The Conflict Between The Turkish State and The Kurdistan Workers' Party

MASARYK UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
Department of European Studies and International Relations

Domain in International Relations
The Conflict between the Turkish Government

and the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party: Complex
Analysis and Possible Future Scenarios
Bachelor Thesis
Lenka Petrželová
Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Chovančík

UČO: 219151
Domain: MV-ES
Year of Imatriculation: 2006 Prague 2010
Bibliographic card
PETRŽELOVÁ, Lenka: The Conflict between the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party: Complex Analysis and Possible Future Scenarios. Brno: Masaryk University,
Faculty of Social Studies, Department of European Studies and International Relations, 2010.
Abstract
The thesis explores the dyadic intrastate conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
and the government of the Turkish republic within the time frame between 1984 to the
present. The first part of the thesis presents the complex conflict analysis focusing deeply in
understanding all of the relevant factors influencing the conflict in Turkey. The analysis
further serves as a basis for the depiction of three different scenarios of possible future
development – status quo, escalation and de-escalation – according to the scenario tree which
assumes a two-year time frame. The conflict in Turkey is still very topical and is
indispensably connected to the broad Kurdish issue which has been gradually, due to the
accession process with the EU, Turkey’s fundamental membership in NATO and influential
Kurdish Diaspora in Europe, brought to the attention of both domestic and international
public. While there has been a significant motion concerning the Kurdish issue recently in
Turkish politics, the solution to the conflict seems to remain far in the future.
Key words
Conflict, Kurdish issue, PKK, Turkish Government, EU, KRG.
2
Declaration
1. I declare that I have written this bachelor thesis independently only on the basis of listed
references.
2. I give my permission to use this thesis for study purposes and place it to the Main
Library of Masaryk University.
3
Prague, April 20, 2010 _____________________
Lenka Petrželová
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank to the advisor of my thesis, Mgr. Martin Chovančík, for his insightful
comments and methodological support throughout my work. I also want to express my
thanks to my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
4
1. INTRODUCTION 7
1. 1. Objectives and structure of the thesis 8
1. 2. Hypotheses 10
2. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

AND THE KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY (PKK) 11
2. 1. Background and context 11
2. 2. Parties 15
2. 3. Incompatibility 19
2. 4. Power relations 21
2. 5. Dynamics 23
2. 6. Internal and external factors 29
2. 7. Solution proposals 32
3. CONFLICT SCENARIOS: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT VS. KURDISTAN

WORKERS’ PARTY (PKK) 37
3. 1. Current situation and starting point 37
3. 2. Scenario tree 41
3. 3. Status quo 42
3. 4. Escalation 44
3. 5. De-escalation 49
4. CONCLUSION 56
REFERENCES 60
ATTACHMENTS 68
5
1. Introduction
The Kurdish issue is probably the most important challenge for Turkey today. Since
the origins of the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan,
PKK) and the government of the Turkish republic the problem has been gradually rising up on
the agenda not only domestically but also internationally. The accession process with the EU
as well as significant Kurdish Diaspora in Europe brought the problem to the attention of the
international public – it is now general knowledge that Turkey has a problem with Kurds. The
situation is, however, very complex and it is thus hard to find an appropriate way on how to
approach it. This thesis has chosen one particular aspect – to analyze the conflict between the
PKK and the Turkish government – in order to bring closer the comprehensive situation of
Kurds in Turkey.
It is a very topical issue that has experienced a lot of motion recently, although origins
of the conflict date back to the early 1980s. Considering the peculiar nature of the Turkish
political system, it is difficult to obtain reliable information, especially as regards to the latest
development1 which is not fully covered in academics texts. For this reason many comments
suffer from overmuch bias and subjectivity. The thesis will try to fill this gap and provide as
an impartial insight as possible.
The conflict has undergone several changes in both scope and size, however, all the
previous opportunities for solution have been lost. Neither party seems to gain from the
violent struggle any more. Therefore there has been a rising awareness that the solution
cannot be achieved on the battle field, instead other means have been put on the table. The
PKK called for a dialogue after of its frequent declaration of ceasefires – this shift in tactics is
associated with the imprisonment of the leader Abdullah Ocalan. The most influential and
principal moves on the side of the government are connected to the Justice and Development
party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) who has the majority in parliament since the
elections in 2002 and constitutes a one-color government with a strong mandate from voters.
Although during its government the party has shown determination for military measures and
the Kurdish policy has been a rather rhetorical project without concrete steps, it launched the
so called Kurdish initiative, aiming at the political solution to the conflict in the early summer
of 2009. The AKP also strengthened its commitment to deal with poor socioeconomic
conditions in the southeast of Turkey, which had created part of the Kurdish problem, by re-
1
The thesis was written to the 20th of April 2010 so it may not reflect the most up-to-date development of the
conflict in Turkey.
6
launching the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP). The
initiative, as an unprecedented phenomenon in Turkish politics concerning the Kurdish
minority has had strong international support, especially from the EU. However, there is a
wide opposition in the domestic political arena. The hardliners stance that derives from
Kematist-nationalist principles is still deeply entrenched in the Turkish politics and continues
to have an influence in everyday life.
Thereby the question stands whether the Kurdish ‘opening’, as the initiative is also
called, is actually a breakthrough that could eventually lead to the solution of the conflict or it
may be only another lost opportunity that will be forgotten by the time the conflict will
escalate again. For the time being – in reference to the introduction of the constitutional
reform package – there are high expectations about the future development, however, the true
solution to the conflict still remains a conundrum.
1. 1. Objectives and structure of the thesis

The analysis and further possible scenarios of the conflict in Turkey will use a
qualitative methodology, particularly a case study, relying on the theory of conflict presented
for instance in works by Peter Wallensteen (Understanding Conflict Resolution) or Dean G.
Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim (Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement). Wallensteen
provides a complete definition of a conflict as: “a social situation in which a minimum of two
actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scare
resources”.2 Accordingly there are three main components of the conflict: incompatibility,
action and actors.3 Applying to the thesis the objective will be to provide an analysis of the
dyadic conflict between the government of Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The
focus is placed on two particular parties included in the conflict although multiple actors are
involved because the dyadic conflict is the main focus of the theory of conflict. Besides,
multiple parties are often reduced to the case between two parties. 4 The conflict will be
analyzed in the time-frame from 1984, when the PKK started its violent insurgency, to the
present. The thesis seeks by reduction of attention on dyad and limited time period to provide
as deep and focused analysis as possible. The strict division on particular components of the
conflict (parties, incompatibility, power resources etc.) should contribute to this effort because
2
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (London: Sage Publications, 2007), p. 15.
3
Ibid., p. 14.
4
Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2004), p. 9.
7
it provides a well-arranged structure that enables to present the conflict from different angles.
Chosen structure also aims at incorporating all relevant factors that might be overlooked when
approaching the analysis only chronologically.
The conflict analysis will further serve as a basis for the second part of the thesis
where we aim to envisage three different scenarios of future development – status quo,
escalation and de-escalation. In each scenario the thesis will analyze specific environmental
factors influencing each separate path but also inter-linkages and cross-overs between them. A
scenario tree will be drawn as a result – it will show possible sequence of events in each
scenario. All scenario sketches will be based on a time frame of two years in the future.
The thesis is believed to contribute to the field of international relations because it
intends to introduce the theory of conflict studies which is not widely spread in the Czech
environment. The complex analysis aims to put together all relevant factors of the conflict in
one coherent text and present as much a comprehensive and correct picture of the conflict as
possible. The thesis is to become a valuable basis for a deeper examination of each particular
aspect of the conflict. Concentration on different scenarios will be beneficial for
understanding the dynamics of the conflict and especially for awareness of possible impact of
different parties. It should help to detect areas crucial to the conflict resolution, although the
thesis has no ambition to propose an ultimate solution.
The conflict in Turkey is an example of ethnic conflict which links to the question of
nationalism. The Kurdish effort to apply the principle of national self-determination is a part
of the ongoing debate within the field of international relations between two counter-concepts
– principle of national self-determination on one side and territorial integrity of existing states
on the other. In some respect the conflict in Turkey is also representative case because it
points out the problem of multiculturalism which is very topical in today’s politics. The
successful solution to the conflict in line with the democratization process can serve as a
model for other countries that are facing similar problems. Moreover, the international
awareness of the conflict in Turkey is reinforced by its membership in NATO and aspiration
to become a full member of the European Union. The thesis has thus an ambition to be a
useful part of the discussion over the Kurdish issue in Turkey which will probably be the
centre of attention many a years to come.
8
1. 2. Hypotheses
The conflict analysis presented in the thesis is crucial because it serves as a basis for
the different scenarios that should provide the possible developments of event in the two-year
timeframe. Understandably the portrayal of scenarios is rather theoretical; however, we can
observe some trends that can hint to future development. Considering the relevant players that
take part in the conflict as well as factors influencing current domestic and the international
environment the thesis aims to confirm or rebut three hypotheses that tie to each scenario.
Each hypothesis counts on different factors both internal and external which are considered to
be fundamental to a particular development:
1. The situation will remain a status quo. The development away from this path will be
hindered by internal factors – strong role of hardliners in conservative establishment,
army, and judiciary as well as external factors – the ambiguous support of the EU.
2. The situation will escalate in case of a weakened EU support, radicalization of the

PKK and consequently Ankara’s decision on a military solution.
3. The situation will de-escalate depending upon Turkey’s relationship with the EU,
which can successfully exert pressure on the Turkish government to terminate violent
conflict and find a political solution.
In the first hypothesis the thesis assumes the crucial role of a domestic political
environment which is characterized by a strong position of the Kemalist-nationalist
establishment who will slow down or hinder the reform process. Moreover, if the accession
process with the EU does not gain new dynamics the leverage of the EU on positive
development will be significantly constraint. However, when both the EU and Turkey succeed
in restoration of their relations, the second hypothesis presumes that the conflict will
deescalate. When this is not the case and the support of EU will be fading away the
radicalization of the PKK along with Turkey’s decision to tackle the PKK by military means
will lead to escalation, as expected by the third hypothesis.
9
2. Analysis of the Conflict between the Turkish Government and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
The examined conflict in Turkey can be in line with Wallensteen, classified as an
intrastate conflict over territory.5 According to its intensity, the conflict was for most of the
time defined as armed and minor, with the exception of the war period between the years
1992 and 1999.6 The PKK started its armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984
and the conflict has been ongoing ever since. The insurgency cost of at least 35 000 lives,
paradoxically a majority of them Kurdish civilians. Due to the prolonged and seemingly
irresolvable nature the conflict between the PKK and Turkey could be well in consonance
with Azar, described as a ‘protracted social conflict’. 7 Nevertheless, the insurgency has
undergone several changes since the PKK first ambushed the Turkish armed forces. Those
changes as well as different aspects of the conflict itself will be a matter of following analysis.
2. 1. Background and context

The brief portrayal of background and contextual factors seems necessary to
understand the complex nature of the conflict. Both background and context are often
understood interchangeably. In the analysis we will refer to background as concise historical
facts having influence on the development of the Kurdish issue within Turkey in general.
Other more recent factors of different kinds will be considered as contextual.
First of all we have to consider the contextual factor which ties to the fact that the
dyadic conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government is only one aspect of thorny
Kurdish issue that is very general in its nature. The thesis builds on an assumption that the
PKK’s insurgency is indispensably connected to the Kurdish issue and thus any solution has
to take into account a broader context. There is no clear definition on what the Kurdish
problem exactly entails and the academic literature studies it very broadly. One reason for this
is the character of the Kurdish ethnic group itself. Kurds with 24-27 million people, still not
internationally accepted as a nation within a recognized territory, are spread across the
international borders of the Middle East – nearly half of them live in Turkey but Kurdish
5
6
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), “Turkey (Kurdistan).” UCDP Database, Uppsala University, 2008,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=158&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#, accessed March 2010.
7
Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions,” International Interactions, Vol. 12,
Issue 1 (June 1985): 59-70.
10
ethnic minorities can be found in Iran, Iraq and Syria as well. 8 This indicates that the Kurdish
issue is not only an internal Turkish problem but also a deep-going international one.9
There is about 15 million Kurds living in Turkey which accounts approximately to 20
per cent of the total Turkish population of 75 million and presents the largest minority group
in the state.10 It is important to mention that the birth rate of Kurds is almost double that of
Turks11 for which their number is likely to increase in the future. The majority of Turkey’s
Kurds are Sunni Muslims who speak different dialects of Kurdish and are traditionally
organized along the tribal culture. They live mostly in the peripheral southeastern Anatolia,
one of the most underdeveloped and least integrated areas far from the administrative centre. 12
For this reason the conflict is at some point referred to as a mere ‘southeastern problem’ and
reduced to socioeconomic issues such as unemployment, poverty or backwardness. Recently
many Kurds, indeed due to the restless socioeconomic situation have migrated from the rural
areas to the western cities of Turkey; Istanbul is now regarded as a city with the highest
concentration of Kurdish people in the world.13
In the sense of context it is necessary to bear in mind that the Kurdistan region,
geographical rather than political, is located in an area of high geostrategic importance. The
significance of the area rich in oil, gas and water resources has gradually grown since the end
of the Second World War14 and has become especially vital in light of the looming energy
crisis. This factor, could to some extent explain the continual engagement of the world powers
in this region and their concern for a conflict resolution, but also Turkey’s persisting
opposition to any form of autonomy of the southeast region.
Taking into account background one of the leading factors, is the establishment of the
Turkish republic itself. Sevres Treaty signed in the end of the First World War promised
autonomy for Kurds, however, Kemal Atatürk fought against it and the revised Lausanne
Treaty included no special provisions for Kurdish people in Turkey. 15 Instead the
abandonment of the Islamic caliphate in 1924 gave rise to an establishment of a purely
8
David McDowall, A Modern history of the Kurds (London: Tauris, 2004), p. 2-3. See Map No. 1 in
Attachements.
9
Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 2.
10
Gareth Jenkins, “Turkey and Northern Iraq: An Overview,” The Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper,
February 2008, p. 5.
11
David McDowall, A Modern history of the Kurds (London: Tauris, 2004), p. 3.
12
Svante E. Cornell, “The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics,” Orbis, Vol. 45,
No. 1 (2001): 35.
13
14
15
Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 4.
11
secularist state based on strong Turkish nationalism guided by the doctrine “happy is who call
himself Turk”. In an attempt to foster this new Turkish identity the government adopted a
assimilation policy and denied any existence of Kurdish minority. Everything that belonged to
the Kurdish national identity (language, clothing, or names) was suppressed and Kurds
became mere ‘Mountain Turks’ classified as second class citizens. 16 As a result of brutal state
policies many Kurds, especially in the West, became assimilated. Severe suppression by
draconian laws that tried to eradicate any expression of ‘Kurdishness’, did not undermine the
national feeling completely. On the contrary, three main rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s
revealed persisting dissent within the Kurdish minority. Even though the situation has been
relatively stable in the following decades, these uprisings can be seen as early warning
signals for the subsequent escalation of violence in the 1980s. According to Wallensteen there
are two different stages of conflict – latent when there is incompatibility but no action and
manifested when both incompatibility and action are present. 17 In this regard it can be argued
that the conflict was already in its latent stage because incompatibility, basically unmet needs
for cultural expression, had already been present, however, the conflict did not become
manifested until the initiation of the armed struggle by the PKK.
In accordance with McDowall, the conditions for revolt were created by a combination
of “economic deprivation, social injustice and physical displacement as well as ideas of ethnic
identity”.18 Although it appeared that hardliners in the establishment had by means of a strict
denial and oppression policy the Kurdish nationalism under control, events of the 1960s and
especially 1970s led to the Kurdish national revival in Turkey. The Constitution adopted in
1961, claimed to be the most liberal constitution in the republic’s history allowed a relatively
wide freedom of political expression,19 which gave rise to an exceptionally liberal period that
nourished Kurdish nationalism. As a result the first specifically Kurdish illegal political party
was established, and more significantly a number of leftist movements which mirrored the
socialist moods across Europe occurred. As the dissatisfaction with the state policies toward
Kurds increased the Kurdish problem attracted gradually more attention among radicalized
students at universities. Consequently the PKK was formed under the vision of one man,
Abdullah Ocalan.
The military coup in 1980 is another important background factor which contributed to
the escalation of violence four years later. It was followed by a new wave of repression and
16
Peter Hinchcliffe and Beverley Milton-Edwards, Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945 (London: Routledge,
2007).
17
18
19
Ibid., p. 407.
12
humiliation which significantly worsened the position of Kurds in Turkey. The majority of
insurgent groups were disrupted, however, the PKK fled the country and continued the
preparation for insurgency from Lebanon and Syria.20 The PKK returned to the Turkish
territory in 1984 and the spiral of violence between its guerilla fighters and the Turkish
military troops began. Some authors claim that the armed struggle was the only possibility in
a closed political system.21 In the same vein Coser argues that true access to the political
system is the only remedy which can minimize violence.22
The conflict was also influenced by external background factors. The Iraq-Iranian war
in 1980s had resulted in about 1, 5 million people fleeing from Northern Iraq to Turkey. 23 The
exodus of refugees was repeated again after the Gulf War. The refugees’ problem forced the
world to pay attention to the situation of the Kurds and gave rise to abundant Diaspora. 24 The
Gulf war particularly created a power vacuum which enabled the Turkish government to strike
PKK bases on the Iraqi territory. On the other hand it meant an important trigger for the
mobilization of Turkish Kurds and an increase in margin maneuver in the southeast of Turkey
because the number of security forces was significantly reduced there. 25 Moreover we can
identify the dissolution of the Soviet Empire as another factor that had a temporary impact on
the financial support and hasend the group’s shift in ideology toward greater pragmatism.
The Turkish determination to defeat the PKK was reinforced after the terrorist attacks
on the United States in September 2001. In the perspective of proclaimed ‘war on terror’ the
Turkish fight acquired new legitimacy that went arm in arm with intensification of anti-
Kurdish policy.26 The intervention to Iraq in 2003, highly unpopular in Turkey, had an impact
not only on deterioration in Turkish-U.S. relations but also on the position of the PKK.
Northern Iraq became a safe haven for the PKK’s military bases and the maneuver space for
Turkey had been profoundly restricted there.27
20
David Romano, The Kurdish nationalist movement: opportunity, mobilization and identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 50.
21
Ibid., p. 52.
22
Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the study of social conflict (New York: Free Press, 1967).
23
February 2008.
24
Gunter estimates that there is more than million Kurds outside Turkey, from which half resides in Germany.
25
Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
26
Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 111.
27
13
2. 2. Parties
Primary parties to the conflict are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (armed non-state
actor) and the government of the Republic of Turkey (state actor). The rise of the PKK was
affected by the leftist tendencies within the country in the 1970s. It was founded in 1978
under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. Although it presented itself as a Kurdish nationalist
movement it was from its beginning based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Stalinist style of
leadership and Maoist strategy in gaining the power. 28 The party stated its goal to establish an
independent and socialist Kurdish state which should not be limited only to the Turkish
territory. However, according to Michael Radu the main goal was to spread socialism. 29
Generally speaking the vision of an independent Kurdistan has always been more a political
concept than a real tangible goal.
The PKK’s had grown from very modest beginnings, few individuals gathered around
Ocalan’s leadership, to a mass movement that won support among Kurds across the country.
In line with Romano “Ocalan and his original six comrades were effectively creating
something from nothing”.30 The fact that other Kurdish groups were abandoned has had an
impact on the growth of the popular support for the PKK. Indeed the PKK has always aspired
to be the only group representing Kurdish interests in the country.
The group’s ideology has developed over time, away from socialist separatist
aspirations toward general modernization in both strategies and goals. Ocalan after his arrest
shifted priorities of the PKK – he declared that the foremost aim of the struggle is to achieve
‘Democratic Self-rule’ for the Kurdish minority in Turkey by dialogue and democracy rather
than violence. The change was probably led by an attempt to improve image and attract
support from more allies31- it is true that the general moderation of PKK’s policy allowed
better relations with the West.32 Development in ideology was accompanied by several name
changes.33 However, it has to be noted that albeit frequent announcement of cease-fires the
repeated eruption of violence may imply that those changes were mere cover-up.
Turkey has applied significant pressure on its main allies to place the PKK on the list
of terrorist organizations in order to increase the support for counter-terrorist measures. It
28
Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (Winter 2001).
29
Ibid.
30
31
Ibid., p. 142.
32
Ali Carkoglu and William Hale, eds., The politics of modern Turkey: critical issues in modern politics. Vol. III
Modern Turkey’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 258.
33
In 2002 PKK changed its name to KADEK (Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan). In 2003 it
renamed to Kongra-Gel (People’s Congress of Kurdistan) and finally in 2005 it restore to its original name.
14
appeared as a major victory for the state when the United States (in 2001) and European
Union (in 2002) joined the growing number of western countries that considered the group
terrorist organization – most recently New Zealand announced its support for terrorist
designation of the PKK.34
The government of Turkey as a state actor to the conflict has a special role. According
to Weber it is the only legitimate user of physical violence in society. 35 In addition it has also
fiscal, territorial and ideological monopolies.36 In light of the unique intrinsic character of the
system, based on strict secularism and Turkish nationalism, the sole authority on territory and
ideology is of special importance. It affects the perception of the PKK which is consistently
labeled not as a national liberation movement but rather as a terrorist group challenging the
very existence of the republic. PKK’s separatist tendencies present a threat to the true nature
of the territorial integrity of the republic. Similarly a demand for recognition of cultural
diversity goes against the concept of ‘one nation’ which does not allow any ethnic distinction.
Among secondary parties, the ones that can place pressure from the outside world, 37
the most important are the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU) and Iraq, more
specifically the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which constitutes the northern part of
today’s Iraqi federation.
Turkey has been a U.S. ally for more than 50 years. The partnership has primary been
based on security issues – since the Cold War, the U.S. has provided military support to
Turkey in exchange for access to Turkish military bases. 38 The U.S. is also traditionally a
major advocate of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Yet, relations were sharpened following the
invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Turkey denied the use of its territory as a base for U.S. troops.
As a consequence Turkey has been ever since restricted in its maneuvering space within
territories controlled by the U.S., mainly in Northern Iraq which serves as a safe haven for the
PKK. The future of Iraqi Kurdistan drifted both partners considerably apart. But both Turkey
and the U.S. share the vision of a stable and democratic Iraq which would serve their interests
the best.39 In this respect the U.S. is especially worried about the destabilizing effect of
34
“Turkey thanks Belgium for its fight against PKK,” March 4, 2010, Hürriyet Daily News,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-thanks-belgium-for-fight-against-pkk-2010-03-04, accessed
March 5, 2010.
35
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 154-6.
36
37
Ibid., p. 49.
38
Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser. “Turkey and the United States” in The Politics of Modern Turkey, eds.
Ali Carkoglu and William Hale (London: Routledge, 2008).
39
Henri J. Barkey, Preventing Conflict over Kurdistan (Washington D.C./Moscow/Beijing/Beirut/Brussels:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 20.
15
Turkey’s incursions to Northern Iraq. Ankara and Washington also understand that their
partnership helps to counterweight two other partners in the region – Iran and Russia.
Moreover, the U.S. remains the major supplier of arms to Turkey. 40 Given those facts both
countries have a strong incentive to work on improving their relationship. Nevertheless, the
U.S. policy is stigmatized by certain ambiguity; on one hand it tries to stabilize the region
which is especially important since Obama declared withdrawal of American troops from Iraq
until 2011, on the other hand it has a deep conviction to fight terrorism and therefore is
committed to both moral support and intelligence cooperation to Turkey’s struggle against the
PKK.
The role of Northern Iraq, particularly KRG,41 is also crucial to the conflict. The KRG
was formed following the Gulf War and according to the 2002 constitution it became a
northern part of the Iraqi federal state. It has since then established relatively stable and a
functioning government where Kurds effectively take care of security issues. 42 Turkey’s
relations with KRG has been influenced by three main factors – the hidden aspiration to annex
oil rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk (or at least not to allow their incorporation under Iraqi
Kurds’ control), the presence of PKK bases on Northern Iraqi territory and fear that the
creation of independent Kurdish identity can spark off the separatist tension of Turkish Kurds
who would like to follow the Iraqi model (for this reason Turkey’s government initially
resisted the creation of KRG per se).43 Obviously, the PKK problem presents the most
pressing issue. The safe havens on KRG territory seem critical for PKK’s survival, for which
reason Turkey has for a long time exerted pressure on KRG to combat their bases; however,
KRG seems reluctant to fight the Kurdish organization. 44 The role probably plays the sense of
solidarity that Iraqi Kurds feel to the Turkish Kurds. The PKK also serves as a bargaining chip
over Ankara in negotiations.45 Moreover, KRG does not want to break the relative stability by
triggering violence that would probably follow after confrontation with the PKK on its
territory.46 Nevertheless, despite the political tensions there is a vital cross border trade which
40
Ali Carkoglu and William Hale (London: Routledge, 2008). gunter 2005
41
For distribution of Kurds In Iraq see map no. 2 in attachements.
42
Henri J. Barkey, “Kurdistandoff,” The National Interest 90 (Jul/Aug 2007): 52.
43
February 2008.
44
International Crisis Group (ICG). “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?,” Middle East Report 81,
13 November 2008.
45
Soner Cagaptay, “Everybody’s Kurdish Problem,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 1,
2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1106, accessed April 2010.
46
David L. Phillips, “Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, October 15, 2007, http://www.ncafp.org/articles/07%20Report%20on
%20Disarming,%20Demobilizing%20and%20Reintegrating%20the%20Kurdistan%20Workers%20Party.pdf,
16
makes both countries mutually dependent – especially landlocked KRG is economically
dependent on Ankara. Cooperation is also important for Ankara because it seems that the
long-term damage to the PKK can be made only with assistance of KRG.47
Last but not least the secondary party to the Turkish conflict is the EU. Turkey has
been trying to join the EU since 1987 when it applied for membership. The EU thus exercises
a decisive power of leverage in Turkey’s reform process. The pressure to implement the
Copenhagen Criteria,48 the key requirements which have to be met before accession, has
already set in motion considerable progress. The attempt to harmonize Turkish law with the
EU norms has taken the form of a reform package enacted in the period of 2000-2004.
However, in the following period of 2005-2008 the reform process slowed down hand in hand
with weakened EU support for Turkey’s membership. 49 The opposition to the membership
grew and the idea of ‘privileged partnership’ took roots. This development naturally caused
doubts about the prospects of full membership and led to weakening in pro-EU commitment
in Turkey that will not be satisfied by anything less than full membership. Yet, recently there
has been indication that the EU-Turkey relationship can enter a new promising phase since
France and Germany stopped advocating a ’privileged partnership’.50 In addition, Spain,
supporter of Turkey’s candidacy, took over the presidency of the EU. Although the EU can
exercise a lot of influence, there are many hindrances (for instance the problem of Cyprus,
migration or human rights) that will be very difficult to overcome. However, EU’s interest in
Turkey accession is not inconsiderable and lies in both security and economic incentives of
such development. On the other hand EU’s accession can considerably contribute to the
solution of the Kurdish problem. In this respect it is not surprising that the support for
accession is higher among Kurds than among Turks.51
The U.S. and especially the EU could in the future use their leverage and became third
parties to the conflict that could influence de-escalation. However, since there is no ongoing
negotiation at the present time, no third party is included.
accessed February 2010.

47
February 2008.
48
There is a political, economic and aquis criterion. In respect to the situation of Kurds the request for respect of
minority rights is of special importance.
49
In 2009 only 48 per cent was in favor of Turkish membership in EU. It is a stark decrease in comparison to 73
per cent in 2004. “Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2009.” The German Marshal Fund of the United States
(GMF), 2009, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Key.pdf, accessed April 2010.
50
Hugh Pope, “The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: ‘EU and Turkey Edge Back from the Brink,’” International
Crisis Group (ICG), January 5, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6458, accessed March 12,
2010.
51
Kemal Kirisci, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey: Future Challenges and Prospects for a Solution,” ISPI
Working Paper, Issue 24 (December 2007).
17
2. 3. Incompatibility
The concept of incompatibility (scarcity) is sine qua non for the origins of the conflict.
It is defined as an “inability to meet the demands of two or more parties at the same time with
the available resources”.52 In our case there are two parties – Turkish government and the
PKK – and the incompatibility was from the beginning of the conflict territorial – creation of
an independent Kurdistan. However, the incompatibility has developed over time toward
‘Democratic Self-rule’ within the Turkish borders. The main impact on the shift was Ocalan’s
arrest in 1999. The PKK’s Presidential Council although reluctantly, confirmed the change
one year later. It is doubtful whether this change reflects genuine reconsideration of Ocalan’s
personal opinion or it is only a rhetorical mask in an attempt for personal survival.53
Nevertheless, Ocalan’s vision of solution for the Kurdish situation in Turkey places
emphasis on democratic nature of the republic embodied in a new constitution which should
grant equal rights to expression for Kurds. 54 In the same vein PKK’s acting leader Murat
Karayilan presented 3 principles and 4 steps which can bring an end to the conflict. 55 The
change in stated incompatibility away from purely territorial is obvious; however, because it
is not clear what the real demands actually are, it is uncertain whether the incompatibility
shifted over to the government (political power).
The PKK’s insurgency was successful in bringing the Kurdish issue to the centre of
attention. Shift in its priorities also brought about the lively debate on the Kurdish issue. Since
the issue became internationalized, the incompatibility has been generalized. Especially the
EU uses the Kurdish issue as a basis for its request for reforms in the field of human rights
and fundamental freedom.56
It is interesting to analyze subjective definition of incompatibility. The definition from
the side of the PKK is far from clear because the complexity of the issue has lead to the
vagueness in demands. The PKK representatives emphasize the need for recognition of
Kurdish minority as an equal part of the republic; the main interest therefore lies in changing
52
53
Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis, Vol. 45, Issue 1 (Winter 2001).
54
Abdullah Ocalan, “Proposals for Solution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey,” December 2007, http://freedom-
for-ocalan.com/english/download/proposals-for-a-solution.pdf, accessed March 2010.
55
Emrullah Uslu, “Resolution of Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Question’ in Critical Stage as PKK Threatens to End Peace
Initiatives,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 7 (February 2010).
56
European Commission, “Turkey 2005 Progress Report,” SEC (2005) 1426, 9 November, 2005,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_
en.pdf, accessed February 2010.
18
deficient conditions provided by the government toward Kurds which presents an offensive
type of incompatibility in relation to the status quo. The group seeks for recognition of the
Kurdish issue, however, in a closed political system and absence of dialogue, it still feels that
the military option is the only way to call attention to the problem and assure the survival of
the Kurdish fight for their rights.57
The Turkish government sees incompatibility in a different light. For a long period of
time the state had recognized only a ‘terrorism issue’ and therefore incompatibility was
interpreted strictly as a problem of terrorism which had to be countered by military means.
The democratic reforms were at that time left off the agenda.58 The state painted the outlawed
group as “self-seeking bandits, terrorists, and drug smugglers”59 and maintained the stance
that it will never negotiate with terrorists. It partially originated from the fear of disintegration
of the republic. However, since 2005 when premier Erdogan for the first time admitted that
Turkey had a Kurdish problem, there is a gradual consensus among liberal elite circles that
only military solution cannot solve the Kurdish problem and that the democratic reforms are
also needed. Although president Ozal initiated the discussion over the Kurdish issue his
sudden death in 1993 prevented his vision from materializing. Currently the Turkish
government or more precisely the ruling Justice and Development Party, seems to understand
that the Kurdish issue should be separated from the PKK and that the political solution is
needed. This approach is reflected in the government’s policy known as Kurdish initiative or
‘opening’ that was launched in the beginning of the summer in 2009. 60 There has been a lot of
expectations and optimism about liberal ‘opening’, yet, in light of the strong opposition in the
parliament and army circles who accuse the ruling party of negotiating with terrorists, the
prospects of real results are uncertain. Nevertheless, the state’s definition of incompatibility is
clearly defensive.
2. 4. Power relations
The primary parties significantly differ in the power resources they control. Turkey as
a state actor to the conflict reckons upon legitimate use of its military power across the
country. Turkish Armed Forces are the second biggest in NATO with strength of 514 000
57
Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton, and Joost Jongerden, “’Road Maps’ and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast,”
Middle East Report, 30 October 2009, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero103009.html, accessed April 2010.
58
59
Ibid., p. 73.
60
Cengiz Candar, “The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the ‘Opening’,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11,
No. 4 (2009): 13-19.
19
soldiers in arms and 380 000 in reserve. 61 To tackle the terrorist threat, a professional and
highly trained Special Forces Command was created. It has concentrated mainly on PKK
activities during cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and caused significant loses to the
PKK fighters.62 Turkey also derives a benefit from cooperation with other countries. It favors
from the intelligence cooperation with the U.S., for instance the capture of Ocalan was carried
out with help of the CIA.63 The cooperation with Iraq was initiated by counter-terrorism
agreement, Memorandum of Understanding, signed in 2007, however, without participation of
KRG.64 Moreover in 2008 the trilateral committee among Iraq, U.S. and Turkey to tackle the
PKK was established. Turkey also receives diplomatic support from regional countries, for
instance from Syria, Israel or Iran.65
There is no exact estimation on how many PKK militants the group currently has. It
stems from the illegal character of the party and also from the fact that PKK fighters no longer
control any territory in Turkey and are in majority dispersed across the borders in Northern
Iraqi Mountains. It is estimated that there are between 4000 to 5000 PKK militants, from
which 3000 to 3500 are located in Northern Iraq.66
The financing is crucial to the PKK’s survival. It has been mostly dependent on
external aid provided by Syria, Iraq and Iran. 67 Recently the financing has shifted from the
state support to financial independence due to links to Diaspora in Europe and drug
trafficking activities.68 The Diaspora influence is especially important in terms of moral
support for the Kurdish fight in Turkey and internationalization of the issue. Interestingly,
Kurdish Diaspora in Europe tends to be more radical than Kurds in Turkey themselves. 69 In
terms of financing, the PKK argues that most of its capital originates from private
61
“Turkey Military Strength,” GlobalFirePower.com, February 12, 2009,
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Turkey, accessed February
2010.
62
Emrullah Uslu, “Tackling the PKK: New Directions for Turkey’s Special Forces,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6
Issue 14 (July 2008).
63
Ibid.
64
The agreement established the common cooperation against the PKK. It did not, however, include Turkey‘s
right to a cross-border operations against the outlawed group inside Iraq. International Crisis Group (ICG).
“Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?,” Middle East Report 81, 13 November 2008, p. 5.
65
Ibid., p. 5.
66
U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008.” United States Department of State
Publication, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2009,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf, accessed April 2010.
67
U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008.” United States Department of State
Publication, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2009,
68
“Kurds and pay – Examining PKK financing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Terrorism & Insurgency, March 13,
2008.
69
Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p.
48.
20
contributions, both from Turkey and abroad.70 Nevertheless, the controversial involvement in
illicit activities is a strong argument in the hands of state that underpins the legitimacy to fight
against this group.
In terms of military, the conflict is obviously asymmetrical. The Turkish Armed Forces
far outnumber the PKK forces. In combination with support from other countries, especially
the U.S., the Turkish government has a clear superiority over the PKK. However, for more
than 20 years of the insurgency, the Turkish state failed to combat PKK’s uprising – typical
guerilla war has gradually won popular support across the country. 71 Employment of hit-and-
run tactics and weak experience of Turkish troops enabled the group to maintain military
superiority in the 1980s, however, since 1995 the power relations has changed so that the
state gained the upper hand.72 On the other hand the PKK has increasingly profited from the
safe havens in Northern Iraq, because cross-border incursions on a territory of another state
challenge its sovereignty and therefore became subjected to the controversy over its
legitimacy. Turkey faces an increasing displeasure from the international community when
combating the PKK across the border.
The state dealt a major blow when Ocalan was captured and imprisoned for life. Many
outside observers believed that it meant the defeat of the group. 73 However, the violence
between the PKK and security forces escalated again in 2006 and 2007. Although the PKK is
in military strength considerably weaker than in the 1990s, the Turkish policies cannot be
assessed as successful.74 Despite military superiority, the Turkish government has so far failed
to deal with the PKK and bring about a solution to the conflict.
2. 5. Dynamics
The conflict noted several shifts in dynamics in the chosen time period. It did not go
through a classical sequence of stages (emergence stage, stages of escalation and de-
escalation and termination stage) but rather it went through spirals of escalation and de-
escalation.75 The insurgency began on the Turkish territory in 1984. Initially the revolt was
70
Ibid.
71
72
Dogu Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 2000): 122-135.
73
74
75
Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1998).
21
rather spontaneous, tribally based and without a clear articulated political goal. 76 It has over
time developed to the mass insurgency that has created a circle of violence. The violence
escalated in the early 1990s when the low level guerilla actions reached the level of war
according to estimated battle-related deaths. The main decisive factor that created space for
significant de-escalation of the conflict was the capture of Ocalan in 1999. The leader in line
with announced unilateral ceasefire called for withdrawal from the southeast of Turkey and
proclaimed the will to negotiate with the Turkish government. The number of death-related
battles profoundly decreased, however, sporadic clashes between the security forces and the
PKK continued. This indicates that the group did not fully respected Ocalan’s call for
employment of non-violent strategy and may be an indicator of increased unease in
coordinating PKK’s militants. After a period of relative peace the conflict escalated sharply
when the PKK called off a unilateral ceasefire in 2004. Another ceasefire broke down in 2006
and clashes increased after authorization of Ankara’s incursion in Northern Iraq. The cross-
border operations in 2007 and 2008 escalated the conflict again. 77 Currently both parties seem
to be deadlocked and only a low-level violence is reported.
Both warring parties have used several tactics to fulfill their aspirations. The PKK
resorted to the guerilla campaign. Initial actions of the PKK were aimed, in line with its
underlying socialist rhetoric against exploitative Kurdish landlords. 78 The Turkish government
responded to the outbreak of violence by introducing the so called Village Guard System in
1985.79 Local Kurdish villagers were, as an additional help to security forces, armed so that
they could protect themselves against the PKK.80 During the 1980s and 1990s Turkish security
forces resorted to forcible evacuations of villages under the emergency rule in an attempt to
hinder the PKK militants’ access to goods and infrastructure. 81 The evacuations were
conducted unsystematically and with extreme brutality which resulted in a great problem of
internal displacement. In addition to the military response the state has until recently
maintained the policy of denial and replacement of Kurdish identity which embodied in a
76
Bill Park, Turkey's policy towards Northern Iraq: problems and perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.
17.
77
78
22.
79
The system was intended to be only a temporary measure; however, it is still in place. It is estimated that there
are 70 000 village guards in Turkey, of which 57,174 are temporary and 12,279 are volunteers. Laurie Freeman,
ed, A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the Government
(Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2008).
80
81
S. Jarosławski, “Human rights of the Kurdish community in Turkey”, Netzwerk Migration, 2008,
http://www.migrationeducation.org/27.1.html?&rid=111&cHash=a296177910, accessed March 2010.
22
series of violent and coercive measures against the expression of ‘Kurdishness’. Threats have
become common practice on how to spread fear among Kurdish citizens.
Since the public recognition, of the Kurdish problem proclaimed by the Prime
Minister Erdogan Ankara has taken series of symbolic steps that should improve the condition
of Kurds in Turkey. In 1991 the private use of Kurdish language was allowed and further legal
regulations were made for the sake of the EU membership. For instance the government
allowed the education of Kurdish in private language courses or the one-hour broadcasting in
Kurdish.82 Most recently the government allowed the establishments of the state satellite TV
channel TRT, which broadcast in all three dialects of Kurdish.83 Despite those modest
developments, the Human Rights Watch and other agencies repeatedly reported that the
reforms are insufficient.84 Regarding the state tactics, the Turkish police reportedly uses
violent techniques against innocent people. This fact, nourished by the adoption of
amendment to the Law on the Fight against Terrorism in 2006, which by its vague definition
of terrorism, created space for advanced competences of security forces.85
The PKK initiated a guerilla war. Aside from the initial violence against other Kurds, it
has used classic insurgency tactics. 86 The group often resorted to one-sided violence against
civilians who were seen as potential collaborators with the state. The most casualties were
reported in 1994, afterwards the PKK started to change its tactics away from hurting civilians
to concentrating more on economic and military targets. It announced its intention to comply
with the international rights commitments that protect civilians during the conflict. 87 In
addition to its statements the PKK members asserted that they had never harmed civilians
intentionally and that they do not intend to do so in the future. 88 Yet, PKK’s violent tactics has
spread fear in the southeast rural areas and has resulted in a change in demography so that
many Kurds have fled to the urban cities.89
82
Nesrin Ucarlar, Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights
in Turkey (Lund: Lund University, 2009).
83
Marlies Casier, Andy Hilton, and Joost Jongerden, “’Road Maps’ and Roadblocks in Turkey’s Southeast,”
Middle East Report, 30 October 2009, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero103009.html, accessed April 2010.
84
See for instance: Amnesty International, “Turkey.” Amnesty International Report 2009,
http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/europe-central-asia/turkey, accessed April 2010.
85
S. Jarosławski, “Human rights of the Kurdish community in Turkey”, Netzwerk Migration, 2008,
http://www.migrationeducation.org/27.1.html?&rid=111&cHash=a296177910, accessed March 2010.
86
28.
87
88
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “PKK Military Wing Commander: Turkey May Become
‘Exact Replica of Iraq.’“ March 4, 2008, http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc030408MEM.html, accessed March
2010.
23
As has been briefly noted above, both parties behavior developed over time. The
major change in behavior on the PKK side was initiated by Ocalan when he declared
unilateral ceasefire and called for democratic solution to the conflict. The declaration of
unilateral ceasefires became a frequent tactic, although it never took long until the group came
back in arms. However, along with the name changes the ceasefires indicate that the PKK is
willing to abandon the violence in exchange for political dialogue which is an important sign
of moderation in PKK’s behavior, albeit it still remains violent. Ocalan showed the will to
transform the PKK guerilla into a more political actor. 90 Noteworthy, the shift in objectives
transformed the conflict from a zero-sum game between Turks against Kurds to the situation
where both parties can gain (a win-win game).91
On the side of the state the change has been more subtle. The PKK has been constantly
labeled as a terrorist group which has not gone through the essential changes needed to be
recognized as a legitimate negotiating partner. 92 The ceasefires have been thus seen as a pure
weakness. Nevertheless, the government mostly under the pressure of the EU has
implemented limited reforms toward the rights of Kurdish population that broaden the space
for possible debate. Those reforms and the latest ‘opening’ in the Kurdish issue can be seen
as slight gradual changes in the government’s behavior. It raises hopes about the termination
of PKK’s insurgency; however, the final success of such initiative is conditioned upon many
seemingly insurmountable factors (that will be discussed in the next chapter) so the optimism
should not be overestimated. Another change of behavior can be seen in the shift of the battle-
field from the southeast of Turkey to mainly Northern Iraqi territory.
The protracted nature of the conflict and the failure to its settlement is also caused by
hostile attitudes, such as stereotyping, anger, fear or, suspicion, that has rooted between the
parties. From the side of the Turkish government there is a strong prejudice against the
legitimacy of the Kurdish identity rooted in the strong Turkish nationalism. 93 Officially, the
PKK is perceived as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world, trying to
89
Matthew Kocher, “The Decline of PKK and the Viability of a One-state Solution in Turkey,“ MOST Journal
on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002): 6.
90
Ferhad Ibrahim and Gülistan Gürbey, eds., The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. Obstacles and Changes for Peace
and Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 11.
91
92
Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “PKK/KONGRA-GEL,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-
gel.en.mfa, accessed February 2010.
93
24
undermine Turkey’s effort to ensure economic and social wellbeing for its citizens. 94 This
mirrors the hardliner’s view which sees the Kurdish problem only as an issue of national
security95 - the PKK is equated with a problem of terrorism and not as an indicator of deeper
Kurdish problem. Although the liberal approach to the question has broken many taboos
connected to Kurds in recent years, it is still too early to say whether it can outweigh the
ingrained adversary mindset or not. The attitudes are intensely stereotyped – the PKK has
been painted as the enemy to the state ever since the insurgency started. This perception
seemed ideal since it provided justification for severe counter-measures. Stereotyping is also
influenced by a high degree of mistrust prevailing between the parties. Any shift in PKK’s
policy has always been envisaged as a mere cover-up. Another important factor is the
government’s fear of image loss. The failure to combat the PKK is believed to induce
weakness in front of the domestic public but also in the international scene, especially in the
eyes of the U.S.
Kurds have perceived sensitively the intense far-reaching discrimination from the side
of the government. The harsh counter-terrorist campaign conducted in the early years of the
conflict has rooted widespread hostility among PKK members. 96 The long-term suppression of
Kurdish rights accompanied with economic marginalization has caused accumulation of
anger and frustration. According to the basic needs approach the conflict often arises from the
frustration and deprivation that emerges as a result of unmet needs. 97 In this respect the
situation where basic needs were not satisfied, naturally gave rise to the violent struggle.
The conflict is also influenced by a strong emotional factor. The security forces are
labeled as behaving heroically.98 In the same vein, the PKK fighters killed in confrontation
with the military are often painted as martyrs. 99 In this situation it is very hard to change the
attitude of the parties toward another. It can be therefore argued that despite changes in
behavior, the attitudes of parties remain mostly unchanged.
94
Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Concept and Ideology of Terrorism,”
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/concept--and-ideology-of-terrorism_.en.mfa, accessed February 2010.
95
Working Paper, Issue 24 (December 2007).
96
Emrullah Uslu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Steps Toward Solution,” Studies in Conflict &Terroris, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (2007): 163.
97
Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (London: Sage Publications, 2007), p. 37-38.
98
“Erdogan defends military in fight against terror.” Turkish Daily News, October 17, 2008,
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=117772, accessed December
2009.
99
No. 2 (2007): 169.
25
The community in the conflict tends to polarize over time which means that
“communities become fractured into two large camps, with positive relations among the
people in each camp and negative relations between the camps”. 100 It can be argued that as the
conflict in Turkey intensified the society became increasingly polarized – the neutrality in the
conflict was not an option101 because Ocalan demanded to choose between support of the
PKK and the state. However, there are some difficulties when describing polarization. The
first problem came with the support of the PKK. There is a discussion whether the group
stands for the representation of the Kurdish attitudes in large. In light of the peculiar role of
the pro-Kurdish political parties which have always acted as a spokesman for the PKK, 102 we
can assume that the PKK holds a strong support because many see no other alternative in the
closed centralized system where the Kurdish voice is so limited. Yet, many Kurds are tired of
over two-decades of long armed conflict and do not want the war any longer. Even Ocalan
warned the newly formed Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) that was created after the
closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) to distance themselves from the PKK. 103 This
corresponds to the strong support for Kurdish initiative within the society. 104 There is also a
rising discontent against the PKK terror rising from the neo-nationalist circles that perceive
the PKK as a part of wider disintegration tendencies.105
The second problem is the doubted positive relations within the Kurdish camp,
because most of the lives lost during the insurgency were paradoxically Kurdish.106 This fact
is often used by the government to point at the hostile relationship between Kurds in the
region and supports the claim that the PKK does not really represent the Kurds. In addition,
we have to take into consideration the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe which stands for Kurds
abroad.
Some authors argue that the conflict resulted into a psychological gap between Turks
and Kurds,107 whereas other suggests that the ethnic boundaries remain quite open. 108 We have
to bear in mind that many Kurds become assimilated in the sense that they accepted Turkish
100
Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation Stalemate, and Settlement (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2004).
101
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 87-88.
102
103
Ibid.
104
SETA & POLLMARK, Public Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey (Ankara: Design & Layout by
Harun Tan, Ümare Yazar, 2009).
105
Bulent Aras, “Turkey’s War on Terror,” SETA Policy Brief No. 2, November 2007.
106
Michael Radu, “Terrorism is Free Speech,” E-notes FPRI, February 10, 2004,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20040210.middleeast.radu.terrorismfreespeech.html, accessed March 2010.
107
17.
26
identity.109 Kurds who successfully integrated into Turkish society (also called ‘occasional
Kurds’) hold more moderate views and behave in legitimate opportunity spaces although
there are many close to the PKK among the radical youth. 110 A recent survey111 carried out to
ascertain the public perception of the Kurdish situation interestingly disclosed that there may
be a strong integration between Turks and Kurds. The study claims that there is no significant
perception of enmity or hostile sentiment between those two communities as one would
expect. On the contrary, the relations between Turks and Kurds seem generally positive. The
survey states: “despite the political polemics, violence and terrorism that have been occupying
the agenda of Turkey for many years, no enmity, hostility, distrust and social disintegration is
occurring in Turkey”.112 However, it is needless to say that Turks and Kurds are still divided
on political issues. The majority of Turks perceives that Kurds want a separate state which
leads to the fear that the country could be divided along ethnic lines, whereas most of Kurds
do not see the separation as an ultimate goal.113
2. 6. Internal and external factors

We can identify several important factors that influence the conflict both from inside
and outside the country. There is an ongoing debate about the nature of the Turkish democracy
which is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, one critical aspect has to be
mentioned – the political role of the military and the lack of its civilian control as an
important internal factor. The military is regarded as a watchdog of the Kemalist principles,
political unity and secularism, and is determined to defend them in the case that they are
threatened.114 In this vein the military does not recognize the distinct Kurdish identity and
favors military means to combat the PKK problem. 115 Although the role of powerful National
Security Council decreased considerably,116 the military establishment still holds an
108
Matthew Kocher, “The Decline of PKK and the Viability of a One-state Solution in Turkey,“ MOST Journal
on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002): 2-3.
109
12.
110
Working Paper, Issue 24 (December 2007), p. 13.
111
SETA & POLLMARK, Public Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey (Ankara: Design & Layout by
Harun Tan, Ümare Yazar, 2009).
112
Ibid., p. 70.
113
Ibid.
114
The military intervened in order to defend secularism in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997.
115
Egemen Basar Bezci, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey: A Critical Juncture,” Telavivnotes, 17 August 2009,
http://www.tau.ac.il/dayancenter/Kurdish_question_in_Turkey.pdf, accessed March 2010.
116
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Turkey and Europe: the Decisive Year Ahead,” Europe Report 197, 15
December 2008, p. 11.
27
exceptionally huge influence over the political sphere which raises serious criticism especially
from the EU.117 The role of the military is also underpinned by the fact that it remains in the
long term the most trusted institution of the republic.118
The composition of the government is another internal factor. The majority of the
parliament is since the elections in 2007119 composed by the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) that gave birth to the Kurdish initiative. AKP has gained an increased support from the
Kurdish southeast and therefore holds a strong mandate from Kurds. The party places
emphasis on a pro-EU agenda and has declared to be committed to addressing the need for
constitutional reforms.120 As a part of this promise, the party officially unveiled the
constitutional amendments package on the 22nd of March which is now discussed among the
parliament. Two parties – Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) – stand in opposition to AKP’s
policy. They are reluctant to any concessions toward the Kurdish minority and basically
ignore the existence of the Kurdish issue. Both parties argue that the initiative of cooperation
with terrorists shows weakness in the government. 121 The similar stance, although not so
loudly expressed, holds the military establishment and judiciary. In sum there is a strong
opposition that could possibly prevent the Kurdish initiative from happening. Nevertheless,
according to Watts division within the establishment over how to approach the Kurdish issue
creates a space from which the pro-Kurdish politics can profit and not vice versa.122
The restricted space for minority parties in the Turkish political system has to be also
taken into account. The establishment of the Kurdish party, e. g. based only on ethnicity, is not
permitted123 which links to the deficits in minority rights in Turkey. Besides, there is a 10 per
cent national threshold for entering the parliament that prevents broader political
representation. However, pro-Kurdish parties have established and have gradually attracted
the voters support, albeit their survival has always been aggravated by interference by the
117
Commission of the European Communities, “Turkey 2009 Progress Report,” Commission Staff Working
Document SEC(2009)1334, 14 October 2009,
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2009.pdf,
accessed April 2010.
118
December 2008, p. 11.
119
In 2007 AKP won 46.7 per cent, CHP 20.8 per cent and MHP 14.3 percent of the voters support.
120
Justice and Development Party, “Development and Democratization,” Program, February 2, 2007,
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html, accessed February 2010.
121
Emrullah Uslu, “PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan Challenges Omission from Peace Initiative from His Prison
Cell,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 37 (December 2009).
122
Nicole F. Watts, “Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-94,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (November 1999): 631-656.
123
Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic
Conflict (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), p. 151.
28
Constitutional Court, which has the right to abandon the party. 124 Current representatives of
Kurdish interests, BDP, hold 20 seats in the parliament; therefore they can become an
important part of the discussion over constitutional amendments. However, we have to bear
in mind that the limited space for articulation of Kurdish interests in the parliament has
worked in favor of the PKK’s support.
There are also internal factors on the side of the PKK that have influence on the
conflict. The party’s structure as established in 1978 lacks pluralism and is organized along
the personality cult resembling the style of Stalin.125 The group has a special illegal character
typical for authoritative parties – it is a “solid, all day professional organization”. 126 Hierarchy
and discipline are associated with “charismatic authority” of the leadership. 127 In spite of his
imprisonment, Ocalan has remained the undisputable leader still controlling the organization
through his lieutenants. Symptomatic is also the strong loyalty of the group to its leader. The
continual insistence on Ocalan’s amnesty as well as recent demonstrations against new cell’s
conditions indicate that he still enjoys high respect among his followers. In fact he is seen as
the key player in any solution to the conflict. Unfortunately the government appears reluctant
to include Ocalan as a legitimate negotiator in its initiative. However, since Ocalan’s
communication with the PKK is limited, possible only through his lawyers on irregular basis,
there are voices that the organization has lost the strict hierarchical structure it used to have.
This argument can be underpinned by the fact that Ocalan’s call for cease-fires has never
resulted in full abandonment of violence.
The conflict and especially its solution are also influenced by external factors. Main
role players are two secondary parties – EU and the KRG. The EU as noted above by its
decision to start accession negotiation with Turkey exerts considerable leverage over the
Kurdish issue. Turkey’s commitment to controversial reforms demanded by Brussels seems
dependent on political support for Turkey’s membership in EU member states. Therefore the
EU could play one of the most important roles when the support is strong; otherwise the
leverage is considerably weakened and can lead to opposite outcomes. The situation in
Northern Iraq controlled by KRG has a direct impact by providing safe havens and access to
124
The court already closed seven pro-Kurdish parties.
125
40.
126
Kemal Ali Ozcan, Turkey's Kurds. A theoretical analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 157-158.
127
Ibid., p. 222.
29
weaponry to the PKK.128 It makes it more difficult for Ankara to eradicate the PKK
insurgency and easier for the PKK to survive. Indirectly, development of Iraqi Kurds is feared
as an undesirable model for Kurds in Turkey. Finally, one can also fear of pan-Kurdish
tendencies.
The external sponsorship and backing of the PKK should be considered as a crucial
factor for the PKK’s survival. Ankara is persuaded that the Kurdish insurgency is from a
considerable part, a consequence of very external funding.129 Outside support both financial
and moral provided by the European Diaspora is also a fundamental factor that influences the
Kurdish internal fight against the state. The Turkish public believes that the PKK’s insurgency
is a tool of ‘outside forces’ who wants to divide the country. 130 It relates to the Sevres
syndrome rooted in Turkish society – the state tends to believe in conspiracy theories in which
secondary parties such as the EU or the U.S. are trying to weaken the country. 131 It also links
to the division in the establishment where hard-liners believe that the problem is externally
driven, while the liberal moderate stance admits that it is to large extent a result of Kurdish
identity denial132 and thus a broader democratic solution is needed. Regardless of this division
Ankara’s overall objective is to pressure for cooperation with European countries (especially
Germany and Sweden where the majority of Kurdish migrants reside) to take actions against
the PKK on their soil. The vital diplomatic campaign with European governments aiming at
cutting PKK’s resources started last year.133
In 1995 Turkish Kurds established the Kurdish Parliament in exile. It does not present
itself as a tool of the PKK although the majority of its members are at least pro-PKK
sympathizers.134 The parliament was recognized by several European governments and
established information offices in several cities. It aims at the political solution to the conflict
through negotiations.135
128
Murat Somer, “Why Aren’t Kurds like the Scots and the Turks Like the Brits?: Moderation and Democracy in
the Kurdish Question,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008): 234.
129
18.
130
Emrullah Uslu, “Imprisoned PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan Preparing a Roadmap to Peace in Turkey’s Ethnic-
Kurdish Insurgency,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 24 (August 2009).
131
13.
132
Ali Carkoglu and William Hale, eds., The politics of modern Turkey: critical issues in modern politics. Vol. III
Modern Turkey’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 259.
133
“Belgium deals heaviest blow to PKK in Europe,” Today’s Zaman, March 5, 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-203350-belgium-deals-heaviest-blow-to-pkk-in-europe.html,
accessed March 8, 2010.
134
34.
135
30
2. 7. Solution proposals
The dynamics of conflicts indicates that they are solvable although because there is no
general formula for conflict resolution it is often hard to find a solution. The conflict
resolution is defined as “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary)
agreement resolve to peacefully live with – and/or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and
henceforth cease to use arms against one another”. 136 The conflict in Turkey is currently in a
stalemate where no peace agreement has been negotiated so far. However, there have been
signs that the parties would be willing to cease military hostilities in order to bring peace. It is
due to the fact that violence does not serve either PKK’s or government’s interests anymore
which is influenced by both internal and external factors. First, there is a growing
international pressure on the PKK to abandon the violence. The cooling of the relationship
with Israel on one side and improved relationship with Syria and supportive view on Iran’s
nuclear program is observed with high concern by the U.S. Second, since the war in Iraq,
Turkey has been gradually developing an economic and security ties with the Iraqi Kurds.
Third, the democratizing effect of Turkey’s accession process with the EU, and acceptance
that the only military solution to the Kurdish problem is not plausible, play a remarkable role.
Finally, both Kurds and Turks became exhausted and frustrated by the protracted conflict and
have little interest in returning to war.137
In December 2007 Ocalan from his prison publicly introduced Proposals for a
Solution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey. 138 He presented a vision of a democratic resolution
to the very complex conflict that cannot be characterized as one of terrorism and therefore
cannot be treated by violent means. He made it clear that the group does not intend to
challenge the secularist and unitary character of the republic in order to establish a separate
state, instead he proposed a ‘Democratic Self-Rule’ for Kurds – more precisely Ocalan
suggested 9 proposals as a way to a solution. 139 Although those proposals provide a valuable
framework for the establishment of ‘Democratic Nation’, there are no specific measures listed
how to realize them. More elaborative should be Ocalan’s Road Map to Peace which is
expected to include necessary steps to be taken to implement short-term and long-term
136
137
138
Abdullah Ocalan, “Proposals for Solution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey,” December 2007,
http://freedom-for-ocalan.com/english/download/proposals-for-a-solution.pdf, accessed March 2010.
139
Ibid.
31
solutions, conditions for PKK’s disarmament as well as ten fundamentals necessary for the
settlement.140 Most recently PKK’s acting leader Murat Karayilan presented three principles
and four steps to the termination of violence.141 However, in light of the contested position of
the PKK as a sole representative entity to all Turkish Kurds, it is not clear what the Kurdish
demands really are. The PKK and Ocalan seek to be recognized as negotiating partners and
therefore as the ones who can state the Kurdish demands.
The government reacted to those developments by launching its own comprehensive
and multi-tiered policy which became known as the Kurdish initiative. It was hinted for the
first time by president Güll who told journalists that “good things are expected to happen
concerning the Kurdish issue”.142 The government issued six initial steps, for example the
establishment of an independent human-rights institution to monitor human rights violations
or allowing political parties to communicate during the election campaign in other than
Turkish language.143 However, it has to be borne in mind that the Kurdish initiative is rather
an idea with no exact definition of what it really is; there is only hope that it will bring about
the end of violence.144
The fate of the initiative is now very unclear. It was shattered by disclosure of the
Democratic Society Party which triggered violent demonstrations, and is still facing strong
opposition from nationalists. There are also serious suspicions whether the AKP really means
the initiative seriously and is willing to challenge its position in the parliament in order to
keep the promise. The inconsitency of Erdogan’s commitment to the political solution can be
demonstrated by the hardening of his position in 2008.145 Yet, currently the party has increased
the pressure on a political solution again and renewed its commitment to the initiative – it
presented the package of constitutional amendments – but we can expect that the approval
process will be facing serious hindrances because the official Kemalist ideology is likely to
resist. Nevertheless many observers suggest that the current stage of the conflict can offer a
window of opportunity.
140
141
142
Soli Ozel, “Kurdish Opening: Onto the Second Round,” GMF Analysis on Turkey (December 2003, 2009): 2.
143
144
Cengiz Candar, “The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the ‘Opening’,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11,
No. 4 (2009): 16.
145
In November 2008 Erdogan stated “One nation, one flag, one motherland and one state. Those who oppose
this should leave.“ “Erdogan’s comment rattles Kurds in Diyarbakir,” Today’s Zaman, November 4, 2008,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=157780, accessed February 29, 2010.
32
The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) issued comprehensive
proposals for the solution of the Kurdish situation 146 which covers series of steps, from
political and economical to security measures. This view has much in common with Ocalans
proposals. It calls for a multi-focused approach that will understand the Kurdish situation not
as a mere terrorism problem which will be resolved with the destruction of the PKK
insurgency. In addition to measures that should be taken domestically many authors agree that
the solution can be achieved through EU candidacy.147
Taken into account all proposals mentioned, an ideal series of steps toward conflict
transition will be suggested. To settle the conflict it has to be transformed from violent to non-
violent behavior by the parties themselves.148 In order to start negotiations primary parties
have to recognize each other as legitimate partners who can enter agreement. Considering
only a limited representation of Kurds other than PKK, the negotiation cannot start without
Ankara regarding the PKK as legitimate party to negotiate with. This has to be anticipated by
the transformation of the PKK into a reliable bargaining partner. In exchange for PKK’s
unconditional withdrawal from violence the government should immediately stop all domestic
and cross-border operations and accept the group as a legitimate and representative
spokesman for Kurdish demands. In this process the pro-Kurdish BDP can play a crucial role
– it may become the third impartial party to the conflict and lead the parties to cease military
action and consequently start negotiations.
Before the negotiation process starts, the pre-negotiations, where the genuine
negotiations are planned and prepared, should take place. During this stage it is highly
important that, given the different understanding of the term Kurdish issue, parties regulate
incompatibility in order to agree on its common definition. On one hand the government
needs to as a prerequisite to negotiations, admit to the wider Kurdish problem instead of
narrow understanding of PKK’s insurgency as a purely security issue. PKK on the other hand
needs to clearly define its demands. The confidence-building measures should take place
within this process to show sincerity of intentions by both parties and assure the stability of
ceasefire. To change the structure of the conflict, its dynamics, in order to acquire a common
146
Laurie Freeman, ed, A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region
for the Government (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2008).
147
For instance Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights (London: Pluto Press,
2005) or Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and
Turkey (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).
148
33
denominator for further negotiations is sine qua non for the solution and probably also the
most difficult part of the conflict transition.
During the negotiations themselves the importance of the third parties increases. The
EU as well as the U.S. could brush up and exert their political leverage on the conflict and
develop an effective mediation power and foster trust between parties. The role of BDP is also
highly important because it can claim Kurdish demands within official policy structures. The
involvement of growing and increasingly plural Kurdish civil society, respected
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent intellectuals not
connected to the PKK could be also highly contributive. The more perspectives on the conflict
are included, the more probable it is that the process reaches a fruitful end. The role of third
parties would be especially helpful to complete a final deal. Mechanisms that would provide
phased political amnesty for PKK members are mentioned in almost all proposals and seem to
be of high importance for the negotiations to start. The final proposal which would ideally be
a product of those negotiations should resolve the main incompatibility.
The possible proposal has to meet at least certain minimum demands – reforms
addressing cultural rights, Kurdish language, education and minority rights which should
couple with economic measures, a plan for economic reconstruction of the Kurdish southeast
region (the completion of GAP Project would be a good option). Those reforms would require
an introduction of a new constitution. The government should also deal with the Village
Guard System which is considered as the major obstacle to consolidation of the situation in
southeast Turkey. The replacement of the personnel and security apparatus should help to
consolidate the situation in the Kurdish region.149 Ideally the final solution will include some
sort of local autonomy for Kurds in the southeast since the secession or federation is
unacceptable option for the state. However, regarding the experience with slow
implementation of reforms and strong opposition from nationalists, the autonomy would
probably be left until later. The reforms mentioned earlier should have priority because they
can become a basis for further arrangements.
Such a proposal is a type of integrative approach using the cooperative problem
solving mechanism which intends to provide a positive-sum solution where both parties gain
at the same time. It is an example of a compromise where both parties have to make
concession steps in order to meet the settlement. It partly deals also with the package deal
149
No. 2 (2007): 166.
34
because the proposal includes different reforms ranging from political to economic and
security issues.
During the implementation and consolidation phase of the conflict resolution the time
dimension is crucial. It is of high importance that the proposed comprehensive deal will be
realized according to some schedule. The different phases of implementation are necessary for
the solution to be workable. Success of implementation and consequentlyof the consolidation
phase is from a large extent dependent on social relations between the parties. In light of
rooted hatreds and hostile attitudes between the parties it seems necessary to provide a
reconciliation process addressing those types of stereotyped attitudes. It corresponds with
Ocalan’s proposal of Commission for Truth and Justice as an instrument aiming at mental
trauma caused during the conflict. The problem of internally displaced people should be also
addressed properly.150 The assistance to people forcibly displaced from their villages such as
Back to the Village Program or Homecoming Law have to continue. In this dimension the
involvement and pressure of the international community will be fundamental.151
3. Conflict Scenarios: the Turkish Government vs. Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK)
The second part of the bachelor thesis intends to depict three different scenarios of
possible future development to the conflict in Turkey analyzed in the first part. Each scenario
– status quo, escalation, and de-escalation – will follow the sequence of events beginning
from the starting point as drawn in the scenario tree. All scenario sketches are based on the
timeframe of two years in the future.
3. 1. Current situation and starting point
There has been a significant motion concerning the sensitive Kurdish issue in Turkey
recently. The government initiated a open and wide-ranging debate when it launched its
150
“Still Critical: Prospect in 2005 for Internally Displaced People in Turkey,” Human Rights Watch. Vol. 12,
No. 2 (2005).
151
Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 112.
35
Kurdish initiative in the beginning of the summer 2009. It was an unprecedented move which
ties the liberal and pro-EU policy advocated by the AKP. However, the initiative has for a
long time lacked concrete content and has been more of a common belief than that of what the
military measures can bring about, the termination of violence flamed up between the PKK
and the state.
Nonetheless the ‘opening’ had some response from the rebel’s side. In support for the
initiative so called ‘peace group’, 34 people, 8 of them from the PKK and the rest from the
Mahmur refugee camp, surrendered at Harbur border between Turkey and Iraq on the 19 th of
October 2009. Returners carried a ‘message of peace’, hoping to open the way to a peaceful
solution. Although they refuse to repent, returners were in contravention to the Repentance
Law released. This breakthrough event initiated by Ocalan made many think that it may lead
to disarmament of the PKK.152 However, it did not take long until Erdogan suspended the
‘peace group’ initiative; probably because the returners were welcomed with public glory as
winners which harmed the government’s credit for the process. Recently court officials
announced that the released group will stand trial for suspected links to the PKK. In addition,
the initiative was significantly faltered by the disclosure of the DPT on the 11 th of December.
The Constitutional Court banned the party for alleged links to the outlawed PKK and two
representatives were prohibited from political activity for five years. The rest of the
representatives joined the newly formed pro-Kurdish BDP which currently holds 20 seats in
parliament.
The submission of the constitutional amendments package on the 22 nd of March has
shown the commitment of the government to continue its Kurdish initiative and deepen the
democratization process in Turkey by necessary changes in the constitution. 153 It is the first
genuine measure the AKP has taken within its ‘opening’ policy of the Kurdish problem,
although the reforms touch upon a wide range of other issues not related to the Kurds. The
amendments package that would, if accepted, result in changes in at least 107 laws,154 was
approved by the parliamentary commission and is now negotiated in Parliament’s General
152
“PKK turnover offers hope for end to Kudish problem,” Today’s Zaman, October 19, 2009,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-190401-101-pkk-move-marks-critical-threshold-in-laying-down-
arms.html, accessed April 14, 2010.
153
The current 1982 constitution has been exposed to strong controversy for lack of regard for basic rights and
freedoms. According to the constitution the state recognizes only the existence of non-Muslim ethnic minorities
and therefore does not allow formation of any minority political party. Ergil Dogu. “PKK: The Kurdistan
Workers’ Party” in Terror, insurgency, and the state: ending protracted conflicts, eds. M. Heiberg, B. O’Leary, J.
Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 324.
154
“Constitutional amendment package will result in changes to 107 laws,” Today’s Zaman, April 11, 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-207070-constitutional-amendment-package-will-result-in-changes-
to-107-laws.html, accessed April 12, 2010.
36
Assembly. The package includes generally accepted articles, however, three items are facing
strong opposition – two are related to the judiciary, and one makes the party closure more
difficult.155 In light of the strong resistance to those changes from the two major opposition
parties (CHP and MHP) along with military and judiciary, the final fate of reforms is indeed
unclear.
The position of the major opposition party CHP has been very inconsistent – despite
initial strict demission to the package, the party has proposed a two-part offer that could
assure the consensus over the AKP’s amendments. Deniz Baykal, leader of CHP, suggested
that if the government separated three main controversial articles his party would support the
rest of the package. As the second part of the offer the party asks the government to delay the
approval of three controversial articles until after the elections in 2011.156 However, Prime
Minister Erdogan did not agree to the proposal and refused to separate controversial articles
from the reform package.157 In response, CHP has recently changed its stance so that it
increased its opposition to 12 articles. The consensus seems therefore nearly impossible. The
compromise will not be easy to reach with the pro-Kurdish BDP, who also conditioned the
support of amendments by meeting its demands – party put forward the list of proposals of
constitutional reforms.158 Finally the second biggest opposition party MHP announced as was
expected, that it would not support the package either.
The ruling party holds 336 seats in the parliament, 159 down from 337 after Zekai
Özcan, a deputy for AKP, who was known for his adversary stance to the Kurdish initiative,
resigned.160 Moreover, the Speaker of the parliament and AKP deputy Mehmet Ali Şahin is
prevented from voting so the party has only 335 votes. The package has to receive at least 330
votes to pass – the approval process requires that the reform package would be subjected to
155
“Experts remain divided on Turkish President’s authority on referendum,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 7,
2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=experts-remain-divided-on-president8217s-authority-on-
referendum-2010-04-07, accessed April 8, 2010.
156
“CHP’s proposals rise hopes of compromise on Turkish reform package,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 12,
2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=chp8217s-proposals-raise-hopes-for-reconciliation-on-
reform-package-2010-04-12, accessed April 12, 2010.
157
“AKP rejects CHP’s proposal to split reform package,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 14, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=chp-renews-calls-to-akp-for-consensus-over-the-reform-package-
2010-04-14, accessed April 15, 2010.
158
“Pro-Kurdish party introduces own draft on constitution,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 29, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=pro-kurdish-party-introduces-its-own-draft-showing-its-readiness-
for-bargain-2010-03-29, accessed March 30, 2010.
159
The major party is followed by the CHP (97), the MHP (69), and the BDP (20). Total number of seats in the
parliament is 542.
160
“AKP deputy resigns from party ahead of Turkish Parliament vote,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 12, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=akp-dissident-mp-resigns-from-the-party-2010-04-12, accessed
April 13, 2010.
37
the referendum if it receives between 330 and 367 votes. In the case that the package receives
over 367 votes (more than two-thirds of a majority) it would be submitted to the approval of
the president who can ratify it, send it back to the parliament for further discussion, or decide
whether there would be a popular vote or not. If there was a referendum, the last poll showed
that 48 per cent of voters would vote in favor of the constitutional changes and 38 per cent
plan to say ‘no’ to the referendum.161 Nevertheless, a popular vote would probably be
perceived as the vote proving the confidence the people have in the ruling AKP and their
belief of its future continuance in office. The opposition parties would definitely mobilize
their supporters to vote against it. Therefore, the ruling party naturally seeks to get the
package approved without being obliged to forward it to a referendum, in order for this it
needs to assure a win of at least 31 votes from the other parties.
It is assumed that the approval process could be completed by the end of June.
However, the passing of the amendments package is only the first step, the implementation of
reforms – harmonization of the current legislation with the package – is an important second
step that is expected to take at least half a year.162 The package has already set in motion
serious constitutional debates within Turkish politics and tensions are expected to continue
until the final vote on the reforms is carried out.
The decision to continue the Kurdish initiative has been taken as the starting point
(SP) from which we can envisage three different possible scenarios as future developments
unfold in the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government. By the amendment
package AKP kept the promise that it will pursue changes in the constitution which are
needed for further reforms regarding the Kurdish problem and in doing this achieved another
step toward fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. The steps taken within the renewed support for
the initiative are fundamental and can lead to a notable and different outcome on the future
political landscape.
161
“Turkish constitutional changes have 48 percent support Metropoll says,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 26,
2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-constitutional-changes-have-48-percent-support-
metropoll-says-2010-03-26, accessed March 26, 2010.
162
“Constitutional amendment package will result in changes to 107 laws,” Today’s Zaman, April 11, 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-207070-constitutional-amendment-package-will-result-in-changes-
to-107-laws.html, accessed April 12, 2010.
38
3. 2. Scenario tree
39
3. 3. Status quo
The status quo scenario presumes that there will be no significant shifts to both the
escalation and de-escalation path, and thus the conflict remains ongoing in the similar low-
level violence between the two primary parties along with any significant progress in Kurdish
rights. The scenario assumes that there will be only a limited progress in implementation of
reforms addressing the Kurdish issue (B1). Even if the current reform package is accepted the
issue of implementation is a far-reaching process that can be seriously slowed down. It is
plausible that the implementation will cover only generally accepted issues leaving the
controversial matters behind. It is also possible that the major opposition party CHP keeps its
promise and takes the amendment package to the Constitutional Court. This move would
definitely slow down any progress that could be finally abated completely.
In relation to the EU there remains certain ambiguity from the Turkish side concerning
the commitment to reform.163 Besides, there is a difference in perception held by both Turkey
and the EU concerning the time-frame in which reforms should be implemented. Whereas EU
expects to see the changes materializing in the short-term, Turkey foresees a further
horizon.164 Consequently, many current reforms exist only on paper rather than in practice. 165
Along this line of reasoning, even if the Kurdish issue is addressed through Turkish reforms,
the short-term outcomes of reforms may not be visible. Combined with the lack of other steps
addressing the free expression of Kurdish identity the progress in Kurdish initiative will be
seriously hindered (B2).
In an effort to keep the initiative alive the government would probably continue to
offer promises and incentives to the Kurdish public, however, real outcomes of the initiative
are likely to be lacking. According to Pruitt and Kim 166 we can identify some problems with
promises. Regarding the situation in Turkey the main problem the AKP faces is to decide how
much and what exactly to promise to the other party, the Kurds. It ties again to the uncertainty
of the Kurdish demands due to PKK’s dubious representative position. Moreover, there is the
cost of reward which has to be given if the promise is to be effective. When the government
promises too much it can be far too costly and thus can be perceived as uncreditable. In the
same vein when the AKP promises too little it is more likely to create the sense of distrust in
163
December 2008.
164
Ibid.
165
166
McGraw-Hill, 2004).
40
the eyes of the other party. In both cases the promise would not work effectively and thus
would not contribute to the solution of the conflict.
When the government did not manage to offer credible promise which met at least
some demands perceived as crucial by the Kurds, the Turkish public is likely to be dissatisfied
and feel reluctant toward the initiative as a whole (B3). The lack of support to the initiative
may favor the PKK, which would be seen as the only relevant actor capable of advocating
Kurdish interests. Along with the sense of increased legitimacy of the struggle the PKK would
consequently continue to attack the Turkish security forces from the Iraqi territory. The
resulting low-level violence on the border (B4) would sharpen the stance of the PKK’s
sympathizers both inside Turkey and in the European Diaspora. Pro-Kurdish demonstrations
are likely to be accompanied by occasional outburst of violence (B5) that would be defeated
by repressive measures from state’s side.
Neither the Turkish state nor the PKK would at this stage express the will for a
peaceful settlement. In this situation – where no party seems to be willing to lay down its
arms – the dialogue is often initiated under outside pressure. In approaching the armed
struggle as an interstate geopolitical conflict, it is unlikely that the international community
will press for a solution that grants Kurds and an autonomous region within the present
Turkish borders. The defending of territorial integrity is, ultimately, one of the cornerstones of
the UN Charter.167 Nevertheless, the international community may be hesitant to press for a
hard-line solution and may rather promote political measures to terminate the conflict (B6).
The U.S in particular, given the unpopularity of its coercive measures in the region over the
past few years and its concern for stabilization of situation in Iraq, may remain the
furthermost advocate of a non-violent solution. Similarly the EU, in the context of the
ongoing accession process with Turkey, may press for revitalization of the Kurdish initiative
as a part of its pressure to fulfill the political criteria for membership within the EU.
The support of the EU is indeed crucial. There is a common belief that Turkey needs
strong commitment from the EU to progress; the ambiguous signs of support from the EU
may thus seriously influence Turkey’s commitment to reforms and consequently radicalize the
actions of the PKK. The failure to address the Kurdish issue is likely to delay the EU
membership, maybe forever. Therefore, the Turkish reform process and the role of EU seem
to be mutually dependent. On one hand reforms are unlikely to be adopted without the EU
strong support; on the other hand it appears implausible that the EU will support Turkey’s
membership without seeing sufficient improvement in reform process.
167
“Charter of the United Nations,” 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, accessed April 2010.
41
If the pressure to address the Kurdish issue is prioritized in the conditions set for EU
accession, it may lead to a cross-over into the de-escalation path (C1) which assumes that
both parties of the conflict will finally approach negotiations. However, when this is not
emphasized the Kurdish issue may be pushed lower down on the EU agenda. The confusing
support embodied in advocacy for privileged partnership (B7) may lead to slow-down in the
admission procedure and thus weaken the reform progression in Turkey. Ankara has
repeatedly stated that Turkey’s goal is full membership168 and therefore, the lack of a clear
sign whether it will ultimately materialize or not, underpins its mistrust toward sincerity of
EU’s final intentions. Given the absence of strong encouragement to a non-violent solution
and the protracted nature of the conflict, neither the PKK nor the Turkish government will lay
down their arms at this stage (B8). The PKK is likely to gain confidence and restore to violent
clashed which will be reinforced by the state’s counterterrorist measures and persisting
opposition to negotiation with terrorist organizations. Ultimately, a lack of visible reforms and
minimal pressure from the outside community will result in a continuation of low level
violence as the status quo.
3. 4. Escalation
In this section we will focus on the possible manners in which an escalation of conflict
can occur. In line with Kriesberg “conflict escalation generally refers to increases in the
severity of the coercive inducements used and increases in the scope of participation within a
conflict”.169 In the same vein Pruitt and Kim describe the escalation as “an increase in the
intensity of a conflict as a whole”.170 The first step in the escalatory scenario is the situation
where there is no progress in implementation of reforms affecting the Kurdish issue, and other
wide-range matters concerning the deepening of democratization in Turkey (A1). It is true
that not many reforms have been materialized so far despite a strong rhetoric that has
indicated the reversal. Regarding the current reforms effort, given the strong opposition to
some key items in the constitutional amendments package and the thorny approval process in
the parliament, it is plausible that the reform package will not go through. But even if it was
168
“Merkel to rip open an old wound in Turkey: privileged partnership,” Today’s Zaman, March 23, 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-205159-merkel-to-rip-open-an-old-wound-in-turkey-privileged-
partnership.html, accesssed March 25, 2010.
169
Littlefield, 1998), p. 151.
170
McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 88.
42
approved the subsequent referendum that will most certainly be carried out may not approve
the constitutional change. If the reforms are not approved it will seriously falter the support
for the Kurdish initiative among both Kurds and Turks (A3) who are observing the policy
with high expectations and would therefore feel strongly disappointed. The same reaction may
nonetheless follow also in the case that the amendments package is approved, but there are as
yet no evident short-term outcomes because of the lengthy implementation process.
The waning backing for the Kurdish initiative is likely to go hand in hand with the rise
in Kurdish nationalism (A2). As the structural change model indicates, changes in groups may
occur. These changes, for example the development of hostile attitudes or strong polarization,
have to be seen as a result of the prior escalation but they are also fueling a further
escalation.171 As the conflict analysis showed, both groups are already polarized and they also
share hostile attitudes underpinned by a sense of fear and mistrust. It is thus plausible that the
sequence of events described above will lead to PKK’s decision to start a new wave of
violence (A4). The rise of nationalism which would lead to the rising tension and instability
were already visible when the conflict escalated in 2006 and 2007.
According to transformations during the escalation of the conflict, tactics are likely to
shift from light to heavy and as are issues from small to large. 172 Hence, we can expect that
PKK’s current occasional attacks will intensify in both lethality and scope. As a response to
PKK’s escalating attacks and the lack of motion within the Kurdish initiative the government
may decide to break down the terrorist group by military means once for all (A5). At this
stage we can foresee three different developments.
The course of events is dependent on the U.S. stance vis-à-vis a possible larger
military operation against the PKK led by Turkey on Iraqi territory. The U.S. has already
tolerated a few very limited Turkish ground assaults in Northern Iraq in February 2008. The
U.S. provided critical cooperation including the opening of Iraqi air space and sharing satellite
intelligence that was able to detect PKK bases.173 The new Obama administration is holding a
strong rhetoric concerning the terrorism, albeit during his public speech the President does not
refer to ‘war on terror’ in contrast to his predecessor George W. Bush. President Obama also
presented the plan to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011 along with the plan for
Afghanistan which included a considerable increase in the number of U.S. troops there. Both
171
McGraw-Hill, 2004).
172
Ibid.
173
International Crisis Group (ICG). “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?,” Middle East Report
81, 13 November 2008, p. 9.
43
of those plans try to consolidate the position in the Middle East which is still characterized by
significant tensions. Moreover, the powers such as Iran or Russia aim to establish a more
dominant position in the region and thus threaten the balance of power currently dependent on
the U.S. security assurances. In order to assure this balance of power the U.S. should advance
the strategic relationship with Turkey, a dominant NATO member in the Middle East. Ankara
is also a valuable partner for economic reasons. On the way out of the economic crisis, the
U.S. will seek new possibilities and the Turkish market is not yet fully explored. 174 The vital
strategic and economic partnership could be fostered by further supporting Ankara in its fight
against the PKK. Hence, we can presume that the U.S. could acknowledge Turkey’s right to
combat the PKK on Iraqi territory again – under certain constraints as was previously the case
(A6).175 This decision can be also influenced by an effort to contribute to the immediate
solution of the PKK insurgency.
On the other hand the U.S., given its fear of serious conflict in Northern Iraq, the
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the rising troubles with Iran, might
prefer not to destabilize the region and oppose the Turkish action. The U.S. reluctant stance to
the Turkish decision to launch a larger cross-border operation may prevent Turkey from
exercising such a move which would lead to a cross-over into the status quo scenario (B6).
However, in the third possible course of events Ankara could decide for a unilateral large-
scale military operation without the consent of the U.S. (A10). This move would probably be
the most disastrous one and would lead to destructive escalation.
In a situation when the U.S. is willing to cooperate or at least tolerate Ankara’s
coercive solution on Iraqi territory the stance of KRG has to be taken into account. The
territory under control of the KRG has become crucial for the survival of the PKK because of
the safe havens it provides. The cooperation between KRG and Turkey is thus perceived as
crucial because it seems that the long-term damage to the terrorist group can be done only
when both parties cooperate.176 However, so far KRG has not been willing to fight PKK’s
bases on its own territory,177 which appears to be among one of Turkey’s major conditions for
collaboration with the KRG.178 In regard to cooperation with KRG we can identify two
174
Ali Carkoglu and William Hale (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 210.
175
For instance: International Crisis Group (ICG). “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?,” Middle
East Report 81, 13 November 2008.
176
February 2008.
177
81, 13 November 2008.
178
Ibid.
44
contradictory approaches within the Turkish establishment. The members of Kemalist-
nationalist circles perceive the KRG as an existential threat and therefore advocate diplomatic
isolation, whereas pro-European liberal circles believe that the KRG could play an important
role in combating the PKK for which reason they argue reinforcement of diplomatic ties.179
Nonetheless in the escalatory scenario when Turkey has the support of the U.S. it will
seek to use both the U.S. and the central Iraqi government pressure on KRG to join the fight
against the PKK (A7). The Joint Committee established between the U.S., Turkey and KRG
have already presented a three-phased plan on how to combat the PKK. Following the U.S.-
Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it was made it clear that Iraqi territory should not
be used as a base for attacks against other countries.180 Additionally, after the withdrawal of
the U.S. from the region, the KRG will be in need of partnership with its neighbor. Finally,
there are strong economic incentives for Northern Iraq to improve the relations with Turkey.
Hence, ultimately the KRG may decide to back the Turkish operation (A9). The KRG-Turkey
cooperation will probably lead only to a limited military action on Iraqi territory (A11), which
would result to an escalatory spiral, but not as destructive as in the case of the large-scale
military strike. The KRG will help with the cracking down of the PKK but will try to keep it
limited in order not to risk a high degree of instability.
On the other hand, KRG may decide to refuse the cooperation with Turkey (A8).
Although the KRG publicly condemns the PKK and declares that it shares the same view as
Turkey,181 there are allegations that the KRG is tacitly backing the PKK. 182 In this respect the
issue of identity can play a significant role. As Calhoun points out, the identity as a tool is a
significant motivator for action and may therefore affect KRG’s decision. 183 Though never
united in their struggle, Kurds long for a common Kurdistan that would transcend the national
borders, albeit the PKK as has been noted, in the analysis, abandoned this goal and call for a
solution within the state borders. Nonetheless the governments both in Turkey and Iraq still
fear the pan-Kurdish tendencies that could result in the secession of Kurdish areas and
creation of a ‘greater Kurdistan’. In light of the relatively strong autonomy of the KRG it
179
81, 13 November 2008.
180
Emrullah Uslu, “Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge after Iraq Reaches Status of Forces Agreement with
United States,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (January 2009).
181
Ibid.
182
81, 13 November 2008.
183
Craig Calhoun, “The variability of belonging: A reply to roger Brubaker,” Ethnicities, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2003):
558-568.
45
seems that this goal has never been closer. The situation of Kurds in Northern Iraq could
possibly cause a spillover effect and trigger the same tendencies in Turkey.
When the KRG is not willing to cooperate with Ankara, Turkey may proceed with a
large-scale operation against the PKK. Such an act would be another step in the escalatory
spiral as a response to the PKK’s attacks, growing in both size and number. According to the
conflict spiral model, which describes the escalation as deriving from a vicious circle of
action and reaction, a retaliating act is usually more severe than the one to which the response
is directed.184 Thus we can assume that the PKK’s response would be even harsher and we
could be witnessing a grave escalation. However, we can expect that the possible military
incursion either limited or on a large-scale would not last more than several months because a
long-term intervention would seriously destabilize an already shattered region which would
not benefit any of the included parties.
At this stage of such a destructive escalatory spiral, it is interesting to examine the
motivation of both the PKK and the Turkish state to resort to violence which further
contributes to the persistence of the escalation. In line with Coser, we can argue that the
PKK’s use of violence has been triggered by two main reasons – slow progress in economic
the improvement of southeastern Anatolia which has resulted in a great socioeconomic
backwardness, and the persisting restricted space for articulation of Kurdish political
demands. Both aspects consequently lead to an aggressive behavior which is perceived as the
only way to pursue existing demands.185 The relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with
broken promises regarding the Kurdish initiative may also affect the PKK’s dedication to
violent tactics. Aside from unmet expectations the state’s decision for coercive measures
fosters the feeling that there may be ‘no other way out’ than the violent struggle.186
The AKP as the government, has increasingly accepted that military solution is
insufficient to bring about the solution to the conflict which relates to the fact that the PKK
insurgency is no longer equated with the broad Kurdish problem. However, this liberal view
stands in strong opposition to the Kemalist-nationalist establishment that includes the
opposition parties in the parliament (CHP and MHP), Turkish armed forces and the influential
parts of bureaucracy and judiciary. These maintain the hard-line position that military means
can result in a solution of the conflict. Moreover, any policy of alleged concessions to the
PKK is condemned as negotiation with terrorists which goes against the foundational
184
McGraw-Hill, 2004).
185
186
46
principles of the republic. Combined with a weakened EU support and a fading public
backing for the Kurdish initiative, the AKP may find itself in a difficult position for
advocating a non-violent solution to the PKK issue. The diplomatic pressure on the KRG to
cooperate in bringing down the PKK in Northern Iraq in accordance with the U.S. green light
for military strike, presents a suitable solution for the government. It would satisfy the hard-
liners calling for harsher policies towards the PKK and would not threaten the relation with
the U.S. who would likely approve the joint KRG-Turkey action. 187 Finally the AKP would
avoid the image loss – according to Pruitt and Kim “fear of image loss discourages
yielding”188 – by demonstrating that the state is strong enough to eradicate the terrorist
organization, challenging the stability within its borders.
The escalation also persists due to a mechanism called self-fulfilling prophecy –
“Party’s beliefs and attitudes about Other make Party behave in ways that elicit behavior from
Other that reinforces these beliefs”.189 The PKK’s threat to national security justifies the hard-
line policies of the state. Ankara’s coercion consequently generates strong support for the
radical tactics used by the PKK because they are seen as an adequate response to the state’s
measures. It can be thus argued that to some extent the state labeling PKK as a terrorist group
and subsequent restoration to violence, reinforces the PKK’s hardliners resolve to fight back.
3. 5. De-escalation
The de-escalation describes the situation as the reverse to the escalation that has been
presented above. It refers to the general decrease in severity or scope of the conflict. It is
noteworthy to mention that de-escalation always precedes the conflict resolution although it
does not necessarily have to lead to the solution of the conflict. 190 The first step in the de-
escalatory scenario is conditioned upon the implementation of reforms addressing the Kurdish
issue (C1). Regarding the AKP’s amendment package the consensus on controversial articles
is of high importance. In order to assure that the AKP has to carefully negotiate with main
opposition parties who, however, seem reluctant to shift their priorities on this issue. Even if
187
Michael Gunter, “Turkey’s New Neighbour, Kurdistan” in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, eds. Brendan
O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
188
189
Ibid., 126.
190
Littlefield, 1998).
47
they maintain their resistance to particular constitutional changes, the ruling party has enough
votes to pass the package to the referendum that might approve it. We have to bear in mind
though that the amendment package has to be not only approved in parliament and eventually
by popular vote, but also implemented. Implementation would require significant work and
time to assure the harmonization of the standing Turkish laws with the reforms. Turkey is
repeatedly criticized for ineffective implementation that does not translate into concrete
progress,191 for which reason it is vital that any changes must be visible in the short term.
Unease with the implementation relates to the fact that whereas the EU may have an impact
on the institutional change, the impact on values, norms and identities is only limited.192
The EU welcomed the constitutional amendments package as ‘positive’; however, it
remains concerned about three main areas – freedom of expression, religious freedom and the
10 per cent threshold for elections.193 It is thus important that Turkey also renew its
commitment to the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis,194 adopted in December
2008, and should continue preparing reforms which are of a major EU concern. Other positive
steps toward the free expression of Kurdish identity, such as was the establishment of satellite
TV channel TRT 6 which broadcasts in all three main Kurdish dialects, all would favor the
positive environment for de-escalation.
The EU will, as a response to this motion, send a clear positive sign (C2) instead of
confusing signals as was the case in the status quo scenario. It is believed that the EU’s full
membership will promote a sufficient domestic democratic reform that will contribute to the
acknowledgement and protection of the Kurdish minority within the state. 195 The EU has
already proved the power of its leverage over the reform process – most of the reforms were
adopted when the EU-Turkey relationship was at its best (national reform package was
approved in 2000-2004). For this reason it is highly important that the EU member states
would adequately appreciate positive developments in Turkey which will consequently
translate into additional progress. In addition the EU need to make clear weather it seeks only
191
Commision of the European Communities, “Turkey 2009 Progress Report,” Commision Staff Working
Document SEC(2009)1334, 14 October 2009,
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2009.pdf,
192
Rabia Karakaya Polat, “The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong?” SETA Policy Brief No. 14, May
2008.
193
“EU welcomes Turkey’s reform package but urges freedoms,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 13, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=eu-welcomes-reform-package-but-urges-freedoms-2010-04-13,
accessed April 14, 2010.
194
“Turkish National Programme for the adoption of the Aquis.“ 2008,
http://www.isgucsahibi.net/condocs//ekutuphane/npaa_full.pdf, accessed April 2010.
195
For instance: Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights (London: Pluto Press,
2005).
48
a privileged partnership with Turkey or full membership. The Commissioner for enlargement,
Stefan Füle expressed his opinion on this question positively: “Can I see Turkey as a member?
Yes I can. It's about the credibility of the EU, but also about Turkey fulfilling all criteria. I'm
confident it will be a new, modern and reformed Turkey, that will be to the benefit of the EU
and Turkey.”196
Indeed the accession process with Turkey, which was initiated by the Ankara
agreement197 in 1963 but did not officially start not until 2005, proves the cohesiveness and
credibility of the EU. There are many benefits deriving from Turkey’s membership that would
profit the EU. Besides economic incentives, such as expanding markets and a young
workforce that would make the EU more confident and influential on an international arena,
the admission of Turkey would make the Union genuinely multicultural which may disprove
assumptions about a clash of civilizations. Given the current effort to constitute an effective
Common defense and security policy, Turkey, with its strategic territorial position and large
army can make a significant contribution as well. On the other hand Turkey may benefit from
the EU democratization effect of enlargement. 198 The role of the EU is especially important in
relation to the Kurdish issue – it is generally accepted that a solution to the Kurdish issue is
largely dependent on the Turkish membership within European structures.199 As a result an
essential number of Kurds prefer to be part of the EU rather than the ‘greater Kurdistan’. 200
The EU is unlikely to support Ankara in any military solution to the Kurdish problem; instead
it could provide a useful and fruitful guideline to a political one, which would lead the
scenario to de-escalation. However, we have to bear in mind that EU’s engagement with
Turkey is aside from internal conditions, such as full liberalization and democratization,
seriously hindered by external ones, most importantly by the Cyprus-Turkey relations, that
add to the complexity of costs and benefits of Ankara’s membership.
The positive development in Turkey concerning the reform process incited by the
improvement in relations with the EU may lead KRG and U.S. to cooperate with Turkey and
thus promote further de-escalation (C3). Unlike the EU, KRG and U.S. have only limited
196
“Stefan Fule European Parliament Hearing Report. Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy.“ Neweurope,
Issue 869, January 13, 2010, http://www.neurope.eu/articles/98479.php, accessed April 2, 2010.
197
“Ankara Agreement.” 1963, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2, accessed April 2010.
198
Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU. An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership (Aldershot/Burlington:
Ashgate, 2003).
199
200
David L. Phillips, “Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, October 15, 2007, http://www.ncafp.org/articles/07%20Report%20on
%20Disarming,%20Demobilizing%20and%20Reintegrating%20the%20Kurdistan%20Workers%20Party.pdf,
49
influence on domestic politics; however their influence lies in the possible cooperation on
fighting and consequently the disarmament of the PKK in Northern Iraq.
Turkey’s relationship to KRG as has been noted above has been influenced by three
main factors – the status of Kirkuk and Mosul, presence of the PKK, and fear of the pan-
Kurdish separatism. The Turkish stance toward cooperation with KRG is also affected by the
division within ruling circles, where only pro-European AKP and liberal intelligentsia seek to
initiate diplomatic political and economic ties with KRG.201 However, according to Barkey an
improved KRG-Turkey relationship would have a positive impact on decreasing the tension in
Turkey and not vice versa. Turkish Kurds may moderate their behavior when Turkey accepts
the KRG as a representative body of the Kurds. It is also unclear how strong the Kurdish
desire to live in a greater Kurdistan is feared and whether it is still perceived as a feasible goal
or rather an unrealizable dream, because according to some observers most Kurds desire
solution within the Turkish borders.202 In addition, it is in the Iraqi Kurds interest to disband
the PKK.203
However, for a long time neither party due to lack of mutual trust was willing to
initiate a rapprochement.204 The U.S. has played a significant role in upholding the
cooperation. The U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that followed the
establishment of joint Committee among Turkey, Iraq and the U.S., opened the space for
improved relations. The agreement clearly stated that Iraqi territory cannot be used as a base
for attack on its neighbor. Besides the KRG became fully responsible for the stability and
security which forced Turkey to establish official diplomatic ties with the KRG. 205 The
opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil on the 13th March 2010 confirmed the positive
development which aims at decreasing political tensions and encouraging the growing
economic ties between countries.206 Both parties seem to be committed to the cooperation that
has been unthinkable until recently. Northern Iraqi-Turkish rapprochement can be an
“important sign of changing times”.207 The positive relations broaden the space in which KRG
201
81, 13 November 2008.
202
Emily Zivanov Kaiser, “Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Issue’: A Sourmountable Challenge?” NIMEP Insights, Vol. 2
(Spring 2006).
203
Ibid.
204
Henri J. Barkey, Preventing Conflict over Kurdistan (Washington D.C./Moscow/Beijing/Beirut/Brussels:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
205
Emrullah Uslu, “Turkey Addresses PKK Challenge after Iraq Reaches Status of Forces Agreement with
United States,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (January 2009).
206
“Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds: Loving thy Neighbor,” KRG News, April 12, 2010,
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010200&rnr=73&anr=34577, accessed April14, 2010.
207
“Turkey more prepared to engage in Northern Iraq, envoy says,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 9, 2010,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=changing-times8217-between-turkey-and-northern-iraq-2010-04-08,
50
will be willing to cooperate on combating the PKK. The KRG could for instance play a
positive role so that it could urge the PKK to disarm by negotiating the ceasefire.
There are also prospects for improved cooperation with the U.S. – Washington has
recently discussed an ‘action plan’ on possible future assistance with Turkey in a fight against
the PKK threat.208 The cooperation may be reinforced by fear from repeated rising tensions in
the region as well as from the Iranian or Syrian subsequent reaction. The U.S. role in the de-
escalation could be highly beneficial – it may use its positive relations with both Turkey and
Iraqi Kurds and help to demobilize the PKK. The PKK is not likely to disarm to the Turkish,
but might to do so to the Americans.209
However, the disarmament of the PKK has to be preceded by the development within
the Turkish political arena. In a situation when the EU, the KRG and the U.S. are included in
and committed to the conflict de-escalation we can presume the BDP will become the third
party in the conflict (C4). It would be unlikely that the government would be willing to talk
directly to the PKK before it abandons violence, mostly because of the persisting policy that it
will never negotiate with terrorists. The pro-Kurdish party may thus act as the mediator which
can play a significant role in promoting the de-escalation.210 It may act as the catalyst needed
to begin the negotiations.211 For the government to accept BDP’s role in the conflict
resolution, party has to according to the request of both Ocalan and the EU, deny any links to
the outlawed PKK and work independently in the legal arena, 212 because to be effective the
third party should be impartial. In this situation the BDP may develop the conditions for the
problem solving strategy – “alternative that satisfies the aspiration of both sides” 213 – in
bargaining with the government over the Kurdish issue. Since the party will successfully
advocate Kurdish interests in parliament while distancing itself from the use of violence by
the PKK, it could also win some more support especially from the moderate Kurds and those
who are tired of the conflict and demand political solution. The changed conditions for
representation of Kurds are a significant factor promoting the de-escalation.

208
“From the Bosphorus: Straight – The US action plan against the PKK?” Hürriyet Daily News, February 8,
2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=from-the-bosphorus-straight-----the-u.s.-action-plan-against-
pkk-2010-02-08, accessed April 3, 2010.
209
Barkey Henri J, “A Chance for Turkish-Kurdish Peace,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2009.
210
Littlefield, 1998).
211
Ibid.
212
213
51
Consequently, the party may mediate a short-term concession on both sites of the
conflict. As another step in the de-escalation path the government offers amnesty to the PKK
militants (C5). This move is perceived as a necessary prerequisite for further development in
this scenario. Although PKK and its sympathizers demand also the release of Ocalan and wish
him to become a negotiator, it is highly unlikely that the government would be willing to
include him as a part of the initiative, due to the extreme opposition from nationalist parties. 214
In parallel with amnesty, the government should discuss with Iraq and the U.N. measures to
assure the closure of the Mahmur U.N. refugee camp and coordinate the return of its refugees
(C6). The camp established in Northern Iraq provides shelter for about 11 000 Turkish Kurd
refugees who were forced to migrate from southeastern Turkey in the 1990s when the violent
struggle between the PKK and the state began.215 Mahmur is perceived as the major source of
recruitment for the PKK and its closure is therefore seen as another precondition for
disarmament of the terrorist group.216 The ‘peace group’ project set off by Ocalan in the
autumn of 2009 was a significant turning point in this sense because the majority of the
returned were indeed from that camp. However, without the amnesty, the returned would face
charges because of their links to the PKK. The repatriation of the Mahmur camp residents
could be easily reapplied in a situation if Ankara cooperates with the KRG.
Following the offers made by the government and mediated by the BDP – amnesty to
PKK fighters and the closure of the Mahmur refugee camp along with the assurance of their
safe return to Turkey – the PKK may be sufficiently convinced about the sincerity of the
proposal and change its behavior and edge away from violence (C7). Other factors may also
influence this decision. In contrast to the escalatory scenario where we assumed the restricted
space for Kurdish demands, the true access to the political system – allowing all groups in
society to express their demands – could successfully minimize the political violence. 217 The
role of BDP that may become a representative of Kurdish demands in the parliament and
generally a more open-minded stance toward the Kurdish problem may further weaken the
broad populous support of the PKK. According to the grievance-motivated approach as
origins of the incompatibility, the PKK is backed mainly because it expresses the unmet needs
and frustration of the Kurds. This has generated the so called ‘relative deprivation’,
214
215
“Turkey must allow refugees to return without fear,” Amnesty International, October 2, 2009,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/turkey-must-allow-refugees-return-without-fear-20091023,
216
217
52
contributing to the violent escalation of the conflict. 218 Nonetheless, the support for policies of
violence is low amongst the Kurdish people who now gradually believe in winning by other
means.219 Moreover, if the KRG is willing to cooperate on eradicating the PKK from Northern
Iraq, the group’s position will be significantly weakened. Finally, the PKK will come to the
awareness that the benefits of dialogue are far higher than the benefits of continued violence.
The PKK’s disarmament would lead the de-escalation scenario to the last step – the
cessation of armed struggle on both sides of the conflict (C8). Although the termination of
violence does not mean a conflict resolution it provides the necessary precondition. The
Kurdish Diaspora in Europe can, in the future, play a noteworthy role in a further conflict
resolution. Its potential lies in promoting a democratic solution to the conflict between the
PKK and the Turkish government, as was achieved by the Irish Diaspora in America that
influenced the peace agreement between the IRA and the Irish government. 220 Clearly, a
parallel can be drawn here with the peacemaking potential of the Kurdish Diaspora,
particularly considering its size and influence. The active Kurdish community, concentrated
mostly in Germany, could through civic organization, apply considerable pressure and take on
a crucial role in assuring the peace agreement.
4. Conclusion
The thesis has set three hypotheses which relate to three different scenarios. It is an
objective of the concluding part to confirm or rebut each one of them. The first hypothesis
deals with the status quo scenario: The situation will remain a status quo. The development
away from this path will be hindered by internal factors – strong role of hardliners in
conservative establishment, army, and judiciary as well as external factors – the ambiguous
support of the EU. The status quo scenario assumes that the decision to continue the Kurdish
initiative will be followed only by limited progress in the implementation of reforms. In this
218
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
219
Ergil Dogu. “PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party” in Terror, insurgency, and the state: ending protracted
conflicts, eds. M. Heiberg, B. O’Leary, J. Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 350-
351.
220
Cochrane Fergal, “Irish-America, the End of IRA’s Armed Struggle and the Utility of ‘Soft Power’,” Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007): 215-231.
53
development as well as in further courses of events the internal factors play an important role.
The nationalist establishment that acts as a guardian of traditional Kemalist principles has a
strong voice in every day’s politics. Although the parliament is dominated by the liberal AKP
party which is advocating a progressive style in politics, departing from the conservatives
dogmas, it has to confront the opposition from CHP and MHP that are both more or less
advocators of traditional Turkish politics. Therefore, the party finds itself in a difficult
position when it promotes a political solution to the PKK’s rebellion because apart from the
opposition parties, military and a significant part of the judiciary favor the military means as
the most suitable way on dealing with the PKK. It ties to the traditional mindset where the
PKK insurgency is equated with the broad Kurdish problem – a solution to this problem is
therefore seen in the defeat of the PKK. As long as this attitude persists in influential policy
circles, the development away from the status quo is seriously constraint.
However, we have to add that the behavior of the Kurdish public, especially that of
PKK’s sympathizers has to be also counted among internal factors influencing the persistence
of the status quo path. The reluctance to the government’s initiative and subsequent
radicalization among Kurds as the most possible response also impede additional progress
away from status quo. Also the PKK violent actions make the status quo scenario more
possible because they hinder the government’s decision to shift away from coercive counter-
measures.
Regarding the second part of the first hypothesis all scenarios indeed showed that the
EU exercises noteworthy leverage over the development in Turkey. In the case of mixed
signals towards the future prospects for Ankara’s full membership, the EU risks that the
reform process and overall pro-EU commitment in Turkey will slow down. We can
consequently expect that the EU will be able to influence the Kurdish situation and effectively
put a pressure for a political solution only to a limited extent.
Overall, the first hypothesis seems to be confirmed. In light of the current state of
events the status quo scenario also comes into sight as the most likely one. Both internal and
external factors will presumably thwart the development away from this path. Given the
peculiar nature of the Turkish political system the strong position of hardliners is unlikely to
move in favor of liberal moderates. Although mandate of the ruling AKP remains strong, so
that it can pursue unpopular steps, given the coming general elections in 2011 it might harden
its stance in order to secure its position. It is plausible that the effort to accommodate both
hardliners and liberally disposed voters, many of them from Kurdish areas, will control the
AKP’s policy in years ahead. This two-track policy is unlikely to generate fundamental
54
movement within the Kurdish initiative. Rather we should expect that improvements will take
turns with slight setbacks that would not motivate the PKK to lay down its arms.
The second de-escalation-related hypothesis assumes: The situation will de-escalate
depending upon the Turkey’s relationship with the EU, which can successfully exert pressure
on Turkish government to terminate violent conflict and find political solution. It has been
proven that the strong support from the EU could generate significant motion concerning the
Kurdish issue in Turkey – within the effort to meet political criteria as a condition for the
membership Ankara will be forced to deal with the Kurdish problem. EU as an advocate of
non-military solutions to the conflict between the PKK and the state, pressures for deepening
of domestic democratic reforms that will indispensably also touch upon the situation of Kurds
in Turkey. The EU expresses a high concern about the issue of freedom of expression,
religious freedom, and protection and the tolerance of language, culture and fundamental
rights vis-à-vis minorities which remain restricted. Regarding an effective pressure on those
issues it is necessary that the EU will send to Turkey clear positive signs that it is committed
to Ankara’s accession. In Turkish eyes it is also essential that member countries will depart
from the idea of privileged partnership that creates distrust among both Turkish government
and the public toward the prospect of membership. When this is achieved, Turkey is likely to
progress in the reform process which is expected to lead to the de-escalation of the conflict.
However, as has been shown the EU-Turkey relations works on reciprocal basis – the
EU articulated support for Turkish membership goes hand in hand with Ankara’s progress.
Turkey therefore has to demonstrate improvement in effective implementation of already
adopted reforms. Generally speaking in order to promote de-escalation to the conflict both EU
and Turkey have to encourage the cooperation by showing strong commitment. However, not
only EU alone could exert pressure for solution but also the KRG and the U.S. could play a
beneficial role. Their willingness to cooperate with the Turkish government on disarmament
of the PKK may, along with other factors accelerate the PKK’s change in behavior away from
violence and put forward negotiations.
Besides external factors the de-escalation of the conflict is also dependent on the
favorable domestic environment. The scenario assumed that the pro-Kurdish BDP party will
become the third party to the conflict. This is plausible only in the case that access to the
political system is opened to the extent that the BDP is able to freely articulate its demands.
Consequently the mediation power of the BDP may press the PKK to accede a democratic and
peaceful settlement path. The positive steps from the government such as amnesty for the
PKK militants appear necessary for the PKK to lay down its arms.
55
In sum, the de-escalation scenario appears to be the second most likely one. It would
be plausible in a situation when the AKP renewed its pro-EU commitment and took necessary
measures satisfying the Kurdish demands. The adoption of constitutional reforms as presented
by the amendment package may advance the position of moderates in the government and
mobilize the supporters of Turkish membership within the EU. Consequently the rational
calculation could lead the leaders to choose a political solution because it would be perceived
as less costly than the military one.
Finally, the third hypotheses relates to the escalation of conflict: The situation will
escalate in case of a weakened EU support, radicalization of the PKK and consequently
Ankara’s decision on a military solution. Escalation again takes into account the role of the
EU – in contrast to de-escalation it portrays the situation when the EU support is considerably
weakened. It is true that if the EU relaxes its pressure, as was the case between 2005 and
2008, we cannot expect so strong a Turkish commitment to the reform process. Ensuing
stagnation of reforms is likely to lead to radicalization of the PKK. Increasing violence may
result in the government’s decision for military solution which would climax to an escalatory
scenario. Therefore also the last hypothesis appears to be confirmed.
The escalatory spiral would be broken only if the U.S. does not acknowledge Ankara’s
right to pursue cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and would increase its pressure for a
non-military solution. The U.S. role could ultimately discourage Turkey from exercising a
military strike and shift the events into a status quo scenario. However, since the decision on
military action is made within the Turkish government, the powerful hardliners, who are
likely to gain the upper hand when the violent clashes intensify, are expected to advocate
military force whatever the cost. It has to be also borne in mind that radicalization of the PKK
tends to unite the country against terrorist threat. Consequently military measures would win
far-reaching national support – we can go back to the situation in 2007 to demonstrate this
pattern. Although we consider escalation as the less likely scenario of development, it is still a
relevant possibility in regards to the strong hardliners’ voice in parliament, persisting radical
support for the PKK and the unclear nature of the EU-Turkey ties in the future.
Overall, each hypothesis seems to be confirmed in relation to its correspondent
scenario. However, it was revealed that there are other factors that have to be taken into
account. Due to the complexity of the conflict in Turkey it cannot be said whether internal or
external factors play a more important role – it is always the interplay of both that creates
favorable conditions for any particular development. Yet, we have to take into consideration
that certain instability and unpredictability of the Turkish politics combined with recent
56
frequent changes in approaching the Kurdish issue may give rise to a completely different
course of events in each scenario. Nevertheless, given the past and present development that
can hint some trends, and the general patterns in conflict development, the sequence of events
as presented in each scenario are considered as the most probable.
In accordance to the first hypothesis the conflict is likely to follow the path of status
quo. Although there have been several signs that primary parties are ‘ripe’ for political
solution, we should be rather skeptical about real prospects given the rigidity of the political
system and past failures in accommodating the situation of Kurds in Turkey. Notwithstanding,
we have to consider the unprecedented substantial motion toward the ‘opening’ of the Kurdish
issue since its official recognition in 2005. The problem has shifted from the security sphere
to the political one not only in AKP’s conception but also in the minds of the Turkish public.
A growing number of people now understand the long-known truth for external observers –
the conflict between the PKK and the government cannot be solved without dealing with the
PKK; however suppression of the PKK only is not going to solve the problem either. In
addition it also appears that the government understands the necessity for a political solution.
However, the question stands: Does Turkey really want a political solution to the conflict? So
far it seems that the answer is yes but all the recent progress could be also perceived as a mere
cover-up policy that tries to accommodate different domestic and international interests.
Eventually Turkey may resort to military force as was its frequent tactic in the past.
Nonetheless, the common hope is that Turkey will, with additional help from the outside
world, finally approach the conflict by political means and will promote a long-term solution
to the conflict – it will be most likely done through small steps rather than any major
breakthrough.
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Attachments
No.1: The distribution of Kurds in the Middle East
65
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No. 2: Kurdish population in Northern Iraq
66
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_kurdish_areas_2003.jpg.
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The Conflict Between The Turkish State and The Kurdistan Workers' Party

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MASARYK UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Department of European Studies and International Relations

The Conflict between the Turkish Government

Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Chovančík

Conflict, Kurdish issue, PKK, Turkish Government, EU, KRG.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

2. 6. Internal and external factors 29

3. CONFLICT SCENARIOS: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT VS. KURDISTAN

3. 1. Current situation and starting point 37

1. 1. Objectives and structure of the thesis

2. The situation will escalate in case of a weakened EU support, radicalization of the

2. 1. Background and context

accessed February 2010.

2. 6. Internal and external factors

3. Conflict Scenarios: the Turkish Government vs. Kurdistan

3. 1. Current situation and starting point

accessed April 11, 2010.

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Phillips, David L. “Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Workers’

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