Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22008 November 3, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO POMAR, defendant-appellant.

Araneta and Zaragoza for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

It appears from the record that on the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila
presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of section 13 in connection
with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint alleged:

That on or about the 27th day of August, 1923, and sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory
pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business
in said city, and having, during the year 1923, in his employ and service as cigar-maker in said factory, a woman
by the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by
reason of her pregnancy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said
woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as her regular wages
corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took place on the
12th day of August, 1923, despite and over the demands made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said
accused, to do so.

To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense. The
demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial all of the allegations contained in
the complaint, and contended that the provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based were
illegal, unconstitutional and void.

Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant, the Honorable C. A. Imperial,
judge, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P50, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.

From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error: That the court erred in
overruling the demurrer; in convicting him of the crime charged in the information; and in not declaring section 13 of Act
No. 3071, unconstitutional:

Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is as follows:

Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall
be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay
before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer
without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months
counted from the day of her discharge.

Section 15 of the same Act is as follows:

 Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less
than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred and fifty, or by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the case of firms or corporations, the presidents, directors or managers thereof or, in their default, the persons
acting in their stead, shall be criminally responsible for each violation of the provisions of this Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power,
with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor
of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month
after their delivery. The question presented for decision by the appeal is whether said Act has been adopted in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in fact, within said power, it
becomes necessary first, to determine what that power is, its limits and scope. Literally hundreds of decisions have
been promulgated in which definitions of the police power have been attempted. An examination of all of said decisions
will show that the definitions are generally limited to particular cases and examples, which are as varied as they are
numerous.

By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing civilization, the term "police power" has never been,
and we do not believe can be, clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. One hundred years ago, for example, it
is doubtful whether the most eminent jurist, or court, or legislature would have for a moment thought that, by any
possibility, a law providing for the destruction of a building in which alcoholic liquors were sold, was within a reasonable
and lawful exercise of the police power. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.) The development of civilization, the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with a desire on the part of the masses and of the government to
look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power of the state many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. In a republican form of government public sentiment
wields a tremendous influence upon what the state may or may not do, for the protection of the health and public morals
of the people. Yet, neither public sentiment, nor a desire to ameliorate the public morals of the people of the state will
justify the promulgation of a law which contravenes the express provisions of the fundamental law of the people — the
constitutional of the state.

A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law and the particular facts to which it is to
be applied. The many definitions which have been given by the highest courts may be examined, however, for the
purpose of giving us a compass or guide to assist us in arriving at a correct conclusion in the particular case before us.
Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest expounders of the common law, defines the police power as "the due
regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners,
and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 162.)

Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, gives us the following definition: "Police is in general a
system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight
distinct branches: (1) Police for the prevention of offenses; (2) police for the prevention of calamities; (3) police for the
prevention of endemic diseased; (4) police of charity; (5) police of interior communications; (6) police of public
amusements; (7) police for recent intelligence; (8) police for registration."

Mr. Justice Cooley, perhaps the greatest expounder of the American Constitution, says: "The police power is the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same. . . ." (Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 830.)

In the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53), we find a very comprehensive definition of
the police power of the state. In that case it appears that the colony of Massachusetts in 1647 adopted an Act to
preserve the harbor of Boston and to prevent encroachments therein. The defendant unlawfully erected, built, and
established in said harbor, and extended beyond said lines and into and over the tide water of the Commonwealth a
certain superstructure, obstruction and encumbrance. Said Act provided a penalty for its violation of a fine of not less
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 for every offense, and for the destruction of said buildings, or structures, or
obstructions as a public nuisance. Alger was arrested and placed on trial for violation of said Act. His defense was that
the Act of 1647 was illegal and void, because if permitted the destruction of private property without compensation. Mr.
Justice Shaw, speaking for the court in that said, said: "We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal environment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this
commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the
government and held subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by
law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient." Mr. Justice Shaw further adds: ". . . The power we allude to is rather the police power, the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

This court has, in the case of Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser (24 Phil., 250), in discussing the police power of the
state, had occasion to say: ". . . It is a well settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and civilized
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the
police power is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety
of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power
is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression."

Many other definitions have been given not only by the Supreme Court of the United States but by the Supreme Court of
every state of the Union. The foregoing definitions, however, cover the general field of all of the definitions, found in
jurisprudence. From all of the definitions we conclude that it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and
sources of the police power than to exactly mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise by the legislative
department of the government.

The most recent definition which has been called to our attention is that found in the case of Adkins vs. Children's
Hospital of the District of Columbia (261 U. S., 525). In that case the controversy arose in this way: A children's hospital
employed a number of women at various rates of wages, which were entirely satisfactory to both the hospital and the
employees. A hotel company employed a woman as elevator operator at P35 per month and two meals a day under
healthy and satisfactory conditions, and she did not risk to lose her position as she could not earn so much anywhere
else. Her wages were less than the minimum fixed by a board created under a law for the purpose of fixing a minimum
wage for women and children, with a penalty providing a punishment for a failure or refusal to pay the minimum wage
fixed. The wage paid by the hotel company of P35 per month and two meals a day was less than the minimum wage
fixed by said board. By reason of the order of said board, the hotel company, was about to discharge her, as it was
unwilling to pay her more and could not give her employment at that salary without risking the penalty of a fine and
imprisonment under the law. She brought action to enjoin the hotel company from discharging her upon the ground that
the enforcement of the "Minimum Wage Act" would deprive her of her employment and wages without due process of
law, and that she could not get as good a position anywhere else. The constitutionality of the Act was squarely
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that said Act was void on the ground that the right to contract about one's
own affairs was a part of the liberty of the individual under the constitution, and that while there was no such thing as
absolute freedom of contract, and it was necessary subject to a great variety of restraints, yet none of the exceptional
circumstances, which at times justify a limitation upon one's right to contract for his own services, applied in the
particular case.

In the course of the decision in that case (Adkins vs. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U. S., 525), Mr.
Justice Sutherland, after a statement of the fact and making reference to the particular law, said:

The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional
interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this
 clause is settled by the decision of this court, and is no longer open to question. Within this liberty are contracts
of employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain
from each other the best terms they can as the result of private bargaining. (Allgeyer vs.Louisiana, 165 U. S.,
578; 591; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)

xxx xxx xxx

The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the
employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of
earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course,
the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss. Within the limits of the minimum
sum, he is precluded, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, from adjusting compensation to the differing
merits of his employees. It compels him to pay at least the sum fixed in any event, because the employee needs
it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the employee. It (the law) therefore undertakes to solve but
one-half of the problem. The other half is the establishment of a corresponding standard of efficiency; and this
forms no part of the policy of the legislation, although in practice the former half without the latter must lead to
ultimate failure, in accordance with the inexorable law that no one can continue indefinitely to take out more than
he puts in without ultimately exhausting the supply. The law . . . takes no account of periods of distress and
business depression, or crippling losses, which may leave the employer himself without adequate means of
livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a
compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there
rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden
which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.

The failure of this state which, perhaps more than any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it exacts
from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no casual connection with his
business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do. The declared basis, as already pointed out,
is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous circumstances that the employee needs to get a
prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence, health and morals. . . . The necessities of the employee are
alone considered, and these arise outside of the employment, are the same when there is no employment, and
as great in one occupation as in another. . . . In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling
labor and the case of selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer to buy food, he is morally
entitled to obtain the worth of his money, but he is not entitle to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays, he
is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs more; and the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and
honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in any peculiar sense with the question of his customer's
necessities. Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission power to determine the quantity of food
necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that
quantity at not more than a fixed maximum, it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy of
any argument in support of the validity of such a statute would be quickly exposed. The argument in support of
that now being considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it may not be so plain. . . .

It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of
contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent
matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the common good, and the line beyond which the power of
interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, may be made to move, within limits not well defined,
with changing needs and circumstances.

The late Mr. Justice Harlan, in the case of Adair vs. United States (208 U. S., 161, 174), said that the right of a person to
sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to
prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell. In all such particulars the
employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land, under a constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.

Mr. Justice Pitney, in the case of Coppage vs. Kansas (235 U. S., 1, 14), speaking for the Supreme Court of the United
States, said: ". . . Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property — partaking of the nature of
each — is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal
employment, by which labor and other services are exchange for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck
down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional sense.
The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have
no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money."

The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts. In the case of Gillespie vs.People
(118 Ill., 176, 183-185) it was held that a statute making it unlawful to discharge an employee because of his connection
with any lawful labor organization, and providing a penalty therefor, is void, since the right to terminate a contract,
subject to liability to respond in a civil action for an unwarranted termination, is within the protection of the state and
Federal constitutions which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. The court said in part: ". . . One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can anyone
be compelled to be employed against his will. The Act of 1893, now under consideration, deprives the employer of the
right to terminate his contract with his employee. The right to terminate such a contract is guaranteed by the organic law
of the state. The legislature is forbidden to deprive the employer or employee of the exercise of that right. The
legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of an innocent act criminal when the public health, safety,
comfort or welfare is not interfered with. The statute in question says that, if a man exercises his constitutional right to
terminate a contract with his employee, he shall, without a hearing, be punished as for the commission of a crime.

xxx xxx xxx

Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to contract to labor
or for labor, and to terminate such contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts. The legislature cannot
prevent persons, who are sui juris, from laboring, or from making such contracts as they may see fit to make
relative to their own lawful labor; nor has it any power by penal laws to prevent any person, with or without
cause, from refusing to employ another or to terminate a contract with him, subject only to the liability to respond
in a civil action for an unwarranted refusal to do that which has been agreed upon. Hence, we are of the opinion
that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal constitutions, which guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The statute in question is exactly analogous to the "Minimum Wage Act" referred to above. In section 13 it will be seen
that no person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory shop, or place of labor of any description, can make a
contract with a woman without incurring the obligation, whatever the contract of employment might be, unless he also
promise to pay to such woman employed as a laborer, who may become pregnant, her wages for thirty days before and
thirty days after confinement. In other words, said section creates a term or condition in every contract made by every
person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant, and a
failure to include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine and imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived,
every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the
Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may
agree upon. The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are,
therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen
his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.

It is believed and confidently asserted that no case can be found, in civilized society and well-organized governments,
where individuals have been deprived of their property, under the police power of the state, without
compensation, except in cases where the property in question was used for the purpose of violating some legally
adopted, or constitutes a nuisance. Among such cases may be mentioned: Apparatus used in counterfeiting the money
of the state; firearms illegally possessed; opium possessed in violation of law; apparatus used for gambling in violation
of law; buildings and property used for the purpose of violating laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors; and all cases in which the property itself has become a nuisance and dangerous and detrimental to the public
health, morals and general welfare of the state. In all of such cases, and in many more which might be cited, the
destruction of the property is permitted in the exercise of the police power of the state. But it must first be established
that such property was used as the instrument for the violation of a valid existing law. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S.,
623; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., [U. S.], 36; Butchers' Union, etc., Co. vs.Crescent City, etc., Co., 111 U. S., 746
John Stuart Mill — "On Liberty," 28, 29.)

Without further attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of the police power, it may safely be
affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and
morals, must come within this category. But the state, when providing by legislation for the protection of the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the
constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere
with the execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their law — the constitution.
(Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.)
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience
becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment
with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the
fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people's law — the constitution. If the
people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law,
they must first amend that law. 1aw phil .net

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of
women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by
the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to contract about
one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution.
(Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578, 591; New York Life Ins. Co. vs. Dodge, 246 U. S., 357, 373, 374;
Coppage vs. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1, 10, 14; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161; Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S.; 45,
49; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)

The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may
deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of
Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the
provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12,
Public Laws, p. 238.)

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the defendant is
hereby discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------ x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.

x------------------------------------------------------ x

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-
Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of
the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health
Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,

MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO
GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.

x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.

x -----------------------------------------------------x

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.

x -----------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
 The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of
an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their
petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only
the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to
show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay
Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the
Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and
its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is
a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2)
the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum
requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section
10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties'
memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's
ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should
be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions
of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, declared:
 [A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions
of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this
case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest
in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar
terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full
text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section
which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge.
Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their
proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this
Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative District: Barangay:
Verified

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER
EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it.
Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
"petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which
they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their
amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both.
However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August
2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02,
which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

 RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the
use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the
same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF

THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC)
OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the
30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals
(sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a
mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from
the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed
with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the
Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the
existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with
the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino
Group's proposed changes.

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition,
more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were
inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they
had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged
that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition
is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read
the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did
not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.]
Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC"
appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu
Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed
changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but
failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments
that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand
the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition
signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be
attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to,
the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls
the rug from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the
signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino
Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the
signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the
amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very
limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies
the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because
he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that
"petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x
x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed
to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature
sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the
petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the
petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature
sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the
attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would
not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is
that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If
ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the
face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner
Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact
is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the
text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among
which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-
elected indefinitely;26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present
members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people
who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed
changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a
reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if
the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the
word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for
the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes.
However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly
even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty.
Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to
rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full
text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe
that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with
the local elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed
changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed
Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer
only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions,
one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The
very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska
warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted
to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase
the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in
the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other
(more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters.
Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for
amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative
from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by
the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known
that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise
again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In
the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again
the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people
are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is
not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does
not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years
earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the
interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of
the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the
Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the
present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the
people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending
the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts
the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment
is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition."

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
 ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress
upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is
through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to
us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on
the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

xxxx

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article
on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

xxxx
 MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's
initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even
as they are empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32the
Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the
proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called
for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure
(hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to
the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by
petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can
be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as
that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in
large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized
by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in
the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of
adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless,
a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x
xx

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

 It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than
the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary.
x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according
to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed
the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of
the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and
duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never
revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the
Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest
cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and
thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the
system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the
guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system
to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court
of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the
form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress
and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a
more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear
apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.

xxxx

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify
the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate
amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this
State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for
only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give
the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly
if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43(Emphasis
supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative
not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative
departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by
the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession,
or vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in
general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the
substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a
revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group
as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not
deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating
that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature
can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the
people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot
be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is
determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights
and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that,
because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the
trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior
approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
 accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution
which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the
initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red
for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or
article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not
a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the
specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of
checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the
spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have
to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections
18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system
of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form
of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral
arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the
rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency.
However, it is not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency
shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ―
the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of
government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the
present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the
scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the
Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the
1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories."
Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed
with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the
petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature
sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not
even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more
than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than
one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is
valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following
this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present
petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with
the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of
this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly
specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well
for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will
and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies
the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes
of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative
changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states
in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice"
or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies
the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To
allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the
Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No.
6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors
Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.

Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by
petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers
in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.

It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with
the Revised Election Code.

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in
toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those
required of members of the House of Representatives,"1 "and that any other details relating to the specific
apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be
embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Resolution."2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions
Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.3

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in
Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a)
of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations
or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently
sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the
prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal
protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld.4

II

Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A.
No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a
Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the
expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as
well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively
pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
 Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with
any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized
in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no
argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for
it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

III

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with
proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any
specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting
as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each
province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution
wanted the apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each
representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the
representative districts.5

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein;
for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of
Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a
representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for
such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation
to effect the desired proportional representation.

The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132,
submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official
preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that
Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census
and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary
count of the population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on
Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the delegates
pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session
of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the
computation on the basis of the above-stated method."

Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such apportionment.6The
fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted two
delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several other congressional
districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone,
does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is
not required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate
nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement of
population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting
apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional
district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted to Congress by
the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by, Congress for
proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No.
6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation.

In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as unconstitutional,
granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not
the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to
the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The present petitions therefore do not present
facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.

The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the
apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis
supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes
the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely
proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.

IV

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and
denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office
in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government government until
after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our constitutional
system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the qualifications and
disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications
and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office.
The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-
interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of
the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for
generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5,
the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive
office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice
votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate;
otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of
the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but only temporary
only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention
that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February
8, 1935.

As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a member of
Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may have been
created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI,
Phil. Constitution.)

As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary
in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the
convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be
vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent
popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the
latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)

Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office
pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is
based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies
to all members of the same class.7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that
of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates
the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and
controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No
other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose
constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The
classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed
amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed,
corruption, or injustice.

Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970.

Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of
due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free
expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the
pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public
interests.8

In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine whether a statute
which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police power.9

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any
other organization; and

2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other
organizations or organized group of whatever nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election.

The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined
to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its
provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his
district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be
denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The
right of a member of any political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as
such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy
with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public
interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights
themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid
constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation on
the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in
character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred
and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than
ninety days immediately preceding an election.

The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they
may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic
right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there
infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its
validity. We do so unanimously. 10

In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election campaign or
partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is
designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11

Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other group of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar
assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly,
(Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this
Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive
evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue
unless curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;

Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster the
required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making speeches, announcements
or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (b)
publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A.
4880. 13

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major compelling interests
that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban.
In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if
possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A.
No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative
body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to
the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our
attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring
governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless
clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by Senator
Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the
Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal
protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to
avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator
Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as
against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated as it is
on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the
independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon
in this country and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial
and otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by
the principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal
opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case Guido
vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of
the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the
freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support." 18

The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. 19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful
endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country.
Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention
which shall have the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the
people. Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the
Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates truly representative of the people's will. Public
welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a
particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political,
civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and
Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function of a constitution is not to represent
anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage of the
candidates — but to encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one
harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not the predominance of
interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."

So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is
necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and
conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they
have been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently
representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political,
religious or economic interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20

We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of
Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue
favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political
parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are
to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates and
thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and other
facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not have. The fact that the other
civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary
the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support.
Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common candidates, who
advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner
Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the
Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales
and two others as their candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban,
Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise
effective control and supervision over our
leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could have
presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."

The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted from the ban;
because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which they are
denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election
of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This,
despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional associations usually prohibit the
association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence, they
must likewise respect the ban.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A
person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for
support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or
organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to
assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the
country can utilize their services if elected.

Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Tañada for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of
constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a),
paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in
expression, has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion
that there is no basis for the challenge hurled against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the
Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization
or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election: ..."1 It is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic,
professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like
persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by
the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being
traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963
article, that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the
press, of assembly and of petition "that provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable
and continue to contribute to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme
Court had already declared: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech."4

Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the
scope of the right of association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and
while it is not extremely included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees
fully meaningful."5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the instrument"
and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty"6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."7

2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged
provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus
curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing
himself to be represented as such of any political party or any other organization as well as of such political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in
his nomination, in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe
therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is
prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same
section of the Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political,
religious, professional, trade organizations or organized groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or
arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs,
policies or proposals for amendment of the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail
the right of their members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention."8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently
with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of association falls short of according full
respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid
or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain as to its lack of validity is
further strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a
limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As
repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ...
the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for
averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be
"extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no
compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought
merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is whether the
words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The
majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due
respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship
running riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved.
The Convention might not be able to live up to the high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It
would appear though that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to
play its dominant role in the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a
Convention truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency
was won by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only
one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to
believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming
Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people
can, if so minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels
would automatically insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party
spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any
other organization or organized group of whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or
indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or
apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true
colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see through such schemes and can emphatically
register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that whatever work the Convention may propose is
ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard
against such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution
ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of
an existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy
of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the
community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to
preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation
of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential process one step farther to recognize and to implement the
right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by their election, could translate into actuality their
hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in keeping with the rights to intellectual
freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making their
influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is
decisive of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it
be successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such
legislative determination. This is merely to stress that however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be
paid deference. Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded
as not lacking in effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is
concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the
commendable admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their
individual capacity, could continue to assert their influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases,
assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus
sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be doomed to futility. The
high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be
realized. The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem
possibly tainted with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a
fresh and untried solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely
different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the
outcome might belie expectations. Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be
legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the end
can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or
associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose their trust is consistent
with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so
clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards, magnified by the probability that the result would be
the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the imprimatur of judicial approval to
the challenged provision.
5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v.
Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision.
What survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for
any political party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at
large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days
immediately preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party
or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods
successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing
or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this
Court unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to
muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election campaign or partisan political
activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the
giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly as well as the
holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality. What emerges
clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and
thereafter working for them in effect were considered by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of
speech, of press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization
or organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed
to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections which already was indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what
otherwise are invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is
in agreement with the views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the
provisions of Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section
8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others.
(G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on
the freedoms of association, assembly and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their
own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive
device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling completely the other kinds
of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the law of equalizing the forces that will
campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to maintain said ban only as against political
parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members have
made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage
unless they are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act
6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions intended to minimize the participation of political parties in
the electorate processes of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of
candidates more or less connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right
to form other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering
particularly the shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights
and liberties of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the
people against political parties which may be inclined towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize
themselves to gain much needed strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity
for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in
the use of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are
important, but unrelated to each other, each of them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by
organization. Precisely because the issues in this election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it
is imperative that all of the freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who
are minded to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a
new constitutional convention has been conceived.

Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18,
1969 and for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy
like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed,
restrained or hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as
Section 8(a) stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against
other associations within the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the
application thereof to any "persons, groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The opinion of Justice Makasiar speaking for the Court, comprehensive in scope, persuasive in character and lucid in
expression, has much to recommend it. On the whole, I concur. I find difficulty, however, in accepting the conclusion
that there is no basis for the challenge hurled against the validity of this provision: "No candidate for delegate to the
Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization
or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election: ..."1 It is with regret then that I dissent from that portion of the decision.

1. I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political parties and civic,
professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.2 The right of an individual to join others of a like
persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by
the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being
traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such character, it is the view of Justice Douglas, in a 1963
article, that it is primarily the First Amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of speech and of the
press, of assembly and of petition "that provides [associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain viable
and continue to contribute to our Free Society."3 Such is indeed the case, for five years earlier the American Supreme
Court had already declared: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" [embraced in] freedom of speech."4

Not long after, in 1965, Justice Douglas as; spokesman for the American Supreme Court could elaborate further on the
scope of the right of association as including "the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means, Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and
while it is not extremely included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees
fully meaningful."5 Thus is further vitalized freedom of expression which, for Justice Laurel, is at once the instrument"
and the guarantee and the bright consummate flower of all liberty"6 and, for Justice Cardozo, "the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."7
2. It is in the light of the above fundamental postulates that I find merit in the plea of petitioners to annul the challenged
provision. There is much to be said for the point emphatically stressed by Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, as amicus
curiae, to the effect that there is nothing unlawful in a candidate for delegate to the Convention representing or allowing
himself to be represented as such of any political party or any other organization as well as of such political party,
political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organization or organized group intervening in
his nomination, in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election as such delegate. I find the conclusion inescapabe
therefore, that what the constitutional provisions in question allow, more specifically the right to form associations, is
prohibited. The infirmity of the ban is thus apparent on its face.

There is, to my mind, another avenue of approach that leads to the same conclusion. The final proviso in the same
section of the Act forbids any construction that would in any wise "impair or abridge the freedom of civic, political,
religious, professional, trade organizations or organized groups of whatever nature to disseminate information about, or
arouse public interest in, the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, or to advocate constitutional reforms, programs,
policies or proposals for amendment of the present Constitution, and no prohibition contained herein shall limit or curtail
the right of their members, as long as they act individually, to support or oppose any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention."8 It is regrettable that such an explicit recognition of what cannot be forbidden consistently
with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of association falls short of according full
respect to what is thus commanded, by the fundamental law, as they are precluded by the very same Act from giving aid
or support precisely to the very individuals who can carry out whatever constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
proposals for amendment they might advocate. As thus viewed, the conviction I entertain as to its lack of validity is
further strengthened and fortified.

3. It would be a different matter, of course, if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that would justify a
limitation on such cherished freedoms. Reference has been made to Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.9 As
repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ...
the evil apprehended is to imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively serious." For
"[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for
averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be
"extremely serious." Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no
compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those extreme borders where thought
merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is whether the
words used in such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." " 10 The
majority of the Court would find the existence of a clear and present danger of debasing the electoral process. With due
respect, I find myself unable to share such a view.

The assumption would, appear to be that there is a clear and present danger of a grave substantive evil of partisanship
running riot unless political parties are thus restrained. There would be a sacrifice then of the national interest involved.
The Convention might not be able to live up to the high hopes entertained for an improvement of the fundamental law. It
would appear though that what prompted such a ban is to assure that the present majority party would not continue to
play its dominant role in the political life of the nation. The thought is entertained that otherwise, we will not have a
Convention truly responsive to the needs of the hour and of the future insofar as they may be anticipated.

To my mind, this is to lose sight of the fact that in the national elections of 1946, 1953, 1961 and 1965, the presidency
was won by the opposition candidate. Moreover, in national elections for senators alone, that of 1951, to mention only
one instance, saw a complete sweep of the field by the then minority party. It would be unjustifiable, so I am led to
believe to assume that inevitably the prevailing dominant political party would continue its ascendancy in the coming
Convention.

Then, too, the result of the plebiscite in the two proposed amendments in 1967 indicate unmistakably that the people
can, if so minded, make their wishes prevail. There is thus no assurance that the mere identification with party labels
would automatically insure the success of a candidacy. Even if it be assumed that to guard against the evils of party
spirit carried to excess, such a ban is called for, still no such danger is presented by allowing civil, professional or any
other organization or organized group of whatever nature to field its own candidates or give aid or support, directly or
indirectly material or otherwise, to anyone running for the Convention. From such a source, no such misgivings or
apprehension need arise. Nor it the fear that organizations could hastily be assembled or put up to camouflage their true
colors as satellites of the political parties be valid. The electorate can see through such schemes and can emphatically
register its reaction. There is, moreover, the further safeguard that whatever work the Convention may propose is
ultimately subject to popular ratification.

For me then the danger of a substantive evil is neither clear nor present. What causes me grave concern is that to guard
against such undesirable eventuality, which may not even come to pass, a flagrant disregard of what the Constitution
ordains is minimized. A desirable end cannot be coerced by unconstitutional means.

4. It is not easy to yield assent to the proposition that on a matter so essentially political as the amendment or revision of
an existing Constitution, political parties or political groups are to be denied the opportunity of launching the candidacy
of their choice. Well has it been said by Chief Justice Hughes: "The greater the importance of safeguarding the
community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to
preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation
of constitutional government." 11 It is to carry this essential process one step farther to recognize and to implement the
right of every political party or group to select the candidates who, by their election, could translate into actuality their
hopes for the fundamental law that the times demand. Moreover, is it not in keeping with the rights to intellectual
freedom so sedulously safeguarded by the Constitution to remove all obstacles to organized civic groups making their
influence felt in the task of constitution framing, the result of which has momentuous implications for the nation? What is
decisive of this aspect of the matter is not the character of the association or organized group as such but the
essentially political activity thus carried out.

This is not to deny the wide latitude as to the choice of means vested in Congress to attain a desirable goal. Nor can it
be successfully argued that the judiciary should display reluctance in extending sympathy and understanding to such
legislative determination. This is merely to stress that however worthwhile the objective, the Constitution must still be
paid deference. Moreover, it may not be altogether unrealistic to consider the practical effects of the ban as thus worded
as not lacking in effectivity insofar as civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group is
concerned, but not necessarily so in the case of political party, political group or political committee. There is the
commendable admission by Senator Tolentino, appearing as amicus curiae, that the political leaders of stature, in their
individual capacity, could continue to assert their influence. It could very well happen, then, in not a few cases,
assuming the strength of political parties, that a candidate thus favored is sure of emerging the victor. What is thus
sought to be accomplished to guard against the evil of party spirit prevailing could very well be doomed to futility. The
high hopes entertained by the articulate and vocal groups of young people, intellectuals and workers, may not be
realized. The result would be that this unorthodox and novel provision could assume the character of a tease, an illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.

If such an appraisal is not unjustifiably tinged with pessimism, then, to my mind, a radical approach to a problem
possibly tainted with constitutional infirmity cannot hurdle the judicial test as to its validity. It is one thing to encourage a
fresh and untried solution to a problem of gravity when the probability of its success may be assumed. It is an entirely
different matter to cut down the exercise of what otherwise are undeniable constitutional rights, when as in this case, the
outcome might belie expectations. Considering the well-settled principle that even though the governmental process be
legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, if the end
can be narrowly achieved, I am far from being persuaded that to preclude political parties or other groups or
associations from lending aid and support to the candidates of men in whom they can repose their trust is consistent
with the constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of expression. Here, the danger of overbreadth, so
clear and manifest as to be offensive to constitutional standards, magnified by the probability that the result would be
the failure and not success of the statutory scheme, cautions against the affixing of the imprimatur of judicial approval to
the challenged provision.

5. Necessarily then, from this mode of viewing the matter, it would follow that the holding of this Court in Gonzales v.
Comelec 12 does not compel the conclusion reached by the majority sustaining the validity of this challenged provision.
What survived the test of constitutional validity in that case, with the Court unanimous in its opinion, is the prohibition for
any political party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at
large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding election and for any other public office earlier than 90 days
immediately preceding such election. 13 A corollary to the above limitation, the provision making it unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party
or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the above periods
successfully hurdled, the constitutional test, although the restrictions as to the making of speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office or the publishing
or distributing of campaign literature or materials or the solicitation or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party, directly or indirectly, survived by the narrow margin of one vote, four members of this
Court unable to discern any constitutional infirmity as against the free speech guarantee, thus resulting in failing to
muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a declaration of invalidity. Insofar as election campaign or partisan political
activity would limit or restrict the formation, of organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate or, the
giving, soliciting, or receiving a contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly as well as the
holding of political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies, with a
similar and in view, only five members of this Court, a minority thereof voted, for their unconstitutionality. What emerges
clearly, then, is that definite acts short of preventing the political parties from the choice of their candidates and
thereafter working for them in effect were considered by this Court as not violative of the constitutional freedoms of
speech, of press, of assembly and of association.

The challenged provision in these two petitions, however, goes much farther. Political parties or any other organization
or organized group are precluded from selecting and supporting candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. To my mind, this is to enter a forbidden domain, Congress trespassing on a field hitherto rightfully assumed
to be within the sphere of liberty. Thus, I am unable to conclude that our previous decision in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections which already was indicative of the cautious and hesitant judicial approach to lending its approval to what
otherwise are invasions of vital constitutional safeguards to freedoms of belief, of expression, and of association lends
support to the decision reached by the majority insofar as this challenged provision is concerned.

Hence my inability to subscribe in its entirety to the opinion of the Court. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice is
in agreement with the views herein expressed.

Concepcion, C.J., Villamor and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Without prejudice to a more extended opinion, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to sustain the validity of the
provisions of Republic Act 6132 impugned by petitioners in these cases, except Section 4 and the portion of Section
8(a) referring to political parties. As regards Section 4, I reiterate my separate opinion in the cases of Subido and others.
(G.R. Nos. L-32436 and L-32439) With respect to Section 8(a), I hold that the considerations which take the restraint on
the freedoms of association, assembly and speech involved in the ban on political parties to nominate and support their
own candidates, reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution do not obtain when it comes to civic or non-political
organizations. As I see it, the said ban, insofar as civic or non-political organizations are concerned, is a deceptive
device to preserve the built-in advantages of political parties while at the same time crippling completely the other kinds
of associations. The only way to accomplish the purported objective of the law of equalizing the forces that will
campaign in behalf of the candidates to the constitutional convention is to maintain said ban only as against political
parties, for after all, only the activities and manners of operation of these parties and/or some of their members have
made necessary the imposition thereof. Under the resulting set up embodied in the provision in question, the individual
candidates who have never had any political party connections or very little of it would be at an obvious disadvantage
unless they are allowed to seek and use the aid of civic organizations. Neither the elaborate provisions of Republic Act
6132 regarding methods of campaign nor its other provisions intended to minimize the participation of political parties in
the electorate processes of voting, counting of the votes and canvassing of the results can overcome the advantages of
candidates more or less connected with political parties, particularly the major and established ones, as long as the right
to form other associations and the right of these associations to campaign for their candidates are denied considering
particularly the shortness of the time that is left between now and election day.

The issues involved in the coming elections are grave and fundamental ones that are bound to affect the lives, rights
and liberties of all the people of this country most effectively, pervasively and permanently. The only insurance of the
people against political parties which may be inclined towards the Establishment and the status quo is to organize
themselves to gain much needed strength and effectivity. To deny them this right is to stifle the people's only opportunity
for change.

It is axiomatic that issues, no matter how valid, if not related to particular candidates in an organized way, similarly as in
the use of platforms by political parties, cannot have any chance of support and final adoption. Both men and issues are
important, but unrelated to each other, each of them alone is insignificant, and the only way to relate them is by
organization. Precisely because the issues in this election of candidates are of paramount importance second to none, it
is imperative that all of the freedoms enshrined in the constitution should have the ampliest recognition for those who
are minded to actively battle for them and any attempt to curtail them would endanger the very purposes for which a
new constitutional convention has been conceived.
Consistently with my separate opinion in the case of Gonzales and Cabigao vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18,
1969 and for the reasons therein stated, I maintain that the right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy
like ours is meaningless when the right to campaign in any election therein is unreasonably and unnecessarily curtailed,
restrained or hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.

It is, of course, understood that this opinion is based on my considered view, contrary to that of the majority, that as
Section 8(a) stands and taking into account its genesis, the ban against political parties is separable from that against
other associations within the contemplation of Section 21 of the Act which expressly refers to the separability of the
application thereof to any "persons, groups or circumstances."

I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.

# Footnotes

1 Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4.

2 Sec. 3, Res. No. 4.

3 Sec. 22, R.A. No. 6132.

4 Abelardo Subido vs. Comelec, in re validity of Sec. 4 and Sec. 8(a) par. 2, R.A. 6132, G.R. No. L-
32436, and In the matter of the petition for declaratory relief re validity and constitutionality of Sec. 4,
R.A. 6132, Hon. Guardson Lood, Judge, CFI, Pasig, Rizal et al., petitioners, G.R. No. L-32439, Sept. 9,
1970.

5 Sec. 5, Art. VI, Constitution.

6 Macias et al. vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961..

7 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Solon, G.R. No. L-14864, Nov. 23, 1960.

8 See Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-27833, April 18, 1969; Vol. 27, SCRA, p. 835, 858 et seq.; Justice
Douglas in Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 US 11, 18-19, 1966.

9 27 SCRA, pp. 860-861.

10 27 SCRA, p. 865.

11 27 SCRA, p. 869.

12 27 SCRA, pp. 864-865, 868.

13 27 SCRA, pp. 869-870.

14 27 SCRA, p. 873.

15 27 SCRA, p. 872.

16 See his sponsorship speech of July 20, 1970.

17 84 Phil. 847, 852.

18 See his sponsorship speech on July 20, 1970.

19 See Justice Castro's separate opinion in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, 27 SCRA, pp. 898-899 citing
American Communications Association vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 383, 94 L. Ed., 925, 9437.
 20 Pp. 4-5, 12, Answer in L-32432.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1 Sec. 8(a), Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).

2 The Constitution provides: "The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged." Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 6.

3 Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Col. Law Rev. 1363 (1963).

4 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 US 449, 460 (1958) per Harlan, J. Cf. Bates v. Little Rock,
361 US 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479. (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillon v. NAACP, 366
US. 293 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1 (1961); Scales v.
United States, 367 US 203 (1961); NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation, Comm., 372 US 539 (1963); Brotherhood v. Virginia ex rel. State Bar 377 US 1 (1964);
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964).

5 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 483 (1965). In Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 US 11, 18 (1966) he
spoke of this right as a "cherished freedom." Cf. Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1967).

6 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939), Justice Laurel quoting Wendell Philipps.

7 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319, 323 (1937).

8 Section 8(a), Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).

9 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835.

10 Ibid., pp. 859-860.

11 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 365 (1937).

12 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA -835.

13 Sec. 50(a) of Republic Act 4880 (1967).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN,
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
 DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to
a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself,
through the original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision
of the Constitution, characterized this system as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) [5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC
for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, [6] a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that,
as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country,
with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual
signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the
time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the
said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of
general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the Constitution.Attached to the petition
is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution [10] embodying the proposed amendments which
consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION
4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
 Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the
case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or
counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). [12] Senator Roco, on that same
day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples
Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided
for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo
Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in
1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision
on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not

to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million,
not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the
initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised
demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers and legislators suit. [14] Besides, there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature
drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment [15] on the
petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY

FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF

THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY
PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT

TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A

PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH
RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF
THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP.
412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment [16] which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading
or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution
or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend
the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall;
and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite
it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will
be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same
as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because,
being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him
to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23
January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached
to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in
Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., it would involve a change from a political
[18]

philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change
might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of
[19]

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as
many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment
for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits
is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance. [20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements
the peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may
file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of
the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section
20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a
sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No.
6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law
is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the
respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot
avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of
signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the
initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. [22]
 On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by
the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days
their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its
Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c)
directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record
of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
 For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case
the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences
on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions
of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. [25]

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. [26] The COMELEC
made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors
at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to
the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]

A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.[31]

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of
the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments
to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. [32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass
the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to
the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed
through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that
within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried out - is
it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body
could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths
vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have
a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree
with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede
to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately
cover all the conceivable situations.
[33]

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals
to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. [34]

xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting
it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. [35]

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:

xxx

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account
the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the
proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. [36]

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular
right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage
of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to
the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of
the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. [37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers
to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
[38]

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the
National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a
higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of
the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made
more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law
proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by
the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on
the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. [39]
 The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as

follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT
OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. [40]

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce
an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again
approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the second paragraph so
that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.[44] This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII
then reading:

The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative
and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June
1989 by the Senate[50] and by the House of Representatives.[51] This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).

The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part. [52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no
room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass.It is local initiative if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:

SEC. 3. Definition of terms --

xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Underscoring supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of
local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency
or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:

SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. [55]

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. [56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the
Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of
plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. [58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. [60]

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
-- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. [61] A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC
is then invalid.
 III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON
THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the
sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC
the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not
yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to
gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the
petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the
said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revisionof, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION
 This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right
of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and
Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate opinions.

[1]
Commissioner Blas Ople.
[2]
Commissioner Jose Suarez.
[3]
I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 371, 378.
[4]
Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(1), Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution.
[5]
Annex A of Petition, Rollo, 15.
[6]
Later identified as the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity.
[7]
These sections read:
SEC. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx
SEC. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
[8]
The section reads:
SEC. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date
six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
[9]
The section reads:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
[10]
Rollo, 19.
[11]
Annex B of Petition, Rollo, 25.
[12]
Order of 12 December 1996, Annex B-1 of Petition, Rollo, 27.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 [1976].
[15]
Rollo, 68.
[16]
Rollo, 100.
[17]
Rollo, 130.
[18]
A Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
[19]
Section 26, Article II, Constitution.
[20]
Citing Commissioner Ople of the Constitutional Commission, I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 405.
[21]
Rollo, 239.
[22]
Rollo, 304.
[23]
Rollo, 568.
[24]
These were submitted on the following dates:
(a) Private respondent Delfin - 31 January 1997 (Rollo, 429);
(b) Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa - 10 February 1997 (Id., 446);
(c) Petitioners - 12 February 1997 (Id., 585);
(d) IBP - 12 February 1997 (Id., 476);
(e) Senator Roco - 12 February 1997 (Id., 606);
(f) DIK and MABINI - 12 February 1997 (Id., 465);
(g) COMELEC - 12 February 1997 (Id., 489);
(h) LABAN - 13 February 1997 (Id., 553).
[25]
Rollo, 594.
[26]
Annex D of Rocos Motion for Intervention in this case, Rollo, 184.
[27]
Rollo, 28.
[28]
232 SCRA 110, 134 [1994].
[29]
II The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary 571 [1988].
[30]
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 370-371.
[31]
Id., 371.
[32]
Id., 386.
[33]
Id., 391-392. (Underscoring supplied for emphasis).
[34]
Id., 386.
[35]
Id., 392.
[36]
Id., 398-399.
[37]
Id., 399. Underscoring supplied.
[38]
Id., 402-403.
[39]
Id., 401-402.
[40]
Id., 410.
[41]
Id., 412.
[42]
II Record of the Constitutional Commission 559-560.
[43]
The Congress originally appeared as The National Assembly. The change came about as a logical consequence of
the amended Committee Report No. 22 of the Committee on Legislative which changed The National Assembly to "The
Congress of the Philippines" in view of the approval of the amendment to adopt the bicameral system (II Record of the
Constitutional Commission 102-105). The proposed new Article on the Legislative Department was, after various
amendments approved on Second and Third Readings on 9 October 1986 (Id., 702-703).
[44]
V Record of the Constitutional Commission 806.
[45]
See footnote No. 42.
[46]
As stated by Commissioner Bernas in his interpellation of Commissioner Suarez, footnote 28.
[47]
Entitled "Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987, introduced by then Congressmen Raul Roco, Raul del Mar and Narciso
Monfort.
[48]
Entitled An Act Implementing the Constitutional Provisions on Initiative and Referendum and for Other Purposes, introduced
by Congressmen Salvador Escudero.
[49]
Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum, and the Exceptions Therefrom, Whereby People in Local
Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject Any Ordinance
or Resolution Passed By the Local Legislative Body, introduced by Senators Gonzales, Romulo, Pimentel, Jr., and Lina,
Jr.
[50]
IV Record of the Senate, No. 143, pp. 1509-1510.
[51]
VIII Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, 957-961.
[52]
That section reads:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose and
enact resolutions and ordinances or approve or reject, in whole or in part, any ordinance or resolution passed by any
local legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
[53]
It must be pointed out that Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, as approved on Third Reading, did not contain any
subtitles.
If some confusion attended the preparation of the subtitles resulting in the leaving out of the more important and paramount
[54]

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it was because there was in the Bicameral Conference Committee an
initial agreement for the Senate panel to draft that portion on local initiative and for the House of Representatives panel to draft
that portion covering national initiative and initiative on the Constitution; eventually, however, the Members thereof agreed to
leave the drafting of the consolidated bill to their staff. Thus:
CHAIRMAN GONZALES.
... All right, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, ang magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung
alin ang magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is the House Bill.Logically it should be ours
sapagkat una iyong sa amin, eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo,
17, eh. Huwag na nating pag-usapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka constitutional,
okay. Pero gagawin na nating consolidation of both bills. (TSN, proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee
on 6 June 1989 submitted by Nora, R, pp. I-4 - I-5).
xxx
HON. ROCO. So how do we proceed from this? The staff will consolidate.
HON. GONZALES. Gumawa lang ng isang draft. Submit it to the Chairman, kami na ang bahalang magconsult sa aming mga
members na kung okay,
HON. ROCO. Within today?
HON. GONZALES. Within today and early tomorrow. Hanggang Huwebes lang tayo, eh.
HON. AQUINO. Kinakailangang palusutin natin ito. Kung mabigyan tayo ng kopya bukas and you are not objecting naman kayo
naman ganoon din.
HON. ROCO. Editing na lang because on a physical consolidation nga ito, eh. Yung mga provisions naman namin wala sa inyo.
(TSN, proceedings of Bicameral Conference Committee of 6 June 1989, submitted by E.S. Bongon, pp. III-4 - III-5).
[55]
Sec. 5(a & c), Sec. 8, Section 9(a).
[56]
Sections 13, 14, 15 and 16.
It would thus appear that the Senates cautious approach in the implementation of the system of initiative as a mode of
[57]

proposing amendments to the Constitution, as expressed by Senator Gonzales in the course of his sponsorship of Senate Bill
No. 17 in the Bicameral Conference Committee meeting and in his sponsorship of the Committees Report, might have insidiously
haunted the preparation of the consolidated version of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505. In the first he said:
Senate Bill No. 17 recognizes the initiatives and referendum are recent innovations in our political system. And recognizing that,
it has adopted a cautious approach by: first, allowing them only when the local legislative body had refused to act;
second, not more frequently than once a year; and, third, limiting them to the national level. (I Record of the Senate, No.
33, p. 871).
xxx
First, as I have said Mr. President, and I am saying for the nth time, that we are introducing a novel and new system in
politics. We have to adopt first a cautious approach. We feel it is prudent and wise at this point in time, to limit those
powers that may be the subject of initiatives and referendum to those exercisable or within the authority of the local
government units. (Id., p. 880).
In the second he stated:
But at any rate, as I have said, because this is new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more cautious approach and
limiting it only to the local general units. (TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee on 6 June
1989, submitted by stenographer Nora R., pp. I-2 to I-3).
In the last he declared:
The initiatives and referendum are new tools of democracy; therefore, we have decided to be cautious in our approach. Hence,
1) we limited initiative and referendum to the local government units; 2) that initiative can only be exercised if the local
legislative cannot be exercised more frequently that once every year. (IV Records of the Senate, No. 143, pp. 15-9-
1510).
[58]
Section 20, R.A. No. 6735.
[59]
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]; ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law 86 [1996] (hereafter CRUZ).
[60]
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; CRUZ, supra, 87.
[61]
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965, 974 [1965].
[62]
Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 497 [1970].
[63]
Sec. 7, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
[64]
Sec. 28, id.
[65]
Sec. 29, id.
[66]
Sec. 30, id.
 6 W.Va. 613 (W.Va. 1873)
LOOMIS
v.
JACKSON.
GEORGE LOOMIS, CONTESTANT,
v.
JAMES M. JACKSON, RESPONDENT.
Supreme Court of West Virginia.
January 7, 1873
SYLLABUS.
1. Under the provisions of the Code of W.Va., chapter 6, section 13 the special court there authorized, has a
limited jurisdiction. But such jurisdiction necessarily draws to it the right to hear and determine all questions touching the
regularity and legality of the acts of the officers or persons conducting the election, and making and certifying the returns
thereof. It may re-examine all or such parts of the election returns in said circuit as it may deem necessary, and correct
errors found therein according to law and the truth. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, such court recognizes the
presumption that all officers and other persons engaged in conducting elections, or in making returns and certifying the
results thereof acted in accordance with the law, until the contrary shall be specifically alleged and fully proved.
2. What questions were raised by a motion to quash the petition, notices, etc., of Contestant.
3. It is the intention of section 11, chapter 6 of the Code of W.Va., that every contested election provided for
therein, should be commenced and ended within a comparatively short space of time; and that it was not intended to
permit an incumbent to hold his office much beyond the limit of its constitutional term, and thus enable him to carry on a
protracted and dilatory contest with the person certified to have been elected to that office.
4. A party who desires to contest the election of a judge of a circuit court, is required, by the 11th section of
chapter 6 of the Code, to give notice, with specifications, to the party whose right is contested within sixty days next
after the election. The return notice of respondent must be given to the contestant within thirty days after the service of
his notice upon respondent; and all the depositions taken must be concluded within forty days after the service of the
return notice.
5. By section 4 of chapter 6 of the Code, it is expressly declared that: " In contests respecting seats in the
legislature if new facts be discovered by either party after he has given notice as aforesaid, he may give additional
notice or notices to his adversary with specifications as above prescribed."
In a judicial contest, the contestant in order to ascertain and collect the facts of the case, may postpone the
service of his notice of contest until the sixtieth day after the election, and in like manner and for a similar reason, the
respondent may delay the service of the return notice until the thirtieth day thereafter.
6. As new facts or the clue to the discovery of them may for the first time be disclosed by the return notice itself,
new notices with additional specifications of new facts discovered after the service of the original notice and
specifications, and after the expiration of the sixty days, may be given by the contestant, within the forty daysallotted for
taking depositions, subject always to the limitations necessarily implied in sections 5 and 8 of chapter 6, requiring that
reasonable notice of the taking of depositions shall be given to the adverse party.
7. But in every such instance, it must appear by the proper averments that the facts relied on to authorize the
giving of the additional notice or notices, are new facts, and were discovered after the service of the original notice, and
that they are such as the party could not have learned at that time by the exercise of due diligence, and that they are
also material and relevant to the main question in controversy.
8. The petition, in a contest for the office of judge, should be addressed to the special court, and not to the
governor, as the one filed in this case. It ought not to contain any prayer for relief beyond what the court is authorized to
afford, which is confined to the duty of certifying to the governor which of the parties to the contest had been elected to
the office of judge, or that no legal election therefor had been held in the circuit.
9. To invoke the authority vested in the governor by section 13, chapter 6, it is necessary that the contestant
should file with the governor a petition, with copies of his grounds of contest, notice and specifications.
Such petition must remain in the governor's office; without it he could have no evidence upon which to justify his
official action.
10. What principles of law apply to cases of election contests.
11. Many provisions of the law, in regard to the manner of holding and conducting the election and counting the
votes, and certifying the result, must be held to be directory only, and intended to point out to inexperienced and
ignorant persons, who sometimes act as election officers, a plain, easy and direct way by which they are to attain the
great end of their creation, viz: To ascertain the true result of their election. When the true result of a legal election has
been ascertained, or can be ascertained by the officers charged with the performance of this duty, no irregularity,
mistake or even fraud committed by any of the officers conducting the election, or by any other person, can be permitted
to defeat the fair expression of the popular will as expressed in said election.
12. The People v. Cook, 8 N.Y. 67, and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 75, 617, cited and approved.
13. What irregularities are held to be immaterial.
It is affirmed that no irregularity or even misconduct on the part of the election officers, or other persons, will vitiate
an otherwise legal election, unless the result thereof has been thereby changed, or rendered so uncertain as to make it
impossible to ascertain the true result. A different rule would make the manner of performing a public duty more
important than the duty itself.
14. The allegata et probata must agree. Therefore a contestant, either in his petition or notice of the grounds of
contest and specifications, must by direct averments substantially show what was the result of the election as
declared by the returning officers, in what manner and to what extent that result will be effected by the errors & c.,
complained of in the specifications.
And unless it further appears upon the face of the petition, notice and specifications that the result of said election
will be so changed by proof of said allegations, as to overcome the majority of the person who has been declared duly
elected, or to show that it is impossible to ascertain the true result, it will be the duty of the court, on motion, to quash
the same. The petition in this case not containing such averments, the question did not arise upon the petition.
15. By the provisions of chapter 3, Code of West Virginia, it was the intention of the legislature to create a judicial
tribunal in conferring upon the boards of supervisors the power to call and examine witnesses, to compel the production
of papers, to open, inspect, examine and count the ballots, and to make all orders deemed necessary to enable them to
discharge these duties; and that their determinations upon that subject should be entitled to the force and validity of a
judgment, until impeached on the grounds of mistake, corruption or fraud, precisely averred and clearly proved.
The intention was to avoid the necessity of resorting to contested elections of judges and state officers except in
cases of mistake, corruption or fraud, by providing the people with a tribunal essentially and peculiarly their own, always
accessible to them.
16. The legislature did not intend that a legal election should be set aside upon the ground of illegal votes
received, or legal votes rejected, or any ambiguity in the ballots as to the designation of the person voted for or of the
office intended.
17. All errors, irregularities and illegalities committed at the election, or existing at the time the election returns are
examined by the boards of supervisors, must, in the absence of averments and proofs to the contrary, be taken and
held to have been corrected by such boards, and excluded from their certificates of the correct result. From this it
follows that any specification which alleges errors, irregularities, illegalities or malconduct on the part of the officers, or
other persons, conducting the elections, committed before the action of the board of supervisors was had thereon, must
be held insufficient, unless it is further alleged that such errors were carried into and formed a part of the result of the
election as certified by the boards of supervisors.
18. Fraud is never to be presumed, it must be particularly alleged, especially when the act charged as a fraud may
be innocent. In pleading a fraud, the pleader must by apt words allege in his pleading every act, fact and intent which
necessarily enter into, and constitute that particular fraud; and these essentials must be alleged with such precision and
certainty as to exclude every construction, except the fraudulent and wrongful purpose complained of; and if, from the
face of the pleading, it is doubtful whether the allegations do in fact amount to that particular fraud or not, it is not well
pleaded.
19. The rights of voters and the duties of persons conducting and certifying elections, considered and stated.
20. A constitutional convention, lawfully convened, does not derive its powers from the legislature; but from the
people. The powers of such a convention are in the nature of sovereign powers.
The legislature can neither limit nor restrict the exercise of their powers.
The legality of the election for officers held on the 22nd day of August 1872, after the...

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and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators,
seventeen representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine
Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
 The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into
the facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this
purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been
formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but
that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
 As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
 At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this
Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some
merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with
conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection,
however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in
practice and in their operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in
that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent
departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that
respect.
 It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon
the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of
authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is
not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope
of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government.
 But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision
delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable.
The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of
whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state
legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
 If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists
of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution
itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of
expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has
once said:
 There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established
form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for
the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to
trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of
free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free
and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
 Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
 The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the
courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether
submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of
the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political department" to which the
Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of
. . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with
it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon
this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary
its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly
assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over
submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
 The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon
a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may
reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with
an intimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution
solely to the political branch of government.
 The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion
arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power
to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional power to
determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose
legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in
the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed.
No such division between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants
power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been
 given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control
or interference at any point.
 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the
same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which not having
been raised by the parties herein we will not decide — his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the
nature of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different
angle he sees the matter as political, saying:
 The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66
Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and
the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct.,
446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to
vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action because
the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition
concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be
caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two
hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld.
Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the
famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which
it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's franchise is a
personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which
there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it
is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev.,
114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it:
they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
 The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies
to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies — who
are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of
legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any connotation at all.
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495;
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of
"private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the
legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the
manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of
Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred
years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to
purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the
functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.
 We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in
the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the
United States institutions after which ours are patterned.
 But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the
opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is
necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the
Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to
out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.
 Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-
one members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child
Labor Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the
Senate to erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to
indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of
Representatives from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and
delivering it to the Governor.
 The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by
Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a
copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new
resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty
 senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the
Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.
 The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment
had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five
states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed
amendment had lost its vitality.
 The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
 First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a
tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the
Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the
Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed
amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous rejection of the
amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
 The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally
divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached
the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the
exercise of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the
Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
 The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in
the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts,
Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the
questions raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions
were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been
granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend
had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as
political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a
deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
 The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the
result to be reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other,
was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
 As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent
but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered,
aptly queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the
judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-
ups of the justices "leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested
with the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide
the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered
the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of
justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it
because he could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference
and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of
the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision
of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the
disposal of the other issues.
 From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of
the case.
 The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point
of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three
 have changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or
four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685,
footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side
of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854;
Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
 If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow
the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies,
it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
 But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
 This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident
vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous
on our part to pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of
cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of
materials and arguments under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
 The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion,
almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
 SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled
bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be
an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of
which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the
journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act
theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has
become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.
 From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
 I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more
mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at
the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of
State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal
value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the
former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be
applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been
recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the
acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us
some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the
State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all
written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of
such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely
too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons
having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
 But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of
the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and
political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in
them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that
its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to
supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a
statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in
Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
 Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence — considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a
noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured
 nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" — unequivocally identifies himself with those
who believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of
Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional
restrictions on legislative action, says:
 (1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound
to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an
act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a
duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond doubt
that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The
Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in
upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that
the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is
unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not
allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is
answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get
at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that
is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above, namely,
how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of
view there can be but one answer.
 (2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and pushed
only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the
fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary
and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large field
of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain
unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions
as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain
purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet
the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by
imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the
best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such
belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the
Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain
conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its
majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only
after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?
 These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, — Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to
perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated
as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters
leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that
department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature
as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has
carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act
finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as
well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the one
case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
 xxx xxx xxx
 The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch
and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on
Evidence, 699-702.)
 The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out
whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
 It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210,
that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of
acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
 The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the
documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or
was placed before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have
held the copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly
stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the
mode of its passage.
 Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and
the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to
the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
 In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators
and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of
Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
 The petition is dismissed without costs.
 Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.


 Separate Opinions

 BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:
 Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us.
 A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to
the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs to
the judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C.
J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a
different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)
 "The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)
 "An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to
determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been
judicially determined whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes.
(Knight vs.Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5
Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St.
Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L.,
289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J.,
880.)
 As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal
theory of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention, composed
mostly of lawyers, and even the members of the American Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie
enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of the world. Hence,
my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.
 B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed
amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and some members of the House of Representatives
were not allowed to participate and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
 The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all
practical purposed did not belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated
and approved.
 Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."
 Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred
and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be
held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
 By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most solemn
manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to
inquire whether those petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not
precluded from questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they opposed
its enactment. In default of a contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress
they endorsed-- or at least are bound by — the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is
estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S.,
198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute he helped
(presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining petitioners, as mere citizens, would
probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)
 C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant litigation may be
solved by the application of other well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one
department of the Government entertains for the actions of the others.
 On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of
section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the
Rules of Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a
question admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of resolution
upon the judicial authorities.
 D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the
time-honored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United
States vs.Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
 According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators approved the
resolution against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes",
eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of
the total membership of twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total
membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear
that the measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.
 True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes
did not constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable arithmetical
computation above shown, those protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them
having then asserted that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken into account.
"Ford although we might have judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no
better qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of its actual membership at any given moment,
what with demises or demissions, remotions or suspensions.


 HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

 I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are
not inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192).
But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended
members of the Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of
Congress."
 The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the
questions therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that
the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me evidence that the questions involved
 in the present proceeding are no less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed
unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said concurring opinion.
 The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is
that the suspension of the said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political
question, the judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper political
department of the government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to go any further in the
consideration of the case. In other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from
the premise that said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being
powerless to interfere with the matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the determination
of said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving the action of the political
departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet.,
420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of
Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)
 If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been thus
suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the
determination of whether or not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely different
from that of members who, not having been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the
resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives,
namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of
course, their votes had to be counted amount those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course,
their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there would be sound
justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention they impliedly
but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would
have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension,
whose validity or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their case
there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have gone or whether or not they would have
abstained from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not been
suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the political
party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still they would have voted independently and following
their individual convictions. In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of
minority members of the legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said
suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution, nor in favor of it
either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should they bed counted with the members
who voted against the resolution or those who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why should
we count them as though we knew that they would have voted against the resolution, or even that they would
have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the Constitution does not, and could not, include
suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths vote.
 I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint
session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly used the vital and all-important word
"voting" therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all
members not suspended or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here
even making a concession in favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain
from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself to
conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to count suspended or disqualified members as
opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible to know which way they would have
voted or that they would have abstained from voting — that they would never have voted in favor of the
measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or disqualified members among those in
favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do not know that they
would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them among
those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that
they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion — the only one possible — that
such suspended or disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of
knowing which way they would have voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a
sound and rational construction of the constitutional precept.


 PARAS, J.:
 I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.


 PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

 To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
 The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
 Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner of the
Constitution is silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard
bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."
 Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all
ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even
in ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
 The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate ideological
pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden
and unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship
floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of the first
typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the
guiding stars in our actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or completely
darken those stars and then we have only to rely on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring
if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless nights. We are sitting in
judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day
shall come that we will be judged on how are are judging. Posterity shall always have the final say. When the
time solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we have faced
our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have chosen the
most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether did keep burning the tripod fire in
the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of historical oblivion;
others will have their names as by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still
others will be remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on accorded to all those
who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.
 This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep
its responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a
conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall be
cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war, or
whether in the heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be
remembered with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice
Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock bottom foundations which made of the American
Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate
keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and unbiased, exacting and
pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line: "lasciate ogni
speranza."
 Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality
or should be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the
resolution in question, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate
were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate
who voted in favor of the resolution, by undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths
of the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution,
by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber.
The official certifications made by the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress to the effect that three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members of the House of Representatives
voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence can. The certification, being
a clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in
conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
 FACTS OF THE CASE
 Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are members of
the Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political
parties, duly registered, with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.
 The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and the
remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing.
 Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23,
1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d
who resigned to assume other positions in the Government.
 On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which
reads as follows:
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote
of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To propose, as they do
hereby propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance
thereto:
 ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
 "Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines,
and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to
all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the
same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."
 This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
 Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18
against.
 Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the
purpose of submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating
P1,000,000 for said purpose.
 Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said act,
submit to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in
resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution,
requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18
Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98
members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who
actually voted for the resolution.
 Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98
members but of only 90. They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in
favor of the resolution 16 votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the
Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No.
73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act is
unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all
the qualified members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately and, consequently,
Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general
election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.
 At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:
 The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:
 1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority vote of the
Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;
 2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in the election of the
President of that body; but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a
resolution was presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and the seating of
Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing and decision of the protest
lodged against their election;
 3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of office before notaries
public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the
said date;
 4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of office accomplished by
them outside of the floor before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31,
1946, respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;
 5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged
oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on said date his
salary was paid corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;
 6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;
 7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the present time, the said
Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate
and to vote therein, not do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;
 8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified as having been
elected in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos
and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and
Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;
 9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
 10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio
Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc
and Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco
for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their election," copy of the resolution being attached to and
made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
 11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and approved by the House,
referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as shown by the
Congressional Record for the House of Representatives;
 12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on the floor and have not
been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of
the House of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11
hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do not appear in the roll of the members
of the House except as shown by the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll
inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit
2 hereof;
 13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office on the date set
opposite their names, as follows:

Jose Cando May 25, 1946

Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946

 all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four who took their oaths
before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;
 14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives;
 15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning April 23, 1946, up to
the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since
August 16;
 16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;
 17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House, Representatives Jose C.
Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution
was discussed and passed on September 18,1946;
 18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was made by the Secretary
calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and
 19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the alleged oaths of
office are made a part of this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question their
materiality and admissibility.
 Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

For the petitioners: For the respondents:

JOSE E. ROMERO ROMAN OZAETA

ANTONIO BARREDO Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

 PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY
 Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first question we have
to consider.
 No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade
deciding it and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.
 To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present recourse of prohibition.
If petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by
respondents themselves.
 Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal
personality to file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.
 Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and
the third, of presidents of four political parties.
 All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the
consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators were
the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for purposes
of determining the three-fourths constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.
 In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the holding
of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to
enforce the resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of
respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are members of the
Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable
injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those
represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."
 There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the House of
Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the Congress which
adopted the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such
unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act
within the bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they
are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their
sacred duty to see to it that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled
upon.
 The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population,
perhaps nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will
personally be affected by the question whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be
violated without any relief and whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the
Constitution itself.
 As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and
inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere
scrap of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the
security, property, personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily
affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals
inhabiting this land of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is finally
decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.
 Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and much more, those
who are members of Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in
them by the electorate.
  24 SENATORS
 The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate.
According to petitioners there are 24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding
Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not duly
qualified and sworn in members of the Senate."
 This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both
parties.
 No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and effects of the
words placed by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude
anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having
been proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of the Senate, their
having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving salaries as senators.
 Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the
pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the
human mind of the twentieth century.
 Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the Senate,
without taking into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question
upon which we have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not
suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the
presence of the sun at day time. Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the
present Senate.
 96 REPRESENTATIVES
 The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present
House of Representatives is composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present
"only 90 members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."
 Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
 The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos,
Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the
House of Representatives.
 The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members of the House
of Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater
than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever been
adopted by the House of Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of the exercise
of some of their official functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.
 That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian
rulers have replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a
constitutional question: whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the
arbitrary power of depriving representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional functions,
privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise
unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.
 The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the
people, an onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system
of representative government may subsist if those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated
from the exercise of their constitutional functions.
 From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election, 98
representatives were elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of
them were actual members of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
 Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths of
them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96
representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The
necessary consequence is that, since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately
have voted in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that
the resolution has not been validly adopted.
 We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion,
have skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives,
notwithstanding the fact that they are among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both
parties. If they had taken them into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring them
to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of
Representatives.
 Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident
that the remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.
  JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
 Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning the questions of
the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the
written arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by
the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.
 The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House
voting separately, . . .."
 Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over the
signatures of the President of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both
Houses, respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as a
dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.
 Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
 An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the
administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon
that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who
keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which
necessarily will result from the suggestion.
 But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false
certification made by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.
 Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an
enrolled bill or resolution."
 To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices A,
B, and C,1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have
amply and ably discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be
standing on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.
 In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.
 POLITICAL QUESTIONS
 The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,"
except "by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."
 The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
 This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We
deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated
on the question.
 Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in
determining what matters fall under the meaning of political questions."
 This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It is
a general proposition made without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial
discernment lies behind it.
 The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question"
shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.
 This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining
what matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of
the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the
government."
 Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a
principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is
a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to
any speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their acceptance.
Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the
elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
 A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing new
propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an
intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at
least be one of the main columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is
supported by a thing whose existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
 We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning
of political question. The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary"
 is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or
uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.
 It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with which
judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration
to drive away a danger or an evil.
 We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as
provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their
conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction
of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine
which we have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.
 Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore,
betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with
the power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"
 COLEMAN versus MILLER
 The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the
mainstay of the majority position.
 No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of
the Supreme Court.
 The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the
Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from
the date of submission to the State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.
 At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the
constitutional questions herein discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of
Kansas of the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the
decision of said Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been adopted
"within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise
a controversy of violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.
 No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925, the
Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of
State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the
Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there
such mention of constitutional violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after
submission of the amendment to the State legislature.
 No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had
cast his vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had
allegedly lost its vitality.
 It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a State
legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide
the question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the
Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.
 Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the present case.
 We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the
American Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject
of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened
that the nine-member United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the
Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."
 How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is
beyond our comprehension.
 GREEN versus WELLER
 One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Green vs.Miller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.
 Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.
 The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of a
proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could
render it dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the
submission is made "in a established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the people of
their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample upon
the exercise of their right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed
privilege to the people of the state to change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."
 So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because
the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the
people is made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance
with the provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the present case, the
submission of the proposal of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the
Constitution, aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the constitutional
prerogatives of duly elected representatives of the people.
 MR. JUSTICE BLACK
 The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.
Justice Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the
majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate
position.
 The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power
to control submission of constitutional amendments."
 Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our
fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a
convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any
grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the people,
Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission." That submission must be provided by law, and
no law may be enacted and come into effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action
of the President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may
step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves upon the Executive
Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people the
proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the Philippines may refuse to
submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.
 After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in the Philippines,
his conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.
 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
 The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is
the next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice maintains that
the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters that concern not merely political actions but are
also of the very essence of political action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the law-courts
to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for
voting in legislative assemblies."
 The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the
idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered
not in answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of
arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to
elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.
 In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but never on
passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
 We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their
judgment are in accord "with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced
thought on the workings of constitutional and popular government. "Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for
those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of
a foreign country, praising it even with the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it
represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.
 THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
 This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C.
Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis
of what is stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
 The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity
of the presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the
certification is false? How can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?
 The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have committed the
nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice,
should our tribunals not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of
imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to reason, never just to imitate what is
 wrong, although such mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable
for our courts to commit such a blunder.
 Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the United
States the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners'
memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for
the rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to
whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
 The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said
effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
 Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have
been repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention.
Section 313 alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine
Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the
existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
 This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and
section 41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a
provision be found that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both
House of Congress even if we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
 The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very
evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.
 50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150
 In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is
invoked as reasons for the theory.
 We will analyze the reasons adduced:
 1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the strongest one,
when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the
sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different departments of the
government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make such a
blunder in our choice? Since when have the social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent
of overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?
 2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the members of
the legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather
on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of the majority are a king of emperos of
Japan, to be worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be
relegated to where it belongs: the archeological museum.
 3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is
justice to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
 4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by the
Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never
become a law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a
perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal stupidity may reach.
 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
 Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will
also analyzed the arguments relied upon.
 1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it
appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to
depict a mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character.
It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of
all persons having access to these journals. . . ."
 The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which seems not to
be too flattering to our former metropolis.
 Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's
assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we
have seen few instances in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been passed, as
shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining
here the same fears entertained by Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to
 correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary
provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall be printed and copies
thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when
the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
 This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
 2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all
times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced."
 The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt
judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to
have their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by the Constitution
presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in any department of government and the system is
established to put a check on them.
 When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of
justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the
proper remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on
impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do
their duty in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which is
given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
 The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of
amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
 The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it, it
must be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the
Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must
be complied with mathematical precision, with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or
expressible in arithmetical figures.
 Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that
no single member should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and eight
Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the presiding officers
and secretaries of both Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had
been complied within the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as false as any
falsehood can be.
 The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell
of constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the
adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to
enthrone in its stead a whimsical government of men.
 The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24
Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member
with the concurrence of two-third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each
be composed of nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members (section 11,
Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no
treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the Senate shall have the
sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
 So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of
momentous importance. Each and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only
 because our loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional
Convention had abided by the wise teachings of experience.
 By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in
question to have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of
lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils and disasters.
 The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may
plunge our people into a maelstrome of war.
 The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
House of Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high
officials, including the President, on the carpet.
 To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not
counting three actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President
of the Philippines if he happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
 Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people high-
handed means have been resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it
will affect future generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that
before such a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be adhered to
by Congress.
 QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
 Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to
wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner
for the vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of the
Chapter of the United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777.
Concerning the judgment that the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same
opinion we ventured that the historian army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
 At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and retrogressive. When the
victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to if
for redress, it adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation and
finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in it
as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue of
human freedom was disposed of by them most discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on
bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
 Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that the highest
tribunal of the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional
system, by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the
great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes
on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.
 The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs of the
United Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of
our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the
whole system is liable to crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the majesty of
the law must always be held supreme.
 To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes
and habits of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be
discarded to be replaced with more progressive ones and inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these
ideas are the wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.
 The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform should continuously
be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created.
New formulas must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be
preserved, but those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the museum of
memory. The past and the present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.
 Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and bounds.
Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the
alpha, beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an under-
microscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.
 Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water,
without any soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is
 produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost
absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are
harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to produce
vinegar for the asking. The penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and
tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful
insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim more than one million victims a year in
the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature. Means of
transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast becoming
marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no reason why the administration of justice should not
progress onward, synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better future.
 The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of the
Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to
adopt the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more
violations of the fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.
 Our vote is for the granting of the petition.


 BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

 Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre una violacion de la Constitucion —
elcodigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A media dos del año pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta
misma Corte Suprema por tres Senadores1 que se quejaban dehaber sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de
su derecho a sentarse en el Senado de Filipinas y a particular y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave
infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos mismos Senadores acuden de
nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero estavez no vienen solos: les
acompañan otros cinco miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de la Camarra de Representantes y tres
jefes de aagrupaciones o partidos politicos — Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party. Jose
O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del Senado y Presidente del Partido Nacionalista. De
modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17 Representantes y 3 particulares.2 Tienenun
comun denominador, a saber: que son todos ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.
 Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor
General y el Director del Buro de Imprenta.3
 El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion dirigigo a los recurridos para que
estos, sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo su superintendencia o en su
nombre "se abstengan y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes haciala celebracion de un plebiscito e eleccion
general el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reformade los articulos 13.º y 14.º de la
Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de
autorizar el expendio de fondos publicos para dicho proposito."
 Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a continuacion el texto de la Resolucion
conjunta que contiene la propuesta reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto de
la consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en el lexico corriente de la
prensa y del publico se conoce por resolucion sobre paridad o igualdad de derecdhos constitucionales a favor
de los americanos, esdecir, que concede a estos iguales derechos que a los filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de
terrenos publicos, en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como bosques,minas, pesca y fuerza
hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de utilidades publicas. He aqui su texto:
 RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote
of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately, to propose, as they do hereby
propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance
thereto;
 ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
 Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the Fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forth-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to
extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United
States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
 States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporation or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
 This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
 Adopted,

(Sgd.) JOSE AVELINO

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) EUGENIO PEREZ

Speaker of the House of Representatives

 We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in joint session assembled in the
Hall of the House of Representatives on September 18, 1946.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ZACARIAS

Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) NARCISO PIMENTEL

Secretary of the House of Representatives

 Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta el Congreso de Filipinas ha
aprobadola Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11 de
Marzo de esteano, provee a la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el presupuesto necesario para sufragar los
gastos del mismo. Siuna mayoria de los electores votare afirmativamente, la reformaquedara ratificada y estara
en vigor por un periodo de 28 años; en caso contrario, quedara rechazada.
 Los recurrentes alegan y sostiened que la resolucion conjuntade que se trate es ilegal y nula por no haberse
aprobadocon los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo XV de
la Constitucion, a saber:
 SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
 Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el Senado se componia actualmente
de 24 miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado en la Constitucion, y la Camara de Representantes de 96
miembros, es decir, dos menos que el numero señalado en la Constitucion, pues does dimitieron despues de
las elecciones, uno para aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para aceptar un
nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin embargo, segun la demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo
se permitio votar a 21 miembros, excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacionfina l de la Resolucion a tres
miembros, a saber; los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero. De los referidos 21 miembros, votaron a favor de la
Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que — arguyen los recurrentes — la Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte
del Senado, con el numero constitucionalde tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de los miembros, elcual debia ser 18.
 En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar a 88 miembros, excluyen dose
de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y
Jesus B. Lava, de Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M. Yuson
y Luis Taruc, de Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros
Occidental. De los referidos 88 miembros votaron a favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que — arguyen los
recurrentas — la Resolucion tampoco quedo aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero constitucional
de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) partes de sus miembros, el cual debia ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun dando por
descontados los dos miembros que despues de las elecciones aceptaron cargos en otros ramosdel gobierno.
 Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica deque se trata, consiguientemente los recurrentes
tachantambien de inconstitucional e invalida la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion
general o plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter alpueblo para su ratificacion o repudio la
enmienda constitucional propuesta, y que consigna la suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere
de incurrir con motivo dela celebracion de dicho plebiscito, entre habilitacion deprecintos electorales, pago de
dietas de los inspectores y costo de la a impresion, publicacion, fijacion y distribucion gratuita de copias de la
propuesta enmienda en ingles, español y otros dialectos del pais.
 Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegacioneses enciales de la demanda y negar otras, plantean las
siguientes defensas especiales:
 Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act or Resolution) de ambas Camaras del
Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba
concluyente deque la misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud del respeto que se debe a un ramo
igual y coordinado del gobierno, no es permisible una investigacion judicial desi la misma a fue o no aprobada
debida y propiamente por el Congreso; y que, por tanto, esta Corte Suprema carecede jurisdiccion para
conocer y enjuiciar los puntos suscitados por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y constitucionalidad de
la resolucion en cuestion.
 Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos alegan, por via de segunda defensa
especial, que la resolucion controvertida fue aprobada a conlos votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos los
miembros cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia
con el Articulo XV, apartado 1, de la Constitucion, y que consiguientementela ley de la Republica No. 73 que
ordena suplanteamiento ante el pueblo para su ratificacion o desaprobacion, senala una fecha para la
celebracion de estaconsulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos publicos para talfin, es valida y constitucional.
 Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertadaentre las partes, pero no se extracta aqui para no
alargar innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se hara particular referencia a ella mas adelante a medida que
las exigenciasde la argumentacion lo demanden.
 Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parteshan hecho cumplida justicia a la tremenda
importancia del asunto haciendo extensos estudios y pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia pertinente,
en particular la americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en nuestras ideas
politicas y constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha convivenciade casi medio siglo.
 Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede decirse, sinexageracion, que excepto en cuatro momentos
culminantes de su historia — el primer grito de rebelion contra España en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de
hostilidades contra Americaen Febrero de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de Independencia en el plebiscito
nacional de 1935, y la guerra contra el Japon en 1941 — en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60 años, ha sido
Ilamado el pueblo filipino a rendiruna decision tan importante, de trascendencia e implicacionestan graves, tan
tremendas, como la que tiene que hacer en el plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivode la Resolucion
congresional discutida en el presente asunto.
 Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que parabien o para mal sacuden los cimientos de un pais tal
quesi fuese un fenomeno cosmico; que determinan el curso desu existencia y deytinos nacionales; que
deciden, en una palabra, de la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y degeneraciones que no han nacido
todaviaa. Es una de esas decisiones que para hacerla los pueblos deben hincarse humildemente de rodillas, de
cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los pueblos y naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita
sabiduria . . ..
 II
 Para los efector de una amplia perspectiva historica quepermita destacar en toda su plenitud los contornos de
losformidables "issues" o puntos constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente que
repasemos, siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no cabeen el mismo texto de esta
disidencia),4 los preceptos basicos de la Constitucion que se trate de reformar conla Resolucion congresional
de que tantas veces se ha hechomerito. Helos aqui:
 ARTICLE XIII. — CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
 SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
 ARTICLE XIV. — GENERAL PROVISIONS
 xxx xxx xxx
 SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.
 Como queda dicho, la reofrma propuesta es en el sentidode que, no obstante lo dispuesto en los preceptos
arribatranscritos, "durante la efectividad del Convencio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de Filipinas
y el Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenorde las disposiciones de la Ley del
Commonwealth No. 733, pero que en ningun case se extendera mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la disposicion,
explotacion, desar rollo y utilizacionde todos los terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico,
de aguas, minerales, carbon, petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzasy fuentes de energia
potencial, asi como de otros recursos de Filipinas, y la operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos para
cualguier persona, quedan abiertos para los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y para todas las formas de
negocio y empresa de la propiedad o controladas, directao indirectamente, por ciudad años de los Estados
Unidos, de la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestasa los ciudadanos de Filipinas o a las
corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o controladas por ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta
del Congreso filipino, supra).
 Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial — pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea, se trata de las labores y
procesos deliberativos de la misma Asamblea Constituyente — de quelos preceptos capitales arriba transcritos
constituyen la expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda laprudencia y sabiduria de que eran
capaces no solo los autores de la Constitucion y los Delegados que la aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la
ratifico en el correspondiente plebiscito nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta
firmeza y tan fuerte unanimidadentre nuestros partidos politicos y sus caudillos como enesa recia y constructiva
afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nadamejor, creo yo, que las siguientes palabras para definir elespiritu, la filosofia
que informa esas provisiones:
 This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the outworn Regalian doctrine which, it is
suggested, may serve to retard the economic development of the Philippines. The best encomium on this
provision is probably the very criticism launched against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would liberalize
the acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to the extent of permitting their alienation or
of depriving the people of this country of their heritage. The life of any nation depends upon its patrimony and
economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting, must go hand in hand with economic security, if not
economic prosperity. We are at most usufructuaries of ourdomains and natural resources and have no power to
alienate them even if we should want to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it would be the
height of folly to even think of opening the door for their untrammelled disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization to the detriment of the Filipinos people. With our natural resources in the hands of foreigners what
would be there left except the idealism of living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all, an
empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that it not ours! We would be beggars in our own
homes, strangers in our own land!
 Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection of the legitimate interests of the
Filipino people. There is no antagonism or hostility towards foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection
which every country of the world is practising today in the interest of self-preservation. (The Three Powers of
Government, by Laurel, pp. 117-118.)
 Los criticos de la enmienda constitucional propuesta pueden discutir libremente, como cumple a los ciudadanos
de un pais democratico, los meritos y demeritos de lamisma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de razones —
morales, politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta de decencia — y naturalmente defenderla
tambiensus partidarios desde todos los angulos. Podrian los opositoreshacer una minuciosa diseccion de su
fraseologia yacaso hallar en sus repliegues peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, como en ese par de
adverbios "directa o indirectamente", a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporacioneso asociaciones extranjeras
controladas solo indirectamente por ciudadanos americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros
terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, y en la operacion de utilidades publicas. Todo estolo pueden hacer, y
algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental quesemejante discusion no compete a esta Corte Suprema, sinoen todo
caso a otros poderes constituidos.
 Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar labondad o maldad de la enmienda propuesta. Lo unico
quenos incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la
enmienda ha sido aprobada por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso de la Constitucion en materia
de enmiendas; si losrequisitos que la Constitucion señala para poder enmendarla — requisitos que
son mandatorios, categorica menteimperativos y obligatorios — se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo
bien en el asunto de Gray vs.Childs ([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), ". . . No podemos decir queel estricto
requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede renunciar a favor de una buena enmienda e invocar encontra
de otra mala. . . . No compete a los tribunales el determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y cuando
no lo es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver conla sabiduria de la politica. Pero es deber de los tribunales,
cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o no el procedimiento adoptado para la aprobacion de la
enmiendaes el señalado por los terminos de la ley organica.
 Todo lo que se lha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relievela filosofia de nuestra Constitucion en materia de
recursos naturales y utilidades publicas, se ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan solo para
subrayar todala gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir entodo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y
 complacienteliviandad. Como tambien se dijo en el citado asunto deGray vs. Childs, "la enmienda de la ley
organica del Estado o nacion no es una cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al
azar. Es una cosa seria. Cuando la enmienda es aprobada, viene a ser parte de laley fundamental del pais y
puede significar el bienestar omaldicion de las generaciones de la nacion donde se haceparte del codigo
fundamental."
 Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una consigna en el presente caso en que
lareforma propuesta afecta vitalisimamente al patrimonionacional del pueblo filipino. ¿No son los recursos
naturalesy las utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion, labase que sustenta su existencia, la espina dorsal
de sueconomia? Por tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el celo, la vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales
ejercenpara que las salvaguardias impuestas por la misma Constitucionen relacion con el proceso y tramitacion
de todaenmienda constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo rigor.
 Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabeescudarse tras la doctrina de la separacion de poderes
quela mayoria de esta Corte invoca para justificar su inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera",
alegando que el presente asunto es coto vedado para nos otros, algo quecae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso
que en derecho politico y constitucional se llama materia politica no-justiciable.
 III
 La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que versa sobre una cuestion
politica, ylas cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la competencia de los tribunales de justicia. Creo que esto es un
error, dicho seacon todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres compañeros que sostienen tal opinion. ¿Hay
acaso algun documento mas politico que la Constitucion? Si la opinion de lamayoria fuese valida y acertada,
practicamente ninguna violacion de la Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual
menos, casi todas las transgresionesconstitucionales, sobre todo las que comete elpoder legislativo o el poder
ejecutivo, tienen caracter politico. Bajo esa opinion la Constitucion seria una letramuerta, un simple pedazo de
papel: los poderes constituidos, los individuos que los componen, podrian infringirim punemente la Constitucion
sin que ningun arbitro constitucional pudiera intervenir ordenadamente para restaurarla suprema majestad de la
ley fundamental violada. Esclaro que esto podria conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion,
dependiendo solo el resultado de lamayor o menor docilidad del pueblo, del grado de elasticidad politica de las
masas. Y es claro que ninguno puedequerer este triste destino para nuestro pais.
 Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema de gobierno que esta esencial
mentecalcado en el americano, es que bajo la teoria relativa de las eparacion de poderes, ningun poder es
superior al pueblo cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los poderes no son mas que agentes,
mandatarios, servidores: el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el soberano. Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio
de la Constitucion — esta es suvoz el verbo hecho carne politica y social, el soplo vital quetraduce y transmuts
su espiritu en postulados esenciales deregulacion y gobierno.
 Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello,dicen los sostenedores absolutistas de la teoria de la
sedparacion de poderes. Pero se pregunta: ¿quien señala lavoluntad del pueblo tal como esta plasmada en la
Constitucion? ?Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar las tablas de la ley? ¿Quien ha de
arbitrar en los conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir los litigios propiamente planteados en que se
ventilan una infraccion de la Constitucion? ¿Hay un peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o por
el contrario, los resorteestan todos bien situados, capaces de operar y funcionarade cuada y eficientemente?
Esto es precisamente el busilis, la cuestion batallona.
 No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno el poder judiciales
el llamado a señalar, a interpretar la ley; y en los conflictoso transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte
Suprematiene la ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremoy final. Bajo nuestra mecanica constitucional,
igual quebajo la americana, se da la aparente paradoja de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de
interpretar la voluntad del pueblo tal como esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion,
no corresponde propiamentea ninguno d e los poderes electivos, los que se renuevanperiodicamente, sino al
poder que si bien es denombramiento en su origen, tiene, sin embargo, sentido deperpetuidad, quiero decir, es
vitalicio en la complexion y funcion de los individuos que los componen — el poder judicial. La sabiduria
peculiar, la originalidad del sistemaconsiste precisamente en eso: en haber alojado el supremo arbitraje con
relacion a los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales en un poder del Estado al cual deliberadamentese le
ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el maspropicio posible a la objetividad y desasimiento de lasdisputas
politicas y discordias civiles, situandosele por encimade los vaivenes de la politica al uso y las veleida desde la
suerte electora. "Esto es lo que va implicto en la expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad
de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).
 The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the inherent
distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion
which, when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme
Court, p. 146.)
 En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de
sugran Chief Justice John Marshall, en terminos inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura
 para poneren vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y declaro que es terminantemente de la
competencia y deberdel departamento judicial el decidir cual es la ley querige.
 The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says: "The Constitution being the
supreme law, it follows of course, that every act of the Legislature contrary to the law must be void. But who
shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal
and becomes only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be
conformable to the Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding;
because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of
very erroneous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case arises, must decide upon the
validity of particular acts." Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol.
1, 2d edition, pp. 4, 5.)
 En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien lo siguiente:
 . . . Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por artbitro final, frena a con efectividad a los demas
departament of en elejercicio de su facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos
ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.
 Esta doctrina reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62), a saaber:
 . . . As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds' neither the sword nor the purse' it is by constitutional
placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and
this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the government
established.
 No es que con esto el poder judicial assume un complejode superioridad sobre los otros poderes del Estado,
no. Setrate simplemente de que, dentro de las limitaciones de todacreacion humana, alguien tiene que arbitrar y
dirimir losconflictos y las transgresiones a gue puede dar lugar la Constitucion, y se estima que el poder judicial,
pro la razonde su ser y de sus funciones, es el mas llamado a ser esearbitro. Se trate de una propia y graciosa
inhibicion delos otros poderes en virtud de una necesidad impuesta porunas teorias y practicas de gobiernio
que han resistido la prueba del tiempo y el choque con la realidad y la experiencia. En mi disidencia en el
asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192), hablando sobre este particular dijelo siguiente y lo reitero ahora, a
saber:
 En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No sepuede discutir que los tres poderes del Estado
son iguales e independientesentre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial
que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y elmas precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se puede
discutir que bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esferade accion propia y privativa, y dentro de
esa esfera un cumulode facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de esaesfera y en el uso de
esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discreciony ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so
pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la
insularidad, la separacion llegasolo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasta
nuestros dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes hasufrido tremendos modificaciones y limitaciones. El
consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la separacionde poderes queda condicionada por
una mecanica constitucional — lamecanica de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the
United States, tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es absoluto dentro de la
esfera quele asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y funcionesno se puede coartar. Pero cuando
se sale y extravasa de esa esferainvadiendo otras esferas constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades queno le
pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es superior a el le sale al encuentro,
le restringe uy leachica dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anti-constitucionales. La cuestion
ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestrosistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo que permite restablecer eljuego
normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de
fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano
sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las
leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en este
asunto.
 Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son los tribunales de justicia.
 La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-justiciable ni las maaterials o casos que
caen dentro de su significado. "The difficulty lies" — dice la ponencia — "in determining what matters fall within
the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with
the actions of the political departments of the government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente,
una autoridad — el caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido no hace muchos años por la Corte Suprema Federal de
 los Estados Unidos. La mayoria cree que este es el caso mas semejante al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria
padece error: el caso de Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un buen argumento en favor del recurso.
 Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos propuso una reforma
ala Constitucion, conocida por "Child Labor Amendment" (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la
Legislatura del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion rechazandola enmienda y una copia certificada de la
resolucionse envio al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 años despues,
una resolucion conocida como "Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del
Estado de Kansas pararatificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Alconsiderarse la resolucion 20
Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra. El Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente
del Senado en virtud de la Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la resolucion, rompiendo asi el
empate. La resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por la Camara de Representantes de Kandas mediante una
mayoria de los votos de sus miembros.
 Fued entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso de mandamus por los 20
Senadores adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3 miembros de la Camarade Representantes. El objeto del
recurso era (a) compeler al Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso favorable de la resolucion y poner en su
lugar las palabras "no ha sido aprobada"; (b) recabar la expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales del
Senado y Camara de Representantes prohibiendo les que firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario de
Estado de Kansad prohibiendole que autentic aradicha resolucion y la entregara la Gobernador. La solicitud
cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernadora emitir su voto decisivo en el Senado. Tambien se
planteabaen la solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habiasido rechazada originariamente y se alegaba,
ademas, quedurante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,1924, y Mayo, 1927, la enmienda habia sido
rechazada porambas Camaras de las Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solose habia ratificado en 5 Estados, y que
por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse ratificado dentro de untiempo razonable la enmienda habia
perdido su validez y vitalidad.
 La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los hechos, asumio competencia sobre
el casoy sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador tenia derecho a emitirvoto decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda
conservabasu vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, y quela resolucion, "habiendo sido aprobada
por la Camara de Representantes y por el Senado, el acto de ratificacion dela propuesta enmienda por la
Legislatura de Kansas erafinal y complete." Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.
 Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio jurisdiccion sobre el caso,
conla concurrencia y disidencia de algunos Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de
plano, sin masceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni
derecho de accion para pedir la revision de la sentencia de la Corte Supremade Kansas, y porque ademas se
trataba de una cuestion puramente politica, por tanto no-justiciable. Bajo la ponenciade su Presidente el Sr.
Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones
planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: "Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is challenged upon the ground that
the petitioners have no standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reviewed and hence itis urged
that the writ of certiorarishould be dismissed.We are unable to accept that view." Esto viene a ser comouna
replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr.
Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no standing in the Court." Delo
dicho resulta evidente que la Corte Federal no adoptola actitud de "manos fuera" (hands off), sino que actuo
positivamente sobre el caso, encarandolo.
 La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante extensa, esta consagrada enteramente
adiscutir la cuestion de la jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya hemosvisto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto enteramente
enfavor de la jurisdiction, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli se explanan y que no reproduzco por no
ser necesario y para no alargar indebidamente esta disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas consta
de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la cuestion de si el voto del Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no
valido. La Corte nolo resuelve, por que dice que sus miembros se dividieron porigual sobre si era una cuestion
politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable. La tercera parte, tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y
discutir las siguientes proposiciones :(a) Si habiendo sido rechazada originariamentela enmienda, una
ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho rechazamiento y tomarse como unaratificacion
legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si ellargo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion —
unos 13 años — no habia tenido el efecto de darcaracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando
estado juridico definitivo.
 El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy interesante y desde luego
acabado. Se estudian y comentan luminos amente los precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento
de unaenmienda propuesta impide que la misma sea ratificada posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente: que
el articulo V de la Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseadoen terminos positivos, es decir, habla de
ratificacion y node rechazamiento, y que por tanto "el poder para ratificarlo confiera al Estado la Constitucion, y
que, como poder ratificante, continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento. "Luego la Corte dice,
examinando los precedentes, que el Congreso, en el ejercicio de su control sobrela promulgacion de las
 enmiendas a la Constitucion, ha resuelto esta cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido indicado, esto es,
considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamientofrente a una positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que esta
accion del Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consiguiente, los tribunales no estan autorizados para
revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice que se trate de una cuestion politica no-justiciable, es
decir una cuestion que cae dentro de la zona constitucional exclusion del Congreso; por tanto, se trate deuna
accion valida, constitucional. Pero no hay nada enesa decision que diga, o permita inferir, que cuando el
Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la Constitucion, como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no
pueden intervenir, bajo el principio de la supremacia judicial entratandose de interpretar la Constitucion, para
resolver el conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio propiamente pedido. En otras palabras,
en el caso de Coleman contra Miller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el Congreso, al declarar valida la
ratificacion de la enmienda constitucional sobre trabajo infantil (Child labor), no habia infringibo el articulo V de
la Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y la Corte lo razona diciendo, con la vista delos precedentes, que el referido
articulo V habla de ratificacion y no de rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, "el poderpara ratificar continua y
persiste a pesar de un previo rechazamiento." De suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no escierto que la Corte
Suprema Federal declaro injusticiablela materia, pues ¿que mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum
categorico, positivo y terminante?
 Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion — unos 136 años
— no habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico
definitivo, la Corte Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir, declarovalida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso
de tiempo, aduciendo razones muy atinadas, entre ellas la de que las condiciones de caracter moral, medico,
social y economico que aconsejaban la prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y
existentes, si no mas, cuandose sometio la enmienda por primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 años
despues. Y luego la Corte cita autoridades y precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellosel caso tipico y
decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U.S., 368; 65 Law.ed., 994; 41 Sup.Ct., 510). En este caso la Cortedeclaro
que el Congreso, al proponer una enmienda a la Constitucion, pueded fijar un tiempo razonable para su
ratificacion, y sostuvo la accion del Congreso al disponer enla proyectada 18.ª Enmienda que la misma seria
ineficaza menos que se ratificase dentro de siete años.
 Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario: el Congreso no habia fijado ningun
plazopara la ratificacion. En vista de esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del
Congreso declarandolo que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuentalos precedentes judiciales y el precedente
congresional de 7 años ya sostenido en el caso citado de Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de
13 años era demasiado largo para ser razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, queno eran los tribunales los
que debian fijar ese tiempo razonable; que en esta cuestion entraban muchos factores denaturaleza varia y
compleja — politicos, economicos y sociales — que solo el Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar ya
mediante la correspondiente legislacion como enel caso de la 18.ª Enmienda, ya en cada caso concreto
deratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora bien, pregunto: ¿no es esto
un dictum judicial? ¿no es esto justiciar? ¿no esta aqui la Corte Suprema Federal sentandose en estrados y
emitiendo judicialmente su opinion sobre una materia juridica y constitucional sometida a su consideracion? En
realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado de resolver es la validez o nulidad del voto
decisivo del Teniente Gobernador, por la razon de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma decision, la
opinion del Tribunal estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas, resueltes, y
esta accion dela mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las materias en el discutidas, es lo que
ha motivado la disidencia de 4 Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y Douglas. En efecto, estos
disidentes no disimulansu desagrado al ver que la Corte asume en el caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de
interpretacion judicial, y aunvan mas alla — expresan un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte "trata el
proceso enmendatorio provisto por la Constitucion, como sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y
en otros sujeto a la autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien que en la decision "no hay desaprobacion de
la conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon contra Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere tacitamente que
una enmienda propiamente sometida debe darsepor muerta, a menos que se ratifique dentro de un tiempo
razonable." Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes esperaban que la Corte revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella
en elcitado asunto de Dillo contra Glass en donde la Corte, envez de abstenerse de conocer del caso por
tratarse en el, segun los disidentes, de materia politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el mismo
asumiendo supoder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y declarando valida la lay del Congreso que fijaba
un plazo de7 años para la ratificacion de la 18.ª Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las
mismas palabrasde la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo que yo pueda decir, demuestran de modo inconcuso
las irreconciliables diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria, representada porel ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los
disidentes, pues mientraspor un lado el ponente justicia decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y
resolviendo todas las cuestionesplanteadas, menos la cuestion del voto del Teniente Gobernador, citando
profusamente autoridades y precedentes, los disidentes, en su opinion, preconizan una actitudde absoluta
abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), portratarse, segun ellos, de una materia politica no-justiciable que cae
exclusivamente bajo el control del Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los disidentes:
 . . . To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments, we are unable to agree.
 The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed
between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon
a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may
reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with
an ultimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution
solely to the political branch of government.
 The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion
arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a property submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power
to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional power to
determine if there is any such implication in article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the political questions of whether a State whose
legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether in
the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed.
No such division between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by article 5 which grants
power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been
given by the article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is not subject to judicial guidance, control
or interference at any point.
 Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject to no judicial review, the
views of any court upon this process cannot be binding upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass
attempts judicially to imposed a limitation upon the right of Congress to determine final adoption of an
amendment, it should be disapproved. . . . (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A.L.R., 695, 708, 709.)
 La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el referido asundo de
Coleman vs. Miller esalgun tanto confusa, como han podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita
de alguna explicacion. Escierto que no suscriben la ponencia mas que 3 Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr.
Hughes y los Sres. Stone y Reed, pero en cuanto a la jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y la
materia hay que añadir los votos de los Sres. McReynolds y Butler. Estos dos ultimos no soloconcurrian
implicitamente en la accion de la Corte al enjuiciarel caso, sino que inclusive opinaban que debia concederse el
recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la ratificacion tardia de la Enmienda sobre Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor)
hecha por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo queen cuanto al "issue" de la jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad del
caso, la votacion era de 5 contra 4 — por la jurisdiccion,la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes, y los
Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera"
(hands off), los Magistrados Sres. Black, Frankfurter, Roberts y Douglas.
 Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser una autoridad a favor de los recurridos,
juntamente con el caso de Dillon vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal
americana a favor de los recurrentes.
 V
 Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de latesis de que tenemos jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidirel
presente caso, en el ejercicio de nuestras supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el
principio firmemente establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos propiamente planteados sobre conflictos
y transgresiones constitucionales, la jurisprudencia de los Estados estodavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas
terminante y decisiva. La importancia de esto sube de punto si se tieneen cuenta que, mas que con el gobierno
federal, nuestra analogia, nuestros puntos de contacto en lo politico, constitucional y juridico es mas bien con
los diferentes Estados de la Union americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierna es unitario. Aqui nuestras
provincias no son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes como lo son los Estados americanos. Asi que la
cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la nuestra no es la federal, sino la estatal. Por eso si bienes cierto
que las constituciones de los Estados, como lanuestra, todas estan fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de
la Constitucion federal, se vera que en ciertosrasgos caracteristicos del sistema unitario nuestra Constitucionse
aproxima evidentemente mas a las de los Estados que a la federal. Esa semejanza es sobre todo
notabilisimaen la parte que se refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en realidad, los
Estados de la Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son practicamente
naciones independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transitode la condicion de Commonwealth a la de
Republicas oberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de ellos enel derecho internacional, ninguna
diferencia, sin embargo, ha operado en el campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion,
 ora en la parte organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la independencia nohemos tenido necesidad de
cambiar de Constitucion: lamisma que nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando
estabamos sujetos a la soberania americana, es la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republic; y no
cabe duda de que nos serviria perfectamente bien si no la tuvieramos asendereada y malparada en nuestras
pecaadoras manos con repetidas violaciones, confrecuentes asaltos contra su integridad . . ..
 Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquieraa que señale un caso, un solo caso en la jurisprudencia
de los Estados de la Union americana en que los tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y
enjuiciaruna violacion constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupapor la razon de que se trataba de una
cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay absolutamente ninguno; por esoque los recurridos, a pesar de las
pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota su habil y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un
solo caso.
 En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de various Estados dan cuenta de casos indenticosd al que nos ocupa
y entodos ellos se ha declarado invariablemente que la violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al
precepto que regula el proceso de la enmiendas a la Ley organica esuna cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte
Suprema de Estados e ha lavado jamas las manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo
que in siquiera seha planteado seriamente la objecion fundada en el argumentod e la injusticiabilidad.
 Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citarmas que algunos casos los mas conocidos y
representativos, tomados de la jurisprudencia de algunos Estados, a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e
Indiana. De la Corte Suprema de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs .Gilchrist y el de
Gray vs. Childs.
 En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963l Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916), se trataba de una
accionde prohibicion interpuesta por el Gobernador del Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de
Estado, H. Clay Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta enmiendaa la Constitucion se publicara y se
sometiera al electorado en un plebiscito para su ratificacion o rechazamiento. Esdecir, lo mismo de que se trate
en el case que tenemos antenosotros. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camarade Representantes de
Florida con el voto necesario y constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su
concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo conel voto de tres quintos, pero esta votacion fue reconsiderada
posteriormente. Asi estaba el asunto, pendiente de reconsideracion cuando se clausuro la Legislatura.
Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienday el Secretario de Estado trato de dar los
pasos parasu publicacion y ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi la accionde interdicto prohibitorio, fundada en la
alegacion de quela enmienda no habia sido aprobada debidamente por la Legislatura de acuerdo con los
metodos prescritos en la Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente casetambien hubo alli una batalla
forense colosal, con untremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado. El ponente no se recata en
alabar el esfuerzo de las partesy dice: ". . . we think the parties to this litigationare to be commended, both for
taking the proceedings that have brought these unsual questions before the court for determination and for the
great ability with which their counsel have presented them to this court."
 ¿Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para conocer del asunto por la
razonde que se trataba de una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable? De ninguna manera. La Corte
asumio resueltamente su responsabilidad y poder tradicional de interpretarla Constitucion y fallo el asunto en su
fondo, declarando que la cuestion era propiamente judicial y que laenmienda constitucional propuesta no se
habia aprobada deconformidad con los requisitos establecidos por la Constitucionpara el proceso y tramitacion
de la enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la peticion de supersedeas interpuestapor el recurrido para enervar el
recurso; es decir, al recurrentegano su inusitado e historico pleito. Y las esferas politicas de Florida no se
desorbitaron por esta decisivaderrota de la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunar
de las doctrinas sentadas en elasunto, a saber:
 Constitutional Law — Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by Legislature in Proposing Constitutional
Amendment.
 A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the
Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where the constitution provides no other means for such
determination.
 Injunction — Subject of Relief — Act of Secretary of State in Certifying Proposed Amendments.
 The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the country commissioners proposed
amendments to the constitution is in its nature ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and if the act is
illegal it may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy
afforded by law.
 Injunction — Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as Defendant.
 The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in
proceedings brought to enjoin the secretary of state from publishing at public expense and certifying proposed
amendments to the constitution upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because they
have not been duly "agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature.
 Amendments to Constitution — Effect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of Constitution.
 If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the constitution, it violates the right
of all the people of the state to government regulated by law.
 Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.
 It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing constitution.
 Mandatory Provisions of Constitutions as to Manner of Amending Constitution.
 The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the constitution to "be agreed to by three-
fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that
such amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the
numbers of each house at a regular session.
 Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect — Mandatory Character of Provisions.
 Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a
constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914 B, pp. 916, 917.)
 El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. Enm 1934 otro asunto constitucional importante, el de
Gray contra Childs, se decidio en virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.
 En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien se trataba de una demanda de
prohibicion para impedir la publicacion de una propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al
electorado de Florida para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una eleccion general o plebiscito fijado para
Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres
quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura,
antes de clausurarse aprobo unafs resolucion conjunta autotizando a ciertos oficiales de las Camaras para que
despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones enlas actas y en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la
verdaderahistoria de los procedimientos y compulsar el textode la enmienda tal como habia sido aprobada. Se
alegabaen la demanda que esto era ilegal y anticonstitucional. Eltribunal de circuito estimo el recurso de
prohibicion. Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del Estado, la misma confirmo la
sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto prohibitorio. Hed aqui los pronunciamientos de la Corte que
parecen estereotipados para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:
 (4,5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by which the Constitution may be amended.
It requires that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective Journals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate with the yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such
amendment by each House. The proposed amendment here under consideration nowhere appears upon the
Journals of the Senate, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to consider any other questions presented or any
authorities cited.
 The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be lightly undertaken not to be
accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious thing. When an amendment is adopted, it becomes a part
of the fundamental law of the land, and it may mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state
wherein it becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict requirements pertaining to
amendments may be waived in favor of a good amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the
Constitution may be amended in one respect without the amendment being spread upon the Journals of one of
the respective House of the Legislature, then it may be ameqnded in any other respect in the same manner. It is
not for the courts to determine what is a wise proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom
of the policy the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called upon so to do, to
determine whether or not the procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is required by the terms of the
organic law.
 Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed out, the decree appealed from should
be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on authority of the opinion and judgment in the case of
Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas., 1914B, 9156. (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern
Reporter, pp. 274, 279.)
 Note se que la clausula sobre enmiendas en la Constitucion de Florida es semejante a la nuestra, a saber: (1)
la propuesta enmienda tiene que ser aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres quintos (3/5) de
los miembros, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los sies y los nos tienen que hacersesd constar
en el diario de sesiones (Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3)
despues de aprobada la enmienda por la Legislatura se somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para
su ratificacion orechazamiento.
 El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal americana es diferente, a saber: el
Congreso puede proponer la enmienda bien (1) mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros;
bien (2) mediante una convencion que se convocara al efecto apeticion de las Legislaturas de dos tercios (2/3)
de los diferentes Estados. En cualquiera de ambos casos la enmiendasera valida para todos los efectos y fines
comoparte de la Constitucion siempre que fuera ratificada porlas Legislaturas de tres cuartos (3/4) de los
Estados, o porconvenciones de tres cuartas-partes de los mismos, segun que uno u otro modo de ratificacion
hubiera sido propuestopor el Congreso.
 Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digomas arriba, me inclina a sostener que la jurisprudencia
constitucional propiamente aplicable a Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es con estos
con los cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo que toca a la forma y manera como se puede
reformar la Constitucion.
 Seguire ahora citando mas casos.
 Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el asunto de In re McConaughy (106
Minn., 392; 119 N.W., 408), tambin se suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia
sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos señalados en la Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien
hubo disputa sobre si esto era una cuestion judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema
deaquel Estado declaro sin ambajes que era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen
desperdicio:
 The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question. There can be
little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to
determine whether the constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution, unless a
special tribunal has been created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the
tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There is some authority for the view that when
the constitution itself creates a special tribunal, and confides to it the exclusive power to canvass votes and
declare the results, and makes the amendment a part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by
proclamation or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is final and conclusive. It may be conceded that this is true
when it clearly appears that such was the intention of the people when they adopted the constitution. The right
to provide a special tribunal is not open to question; but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not
done so, and this fact alone eliminates such cases as Worman vs. Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A.,
716, and Miles vs. Badford, 22 Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the jurisdiction of the courts.
(In re McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408.)
 Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark (136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479; 38
L.R.A.[N.S.], 77), se suscito igualmente una disputa sobre siuna enmienda habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con
los requisitos de la Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro
afirmativamente. He aqui su inequivoca pronunciamiento:
 Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the governor declaring that the amendment was
adopted was conclusive, and that the courts could not inquire into the question. To this contention we cannot
assent. The constitution is the supreme state law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes no provision for
exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an amendment has been made in the constitutional
method, and for the issuance by him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation may be both
useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether or not a change has been made in the fundamental law;
but the constitution did not make it conclusive on that subject. When the constitution was submitted for
ratification as a whole, a provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the governor. Const. art. 13,
section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference to amendment there is no such provision.
Const. article 13, section 1, par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive
method of determination provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is to the effect that whether an
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing constitution is a judicial
question. (Hammond vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479;38 L.R.A. [N.S.], 77.)
 Tambien tenemos el siguiente case de Indiana:
 (1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of appellees that this court has no
jurisdiction to determine the questions in issue here. In the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99
N.E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court, after reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to
determine similar questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:
 "Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or because the constitutional forms of
conditions have not been followed or have been violated (emphasis supplied) may become a judicial question,
and upon the courts the inevasible duty to determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and they
have, with practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of change in the organic law. Such is the rule in this state" — citing more than 40 decisions of this
and other states.
 (2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case entitling him to equitable relief. The trial
court found that the officers of the state, who were instructed with the execution of the law, were about to
expend more than $500,000 under the law, in carrying out its provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the course
of the oral argument, that the necessary expenditures would amount to more than $2,000,000. This court, in the
case of Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the submission to the people of the Constitution prepared by the
Legislature, answered this same question contrary to the contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414 of
that opinion. (186 Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol. 116, pp. 921, 922.)
 Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia americana tanto federal como de Estado sobre este punto, esto es,
cuandoes judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo es, se halla bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en la
parte que llevael encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption of
Constitution and Amendments" (12 Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es un compendiocuidados amente elaborado en
que se da un extracto de la doctrina con las citas sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero
omitiendo las citas para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tienemas que
consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que parece un resumen del extenso analisis que
llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto federal como estatal. Su meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una nueva
constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los departamentos politicos del gobierno; pero la cuestion de
si una enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido debidamente propuesta, adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo
con los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion, para que vengaa ser parte de la misma, es una cuestion que los
tribunales de justicia tienen que determinar y resolver, excepto cuandola materia ha sido referida por la
Constitucion a un tribunale special con poder para llegar una conclusion final. He aqui el sinopsis:
 SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments. — Whether or not a new constitution has been adopted
is a question to be decided by the political departments of the government. But whether an amendment to the
existing constitution has been duly proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner required by the constitution, as
as to become part thereof, is a question for the courts to determine, except where the matter has been
committed by the constitution to a special tribunal with power to make a conclusive determination, as where the
governor is vested with the sole right and duty of ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case the courts
have no jurisdiction to revise his decision. But it must be made clearly to appear that the constitution has been
violated before the court is warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire constitution is involved, or
merely an amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to pass on the legality of such constitution or
amendment where its validity has been recognized by the political departments of the state government, and
acquiesced in by the state judiciary. (12 C.J., pp. 880, 881.)
 VI
 Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recusro es que la copia impresa de la resolucion en
cuestionaparece certificada por los presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion
consta que dicha resolucion fue debidamente aprobada por el Congreso conlos votos de las tres quintas-partes
(3/5) de sus miembros; que, por tanto, la debida aprobacion de dicha resolucion nose puede cuestionar, es una
prueba concluyente para todoel mundo y para los tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se
funda en la doctrina inglesa llamada "enrolled act doctrine," cuya traduccion mas aproximada al español es
"doctrina de la ley impresa." Esto, por unlado.
 Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y prevaleced en esta jurisdiccion noes
la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine," sino ladoctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de
"journalentry doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de siuna ley o una resolucion ha sido debidamente
aprobadapor el Congreso debe buscarse en el diario de sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de
sesiones esconcluyente y final.
 Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio por esta Corte en la causa de los
Estados Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur. Fil., 772), que ambaspartes discuten en sus respectivos informes. Una de
las defensas del acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido
condenado era nula e ilegal porque so aprobo despues ya del cierrede las sesiones especiales que tuvo lugar
el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de la noche; es decir, que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo
el 1.º de Marzo, puesla sesion sine die del dia anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar las
manecillas del reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta Corte, sin necesidad deninguna otra prueba, examino el
diario de sesiones correspondientea la referida fecha 28 de Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli constaba
inequivocamente haberse aprobadola mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo que esta pruebaera final y concluyente
para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mundo. La Corte desatendio por completoel "enrolled act," la
copia impresa de la ley, pues dijo, asaber: "Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa as si la Ley Impresa (Ley No.
2381), que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye prueba concluyente sobre la fecha desu aprobacion,
investigaremos si los Tribunales pueden consultar otras fuestes de informacion, ademas de los diarios de las
sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha enque se cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando
talesdiarios son claros y explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que nohabia necesidad de consultar otras fuestes, que el
diario de sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la causaen contra del apelante.
 Y no era extraño que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana, familiarizada y compenetrada
naturalmente con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su pais ¿Quede extrano habia, por tanto, que aplicasen la
doctrina americana, la doctrina del "journal entry," que es mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la
doctrina inglesa, el "enrolled act doctrine," que despues de todo tiene ciertotinte monarquico, producto del
caracter peculiar e influencia tradicionalista de las instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep.,
371; Del.) Firman, como se sabe, la decision el ponente Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres, Johnson,
Moreland y Araullo, sin mingun disidente.Y notese que cuando se promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en
vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba reformado por la Ley No. 2210. que
 entre otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: ". . . Entendiendose, que en el caso de las Leyes de la Comisionde
Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existeuna copia firmada por los Presidentes y los secretarios de
dichos cuerpos, sera prueba concluyente de las dispociones de la ley en cuestion y de la debida aprobacion
delas mismas." ¿Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de hacer prevalecer la doctrina
americana sobrela doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Cortehubiera sido aplicar el citado articulo 313
del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. No lo hizo, paso por alto sobreel mismo, yendo directamente al diario de
sesiones dela Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay algun respeto a la regla
del stare decisis, estaes una magnifica ocasion para demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de
abrogarse asi como asi; sobretodo cuando de por medio anda la Constitucion como enel presente caso en que
se ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la ley fundamental ha sido violada en unrespecto muy
importante como es el capitulo sobre enmiendas, y la queja no solo no es temeraria sino que se hallaapoyada
en buenas y solidas razones.
 Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en lacitada causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (1916,
Agosto 12) adoptando en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" en lugar de la inglesa del
"enrolled act," en nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de
1902, no habia ninguna disposicion que proveyera mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones de la
Legislatura sehiciesen constar los sies y los nos en la votacion de cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion,
consignando especifica mentelos nombres de los miembros que hayan votado enpro y en contra, ni tampoco
habia ninguna disposicione statutoria a dicho efecto. De modo que en aquella epoca el diario de sesiones de la
Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de veracidad que ahora posee en virtud de esa disposicion que
hace obligatoria la constancia oconsignacion de los sies y nos, disposicion incorporada enla Constitucion del
Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4;
seccion 20, incico 1; seccion 21, inciso 2.)
 Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no puede haber duda. Ese articulo, que
equivale a una regla de prueba, no se ha incorporado enel Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una
regla fundada en un principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino de algo peculiar aislado, acerca del
cuallas autoridades estan divididas, con una mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en
contra, suno inclusion en el Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene queconsiderarse necesariamente como una
derogacion. Indudablemente esta Corte, al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, ha
querido derogarlo en vistade los resuelto en la citada causa de Estados Unidos contraPons y de la novisima
disposicion insertada en la Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica, que exige la consignacion
en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada votacion final de proyecto de ley o resolucion conjunta, con
especificacion de los nombres de los que hasvotado.
 Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen masrazones para reafirmar en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina
americana del "journal entry" o "constancia en el diario desesiones" (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del Codigo
de Procedimiento Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa disposicion
denuestra Constitucion que hace obligatoria la consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o
resolucion, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hayan votado enfavor y en contra, hace del diario de
sesiones la mejor prueba sobre autenticidad de los actos legislativos y es, porconsiguiente, la ley sobre la
materia en este pais, con entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine."Las autoridades
americanas son contestes en que siempreque en un Estado de la Union Federal la Constitucioncontiene una
disposicion semejante a la nuestra sobre sies y nos la regla de prueba no es la copia impresa de la leyo
"enrolled act," sino el "journal entry" o constancia enel diario de sesiones. (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)
 Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera porque los abogados de los
recurridos arguyen fuertemente en favor de la doctrina de la copia impresa o "enrolled act doctrine," y la
mayoria de esta Corte acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal de Field vs. Clark en
apoyo de la doctrina.
 He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la diligencia de que he sido capaz y
he llegado a la conclusion de que nuestros predecesores enesta Corte merecen todo encomio por su
indubitable aciertoal adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons, supra, la
doctrina americana del "journal entry" o constancia en el diario de sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de que
esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas liberal, y tambien mas humana y mas concorde con la realidad. La
doctrina inglesa del "enrolled act" ocopia impresa de la ley esta basada en el derecho comun y se adopto en
Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y la forma de gobierno es monarquica,y se adopto
en un tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas alto tribunal de justicia, era absoluto y
transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy ligeras. Por eso un tribunal americano ha dicho:
"Because such a rule obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a monarchial form of government, that
cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its application in this state, where the will of the sovereign power
hasbeen declared in the organic act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito con frecuencia este asunto
famoso de Delaware porque es en el mismo donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre
ambas doctrinas: la americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled act.")
 Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a favor de la doctrina del "journal
entry." Lo resuelto en el asunto federal de Field contra Clark, enque tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha
hecho mas que fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va en vuelta lainferencia de que cuando la
Constitucion establece ciertos requisitos para la aprobacion de una ley o resolucion, conla consignacion de
los sies y nos y los nombres de los que han votado afirmativa y negativamente, el diario de sesioneses el que
rige y prevalece como modo e instrumento de autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativode
Union Bank vs. Commissioners of Oxford (199 N.C., 214; 25 S.E., 966; 34 L.R.A., 487), la Corte Supremade
North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente.
 According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases in the courts of last resort in 30 states,
and also by the Supreme Court of the United States, that when a state Constitution prescribes such formalities
in the enactment of laws as require a record of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals, these journals are
conclusive as against not only a printed statute, published by authority of law, but also against a duly enrolled
act. The following is a list of the authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either directly or by very close
analogy. . . . It is believed that no federal or state authority can be found in conflict with them.
 Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr. vs. Coke (116 N.C., 223; 22 S.E. 16; 28 L.R.A., 737; 47 Am. St.
Rep., 801, supra, to the effect that, where the Constitution contains no provision requiring entries on the journal
of particular matters — such, for example, as calles of the yeas and nays on a measure in question — the
enrolled act cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals. That, however, is very different proposition
from the one involved here, and the distinction is adverted to in Field vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495;
36 Law. ed., 294. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)
 Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos ha dicho lo siguiente:
 But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South Ottawa vs. Perkins, 94 U.S., 260; 24 Law., ed.,
154, on appeal from the United States court for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice Bradley delivering the
opinion), said: "When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be
deemed a valid law, unless by the journals of the Legislature it appears to have been regularly passed by both
houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The courts of
Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless parties bring the matter to their attention, but on general
principles the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one and must be so regarded by the courts of the
United States." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 387.)
 Se dice que el interest publico exige que el "enrolled act" o copia impresa de la ley firmada por los Presidentes
deambas Camaras del Congreso de declare concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos, confusion:
cualquierase creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley o resolucion, impugnando la autenticidad de su
aprobacion ode su texto. Pero esto pone en orden las siguientes preguntas que se contestan por si mismas:
?no es el diariode sesiones un documento constitucional, exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve por las dos
camaras del Congreso, controlado y supervisado por dichas camaras y por los oficiales de las mismas? ¿que
mejor garantia de autenticidad, contra la falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar
obligatoriamente en el diario, en la votacionde todo bill o resolucion, los sies y los nos, y haciendoconstar los
nombres tanto afirmativos como negativos? ¿se ha producido por ventura caos y confusion en los Estados
americanos que han adoptado esta regla y que, segun admiten los mismos recurridos, forman una decisiva
mayoria? ¿se acaso posible concebir que el sentido americano, tan practico, tan utilitario, tan, realista, optase
poruna regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion? Prescindiendo ya de la jurisprudencia que, ya hemos visto,
estadecididamente inclinada a favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry" ?que dicen los tratadistas mas
autorizados, los de nombradia bien establecida, y sobre todolos especialistas en derecho constitucional?
 El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 193, dice lo siguiente a favor del
"journal entry rule":
 Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193), says: "Each house keeps a journal of its
proceedings which is a public record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If it would
appear from these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the
Legislature did not follow any requirement of the Constitution or that in any other respect the act was not
constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void. But whenever it is
acting in apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of the
action of a legislative body. It will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either
house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts,
unless when the Constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance,
where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered."
 Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction, seccion 46 y siguientes, tambien
sedeclara a favofr del "journal entry rule" con el siguiente pronunciamiento:
 The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly passed, unless there is evidence of which
the courts take judicial notice showing the contrary. The journals are records, and, in all respects touching
proceedings under the mandatory provisions of the Constitution, will be effected to impeach and avoid the acts
 recorded as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals affirmatively show that these provisions have been
disregarded. . . . The journals by being required by the Constitution or laws, are record . . ..
 When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a paramount law, for the obvious purpose of
showing how the mandatory provisions of that law have been followed in the methods and forms of legislation,
they are thus made records in dignity, and are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly authenticated
are also records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such journals are parallel records; but the latter are
superior, when explicit and conflicting with the other, for the acts authenticated speak decisively only when the
journals are silent, and not even then as to particulars required to be entered therein. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl.
Rep., p. 378.)
 Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece toda clase de respetos. Pero creo no
seme tachara de parcial ni ligero si digo que sobre el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me inclino
mas y doy mayor peso a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de Sutherland, por razones obvias. Wigmore nunca
pretendio serespecialista en derecho constitucional. Con mucho tino elponente en el tantas veces citado asunto
de Rash contra Allen dice lo siguiente de la opinion del celebrado constitucionalista:
 We have quoted Judge Cooley's language because of the great respect that his opinions always command, and
also because of the fact that it is upon the authority of his opinion that many of the decisions in support of
the American rule have been based. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)
 Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados sobre el particular lleva a uno al
convencimiento de que la tendencia actual en America es a tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas
en vez de la simpleforma, el caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la ficcion legal, para ir a la realidad misma.
Y no cabe duda deque el "enrolled act" se presta a veces a tener mas apoyo en el artificio y ficcion legal,
mientras que el diario desesiones, con las fuertes garantias de autenticidad como las que se proveen en
nuestra Constitucion y en Constituciones similares americanas, reproduce y refleja la realidad de los hechos
relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad. Tomemos como ejemplo el presente caso. La copia impresade la
resolucion cuestionada, firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso, reza que la misma
fueaprobada debidamente con los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, pero esto no es mas que
unaopinion, una conclusion legal de los presidentes, pues noconsta en dicha copia impresa el numero concreto
de votos emitidos, ni el numero concreto de la totalidad de miembros actuales de cada camara. Tampoco
constan en dichacopia impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion, los sies y nos de la votacion, con los nombres
de los que votaron afirmativa y negativamente. Asi que, con solo esa copiaimpresa a la vista, no podemos
resolver la importantisima cuestion constitucional que plantean los recurrentes, a saber: que la votacion fue
anticonstitucional; que arbitrariamente fueron excluidos de la votacion 11 miembros debidamente cualificados
del Congreso — 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes; que, por virtud de la exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11
miembros, el numero de votos emitidosen cada camara a favor de la resolucion no llegani constituye las tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion; y que, por tanto, la resolucion es ilegal, anti-constitucional y
nula. Para resolver estas cuestiones, todastremendas, todas transcedentales, no hay mas remedio queir al
fondo, a las entrañas de la realidad, y todo ello no sepuede hallar en el "enrolled act," en la copia impresa dela
ley, que es incolora, muda sobre el particular, sino enel diario de sesiones donde con profusion se dan tales
detalles. ¿No es verdad que todo esto demuestra graficamentela evidente, abrumadora superioridad del
"journalentry" sobre el "enrolled act," como medio de prueba?
 Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro dela legislacion jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de
la Union es decididamente en favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry"; que en Filipinas desde 1916 en
que se promulgo la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons la regla es el "journal entry rule"; que
esta regla se adopto por este Supremo Tribunal enun tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313 del Codigo
de Procedimiento Civil y cuando el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura no gozaba de los prestigios de que goza
hoy, en virtud de las rigidas y fuertes garantias sobre autenticidad de las votaciones legislativas provistas en
nuestra Constitucion; que ahora que el referido articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya ha sido
derogado porel Reglamento de los Tribunales y se hallan vigentes esasgarantias constitucionales que
son mandatorias, la reglaindiscutible y exclusiva sobre la materia es el "journal entry rule"' que la regla
americana es mas liberal y mas democratica que la regla inglesa, la cual tiene un evidente sabormonarquico;
que el puebo filipino jamas tolerara un sistemamonarquico o algo semejante; que el cambiar de regla ahora es
un paso muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la reaccion y puede dar lugar a la
impresionde que las instituciones de la Republica filipina tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del
"enrolled act" es un instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver conflictos constitucionales que se iran
planteando ante los tribunales, e inclusive puede fomentargroseros asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por el
contrario, la doctrina americana del "journal entry" es amplia, eficaz, y permite que con toda libertad y
desembarazose puedan resolver los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, sin evasivas ni debilidades; y,
por ultimo, que nuestro deber, el deber de esta Corte, es optar por la doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los
procesos ordenadosde la ley y de la Constitucion y evitef situaciones en que el ciudadano se sienta como
desamparado de la ley y dela Constitucion y busque la justicia por sus propias manos.
 VII
 La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria, estima innecesario discutir la cuestion
de si los 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes que fueron excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros del
Congreso. Es decir, lo que debiera ser cuestion fundamental — el leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio decidendi en este
caso — se relegaa termino secundario, se deja sin discutir y sin resolver. No puedo seguir a la mayoria en esta
evasion: tengo que discutir este punto tan plenamente como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es
precisamente lo principal — el meollo del caso.
 Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluido seran miembros actuales del Senado cuando se voto la
resolucion cuestionada, por las siguientes razones:
 (a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en
autoscomo anexos, dichos Senadores fueron proclamados por la Comision de Elecciones como electos
juntamente con sus 21 compañeros. Despues de la proclamacion participaron en la organizacion del Senado,
votando en la eleccion del Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el Senador Vera recibio 8 votos para
Presidente contra el Senador Avelino que recibio 10. Tambien participaron en algunos debates relativos a la
organizacion.
 (b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y enel diario de sesiones que prestaron su juramento de cargo
ante Notarios particulares debidamente autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose depositado
dicho juramento en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin embargo, que ese juramento no era valido porque no
se presto colectivamente, en union con los otros Senadores. Esto es unerror. La Ley sobre la materia es el
articulo 26 del Codigo Administrativo Revisado, a saber:
 By whom oath of office may be administered. — The oath of office may be administered by any officer generally
qualified to administer oath; but the oath of office of the members and officers ofeither house of the legislature
may also be administered by persons designated for such purpose by the respective houses.
 Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es evidente que el Senador y Representante
puede calificarse prestando el juramento de su cargo antecualquier funcionario autorizado para administrarlo; y
la disposicion de que tambien pueden administrar ese juramento personas designadas por cada camara es solo
decaracter permisivo, opcional. Y la mejor prueba de estoes que antes del advenimiento de la Republica el
Senadodhabia reconocido la validez del juramento de cargo prestadoante un Notario Publico por otros
Senadores de la minoria los Sres. Mabanag, Garcia, Confesor y Cabili. Amenos que estas cosas se tomen a
broma, o la arbitrariedadse erija en ley — la ley de la selva, del mas fuerte — no esconcebible que el juramento
ante Notario se declare validoen un caso y en otro se declared invalido, concurriendo lasmismas circunstancias;
 (c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran
en autos como anexos, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus sueldos y
emolumentos como tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del Senado hasta ahora, incluso naturalmente el
tiempo en quese aprobo la resolucion cuestionada. Es violentar demasiadola argucia el sostener que un
miembro de una camara legislativa puede cobrar todos sus haberes y emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser
legalmente miembro de la misma. El vulgo, maestro en la ironia y en el sarcasmo, tiene unamanera cruda para
pintar esta situacion absurda: "Tiene, pero no hay". ¿Como es posible que las camaras autoricen el
desembolso de sus fondos a favor de unos hombres que, segun se sostiene seriamente, no estan legalmente
cualificados para merecer y recibir tales fondos?
 (d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no son miembros del Senado porque,
envirtud de la Resolucion Pendatun, se les suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del
juramento, ya hemos visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto dela suspension del derecho al asiento, he
discutido extensamente este punto en mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de
anticonstitucional ynula la suspension. Pero aun suponiendo que la mismafuera valida, los recurrentes alegan y
arguyen que no poreso han dejado de ser miembros los suspendidos. La alegaciones acertada. La suspension
no abate ni anula lacalidad de miembro; solo la muerte, dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto
(vease Alejandrinocontra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101; vease tambien United States vs. Dietrich,126 Fed.
Rep., 676). En el asunto de Alejandrino contra Quezon hemos declarado lo siguiente:
 Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en toda su larga historia no ha suspendido a
ninguno de sus miembros.Y la razon es obvia. El castigo mediante reprension o multavindica la dignidad
ofendida de la Camara sin privar a los representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es
permisiblevindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo dando asi oportunidad a los representados
de elegir a otro nuevo; pero la suspension priva al distrito electoral de una representacion sin quese le de a ese
distrito un medio para llenar la vacante. Mediante la suspension el cargo continua ocupado, pero al que lo
ocupa se le ha impuesto silencio. (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil.,100, 101.)
 La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de la votacion es todavia mas
firme.Consta igualmente, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones
obrantes en autos, que dichos 8 Representantes tambien se calificaron, alinaugurarse el Congreso, prestando
el juramento de sucargo ante Notarios Publicos debidamente autorizados; quesu juramento se deposito en la
Secretaria de la Camara; que han estado cobrando desde la inauguracion hasta ahoratodos sus sueldos y
emolumentos, excepto dos los Representantes Taruc y Lava que han dejado de cobrar desde hacealgun
 tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas deliberaciones, las relativas al proyecto de resolucion
parasuspenderlos.
 Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe estadiferencia fundamental: mientras con respecto a estos
ultimosla Resolucion Pendatun sobre suspension llego aaprobarse adquiriendo estado parlamentario, en la
Camarade Representantes no ha habido tal cosa, pues la resolucionde suspension se endoso a un comite
especial para su estudioe investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no ha tomadosobre ella ninguna accion, no
favorable ni adversa. Demodo que en el caso de los Representantes hasta ahora nohay suspension, porque de
tal no puede calificarse la acciondel Speaker y del macero privandoles del derecho detomar parte en las
deliberaciones y votaciones. Para queuna suspension produzca efectos legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales,
tiene que decret arla la Camara misma, pormedio de una resolucion debidamente aprobada, de acuerdocon los
requisitos provistos en la Constitucion. Nada deesto se ha hecho en la Camara.
 El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que "El Congreso, en sesion conjunta, por el
voto detres cuartas partes de todos los miembros del Senado y dela Camara de Representantes votando
separadamente, puede proponer enmiendas a esta Constitucion o convocar unaconvencion para dicho efecto."
Donde la ley no distingueno debemos distinguir. La frase todos los miembros debeinterpretarse como que
incluye todos los miembros elegidos, no importa que esten ausentes o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente
cuando no estan suspendidos como en el casode los ya citados 8 Representantes. El Juez Cooley, ensu ya
citada obra Constitutional Limitations, hace sobreeste particular los siguientes comentarios que son terminantes
para la resolucion de este punto constitucional, a saber:
 For the votre required in the passage of any particular law the reader is referred to the Constitution of his State.
A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by
the Constitution, a two-thirds of three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class of
bills, two-thids or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate that
this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is intended. (A constitutional requirement that the
assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill
appropriating the public money or property for localor private purposes, is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by
calling a bill a "joint resolution".)
 (Footnote: "Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus frittered away." Allen vs. Board of State
Auditors, 122 Mich., 324; 47 L.R.A., 117.)
 (Footnote: "By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some particular subjects, are required to
be adopted by a majority voted, or some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of "the whole
representation." These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account whether present or
not. Where a majority of all the members elected is required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not
on that account to be excluded in the count. (Satterloo vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal.,314.)" (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 291.)
 VIII
 Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los recurrentes para plantear el presente
litigio. Sin embargo, en nuestras deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sbore si los
recurrentestien en interes legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y, por tanto, para invocar nuestra
jurisdiccion en el presentecaso. La duda es si el interes que alegan los recurrentesno es mas bien el general y
abstracto que tiene cualquier otro ciudadano para defender la integridad de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso seria
insuficiente para demandarante los tribunales, los cuales, segun el consenso de las autoridades, no estan
establecidos para considerar y resolver controversias academicas y doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales,
en que hay algun dano y perjuicioo amago de dano y perjuicio.
 Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de losrecurrentes es incuestionable. En primer lugar, 11 de
ellosson miembros del Congreso, y alegan que se les privo delderecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion
cuestionaday que si se les hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no hubiese obtenido la sancion de las tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion. ¿Que mayor interes legalque este? Ellos dicen que sus votos
hubieran sido decisivos, que con su intervencion parlamentaria hubies en salvado alpaid de lo que consideran
amago de una tremenda calamidad publica — la concesion de iguales derechos a los americanos para explotar
nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades publicas. ¿No es este amago de dano, para ellos individualmente y
para el pais colectivamentem, adecuado y suficiente para crear un interes legal? En el asunto de
Coleman vs. Miller, supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se resolvio a favor de los recurrentes. Como ya
hemos visto, estos eran 20 Senadores del Estado de Kansas que alegaban que en la propuesta ratificacion de
la 18.ª Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal sus votos que daron abatidos por elvoto decisivo del Teniente
Gobernador. La Corte Federal declaro que esto constituia interes legal suficiente y adecuado.
 En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y contribuyentes de Filipinas. Naturalmente,
como tales tienen derecho a participar en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion de
utilidades publicas, con exclusion de los americanos y otros extranjeros. De ello se sigue logicamente que
cualguier actolegislativo que anule y abrogue esa exclusividad afectarapersonalmente a sus derechos,
amagandolos de un probable perjuicio. Esto, a mi juicio, crea un interes legalade cuado u suficiente para litigar.
 Esto no es un interesmeramente academico, abstracto. (Vease Hawke vs.Smith, 253 U.S., 221, 227; 64 Law.
ed., 871, 875; 40 Sup.Ct., 495; 10 A. L. R., 1504; veanse tambien Leser vs.Garnett, 258 Ud.S., 130, 137; 66
Law. ed., 505, 571; 42 Sup.Ct., 217; Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R., 698.)
 En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba ser "ciudadano y elector del Estado de Ohio, y
comoelector y contribuyente del Condado de Hamilton, en sunombre y en el de otros similarmente situados,
presento una solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado para que se prohibiera al Secretario de Estado
a que gastara fondos publicos en la preparacion e impresion de balotaspara la sumision al electorado de la 18.ª
Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal para su ratificacion. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante
tenia intereslegal y, por tanto, personalidad y derecho de accion para demandar.
 En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes alegaban ser electores cualificados de Maryland y
solicitaban la exclusion de ciertas mujeres del censo electoralpor el fundamento de que la Constitucion de
Maryland limitaba el sufragio a los varones y la 19.ª Enmiendaa la Constitucion Federal no habia sido
validamente ratificadaa. Lo Corte Suprema Federal fallo tambien que los demandantes tenian interes legal
suficiente y adecuado.
 IX
 Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto sele pregunto a uno de los abogados de los recurridos,
creo que el mismo Secretario de Justicia, cual seria el remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se sostiene
que en elpresente caso se trate de una materia no judicial, injusticiable, y, que, por tanto, los tribunales nada
tienen que hacer. El Secretario de Justicia contesto: ninguno. Lounico que los recurrentes pueden hacer es
esperar las elecciones y plantear el caso directamente ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de
caracter politico. Esto mismose dijo en el caso de Vera contra Aveino, supra, y reiterolo que alli he dicho sobre
este argumento, a saber:
 Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, desalentadorde que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene
remedio ni bajo la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se lesdice que no tienen mas que
un recurso: esperar laas elecciones y plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eligiendoles o elevandoa su partido al poder, repudiando, en
cambio, a los recurridoso a su partido. Algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de este argumento. Se podria
decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es expeditoni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis anos, asi que no se les podra exigir ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo
tiempo. Se podria decir tambien que en una eleccion politica entran muchos factores, y es posible quela
cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por
otros "issues" maspresionantes y decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que, independientemente de la justicia de
su cuasa, un partido minoritario siemprelucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.
 Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento esque no cabe concebir que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligros ovacio en donde
quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constituciony de la ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente frente a
lo que el considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactoresde la Constitucion conocian muy bien
nuestro sistema de gobierno — sistema presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidaddel tipo
ingles — el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en lospaises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de
seguridad politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacudenlos cimientos de la nacion, el
parlamento se disuelve y se convocanelleciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues" del
dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin violencia. El sistema presidential no tiene esa
valvula. El periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, porejemplo, el periodo es de
seis años para el Senado, y de cuatro años para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas
elecciones generalesy otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi esharto peligroso, es jugar
con fuego el posibilitar situaciones dondeel individuo y el pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la Constitucion
y de las leyes, bajo procesos ordenados y expeditos, paraprotegar sus derechos. (Vera contra Avelino, pags.
363, 364.)
 Fued Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politicaera conveniente que el pueblo americano tuviera
una revolucion cada veinte años. Parece que el gran democratadijo esto no por el simple prurito de jugar con
laparadoja, con la frase, sino convencido de que la revoluciones el mejor antidoto para la tirania o los amagos
de tirania.
 Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones delinmortal autor de la Decaraction de Independencia,
creoque la revolucion es siempre revolucion, la violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion, desquiciamiento
de los resortes politicos y sociales, derramamiento de sangre, perdidade vidas y haciendas, etcetera, etcetera.
Asi que normalmente ninguno puede desear para su pais la violencia, aun en nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud
publica.
 Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucionsin sangre, esa que no pocas veces se ha
consumado v. gr. en la historia contemporanea de Inglaterra, yaun de America misma. Y ese ideal es
 perfectamente realizable permitiendo el amplio juego de la Constitucion y delas leyes, evitando pretextos a la
violencia, y no posibilitando situaciones de desamparo y desesperacion.
 Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica, la mejordoctrina judicial es la que en todo tiempo encauza y
fomentalos procesos ordenados de la Constitucion y de la ley.


 Footnotes
 PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
 1 Omitted.

 BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., dissidente:

 1 Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.

 2 Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P. Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez, Tomas Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O.

Vera, Ramon Diokno, y Jose E. Romero.

 Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario Cabigon, Floro Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan,
Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin Y. Kintanar, Vicente Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P. Primicias, Nicolas
Rafols, Jose V. Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez, Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson, George K. Tait, y
Leandro A. Tojong.
 Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y Sofronio Quimson, Nacionalista Party,
Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party, respectivamente.
 3 Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez Vito, Francisco Enage y Vicente de Vera, respectivamente.

 Marciano Guevara, Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero, Auditor y Director de Imprenta, respectivamente.
 4 La politica de nacionalizacion de la recursos naturales yutilidades publicas incorporada en nuestra

Constitucion no es unapolitica nueva, sino que trae su origen de nuestro pasado remoto, dela historia colonial
misma de España en Filipinas. Los primeros conflictos de los filipinos con los conquistado es tenian por causala
propiedad de la tierra; los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicarel dominio del suelo que creian detentado por
los colonizadores. Estos conflictos fueron agravandose con el tiempo condensan dose enla formidable cuestion
agraria que en las postrimerias del siglo diecinueve fue enm gran parte la causa de la revolucion contra
España. Lass campanas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el Katipunan de Bonifacio tomaron gran parte de su
fuerza, de su valor combativo, delos agravios provocados por la cuestion agraria. La Liga Filipinade Rizal
estaba fundamentalmente basada en un ideario economico nacionalista, de control y dominio sobre la riqueza y
recursos delpais.
 "Cuando America establecio aqui su soberania su mayor acierto consistio en echar los cimientos de su politica
fundamental de 'Filipinas para los filipinos.' Primero el Presidente McKinley, y despues los Presidentes Taft y
Wilson, consolidaron esta politica. El congresoaprobo leyes tendentes a la conservacion de terrenos publicos
yrecursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de 1.º de Julio de 1902 conocida por Ley Cooper. En estas leyes se
limitaba y restringia la adquisiciony uso de bienes de dominio publico por particulares.
 "Una pruebaf palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener rigidamente la politica de conservacion
del patrimonio delos filipinos fue la investigacion congresional provocada por el Congresista Martin, de
Colorado, en relacion con la venta de terrenos delos frailes en Mindoro, a una compañia americana en exceso
de las 1,024 hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto diolugar a uno de los episodios mas
famosos en la carrera del Comisionado Residente Quezon. Este relata su campaña en su autobiografia 'The
Good Fight,' a saber:
 "'My next address to Congress took place when a congressional investigation was being urged by Congressman
Martin of Colorado to determine how the Government of the Philippines was carrying out the policy laid down by
Congress, that limited to 1024 acres the maximum area of government land that could be sold to corporations or
individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the United States has taken the Philippines to prevent the
exploitation of the Filipino people by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives. American capital interested in the
sugar industry has acquired two very large tracts of land which the Philippine Government had bought from the
friars with the funds bonds issued under the security of the Philippine Government. The avowed purpose in
buying these extensive properties from the Spanish religious orders was to resell them in small lots to Filipino
farmers, and thus to do away with absentee landlordism which had been the most serious cause of the
Philippine rebellion against Spain. The reason given for the sale of these lands to American capital by the
American official in charge of the execution of the congressional policy were two-fold: First, that the act of
Congress referred only to lands of the public domain not to lands acquired by the Government in some other
way. And second, that the sale of these lands was made in order to establish the sugar industry in the
Philippines on a truly grand scale under modern methods, as had been done in Cuba. It was further alleged that
such a method would bring great prosperity to the Philippines.
 "'I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the establishment of the sugar industry under
those conditions would mean the debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. 'Moreover,' I argued, 'large
investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the permanent retention of the
 Philippines by the United States.' At the climax of ny speech I roared: If the preordained fate of my country is
either to be a subject people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter.'
 "'The investigation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and although the sales already made were
not annulled, no further sales were made in defiance of the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by President
Quezon, pp. 117-119.)'
 "Para implementar la politica de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino bajo la Ley Jones y la Ley del
Commonwealth fundo con una gruesa capitalizacion las corporaciones economicas del Estado comoel
Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, National Cement Company, National Power
Corporation, y otras.
 "Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se creo la Comision de Servicios Publicos."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON
B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The
rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of
novelty – but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the
wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done
here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of
constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.

The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13 respectively,
respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment on the part of the
respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral
argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.
1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion
of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then concluded: "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere.
It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court
says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter
of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be
too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so
convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In
declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the
latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then,
this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be
cited. 13

2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how it may
be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes
necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated earlier,
petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same
powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." 14One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 15When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted
by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is
Concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new.
In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question
was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in
that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the
retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is
but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively
discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our
people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that
they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of
the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of this
contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by
the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is
merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal
texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed to deviate from such a
principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.

(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The language of the
Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body,
can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to
assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened
as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises
its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth
votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of
land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No.
3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then
is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from
the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were
properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to
the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited
1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of
the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining
the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.

1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments
proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory
provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of
the December 17, 1977 referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime
Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976
Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments
proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive
power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to
existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted
for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in
the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the
proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so,
i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and
not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been
withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were
invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or
manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the
government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is
anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen)
in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of
the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing
complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite
for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the
Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion
in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,'
if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people,
an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to
the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious
influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the
people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these
safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people
decree their own fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of our
state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved
in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake
and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order enjoining
the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976 amendments
proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with the mandatory
provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 , questioning the validity of
the December 17, 1977 referendum – exercise as to the continuance in office as incumbent President and to be Prime
Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976
Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision of dismissal of the petitions.

I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments
proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive
power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the Constitution had not come to
existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted
for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in
the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the
proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so,
i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and
not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been
withheld.

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were
invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or
manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the
government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law is
anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.

3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen)
in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of
the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing
complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite
for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the
Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion
in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,'
if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people,
an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to
the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious
influences. We believe the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the
people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these
safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people
decree their own fate."

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of our
state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved
in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake
and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Footnotes

1 Resolution Nos. 28, 104 and 106(1981).

2 Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.

3 L-56350, Samuel C. Occena v. The Commission on Elections, The Commission on Audit, The National
Treasurer and the Director of Printing.

4 L-56404, Ramon A. Gonzales v. The National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections. The other
co-petitioners are Manuel B. Imbong, Jo Aurea Marcos- Imbong, Ray Allan T. Drilon, Nelson V. Malana
and Gil M. Tabios.

5 There was on March 24 an amended petition in Occena, adopting the theory of petitioner Gonzales
that the 1935 Constitution was once again in force and effect.

6 It should not be lost sight of that four other cases where decided in the joint resolution of dismissal
dated March 31, 1973, Tan v. The Executive Secretary, L-36164; Roxas v. Melchor, L-36165;
Monteclaro v. The Executive Secretary, L-36236; Dilag v. The Honorable Executive Secretary, L-36283,
all reported in 50 SCRA 30.

7 The six votes came from Justices Makalintal Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra.

8 The four votes were cast by then Chief Justice Concepcion, the late Justice Zaldivar, and Justice
Teehankee as well as the writer of this opinion.

9 50 SCRA at 141. Concepcion, C.J., dissented from this concluding statement.

10 Black, The People and the Court 56-58 (1962).

11 Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 17-18 (1964).

12 G.R. No. 56158-64, March 17, 1981.

13 Cf. Garcia v. Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 143;

Buendia v. City of Baguio, L-34011, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 155; Flores v. Flores, L-28930, August 17,
1973, 52 SCRA 293; Alfanta v. Nao, L-32362, September 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 76; People v. Molina, L-
30191, October 7, 1973, 53 SCRA 495; People v. Zamora, L-34090, November 16, 1973, 54 SCRA 47;
Republic v. Villasor, L-30671, November 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 83; Paulo v. Court of Appeals, L-33845,
December 18, 1973, 54 SCRA 253; People v. Bacong, L-36161,

December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288 and Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Herrera, L-25232, December
20, 1973, 54 SCRA 312.

It may be mentioned that the first of such cases, Garcia, was promulgated on July 25, 1973 with the
writer of this opinion as opposite and the next case, Buendia, also on the same date, with Justice
Teehankee as ponente, both of whom were dissenters in Javellana, but who felt bound to abide by the
majority decision.

14 1976 Amendments, par. 2. The last sentence follows: "However, it shall not exercise the powers
provided in article VIII, Section 14, (1) of the Constitution." Article VIII, Section 14, par. (1) reads as
 follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. no treaty shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by a majority of all the members of the National Assembly."

15 Article XVII, Section 15 of the Constitution reads as follows: "The interim National Assembly, upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof."

16 L-52265, 95 SCRA 755.

17 Ibid, 762.

18 L-32476, October 20, l970, 35 SCRA 367.

19 lbid, 369-370.

20 Cf. Ex parte Kerby, 205 P279 (1922).

21 Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

22 L-52265, 95 SCRA 755, 762. The writer of this opinion, along with retired Chief Justice Concepcion
and Justices Makalintal and Bengzon, is committed to the view expressed in the ponencia of the retired
Chief Justice that in the final analysis the question of proper

submission reduces itself not as to power, which is the concern of the judiciary, but as to wisdom, which
is entrusted to the constituent body proposing the amendments. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 801. The opposing view was set forth by Justice Sanchez.

Teehankee, J.

1 73 SCRA 333 (1976).

2 80 SCRA 538 (1977).

3 80 SCRA 525 (1977).

4 L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702 and Resolution denying motion for reconsideration dated Nov.
4, 1971.

5 21 SCRA 774.

6 21 SCRA, at page 817.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer,respondents.
Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party,
whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the
official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita
Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao
Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who
eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo
Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run
for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was
next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose
respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his
recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his
recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well
as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners
allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the
Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these
respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority
and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without
color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of
respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco
and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and
void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M.
Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants
to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators
chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than
the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3)
Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five
members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators
having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".

Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary
injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or
hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs
against the respondents.".

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and
validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and
of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical
assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the
Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
"petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2)
more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite
the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect
their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines,
and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of
public opinion.".

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an
action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to
perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form
part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be
exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other
hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they
do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of
an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom
devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the
Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial
Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).

The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised
its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into
the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this
does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial
power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and
approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any
other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called
"judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of
the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the
validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue,
but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its
eventual destruction. 4.

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked
by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to
the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining
whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy
the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been
weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine
the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of
votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the
Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution
gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2)
Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias
claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in
the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon
(supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement
of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended
mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization
and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon,
in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the
Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right
vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.

xxx xxx xxx

The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the
proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be
entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to
use petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had
declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the
issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he
nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel
aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action
in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to
the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would
constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be
upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may
take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in
the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr.
President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol.
III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the
aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case
to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or
not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of
the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers
are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial
review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments
of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political
policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional
provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these
limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a
given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed
in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is
frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the
constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake
Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108;
emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-
compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court
said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If
this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final,
regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so
often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.

xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to
be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis.
497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C.
C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the
Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to
the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but
because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may
exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the
limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of
the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as
representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the
limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain
and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said
were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether
the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the
Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary
authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine
whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein.

II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and
lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23)
members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the
president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator
Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the
provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate.
Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are
members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being
devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to
the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion
would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the
minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion.
Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the
reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim,
Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp.
329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of
Senator Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate,
namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369).
Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its
spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators
already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations
of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question
before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel,
with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator
Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party,
nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body,
and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-
and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and
Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen,
Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but
because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The
Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to
record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con
la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para
ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda
aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista
Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of
authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and
Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the
Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be
compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as
the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their
election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf
of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the
fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators
Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a
motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens
Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the
movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created
a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Tañada
formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that
Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the
framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened,
stating:.

"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of
votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a
matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a
privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere
privilege to nominate," adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind
that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to
bear in mind, .. that when Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a
coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when
Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby
become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere
coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we
should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the
effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.

"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the
minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he
is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of
public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the
point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to
help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the
"privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party
in this Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for
doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator
Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of
the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall",
therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February
1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any,
weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any,
unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the
doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a
constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight,
and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions
than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts,
even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S.,
71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein
adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover,
said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is
more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said
change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory
nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same
term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and
must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even
tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of
each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important
still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents'
pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of
providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative
Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the
determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were
many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests
controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the
irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the
determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of
public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the
organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was,
gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election
contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator
Sumulong declared:.

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the
majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a
majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of
that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there
were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of
the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that
case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it
was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority
injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few
and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was
that the majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did
commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine
members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the
second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will
sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the
members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the
corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the
Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns
and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and
the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system
obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that
power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the
determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past." (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line
because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and
the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also
be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the
National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco
summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but
also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan
manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was
impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but
also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no
tyranny on the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices.
So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or
the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party
in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the
protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the
three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the
tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the
doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the
application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these
electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set
aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that
the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be
applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the
formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the
certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the
party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party
in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many
have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that
these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with
the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63
Phil., 139), he asserted:.

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ
and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having
in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el
draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria
que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la
mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de
sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los
de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp.
168-169; emphasis supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment,
first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To
achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the
party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given
the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and
(b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties,
so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who
had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this
Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two
parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold
the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis
supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal
it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is
hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the
Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that
we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be
free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three
from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go
there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the
deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees
or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of
the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members
the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to
serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution
when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially
and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the
Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have
no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several
members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and,
hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any
Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the
Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively
making the nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second
largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do
not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the
equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the
Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects
the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be
organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is
to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and
whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the
letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be
distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other
question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be
obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from
construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of
permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms
of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable
operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the
language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be
carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the
construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new
law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the
thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of
essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute
relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than
substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct
of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is
regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of
the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the
other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory,
and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the
legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when
same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words
and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of
Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the
Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting
balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is
vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said
procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the
case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate
was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349,
354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the
spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens
Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority
party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would
worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination
and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5)
members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the
Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy
underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed.
What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu
thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of
election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to
forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As
a matter of fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was
based, not upon their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the
Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the Constitution
thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of
those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great
note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that
the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the
composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to
shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the
pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As
above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party
represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of
the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would
establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for
example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections
to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or
terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of
election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who
would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents,
it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party
A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would
make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in
power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.

xxx xxx x x x.

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by
candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the
statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check
on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a
function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple
reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority
party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a
test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and,
sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or
public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure
outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of
the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should
not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such
effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the
exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner
Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and
Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination.
He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel
applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the
other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not
in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the
case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate,
distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those
Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal;
that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other
three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of
them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such
nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to
hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with
the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held
in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction
and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation
to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the
case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A.
Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as
such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said
Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the
qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes therein." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged
to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that
three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of
votes, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision
involved. Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.

"Sir:.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of His Excellency, the
President, in which you request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':.

`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having
the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.'.

"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is impossible to
comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Assembly.'.

"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the
National Assembly; and that (2) of the six members to be chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be nominated by
the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party having the second largest number of votes.
"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral
Commission shall be composed of `three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of
vote three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court ..(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally adopted by the Convention, the
Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, an and three by the party having the second largest number
of votes' (Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).

"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention of the framers of our
Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It was also intended to create
a non-partisan body to decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. The primary object was
to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan considerations.

"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled
to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to
nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may
nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the
National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been intended. We
cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the
next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is
intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties
in the Assembly.

"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they
shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstances may
have so changed as to make a different rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the
Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the
election of any member of the minority party is protested. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was
to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members of the
Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly,
the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the
three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has
undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion, as well as, the considerations that must
have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National
Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such nomination.".

Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally organized, with six
members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme Court.
Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by
an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each house, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
(Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution.).

If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be
assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which gave rise to the
abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify
said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original
constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members
regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of Congress.
It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong to the
same party. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the
conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary.

Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the second
largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief Justice may similarly designate
less than three Justices. If not absurd, would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the
Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members
of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines,
checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the
Justices of the Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives.
Upon the other hand, he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed their faith
and confidence in the independence, integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the
Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme
Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.

In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party, the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was
justified, in obedience to the constitutional mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endencia, J., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.

I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.

The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the Constitution.).

I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character and that this
character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which defines the
manner in which the members shall be chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory
construction.

"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory effect than is
true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of
constitutional fiat; that its character is such as to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the
very principles of our institutions, involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy, are such as to form
reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it .."
(Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).

The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista
Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other members the Senate
may not elect said two other members. And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the
constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. This holding is subject to the following fundamental
objections. In the first Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the
power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so
in effect this right or prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the
hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the
supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and
paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural
provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by interpretation
inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely,
a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the
membership of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not
justified by any rule of law or reason.

I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members must be
construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the constitutional provision as a whole, but
with the dictates of reason. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional
provision, that which fixes membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine
may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify
each other should be reconciled to make them both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of
other legal principles. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.

While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to
enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to
say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized
power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda
vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599; McDaniel
vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48
Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50 Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil, 399;
Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56;
Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz.,
1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs.
M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.

2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of the Electoral Tribunals
under the Constitution as amended.

3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of the Philippines, 84 Phil.,
368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84
Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil.,
456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51
Off. Gaz., 5607.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From the very nature of the American system of

government with Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government, it
has devolved on the judiciary to determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the
fundamental law. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to judge of the
Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the obligations imposed in the instrument, and in the order
of time pointed out by it. When the, judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of the other two departments are held to be
unauthorized or despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they cease to be operative or
binding.

xxx xxx x x x.

"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of government
and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the court are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. It
is their duty in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions
irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.

"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law
unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal
before which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the
authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional cause
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other
course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a
judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by
political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-715; emphasis
supplied).

5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100;
State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly
vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs. Melver, 72
N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs.
Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.

6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate that the Assembly is
entitled to six in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to
nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may
nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the
National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been intended; We
cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the
next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is
intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties
in the Assembly.

`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they
shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstance may
have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the
Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the
election of any member of the minority party is protected. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was
to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members of the
Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly,
the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the
three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has
undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the considerations that must
have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National
Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such nomination." Annex A to the
Answers pp. 2-3.

6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up or discussed, until
the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).

6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral Commission
formed part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of contemporaneous and practical
construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.
7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the following language:.

"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner prescribed in the
Constitution, the party that received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party which is the Nacionalista
Party now, and three to represent the party receiving the next highest number of votes therein, meaning the minority
party, the party receiving the next highest number of votes. But there was a great deal of opinion that it would be better
if this political organization, so far as the legislative department is concerned, could be tempered by a sort of a judicial
reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to each Electoral Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And that, I
think, was the reason because a great majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle.
That is why we have nine members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I
remember then and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three members representing
a party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it would be better that even on that hypothesis
or on that supposition it would be better, in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes
against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the case because
then it would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices of the Supreme
Court are supposed to be beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having reached the highest judicial
position of the land, these persons would likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).

8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.

9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

10 Senator Lim said:.

"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second largest
number of votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter
into the mind and heart of a senator belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I agree with Your Honor,
Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the Constitution is clear that the three must come from the party
having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated must belong to the party having the second highest
number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow Your Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium
should be maintained, because partisan considerations enter when one is with the majority party, and that no party
should prevail, Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that to
the extent that the only three can be nominated from the party having the largest number of votes and three from the
party having the second largest number of votes." (Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis
supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

The statement of Senator Sabido was:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two
parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold
the balance of power. That is the ideal situation.".

xxx xxx x x x.

".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those participating in
the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral tribunal either as protestants
or protestees, in order to insure impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349, 352; emphasis supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

Senator Cea declared:.

".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the Senate in the
Electoral Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350; emphasis supplied.).
The words of Senator Paredes were:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine
members three of them belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three from, the party having the
second largest number of votes so that these members my represent the party, and the members of said party who will
sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).

11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but, also, by the fact that
constitutional provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be mandatory, "unless the contrary is
unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as
follows:.

"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or
directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency
of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard
constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard
them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions
are intended to be merely directory. The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little
value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.

"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said
that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be
regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and
mandatory, without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes." (II Am.
Jur. 686-687; emphasis supplied.).

12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.

13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court, recalled that:.

"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to
accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission."(emphasis supplied.).

Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or grant of
authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by resolution of one House of
Congress, a mere creature of said charter.

14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or a total of six
(6) members of the Tribunal.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-66088. January 25, 1984.]

ALEX G. ALMARIO, ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., DORINTINO FLORESTA, FIDELA Y. VARGAS, ET
AL., Petitioners, v. HON. MANUEL ALBA and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS BASED ON PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. — The present
provisions of the Constitution are adequate to support any program of the government for the grant of public lands to qualified
and deserving citizens or for the implementation of urban land reform. Homesteads and free patents are "grants." We likewise
see no constitutional infirmity to a law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, under the present Constitution, that would grant
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not more than twenty four (24) hectares to any qualified tenant, farmer, and
other landless citizen in areas reserved by the President, acting pursuant to such law.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE PEOPLE. — The necessity,
expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or
not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are
unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION; REQUIREMENT FOR FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION ADEQUATELY MET. — Batas Pambansa Blg.
643 directs the COMELEC to publish the amendments. The respondents assure us that publication in all provinces and cities,
except a few where there are no local newspapers, has been affected and that Barangays all over the country have been enjoined
to hold community gatherings for this purpose. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various civic organizations have taken a
strong stand for or against the last two proposed questions. Television and radio programs regularly broadcast the amendments.
The petitioners have failed to explain why, inspite of all the above, there is still fair and proper submission.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS ALREADY AUTHORIZED UNDER THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. —
Resolution No. 105 deals with the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants,
farmers and other landless citizens. Resolution No. 113 deals with urban land reform and social housing program. They are, then,
immediately recognizable as logical and necessary extensions of the fundamental principle of social justice enshrined as far back
as the 1935 Constitution and expanded in the present Constitution. Our adoption of such principle antedated the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by thirteen years. To my mind, therefore, no question need arise under the standard of proper
submission.

PLANA, J., concurring:chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS ALREADY AUTHORIZED UNDER THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. —
Reflecting on Section 11, Article XIV and Section 6, Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution, it seems evident that what is sought to be
adopted under Questions 3 and 4 of the forthcoming plebiscite based on Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa, is already authorized under the existing Constitution. The proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3
and 4 would just be confirmatory of a legislative power already existing, it stands to reason that a protracted discussion of the
proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3 and 4 is neither necessary nor constitutionally required.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION COMPLIED WITH. — There is compliance with Article XVI,
Section 2 of the Constitution, under which a proposed Constitutional amendment shall be submitted to a plebiscite "which shall
be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment." The proposed amendments under Questions 3 and 4, as
embodied in Resolutions 105 and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa, were adopted on November 21 and December 19, 1983,
respectively. From November 21, 1983, when Resolution No. 105 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be a spread
of 67 days. On the other hand, from December 19, 1983, when Resolution No. 113 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there
would be a spread of 39 days.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO COMPELLING REASON FOR A SEPARATE PLEBISCITE FOR THE APPROVAL OF QUESTIONED PROPOSALS. —
There is no compelling reason why so much of the people’s money should be spent for holding a separate plebiscite when the
purpose, by and large, of the second is merely to confirm an existing Constitutional power.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: chanrob 1e s virt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; REQUIREMENT OF FAIR AND PROPER
SUBMISSION. — The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated
by the Court in Tolentino v. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729) mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time, but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which
it has to form a harmonious whole." There must be fair submission and intelligent consent or rejection. As the late Justice
Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales v. Comelec, concurred in by the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774, 817), the people must be "sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN
GIVEN AMPLE TIME TO COMPREHEND THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES THEREOF; RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENTS
IN A PLEBISCITE SHOULD BE ENJOINED. — There has not been ample time and dissemination of information to comprehend the
significance, implications and complications and consequences of the proposed amendments so as to comply with the
fundamental requirements of a fair and proper submission in order that the people may intelligently approve or reject the same.
It is, therefore, but proper, in accordance with due process in dealing with such a fundamental instrument as the Constitution
which basically is a charter of limitation of the powers of government, that the precipitate submittal on January 27, 1984 of
Questions Nos. 3 and 4 for the people’s ratification or rejection be enjoined. It is far better to avail of the maximum 90-day
period after the approval of the proposed amendments for their submittal in a plebiscite so that the people may at the proper
time make their decision with the fullest possible comprehension. During this interval, the separate and completely different
second additional paragraphs proposed to be inserted in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution in conflicting Resolutions Nos.
105 and 113 (103) as pointed out on pages 2 and 5 hereof should be clarified. Otherwise, if the plebiscite is held on the 27th, the
people would just have to go by the position taken by the State at the hearing of January 24th that their remedy is to vote "No"
against the proposed amendments which they do not understand (or are "unnecessary").

ABAD SANTOS, J., separate opinion: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS IN A PLEBISCITE TO BE DEFERRED. — Partial relief
should be granted to petitioners as there is manifest basis for their claim that the citizenry has not been adequately educated on
the proposed amendments on grant of public lands and urban land reform. The petitioners cite the case of Tolentino v. Comelec
and although the instant case does not fall squarely under said decision, that case can serve as a guide in the resolution of this
case. No question is raised with respect to Questions 1 and 2 which have been thoroughly discussed in public and private fora for
which reason there is no cause to delay their submission to the people. Preparations for the plebiscite on January 27, 1984, have
reached the point of no return. questions 1 and 2 can and should be submitted to the people on plebiscite day but Questions 3
and 4 should be submitted at some other appropriate date.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., separate opinion: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; PROCEDURE ADOPTED THEREFOR SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL INQUIRY. — What may be noted in Article XVI is that, besides the provision for the number of votes necessary for the
Batasan’s proposal to amend or revise the Constitution, or to call a convention or propose to the people the calling of a
convention, the procedure for the revision or amendment of the Constitution has not been established. Hence, the procedure
shall be as the Batasan shall adopt in the exercise of sound judgment, in the understanding that when it does so, it acts only as a
constituent assembly and not as a legislative body. If the Batasan, as a constituent assembly, should provide for the revision or
amendment of the Constitution in a manner not consonant with fundamentals of democracy and of good government, and its
action is challenged, this Court can assume jurisdiction to resolve the controversy.

2. ID.; ID.; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; BATASANG PAMBANSA
RESOLUTIONS PROPOSING THE SAME SUBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT IN THE CIVIL CODE. — Publication is a
fundamental requirement for Resolution 105 and Resolution 113 and it has been sought to be done in BP 643, a statutory law
setting January 27, 1984 for the plebiscite. In the same way that the people are entitled to know what laws have been approved
by the Batasan, through their publication in the Official Gazette, the same requirement should be followed in respect of
resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, a statutory law setting January 27, 1984 for the
plebiscite, where the people can vote on the proposed constitutional amendments, it should be published in the Official Gazette
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. The Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided." The important factor in the codal provision
is the publication, and the date of effectivity of the law is of secondary importance. I do not subscribe to the proposition that,
when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity it no longer needs to be published. The provision should be interpreted such
that when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity, it shall not become effective after fifteen days of publication but it shall
be effective after publication, on the date provided in the statute itself.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. — A reading of the minimum standards
set in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) will readily show that principles of good government require that, in a
plebiscite for the revision of the Constitution, aside from other standards set, the ballots should set out in full the proposed
constitutional amendments so that there can be no question that when a citizen had voted "yes" or "no", he thoroughly knew
what he had voted for or against. Publication is for the general public. Individual notice should also be given to the voter and this
can be done easily through the ballot that he will cast. Thus, in the case of non-resident defendants, summons is published in a
newspaper of general circulation but it is also required that summons be served to him individually through registered mail sent
to his last known address. In the ballots to be prepared for the January 27 plebiscite, as mentioned in BP 643, the citizen is not
made aware of the exact amendments which have been proposed by the Batasan. Said law merely makes mention of the
amendments in substance. For example, anent Question No. 3, that the "grant" is limited to 24 hectares is not stated. Question
No. 4 is not even indicated. Again, to my mind, there is failure of effective publication. It is not enough that the citizen is
expected, or required, to read the newspapers and posted copies in public places.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY AMENDMENTS TO BE HELD WITHIN 3 MONTHS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF LAST
PUBLICATION. — If BP 643 is published in the Official Gazette, and the ballots for the plebiscite should contain in full the
proposed amendments to the Constitution, the plebiscite can be held on a stated date within 3 months following the completion
of the last publication. The number of days after completion of the last publication, whether it is ten days, one month, or three
months, will be a question which this Court will have no jurisdiction to resolve. It is very clear in Article XVI of the Constitution
that the plebiscite shall be held in so many number of days after approval of the amendment provided they do not exceed 3
months. The number of days is within the exclusive power of the Batasan to determine.

RELOVA, J., separate opinion: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; REQUIREMENT OF PROPER SUBMISSION NOT MET. — It is safe to say that the
people in the provinces are not, and by Friday (January 27) will not be sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects
thereof. Undersigned takes judicial notice of the fact that they have not been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon
conscientiously. As stated by this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702, 729, "in order that a plebiscite for
the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." In the case at bar, it is sad to state that proposed Amendments 3
and 4 have not been fairly laid before the people for their approval or rejection. In fact, said proposed Amendments have only
been translated into Tagalog and Cebuano. There has been no translation thereof in the many other dialects in which case it
cannot be said that our people were afforded ample opportunity to understand and deliberate over them.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or
reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO
answers. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 and 4, which cover Resolution Nos. 105
and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the
doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite
but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature
and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

The questions to be presented to the electorate at the plebiscite are: cha nrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

QUESTION NO. 3

Do you vote for the approval of amendments to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Resolution Numbered
105 which, in substance, provide that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands belonging to the public
domain and that the agrarian reform program may include the grant or distribution of alienable lands of the public domain to
qualified tenants, farmers and other landless citizens.

QUESTION NO. 4

Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in its Resolution
Numbered 113, adding the following paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Constitution: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving landless, homeless
or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire land and decent housing consistent with
Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

After a careful consideration of the issues raised in the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, the answer of the
Solicitor General, and the arguments of the parties during the hearing on January 24, 1984, the COURT Resolved to DISMISS the
petition for lack of merit.

Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution which states: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1a w libra ry

x x x

SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

allows a period of not more than three months for the conduct of information campaigns. The sufficiency of the period during
which amendments are submitted to the people before they vote to either affirm or reject depends on the complexity and
intricacy of the questions presented. The petitioners have failed to show that the addition of the one word "grant" to Section 11,
Article XIV to make the provision read: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

". . . nor may any citizen hold such (alienable) lands (of the public domain) by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire
by purchase, homestead, or GRANT in excess of twenty four hectares. . ." cralaw virtu a1aw lib rary

or that the addition of two paragraphs including one on urban land reform to Section 12 of Article XIV to make it read: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

SEC. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.

"SUCH PROGRAM MAY INCLUDE THE GRANT OR DISTRIBUTION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN TO QUALIFIED TENANTS, FARMERS AND OTHER LANDLESS CITIZENS IN AREAS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY BY OR
PURSUANT TO LAW RESERVE FROM TIME TO TIME, NOT EXCEEDING THE LIMITATIONS FIXED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SECTION.

"THE STATE SHALL MOREOVER UNDERTAKE AN URBAN LAND REFORM AND SOCIAL HOUSING PROGRAM TO PROVIDE
DESERVING LANDLESS, HOMELESS OR INADEQUATELY SHELTERED LOW INCOME RESIDENT CITIZENS REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE LAND AND DECENT HOUSING CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THIS
CONSTITUTION." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

result in amendments of such nature that when the people go to the polls on January 27, 1984 they cannot arrive at an
intelligent judgment on their acceptability or non-acceptability.

The present provisions of the Constitution are adequate to support any program of the government for the grant of pub]ic lands
to qualified and deserving citizens or for the implementation of urban land reform. Homesteads and free patents are "grants." We
likewise see no constitutional infirmity to a law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, under the present Constitution, that would
grant alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not more than twenty four (24) hectares to any qualified tenant,
farmer, and other landless citizen in areas reserved by the President, acting pursuant to such law. Nor is it correct to say that
after the agrarian land reform program now being implemented and the agitation for a similar program in urban areas, the
meaning of "urban land reform" is not yet understood. Questions No. 3 and No. 4, if ratified with an affirmative vote, will serve at
most a symbolic purpose. That much the Solicitor General conceded when he stated that the amendments under Question No. 3
serve to confirm existing practice pursuant to long standing legislation. Any interpretation of "grant" will, therefore, carry the
weight of applicable precedents which surround the associated words "homestead" and "purchase" in the same clause of the
Constitution. Similarly, any legislation laying down the rules on urban land reform will have to survive the constitutional tests of
due process, equal protection, police power, reasonable compensation, etc., now applied to agrarian land reform. chanrob les vi rtua l lawlib rary

More important, however, is that the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of
the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or
whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are
presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional
mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their
own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or
the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the
dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of
public land or of "urban land reform." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

As argued by the Solicitor-General: jgc:cha nrob les.c om.ph

"‘Agrarian reform program", for example, has been in the ‘consciousness of the Filipino people’, to borrow a phrase from the
petitioners, since 1972 with the passage of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972), emancipating our tenants and transferring to them
ownership of the land they toil, without mentioning the fact that even prior to this, there were several laws enacted attempting at
land reform, notably Rep. Act No. 3844 (1964), ordaining the agricultural Land Reform Code and instituting land reforms in the
country. More importantly and more to the point, ‘grant’ or ‘land grant or distribution’ are subject matters that have been in the
‘consciousness’ of the Filipino people since Commonwealth days, with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, amending
and compiling the previously scattered laws relative to the conservation and disposition of lands of the public domain.

x x x

"Similarly, the Filipino people have long been since familiar with the topics of ‘urban land reform’ and ‘social housing’, beginning
perhaps with the country’s first zoning laws and, through all these years, with such laws as Rep. Act No. 267 (1948), authorizing
cities to purchase or expropriate home sites and landed estates and subdivide them for resale at cost, P.D. No. 814 (1975),
providing a land tenure system for the Tondo Foreshore Dagat-Dagatan Urban Development Project, P.D. No. 933 (1976)
creating the Human Settlement Commission ‘to bring about the optimum use of land’, Rep. Act No. 1322 (1955) creating the
Philippine Homesite and Housing Authority, and P.D. No. 1517, proclaiming an urban land reform in the Philippines, to give but a
few samples. . . ." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 direct the COMELEC to publish the amendments. The respondents assure us that publication in all
provinces and cities, except a few where there are no local newspapers, has been affected and that Barangays all over the
country have been enjoined to hold community gatherings for this purpose. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various
civic organizations have taken a strong stand for or against the last two proposed questions. Television and radio programs
regularly broadcast the amendments. The petitioners have failed to explain why, inspite of all the above, there is still fair and
proper submission.

On the bid for additional time, the respondents point out that Resolution No. 105 will have been submitted for sixty seven (67)
days to the people on Plebiscite Day while Resolution No. 113 will have been submitted for forty two (42) days. The entire 1935
Constitution was submitted for ratification thirty six (36) days after approval of Act No. 4200. The 1976 amendments which
admittedly are much more complicated, difficult to understand, and novel and far-reaching in their implications were presented to
the people for only three (3) weeks. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (73 SCRA 333, 375), this was how this Court
answered the issue of sufficient and proper submission: jgc:cha nrobles.com. ph
"Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin are of
the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate
Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however, that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and
cognizance of this Court. Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774). Associate Justices Teehankee, and Muñoz Palma hold that prescinding from the President’s
lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper
submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in
the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra and Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702)." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The undersigned ponente would like to add his personal views to this opinion of the Court. On January 27, 1984, the average
voter who goes to the polling place and reads Question No. 3 will know whether or not he or she is in favor of distributing
alienable public lands through "grants" in addition to leases, homesteads and purchases. Upon reading Question No. 4, the voter
will know whether or not he or she is in favor of an urban land reform program. I personally find existing provisions of the
Constitution more than sufficient basis for legislation to achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments. To me, the second
question on the Vice-President vis-a-vis the Executive Committee involves more complex and difficult issues involving as it does a
collegiate body as successor to the President. Yet, no one seems to question its fair and proper submission. However, my
personal feelings about the merits or demerits of the third and fourth questions are entirely distinct and separate from the issue
of their fair and proper submission to the electorate. Like any other voter, my remedy is to vote NO on any proposal I find unwise
or ill-advised and YES on those I favor. I respect the views of those who may think differently. c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, voting to dismiss for lack of a cause action; Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Plana and
Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

While recognizing the force and eloquence with which the late Justice Sanchez in Gonzales and retired Justice Barredo in
Tolentino expounded their views on the question of proper submission, still for me — and from the strict legal aspect as to the
precise boundary which separates a question of wisdom, which belongs to the political branches, and the question of power,
which the court is duty bound to inquire into — the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, with which I concurred then,
in the one that should prevail. There is, for me, this added reinforcement to the conclusion I have reached. Resolution No. 105
deals with the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants, farmers and other
landless citizens. Resolution No. 113 deals with urban land reform and social housing program. They are, then, immediately
recognizable as logical and necessary extensions of the fundamental principle of social justice enshrined as far back as the 1935
Constitution and expanded in the present Constitution. Our adoption of such principle antedated the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by thirteen years. To my mind, therefore, no question need arise under the standard of proper submission. chan roble s virtual law lib rary

PLANA, J., concurring:chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Petitioners ask that the plebiscite set on January 27, 1984 on Questions 3 and 4 be deferred, leaving that on Questions 1 and 2
to proceed as scheduled. Grant of the petition will therefore have the effect of having two plebiscites.

Under the existing Constitution, plenary legislative power is vested in the Batasang Pambansa, including the power to enact laws
authorizing the conveyance or grant of alienable public lands to deserving citizens under prescribed terms and conditions. Indeed
there are extant so many laws providing for such disposition of public land.

Section 11 of Article XIV of the Constitution clearly recognizes the existence of the power and, on that assumption, merely
restricts the same by providing that no citizen may "acquire by purchase or homestead (alienable lands of the public domain) in
excess of 24 hectares." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

With respect to social justice measures which include urban land reform and social housing program, the present Constitution
provides —

"The State shall promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." (Article II, Section 6.)

"The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution." (Article XIV, Section 12.)

Reflecting on the foregoing Constitutional provisions, it seems evident that what is sought to be adopted under Questions 3 and 4
of the forthcoming plebiscite based on Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa, is already authorized under the
existing Constitution.
If the foregoing be correct and the proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3 and 4 would just be confirmatory of a
legislative power already existing, it stands to reason that a protracted discussion of the proposed Constitutional amendments
under Questions 3 and 4 is neither necessary nor constitutionally required.

At any rate, I find that there is compliance with Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution, under which a proposed Constitutional
amendment shall be submitted to a plebiscite "which shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such
amendment." The proposed amendments under Questions 3 and 4, as embodied in Resolutions 105 and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa, were adopted on November 21 and December 19, 1983, respectively. From November 21, 1983, when Resolution No.
105 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be a spread of 67 days. On the other hand, from December 19, 1983,
when Resolution No. 113 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be a spread of 39 days.

Finally, apart from legal considerations, I do not see any compelling reason why so much of the people’s money should be spent
for holding a separate plebiscite when the purpose, by and large, of the second is merely to confirm an existing Constitutional
power.

I therefore vote to deny the petition.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: chanrob 1e s virt ual 1aw li bra ry

I vote for the partial granting of the petition and for the elimination of Questions Nos. 3 and 4 at the Plebiscite set on January 27,
1984.

The Comelec has formulated four plebiscite questions for approval or rejection by the people of the latest proposed amendments
to the Constitution, as follows: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. Election of the members of the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) by provinces and cities and in the case of
Metropolitan Manila, by districts, instead of by regions;

2. Restoration of the office of Vice-President who shall succeed the President in case of the latter’s death or incapacity, instead of
the 15-member Executive Committee designated by him;

3. The insertion of the word "grant" in Article XIV, section 11 of the Constitution so as to provide for granting as an additional
mode (besides purchase and homestead as presently provided) for the disposition (although the word "acquisition" is used in the
question) of lands belonging to the public domain; and

4. The insertion of a second paragraph in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution so that the same would be amended to read,
as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"SEC.12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.

"Such program may include the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants,
farmers and other landless citizens in areas which the President may by or pursuant to law reserve from time to time, not
exceeding the limitations fixed in accordance with the immediately preceding Section." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

(The underlined paragraph constitutes the proposed amendment by insertion, under Resolution No. 105 of the Batasang
Pambansa adopted on November 21, 1983, entitled "Resolution Proposing Amendments to Sections 11 and 12 of Article XIV of
the Philippine Constitution, as Amended." 1) Under Resolution No. 113 of the Batasang Pambansa adopted on December 19,
1983, entitled "Resolution Proposing to Add a Last Paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution in order to
Provide for Urban Land Reform and Social Housing Program," the proposed additional second paragraph carries an entirely
different wording, as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving landless, homeless
or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire land and decent housing consistent with
Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

(This additional second paragraph providing for the inclusion of an urban land reform and social housing program appears to be
the one submitted for the people’s approval or rejection in accordance with available literature and leaflets issued by the
Comelec.)

The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated by the Court in
Tolentino v. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729) mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time, but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole." There must be fair submission and intelligent consent or rejection. 2

As the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales v. Comelec, concurred in
by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774, 817), the people must be "sufficiently
informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner."
virtua 1aw lib rary
cralaw

Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are not placed in issue by petitioners. As already indicated, they ask for the approval or rejection of the
proposed amendments for restoration of the old office of Vice President of the Republic and the old system of electing the
members of the National Assembly by provinces or by cities instead of by regions. These two proposed constitutional
amendments apparently bear the endorsement of the Government and the party in power, the KBL, as well as by the opposition
in general who have long clamored for such restoration. Hence, there appears to be no question as to their being fully understood
by the people in the same manner that they readily understood and approved the first amendment to the 1935 Constitution of
giving women the right to vote. chanro bles vi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s.com:c hanro bles. com.ph

Questions Nos. 3 and 4, however, do present a problem. They appear to be simple yet complex. Petitioners cite the separate
joint concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro and Makasiar in the Tolentino case which stopped the
scheduled plebiscite on November 8, 1971 to allow 18-year olds to vote, wherein the pungent remark was made that while the
proposed amendment "would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life’s verities that things which appear to
be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

To start with, several members of this very Court who have turned down the petition have expressed the view that the
amendments proposed by Questions Nos. 3 and 4 are "unnecessary," while others like Justice Abad Santos have expressed their
inability at this late date to comprehend the nature and significance of the proposed amendments and their implications and
complexities.

The Solicitor General himself at the hearing held on January 24, 1984 stated that in his personal (not official) perception,
Question No. 3 adding the single word "grant" as a mode of additional disposition of public lands was "unnecessary", because
"this has been done already. There are so many lots which had been donated by the government granted for that building and
their constitutionality has never been questioned." And as to Question No. 4 which would insert a second additional paragraph to
the present Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution to provide that the State shall undertake an urban land reform and social
housing program, the Solicitor General stated at the same hearing that its utility would be to "eradicate completely" any doubts
about the Government’s expropriation program for the purpose. chan robles v irt ual lawl ibra ry

The Solicitor General in his answer to the petition further submits that the proposed amendments are "relatively simple and easy
to comprehend", as follows: jgc:chanrob les.com .ph

"It is to be noted also that Resolutions 105 and 103 3 are relatively simple and easy to comprehend, even as compared to the
other four amendments proposed for ratification at the same time and the submission of which are not questioned by the
petitioners. Resolution No. 105 which proposes to amend Section 11, Art. XIV merely adds the word ‘grant’ and adds additional
paragraph in Section 12 of the same Article. The additional paragraph is really nothing new for among the government’s policies,
it has always been the policy to make lands of the public domain available to tenants, farmers and other landless citizens (see
Sec. 13, Art XIV, Constitution). And as to Resolution No. 103 which adopts as a State responsibility ‘urban reform and housing
program’ the policy is also not new and housing is, in point of fact, already among the declared objectives of government
(Section 7, Article XI of the Constitution)." (Emphasis supplied)

Professor and former Dean Froilan M. Bacungan of the U.P. College of Law shares the same view that the proposed amendments
submitted with Questions Nos. 3 and 4 are unnecessary, as follows: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"The proposed amendment to the agrarian reform program and urban land reform and social housing program may be
considered by constitutional law experts as unnecessary.

"The 1973 Constitution now has, in addition to its specific provision on agrarian reform, a very categorical provision on social
justice where the State is mandated to ‘promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people’ and
where it continues to say: ‘Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition
of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.’

"It should also be noted that the Supreme Court, interpreting constitutional law concepts such as ‘police power’ and ‘due process
of law,’ has given very much greater emphasis on the former and very much less emphasis on the latter, when it comes to the
interpretation of laws implementing economic, social and cultural rights.

"But as emphasized by its proponents, these proposed amendments on agrarian and urban land reform are most useful for they
reinforce the constitutional basis and mandate for government activities in these fields." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The Philippines Daily Express editorial of January 25, 1984 presents the following justifications for urging a "Yes" vote to the
questioned amendments, as follows: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

"As for the proposal to empower the government to grant public lands to citizens, we believe that it is a move to enhance the
development and productivity of public lands which have been idle for a long time now. Many of our countrymen are still landless,
and if they are enterprising and industrious enough to convert the great wilderness into a productive land, they should be given
all the chances to do so. The fear of some quarters that the proposal will only spawn graft and corruption emanates from
negative thinking and suspicious minds.

"On the fourth question about urban land reform, it must be noted that the proposal is nothing but a statement of national policy
in the basic charter of the land. There is already an existing law on urban land reform and it does not authorize the grabbing of
urban lands from private owners for distribution to the landless. No government in its right senses would do that.

The premises of the newspaper would seem to be contradicted by the figures given by Minister of Agrarian Reform Conrado
Estrella in a newspaper of the same date to the effect that only 3.26 million hectares of the Philippines’ total land area remain
disposable, as follows:jgc:cha nro bles. com.ph

"Estrella said the country has a total land area of 30 million hectares. Of this, 13.371 million hectares are disposable, 11.07
million are timberland, and 5.55 million unclassified.

"Of the 13.37 million hectares alienable lands, 2.75 are judicially registered, 7.35 million covered by land applications, and 3.26
million remain disposable." 4

On the other hand, all the bar associations, including the compulsory Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the voluntary bar
associations, have expressed grave doubts as to the questioned amendments. To cite a few observations, Atty. Raul Roco, IBP
President, "said the granting of such properties could be a cause of corruption among public officials. He compared the proposed
amendment to the Spanish era when vast lands were acquired by government supporters through royal grants." 5

Philippine Bar Association President Enrique P. Syquia "said the Constitution itself embodies the policy of conserving the
patrimony of the nation for all Filipinos, including those yet unborn. But Syquia said the amendment would allow these lands,
including residential, commercial, industrial, educational, charitable, and resettlement lands, to be given away freely to any
Filipino chosen at pleasure." 6

The Philippine Lawyers Association stated that "the proposed amendment, which will allow these lands, including ‘residential,
commercial, industrial,’ and other classes of land to be given away fully and freely on any Filipino chosen at pleasure, goes
against the very preamble of the Constitution. These land grants may very well be the source of patronage, graft, and corruption,
it said." 7

All these go but to show that there has not been ample time and dissemination of information to comprehend the significance,
implications and complications and consequences of the proposed amendments so as to comply with the fundamental
requirements of a fair and proper submission in order that the people may intelligently approve or reject the same. It is,
therefore, but proper, in accordance with due process in dealing with such a fundamental instrument as the Constitution which
basically is a charter of limitation of the powers of government, that the precipitate submittal on January 27, 1984 of Questions
Nos. 3 and 4 for the people’s ratification or rejection be enjoined. It is far better to avail of the maximum 90-day period after the
approval of the proposed amendments for their submittal in a plebiscite so that the people may at the proper time make their
decision with the fullest possible comprehension. During this interval, the separate and completely different second additional
paragraphs proposed to be inserted in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution in conflicting Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113
(103) as pointed out on pages 2 and 5 hereof should be clarified. Otherwise, if the plebiscite is held on the 27th, the people
would just have to go by the position taken by the State at the hearing of January 24th that their remedy is to vote "No" against
the proposed amendments which they do not understand (or are "unnecessary"). chanroble s virtual lawlib rary

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Once again the Filipino people are asked to approve or reject amendments to the 1973 Constitution.

The Batasan Pambansa, convened as a constituent assembly, approved six (6) resolutions, namely: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

1. Resolution No. 104 proposing to amend Sections Two and Four, Article VIII of the Constitution by providing that Members of
the Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned among the provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila or its districts.

2. Resolution No. 105 proposing amendments to Section 11 and 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution, as amended.

3. Resolution No. 110 proposing amendments to the Constitution to establish a different mode of presidential succession by
creating the Office of Vice-President and abolishing the Executive Committee.

4. Resolution No. 111 proposing to amend Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution by providing that at least a majority of the
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the provincial, city or district representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa.

5. Resolution No. 112 providing for an Ordinance to be appended to the Constitution apportioning the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa to the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila.

6. Resolution No. 113 proposing to add a last paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution in order to
provide for urban land reform and social housing program.

In the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 27, 1984 —

Question No. 1 deals with Resolutions Numbered 104, 111 and 112;

Question No. 2 deals with Resolution Numbered 110;

Question No. 3 deals with Resolution Numbered 105; and

Question No. 4 deals with Resolution Numbered 113.

The petition in this case is confined to questions numbered 3 and 4. The petition recites: jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph

"5. Petitioners respectfully submit that of the six (6) proposed amendments, Proposal No. 5 (Resolution Nos. 105 adopted by the
Batasang Pambansa on November 2, 1983), which would empower the President of the Philippines to grant alienable lands of the
public domain to individuals and landless citizens, and Proposal No. 6 (Resolution No. 113, adopted by the Batasang Pambansa
on December 19, 1983), which provides for urban land reform and social housing program, have not yet been properly and fairly
submitted to the understanding of the Filipino people.

"6. These two mentioned proposals bear far-reaching implications, and are bound to affect existing Constitutional and statutory
provisions as well as Supreme Court holdings on acquisition and/or disposition of public lands and on property rights particularly
in urban areas, that said proposals ought first to be thoroughly explained to the people before they are made to vote for their
approval or disapproval. Such is the import of the doctrine of fair and proper submission (Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 707
[1971]).

"7. Petitioners are not aware of any campaign by the COMELEC, nor by any other governmental agency, endeavoring to register
in the consciousness of the Filipino people the rationale behind Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 and their implications.

"8. It appears to the petitioners, therefore, — who stand to be adversely or favorably affected both as citizens and as taxpayers,
together with the rest of the Filipino electorates — to be a deception if the Filipino people are hurried to approve or disapprove
the abovestated proposed amendments to the constitution . . ." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

The petitioners pray that this Court stop the "respondents from holding the plebiscite on 27 January 1984 until the matters
complained of in the body of this petition are properly and fairly submitted for the understanding of the electorate." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

I vote to grant partial relief to the petitioners.

There is manifest basis for the claim of the petitioners that the citizenry has not been adequately educated on the proposed
amendments on grant of public lands and urban land reform. At this late date — January 24, 1984 — I am asked questions about
the two proposals and although I try to do the best I can, I am not too sure about my answers.

The petitioners cite the case of Tolentino v. COMELEC. In that case the following question was posed for resolution: jgc:cha nrob les.com. ph

"Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article
V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?" ‘ (At p. 721.)

This Court answered the question in the negative.

To be sure, the instant case does not fall squarely under the Tolentino decision but as the petitioners assert, that case can serve
as a guide in the resolution of this case. In the eloquent and ringing words of Mr. Justice Antonio P. Barredo: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." (At
p. 729.)

The petitioners do not raise any question with respect to Questions 1 and 2 and indeed I can vouch that those questions have
been thoroughly discussed in public and private fora for which reason there is no cause to delay their submission to the people.
Preparations for the plebiscite on January 27, 1984, have reached the point of no return. Questions 1 and 2 can and should be
submitted to the people on plebiscite day but Questions 3 and 4 should be submitted at some other appropriate date.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this case, petitioners have asked that this Court promulgate a judgment "stopping . . . the plebiscite on 27 January 1984" until
the constitutional amendments proposed in Batasan Resolutions Nos. 105 (Resn. 105) and 113 (Resn. 113) "are properly and
fairly submitted for the understanding of the electorate." I vote for the grant of that plea.

Article XVI of the Constitution provides: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

"SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the Batasang Pambansa upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.

(2) The Batasang Pambansa may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.

SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." cralaw virt ua1a w libra ry

What may be noted in Article XVI is that, besides the provision for the number of votes necessary for the Batasan’s proposal to
amend or revise the Constitution, or to call a convention or propose to the people the calling of a convention, the procedure for
the revision or amendment of the Constitution has not been established. Hence, the procedure shall be as the Batasan shall
adopt in the exercise of sound judgment, in the understanding that when it does so, it acts only as a constituent assembly and
not as a legislative body. If the Batasan, as a constituent assembly, should provide for the revision or amendment of the
Constitution in a manner not consonant with fundamentals of democracy and of good government, and its action is challenged,
this Court can assume jurisdiction to resolve the controversy. chanrobles lawlib rary : re dnad

What is involved herein are Resn. No. 105 adopted on November 21, 1983, Resn. No. 113 adopted on December 19, 1983, and
BP Bilang 643, enacted on December 22, 1983.

Resn. 105 has proposed that Sections 11 and 12, Article XIV, of the Constitution be amended to read as follows: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"SEC. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and developmental requirements of the natural
resources, shall determine by law the size of lands of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased
to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may
hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold
such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four
hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession; license, or permit, timber or forest lands and
other timber of forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares; however, such area may be increased by the
Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

"SEC. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.

"Such program may include the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants,
farmers and other landless citizens in areas which the President may by or pursuant to law reserve from time to time, not
exceeding the limitations fixed in accordance with the immediately preceding Section." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Resn. 113 has proposed that the following paragraph be added to Section 12, Article XIV, of the Constitution: jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph

"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving landless, homeless
or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire land and decent housing consistent with
Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution."
cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

BP 643, a statute, provides for the holding of the plebiscite on January 27, 1984 for submission to the vote of the citizenry the
adoption or rejection of the amendments proposed in Resn. 105 and Resn. 113.

That Resn. 105 and Resn. 113 have been approved by three-fourth (3/4) vote of all Batasan members is not in question.
Publication, in my opinion, is a fundamental requirement for those two resolutions, and it has been sought to be done in BP 643.
In the same way that the people are entitled to know what laws have been approved by the Batasan, through their publication in
the Official Gazette, the same requirement should be followed in respect of resolutions proposing constitutional amendments.

Coming now to BP 643, a statutory law setting January 27, 1984 for the plebiscite, where the people can vote on the proposed
constitutional amendments, it should be published in the Official Gazette pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. The Code
provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided." The important factor in the codal provision is the publication, and the date of effectivity of the
law is of secondary importance. I do not subscribe to the proposition that, when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity it
no longer needs to be published. The provision should be interpreted such that when a statute provides for the date of its
effectivity, it shall not become effective after fifteen days of publication but it shall be effective after publication, on the date
provided in the statute itself. As stated in People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, 642, "the general principle and theory that before
the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, circular must first be published and the
people officially and especially informed of said contents and its penalties." There is no "penalty" for an individual in BP 643 but
the entire statute, if not publicized, can penalize the great majority of the people. chan robles v irt ual lawl ibra ry

A reading of the minimum standards set in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) will readily show that principles of good
government require that, in a plebiscite for the revision of the Constitution, aside from other standards set, the ballots should set
out in full the proposed constitutional amendments so that there can be no question that when a citizen had voted "yes" or "no",
he thoroughly knew what he had voted for or against. Publication is for the general public. Individual notice should also be given
to the voter and this can be done easily through the ballot that he will cast. Thus, in the case of non-resident defendants,
summons is published in a newspaper of general circulation but it is also required that summons be served to him individually
through registered mail sent to his last known address. In the ballots to be prepared for the January 27 plebiscite, as mentioned
in BP 643, the citizen is not made aware of the exact amendments which have been proposed by the Batasan. Said law merely
makes mention of the amendments in substance. For example, anent Question No. 3, that the "grant" is limited to 24 hectares is
not stated. Question No. 4 is not even indicated. Again, to my mind, there is failure of effective publication. It is not enough that
the citizen is expected, or required, to read the newspapers and posted copies in public places. cha nrob les vi rtua l lawlib ra ry

If BP 643 is published in the Official Gazette, and the ballots for the plebiscite should contain in full the proposed amendments to
the Constitution, the plebiscite can be held on a stated date within 3 months following the completion of the last publication. The
number of days after completion of the last publication, whether it is ten days, one month, or three months, will be a question
which this Court will have no jurisdiction to resolve. It is very clear in Article XVI of the Constitution that the plebiscite shall be
held in so many number of days after approval of the amendment provided they do not exceed 3 months. The number of days is
within the exclusive power of the Batasan to determine.

RELOVA, J.:

Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents Commission on Elections and Minister of the Budget from holding the plebiscite on
27 January 1984. It is argued that the proposed amendments: Resolution No. 105 which would empower the President of the
Philippines to grant alienable lands of the public domain to individuals and landless citizens, and Resolution No. 113 which
provides for urban land reform and social housing program, have not been properly and fairly submitted to the understanding of
the Filipino people. Paragraph 6 of the petition states that —

"These two mentioned proposals bear far-reaching implications, and are bound to affect existing Constitutional and statutory
provisions as well as Supreme Court holdings on acquisition and/or disposition of public lands and on property rights particularly
in urban areas, that said proposals ought first to be thoroughly explained to the people before they are made to vote for their
approval or disapproval." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Respondents deny the truth of the allegations of the petition with respect to the issue of proper submission to the electorate and
claims "that Resolution No. 105 was approved on November 21, 1983 and Resolution No. 113 was approved on December 19,
1983 or 67 and 42 days, respectively, before the plebiscite scheduled on January 27, 1984. Assuredly, these periods afford
adequate and sufficient time for debate. In fact, the amendments are now being discussed all over the country, in barangay
meetings, in civic organization discussions, as well as in radio and television. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines has been
airing its views on the amendments." (pp. 23-24, Rollo)

On the questioned proposed amendments, it is safe to say that the people in the provinces are not, and by Friday (January 27)
will not be sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects thereof. Undersigned takes judicial notice of the fact that they
have not been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. As stated by this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on
Elections, 41 SCRA 702, 729, "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." In
the case at bar, it is sad to state that proposed Amendments 3 & 4 have not been fairly laid before the people for their approval
or rejection. In fact, said proposed Amendments have only been translated into Tagalog and Cebuano. There has been no
translation thereof in the many other dialects in which case it cannot be said that our people were afforded ample opportunity to
understand and deliberate over them. Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774,
expressed his view on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people
of a proposed constitutional amendment. He said: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

". . . amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber
stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare
them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the
incubus of extraneous or possibly insidiuous influences. We believe the word ‘submitted’ can only mean that the government,
within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one
citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and
another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

Undersigned is of the view that in the instant case the people have not been properly informed of proposed Amendments 3 & 4 to
the Constitution and, accordingly, its submission to them should be postponed. Respondents are hereby enjoined from submitting
them to the people on Friday, January 27, 1984. However, the plebiscite should proceed with respect to proposed Amendments 1
& 2.chanrobles law lib rary : re d

January 24, 1984.

Endnotes:

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: chanrob 1e s virt ual 1aw li bra ry

1. As published by the Comelec in the Evening Post issue of December 30, 1983.

2. See writer’s separate opinions in Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, 405 (1976) and Occeña v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1, 12
(1981).

3. The Solicitor General’s reference to Resolution No. 103 would appear to be erroneous. The official resolution as published by
the Comelec to provide for urban land reform refers to the No. of the Resolution as 113, not 103.

4. Bulletin Today issue of Jan. 25, 1984, p. 6.

5. Bulletin Today issue of Jan. 20, 1984.

6. Bulletin Today issue of Jan. 25, 1984.

7. Bulletin Today issue of January 24, 1984.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-60258 January 31, 1984

SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Samuel Occeña in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

PLANA, J.:

This petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of
May 17, 1982 "from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party ... or
prohibits a political party, political group, political committee ... from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the
barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is prayed that —

... judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections NULL AND VOID ab initio, for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and directing the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the
involvement of political parties, political committees, political organizations and other political group. 1

The constitutionality of the prohibition vis-a-vis non-political groups is not challenged.

This Court has considered the Comments of the Solicitor General as an Answer and deemed the case submitted for
decision after the oral arguments on May 5, 1982. 2

The legal provisions in question read as follows:

SEC. 4. Conduct of elections. — The barangay election shall be, non-partisan and shall be conducted in
an expeditious and inexpensive manner.

No person who filed a certificate of candidacy shall represent or allow himself to be represented as a
candidate of any political party or any other organization; and no political party, political group, political
committee, civic religious, professional or other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall
intervene in his nomination or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support directly or
indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election: Provided, That this
provision shall not apply to the members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity prior to the personal campaign staff of the candidate which shall not be more
than one for every one hundred registered voters in his barangay: Provided, further, That without
prejudice to any liability that may be incurred, no permit to hold a public meeting shall be denied on the
ground that the provisions of this paragraph may or will be violated.
 Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an
impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office.

SEC. 22, Penalties. — Violations of this Act shall constitute prohibited acts under Sec. 178 of the 1978
Election Code and shag be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provisions of said code.

The petitioner contends —

(a) That the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is violative of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations arid societies for purposes not contrary to
law.

(b) That the ban is incompatible with a democracy and a parliamentary system of government.

The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always
subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to
serve appropriate and important public interests. (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835: Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA
28). Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case.

Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be it noted that thereunder, the right to organize is intact.
Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the
election of barangay officials on May 17, 1982 is prescribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only
on concerted or group action of political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) ... shall be construed as in any manner affecting
or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office."
Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the
personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in Ms barangay) can engage in
individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate.

Aside from the narrow character of the restriction thus impose, the limitation is essential to meet the felt need of the
hour. Explaining the reason for the non-partisan character of the barangay election when he sponsored Parliamentary
Bill 2125 which later became BP Blg. 222, Minister of State for Political Affairs Leonardo B. Perez said

Mr. Speaker, we must not lose sight of the fact that the barangay is the basic unit not only of our social
structure but also of our political structure. As much as possible, we believe that it would be a more
prudent policy to insulate the barangays from the influence of partisan politics.

Mr. Speaker, we have seen the salutary results of the non-partisan election of the members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971. We all recall, Mr. Speaker, that the election of Concon delegates was
non-partisan and, therefore, when history will judge that Constitutional Convention, it can be safely
stated that Constitutional Convention did not belong to any political party because it was chosen under a
non-partisan method; that it was a constitutional convention that was really of the people, for the people
and by the people. So we should not be concerned and our attention should not be focused on the
process but on the after effects of the process. We would like to say later on, Mr. Speaker, that the
barangays, although it is true they are already considered regular units of our government, are non-
partisan; they constitute the base of the pyramid of our social and political structure, and I think that in
order that base will not be subject to instability because of the influence of political forces, it is better that
we elect the officials thereof through a non-partisan system.

There are other reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political
campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also
act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in
conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa
appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of
settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local controversies within the barangay
either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties
for barangay officials to be shielded form political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political
parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the
impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social
structure.

This is not the first time that a restriction as that prescribed in Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 has been judicially
challenged. In Imbong vs. Comelec, supra, the first paragraph of Section 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132 was assailed as
unconstitutional for allegedly being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the law,
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Like Section 4 of BP Blg. 222, Section 8(a) of
RA 6132 prohibited:

1. any candidate for delegate to the (Constitutional) Convention

(a) from representing, or.

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization; and

2. any political party, political group, political committee, civil, religious, professional or other organization
or organized group of whatever nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or
against his campaign for election.

In refusing to declare the assailed legal provisions as unconstitutional, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Makasiar,
said:

The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or
otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its proviso permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of
the members of his family within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff
composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. ... The right of a member of any
political party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such
member acts individually. ...

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional
rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the
aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners. ...

In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave 'due recognition to the legislative concern to
cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral process impressed as it was by the explanation
made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tanada, who appeared as amicus curiae, 'that such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as of violence that of late
has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. lie did invite our attention
likewise to the well settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring
governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed
by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded.

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded
by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo
Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them equality of chances.
The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another
substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their
individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and
Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as
 against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion,
predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both
senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the
major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate
mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or
organization supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the
guarantee of social justice under Sec. 5, Art. 11 of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal
opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuason in
the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration.

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true that
Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala
prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times, One such act is the party or organization support
proscribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid limitation on The freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support.

xxx xxx xxx

The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery
and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does no
have.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing
organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political
party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not
evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As
emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with
talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their
services if elected.

Since Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act is almost a verbatim copy of the first paragraph of Section 8(a) of Republic
Act No. 6132, the quoted arguments in support of the constitutionality of the latter apply as well in support of the former.

II

The petitioner argues that in a democracy, all elections necessarily must be partisan. This is not so. For in a
representative democracy such as ours, there is merely a guarantee of participation by the people in the affairs of
government thru their chosen representatives, without assurance that in every instance concerted partisan activity in the
selection of those representatives shall be allowed, unless otherwise mandated expressly or impliedly by the
Constitution. The case of Imbong vs. Comelec has precisely rejected the petitioner's posture.

Nor does a parliamentary system of government carry the guarantee that elections in all levels of government shall be
partisan. Under the Constitution, there is an implicit guarantee of political party participation in the elections for
President and members of the Batasang Pambansa. For the outcome of the elections for President determines the
subsequent accreditation of political parties.

The political parties whose respective candidates for President have obtained the first and second
highest number of votes in the last preceding election for President under this Constitution shall be
entitled to accreditation if each has obtained at least ten percent (10%) of the total number of votes cast
in such election. If the candidates for President obtaining the two highest number of votes do not each
obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the total number of votes cast, or in case no election for President
shall as yet have been held, the Commission on Elections shall grant accreditation to political parties as
may be provided by law. (Art. XII-C Sec. 8.)
On the other hand, the presence and participation of majority and minority parties are essential to the proper working of
the Batasang Pambansa, the operation of which assumes that there is a ruling political party that determines the
program of government and a fiscalizing political party or parties to curb possible abuses of the dominant group.

Outside of the cases where the Constitution clearly requires that the selection of particular officials shall be thru the
ballot and with the participation of political parties, the lawmaking body, in the exercise of its power to enact laws
regulating the conduct of elections, may in our view ban or restrict partisan elections. We are not aware of any
constitutional provision expressly or impliedly requiring that barangay officials shall be elected thru partisan electoral
process. Indeed, it would be within the competence of the National Assembly to prescribe that the barangay captain and
councilmen, rather than elected, shall be appointed by designated officials such as the City or Municipal Mayors or
Provincial Governors. If barangay officials could thus be made appointive, we do not think it would be constitutionally
obnoxious to prescribe that they shall be elective, but without political party or partisan involvement in the process in
order to promote objectivity and lack of partisan bias in the performance of their duties that are better discharged in the
absence of political attachment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. Petitioner, as a taxpayer, has no cause of action for prohibition to test the constitutionality of the
Barangay Election Law. Prohibition is not proper in this case.

FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:

The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Plana deserves to be commended for the thoroughness with which it
analyzed all pertinent issues and for the soundness of the conclusion reached. My concurrence in the result is due to
certain reservations insofar as the ponencia would rely on Imbong v. Commission on Elections, 1 as the basis for limiting the
constitutional right to freedom of association.

The concluding paragraph of the dissent of Justice Teehankee cites an excerpt from my concurring and dissenting
opinion in Imbong I stressed therein the constitutional right to freedom of association, implicit in which is "the right to join
others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives characterized as "embraced within if not actually encouraged
by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution." 2

I stand by what I said. That does not, for me at least, conclude the matter. My dissent was predicated on the ban on the
1971 Constitutional Convention Delegates. here the ban is on Barangay candidates. There is then, for me, a significant
distinction. Hence the result reached by the Court is for me entitled to acceptance.

Nor would I want to be misunderstood. The ponencia of Justice Plana is equally deserving of approval insofar as his
treatment of what a barangay stands for is concerned: Thus: "There are other reasons for insulating the barangay from
the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council,
apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the
distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain,
together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the
barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps
settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the
objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. In fine,
the ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the
unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials
as the basic unit of our political and social structure. 3

Now as to what I believe is the test of the permissible limitation on freedom of association. As set forth in
my ponencia in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 4 referred to in the opinion of the Court: "It is indispensable not
only for its enhancing the respect that should be accorded a human personality but equally so for its assurance that the
wishes of any group to oppose whatever for the moment is the party in power and with the help of the electorate to set
up its own program of government would not be nullified or frustrated. To quote from Douglas anew: 'Justice Frankfuter
thought that political and academic affiliations have a preferred position under the due process version of the First
Amendment. But the associational rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view much broader and cover the
entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion. In my view, government
ran neither legislate with respect to nor probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups whether popular or unpopular, that exist in this country.' Nonetheless, the
Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations
or societies when their purposes are contrary to law'. How should the limitation 'for purposes not contrary to law' be
interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an
association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for
abridging the right to form associations or societies." 5

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I submit that the case has become moot and academic, since the May 17, 1982 barangay elections have already been
held with the enforcement of the questioned prohibition against political party or other organized group support for or
against any candidate.

If the Court should nevertheless render judgment upholding the validity of the questioned prohibition, I wish to record my
dissent. Experience has shown, as stated in my dissent in Badoy, Jr. vs. Comelec (35 SCRA 285), that such structures
and restrictions in elections which constitute the most elemental and direct participation of the citizen in the conduct of
government and necessarily imply political or concerted group activity and support, (more so, on the barangay level), far
from suppressing the evils of "political partisanship" work to foment them by denying "non-political" candidates the very
freedoms of effectively appealing to the electorate through the public media and of being supported by organized
groups that would give them at least a fighting chance to win against candidates of the political kingpins. The political
bigwigs are meanwhile left to give their "individual" blessings to their favored candidates, which in actuality is taken by
all as the party's blessings.

For brevity sake, I reproduce herein by reference my separate dissenting opinions in the cases of Badoy, supra, and In
re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. (35 SCRA 429) that the herein challenged provision (similar to the challenged Con-Con Act
[Republic Act 6132]) in the cited cases "oppressively and unreasonably straitjacket the candidates as well as the
electorate and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom
of association, and deny due process and the equal protection of the laws," and that "(S)uppression of free, open and
public discussion of men and issues, particularly in times of elections, goes against our traditions of liberty and
freedom."

Finally, a reference to the separate opinions of the now Chief Justice in the cited cases would be enlightening. As he
stated in the Imbong case: "I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political
parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. The right of an individual to join others
of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually
encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its
origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution. (35 SCRA at page 47-48)

I accordingly vote to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. Petitioner, as a taxpayer, has no cause of action for prohibition to test the constitutionality of the
Barangay Election Law. Prohibition is not proper in this case.

FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:

The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Plana deserves to be commended for the thoroughness with which it
analyzed all pertinent issues and for the soundness of the conclusion reached. My concurrence in the result is due to
certain reservations insofar as the ponencia would rely on Imbong v. Commission on Elections, 1 as the basis for limiting the
constitutional right to freedom of association.

The concluding paragraph of the dissent of Justice Teehankee cites an excerpt from my concurring and dissenting
opinion in Imbong I stressed therein the constitutional right to freedom of association, implicit in which is "the right to join
others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives characterized as "embraced within if not actually encouraged
by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution." 2

I stand by what I said. That does not, for me at least, conclude the matter. My dissent was predicated on the ban on the
1971 Constitutional Convention Delegates. here the ban is on Barangay candidates. There is then, for me, a significant
distinction. Hence the result reached by the Court is for me entitled to acceptance.

Nor would I want to be misunderstood. The ponencia of Justice Plana is equally deserving of approval insofar as his
treatment of what a barangay stands for is concerned: Thus: "There are other reasons for insulating the barangay from
the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council,
apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the
distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain,
together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the
barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps
settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the
objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. In fine,
the ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the
unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials
as the basic unit of our political and social structure. 3

Now as to what I believe is the test of the permissible limitation on freedom of association. As set forth in
my ponencia in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 4 referred to in the opinion of the Court: "It is indispensable not
only for its enhancing the respect that should be accorded a human personality but equally so for its assurance that the
wishes of any group to oppose whatever for the moment is the party in power and with the help of the electorate to set
up its own program of government would not be nullified or frustrated. To quote from Douglas anew: 'Justice Frankfuter
thought that political and academic affiliations have a preferred position under the due process version of the First
Amendment. But the associational rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view much broader and cover the
entire spectrum in political ideology as well as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion. In my view, government
ran neither legislate with respect to nor probe the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the
myriad of lawful societies and groups whether popular or unpopular, that exist in this country.' Nonetheless, the
Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations
or societies when their purposes are contrary to law'. How should the limitation 'for purposes not contrary to law' be
interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an
association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for
abridging the right to form associations or societies." 5

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I submit that the case has become moot and academic, since the May 17, 1982 barangay elections have already been
held with the enforcement of the questioned prohibition against political party or other organized group support for or
against any candidate.

If the Court should nevertheless render judgment upholding the validity of the questioned prohibition, I wish to record my
dissent. Experience has shown, as stated in my dissent in Badoy, Jr. vs. Comelec (35 SCRA 285), that such structures
and restrictions in elections which constitute the most elemental and direct participation of the citizen in the conduct of
government and necessarily imply political or concerted group activity and support, (more so, on the barangay level), far
from suppressing the evils of "political partisanship" work to foment them by denying "non-political" candidates the very
freedoms of effectively appealing to the electorate through the public media and of being supported by organized
groups that would give them at least a fighting chance to win against candidates of the political kingpins. The political
bigwigs are meanwhile left to give their "individual" blessings to their favored candidates, which in actuality is taken by
all as the party's blessings.

For brevity sake, I reproduce herein by reference my separate dissenting opinions in the cases of Badoy, supra, and In
re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. (35 SCRA 429) that the herein challenged provision (similar to the challenged Con-Con Act
[Republic Act 6132]) in the cited cases "oppressively and unreasonably straitjacket the candidates as well as the
electorate and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom
of association, and deny due process and the equal protection of the laws," and that "(S)uppression of free, open and
public discussion of men and issues, particularly in times of elections, goes against our traditions of liberty and
freedom."

Finally, a reference to the separate opinions of the now Chief Justice in the cited cases would be enlightening. As he
stated in the Imbong case: "I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political
parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. The right of an individual to join others
of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually
encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its
origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution. (35 SCRA at page 47-48)

I accordingly vote to grant the petition.

Footnotes

1 There was a prayer to restrain the holding of the barangay election on May 17, 1982 pursuant to Sec.
4 of B.P. 222, but this Court did not issue a restraining order.

2 Delay in deciding this case was occasioned by the acceptance of the resignations of all the Justices of
the Court on May 10, 1982.

FERNANDO, CJ.

1 L-32432, September 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28.

2 Ibid, 47.

3 Opinion of the Court, 5-6.

4 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835.

5 Ibid, 863.