The Craft of Diplomacy

Author(s): Colin L. Powell

Source: The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 60-67
Published by: Wilson Quarterly
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 The Craxt ot
Diplomacy
Diplomats have only three principles to guide their work, yet
their craft is extraordinarilycomplex. In this essay adapted from
his March 25 speech marking the 30th anniversaryof the Wilson
Center's Kennan Institute and the centennial of its cofounder,
George F. Kennan, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell defends
the Bush administration'srecent use of those tools.

by Colin L. Powell

wordsdiplomat and diplomacy most commonly bring to mind

ambassadors,consuls, and other officialsengaged in foreignaffairs.
These wordsare also used more generally to praisetact and verbal
finesse. But a more sardonic view of diplomacy and diplomats also remains
popularamong Americans. Sharing the traditionalJeffersonianantipathyto
pomp and circumstance, many would second the popular 19th-centurytake
on diplomacyas the patrioticartof lying to foreignerson behalf of one's coun-
try.Others see diplomacy as mere temporizing, affirmingWill Rogers's def-
inition: the art of saying "nice doggie, nice doggie" until you can lay hands
on a good-sized stick. As for diplomats themselves, Ambrose Bierce once
defined a consul as someone who, having failed to achieve public office from

60 Wilson Quarterly
the people, achieves it from the administration- on condition that he leave
the country.But Bierce even disparagedpatience as "aminor form of despair
disguised as a virtue."
The literaryabuse of diplomats and diplomacy is mostly harmless. One
could easily multiply examples of such descriptions without doing damage
to the nationalinterestin the process,but I am not so inclined. From 35 years
in the armyand another dozen or so as national security advisor,privatecit-
izen, and secretaryof state, my view of diplomacyand diplomatsincludes nei-
ther scorn nor skepticism.To the contrary,I deeply respect both diplomacy
and diplomats because I know how difficult and important it is to conduct
a truly skillful diplomacy.
Three principleslie at the core of that skill. To introducethe first,we may
observethat diplomacy is often taken- improperly- to be synonymouswith
statecraft.Statecraftencompasses both the internal and the external man-
agement of the state, and the relationsbetween the two; diplomacyhas to do
only with externalaffairs.For example, managing the connections between
the domestic economy and internationalcommerce is a taskof statecraft,not
diplomacy.Negotiating free-tradeagreements is a taskfor diplomacy as well
as statecraft.
Put a little differently,statecraftinvolvesthe full ensemble of means at the
disposal of statesmen. Statesmen can choose force as a means to deal with
other states, in which case they rely on soldiers, and they can use the non-
forceful methods of diplomats.Wise statesmen see an intrinsic link between
these two means, and between power, which is the engine offeree, and per-
suasion, which is the engine of diplomacy. Adroitly used, each means
strengthensthe other.

firstprinciple of diplomacy concerns the relationshipbetween

persuasionand the power to coerce others, whether by militaryor
economic means. The principle is this: Power is a necessarycon-
dition for enduring foreign-policysuccess but not a sufficient one.
Clearly,poweris necessary.Using force in statecraftis sometimes unavoid-
able because it is justnot possibleto reasonwith everyadversarythatthreatens
a vitalinterest.Beforeand even afterSeptember11, 2001, forexample,we gave
the Talibanampleopportunityto turnoverAl Qaedamemberslurkingand plot-
ting withinAfghanistan'sborders.The internationalcommunitygave Saddam
Husseina dozen yearsto fulfillIraq'sinternationalobligations,and offeredhim
several"lastchances"along the way.We were more than patient.
Patience is a virtue in diplomacy,but not invariablyso. As Bierce implies,
patiencecan degradeintopassivity,allowingdangersto growand importantprin-
ciplesto be undermined.Beyonda certainpoint,it is moreharmfulto one'ssecu-
rityand idealsto keep tryingto reasonwith certainadversariesthan it is to use
forceagainstthem. Such circumstancesare relativelyrare,but we reachedthat
point in recentyearswith respectto both Afghanistanand Iraq.
In both cases, PresidentGeorge W. Bush patientlyexhaustedthe nonmili-
tarymeansat his disposal,gatheredallies,and acted. In both cases,he displayed
greatpatience, but also sawthatpatience is not the only virtuein diplomacy.

Summer2004 61
 Diplomacy

When we must use force, it is a blessingto have the best force around.The
U.S. militaryis the finestin the world,a factforwhichwe arethankful.Ourtroops
and those of our Coalitionpartnersperformedbrilliantlyin Afghanistanagainst
the TalibanandAl Qaeda,and in Iraqagainstthe Baathregime.We are in their
debt as they continue today,in still-dangerousmissions,to build peace afterthe
rigorsof war.We also owe our gratitudeto thousandsof diverselytalentedcivil-
ians, diplomatsincluded, who workat these soldiers'side.
That this workin Afghanistanand Iraqgoes on illustrateswell the principle
thatpoweralone can but rarelyproducepolicysuccess.Militaryvictoriesdo not
translateautomaticallyinto political achievements. After the main fighting
stops,otherkindsof hardwork,includingthe politicaland diplomaticwork,have
to continue.
There is anotherwaythatpoweris necessarybut not sufficientto the endur-
ing success of foreign policy. When statesmen use force, it affects not only
the immediatetheaterof militaryoperationsbut also, overtime, a much broad-
er theater of political operations. Powerthus attains a reputation that walks
before it into the future, affecting what othersthink and do. That reputation
worksas the awarenessof power'spotentialuse, and it is the businessof diplo-
macy to transformthat awarenessinto influence. One of my predecessorsat
the State Department, Dean Acheson, said it well: "Influence is the shad-
ow of power."
Americaneverlooksforopportunitiesto exercisepowerexcept in defenseof
vital nationalinterests.We do not use force justto burnishour reputation.But
those who do not understandour democraticwaysmay mistakeour reluctance
to use forceforirresolution.BecauseAmericansareslowto anger,Al Qaeda,the
Taliban,and SaddamHusseinmay have concluded as the 1990sunfoldedthat
we could be pummeledand spurnedrepeatedlywithouttheirhavingto fearseri-
ous reprisal.If so, they and othershave now been set straight.
That is importantbecause, as Acheson suggests,it is better,wheneverpossi-
ble, to let the reputationof powerratherthan the use of powerachieve policy
goals.Ittakesskill,diplomaticskill,to deploythe reputationof power,and it often
takestime for success to manifestitself.But it is clear that enduringsuccess in
foreignpolicy comes from patientlydeployingthe shadowof power,as well as
from the occasionalapplicationof poweritself.Indeed, too much use offeree
makesenduringsuccess lesslikely.
The most importantreasonforthis is widelyappreciated:A greatpowerthat
uses force forless than vital interests,and thatdoes so frequentlyor with a short
fuse, risksmobilizingotherstatesto join ranksto balanceagainstit. This is what
EdmundBurkemeantin 1790when, in lightof the FrenchRevolution,he wrote
of a powerfulBritainthat "ourpatience will achieve more than our force."
The use offeree often gives riseto an aftermathmore complex and less pre-
dictablethan the actualemploymentofferee. If thataftermathis not mastered,
all foregoinguse offeree will be retrospectivelydevalued;one can win a warand
still lose the peace by under-reaching diplomatically.Thus, for example,
Americaprovidedthe marginof Allied victoryin WorldWarI, but laboredtoo

>COLIN L. POWELLis the U.S. secretaryof state.

62 Wilson Quarterly
littleto shapethe postwarpoliticaland economic environmentto preventa new
waronly 20 yearslater.
The workof diplomatsandothersin a postwarenvironmentis inherentlyhard
work,but it is crucial.We knew such laborswould lie beforeus in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Yearsof war in Afghanistan,and an avaricious tyranny in Iraq,
destroyedfarmorethandidthe Coalition'suse offeree in eithercountry.Worse,
both societieswere wounded in theirspiritsas well as theirbodies,theirnation-
al cohesion brought low by despots who manipulated internal divisions to
advancetheirown ends. Fromthe start,we resolvedto staythe course until we
achieved not only physicalreconstructionbut also decent representativegov-
ernmentsin both countries- in otherwords,until we turnedmilitaryvictories
into lastingpoliticalaccomplishments.
Too frequentor too quicka resortto force can also underminethe authority
of power.Not all use offeree is createdequal. Other stateswill grantauthority
to the use offeree, implicitlyif not otherwise,if it fallswithin the boundsof jus-
tice and reason;if theythinka use offeree does not fallwithinsuch bounds,they
will withdrawtheirlegitimatingconsent, and therebyunderminethe authority
of power.
Obviously,we still lack universalagreementon what is justand reasonable,
but there is a growing sense of both. Between March 1991 and November
2002,the UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilpasseda dozen resolutionsconcerning
Iraq- resolutionsauthorizingthe use offeree.Thatmattersin a worldwhereprin-
ciplescount.And thatis the kindof worldwe live in, not leastbecauseAmerica,
morethanmostnations,hasstruggledovermanygenerationsto bringsucha world
into being.
Of this, too, we have been mindful in the currentadministration.We have
usedforcewhen we hadto, but not beyond.PresidentBushhasstressedthatstates
supportingterrorismare as guiltyas terroriststhemselves,and they are. But we
wereneverso unimaginative asto thinkthata singleapproachto all terrorist
groups
and theirstatesupporters,least of all a militaryapproach,would workin every
case.As the presidentmade clearon May 1, 2003, we use "allthe toolsof diplo-
macy,law enforcement,intelligence, and finance. We'reworkingwith a broad
coalition of nationsthat understandthe threatand our sharedresponsibilityto
meet it. The use offeree has been- and remains- our last resort."
Diplomacy,then, is persuasionin the shadowof power.It is the orchestration
of wordsagainstthe backdropof deeds in pursuitof policy objectives.As every
sentientdiplomatknows,diplomacyusesthe reputationof powerto achievewhat
poweritselfoften cannotachieve, or can achieve only at greaterand sometimes
excessivecost.
But not everyone is a diplomat. Some have recently argued over Libya's
decision to turn awayfrom weapons of mass destruction in terms that sound
like an old beer commercial:tastesgreat/lessfilling, tastesgreat/lessfilling-
force/diplomacy,force/diplomacy.But of course it's not an either/or propo-
sition. Diplomacy without power is just naked pleading. Power without
diplomacy is often unavailing. Libya's recent decision to turn away from
weapons of mass destruction was, at the least, accelerated by displays of
American power, but policy success also required American and British

Summer2004 63
Diplomacy

skills at persuasion. The combination of power and persuasion is what

worked in this case, as it is what worksin most others.

secondbasicprincipleof diplomacyfollowsfromthe first:Policysuc-

cess comes more easilywhen more skilledactorsworkwith you to
achieve it than workagainstyou to preventit.
One of diplomacy'skeytasksis to arrangecoalitionsso thatone'spowerand
its reputationare multiplied through them. Power cannot do this by itself,
becausepowerrepelsaswell asattracts. A wisediplomacymagnifiespower'sattrac-
tive qualityand minimizesits repellentqualityby using powerto benefitothers
as well as oneself.A wise diplomacypersuadesotherstatesthattheirmostimpor-
tant interestsand principleswill be advancedif they cooperatewith you. The
epitome of this principleis a formalalliance.
AmericandiplomacyafterWorldWarIIexemplifiedthe soundnessof thisprin-
ciple. We put ourpowerat the disposalof all who cherishedfreedomand peace.
We did thingsfor othersthey couldn'tdo for themselves.We defended others,
yes,butwe alsoforgaveourformerenemiesand helpedreconcileold adversaries,
such as FranceandGermany.We advancedcommon prosperity by buildinginsti-
tutionsto promotetrade.All this magnifiedthe attractivequalitiesof American
powerand legitimatedour powerin the eyes of others.We were the rainmaker
of internationalpolitics.
And we stillare.The standardrapagainstthisadministration's supposeduni-
lateralismand self-absorptionis well known,but it simplydoes not fit the facts
of recent U.S. foreign policy. Did we not work hard to build coalitions in
Afghanistanand Iraq?Dozens of nationsstand with us in each of those coun-
tries. And do we not put our power at the disposalof others, including the
dozens of nationswith whom we cooperatein the waragainstterrorism?Do we
not still do for othersthingsthey cannot do for themselves- organizeregional
coalitions,forexample,to bringreliefto shatteredcountriessuch as Liberiaand
Haiti?We still embraceold enemies who have attainednew perspectives,as in
Afghanistanand Iraq, and we still work to reconcile old adversaries,as our
effortsin the Middle East,Africa,South Asia,and elsewhereshow.We are cer-
tainlyno lesscommittedto freetradethanwe everwere.Andwe areno lessded-
icatedto our allieseither,despitethe shiftingof the circumstancesthatgaverise
to our oldestand most cherishedalliances.
Now, alliesarenot alwayseasyto get alongwith,in waror in peace. Butwhen
thereis troubleamongfriends,aswe havehadoverthe pastyearor so, it does not
followthatthe faultalwayslieson one side.Somespeakasthoughthe UnitedStates
is to blame forthe inabilityof the SecurityCouncil to agreeto act on the eve of
warin Iraq.Butthe presidentwentto the UnitedNationson September12, 2002,
and we initiatedand securedResolution1441 in November2002 by a 15-0vote.
In ourview,thatresolution(andseveralprecursors) furnishedsufficientjustification
forthe use of force in light of Iraq'sclearfailureto respondto its demands.
But we went the extramile, proposingyet anotherresolution.It did not pass
becauseothers,particularlyone old and dearallyof the United Statessittingper-
manentlyon the SecurityCouncil, preventedit fromdoingso. How then arewe
"unilateralist"? How then did we harmthe credibilityof the SecurityCouncil?

64 WilsonQuarterly
 Disagreementsamong friendsare unpleasant,but they should not surprise
or overlyexciteus. Nearlyeveryyearsince 1949,someone haspredictedthe end
of the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization,whetheroverBerlin,Suez, Vietnam,
the 1973 Middle Eastwar,the Euromissiledebatesof the 1980s,or some other
pretext.But NATO hasn'tended; it has grownlarger,teaching us two valuable
lessons.First,don'tfall forthe transatlantichysteriadu jour.Second, and more
important,alliancesbasedon principlesratherthan momentaryneeds havethe
abilityto adjustwhen circumstanceschange.
NATO is such an alliance.In the late 1940s,we worriedthatWesternEurope
might be overrunby the Red Army,or subvertedby local Soviet-supported
Communists.We no longerworryabout the dangersthat confrontedus in the
late 1940s,oreventhe late 1980s.IfNATOwereonlya militarycoalition,it should
have expiredvictorious,fromold age, at leasta decade ago.
ButAmericanstatesmenwere justas concernedin the late 1940sthatwe not
be draggedinto a thirdworldwarovernew Europeansquabbles.That is whywe
weredeterminedthatpostwarEuropesproutstableandprosperousliberaldemoc-
racies,becauseliberaldemocraciesdo not producedisasterson the scaleof world
wars.Thats whatthe MarshallPlanand then NATO,alongwith consistentU.S.
supportforgreaterEuropeancooperationand integration,wereall about.
So NATOhasneverbeen justa militaryalliance.It'sbeen a compactof polit-
icalprinciples,too,which is whyit can nowtransformitselffroman alliancedevot-
ed mainlyto the defenseof commonterritory intoan alliancedevotedto the defense
of common interestsand ideals.That is also why it can apply its irreplaceable
experiencein common defense to dealingwith new kindsof threats.
Transformations can be tricky,however.Our common securitychallengesare
no longer as fixed and vividas they were in the face of Sovietpower.The new
threatswe face are less sharplydefined, more unpredictablein theirtargetsand
methods,so thatwe and ouralliesno longersharecommon perceptionsof threat
to the same extentas in Cold Wartimes.Thathasbeen truein recentyearseven
of mass-casualtyterrorism,though it should now be clear to all that this threat
is not aimed only at America.
But though NATO memberstodaymay not formulateidenticaldefinitions
of threatsandinterests,we morethanmakeup forthe differencesthrougha mature
recognitionthatwe sharethe same vision of a good societyand a betterworld.
Transatlanticties are as flexible as they are unbreakable. So are those of
Americas alliancesin Asiaand elsewhere,particularly as thosealliancesbecome
ever-stronger partnerships amongdemocraticnations.We shouldnot let the nat-
uralstressof dealingwithchangemisleadus.Ourpartnerships aregrowingstronger
as they adaptto new realities.
That said,I will not trivializethe disagreementsthataroseduringthe debate
overwhetherto go to warwith Iraqlastyear.What happenedwas not classical
militarybalancingagainstthe United States;such behaviorwould be senseless,
forEuropeansknowthatthe United Statesis not a strategicthreatto Europe.We
witnessedinsteada formof symbolicbalancingin the withdrawalof consent by
some of our allies to the uses of Americanpower.
It is truethatwe did not need those allies in a strictlymilitarysense. But the
withdrawalof theirconsentfromthe uses of our powerunderminedthe author-

Summer2004 65
Diplomacy

ity of Americanpower in the world,and if that withdrawalwere to persistand

spread,it would be a troublingdevelopment.But thatis unlikelyto happen.On
neither side of the Atlantic is there a taste for such trouble, so we now see
NATO closing ranks and working well on a range of issues, notably in
Afghanistan.Everyoneknowsthat Europe and Americaneed each other,that
we are wrappedup in each other like family,and have been for centuries.We
arguein proportionto how much we careabouteach other,and we carea lot-
enough to keep our differencesin perspective.

third core principle of diplomacy is this: Success in diploma-

cy is often most advantageous when it is incomplete. Much of
the time, less is more.
This principlemaysound a bit strangeat firstblush, but it merelypointsout
that it is possibleto overdothings,thatthere are waysof winning that can turn
victoryintodefeat.Examplesof over-reachaswell as under-reachfillhistorybooks.
Fortunately,there are also examplesin those booksof gettingit right.
Anotherwayto putthisprincipleis thatan adversary needsan honorablepath
of retreatif we areto achieveour main policygoalsthroughthe reputationof our
powerratherthanthroughthe actualuse of force.A corneredadversary maylash
out, and our eventualsuccess at arms,if it comes at all, may be Pyrrhic.
The diplomacyof the Cuban Missile Crisisfamouslyillustratesthis princi-
ple. By offeringto withdrawU.S. JupitermissilesfromTurkey(weaponsthatwe
had alreadyplannedto removeforentirelydifferentreasons),PresidentJohnF.
Kennedy gave Chairman Nikita Khrushchev an honorable way out- and
Khrushchevtook it. We thus removeda mortalthreatto the United Statesand
transformedthe dynamicsof Cold Warrisktakingin a positiveway.Nevertheless,
our successwas incomplete.We did not get the Sovietsaltogetherout of Cuba.
Nor did we get Fidel Castroout of power.But given the risksand probablecosts
of seekingmore, our success was the most advantageousone achievable.
This thirdprincipleof diplomacyremainsverymuch in play.We now have
a problem with North Korea. The leadership of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea(DPRK)has been tryingto generatea crisisatmosphereon
the Koreanpeninsula, using behaviorthat conformsto a patternof extortion
the governmenthas exhibitedover many years.It would not be diplomaticfor
me to lay bareall our tactics in dealing with North Korea,which remainsvery
much a live issue. But it would be telling no secrets to say that we have
employed the firsttwo core principlesof diplomacy.The presidenthas been
verypatient.All options remain on the table, but we have focused our efforts
on persuasion.The presidenthas also gatheredallies. The main interestsand
principles of four of our five interlocutorsin the Six-PartyTalksrun parallel
to our own:the complete denuclearizationof North Korea.By workingto pull
Japan,Russia,China, and South Koreainto our Koreadiplomacy,we advance
those states'interestsand principleswith our own, legitimate our power,and
give our poweradded authority.We also enhance the prospectthat a solution
will endure, and we improve our relationswith importantcountries in ways
that transcendthe stakesin Korea.
Ifwe areto succeed in Korea,however,principlenumberthreeis key.There

66 Wilson Quarterly
has to be an exit throughwhich the DPRKleadershipcan move if it makesthe
rightchoices.Thatexitis marked,"Embarkhereforthe 2 1stcentury,andan hon-
orableplace in the worldcommunity."If North Korea'sleadersdo embarkfor
the 21st century,and if our diplomacyachievesthe dismantlingof the DPRK's
nuclearprograms,we will havegainedan importantsuccess.Itwould stillbe an
incomplete success- but deliberatelyso. As with Cuba in 1962, we will have
achievedthe most advantageoussuccess availableunderthe circumstances.
This approachto Koreanissuesdoes not mean thatwe will ever rewardthe
NorthKoreanregimeforoppressingitspeopleand threateningitsneighbors,any
morethanwe haverewardedthe Cuban regimesince 1962.Those regimeswill
change, either because they themselves will seek transformationor because
theirpeopleswill changethem. Justas the SovietUnion wasrunningagainstthe
flow of history,so, too, are these two relicsof 20th-centurytotalitarianism.
Clearly,not everyinstanceof politicalprogressin the world,whetherin north-
eastAsiaor anywhereelse, can or shouldbe accomplishedby forceof arms,cer-
tainlynot Americanforceof arms.Of course,we standforuniversalideals- for
liberty,forfreedom,forgovernmentof, by,and forthe people underthe rule of
law- but we cannot justwaveour handsand turnthese idealsinto realityevery-
where at once. Justas clearly,then, our policy prioritiesmust be based on our
nationalinterests.We mustdeal with the worldas it is if we areto haveanyhope
of makingthe worldmore as we would like it to be.
Equallyobviousis that our policy is anchoredin a sound method that con-
nects our intereststo our ideals.If we wantAmericanpowerto endure,and the
reputationof thatpowerto achievethe endswe seek,we mustbe patientandwise,
aswell as strongandbold, in the face of danger.That is ultimatelyhow our ideals
and our interestsare best served:when power and persuasion combine in
advancingour objectives,when we seek partnersthroughwhom our powercan
be legitimatedand used forthe greatergood, and when we distinguishbetween
what is both desirableand attainableand what is only one or the other.
I haveseen enough of U.S. foreignpolicy- itsformulationand its impact-
to know that it is much easierto speakof ideals, interests,and methodsthan it
is to renderthe judgmentsthatconnect them in justthe rightways.Foreignpol-
icy is difficultunder the best of circumstances.It is harderstill when decision
makerssense high stakesand more than the usual degree of uncertaintyin the
world,as has been the case forthe pasttwo and a half years.
So distinctions notwithstanding,it is helpful to think of diplomacy as a
species of statecraft,for diplomacyis a craftmore than it is either a science or
an art.In science, both materialand method are beyond the free choice of the
scientist.In art,neithermaterialnormethodis beyondthe freechoice of the artist.
A craftlies in between:The materialis given in the worldas we find it, but the
methods by which the statesman can shape that material offer wide if not
unboundedchoice.
That in-betweenstateputs a specialpremiumon the good judgmentof the
craftsmanto shapea realityhe can neitherchoose nor ignore.His aim is efficacy.
Havethisadministration s judgmentsbeen basicallysound?Does Americanstate-
craftwork?I believethe answerto both questionsis yes, and I am confident that
future generations will believe so too.

Summer2004 67