Pavia vs. De la Rosa 8 Phil.

70 March 18, 1907

FACTS: The plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants for
the sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action, alleging in effect
that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco Granda e Iturralde was
appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will the minor Carmen Linart y Pavia
was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death of the executor Francisco Granda toward
the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as executor Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the
personal property of the state, amounting to 10,673 pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the property
situated at No. 27 Calle Solana, Walled City, likewise the property of the testator; that during the month
of April, 1904, the plaintiff, Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia,
executed a power of attorney in behalf of the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed,
and the attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless
manner until the 20th of August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the capital,
and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the fact of having
retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican currency, together with
interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts would have produced 12,321.90 pesos,
Mexican currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise,
count, and divide the estate of Linart, deceased, notwithstanding it was his duty to do so, and leased the
aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to his relatives from December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a much
lower rental than could have been obtained, thereby causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to 6,570
pesos, Mexican Currency; that the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa died on the 14th of September, 1903, leaving
the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives, Eusebio Canals being
the husband of the said Bibiana.
ISSUE WON the defendant Bibiana and Salud de laRosa are responsible for the personal acts of Josedela
Rosa.
HELD: No. It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de la
Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence, notwithstanding that at
the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act [SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]
LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014 [7] No.190) was already in force, and that in accordance with its
provisions the estate of the deceased should have been administered and liquidated.- In accordance with
the provisions of the Act No.190 it is understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is
always accepted and received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession
of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their
own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said
deceased.- The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate
succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment
of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the
appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and
deciding as to the claims against said estate.

PAMPLONA vs. MORETO

96 SCRA 775, March 31, 1980

Facts:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife with 6 children. During their marriage,
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496.
Monica Maniega died intestate. more than (6) years after, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the
heirs of his said deceased wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership, executed in favor
of Geminiano Pamplona, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot
1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the
premises on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife.
The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate hence, this suit was instituted seeking for the declaration of
the nullity of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the
same.

Held:

The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one
big land. They are not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. And since
Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his
share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses.
Moreover, private respondents, as heirs are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles
1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and
transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the
herein private respondents.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their
deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations
which were not extinguished by their parents' death.

DKC Holdings Corp. v. CA

G.R. No. 118248, 5 April 2000

FACTS:
DKC Holdings Corporation entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion
Bartolome, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the
Contract. In turn, DKC undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its
option. Within the two-year period, DKC shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor of its desire to
exercise its option.

When Encarnacion died, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the
sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept the payments. Subsequently, petitioner
served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property,
tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to
surrender possession of the property to petitioner. On April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights under a Contact of Lease with Option to Buy were transmissible.

RULING:

Article 1311 of the Civil Code states that the general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound
by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. The Court held
that there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the
lease contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are
transmissible.

In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property right. The death of a
party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in
the subject matter of the contract.

Therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

Opulencia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125853, July 30, 1998

Facts:
A complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo, herein private respondents, Aladin
Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a
contract to sell Lot 2125 that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300, 000.00 but defendant, despite
demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract.

Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00
as down payment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject
of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which a
petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court. At the time the contract was executed, the
parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved
by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the down
payment received from private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it. She further argued that the
contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of defendant's father
Demetrio Carpena.

Issue:
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding without the
approval of the probate court?

Ruling:
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject
of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the Probate Court." She maintains that the Contract to sell is void because it was not
approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an
executrix or administratrix of the estate.

In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of
land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent
"need of cash." These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under
probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.

Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death.
Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack
of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to sell, because the petitioner has the substantive
right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

The possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.' And Manresa with
reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided. Every part
owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or
mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of
the community.

Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by
their deceased father, the sale is valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be
allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to
Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the
private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and
outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed,
it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."

Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to sell
with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300, 000 as initial payment of the
purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the
private respondents who have relied on them.

BUSTAMANTE VS. AREVALO

73 Phil 635

FACT:
The testatrix in this case executed two wills, one on January 9, 1936, and the other on October 2, 1937. In
the first will, the testatrix specifically referred to seven parcels of land of considerable value and to certain
personal properties. Three of these parcels of land and all the personal properties are given to Amando
Clemente, another three to Ariston Bustamante, and the seventh parcel to Petrona Arevalo and Carmen
Papa. In the second will, the testatrix particularly referred to only five parcels of land and certain personal
properties, all of which are give to Ariston Bustamante, as her universal heir. The second will does not
make mention of two of the three parcels given to Amando Clemente under the first will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the later will, whose probate is herein approved, has entirely revoked the earlier will.

HELD
NO. The two wills can be reconciled, the first should be considered revoked only in so far as it is
inconsistent with the second. As the second will was executed only twenty-one months after the first, the
testatrix, who has been conclusively shown to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the later
will, could not have forgotten that she owned two other parcels of land, especially if they are of
considerable value. Even the lawyer who drafted the second will was aware that the testatrix owned the
said two parcels, because they were included in the inventory made of her properties in connection with
the administration proceedings of the estate of her deceased husband. This omission could have been
made only on purpose, and, coupled with the circumstance that the section will does not expressly revoke
the first which has not been burned, torn, cancelled or obliterated, inevitably leads to the inference that the
testatrix in face intended to make the first will effective as to the two parcels of land above referred to.
Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
No will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or
other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or by burning, tearing, cancelling, or
obliterating the same with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction.
xxx xxx xxx
If partially conflicting, that of the latter date will operate to revoke the former so far as the
provisions of the two are conflicting or incompatible, and in such case both wills are entitled to
probate. (68 Corpus Juris 805.)

Where there is no revocation in a later will of all former wills, two separate and distinct wills may be
probated, especially when the probating of one only of the instruments would leave an intestacy as to part
of the estate. This rule applies even though the later instrument states that it is the last will and testament
of the testator, as the use of such words in a later instrument does not of itself revoke a prior will. (Id. p.
885.)

AVELINO vs CA 329 scra 369

In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In 1991, his daughter, Maria Socorro Avelino
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of his deceased
father. All the other heirs however opposed the petition and they moved that the petition be
converted into an action for judicial partition of the said estate. The trial court granted the
opposition’s motion and so Socorro’s petition was converted accordingly. Socorro’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. Socorro then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in granting the other heirs motion. The Court of
Appeals found no reversible error. Socorro elevated the petition to the Supreme Court. She
insists that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the estate is not yet determined
hence an administration proceeding is still needed. She also insists that the Rules of Court
does not provide for a conversion of a petition for administration to an action for partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration may
be converted into an action for judicial partition.
HELD: Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Where the
more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority
of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. In this case, all the
heirs, with the exception of Socorro, agreed to judicial partition as they see it to be the more
convenient method. There is no merit to the contention of Socorro that a partition cannot be
had because the extent of the estate is not yet determined. The extent of the estate can
actually be determined during the partition proceedings. Therefore, the trial court made no
error in converting Socorro’s petition to an action for judicial partition.

G.R. No. 112443.January 25, 2002] TERESITA P. BORDALBA,petitioner, vs.COURT OF

APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL
JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS
OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN
JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY,respondents.

FACTS: a land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters
and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot is part
of a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City,
and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
Jayme.In 1947, an extra-judicial partition:

1)1/3 in favor of -(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia
and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose
heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.
Bordalba; and

3)1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which
his family occupied since 1945.
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part
of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition.She
further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor
Jayme with her permission.
Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land
adjudicated to him by way of extra judicial partition.
Petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the
instant complaintagainst petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and
Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her
through purchase from her mother who was in possession since 1947.
The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No.
(VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its
cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as
well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith,
respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale.
Appealed to CA. affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.It ruled that since
private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner
should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents.

RULING: Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal
heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other than their bare allegations
todispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their
allegations.Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased,
no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was
disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in
her name, to the exclusion of private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents
as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.