which had been set on August 17,
1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of
the Official Gazette were actually released
for circulation on October 3, 1988, or forty-
seven (47) days after the scheduled
hearing of the petition.
- Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with
the SC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner complied with the
jurisdictional requirement?
Whether or not the Register of Deeds institute a
petition for reconstitution of title motu proprio.
HELD:
- No, . The purpose of the publication of the
notice of the petition for reconstitution in
the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole
world that such a petition has been flied
and that whoever is minded to oppose it
for good cause may do so within thirty
EXTRA CASE:
(30) days before the date set by the court
for hearing the petition
- It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it.
- Where there is a defect in the publication
of the petition, such defect deprives the
court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, 40
SCRA 37). And when the court a quo lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it
lacks authority over the whole case and all
its aspects
- Apart from the defective publication of the
petition, another reason for its dismissal is
that the Register of Deeds for Malabon is
not the proper party to file the petition for
reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 26, which allowed the Register of
Deeds to motu proprio reconstitute a lost
or destroyed certificate of title from its
corresponding owner's duplicate
certificate, was expressly repealed or
declared to be "inoperative" by Section 6
of Republic Act 6732, approved on July 17,
1989. A petition for reconstitution may
now be filed only by "the registered owner
his assigns, or any person who has an
interest in the property" (Section 12,
Republic Act No. 26). In other respects, the
special procedure provided in Republic Act
No. 26 remains unchanged and therefore
still applies (Zuñiga vs. Vicencio, 153 SCRA
720).
- Petition is denied.
RAGUA v CA

FACTS: meters of land situated in Diliman, Quezon

City. Tuason maintained that OCT No. 632
- The land involved in this estate is 439 in the name of Ragua was a fake title
hectares and includes the following: : the since the records of the Registry of Deeds
Quezon City Hall, Philippine Science High of Pasig, Rizal showed that OCT No. 632
School, Quezon Memorial Circle, Visayas was issued in the name of Dominga J.
Avenue, Ninoy Aquino Parks and Wildlife, Oripiano, for a parcel of land covering 97
portions of UP Village and East Triangle, hectares situated in Taytay, Rizal.
the entire Project 6 and Vasha Village,
Veterans Memorial Hospital and golf - Later on several parties opposed the
course, Department of Agriculture, reconstitution: Tuasons, the National
Department of Environment and Natural Housing Authority (formerly PHHC),
Resources, Sugar Regulatory Department of National Defense,
Administration, Philippine Tobacco Department of Agriculture and Natural
Administration, Land Registration Resources, Parks and Wildlife, Philippine
Authority, Philcoa Building, Bureau of American Life Insurance Company, et. al.,
Telecommunications, Agricultural Training among other parties, which claimed to
Institute Building, Pagasa Village, San have purchased portions of the Diliman
Francisco School, Quezon City Hospital, Estate from the Tuasons.
portions of Project 7, Mindanao Avenue
subdivision, part of Bago Bantay - CFI rendered decision adjudicating the
resettlement project, SM City North E land in favor of Ragua.
- DSA, part of Phil-Am Life Homes
compound and four-fifths of North Triangle. - CA:

- Eulalio Ragua, together with her co- o upon appeal CA held that the trial
owners filed for reconstitution of title
court had no jurisdiction over the
before CFIattached was a phtostatic copu
petition for reconstitution for failure
of OCT 632.
to comply with jurisdictional
requirements of publication and
- JM Tuason and Co. filed an opposition that posting of notices.
OCT 632 is fictitious and that the land was
covered by TCT 1356 in the name of
o Furthermore, it has been held in
PHHC. TCT 1356 came from OCT 735
several cases that OCT 735 of the
which has been held beyond judicial
Tuason’s are valid and that the trial
review in the case of Maximo
court may not proceed with the
L. vs. Mariano Severe Tuason.
reconstitution unless OCT 73 is first
annulled.
- NHA likewise filed opposition on the same
ground that PHHC has title to it.

- On January 29, 1965, during the pendency

ISSUE:
of the petition, Sulpicio Alix applied for,
and on the same date, obtained from the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, an - whether the trial court acquired
administrative reconstitution of OCT No. jurisdiction over the proceedings for
632. reconstitution of title due to non-
compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements prescribed for reconstitution
- On February 10, 1965, Tuason filed with
of tittles, and
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
- whether the evidence of the sources of the
Branch 18 a complaint for annulment of
title to be reconstituted was sufficient
OCT No. 632.
basis therefor.
- . Tuason averred that on January 29, 1965,
HELD:
Ragua and/or Alix knowingly caused to be
reconstituted administratively in the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, a fake - As to Jurisdiction:
OCT No. 632 covering 4,399,322 square
 o Petitioners did not comply with the
requireents set in Section 12 (d),
(e) and (g), namely, the petition did
not state
 (1) the nature and
description of the buildings
or improvements, if any,
which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or
improvements,
 (2) the names and
addresses of the occupants
of the adjoining property
and of all persons who may
have any interest in the
property and
 (3) that no deeds or other
instrument affecting the
property have been
presented for registration
o We have ruled that the failure to
comply with the requirements of
publication and posting of notices
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26,
Sections 12 and 13 is fatal to the
jurisdiction of the court.23 Hence,
non-compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements renders
its decision approving the
reconstitution of OCT No. 632 and
all proceedings therein utterly null
and void.
- As to evidence:
o The Court of Appeals held that the
documents submitted were dubious
in character and could not be
proper sources of reconstitution of
OCT No. 632. This is a factual
finding that we cannot review in
this review oncertiorari.
 First: Regarding Plan II-4816
and microfilm of Plan II-
4816, the Court of Appeals
found that there were
conflicting reports regarding
their authenticity as there
was showing of splicing of
the microfilm, which tainted
its genuineness.
Consequently, Plan II-4816
can not be considered as
genuine evidence for
reconstitution.
 Second: the application for
registration of title of Eulalio
Ragua, duly certified by
Commissioner Noblejas did
not indicate that the
application was approved.
Hence, it can not constitute
proof of the title supposedly
issued subsequently.
Neither was there proof that
such application was
published in the Official
Gazette as required by law.
 Third: the photographic
copy of OCT No. 632 was
not authenticated by the
Register of Deeds.
 Fourth: the copy of Decree
No. 6970, can not be
considered as competent
evidence because only the
upper and lower parts of the
document remain. The
document does not show to
whom the decree was
issued or the technical
description of the property
covered.
 Fifth: the tax declarations
covering the property do
not prove ownership over
the land
o Consequently, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that none of the
source documents presented was
reliable. We are convinced that the
factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are supported by sufficient
evidence and, thus, binding on this
Court.
- Moreover, petitioners filed the petition for
reconstitution of OCT 632 nineteen (19)
years after the title was allegedly lost or
destroyed. We thus consider petitioners
guilty of laches.27 Laches is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to
 assert it either has abandoned or declined
to assert it.
- The reconstitution of a title is simply the
reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of
title allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition.30"
Consequently, as the purported sources of
the title to be reconstituted were dubious,
the trial court erred in making use of them
for the reconstitution of the title in the
name of Eulalio Ragua

- Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Reconstitution of Ragua OCT is invalid.