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Material Facts;
The claimant and Mr. Winters were in a state of cohabitation for a period of six months
until the point of the latter suffering a fatal workplace injury. The claimant was carrying an
unborn child at the time, who was eventually delivered after the death of Mr. Winters. This
particular child succeeded in rendering a claim for the loss of dependency as per Section 1(3)(e)
of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 (at 3). Due to the tenure of married cohabitation between the
claimant and Mr. Winters not spanning beyond two years prior to the latter’s death, the claimant
was unable to do the same as per Section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 (at 3). The
claimant further suggested that the section in question was inherently incompatible with her
given, protected rights under Article 8 and Article 14 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) of 1998,
which respectively pertain to the securing of rights and freedoms sans discrimination and the
right to respect for family and private life (at 4).
Question of Law/Issues;
It would be unfair to declare that there existed a finite amount of permanence of a
relationship between the claimant and her spouse. Such a declaration fails to discern between a
spontaneous relationship and a serious, familial one. The statute dictates that the claimant resides
in the same property as the deceased individual as the theoretical wife or husband of the
deceased individual, thereby removing the possibility of the relationship being casual in nature.
(at 18). Nevertheless, such a peculiarity as noted by Parliament does nothing to alleviate the
burden on the claimant as per Section 1(3) of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that they had resided on the property as a spouse of the deceased individual.
The position stated by the Department of Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the
House of Commons Justice Committee was that the exclusion of cohabitants of less than two
years was unfair (at 20). The primary issue, thus, revolves around whether or not a declaration of
incompatibility may be made in relation to both the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 and the Human
Rights Act of 1998.
Decision;
The Court of Appeal deemed that Section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976 was
in no way, shape, or form incompatible with Article 14 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) of 1998
in concurrence with Article 8 of the same convention (CM Treacy LLJ at 41). The claimant was
unable to assume the status of loss of dependency.