MAMANTEO VS. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAGUMUN A.M. NO.

P-98-1264
LORENZA C. ONGCO VS.VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY G.R. NO. 190810
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT) VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. AND
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO G.R. NO. 90478
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-98-1264. July 28, 1999]

BASILIO P. MAMANTEO, FLORENTINO B. TRINIDAD, BONIFACIO MANGANIP and EDGAR S. SALLIDAO,

complainants, vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MANUEL M. MAGUMUN,[1] respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

What should the sheriff do when he is informed by the defendant in a replevin that the property to be
seized is in custodia legis and in fact already forfeited in favor of the government by order of another
government agency?

This question assumes importance in light of the charges of grave misconduct filed by complainants
Basilio P. Mamanteo, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources (PENR) Officer; Florentino B.
Trinidad, Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENR) Officer; and Bonifacio Manganip and
Edgar S. Sallidao, both DENR forestry employees stationed in Tabuk, Kalinga, against Deputy Sheriff
Manuel M. Magumun of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Tabuk, Kalinga,
tasked with the enforcement of forestry laws, intercepted a San Miguel Corporation van with Plate No.
PJC-321 loaded with narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles and
cartons. Confronted by the forestry employees, Villamor Martinez, driver of the van, could not produce
any legal permit authorizing him to transport the narra lumber. Hence, after issuing seizure receipts, the
vehicle and its load of narra flitches were confiscated by the DENR forestry employees.

On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against driver Villamor Martinez was filed before the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Tabuk, Kalinga, for violation of Sec. 78 of P.D. 705[2] as amended, and implemented
by DENR Administrative Order 59.[3] On 24 July 1996, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, an
order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by the DENR Regional Office pursuant to its
quasi-judicial authority to administratively order the confiscation and forfeiture of lumber possessed
without permit including its conveyance.

Thereafter, San Miguel Corporation, the owner of the vehicle, through its agent Aimardo V. Interior, filed
a case for recovery of personal property and damages with application for writ of replevin with the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against herein complainants. The trial court issued a
warrant of seizure of personal property directing its sheriff to take hold of the van and its contents.

On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun, escorted by Sheriff Jacinto Contapay of RTC-Br.
1, Tabuk, Kalinga, and agents of the Philippine National Police, went to the office of the DENR in Tabuk,
Kalinga, to enforce the warrant issued by the trial court but the forestry employees and officials refused
to release the van on the ground that it had already been forfeited in favor of the government and was
now in custodia legis. Despite this explanation, on 7 August 1996, Deputy Sheriff Magumun
accompanied this time by Sheriff John Dongui-is Jr. of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tabuk, Kalinga,
and twenty (20) other persons, took the van without permission of the employees and officials of the
DENR. On 13 August 1996, after the lapse of the five-day period prescribed by law for filing an opposition
to the writ, the vehicle was delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.

In his comment, Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his ministerial duty to execute the
warrant in accordance with its mandate and his duties as sheriff under the Rules of Court and the
Manual for Clerks of Court.[4] He conceded that he was informed by the forestry employees and officials
of the forfeiture of the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure but he reasoned that it was not within
his discretion to withhold the implementation of the warrant.[5] The execution of a warrant of seizure on
a vehicle allegedly forfeited in favor of the government was a question of law too technical for him to
resolve[6] and faced with such a dilemma he opted to follow the order of the court and execute the
warrant in accordance with its mandate.
On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA observed that Deputy Sheriff Magumun made a very
literal interpretation of Sec. 4, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court as amended.[7] The OCA noted that while
Rule 60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed by the defendant in the replevin
that the personal property to be seized has been forfeited in favor of the government and is already in
custodia legis, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property subject of the
warrant of seizure.[8] The appropriate action should have been for respondent to inform his judge of the
situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be
observed.[9] For such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun be
penalized in the amount of P5,000.00 at the very least.[10]

We agree. Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject of the warrant of
seizure had already been confiscated by another government agency and forfeited in favor of the
government. However, the novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion and justify
his insistence on taking the property subject of the warrant without waiting for instructions from his
judge. A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is
entitled to the possession of the attached property,[11] much less does he have any discretion to decide
which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.

When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.[12]
However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where there is
no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where the plaintiff has shown by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of the property; that the property is wrongfully detained by
the defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax assessment or seized under execution or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure,[13] then the executing officer has no
other recourse but to execute the warrant or writ expeditiously.

In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property had been impounded
due to violation of forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had already been issued by the DENR.
Moreover, he was advised that the proper remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the
order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR.[14] The prudent recourse then for respondent was to
desist from executing the warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. Instead,
Deputy Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure with undue haste as
evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of seizure on the DENR
officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A warrant could be returned within a period of
not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the executing officer.[15]
Within this time frame, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge and thereafter
execute the warrant judiciously and with more certainty.

True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and
expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all
times conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and act above suspicion.[16] There must be no
room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired
with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is
the front line representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.

As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to
retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code,[17] tax assessment,
attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings
could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs, as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court,
they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of
justice.[18]

WHEREFORE, respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun is found guilty of grave misconduct and,
as recommended, is fined P5,000.00 for arbitrarily implementing the warrant of seizure of personal
property and for ignorance of the proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the
personal property to be recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government for
violation of forestry laws. Respondent is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a
more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] Respondent Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun was referred to as Deputy Sheriff M. Magiimun in
the affidavit-complaints submitted by complainants, although in his answer to the complaint as well as in
his Sheriff 's Report he gave his family name as "Magumun."

[2] Sec. 78. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable and disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority or possess timber
or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided,
That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Revised Forestry Code,
P.D.705 as amended by P.D.1559, and by E.O. No. 277, promulgated 25 July 1987, 83 OG No. 31, 3 August
1987).

[3] Guidelines for the Confiscation, Forfeiture and Disposition of Conveyance used in the commission of
offenses.

[4] Rollo, p. 21.

[5] Id., p. 22.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Sec. 4. Duty of the sheriff. Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the
adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the
property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the
property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its
delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take
the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled
thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.

[8] Rollo, p. 36.

[9] Id., p. 39.

[10] Ibid.

[11] NBI v. Tuliao, A.M. No. P-96-1184, 24 March 1997, 270 SCRA 351.

[12] See Note 7; Balantes v. Buena, A.M. No. P-94-1013, 14 March 1995, 242 SCRA 327.

[13] Paat v. CA, G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266

SCRA 167.

[14] Rollo, p. 5.

[15] Chua v. Gonzales, A.M. No. P-94-1060, 17 December 1996, 265 SCRA 662.

[16] Vda. de Tisado v. Tablizo, A.M. No. P-94-1025, 20 February 1996, 253 SCRA 646; Flores v. Caniya,
A.M. No. P-95-1133, 256 SCRA 518; Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Melgar, A.M. No. P-92-725, 30
April 1996, 256 SCRA 600.

[17] Pacis v. Hon. Averia, No. L-22526, 29 November 1966, 18 SCRA 907.
[18] Bernasal Jr. v. Montes, A.M. No. P-97-1250, 6 October 1997, 280 SCRA 181.

Today is Tuesday, February 12, 2019 home

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012

LORENZA C. ONGCO, PETITIONER,

vs.

VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
asking the Court to rule whether petitioner may intervene in a land registration case.

The Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions1 dated 30 September
2009 and 11 November 2009 (assailed Resolutions), which denied petitioner's Motion for Leave to
Intervene dated 23 June 2009.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 15 October 2007, respondent Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied for registration of a parcel of
land designated as Lot 1792, Cad-609-D, by filing an Application for Land Registration before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Branch 2.2 At the hearings, no oppositor aside from the
Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) came. Neither was there any written opposition filed in court.
Thus, an Order of General Default was issued against the whole world except the Republic.
Consequently, on 15 October 2008, the court found respondent Dalisay to have clearly shown a
registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of registration be issued by the
Land Registration Authority once the Decision had become final.3 Herein petitioner Lorenza C. Ongco
(Ongco) never intervened in the proceedings in the trial court.

The Republic filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92046.4 While the case was
pending appeal, petitioner Ongco filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" dated 23 June 2009 with an
attached Answer-in-Intervention.5

The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisay's Application for Land
Registration on the ground that, contrary to the allegations of Dalisay, the subject property was not free
from any adverse claim. In fact, petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in actual
possession of the subject land in an earlier case filed before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) when she applied for a free patent on the land.6

In her Comment/Objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene, Dalisay contended that Ongco did not
have a legal interest over the property.7 Moreover, the intervention would unduly delay the registration
proceeding, which was now on appeal. Besides, petitioner's interest, if any, may be fully protected in a
separate and direct proceeding. Additionally, Dalisay pointed out that Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court was clear that intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court, but not at any other time. The Republic, on the other hand, said that it was interposing no
objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene.8

On 30 September 2009, the CA issued its first assailed Resolution9 denying the Motion for Intervention
for having been filed beyond the period allowed by law. It said:

Lorenza C. Ongco's prayer to be allowed to intervene in the instant "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE
XXX" is DENIED[,] said motion having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.

Manalo vs. Court of Appeals is emphatic:

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutory
conditions for the right to intervene [are] shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining the propriety of letting a
party intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a person (1) has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of either of the parties; (3) or an interest against
both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof." Just as important, as (the Supreme Court
had) stated in Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals [227 SCRA 161{1993}], is the function
to consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the rendition
of judgment by the trial court, x x x."

After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically, intervention is
not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.
Here, the subject motion was filed only on June 23, 2009, way beyond the rendition of the Decision
dated October 15, 2008 (subject of the instant appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General) by the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Branch 2. As a necessary consequence, the prayed for admission of
the instant "ANSWER-IN-INTERVENTION could only be denied, x x x. (Emphases in the original)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,10 which was also denied in a Resolution dated 11
November 2009.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.

In her three-page Comment11 on the Petition, respondent Dalisay briefly argues that the CA did not
commit any error, because it properly applied the technical rules of procedure in denying the Motion for
Intervention. She also argues that the issues being presented are factual and, as such, not reviewable in
a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

In her Reply,12 petitioner asserts that the issues to be resolved in her Petition are questions of law:
whether the requisites for intervention are present, and whether the intervention she is seeking is an
exception to the general rule that intervention must be filed before judgment is rendered by the trial
court.

Issue for Resolution and the Ruling of the Court

The issue for resolution in the instant case is whether the CA committed reversible error in denying the
Motion for Intervention of petitioner.

We rule to deny the Petition.

DISCUSSION
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings.13 This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on
intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied)

It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's sound
discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take
into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention
will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not more
important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result.14 To help ensure that
delay does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that
intervention may be allowed only before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,15 this Court explained intervention in this wise:

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the applicant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of
Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an
officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest
must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than
mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and
remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal
interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is
limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding." (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, Ongco may not be allowed to intervene.

Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is indirect and contingent. She has not
been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits being only in the process of
applying for one.16 Her interest is at best inchoate. In Firestone Ceramics v. CA,17 the Court held that
the petitioner who anchored his motion to intervene on his legal interest arising from his pending
application for a free patent over a portion of the subject land merely had a collateral interest in the
subject matter of the litigation. His collateral interest could not have justified intervention.

In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had rendered
judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the motion. To recall, the
motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment." The history and rationale of this rule has
been explained thusly:

1. The former rule as to when intervention may be allowed was expressed in Sec. 2, Rule 12 as "before or
during a trial," and this ambiguity also gave rise to indecisive doctrines. Thus, inceptively it was held that
a motion for leave to intervene may be filed "before or during a trial" even on the day when the case is
submitted for decision (Falcasantos vs. Falcasantos, L-4627, May 13, 1952) as long as it will not unduly
delay the disposition of the case. The term "trial" was used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the
introduction for intervention was filed after the case had already been submitted for decision, the denial
thereof is proper (Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Arciaga, L-29207 and L-29222, July 31, 1974). However,
it has also been held that intervention may be allowed at any time before the rendition of final judgment
(Linchauco vs. CA, et al, L-23842, Mar. 13, 1975). Further, in the exceptional case of Director of Lands vs.
CA, et al. (L-45168, Sept. 25, 1979), the Supreme Court permitted intervention in a case pending before
it on appeal in order to avoid injustice and in consideration of the number of parties who may be
affected by the dispute involving overlapping of numerous land titles.
2. The uncertainty in these ruling has been eliminated by the present Sec. 2 of this amended Rule which
permits the filing of the motion to intervene at any time before the rendition of the judgment in the
case, in line with the doctrine in Lichauco above cited. The justification advanced for this is that before
judgment is rendered, the court, for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional
evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has
yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in
the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said
claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.18 (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, in Manalo v. CA,19 the Court said:

The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the rendition
of judgment by the trial court x x x."

After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically, intervention is
not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. (Emphases
supplied)

There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court for the filing of a
motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would result from many belated filings of motions for
intervention after judgment has already been rendered, because a reassessment of claims would have to
be done. Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted privilege to intervene will be rewarded, while
the original parties will be unduly prejudiced. This rule should apply more strictly to land registration
cases, in which there is a possibility that a great number of claimant-oppositors may cause a delay in the
proceedings by filing motions to intervene after the trial court — sitting as a land registration court —
has rendered judgment.

Also, it must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in rem.1âwphi1 Thus, only a
general notice to the public is required, and not a personal one. Its publication already binds the whole
world, including those who will be adversely affected. This, according to this Court, is the only way to
give meaning to the finality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be issued as against the argument
that the said rule could result in actual injustice.20 In the present case, the MTC found that the required
publication was made by respondent Dalisay when she applied for land registration. That publication was
sufficient notice to petitioner Ongco. Thus, petitioner only had herself to blame when she failed to
intervene as soon as she could before the rendition of judgment.

We also note that, had petitioner learned of the trial court proceedings in time, and had she wanted to
oppose the application, the proper procedure would have been to ask for the lifting of the order of
default and then to file the opposition.21 It would be an error of procedure to file a motion to intervene.
This is because, as discussed above, proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam.22

Aware of her fatal shortcoming, petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to exceptionally allow
intervention even after judgment has been rendered by the MTC in the land registration case. She cites
instances in which this Court allowed intervention on appeal. However, the cases she cited are
inapplicable to the present case, because the movants therein who wanted to intervene were found by
the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they had to be
joined because, without them, there could be no final determination of the actions. Indeed, if
indispensable parties are not impleaded, any judgment would have no effect.

In Galicia v. Manliquez,23 the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found that the defendant-
intervenors were indispensable parties, being the indisputable compulsory co-heirs of the original
defendants in the case for recovery of possession and ownership, and annulment of title. Thus, without
them, there could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they certainly stood to be affected
by any judgment in the case, considering their "ostensible ownership of the property."

In Mago v. CA,24 the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land that was mistakenly awarded
by the NHA to another awardee. Thus, the latter was given title to land with an area that was more than
that intended to be awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled the title mistakenly awarded and ordered
the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the mistakenly awarded title filed a Petition for
injunction to enjoin the NHA from cancelling the title awarded. The Petition was granted and the
judgment became final. The other awardee filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a Petition for Relief
from Judgment, which were both denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed the Decision of the court a
quo. This Court, however, found that the intervention should have been granted, considering the
indisputable admission of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the rightful
awardee of half of the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor stood to be deprived of his rightful
award when the trial court enjoined the cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the subdivision
of the lot covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other words, was directly affected.
In the present case, petitioner Ongco is not an indispensable party. As already noted, her interests are
inchoate and merely collateral, as she is only in the process of applying for a free patent. Also, the action
for land registration may proceed and be carried to judgment without joining her. This is because the
issues to be threshed out in a land registration proceeding — such as whether the subject land is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and whether the applicant or her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier — can be threshed out without joining
petitioner.

True, the evidence to be adduced by petitioner Ongco - to prove that she, not Dalisay, has been in
possession of the land subject of the application for registration of respondent — has a bearing on the
determination of the latter's right to register her title to the land. In particular, this evidence will help
debunk the claim of respondent that she has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject parcel of land. In fact, this same evidence must have been the reason why the
Republic did not interpose any objection to the Motion for Intervention. None of these facts, however,
makes petitioner an indispensable party; for there are many other ways of establishing the fact of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcel of land or the lack thereof.

If any, the only indispensable party to a land registration case is the Republic. Against it, no order of
default would be effective, because the Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25

In any case, we note that petitioner is not left without any remedy in case respondent succeeds in
getting a decree of registration. Under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree, there is a remedy available to any person deprived of land — or of any estate or
interest therein - through an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud. The person
may file, in the proper court, a petition for reopening and reviewing the decree of registration within one
year from the date of entry thereof. This Court has ruled that actual fraud is committed by a registration
applicant's failure or intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of the
premises by the party seeking a review of the decree. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact from
which benefit is obtained, to the prejudice of a third person.26 Thus, if he is so minded, petitioner can
still file for a petition to review the decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November 2009, which denied petitioner's Motion for Leave to
Intervene in CA-G.R. CV No. 92046, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 45-47, 49; in CA-G.R. CV No. 92046, and both penned by Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

2 Rollo, pp. 250-253; Application for Land Registration of herein respondent Dalisay.

3 Id. at 51-54; Decision of the MTC-Branch 2 dated 15 October 2008.

4 Id. at 21.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 22.

7 Id. at 190-195.

8 Id. at 196-197.
9 Id. at 45-47.

10 Id. at 200-205.

11 Id. at 300-302.

12 Id. at 305-309.

13 Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. Baikal Realty Corporation, 480 Phil. 545 (2004).

14 Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA, 259 Phil 748 (1989).

15 G.R. No. 179516, 17 March 2009, 581 SCRA 736.

16 Rollo, p. 22.

17 372 Phil. 401 (1999).

18 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. I, 319-320 (9th rev. ed. 2005).

19 419 Phil. 215(2001).

20 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 9 Phil. 186 (1980).

21 NARCISO PEÑA ET AL., REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 84 (rev. ed. 2008).

22 Id.

23 G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85.

24 363 Phil. 225 (1999).

25 AMADO D. AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS, 62 (4th. ed. 2007) citing
Republic v. Sayo, G.R. No. 60413, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 71 (1990).

26 Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 119 Phil. 258 (1963).

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner,

vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.

Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.

NARVASA, J.:

Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago — together with Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-
Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July
21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No.
14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.

After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly
filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the movants, a
reply to the opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite
proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its
complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5 Basically, they sought an
answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" 6 The PCGG
responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as
being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any

guise." 7

On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded
Complaint. 8 As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of
particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9

Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for
bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis.
Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The
Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are
adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of
defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters
sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial
proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of
court is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the
same)."

Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988.
11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory
Counterclaim " 12

The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL.
14 The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit
pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' 17 as
well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. 18

The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's
amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as—

1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or properties does
the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being ill-
gotten?

3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . . were
committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in
furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth?"

5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal
assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?

7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist
Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or
both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well
as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants
Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?

On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and
copying of—

1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the Amended
Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . . marked
as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and

3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the
decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being
scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.

On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25,
1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that

1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on
September 11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are
purposeless and unnecessary;"

2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly
described . . (in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"

3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG
and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:

(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted
in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.

(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 which the
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting
the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that —

1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are
propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"

2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the
proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"

3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants .
. sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"

4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and
irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."

Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.

After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first,
denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second,
reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).
20

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims
—

a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom
they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;

2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the
movants' motion for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial;
and

3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in
contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances; and

b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:

1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;

2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in
Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even
offered objections thereto and made comments thereon; and

3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either —

(a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity
provisions of Executive Order No. 1, or

(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.

This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to
desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor General
withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree
No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service
Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990) 22 to submit his comment/observation on
incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if called for by circumstances in the interest of the
Government or if he is so required by the Court." 23 This, the Court allowed by Resolution dated January
21, 1991. 24

Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from which the
Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the
following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni and such other
attorneys as it may later authorize." 25

The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective
positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the case.

Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court:
interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of documents and things. 27 Now, it
appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a
regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the
modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them
— which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism,
coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly
demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication. 28 Hence, a few
words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.

The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function
is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and
from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the facts has been
completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled
authoritatively, definitely and finally.

It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with
assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that
adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the
approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that
this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or
distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant to the action, or
surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 29

Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30 this Court described the nature and object of litigation
and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted in this
jurisdiction. It said:

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts
its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in technicalities. . . .

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully
and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or
concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical
rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.

Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by
the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings;
hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his
pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 31

Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or
"not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite
statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is,
however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office
to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made
known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact
arising from the pleadings.

The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial.
Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even
before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not
only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal
possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in
other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished
one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials
thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the
table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 32

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy
and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation
theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 33

To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when
the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which
are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged.
The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts
before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule
24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally allows the examination of a deponent —

1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:

(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things" and

(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts;
those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to
the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 35

In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such
modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under
Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may
be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court
explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer
to the complaint has been served. 36 It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of
court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not
yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. 37

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of
documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons
under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law
imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of
court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established
in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party
support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further
proceedings. 38

Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and
without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be
shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass,
or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further limitations come into existence when the
inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege." 40

In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of
the law.

It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of

course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.

The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court cannot be sustained.

It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41 — that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve
interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the
action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule
25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." 42 But there was no need
for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"
(dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no
need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention — that the interrogatories in question are defective because
they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to
the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified
through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and quickly disposed of.

The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if
the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or a
partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in
its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the
interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without
naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be
invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any
officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."

That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for bill of
particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint — and denied for lack of merit — is beside the
point. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-
called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of discovery. 44

Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance at
them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the
PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the
PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of
relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or
oppress it. 45 But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.

2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon
trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of
discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial,
this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made
is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.

3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners
and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances. In the first
place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness . 46 This is expressly
allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. — A party may . . . call an adverse party or
an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called
may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-
examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.

The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition," apart from the
fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a claim against
PCGG officers who are not parties to the action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are
precisely permitted through the modes of discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim
against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (therefore strangers to the action) as
additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the
Rules, to wit:

Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is
required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the
court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained."

The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to
refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are not
self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise
from the facts disclosed in light of Executive Order

No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in the
action.

The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as
foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers. They will be. The private
respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold
the proposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its
study and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued should not be free to file
counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its officers for gross neglect or ignorance, if not
downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such judicial proceedings, or that in
the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to the parties it has
sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.

So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no
application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must
entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the
operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the
rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has
impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in their
possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.

The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its
consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its
immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 48

The suggestion 49 that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so
doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable;
it attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary —

The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State itself
commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. 50

The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899)" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been
held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid,
the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owner. 52

The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the
Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in
its possession.

The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected
had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in
fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously,
there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be
presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study
them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the
corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is
subsequently established that the denial is false.

The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with.
The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege,
constitutional or statutory.

The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production
and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the
documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the
material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is
matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that
the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be
produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable;
their disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier

mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a
complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For
example, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or
put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court,
is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with the request
that they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has
the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions "separately and fully in writing
underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen
(15) days after service of the interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have
already been mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than
the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts
therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing
on him the obligation of serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule
24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless
by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary restraining
order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.

Romero, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia which, besides
reaching a conclusion sustained by the applicable law and jurisprudence, makes for reading both
pleasurable and instructive. One function of the court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader
on the intricacies and even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs this function with impressive
expertise and makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of the bar.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia which, besides
reaching a conclusion sustained by the applicable law and jurisprudence, makes for coding both
pleasurable and instructive. One function of the court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader
on the intricacies and even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs this function with impressive
expertise and makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of the bar.
Footnotes

1 Petition, Annex D.

2 Id., Annex E.

3 Id., Annex F.

4 Rollo, p. 7.

5 Id., pp. 7, 145.

6 Id., p. 7.

7 Petition, Annex G.

8 Rollo, pp. 56-87.

9 Petition, Annex H.

10 Id., Annex I.

11 Id., Annex J.
12 Id., Annex K.

13 Rollo, p. 9.

14 Petition, Annex L

15 Id., Annex M.

16 Rollo, p. 9.

17 Petition, Annex N.

18 Id., Annex O.

19 Petition, Annex R; Rollo, p. 220.

20 Id., Annexes A and B; Rollo, p. 11.

21 Rollo, pp. 244, 245, 245-A.

22 189 SCRA 459.

23 Id., p. 317. The Solicitor General also withdrew his appearance in other cases involving the
PCGG, to wit: G.R. Nos. 74302 (Tourist Sandiganbayan, et al.); 86926 (Cesar E.A Virata v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, et al.); 89425 (Republic, etc., et al. v. Sandiganbayan . . et al.); 90478 (Republic v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, etc. et al.); 93694 (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, etc., et al. v. PCGG, et al.).
24 Id., p. 320.

25 Id., pp. 328 et seq.

26 Governed by Rule 25.

27 Governed by Rule 27.

28 Moran (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6), for instance, points out-citing
the recommendations of the committee of the American Judicature Society that drafted the Model Rules
of Civil Procedure — that "The English and Canadian experience has been of more value than any other
single procedural device, in bringing parties to a settlement who otherwise would have fought their way
through to trial.

N.B. Actions could very well be ended by summary judgments (Rule 34) on the basis of the results of
discovery.

29 Surprises, it has been observed, are "most dangerous weapons" in a "judicial duel" (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963, ed., Vol. 2, p. 6).

30 16 Phil. 315, 322 (July 26, 1910); emphasis supplied.

31 Section 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court.

32 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6; see footnote 28, supra.
33 SEE Hickman v. Taylor, et al., U.S. Sup. Ct. Rpts., 91 Law Ed., 51, 455, cited in Feria, Civil
Procedure, p. 1969 ed., p. 435; 35A CJS Sec. 527, pp. 785-786; 23 Am Jur. 2d, See, 156, p. 493.

34 Sec. 5, Rule 25 ("Interrogatories to Parties") also allows inquiry as "to any matters that can be
inquired into under section 2 of Rule 24 . ."

35 Feria, op. cit., p. 436, citing Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra; SEE 23 Am Jur 2d., Sec. 150, pp. 484-
487.

36 Sec. 1, Rule 24; Sec. 1, Rule 25; Sec. 1, Rule 26.

37 SEE Everett v. Asia Banking Corp., 49 Phil. 512.

38 Rule 29.

39 SEE Secs. 16 and 18, Rule 24.

40 Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra, cited in Feria, op. cit., p. 436.

41 SEE footnote 5, supra.

42 Cf. Uy Chao v. de la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., 6 SCRA 69.

43 SEE footnote 17, supra.

44 SEE discussion at page 8, and footnote 30 and related text, supra.

45 Cf. Lopez, etc., et al. v. Maceren, etc., et al. 95 Phil. 754; Cojuangco v. Caluag, 97 Phil. 982
(unrep.); Villalon v. Ysip, 98 Phil. 997; Caguiat v. Torres, 30 SCRA 109-110; Jacinto v. Amparo, 93 Phil. 693.

46 SEE Cason v. San Pedro, 9 SCRA 925, where such objections as that the interrogatories
transferred the onus probandi from plaintiffs to defendants, or the latter were being made to prove the
former's case, or that anyway, the facts may be proven by plaintiffs through their own evidence, were
overruled.

47 SEE Tan Chico v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 141 (1922).

48 It should be pointed out that the rulings in PCGG v. Peña 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and PCGG v.
Nepomuceno, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78750, April 20, 1990 are not inconsistent with that in this proceeding,
the facts and basic issues therein involved being quite distinct from those in the case at bar. Unlike the
present case, where the PCGG instituted a civil action against Tantoco, et al. in the Sandiganbayan
neither Peña nor Nepomuceno involved any suit filed by the PCGG, the acts therein challenged being
simply its extrajudicial orders of sequestration; and in both said cases, the Regional Trial Courts issued
writs of preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement and implementation of the sequestration orders.
This Court nullified those injunctive writs on the ground that the PCGG, as an agency possessed of
primary administrative jurisdiction (particularly concerning sequestration) and exercising quasi-judicial
functions, was co-equal to a Regional Trial Court which therefore had no jurisdiction to review or
otherwise restrain or interfere with its acts, that power being exclusively lodged in the Sandiganbayan,
subject only to review by this Court. In Nepomuceno, it was additionally ruled that there was prima facie
basis for the challenged order of sequestration; that the take-over of the property in question by the
PCGG fiscal agents was necessitated as much by the resistance and defiance of the holders thereof to the
PCGG's authority as by the desire of the PCGG to preserve said property; and that since the power to
seize property to conserve it pending the institution of suit for its recovery was sanctioned by the
Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, the PCGG must be deemed immune from any suit
which would render that authority inutile or ineffectual.

49 Of the Solicitor General in his Reply to Answer, etc.: Rollo, pp 168-169.

50 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., p. 33.

SEC. 5, Act No. 3083 (eff., March 16, 1923) provides that,
"When the Government of the Philippine Islands is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar
action between private parties."

51 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905, 912.

52 Ministerio vs. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, cited with approval in Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA
294.

53 Petition, Annex O, pp. 206-208.

54 At page 6, last paragraph, supra.

55 Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court.

56 Sec. 2, Rule 25.

57 SEE footnote 38 and related text.

58 Sec. 1, Rule 26.

59 Sec. 2, Rule 25; see also footnote 38 and related text, supra.

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