Toyota War

The Toyota War (Arabic: ‫ ﺣﺮب ﺗﻮﻳﻮﺗﺎ‬Ḥarb Tūyūtā, French: Guerre

Toyota War
des Toyota) or Great Toyota War[9] is the name commonly given to
the last phase of the Chadian–Libyan conflict, which took place in Part of the Chadian–Libyan conflict and the Cold
1987 in Northern Chad and on the Libyan–Chadian border. It takes its War
name from the Toyota pickup trucks used, primarily the Toyota Hilux
and the Toyota Land Cruiser, to provide mobility for the Chadian
troops as they fought against the Libyans.[10] The 1987 war resulted
in a heavy defeat for Libya, which, according to American sources,
lost one tenth of its army, with 7,500 men killed and US$1.5 billion
worth of military equipment destroyed or captured.[11] Chadian losses
were 1,000 men killed.[8]

The war began with the Libyan occupation of northern Chad in 1983,
when Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi, refusing to recognize the
legitimacy of the Chadian President Hissène Habré, militarily Chadian soldiers on a Toyota Land Cruiser
supported the attempt by the opposition Transitional Government of pickup truck
National Unity (GUNT) to overthrow Habré. The plan was foiled by
Date December 16, 1986 – September
the intervention of France which, first with Operation Manta and later
11, 1987
with Operation Epervier, limited Libyan expansion to north of the
(8 months, 3 weeks and 5 days)
[12]
16th parallel, in the most arid and sparsely inhabited part of Chad.
Location Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture,
In 1986 the GUNT rebelled against Gaddafi, stripping Libya of its Chad
main cover of legitimacy for its military presence in Chad. Seeing an Result Decisive Chadian victory
occasion to unify Chad behind him, Habré ordered his forces to pass
the 16th parallel so as to link with the GUNT rebels (who were Expulsion of Libyan forces from
fighting the Libyans in Tibesti) in December.[13] A few weeks later a Chad
bigger force struck at Fada, destroying the local Libyan garrison. In
Belligerents
three months, combining the methods of guerilla and conventional
warfare in a common strategy,[14] Habré was able to retake almost all Libya FANT
of northern Chad, and in the following months, inflicted new heavy CDR FAP
defeats on the Libyans, until a ceasefire putting an end to the conflict PLO[1][2] France (Opération
was signed in September. The ceasefire left open the issue of the Épervier)

disputed Aouzou Strip, which was eventually assigned to Chad by the Commanders and leaders
International Court of Justicein 1994.
Muammar Gaddafi Hissène Habré
Khalifa Haftar[3] Hassan Djamous
Mahmoud Abu Idriss Déby
Contents Marzouq François
Mitterrand
Background
Jean Saulnier
Forces on the ground
Strength
Libyan expulsion
Libya: FANT:
Renewed Chadian offensive
90,000[4] 28,000[6]
Ceasefire
300+ tanks FAP:
References
60+ aircraft 1,500–2,000[7]
Bibliography
France:
 CDR: 1,500
1,000 militia[5] 12+ aircraft
Background
Casualties and losses
Since 1983 Chad was de facto partitioned, with the northern half
7,500 killed 1,000 killed[8]
controlled by the rebel Transitional Government of National Unity
1,000 captured
(GUNT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei and supported on the ground
800 tanks & APCs lost
by Libyan forces, while the south was held by the Western-backed
28-32 aircraft
Chadian government guided by Hissène Habré.[15] This partition on
destroyed[8]
16th parallel (the so-called Red Line) into Libyan and French zones
of influence was informally recognised by France in 1984, following
an accord between France and Libya to withdraw their forces from Chad.[16] The accord was not respected by Libya, which
[17]
maintained at least 3,000 men stationed in northern Chad.

During the period between 1984 and 1986, in which no major clash took place, Habré greatly strengthened his position thanks to
western support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan 1984 agreement. From 1984 onwards, the GUNT also suffered
increasing factional tensions, centered on the fight between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar over the leadership of the
organization.[18] Taking advantage of the GUNT's difficulties, Habré struck a series of accords with smaller rebel factions, which left
the GUNT at the beginning of 1986 with only three of the eleven factions that had originally signed the Lagos Accord in 1979. The
remaining factions were Goukouni's People's Armed Forces (FAP), Acheikh's armed branch of the Democratic Revolutionary
Council (CDR) and that part of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) which had maintained its loyalty to Wadel Abdelkader
Kamougué.[19]

Forces on the ground

At the opening of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan expeditionary force was
still impressive, comprising 8,000 soldiers, 300 tanks, many multiple rocket
launchers (rocket artillery) and regular artillery pieces, Mi-24 helicopters and sixty
combat aircraft. These forces did not have a unified command, but were divided into
an Operational Group South, active in the Tibesti with 2,500 men, and an
Operational Group East, centered inFaya-Largeau.[20]

Apparently formidable, the Libyan military disposition in Chad was marred by

serious flaws. The Libyans were prepared for a war in which they would provide
ground and air support to their Chadian allies, act as assault infantry, and provide
reconnaissance. By 1987, however, Muammar Gaddafi had lost his allies, exposing
Libya's inadequate knowledge of the area. Libyan garrisons came to resemble
isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian Sahara. Also important was the low
morale among the troops, who were fighting in a foreign country, and the structural
A map of Chad, with the Borkou-
disorganization of the military of Libya, which was in part induced by Muammar
Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, where the
Gaddafi's fear of a military coup against him. This fear led him to avoid the war took place
professionalization of the armed forces.[21][22]

The Libyans had also to deal with the greatly strengthened Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), which was composed of 10,000
highly motivated soldiers, led by experienced and able commanders, such as
Idriss Déby, Hassan Djamous and Head of State Hissène
Habré himself. And while FANT previously had no air power, limited mobility and few anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, by 1987
it could count on the French Air Force to keep Libyan aircraft grounded and, most importantly, to provide 400 state of the art Toyota
pickups equipped with MILAN anti-tank guided missiles. It is these trucks that gave the name "Toyota War" to this last phase of the
Chadian-Libyan conflict.[23][24]

Libyan expulsion
Habré selected as the first target for his reconquest of northern Chad the well-
fortified Libyan communications base of Fada. It was defended by 2,000 Libyans
and the bulk of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) militia (Gaddafi's
closest Chadian allies), well-provided with armour and artillery. Hassan Djamous,
the thirty-year-old FANT commander-in-chief, pitched about 4,000–5,000 men
against Fada's Libyan garrison.[20] Taking advantage of his army's superior
knowledge of the terrain, which apparently included unknown access points to the
base, Djamous avoided a frontal assault and used his forces' high mobility to
surround the Libyan positions and then unleashed his troops, destroying the A Libyan Mil Mi-25 captured by
defending garrison. In the battle, 784 Libyans were killed and 100 tanks destroyed, Chadian forces at Ouadi Doum
while only 50 FANT soldiers died.[25][26]

The unexpected defeat stunned Gaddafi, who then reacted on 4 January by recalling to service all of the army reservists. In an act of
defiance towards France, he also ordered the bombing of Arada, well south of the 16th parallel. France retaliated with a new airstrike
on Ouadi Doum and destroyed its radar system, effectively blinding the Libyan Air Force in Chad for several months.[27] Gaddafi
attempted to contain the FANT threat by rushing several new battalions into Chad (especially to Faya-Largeau and Ouadi Doum),
including units of the elite Revolutionary Guard. This brought the amount of Libyan forces in the country to a total of 11,000 by
March.[28]

In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by
minefields,
5,000 soldiers, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyans' base fell to a smaller Chadian attacking force led by Djamous
equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank weapons. Observers estimated that, in the Chadian victories in the
first three months of 1987, more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted. Large numbers of tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya sent its own aircraft
to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny its use to the Chadians. It was reported that, in many cases, Libyan soldiers had been
killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Ouadi Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running through their own
minefields.[29]

The fall of Ouadi Doum was a severe setback for Libya. Deserted by most of their Chadian allies, Libyan forces found themselves
isolated in foreign territory, and the loss of the main Libyan air base in Chad prevented Libya from providing close air cover to its
troops. In general, the offensive against FANT had exposed the vulnerability of Libya's heavy armor to a more mobile enemy. On
Gaddafi's orders, a general withdrawal was undertaken from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, beginning with Faya-Largeau. The
town had served as the main Libyan base during the preceding four years, but was in danger of being encircled. Its garrison of 3,000
men, together with the survivors of Ouadi Doum, retired toward the Libyan base at Maatan-as-Sarra, north of the Chadian border.[30]
In an attempt to reduce the damage inflicted to his international standing, Gaddafi announced that Libya had won the confrontation,
[31]
and was now leaving Chad so that the opposition could play its part in fighting Habré.

These military actions left Habré in control of Chad and in a position to threaten the expulsion of Libya from the Aouzou Strip,
affected the international perception of Libya as a significant regional military power, and cast renewed doubt on the competence and
determination of Libyan soldiers, especially in engagements beyond the country's borders to which they evidently felt no personal
commitment.[29]

The Toyota War attracted considerable interest in the United States, where the possibility of using Habré to overthrow Gaddafi was
given serious consideration.[32] As part of the Reagan Administration's support for his government, Habré, during a visit to
Washington, received a pledge of US$32 million worth of aid, includingStinger anti-aircraft missiles.[11]

Renewed Chadian offensive

In August 1987, the encouraged Chadians carried their offensive into the disputed Aouzou Strip, occupying the town of Aouzou
following another battle in which the Libyans suffered severe losses in troops and abandoned equipment. In retaliation, Libya
intensified its air bombardments of towns in the north, usually from altitudes beyond the range of FANT's shoulder-fired missiles.
Appeals by Habré for French air missions to defend the area against the bombing were
rejected, as Aouzou had been retaken against the wishes of French President François
Mitterrand. Instead, Mitterrand called for international mediation to settle competing
claims to the disputed territory.[30][33]

After a succession of counterattacks, toward the end of August the Libyans finally drove
the 400 Chadian soldiers out of the town. This victory–the first by Libyan ground forces
since the start of the Toyota War–was apparently achieved through close-range air
strikes, which were followed by ground troops advancing cross-country in jeeps, Toyota
all-terrain trucks, and light armored vehicles. For the Libyans, who had previously relied
on ponderous tracked armour, the assault represented a conversion to the desert warfare
tactics developed by FANT.[30] To highlight the victory, Gaddafi flew foreign journalists
[11]
to the region, so the news of his victory could reach the headlines.

Habré quickly reacted to this setback and to the continued bombing of FANT
concentrations in northern Chad. On September 5, 1987 he mounted a surprise raid
The Aouzou Strip, highlighted in
against the key Libyan air base at Maaten al-Sarra. Reportedly, 1,000 Libyans were
red
killed, 300 were captured, and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the
surrounding desert. Chad claimed that its troops destroyed about 32 aircraft – including
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 fighters, Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bombers, and Mil Mi-24 helicopters –
before the FANT column withdrew to Chadian soil.[30]

The attack had been opposed by France, which refused to provide FANT with intelligence and logistical support, causing FANT to
suffer considerable losses. TheFrench Defence MinisterAndré Giraud let it be known that "France was not implicated in any way" in
the attack and "had not been informed of it". The American reaction was markedly different, as it had previously supported the
attempted reconquest of theAouzou Strip; it now welcomed the Chadian raid.[34]

Ceasefire
Because of domestic opposition, internal demoralization, and international hostility, Gaddafi assumed a more conciliatory attitude
following his defeat. On the other side, Habré also found himself vulnerable, as the French feared that the attack on Maatan as-Sarrah
was only the first stage of a general offensive into Libya proper, a possibility that France was not disposed to tolerate. As a result,
Mitterrand forced Habré to accept the mediation efforts of the Organization of African Unity's Chairman, Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia, which resulted in a ceasefire on 11 September.[8][34][35]

It was assumed that war would, sooner or later, resume, but in the end the ceasefire violations were relatively minor.[36] Gaddafi
announced in May 1988 that he would recognize Habré as President of Chad "as a gift to Africa", even if Libya refused to leave the
disputed Aouzou Strip.[11] On 3 October the two countries resumed diplomatic relations, and another important step was made when
the two countries agreed in September 1990 to refer the dispute to theInternational Court of Justice.[37] On 3 February 1994 the court
.[35]
ruled in favour of Chad, thus definitively solving the Aouzou controversy by assigning the territory to the southern country

References
1. "22‫ رﺻﻴﻒ‬- ‫ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺣﺎرﺑﺖ ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻘﺬاﻓﻲ ﺿﺪ ﺗﺸﺎد‬...‫( "ﻗﺼﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ اﻟﻨﺸﺎط اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻲ‬https://raseef2
2.com/politics/2018/11/27/%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%
D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%8
3%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A/) .
2. Talhami, Ghada Hashem (30 November 2018). "Palestinian Refugees: Pawns to Political Actors"(https://books.goog
le.no/books?id=n8LsPA3mTBYC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=PLO+Aouzou&source=bl&ots=qnMx7fHLg1&sig=wxP4y
PUqOBwozIrmH_Z_RIJkc-g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiZvbjk7vzeAhV ykIsKHdFXDJ8Q6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=o
nepage&q=PLO+Aouzou&f=false). Nova Publishers – via Google Books.
 3. Touchard, Laurent (21 October 2014)."Libye : la deuxième vie de Khalifa Haftar au cThad et la défaite finale de
Ouadi Doum" (https://www.jeuneafrique.com/41980/politique/libye-la-deuxi-me-vie-de-khalifa-haftar-au-tchad-et-la-d-
faite-finale-de-ouadi-doum/). Jeune Afrique. Retrieved 28 October 2018.
4. H. Metz, Libya, p. 254
5. The Americana Annual, 1988, 180
6. M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence, p. 119
7. The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements
, 143
8. Pollack 2002, p. 397
9. Neville (2018), p. 16.
10. A. Clayton, Frontiersmen, p. 161
11. Simons 2004, p. 58
12. Pollack 2002, pp. 382–385
13. S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, p. 212
14. M. Azevedo, p. 124
15. Pollack 2002, p. 383
16. M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld,A Study of Crisis, p. 92
17. M. Azevedo, p. 140
18. S. Nolutshungu, pp. 191–192, 210
19. G. Ngansop, Tchad, vingt ans de crise, p. 160
20. Pollack 2002, p. 391
21. Pollack 2002, pp. 386, 398
22. S. Nolutshungu, pp. 218–219
23. M. Azevedo, pp. 149–150
24. Pollack 2002, pp. 391, 398
25. Pollack 2002, pp. 391–392
26. S. Nolutshungu, p. 216
27. M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld,A Study in Crisis, p. 94
28. Pollack 2002, p. 392
29. H. Metz, p. 262
30. T. Collelo, Chad
31. M. Azevedo, p. 150
32. S. Nolutshungu, p. 221
33. S. Nolutshungu, p. 222
34. S. Nolutshungu, pp. 222–223
35. M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 95
36. S. Nolutshungu, p. 223
37. G. Simons, p. 60

Bibliography
Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge. ISBN 90-5699-582-0.
Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study in Crisis. University of Michigan Press.ISBN 0-472-10806-
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Clayton, Anthony (1998).Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa Since 1950. Routledge. ISBN 1-85728-525-5.
Collelo, Thomas (1990).Chad. US GPO. ISBN 0-16-024770-5.
Metz, Helen Chapin (2004).Libya. US GPO. ISBN 1-4191-3012-9.
Ngansop, Guy Jeremie (1986).Tchad, vingt ans de crise(in French). L'Harmattan.ISBN 2-85802-687-4.
Neville, Leigh (2018). Technicals: Non-Standard Tactical Vehicles from the Great Toyota War to modern Special
Forces. Oxford, New York City: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781472822512.
 Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad . University of Virginia
Press. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3.
Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-
8032-3733-2.
Simons, Geoff (2004). Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-988-2.
Le pick up des guerilleros, La révolution T
oyota en Libye(2011). Tristan Ranx. Fluctuat.net.

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