SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 1 of 25

VI. Reserva Troncal

Case #1: SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL
ALCALA, plaintiffs- appellants, vs. MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE
Civil Code, article 891
 DEOCAMPO, defendants- appellees. [G.R. No. 13386. October 27,
Read:
 1920.]

1. Nieva v. Alcala, 41 Phil 915 
 FACTS: Juliana Nieva married Francisco Deocampo, to which Alfeo
1. Hollero v. CA, June 29, 1964
 Deocampo was born. Juliana died intestate on April 19, 1889, and
2. Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil 295
 Alfeo inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in
3. Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil 186
 Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

4. Riosa v. Rocha, 48 Phil 737


5. Beatriz Gonzales v. CFI, 104 SCRA 479
 Later on, Alfeo died intestate and without issue. The two parcels of
6. Lacerna v. Vda. De Corcino, 1 Phil 1226
 land were passed on to Francisco, by intestate succession. Several
7. Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil 480
 years later, Francisco married respondent Manuela Alcala, to which co-
8. Cano v. Director of Lands, 105 Phil 1
 respondent Jose Deocampo was born.

9. Frias Chua v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 78 SCRA 412


10. Gonzales v. CFI, 104 SCRA 479
 When Francisco died on August 1914, Manuela and Jose took
11. Sumaya v. IAC, 201 SCRA 178
 possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that
12. Velayo v. Siojo, 58 Phil 89
Jose had inherited the same, ab intestate, from Francisco.

Years later, petitioner Segunda Maria Nieva, claiming to be an

Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana, instituted the present action
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from for the purpose of recovering from Manuela and Jose the parcels of
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (871)
LOWER COURT RULING: Even granting, without deciding,
that Segundo was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva,
she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its
opinion an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under
the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether Segunda, an illegitimate relative within the third

degree, is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of
the Civil Code? 

RULING: NO, Segunda, an illegitimate relative within the third

degree, is not entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
811 of the Civil Code. The commentators on the Spanish Civil
Code are of the opinion that the provisions of article 811 of the
Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. Even if Segunda is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana, she is still not entitled
to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by
operation of law, since it would be a  flagrant violation of the
express provisions of Article 943 which states: "A natural or
legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit
from the natural or legitimated child."
article 811, — and as we will see also article 812, — continues to treat
In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article
811, Manresa says:
and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being
"Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve?
Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties
proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811
does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the
quali cation of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that
exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying
it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the
ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the
obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
"Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code
recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or
whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgment
between the father or mother who acknowledges and the
acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an
indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms
the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the
reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks
only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them
reference is of course made to those who are legitimate; and when it
desires to make a provision- applicable only to natural relationship, it
Page 2 of 25
does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it
does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants,
brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural
brothers or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809,
810, 846, 935 to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
"Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in
any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural
ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate
ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in
the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section
excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which
article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it refers only to legitimate
ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon
considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of
article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in
favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to
945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as
that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession,
which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
"Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811
creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other
interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the
properties should not pass, by reason of new marriages, out of the
family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of
the so-called 'reserva troncal,' and whether the idea of reservation or
that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is
intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to
legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seg. of the
Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or
subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of
Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluna concede the right to succeed
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 3 of 25
with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
have the right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited
establishes a barrier between the two families; properties of the
"The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural
ascendants may be raised just as the question whether it would be family." (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of

the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the  

interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted

by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants." (Manresa, Case #2: SATURNINA HOLLERO and JOSE CAMEMO, petitioners,
Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE HOLLERO, ANITA HARDER,
ISAGANI EVANGELISTA, ET. AL., respondents. [G.R. No. L-16579.
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the June 29, 1964.]

reservation is established, says:

FACTS: A parcel of land in Jaro, Iloilo was the paraphernal property of

"Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one Paz Hollero, who died in June 1935, leaving her husband Generoso
of the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. Hollero and their only son Felix. Felix died in 1944 followed shortly by
According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the his father Generoso.

parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which the properties came.
Respondents Jose Hollero, Anita Harder, Isagani Evangelista, who are
the brothers and nephews or nieces of Paz, claim the property by
"It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on virtue of the reserva troncal provisions of the Civil Code. 

succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise,

because relationship by a nity is established between each spouse and RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Upon the death of Paz, they
the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor contend, the property passed to Felix; and upon the latter's death, it
the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of passed to Generoso. Thereafter, the reserva troncal began to operate,
the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
to wit: when Generoso died, the property had to be transmitted by
operation of law to the relatives of Felix up to the third degree, i.e., the
"It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve brothers and sisters of Paz (Jose, Severo, Socorro, Estrella, Benjamin
is a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property and Manuel) who survived him. 

which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true,
there can be no question, because the line from which the properties
proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is
the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the
object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the
precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943
denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: They inherited the land from
Saturnina's brother Generoso, upon the latter's death. They assert that
Paz Hollero, in her lifetime, had sold the property to Andrea Gustilo in
1934; and that in 1936, Generoso purchased it from Andrea. It appears
that on December 21, 1934, Paz Hollero executed a document
transferring the property by "pacto de retro" to Andrea Gustillo for
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
P240.00. After Andrea’s death, i.e., on February 28, 1936, Andrea sold
the same land to Generoso for P200.00. It was error to award a part of
the land in question to Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder — whom the
complaint had expressly excluded, and who had previously
acknowledged the right to the land of herein petitioners. Having won
Civil Case 2239, they were deemed to have the rights of Manuel
Hollero and Felix Harder to the property.
Socorro is awarded one- sixth of the property by the above decision;
LOWER COURT RULING: (a) it was a mere mortgage; (b) Generoso
merely repaid the debt; and Felix inherited it upon the death of Paz, his
mother; and (C) when Felix in turn died, it passed to Generoso subject
to the provisions on reserva troncal. 1
It appears that the complaint itself stated that although Manuel and
CA RULING: Reversed the lower court’s decision. The transaction
between Paz Hollero and Aurea Gustilo, executed on December 21,
1934, was an equitable mortgage which was validly cancelled by
payment of the loan on February 28, 1936; declaring that the land,
subject- matter of the mortgage, or lot 2376-D of the Jaro cadastre,
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint, was the paraphernal
property of Paz Hollero; ordering the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to
cancel transfer certificate of title T- 5941 (exh. 30) and in lieu thereof to
issue another in the names of Jose Hollero, Severo Hollero, Manuel
Hollero, and the other brothers and sisters of these persons who were
alive at the time of death of Generoso Hollero, in pro-indiviso and
equal shares, upon the repayment of the defendants of the charges
evidenced by the receipts, exhs. 7, 8, 9 to 14, and 17 to 22, which
charges may however be offset against their share in the produce of
the land due from the defendants and condemning the defendants to
pay to the owners of the property the sum of P5,000 per year
beginning with the crop year 1955-1957, until possession of the land
shall have been restored to the latter.
should be modified to the effect that the property belongs pro-
It must be explained that the record makes reference to two Manuel
Holleros. One is the petitioner Manuel Hollero who is the nephew of
Paz (as the son of her brother Benjamin Hollero) and another Manuel
Hollero who is Paz' own brother — excluded from the complaint. 
Page 4 of 25
Manuel Hollero (Paz’s brother) is the one enumerated — erroneously —
in the dispositive part of the Court of Appeals' decision. Given the
result of the Iloilo Civil Case No. 2239, his portion should have been
reserved or adjudicated to herein petitioners-defendants below. 
What about Felix Harder? He is the son of Socorro, sister of Paz.
and as she had left four children (Anita, Meriam, Alatia and Felix) the
Socorro's share is one- fourth of such one-sixth, i.e. 1/24, which must
be awarded to herein petitioners-defendants below.
Felix Harder were heirs of Paz and Felix Hollero, they were not parties
plaintiff because "they have relinquished their rights in favor of the
defendants"; it also appears in Civil Case No. 2239 of the Iloilo court of
first instance, the herein petitioners sued said two persons for
ejectment from the land; and both having expressly acknowledged the
ownership of then plaintiffs (petitioners here now), were ejected
therefrom (in 1951). 
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have rights over the land in dispute?
RULING: YES, petitioners have rights over the land in dispute to
the portion of Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder. It should be stated
that Manuel Hollero was entitled, upon the death of Generoso, to
one-sixth of the land (they were six brothers and sisters of Paz );
but Felix Harder, as explained, is now entitled to one-fourth of the
one-sixth which his mother Socorro inherited, i.e. 1/24 of the land.
Wherefore, the dispositive part of the appellate court's decision
indiviso to Jose Hollero 4/24; Severo Hollero 4/24; the heirs of
Socorro Hollero 3/24; the heirs of Estrella Hollero 4/24; the heirs of
Benjamin Hollero 4/24; and the spouses of Jose Camemo and
Saturnina Hollero 5/24.

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
Needless to add, the amount to be repaid to defendants for the
charges evidenced by the receipts, etc., must correspondingly be
decreased by 5/24, in the same way that the indemnity per year
(P5,000) payable to plaintiffs, must also be reduced by 5/24; such
indemnity to be computed up to the day this decision becomes
final.
until his death on September 22, 1882. In their marriage they had a son
As surrender of the entire lot to plaintiffs may not now be ordered,
the case should be, and is hereby remanded to the court of rst
instance, so that further proceedings may be had to separate the
portion belonging to defendants; and upon such separation,
orders shall be made for the delivery to plaintiffs of the parts
corresponding to them with the fruits thereof; and the issuance of
the corresponding titles. Unless, of course, the parties come to an
agreement to hold the property pro- indiviso; in which case, a new
title may be issued in the corresponding name and proportions.
With these modifications, the appellate court's decision is
affirmed.
Later on, the Court of Land Registration denied Marcelina’s


Page 5 of 25
Case #3: MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. PABLO
and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees. [G.R. No. 6878.
September 13, 1913.]
FACTS: Petitioner Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan
named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at
Victoriano's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue, and by his death, the two
parcels of land passed through inheritance to Marcelina. Hence, it is
through the hereditary title which was the basis of Marcelina’s
application for registration of her ownership. This was opposed by
respondents Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, being the two legitimate
brothers of Victoriano and they are claiming either that the registration
be denied, "or that if granted to Marcelina the right reserved by law to
them, it shall be recorded in the registration of each parcel." 
registration because the trial court held that the parcels of land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented
jointly in the names of Victoriano’s mother, Pablo and Basilio. To this,
Marcelina appealed through a bill of exceptions.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: Marcelina impugns as erroneous the
first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the
lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by
law to be reserved. Moreover, it is not proven that the two parcels of
land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only
property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by
operation of law, is required by law to be reserved.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The oppositors contended that
Marcelina’s  defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but
only in the appeal.

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 6 of 25

ISSUE: Whether the property is reversable?
decree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and
RULING: YES, the property is reversable. The SC reversed the scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not
judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
that the Marcelina is entitled to register in her own name the two makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the
parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application, condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal
recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does
reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and not have, according to the opinion that has been expressed in
Basilio Sablan, should they survive her.
speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again.
There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish
"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not
what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the
proceeded." (Civil Code, art. 811.)
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the
hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him
in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or
these two parcels of land which had acquired without a valuable
any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form
consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
fee simple. But the ascendant who holds the property required by
obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or
article 811 to be reserved, and the father or mother required by article
relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they inherit itself,
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The
the former from his descendant and the latter from his or her child in
trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature of property required
first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it,
by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

while the persons in whose favor the rights is required to be reserved

in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal of
The ascendants who inherits from a descendant, whether by the
recovery.

latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue

of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article
the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment,
968 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself: "Alienation
disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in
of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by
the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives
the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid
within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or
only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the
they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute
owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 7 of 25
first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The property is not reversable
Mortgage Law."
since: said property originally pertained to the conjugal partnership
composed of Basilia Cabardo and Loranzo Abordo; was it by testate or
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether intestate succession that the property was acquired by Cornelia
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her Abordo from her grandmother, Isabel Macaraya, upon the death of the
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage latter in 1912 should be determined; whether Rosa is within the third
survive.”
degree belonging to the line from which the property was derived; and
in this connection it is suggested that Lorenzo Abordo should be
  
treated as the propositus or person from whom the degrees are to be
reckoned, with the consequence that the plaintiff would be in the
Case #4: ROSA CABARDO, assisted by her husband Apolinario fourth degree reckoning through Cornelia Abordo, Basilia Cabardo,
Zalameda, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA, and Isabel Macaraya, successively, to Rosa.

individually, and in his capacity as administrator of the estate of

Lorenzo Abordo, deceased, defendant-appellee. [G.R. No. 19003. ISSUE: Whether the property is reversable?

December 13, 1922.]

RULING: YES, the property is reversable. Being the case, upon the
death of Cornelia Abordo, since the property is impressed with the
FACTS: An action establishing her right to reserva trongcal on a certain
reservable character in the hands of Lorenzo, and upon his death,
property of considerable value was instituted by petitioner Rosa
Rosa was entitled to succeed the said property, being the only
Cabardo who is assisted by her husband, Apolinario Zalameda with
living person within the limits of the third degree belonging to the
the CFI of Laguna. Cabardo based her right under Article 811 of the
line from which the property came. The case therefore falls
Civil Code. The aforementioned property was in the possession of
precisely under article 811 of the Civil Code. It is sufficient that
respondent Francisco Villanueva, who is the executor of the deceased
Cornelia acquired it by inheritance from her mother, there being no
Lorenzo Abordo’s estate.

difference in this respect between property owned by the ancestor

as member of conjugal partnership and property owned by such
TRIAL COURT RULING: Decided in favour of Cabardo. 

ancestor in separate right. Notwithstanding the fact that a division

The last owner of the property was Cornelia Abordo who died
intestate, childless and no siblings. It was Cornelia’s father, Lorenzo,
who succeeded the latter’s property, including the property in dispute.
Cornelia’s estate was derived by inheritance from her own
mother, Basilia Cabardo (deceased) and from her maternal
grandmother, Isabel Macaraya (deceased). Now, Rosa claims to be a
sister to Basilia, and therefore aunt to Cornelia. Rosa had no brothers
or sisters living at the time of the death of Cornelia Abordo, though
formerly there were two namely, Juan Cabardo and Guadalupe
of Isabel Macaraya's estate was effected by a partition deed
executed by the persons in interest. It is sufficient that the
property descend to Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother by
gratuitous title (por titulo lucrativo). The degree which should be
reckoned here is clearly Cornelia Abordo herself, since she was at
the end of the line from which the property came and the person
upon whom the property last devolved by descent. Lorenzo
Abordo was a stranger to that line and not related by blood to
those for whom the property is reserved.  

Cabardo, both of whom left children who are still alive.

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 8 of 25

Case #5: MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO ROCHA, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the
MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE said testamentary proceedings.

CALLEJA, defendants-appellees. [G.R. No. 23770. February 18,

1926.]
From the foregoing it appears that the eleven parcels of land described
in the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from
FACTS: Respondent Maria Corral was united in marriage with the his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by
deceased Mariano Riosa, to which Santiago, Jose, and Severina were operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of
born. Santiago and Jose survived Mariano, while Severina died article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable
during infancy. Before he died, Santiago married Francisca Villanueva, property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
to which petitioner Magin Riosa and respondent Consolacion Riosa. 
still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11
were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the
Before he died, Jose Riosa, married Marcelina Casas, and they had latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion
one child who died before Jose.
Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from
which this property came.

Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children,
Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving Jose the eleven parcels of land This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should
described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose, he left a will in have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve
which he named his wife, Marcelina, as his only heir.
it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of
parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound
On May 16, 1917, Jose’s will was filed for probate. Notwithstanding to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to
the fact that Marcelina was the only heir named in Jose's will, on join as plaintiff.

account of the preterition of Maria, (Jose’s mother) being his legitimate

heir. On the same day, Marcelina and Maria entered into a contract by
which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose, the
eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to
Maria Corral. Later on, Maria sold 8 of the 11 lots to Marcelina, the
latter in turn sold it to respondent Pablo Rocha who had it registered. 
10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only
The CFI initially denied the probate of Jose’s will, but on appeal this
court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to
probate. The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the
settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at
the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted
to the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had
entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court,
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The complaint prays that the property
therein described be declared reservable property and that the
plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this
reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels
in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff
Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this
right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in
favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral,
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good
and sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as security for the
conservation and maintenance of the improvements existing on the
said reservable property.

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
TRIAL COURT RULING: Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge
the right of Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the
reservation of the said parcels of land described in the complaint,
which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands in the
office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery
of said parcels of land, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and
Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her, either
by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000.
have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with
ISSUE: Whether Pablo may be compelled to note the reserva trongcal
on the properties with the registry of deeds?
Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of the General Regulation for
RULING: YES, Pablo may be compelled to note the reserva
trongcal on the properties with the registry of deeds. Since Maria
was able to sold it to Marcelina who later on sold it to Pablo, who
acquired the property before the expiration of the period of ninety
days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by
the court, after which the right of the reservees to commence an
action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose.  acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria
Reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor
(reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservees (reservatarios). 
such notation, because this acquisition was made before the
For the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations
arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the
property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but
from the date when the said partition was approved by the court, that
is, on November 12, 1920.
As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint
were  first sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them
to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and
Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be ordered to
acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11, acquired by
them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles.
Page 9 of 25
It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred
to in article 968 tending to assure the e cacy of the reservation by the
surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation known as "reserva
troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the reservation now under
consideration.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to
the provisions of the Mortgage Law which xes the period of ninety
days for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the
the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed from
the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code,
regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the
time, as has been indicated, must be computed from the adjudication
of the property by the court to the heirs, is line with the decision of this
court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the
reservees may demand compliance with this obligation.This
Corral to make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the
time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make
expiration of the period of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the
date of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the
reservees to commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation
arose. But the land  first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo
Rocha together with the obligation that the law imposes upon Maria
Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that held by
Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and
the obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is
attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the
reservation as a resolutory condition for the bene t of the reservees
(article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the reservable character of the
property was not recorded in the registry of deeds at the time that it
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
was acguired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the
right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at
the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such
reservation and the reservees did not then have any right to compel
her to fulfill such an obligation.
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, knew of the reservable
character of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of
the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue
of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha
was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who
entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these
parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose
Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of
sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and
by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship
existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha,
the former a daughter: in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral,
amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these
parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from
her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father
Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of
Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11
has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action
against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.
and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz


Page 10 of 25
Case #6: BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDES, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA,
JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE
OF DOÑA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents. [G.R.
No. L-34395. May 19, 1981.]
FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters
named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason
were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo
who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March
19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. Mrs Legarda's properties are in
litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 11 of 25
as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
children.
her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written identical LOWER COURT RULING: Dismissed the complaint.

documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she

inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: defendants-appellees in their six
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).
counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter
 During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and Filomena Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares
her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the reservable
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
la Paz.
prescription.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to ISSUE: Whether the disputed properties are reservable properties
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811?

Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,

Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The decree of RULING: YES, the disputed properties are reservable properties
probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811 in the
Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are
reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's
three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed
by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on
June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters,
In reserva troncal , (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or
is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant,
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant ( prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said property came.

nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva )
in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which
two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmission of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or
sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho
Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan
Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
Page 12 of 25
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor. Article 891 clearly indicates that the
reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this
case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the
reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein. To allow the
reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree
and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree
would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or

brother or sister from whom the property was received by the  

descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or

prepositus ( propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the
****Whether the disputed properties lost their reservable character
due to the non-existence of third degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda,
belonging to the Legarda family, "except third- degree relatives
who pertain to both" the Legarda and Roces lines?

property came and for whom the property should be reserved by

the reservor.
NO, the disputed properties have not lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third degree relatives of
  
Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third- degree
 ****Whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Roces lines. The
them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
her six children.
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of
her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the
 NO, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could not dispose of them second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose
in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties
children. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on
her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, Legarda's estate (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).

44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 13 of 25
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set With the court's permission, Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in
aside. It is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by intervention alleging that she is a half sister of Juan Marbebe who died
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor descendants, and that, as his
Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable half sister, she is entitled, by succession, to the properties in dispute.

properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito,

Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. TRIAL COURT RULING: In favor of intervenor. The lower court found,
The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in and appellants do not question, that the lands described in the
1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia Lacerna. Upon her death in
heirs.
1932, they passed, by succession, to her only son, Juan Marbebe who
was, subsequently, taken to Culion, where he died intestate, single and
 
without issue, on February 21, 1943. 

Case #7: RICARDO LACERNA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: It assumes that said properties are
AGATONA PAURILLO VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee. subject to the "reserva troncal"

JACOBA MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee.  [G.R. No. L-14603. April

29, 1961.]
ISSUE: Whether the provision on reserva trongcal may be applied in
this case?

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo

declaring that the parcels of land in litigation are property of intervenor RULING: NO, the provision on reserva trongcal may not be applied
Jacoba Marbebe.
in this case. Article 891 of the Civil Code applies only to properties
inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant
An action was instituted by petitioners Ricardo, Patrocinia, Patria, from a descendant, and this is not the case before us, for
Faustino, Leonor, Ramona, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan
surnamed Lacerna, for the recovery of three parcels of unregistered Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said
lands, situated in the municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, and more legal provision is, therefore, not in point, and the transmission of
specifically described in the complaint, upon the ground that said the aforementioned lands, by inheritance, was properly
lands belonged to the deceased Juan Marbebe, and that his cousins, determined by his Honor, the Trial Judge, in accordance with the
plaintiffs herein, are his sole heirs.
order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Article 1003
to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a
In her answer, respondent Agatona Vda. de Corcino alleged, inter alia, sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or
that Juan Marbebe might still be alive; that she held the disputed lands brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other
under a power of attorney executed by Juan Marbebe; and that, if he collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong
has died, she is entitled to succeed him in the same manner as to the line from which the property of the deceased came.

plaintiffs herein, she being related to him in the same manner as

plaintiffs are.
It appears that his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna, had two (2) brothers,
Catalino Lacerna and Marcelo Lacerna, and a sister, Agatona Paurillo
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 14 of 25
Vda. de Corcino, the defendant herein; that Catalino Lacerna died in "The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
1950 and was survived by his children, plaintiffs Ricardo, Patrocinia the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
and Patria, all surnamed Lacerna; and that Marcelo Lacerna, who died ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
in 1953, was survived by his children, the other plaintiffs herein, he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
namely, Ramona, Faustino, Leonor, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
Felipe, all surnamed Lacerna. Upon the other hand, intervenor Jacoba said property came." (Emphasis supplied.)

Marbebe is a daughter, by first marriage, of Valentin Marbebe, husband

of Bonifacia Lacerna and father of Juan Marbebe, who, accordingly, is Case #8: ENCARNACION FLORENTINO ET AL., plaintiffs-
a half brother of said intervenor.
appellants, vs. MERCEDES FLORENTINO ET AL., defendants-
appellees. [G.R. No. 14856. November 15, 1919.]

With this factual background, the issue is narrowed down to whether

Jacobo Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's side, FACTS: Apolonio Florentino II married Antonia Faz de leon, they have
is his sole heir, as held by his Honor, the Trial Judge, or whether 11 children. One of the children is Encarnacion, plaintiff in this case.
plaintiffs herein, as first cousins of Juan Marbebe, on his mother side, Apolonio became a widower and married again, he married Severina
have a better right to succeed him, to the exclusion of Jacoba Faz de leon, they had 2 children, Mercedez Florentino and Apolinio III.
Marbebe, as plaintiffs-appellants maintain.
Mercedez was the defendant in this case. Later on, Apolinio Florentino
died.

The latter's pretense is biased upon the theory that, pursuant to Article
891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, establishing what is known as
"reserva troncal", the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of
the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the line from
which said properties came, and that since the same were inherited by
Juan Marbebe from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative
within the third degree on the maternal line, to which plaintiffs belong,
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his
universal heirs his aforementioned 11 children, the posthumos
Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in
one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided
among all of his children of both marriages.

not to intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the greater proximity of her

relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal line .
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to
Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with
Jacoba Marbebe contends, however, and the lower court held, that the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces
brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal
intestate succession, and that, as Juan Marbebe's half- sister, she has, property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.

accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his properties.

That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second

The main flaw in appellants' theory is that it assumes that said marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
properties are subject to the "reserva troncal", which is not a fact, for succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 15 of 25
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
Mercedes Florentino
have died (reservista), in which case said reservable property
losses such character.

ISSUE: Whether the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
the character of reservable property when it was received by his Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
mother, Severina Faz de Leon?
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce
RULING: YES, the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was invested with the nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void,
character of reservable property when it was received by his inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the
mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
right of usufruct or of duciary, with the obligation to preserve and
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own
complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever from the common daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio

III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the
hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811
of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the
source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with
the character and condition of reservable property when Severina
Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not
thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the
right of usufruct or of duciary, with the necessary obligation to
It cannot reasonably be a rmed, founded upon an express
provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from
her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms part of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon,
her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself
are entitled to such reservable property.

preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to

her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of
is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother
Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property, there being no lawfull or just reason which serves as real
foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives,
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 16 of 25
within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil
question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it Code is not applicable in the instant case.

with an indisputable right, we cannot nd any reasonable and lawful

motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of
not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced
litigated property.
or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.

The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress,
her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased
son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable
property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no
further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
reason that as has been already stated, the reservable property,
left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death
nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she
has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their
supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal
foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was
under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being
relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same
came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the
forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the
legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition
to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said
property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives
within the third degree, of certain portions thereof.

relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which

she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the
character of reservable property held before the reservatarios
received same.
proper to grant the rst for there is no evidence of any damage
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the
reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question,
same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise
true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there
is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice
why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews,
relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity
for damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not
which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the
second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the
principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths
of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the
complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same,
from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was led; and the
remaining seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.

article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the

property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the
order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 17 of 25
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six- The decision having become  final, the decree and the Certificate of
sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes Title (No. 0- 20) were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to
is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the counsel for the reservee (reservatario) Guerrero led a motion with the
plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner and
said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the
17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one original Certi cate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered
without special findings as to the costs of both instances.
to place her in possession of the property. The motion was opposed
by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano,
 
who contended that the application and operation of the reserva
troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding,
Case #9: MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the
LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. motion.

JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.  [G.R. No.

L-10701. January 16, 1959.]
LOWER COURT RULING: Granted the petition for the issuance of a
new certi cate, for the reason that the death of reservista vested the
FACTS: In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatario
Land Registration Case No. 12, G. L. O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of troncal.

First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots. Nos. 1798

and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms
and conditions: "In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
notices have been duly published and posted as required by law, and
that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two parcels of
land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with
rea rmation of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land
described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of
the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: The oppositors, heirs of the
reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of thereservatario can not be decreed in a mere proceeding
under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as thereservatario entitled
to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection,
appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatario requires
the declaration of the existence of the following facts:

in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina 71 years of age, widow and

resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that "(1) The property was received by a ascendant by gratuitous titled from
Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of an ascendant or from a brother or sister;

Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of Civil Code. After this

decision shall have become nal for lack of appeal therefrom within the 2. (2)  Said descendant dies without issue;

30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree
issue. So ordered." (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 18 of 25

3. (3)  The property ascendant by operation of law; and
 It appears, however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with
exception of Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the
decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other
4. (4)  The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
to the line from which said property came." (Appellants' Brief, former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin,
p. 8)
 excludes all the other private oppositors, whose degree of relationship
to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands
vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279)." (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)

ISSUE: Whether the requisites enumerated by appellants have already

been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights
of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized?
barred thereby from contesting the existence of the constituent
RULING: YES,  requisites enumerated by appellants have already
been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the
rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly
This decree having become  final, all persons (appellees included) are
elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the titled
from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista;
and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both
facts are admitted, and their existence in nowhere questioned.

recognized. Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise,

by the death of ascendants (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir,
forms no part of the latter’s lawful inheritance nor of the legitime,
for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable,
the heir receiving same as an inheritance from his ascendant has
the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third
degree, of the predecessor in interest, without prejudicing the
right of the heir to an aliquot part of property, if he has at the same
time the right of reservatorio.
reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests
upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit,
the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The
reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the
reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario
receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

"From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that

Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the applicant Maria Cano by inheritance
from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited
the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence falls squarely
under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and
everyone of the private oppositors are within the third degree of
consanguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging
to the same line from which the property came.
the property records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the
reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in
this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner
of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of
the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of
the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in
basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that
the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 19 of 25
his own successors mortis causa, (like appellants herein) so long as a Case #10: IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and
reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA
reservista dies.
DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents. [G.R. No. L-29901.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the August 31, 1977.]

reservable character of the property, without determining the identity of

the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.,
279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among
themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not
the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been
expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other
reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the
heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to prolong their
enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the party
lawfully entitled thereto.
marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his
an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the
FACTS: It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with
Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio, he sired three children, namely:
Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia
S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of
Juanito Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue.
Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second
first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor
of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of
Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second
marriage; marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua , his sons in the second
marriage; By the virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certi cate of Title
No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register
of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua as owners-pro-indiviso of Lot No. 339.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate without any issue. After his death, is mother Consolacion de
la Torre succeeded to his pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a
result of which Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31796 covering the
whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in
the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.cdrep

SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the rst
marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subsequently segregated
as distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11,
1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua but which passed
to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as
reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject
to reserva troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil code. private
respondent as administratrix of the estate of the Consolacion de la
Torre and the heirs of the latter traversed individually the complaint of
petitioners. 4
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does
On July 29, 1968, the respondent Court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of petitioners. Hence this instant petition.
is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
ISSUE: Whether the properties were acquired by Juanito gratuitously?
the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property
RULING: YES, he properties were acquired by Juanito gratuitously.
 It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property
in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the
death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the
order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816. Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property
may be impressed with a reservable character the following
requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by
a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue: (3)
that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of
law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case
before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
Page 20 of 25
borne out by the records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second
marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue;
his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his
mother, Consolacion de la Torre by operation of law. When
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died
intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are
Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua,
who are the petitioners herein.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that
the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of
the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court
quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The
not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on
gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it
does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation."
***whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito Frias
Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In
resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
"It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the
property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration,
namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and
other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court As such
it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 21 of 25
troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December
plaintiff's complaint must fail.”
30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development
Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in
favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The documents
evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Case #11: MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO- Laguna and the corresponding certi cates of titles were issued. The
INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name
SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, of Sancho Balantakbo.LLjur

all surnamed BALANTAKBO , respondents. [G.R. Nos. 68843-44.

September 2, 1991.]
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo
sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No.
FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in
the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of
interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are
Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case presently in its possession.

No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945;
and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of The parties admit that the certi cates of titles covering the above
registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable
Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who character.

died on November 3, 1950.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and
leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover
finado Raul Balantakbo”
the properties described in the respective complaints which they
claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda de. Balantakbo sold
the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H.
Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to
the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita
LOWER COURT RULING: the two (2) cases varied only in the identity
of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the
conveyances but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal.
Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases. After trial, the court a
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 22 of 25
quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the "b.Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

dispositive portion of which reads:

CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto.

"WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957,

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the ISSUE: Whether said properties are reservable and that the brothers
defendants, as follows:
have a better right?

"1.Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut RULING: YES,  said properties are reservable and that the brothers
Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs —
have a better right. In this case, the a davit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which contained a
"a.)In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and statement that the property was inherited from a descendant,
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another
paragraph three (3) subparagraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
this decision;
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certi cate of title cannot be
"b.)In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest and attributed to Consuelo.

ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land

described in paragraph three (3), subparagraph 2, of pages two (2) and Moreover, there is su cient proof that the petitioners had actual
three (3) of this decision;
knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before
they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the
"c.)The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Mariquita Sumaya, the rst vendee of the property litigated in Civil
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third Case No. SC-956, as follows:The properties involved in this case
(1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration
uncles:
of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third
persons shall be prejudiced thereby.

"2.Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to

account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the The respondent appellate court did not err in nding that the cause
properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The
accounting and payment of income being for the period from January cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but
upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on
"3.In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the
pay plaintiffs —
right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee
simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the
"a.One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses

reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession
of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third
degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11,
1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of
the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the
part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for
recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of
Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L- 22601, October
28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved
property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4,
1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not
prescribed yet.
and H, from her grandmother.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual
litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for
attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil
Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to
recover what rightfully belongs to them.
administered said property and reaped the bene ts derived therefrom
Page 23 of 25
Case #12: VALERIANA VELAYO BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MIGUEL SIOJO, defendant-appellee. [G.R. No. 36078. March 11,
1933.]
FACTS: The spouses, Marcelo Velayo Bernardo and Florentina de los
Santos, had two daughters named Valeriana, the appellant herein, and
Maria Trinidad. The latter was married to Pablo Aguirre who died on
May 20, 1929, with whom she had two children, Roman and Maximina.
Roman died on August 30, 1906, without any descendant and the
latter, who was married to Miguel Siojo, the defendant herein, likewise
died without leaving any children.
The lands which are the subject matter of this suit proceeded from the
Velayo spouses and were inherited by Maximina Aguirre in the
following manner: parcels A, B, C, D and F, from her grandfather and G
In her will which was allowed to probate, Maximina Aguirre
bequeathed two- thirds (2/3) of said property to her father, Pablo
Aguirre, and the remaining one-third (1/3) to her husband, Miguel Siojo.
The latter was appointed executor of the said Maximina Aguirre's will,
with Pablo Aguirre.
Sometime later, Pablo Aguirre brought an action against the appellee
herein for partition of the lands in question which action was
withdrawn through a compromise agreement between the parties by
virtue of which Siojo was to remain in possession of all the lands which
belonged to his wife in lieu of payment by him to Pablo Aguirre of the
sum of P3,250.
The appellant herein was not a party to either the action for partition or
the compromise agreement between the appellee and Pablo Aguirre,
yet, in spite of the fact that these two understood the reservable nature
of all the lands in question; they made it appear in their written
agreement that the appellant herein was present in the court when said
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS Page 24 of 25
agreement was made and that she had given her consent thereto, Valeriana Velayo Bernardo brought this action in the Court of First
renouncing whatever right she might have in said lands. It was likewise Instance of Bulacan to compel her nephew, Miguel Siojo, to partition
stated in the compromise agreement that Pablo Aguirre would deliver a the seven parcels of land described in the complaint; to have her
certain portion of the sum of P3,250 to the appellant herein. This declared entitled to a share consisting in  five- sixths (5/6) thereof; to
compromise agreement was approved by the then presiding judge and have the above-mentioned appellee render an accounting of all the
was made a part of the decision rendered therein which terminated the fruits derived by him therefrom since the death of his father- in-law,
litigation.
Pablo Aguirre, on May 20, 1928, and to deliver to her the amount
corresponding to her said share, with costs against the appellee.

After Miguel Siojo became the owner of the property in question, it

appeared that her wife's estate, of which he was administrator, was The reservable nature of the property is not discussed in the briefs led
indebted to various creditors and in order to pay such indebtedness he by the attorneys. The parties admit that all the lands partake of the
sold half of the parcels B, C and F to his father-in- law, Pablo Aguirre, character of reservable property having been inherited by an
who, in turn, sold them at a pro t to the appellant herein. This is how ascendant who was found to reserve them for the bene t of relatives
the appellant herein came into possession of half of the three parcels within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
mentioned above.
came, in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.

Subsequently, cadastral proceedings were held in San Miguel,
Bulacan, where the lands in question are situated, and all of them were
included in said proceedings in the following manner: parcel A was
surveyed as lot No. 156; parcels B and C as lot No. 2324; parcel D as
lot No. 2311; parcel E as part of lot No. 2306; parcel F as lot No. 2326;
The question really originated with the compromise agreement entered
into between Pablo Aguirre and the appellee, Miguel Siojo, in civil case
No. 2954. The latter contends that the appellant herein waived her
right to the reservable property inasmuch as it appears in the
stipulation that she had given her consent thereto in open court.

parcel G as part of lot No. 2863, and parcel H as part of lot No. 2323.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement waiving the Valeriana’s

In the proceedings, lot No. 156 was contested by the appellee herein, right to the reservable property is valid.

Pablo Aguirre and the appellant, but the last two later abandoned their
claim and the land was adjudicated to the above-mentioned appellee RULING: YES, the compromise agreement waiving the Valeriana’s
who obtained certi cate of title No. 10700 on February 27, 1929.
right to the reservable property is valid. Referring to Valeriana's
intervention in the aforementioned compromise agreement it
Lot No. 2324 is disputed by the appellant and appellee herein and is appears that if she actually took part therein, she transferred
pending trial awaiting the result of this litigation. Lot No. 2311 was during the lifetime of the reserver Pablo Aguirre, reservable
adjudicated to the estate of the deceased Maximina Aguirre and property to which she was entitled, which act is prohibited by
subsequently the appellee obtained transfer certi cate of title No. 5845.
article 1271 of the Civil Code forbidding the execution of contracts
with respect to future inheritances, except those the object of
Lots Nos. 2326 and 2863 are still pending trial while lots Nos. 2306 which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate, in accordance
and 2323 are pending adjudication.
with article 1056. In this case, we do not see the essential
difference between the transfer and waiver of rights to reservable
SUCCESSION PART 6 PROVISION + DIGESTS
property mentioned in the decision appealed from. Call it what you
may, the fact remains that, according to the appellee herein, the
appellant lost all of her rights to claim the reservable property by
virtue of the compromise agreement in which she did not take
part.
during the lifetime of the reserver thereof.
In order to prove that there is no ground for the claim su ce it to
say that the appellant herein, Valeriana Velayo had not been made
a party to the aforementioned case as well as to the stipulation.
We do not believe that the statement appearing in the stipulation
and inserted in the decision, to the effect that she had given her
consent thereto, had made her an interested or contracting party.
With respect to the alleged consideration of P3,250, we do not nd
su cient evidence to justify the appellee's contention that the
appellant received any part thereof from Pablo Aguirre; and even
granting that she did, such fact would not justify the transfer or
waiver of reservable property on the ground that it is an act or
contract expressly prohibited by law, as will be shown later.
Referring to the appellant's intervention in the aforementioned
compromise agreement it appears that if she actually took part
therein, she transferred during the lifetime of the reserver Pablo
Aguirre, reservable property to which she was entitled, which act
is prohibited by article 1271 of the Civil Code forbidding the
execution of contracts with respect to future inheritances, except
those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the
estate, in accordance with article 1056. In this case, we do not see
the essential difference between the transfer and waiver of rights
to reservable property mentioned in the decision appealed from.
Call it what you may, the fact remains that, according to the
appellee herein, the appellant lost all of her rights to claim the
reservable property by virtue of the compromise agreement in
which she did not take part.
 We conclude that, strictly speaking, the appellant did not
intervene in civil case No. 2954 or in the compromise agreement
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entered into by the parties to that suit, and even in the supposition
that she had voluntarily given her consent thereto, the contract
thus executed was null and void or without effect for the reason
that it anticipated the transfer or waiver of reservable property
With respect to the last question, we hold that even if the appellee
obtained the certi cates of title Nos. 10700 and 5845
corresponding to parcels A and B, respectively, he is,
nevertheless, bound to transfer to the herein appellant the
portions to which she is entitled in view of the fact that he
obtained said certi cate of title thereto knowing that such
properties did not belong to him but to the reservee, the appellant
herein.) Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343; Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 49
Phil., 433.)
In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed; the appellant herein is declared entitled
to ve-sixths (5/6) of parcels A, D, G and H described in the
complaint and to five-sixths (5/6) of half of the parcels B, C and F
as well as to the same proportion in the fruits realized and derived
by the appellee from said lands from May 20, 1928, for which
purpose the said appellee shall render an accounting thereof, and
the trial court shall, in accordance with law, proceed to the
partition of the aforementioned lands in question adjudicating to
the herein appellant, after the proper proceedings therein, her
share hereinbefore xed, with costs against the appellee.