Diaz-Salgado v. Anson G.R. No.

204494 | July 27, 2016

Facts: Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had one daughter, Maria Luisa and
she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo-Ann Diaz and
she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real properties and according to
him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then
properties in favor of Jo Ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed
a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya. The latter
countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina but they
knew they cohabited as common-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and
married one Teresita. Due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court intervention,
both Spouses claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina.

Issue: Whether the partition done by Luis was valid.

Answer:

Premise 1: Provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil
Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held
in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its
value."
Premise 2: Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings . . . ."
Premise 3: Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.
Premise 4: The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid.
Premise 5: Luis already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement.
Premise 6: The Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled,
in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least,
voidable.
Conclusion: Hence, even without the judicial proceedings, the partition was validly done by Luis and
Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Cardenas v. Heirs of Spouses Aguilar, G.R. No. 191079, [March 2, 2016]

Facts: On 8 November 2000, Elinaida L. Alcantara (Alcantara) obtained a loan from the Spouses Maximo
and Simplicia Aguilar (Spouses Aguilar) in the amount of P3,000,000.00 with fixed interest of
P720,000.00. As a security for the said obligation, Alcantara executed an agreement denominated as
Venta con Pacto de Retro (Sale With Right to Repurchase) in favor of the Spouses Domingo over a parcel
of land.

In December 2002, Joel A. Cardenas (Cardenas), son of Alcantara, sought to exercise for himself, and on
behalf of his mother, the redemption of the subject property by offering to pay the entire amount of the
loan including the interest thereon, but it was refused by the Spouses Aguilar. This prompted Alcantara to
initiate Civil Case No. LP-02-0300 for the Reformation of Instrument and Specific Performance against
the Spouses Aguilar, daughter and husband. After Alcantara passed away, she was substituted by her heir,
Cardenas, who filed an Amended Complaint. Before the filing of the Amended Complaint, the counsel for
the Spouses Aguilar also manifested that Maximo V. Aguilar likewise passed away by filing a Notice of
Death with the trial court and serving a copy thereof on the opposing party. It was stated in the said notice
that Maximo V. Aguilar is survived by his spouse, Simplicia P. Aguilar and his daughter, Melba A. Clavo
de Comer and that both were already impleaded as original defendants in the complaint.

Issue: Did the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of De Comer?

Answer:

Premise 1: In Vda. De Salazar v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in
place of the deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and
participated in the proceedings of the case.
Premise 2: Furthermore, in the said case, there are particular circumstances which negate petitioner's
belated and seemingly ostensible claim of violation of her rights to due process. The Court
should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution
of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment.
Premise 3: The only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was
active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death.
Conclusion Similarly in the case at bar, the RTC had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
De Comer after she was served with summons as a party-defendant to the case and she
continuously appeared and participated therein up to this point. Such jurisdiction
previously acquired achieved the purpose of a formal substitution.

Reasoning used by the Court: Inductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Vda. de Rojales v. Dime, G.R. No. 194548, [February 10, 2016]

Facts: Petitioner Juana Vda. de Rojales owned a parcel of land (Lot 4-A). In a petition filed before the
RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas, respondent Marcelino Dime alleged that petitioner conveyed under a pacto
de retso contract the subject land in favor of the respondent. Petitioner reserved the right to repurchase the
property. Despite repeated verbal and formal demands to exercise her right, petitioner refused to exercise
her right to repurchase said property. Respondent filed a petition for consolidation of the title in his
alleged that she had not sold the subject property . Respondent passed away before the trial on the merits
of the case ensued. Being his compulsory heirs, respondent's estranged wife Bonifacia Dime and their
children substituted him in the suit.

Issue: Whether the admission of the heirs of respondent that the source of the consideration came from
respondent's common law wife Villamin makes the latter an indispensable party.

Answer:

Premise 1: This Court, in defining the word "privy" in the case of Republic vs. Grijaldo, said that the
word privy denotes the idea of succession, thus, he who by succession is placed in the
position of one of those who contracted the judicial relation and executed the private
document and appears to be substituting him in the personal rights and obligation is a
privy.
Premise 2: Jurisprudence provides that where there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no
obligation or liability to speak about.
Premise 3: Villamin is not an heir or an assignee of the respondent.
Premise 4: Villamin did not substitute respondent in the personal rights and obligation in the pacto de
retro sale by succession.
Conclusion: Since she is not privy to the contract, she cannot be considered as indispensable party in
the action for consolidation of title and ownership in favor of respondent.

Reasoning used by the Court: Inductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Capablanca vs. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017

Facts: Andres Bas and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535, and Patent No. 1724 was issued in their names on
May 12, 1937. In 1939, he sold this to Faustina. After the death of Faustina, her heirs executed a notarized
Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lot and it was conveyed to
Alejandra. Alejandra sold the land Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Deen. Upon Atty. Deen's death, an
extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include subject lot, was executed by his heirs. Later they
executed an Additional Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale, which sold the land to
Norberto who took possession of and built a house on it. Norberto died without a will and was succeeded
by Lolita.

Josefina, who represented the Heirs Pedro, filed a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of the subject
lot against Lolita. Later, Lolita sought to register her portion in subject lot but was denied by the Register
of Deeds, citing the need for a court order. Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-96676 had been partially
cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the name of
the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina. Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles.

Issue: Does the petitioner should first be declared an heir of Norberto in order to proceed with this case?

Answer:

Premise 1: According to Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Premise 2: Furthermore, the Court ruled in Bordalba v. Court of Appeals that no judicial declaration
of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of
the deceased.
Premise 3: The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity
of the sale of the property from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of
transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with
Pedro's sale of the property, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to
property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.
Premise 4: Petitioner is pursuing Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed to
her upon the latter's death.
Premise 5: Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir
as against the respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right over the property
which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.
Conclusion: Hence, petitioner does not need to first be declared an heir of Norberto in order to proceed
with this case.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Spouses Caldito v. Obado, G.R. No. 181596. January 30, 2017

Facts: As early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felipe Obado.
After Felipe's death, Paterno Obado, whom Felipe treated like his own son, subsequently occupied Lot
No. 1633 and continued to pay the realty taxes of the same. Sometime in 1995, Antonio Ballesteros
executed an Affidavit of Ownership dated February 23, 1995 narrating his claim over the subject parcel of
land - which he is a co-owner with his five siblings. Antonio and Elena Ballesteros sold the subject parcel
of land to the petitioners which the latter declared the subject lot for taxation purposes and paid the realty
taxes thereon.

In 2002, the petitioners attempted to build a house on the subject parcel of land but the respondents
prevented them from completing the same. The respondents then filed a complaint alleging that that the
Spouses Ballesteros were not the owners and possessors of the subject parcel of land. Said land was
inherited by their father, Paterno, from its original owner Felipe, and they have been paying the real
property taxes for the entire property.

Issue: Does the petitioners able to prove ownership over the parcel of land?

Answer:

Premise 1: The petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title which has two
indispensable requisites as laid down in the case of Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v.
Heirs of Jose Bacud, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Premise 2: The petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel
of land.
Premise 3: The petitioners failed to prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the
Spouses Ballesteros.
Conclusion: From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the petitioners' cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite. Furthermore, the
petitioners' claim of legal title over the subject parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Sale
and Affidavit of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand because they failed to prove
the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Heirs of Leonio vs. Ponce, G.R. No. 213689, January 31, 2018

FACTS: An action for reconveyance was filed by respondent against Fidelita Hidalgo concerning 13
parcels of land. In his petition, respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of three of the properties
involved in the aforementioned action for reconveyance. Petitioners are now filling to annul the decision
of the CA granting the respondents the issuance of new owner's duplicate of title and the new owner's
duplicate certificate of titles. Petitioners argue that jurisdiction has not been properly acquired over them
by the CA considering that the summons were not served on them — "the Estate of the Late Lope L.
Leonio," but instead upon the "Heirs of the Late Lope L. Leonio." Thus, they submit that the case against
them should have been ordered dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the CA acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Lope L. Leonio.

ANSWER:

Premise 1: Under Art. 774 and 777 of the Civil Code, the heirs succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. As such, by operation of law, the
heirs of the deceased person are considered as the continuation of his personality.
Premise 2: In the case of Rioferio, et al. v CA, it was held that no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
Premise 3: In the case of Rioferio, et al. v CA, it was held that no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
Premise 4: The estate of a deceased person has a juridical personality different from that of the heirs,
the Court has recognized the right, as well as the legal personality of the heirs, to institute
an action to represent the estate pending the institution of administration proceedings, or
the appointment of an administrator of the estate.
Premise 5: In this case, no estate proceedings have been instituted.
Premise 6: Petitioners themselves alleged that the late Lope Leonio left no will and no properties,
rights and obligations to be distributed among the heirs. There was no inheritance to be
divided among the heirs such that there was no need for the institution of a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the late Lope Leonio.
Premise 7: The heirs can properly be regarded as a substitute for the decedent and may represent the
latter in protection of the interest that has passed on to them upon their predecessor's
death.
Conclusion: Accordingly, by virtue of the summons served upon the petitioners, the CA validly
acquired jurisdiction over the "Estate of Lope L. Leonio" therein named as respondent.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Estate of Hernaez vs. Pena, [G.R. Nos. 196266-67. October 3, 2018.

Facts: In 1999, Lourdes, an heiress of the late Rogaciana filed a petition for the intestate settlement of

Rogaciana's, Primitivo Hernaez's, and Luisa Hernaez's estates. On June 8, 2000, 8 some of the heirs of the
Hernaez Estates executed a Memorandum of Agreement with Bonifacio Peña and Rodolfo Ham. In the
said memorandum, the former will share 40% of the subject lot to the latter. On July 21, 2000, Lourdes,
as the judicial administrator of the estate of Rogaciana and as attorney-in-fact executed a Contract of
Lease with Peña for 15 years. Lourdes and Wilfredo were appointed as joint regular administrators of the
Hernaez Estates by the Regional Trial Court on July 21, 2003. Peña filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
17 in the intestate settlement, claiming that he was the assignee of a 1/3 share of Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and
2685, and a lessee of all these lots for 15 years. CA found through the contracts presented that what the
heirs had alienated were not specific portions of the Hernaez Estates, but rather their ideal undivided
shares. Thus, the CA found that the intestate court had the power to declare void the dispositions of
properties of the Hernaez Estates made by their heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of the intestate court is a prerequisite for the valid disposition by
heirs of their shares in the properties of an estate.

ANSWER:

Premise 1: Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.
Premise 2: In Palicte v. Hon. Ramolete, At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own
the property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same
even while the property is under administration.
Premise 3: Generally, under the Rules of Court, court approval is necessary to validly dispose of a
decedent's estate, pursuant to Rule 89, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
Premise 4: However, in the case of Acebedo v. Hon. Abesamis, However, this is not intended to
impair the substantive right of heirs to dispose of whatever right, interest, or participation
they may have in the decedent's property.
Premise 5: Here, respondent Lourdes did not sign the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease and June 8,
2000 Memorandum of Agreement in her capacity as a judicial administrator of the
Hernaez Estates, but as the attorney-in-fact of petitioners.
Conclusion: Heirs may dispose of their shares in the properties of an estate without the approval of the
intestate court.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller, G.R. No. 231459, [January 21, 2019]

Facts: Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land originally owned
by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller (Marcelino). After the latter's death, or sometime in 1929 or 1932,
his children, Ambrosio Paller (Ambrosio), Isidra Paller (Isidra), and Ignacia Paller (Ignacia), along
several others, orally partitioned his properties and took possession of their respective shares.

In 1995, respondent Demetria, daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Alde with
right to repurchase. Upon her return from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same but discovered that the
Custodios took possession of the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the
complaint.

Issue: Whether respondents' predecessor, Ambrosio, is a child of Marcelino and is entitled to inherit the
subject land.

Answer: (Justice Caguioa concurring)

Premise 1: Article 777 of the Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
Premise 2: The baptismal certificate of Ambrosio Paller (Ambrosio), respondents' father, cannot be
considered by itself as competent proof of the claimed filiation with Marcelino Paller,
respondents' alleged grandfather and Ambrosio's alleged father.
Conclusion: The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared as such in a separate
special proceeding.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? Yes, kaso di ko alam ano hanapin ko
Republic v. Yap, G.R. No. 231116, February 7, 2018

Facts: On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition 3 for cancellation and re-issuance of
Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of the Carcar Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty
four (34) square meters is covered by Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was
vested upon Yap by virtue of inheritance and donation and that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said lot since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being possessors in good faith in the concept of an owner for
more than thirty (30) years. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs of
Porfirio Yap.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order 5 dated August 3, 2010
setting the case. The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was able to prove his
ownership and possession over Lot No. 922. As such, it granted the petition and ordered the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu to cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new copy thereof, and on the basis
of such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in the name of Andres Abellana, as administrator
of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under
the name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 15 stating that the new
decree and OCT should be issued under his name instead of Andres Abellana. The OSG then interposed
an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap's petition should have been denied due to insufficiency of
evidence and failure to implead indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez and/or Andres
Abellana.

Issues: Whether the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof,
and the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 922.

ANSWER:

Premise 1: It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the decedent.
Premise 2: The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent.
Premise 3: The heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be prohibited from
filing the necessary petition.
Premise 4: A mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new decree shall be issued which shall, in
all respects, be the same as that of the original decree.
Premise 5: Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor modified; hence, it must be under the
name of the original adjudicate.
Conclusion: The RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof,
and the issuance of the corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its
original adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.

Reasoning used by the Court: Deductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No

Leriou v. Longa, G.R. No. 203923, [October 8, 2018]

Facts: Respondent minors represented by their mother (Sta. Cruz) instituted a special proceeding entitled
“In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Enrique T. Longa Petition for Letters of Administration” with the
RTC in Muntinlupa. Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen and
respondent minors, his legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively. Enrique left several properties
with no creditors. RTC appointed Sta. Cruz as the administratrix of Enrique’s estate. Petitioners
subsequently filed an Omnibus Motion to remove Sta. Cruz as administratrix and to appoint Eleptherios
or his nominee as administrator. They allege that they were denied due process of law because they did
not receive any notice of Sta. Cruz’ petition for letters of administration. The emails between Sta. Cruz
and Eleptherios do not prove that they actually received the petition and the RTC order. Sta. Cruz claimed
that she mailed the petition and the RTC order to petitioners in the addresses that the latter gave her and
that they also exchanged correspondences through emails.

Issue: Whether the petitioners were notified by the RTC with regards of the appointment of Sta. Cruz as
the administratix of Enriquez’s estate.

ANSWER:

Premise 1: Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for
proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Premise 2: The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones where some of
the heirs did not receive any personal notice about the intestate proceedings, yet they were
deemed notified through publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem.
Premise 3: The Court in Pilapil adjudged that while it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these
siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind
that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that
the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the
existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the
purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of
the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
Premise 4: In this case, the RTC order was published for 3 consecutive weeks in Balita, a newspaper
of general circulation, on July 27, 2007, August 3, 2007, and August 10, 2007.
Conclusion: Thus, by such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world, petitioners are
deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate.

Reasoning used by the Court: Inductive Reasoning

Is there any fallacious argument in the decision? No