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Ivan Soll
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 19, Seventy-Third Annual Meeting Eastern Division,
American Philosophical Association. (Nov. 4, 1976), pp. 697-710.
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Fri May 25 13:57:50 2007
cation are incompatible. These interests are compatible only if it is
denied that knowledge of historical phenomena and the capacity for
identifying historical actors as analogous centers of consciousness
are mutually dependent. But since Ricoeur acknowledges both that
the interest of knowledge is necessary for the satisfaction of the
interest for communication and that an understanding of anyone
as a historical agent is possible only so far as a communicative in-
terest is maintained, the alleged conflict can only be a result of
adopting a particular analysis of knowledge that rules out knowl-
edge of agents as agents. T h e paradox therefore seems forced and
artificial.
My final request for clarification amounts to the question of what
is achieved by introducing the notion of "distantiation." T h a t her-
meneutics demands an object, and that historical inquiry is made
possible by the fact that things people do leave traces, seems ob-
vious, but I do not know what else the "descending argument" from
hermeneutics to historical inquiry is supposed to show. History
deals with a special kind of object in special kinds of ways, of which
hermeneutics describes a very important one. Ricoeur has indeed
succeeded i n performing the task he set himself of resisting the
position that historical method and hermeneutics are in a "dichot-
omous relation." But then one may wonder why they should have
been thought to be so opposed in the first place.
MICHAEL SIMON
T h e University of Connecticut
fall back on a description that gives the scope of our present, say
'today' or this 'hour'." H e concludes:
This example is less illuminating than it might be, because the partic-
ular fleetingness, whose punctual instants vanish in becoming past,
cannot be matched easily in the discussion of 'here' or 'this'. But the
general point seems to be this: in experience we meet particulars;
we can grasp these particular things only by in some sense "pointing,"
either literally or by focusing on a thing in a way we could only con-
vey through the use of some demonstrative or related word. But the
experience itself of pointing (Aufzeigen)is that, in trying to grasp the
thing, we show the fleeting, unseizable nature of the particular, and
we can recover it and hold it before our gaze, as it were, only by
subsuming it under a universal (H 145).
Although Hegel does speak of "the true now, the now a simple
day that has many nows (hours) in it," the thrust of his argument
is not that, in order for 'now' to function successfully, its scope must
be specified as being either this day or this hour or this minute, but
rather that, in order to be able to point or refer to the present suc-
cessfully, it must be understood as having some, though not neces-
sarily a determinate, duration. T h e referential problems posed by
the punctual present force us, according to Hegel, to treat the
present as having some scope or other, not as having some specific
scope.
As Taylor observes, the difficulty involved in pointing out a dura-
tionless present has no clear analogue in either the case of 'here' or
of 'this'. But Hegel nevertheless tries to generalize the conclusion
of this dialectic, and examining his attempt is instructive. Immedi-
ately following the passage that argues that only a present with
some duration can be pointed out, Hegel argues analogously that
the only here that can be pointed out must have extension, which
is, after all, the spatial analogue of duration. And, having exten-
sion, it has an indefinitely large number of subdivisions and is thus
"the universal here, which, as the day is a simple plurality of nows,
is a simple plurality of heres" (PG 86). Since, in this passage, there
is no mention of any kind of concepts that might specify the scope
of what one means by 'here', it becomes even clearer that Hegel is
not interested in arguing that the scope of ostensive words must be
specified. H e simply wants to establish that the two criticisms he
made of sense certainty with respect to now can also be made with
respect to here: that here, like now, in having subdivisions or parts
is a universal, not a particular, and second that, having acquired
its extension, as now acquired its duration, through a dialectical
process, the here pointed to is not an immediate given. Given
Hegel's previously analysis of "the this" into "the now and the
here,'' if he can extend the points made about now to here, he has
also thereby made the case with respect to this and thus achieved
a substantial generalization of his critique.
The problem with the extension of his position to include here,
alluded to by Taylor, is that it is unclear what initiates the dialectic
that forces here to be understood as having extension. T h e fact that
the process of pointing out takes some time does not cause any
problems for the Aufzeigen of an extensionless here as it did in the
case of durationless now. What is the difficulty involved in pointing
out an extensionless here that forces one to understand it as having
extension? Hegel does not tell us. Perhaps he just carelessly assumed
that, if it is impossible to point out a dimensionless point in time, it
must analogously be impossible to point out a dimensionless point
in space. Perhaps the immediately preceding allusion to the infinite
divisibility of time is meant to be obviously also true of space, and
to suggest that, no matter how small a space is pointed out as here,
it always admits of subdivision and is thus not an extensionless
point.3
A problem of greater consequence concerning Hegel's arguments
about the pointing out of purported particulars goes unmentioned
by Taylor. Hegel argues that the here and now in having extension
and duration, and hence an indefinitely large number of subdivi-
sions, are universals and thus not particulars. But unless one con-
flates the notions of the instances of a universal and the parts of a
whole (as Hegel seems to have done), all the arguments would show,
if they work at all, is that here and now are divisible wholes, not
that they are universals. I t is in no way obvious that a whole having
parts cannot be a particular, and Hegel, not having made the dis-
tinction between wholes and universals, does not even address him-
self to this issue.
Finally, I believe Taylor inaccurately interprets the general point
and result of Hegel's various arguments concerning the possibility
3 That Hegel might have had something like tlus in mind, derives some fur-
ther support from his having made clear reference to the infinite divisibility
(and extension) of space and time in introducing sense certainty: "The concrete
content of sense certainty gives the appearance of the richest knowledge, even
as knowledge of infinite riches, for which no boundary can be found, either
when we move outward in space and time, as that in which it spreads out, or
when we take a part from this plenitude and enter into it by dividing it" (PC
79, my italics).
7 0 ~ T H E JOURNAL O F PHILOSOPHY
4 Curiously, Hegel does not make the point that a proponent of sense certainty
cannot with consistency even use concepts like night. That he lets several oppor-
tunities to make this criticism of sense certainty go by is puzzling, but it does
indicate that the focus of his argument was not to show that the proponent of
sense certainty must use descriptive concepts.
6 See my An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago: University Press,
1969), pp. 10-11, 21.
discussion of "this," "the now," and "the here," these terms d o not
appear in quotation marks, but, along with a startlingly large per-
centage of the text, in italics. When Hegel uses these italicized
terms, he is often concerned with their verbal forms, but he under-
stands them in a broader way. When he asserts that the here, or the
now, or this are universals, he is making a point not merely about
language, but also about the contents of our consciousness, and
ultimately about reality. Hegel is not asserting, as Taylor suggests,
that there really are particulars, of which we are conscious but to
which we cannot refer simply by using ostensive terms. His position
is rather that the fact that even those words which seem to pick out
particulars turn out to be universals that do not pick out partic-
ulars, indicates that the reality of which we are conscious is itself
composed of universals rather than of particulars: For Hegel, the
limits of language reveal the limits of consciousness and, thus, of
reality. "We do not speak as we intend to in this sensible certainty.
Language is, as we see, what is truer; in it we refute our own in-
tentions. . . . the universal is the truth of sense certainty, and lan-
guage expresses only this truth." These arguments are not meant to
show that "we encounter and reach out for particulars and discover
that we can only hold them through the mediating instruments of
universal concepts" (H 145), but that as we reach out for the par-
ticulars we imagine we encounter, we come to realize that they are
really universals.
T h e arguments concerning the difficulty of pointing out partic-
ulars are the same in this respect. Taylor says, "But the experience
of pointing (Aufzeigen) is that, in trying to grasp the thing, we show
the fleeting, unseizable nature of the particular, and we can recover
it and hold it before our gaze, as it were, only by subsuming it
under a universal" (loc. cit). T h e n he mistakenly cites a sentence
as stating this position: "In other words, 'to point something out
is to experience that "now" is a universal' (das Aufzeigen ist das
Erfahren, dass Jetzt Allgemeines ist)" (PG, 86). But there is no men-
tion here of "subsuming" a particular under a universal.6 I n the
context of pointing something out, which is not exclusively a lin-
guistic procedure, it becomes even clearer than in the arguments
about linguistic reference, that Hegel is not merely claiming that
the word 'now' is a universal. I t is rather the present that we are
trying to point out, the object of our pointing and our conscious-
ness, which turns out to be a universal.
Taylor tells us that he has treated this first chapter of the Phenom-
enology in detail because it illustrates what he takes to be "basic
Hegelian themes." I have tried to show that some of these pur-
portedly basic themes are not to be found here. Whether they are
to be found elsewhere in the Hegelian corpus is a question that my
criticisms leave open. Even if they are, their absence here deserves
to be noted and integrated into an over-all assessment of how gen-
erally and consistently these themes are propounded throughout
Hegel's philosophy.
IVAN SOLL
University of Wisconsin
H
EGEL would have been pleased with the opening chapter
of Charles Taylor's recent bookt-and perhaps even in-
structed by it. T h e author restates Hegel's relationship to
his modern predecessors in a way that is faithful and yet not simply
a compilation of Hegel's remarks about them. It is a canvass di-
rected toward the problem that moved Hegel to philosophize in the
way he did. Some English-language expositors have rightly stressed
the prominence of the Greeks in Hegel's solution; and indeed, he
was in continual running commentary upon them. But Hegel's chief
problem was posed by what he called die moderne Bildung, that
spirit of modernity whose conflicting tendencies threatened the in-
telligibility of nature and the civility of modern society (H 513-
533). Professor Taylor finds Hegel's arguments to be unacceptable
today when measured by strict canons. Nevertheless, he is drawn to
T o be presented in an APA symposium on Hegel, by Charles Taylor, De-
cember 30, 1976; cosymposiasw will be Ivan Sol1 and Charles Taylor: see this
JOURNAL, this issue, pp. 697-710 and 723-725, respectively.
t Hegel (New York: Cambridge 1975); hereafter H.