SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 173423; March 5, 2014

BRION, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna (petitioners) filed an application for registration of
a 2,597 square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated at Brgy. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union
in 1994. They stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by one Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death
was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated
August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest over the subject land in favour of Clemente. Clemente
later sold the lot to Rodolfo Cuenca in 1975 and Rodolfo sold the same to the petitioners in 1984.

It is claimed by the petitioners that through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for more than 50 years
as evidenced by the lot’s survey plan, technical description and certificate of assessment. Respondent
Republic of the Philippines opposed the application but did not support any evidence in support of the
opposition. There were likewise no private oppositor, hence, the RTC granted the application for
registration in favour of the petitioners.

Respondent appealed the same to the CA and the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. It ruled that although the petitioners were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of
the land, they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was later denied by the CA.

Issue:

Did the CA err when it reversed and set aside the granting of the application for registration of
land by the RTC?

Ruling:

No. First, petitioners were not able to prove the nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and disposable
public land. The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. Of the
four classes of public land, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Public land that has not been classified
as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any
applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable
and disposable nature of the land. Under the Public Land Act, the classification and the reclassification of
public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public
land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government. In this case, the CA relied on
the notation in the survey plan and a certification issued by the DENR CENRO that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. However, the two documents presented by the petitioners are not evidences of
a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land.
Second, petitioners were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947. Under the
PLA, petitioners must prove that they have been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession
and occupation of the agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least, since May 8, 1947. Petitioners in this case failed to do so
although they presented a tax declaration which purported indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior
to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947, this does not prove that it commenced as of the cut off date of May
8, 1947.

DEFENDANT’S/ RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

 Respondent argued that applicant/petitioners (Spouses Fortuna) did not present an official
proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land.
 Petitioners’ evidence – tax declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over the lot dates
back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section
14(1) of PD 1529