ECE666: Power Systems Operation

Winter 2019: Assignment-2

Last Date of Submission- Thursday, 21st March 2019, 4:30 PM

1. Consider a double auction electricity market where three suppliers A, B and C offer their
energy for sell at offer prices given below. There are two customers Y and Z bidding to buy
energy from the market, and their bid prices are also given below.

𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 0.475𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + 23; 𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.345𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 20; 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 0.235𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 26

𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝜌𝜌𝑌𝑌 = 175 − 0.29𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 ; 𝜌𝜌𝑍𝑍 = 250 − 0.342𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑍𝑍

Generators-A and C and Load-Y are located in East area, other participants are located in
West area. A tie-line of 175 MW capacity connects the two areas.
a. Find the uniform market price and clearing quantities of each participant when transmission
line limit is not considered.
b. If the transmission capacity is considered, find the market settlement (all prices and
dispatches).
c. For the solution obtained in (b), Generator B has an FTR of 100 MW from West to East,
generator A has an FTR from East to West of 100 MW. Find the congestion charges
applicable to all the entities.

2. The figure below shows a lossless two generator, 5-bus system where bus-1 and bus-2 are
generator buses, buses 3, 4 and 5 are load buses. The generation cost of G1 is 15 $/MWh and
of G2 is 25 $/MWh. The transmission line 1-4, shown by the thick dotted line, is congested in
the direction from Bus-4 to Bus-1. The transmission line impedances have the following
relationships:
Z1-3 = Z4-2; Z3-5 = Z2-5
Z3-5 = 2*Z1-3; Z1-4 = 0.75*Z1-3
Find the LMPs at buses 3, 4 and 5.
G1

Bus 1 Bus 3

Bus 5
Bus 4 Bus 2

G2

3. For the 3-bus system shown below, the generator cost functions are given as:
C1(PG1 ) = 0.001PG21 + 2.5 PG1 + 450 $ / hr

C2 (PG 2 ) = 0.0025 PG2 2 + 2 PG 2 + 250 $ / hr

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 The load at Bus-1 and Bus-2 are PD1 = 200 MW and PD2= 150 MW respectively. The load at
Bus-3 is price elastic with a benefit function W3(PD3) = 4.25PD3+500 $/hr. All the transmission
lines have a maximum capacity of 500 MW. The line admittances are:

yL1 = -j10 p.u.; yL2 = -j5 p.u.

Find the LMPs at each bus and the market clearing dispatch using DC OPF. Use a base of 100
MW for converting the power demand to per unit quantities.

4. Consider a double auction electricity market where three suppliers A, B and C offer their
energy for sell at offer prices given below. There are three customers X, Y and Z bidding to
buy energy from the market, and their bid prices are also given below. The transmission line
capacities are shown in the figure.
Area-2
Area-1
B
A PMax = 200 MW

Y X

PMax = 100 MW

Area-3

Z C

Sell = 0.5 ⋅ PG + 20 Buy

ρA A ρX = 200 − 0.5 ⋅ PD X
Sell = 0.2 ⋅ PG + 10
ρB B ρYBuy = 167 − 0.135 ⋅ PDY
Sell = 0.4 ⋅ PG + 25
ρC C ρ ZBuy = 252 − 0.412 ⋅ PDZ
a. Find the market clearing of all participants, ignoring the transmission limits.
b. Find the market clearing of all participants when transmission limits are considered.
c. If Y holds an FTR for 150 MW and X holds an FTR for 50 MW, both in the direction from
Area-2 to Area-1, find the total congestion rent paid by each customer.

5. Consider the small power system shown below. Generators G1 and G2 have incremental
costs of 20 $/MWh and 25 $/MWh, respectively. All transmission lines have the same
impedances, their maximum capacity is 200 MW. The generator limits are as follows:
50 MW ≤ PG1 ≤ 750 MW; 50 MW ≤ PG2 ≤ 500 MW

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 1 2

1 2

150 MW 200 MW

250 MW
a. Evaluate the power flows on each line and hence find the marginal cost of supplying
power at each bus when transmission limits are ignored.
b. Repeat (a) for the case when transmission limits are considered.
c. Now, in (b), let customer at bus-3 with 250 MW demand has purchased an FTR for 200
MW in the direction from bus-1 to bus-3. Find the FTR credit it receives when congestion
occurs on line1-3, and the net congestion charge it has to pay.

6. There are three supply-side participants (A, B and C) and three demand-side participants (D,
E and F) in a double-auction electricity market, and their supply / demand offers are given
below.
ρ ASELL = 0.5PG A + 25; ρ BSELL = 0.2 PGB + 10; ρCSELL = 0.1PGC + 18
ρ DBUY = −0.25PDD + 180; ρ EBUY = −0.40 PDE + 210; ρ FBUY = −0.37 PDF + 195
(ρA , ρB and ρC are the sell-offer prices, ρD , ρE and ρF are the buy-offer prices)
a) Assuming a perfectly competitive electricity market, determine the uniform market price
and the energy cleared for all participants.
b) Consider that A, B, E and F are located in West-Region while C and D are located in the
East-Region. The tie-line connecting the two regions has a total capacity of 150 MW.
Determine the new market clearing conditions (dispatch, price, etc.) incorporating the
transmission line limit.
c) Now consider that the transmission loss on the tie-line is 8%. Also given that the East-
Region bus is the Reference Bus. Find the constraint cost of the tie-line and the LMP at the
East-Region bus and the West-Region bus.
d) How much will be the Congestion Rent, based on the answer of (c), and which bus
participants will pay?
e) Customers-E and F have jointly purchased a Firm Transmission Right (FTR) of 150 MW
from East-Bus to West-Bus, while Generator-D has an FTR of 125 MW from East-Bus to
West-Bus. Find the net congestion payment of each participant to the transmission
company.

7. Consider a double auction electricity market where two suppliers A and B offer their energy
for sell at offer prices given below. There are two customers X and Y bidding to buy energy
from the market, and their bid prices are also given below. The transmission line capacity is
200 MW.

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 East Area
West Area
B
A PMax = 200 MW

Y X

ρ ASell = 0.5 ⋅ PG A + 20 ρ XBuy = 200 − 0.5 ⋅ PD X

ρ BSell = 0.2 ⋅ PG B + 10 ρ YBuy = 167 − 0.135 ⋅ PDY

You are informed that the electricity market price would be 105.24 $/MWh, for the above set
of bids, considering a uniform price settlement, if the transmission limit is ignored. With this
information given, find the electricity market price settlement and market clearing
dispatches of all participants when the transmission line limit is taken into account. Assuming
that Y holds an FTR for 150 MW and X hold an FTR for 50 MW, both in the in the direction
from East to West, find the total congestion rent paid by each customer.

8. There are two supply-side participants (A and B) in a single-auction electricity market, and
their supply offers are given below.
ρASELL = 0.6 PG + 100; ρ SELL = 0.32 PG + 440 (ρ and ρ are offer prices)
A B A B
B
Consider that the demand (PD) is price elastic, and is given as a function of the market price,
as follows:
PD = 535 − ρ
In a scenario of Cournot competition where A and B are indulging in maximizing their
respective profits, find the Nash equilibrium solution of the above auction.

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