TOYOTA ALABANG, INC., petitioner, vs.

EDWIN GAMES, respondent

G.R. No. 206612 (Resolution), [August 17, 2015])

Facts: Respondent Games, worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its
vehicle lubricants. Subsequently, it charged him with qualified theft before the trial court.
Two years thereafter, or on 24 August 2007, Games filed a Complainant for illegal
dismissal, nonpayment of benefits, and damages against petitioner. The latter, through
counsel, failed to file its Position Paper on the date set on 15 November 2007.

On 5 February 2008, the LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay
Games P535,553.07 for his separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave pay
and attorney's fees resulting from his illegal dismissal. Petitioner no longer filed a motion
for reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling became final and executory.

The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner sought to quash. It prayed that the
proceedings be reopened, explaining that it had failed to present evidence because of
its counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate pleadings. The LA denied the claims of
petitioner. Aggrieved, the latter appealed before the NLRC.

The appeal of petitioner was denied due course because it had failed to show proof of
its security deposit for the appeal. According to the NLRC, the bonding company's mere
declaration in the Certification of Security Deposit that the bond was fully secured was
not tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule, because there must first be an
accompanying assignment of the employer's bank deposit.

On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may
be taken from an order of execution of a final judgment. For the NLRC, petitioner's
failure to appeal the LA Decision already made the ruling final and executory.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, but the action was
dismissed. Firstly, the CA ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying the appeal, given that petitioner had failed to comply faithfully with the bond
requirement. Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final judgment is no
longer appealable. Thirdly, the CA found that petitioner's own negligence had caused it
to lose its right to appeal.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for
Injunctive Relief before this Court. It disputed the finding that it did not show proof of its
security deposit for the appeal bond. It also insisted that its counsel's gross negligence
justified the reopening of the proceedings below.
Issue:

1. Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petitioners complaint

2. Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in requiring petitioner to
post an appeal bond

3. Whether or not an appeal bond must be accompanied by a "proof of security

deposit or collateral securing the bond."

Ruling:

1. This Court maintains that the CA correctly refused to reopen the proceedings
below. The reopening of a case is an extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make
a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory. Hence, there must be good cause on the movant's part before it can be
granted.

a) In this case, petitioner itself was negligent in advancing its case. As found by the
appellate court, petitioner was present during the mandatory conference hearing in
which the latter was informed by the LA of the need to file a Position Paper on 15
November 2007. However, petitioner not only reneged on the submission of its Position
Paper, but even failed to move for the filing of the pleading at any point before the LA
resolved the case on 5 February 2008.

b) Moreover, petitioner had failed to exhibit diligence when it did not attend the
hearing on 11 January 2008, or any of the proceedings thereafter, despite its
manifestation that it no longer had any legal representative. Given the instances of
negligence by petitioner itself, the Court finds that the CA justly refused to reopen the
case in the former's favor. Definitely, petitioner cannot now be allowed to claim denial of
due process when it was petitioner who was less than vigilant of its rights.

2. The NLRC did not commit any mistake in requiring petitioner to post an appeal
bond. The paraphrased proposition that "an appeal bond is not required in appeals from
decisions of the LA denying a motion to quash a writ of execution" lacks any citation
sourced from a statute or case law. Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule
VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, uniformly state thus:

In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond,
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to
the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the above rules do not limit the appeal bond requirement only to certain kinds
of rulings of the LA. Rather, these rules generally state that in case the ruling of the LA
involves a monetary award, an employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the
posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying terms,so long as the decision of the
LA involves a monetary award, as in this case, that ruling can only be appealed after the
employer posts a bond.

Clearly, this construction is but proper considering the avowed purpose of appeal bonds
demanded by the law from employers in labor cases. If we are to construe otherwise,
then an aggrieved party may simply seek the quashal of a writ of execution, instead of
going through the normal modes of appeal, to altogether avoid paying for an appeal
bond. This ruse will then circumvent the requirement of both labor rules and
jurisprudence16to post an appeal bond before contesting the LA's grant of monetary
award. Hence, the first point is not only incorrect, but also dangerous.

3. According to the NLRC and the CA, the bonding company's mere declaration in
the Certification of Security Deposit that the bond is fully secured is not tantamount to a
faithful compliance with the rule, because there must first be an accompanying
assignment of the employer's bank deposit. On the other hand, the dissent sees this
declaration as an act that satisfies Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure. For this reason, he opines that the NLRC should have entertained the
appeal of petitioner.

Notwithstanding this issue, the NLRC has given a well-founded reason for refusing to
entertain petitioner's appeal, namely, no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution of a final and executory judgment.

An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of
only in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to elevate an
action must comply with the requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as
regards the period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and other requisites for a proper
appeal before the NLRC; and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit appeals
from final and executory decisions of the Labor Arbiter.

In this case, petitioner elevated to the NLRC an already final and executory decision of
the LA. To recall, after petitioner learned of its former counsel's negligence in filing a
Position Paper before the LA, it nonetheless failed to file a motion reconsideration to
question the ruling of the LA that it illegally dismissed Games. At that point, the Decision
was already final and executory, so the LA dutifully issued a Writ of Execution.
Petitioner sought the quashal of the writ of execution and the reopening of its case only
at that stage; and only after it was rebuffed by the LA did petitioner appeal before the
NLRC. Based on the timeline, therefore, the LA's adverse Decision had become final
and executory even prior to petitioner's appeal before the NLRC contesting the denial of
the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Consequently, the NLRC dismissed the
appeal based on its clear prohibition under Section 5, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules
of Procedure.

The NLRC's reasoning that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution of a final
and executory judgment is also rooted in case law. Jurisprudence dictates that a final
and executory decision of the LA can no longer be reversed or modified.After all, just as
a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the
winning party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the
case.On this basis, the CA did not grievously err when it concluded that the ruling of the
NLRC denying petitioner's appeal was not baseless, arbitrary, whimsical, or despotic.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. DEBBIE UBAÑA, respondent.

G.R. No. 200114 , [August 24, 2015])

Facts: In her complaint for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), the DBP
Service Corporation, and the SSS Retirees Association, respondent Ubana alleged that
in July 1995 she applied for employment with the SSS. Despite passing all the
examinations and submitting the requirements, she was referred to the DBP Service
Corporation, passed the pre-employment examination and was referred to SSS Naga
for training and immediate deployment to SSS Daet.

She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract in May, 1996; and when she
reported to the SSS Daet Branch, she was assigned to various sections and divisions
as Processor and Data Encoder. Her salary was only P229.00 daily compared to a
regular SSS Processor who receives P846.45 daily. While her service contract with the
DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, she continued to be employed by the
SSS; she was continually assured of being absorbed into the SSS; in fact she was
qualified for the position as she passed the required training.

Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment of the SSS, she was forced to
resign in August, 2002 as she could not stand anymore the exploitation, the agony of
dissatisfaction, anxiety, demoralization, and injustice. Respondent Ubana therefore
alleges that the defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service rules and
regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human relations, specifically Articles 19, 20
and 21. Thus, she prayed for actual damages by way of unrealized income, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, averring that the
complaint was predicated on the claims that arose out of employer-employee relations,
thus cognizable by the NLRC. At first, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, but on
motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the RTC reversed itself and denied the
motion to dismiss. It held that a perusal of the complaint filed by Debbie substantially
alleges that the case is for Damages. Having denied the existence of employer-
employee relationship between it and Debbie, and the case is for damages, the regular
trial courts, not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

SSS moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied, hence it filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA which likewise dismissed the case.

Thus, this present petition before the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Debbie.

Ruling: The Court denies the Petition.

In Home Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit, it was held that while they
performed the work of regular government employees, DBP Service Corporation
personnel are not government personnel, but employees of DBP Service Corporation
acting as an independent contractor. Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the
present case, it can be said that during respondent’s stint with petitioner, she never
became an SSS employee, as she remained an employee of DBP Service Corporation
and SSS Retirees Association – the two being independent contractors with legitimate
service contracts with SSS.

Indeed, “[i]n legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between

the principal and the job contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to the job
contractor’s employees only for the proper payment of wages.”

In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner’s employee, but
that precisely she was promised that she would be absorbed into the SSS plantilla after
all her years of service with SSS; and that as SSS Processor, she was paid only
P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a monthly
salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. In its pleadings, petitioner denied the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and respondent; in fact, it
insists on the validity of its service agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS
Retirees Association – meaning that the latter, and not SSS, are respondent’s true
employers. Since both parties admit that there is no employment relation between them,
then there is no dispute cognizable by the NLRC. Thus, respondent’s case is premised
on the claim that in paying her only P229.00 daily – or P5,038.00 monthly – as against a
monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage, paid to a regular SSS Processor
at the time, petitioner exploited her, treated her unfairly, and unjustly enriched itself at
her expense.
For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire
jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation between the
parties thereto.

x x x It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee

relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved
by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining
agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction, x x x The action is within
the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts.
While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the
labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code
as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the
following:

1. Unfair labor practices;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer- employee relations, including
those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional

requisite x x x.

Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then

there is no labor dispute cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC.

There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract

between respondent and petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for
the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a case against
petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper salary
due her as SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that as,
Processor who has worked with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only
P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS employee with the same
designation and who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of
P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts
to deprive respondent of what is justly due her. As a vital government entity charged
with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting the example by treating everyone
with justice and fairness. If it cannot guarantee the security of those who work for it, it is
doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to promote the social security of its
members in line with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure
the well-being and economic security of the Filipino people.

In this jurisdiction, the “long honored legal truism of ‘equal pay for equal work'” has been
“impregnably institutionalized;” “[p]ersons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.” “That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to ‘give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities.’ The very
broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, ‘in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith’.”

ILAW BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. CHAPTER

(ICE CREAM AND CHILLED PRODUCTS DIVISION), ITS OFFICERS, MEMBERS
BONIFACIO T. FLORENDO, EMILIANO B. PALANAS and GENEROSO P.
LAXAMANA, petitioners, vs. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent

G.R. No. 198675, [September 23, 2015]

Facts: The petitioner union staged a strike against Nestle Philippines Inc. company's Ice
Cream and Chilled Products Division on the following grounds: alleged violation of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), dismissal of union officers and members,
discrimination and other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts. However, after a series of
conciliation meetings and discussions between the parties, they agreed to resolve their
differences and came up with a compromise which was embodied in a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). After a lapse of more than eleven (11) years from the time of
execution of the subject MOA, petitioners filed with the NLRC a Motion for Writ of
Execution contending that they have not been paid the amounts they are entitled to in
accordance with the MOA. Respondent filed its Opposition to the Motion for Writ of
Execution contending that petitioners' remedy is already barred by prescription
because, under the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC, a decision or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory
and that the same decision or order may only be enforced by independent action within
a period often (10) years from the date of its finality.Petitioners' basic contention is that
respondent cannot invoke the defense of prescription because it is guilty of deliberately
causing delay in paying petitioners' claims and that petitioners, on the other hand, are
entitled to protection under the law because they had been vigilant in exercising their
right as provided for under the subject MOA.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners' demand to be paid has prescribed

Ruling:

No, it has not.

The compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent was executed on

August 4, 1998 and was subsequently approved via the NLRC Decision dated October
12, 1998. However, considering petitioners' allegation that the terms and conditions of
the agreement have not been complied with by respondent, petitioners should have
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.

It is settled that when a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes

more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is
entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment.
It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or
forgery.The non-fulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of
execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. A
decision on a compromise agreement is final and executor and has the force of law and
is conclusive between the parties. It becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules.
Section 8, Rule XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that a
judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from
the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. If the
prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of
five years from the date of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and executory),
the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it
favors and must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint
in a regular form.

In the present case, the five-and ten-year periods provided by law and the rules are
more than sufficient to enable petitioners to enforce their right under the subject MOA.
In this case, it is clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having been based on a
compromise embodied in a written contract, was immediately executory upon its
issuance on October 12, 1998. Thus, it could have been executed by motion within five
(5) years. It was not. Nonetheless, it could have been enforced by an independent
action within the next five (5) years, or within ten (10) years from the time the NLRC
Decision was promulgated. It was not. Therefore, petitioners' right to have the NLRC
judgment executed by mere motion as well as their right of action to enforce the same
judgment had prescribed by the time they filed their Motion for Writ of Execution on
January 25, 2010.