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1. CECILIA B. ESTINOZO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH


DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Estinozo allegedly represented to Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion
Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she recruits persons to work
abroad and convinced them to pay a total of P15,000.00 each as placement fees.

They were, however, never deployed and sent abroad.

After demands from said persons and albeit executing PNs, Estinozo failed to refund the money
paid.

Prosecutor filed 7 Informations for estafa against Estinozo before RTC Southern Leyte

RTC convicted Estinozo of 7 counts of estafa

Estinozo appealed to CA which affirmed RTC


Her defense that she was merely an agent of the real recruiter was deemed as merely a last-
ditch effort to absolve herself of authorship of the crime. The CA noted that Ramirez was never
mentioned when petitioner conducted her recruitment activities, and no evidence was further
introduced to show that petitioner remitted the said fees to Ramirez

Estinozo filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period to file an appeal or a petition for review

CA denied the motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA); denied Estinozo’s MR

Estinozo filed a Rule 65 before SC


(1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed her right to file a motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s decision, and consequently an appeal therefrom; (2) she should not
be bound by the mistake of her previous counsel especially when the latter’s negligence and
mistake would prejudice her substantial rights and would affect her life and liberty; (3) the
appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed petitioner’s conviction for the
other four (4) criminal cases—Criminal Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269—absent any
direct testimony from the complainants in those cases; (4) she was deprived of her
constitutional right to cross-examine the complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; and (5)
she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to her guilt in all the seven (7)
criminal cases.

ISSUES:
Was CA correct in denying the Motion for Extension of Time to file an MR? NO.

Is a Rule 65 the correct remedy to question the CA Resolution denying a Motion for Extension of
Time to File an MR? NO.

HELD:
Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s
issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition
for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari,
a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no
appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.
The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may
well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is
immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.

Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court
cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA
in the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day
reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot
be extended, except in cases before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its
sound discretion grant the extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is
filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly
denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with
her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the
challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The
instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal—certiorari is not a procedural
device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a
decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not
even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will
be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

We remind party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for
certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, now provide that: x x x However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds
the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions
raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may
award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in
addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules
of Court. The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitor, other disciplinary
sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for
certiorari.

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2. HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO M.


RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, respondents.

Heirs of Spouses Reterta instituted an action for quieting of title and reconveyance before RTC
averring that they were the true and real owners of the subject property as they inherited the same
from their father; that their father had been the grantee of the said land and that his predecessors
have been in Open Continuous Exclusive Notorious possession of the same but the discovered
that their father had purportedly executed an affidavit whereby he waived his rights over the
subject land in favor of Lorenzo Mores and that a TCT was issued to the latter

Spouses Mores filed an MD on the grounds of


(1) lack of jurisdiction of RTC as the land is a friar land and
(2) lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action

RTC granted the MD; denied Heirs’ ensuing MR


Considering that plaintiffs in this case sought the review of the propriety of the grant of lot 2938
of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Friar Lands Estate by the Lands Management Bureau of the
defendant Lorenzo Mores through the use of the forged Affidavit and Sales Certificate No.
V-769 which eventually led to the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-64071 to defendant Lorenzo Mores
and wife Virginia Mores, and considering further that the land subject of this case is a friar land
and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the
matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar
Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the
procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. On
the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state
that the Court deemed not to discuss the same.

Heirs filed a Rule 65 before CA

CA dismissed petition
Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the case at bench, when the court rendered the assailed decision, the remedy of the
petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead they
filed the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court
a quo has become final.

The Order dismissing the case was issued by the court a quo on 29 October 2001, which Order
was received by the petitioners on November 16, 2001. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration dated November 26, 2001 but the same was denied by the court a quo on 21
February 2002. The Order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the
petitioners on 20 March 2002.

Petitioners filed this petition for certiorari on May 15, 2002. Certiorari, however cannot be used
as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

ISSUES:
Was CA correct in dismissing the Rule 65 before it? YES.
In the present case, is a Rule 65 before the CA the correct remedy against the RTC Resolution
granting the MD? NO.
If the case were decided today, would the answer still be the same? NO.
Should the RTC have taken cognizance over the original complaint? YES.

HELD:

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory
order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA
334 (1987), viz.: The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become
final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and
executory.’ xxx Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’ e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment
thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment or order, which is appealable, as above
pointed out, an ‘interlocutory’ order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a


judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward
a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and
evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.
By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial
court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves
the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the
course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court—the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed
decision on May 15, 2002—included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit: Section 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration; x x x It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective
December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order
denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-
appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively
applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply
because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its
assailed final order.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 505 SCRA 8 (2006), the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be
no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of
exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may
be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;
(e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case
of urgency. Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if
appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is
inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant
need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order
annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules
of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper
remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural
requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order
that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice.
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to
destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth
and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the
exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case “as the ends of justice may require.” Thus, the
writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

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3. ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J.


CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and
JOEL JONGCO, petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III, respondent.

FACTS:
Manaloto et.al. won an unlawful detainer case against Veloso before MTC QC
RTC reversed
[Respondent] was ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision
but he was also given an option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating
the same, subject to the reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the
improvements which it found to be in the amount of P120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given
the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should
[petitioners] refuse to pay P60,000.00.

Both parties filed their MRs

RTC modified its previous decision by increasing the value of the improvements from P120,000.00
to P800,000.00.

After appeals to CA and SC the RTC decision became final and executory

The present case is an offshoot of said unlawful detainer case and occurred during the
pendency of the appeal before RTC Br. 8

Veloso filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Manaloto et.al. before RTC
Br 227
The first cause of action was for damages because the respondent supposedly suffered
embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned
MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while
respondent's appeal was still pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 88.

The second cause of action was for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to
make continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable.

Manaloto et.al. filed an Omnibus Motion


Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against them because the MeTC
decision in the unlawful detainer case was a matter of public record and its disclosure to the
public violated no law or any legal right of the respondent.

Moreover, petitioners averred that the respondent's present Complaint for Breach of Contract
and Damages was barred by prior judgment since it was a mere replication of respondent's
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before the MeTC. The
said unlawful detainer case was already judicially decided with finality.

RTC Br 227 granted the motion; dismissed Veloso’s complaint for violating the rule against splitting
of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case

Veloso received the Order dismissing his complaint on September 26, 2003; filed an MR on
October 10, 2003

RTC Br 227 denied the MR on December 30, 2003

Veloso received the Order denying his MR on February 20, 2004; filed a Notice of Appeal on March
1, 2004

RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time.
Veloso received the Order denying his Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2004; filed an MR on May 3,
2004

RTC Br 227 granted the MR because it was "convinced that it is but appropriate and fair to both
parties that this matter of whether or not the Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appellate
court rather than by this Court."
The RTC-Branch 227 then ordered that the records of the case be forwarded as soon as
possible to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

CA granted Veloso’s appeal; held that Manaloto et.al. were liable for damages; affirmed RTC’s
decision but only insofar as the dismissal due to the 2nd COA is concerned
The appellate court, however, held that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded with the trial
on the merits of the first cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, because
"[a]lthough [herein respondent] may have stated the same factual antecedents that transpired
in the unlawful detainer case, such allegations were necessary to give an overview of the facts
leading to the institution of another case between the parties before the RTC acting in its
original jurisdiction."

Manaloto et.al. filed a Rule 45 with the SC


Petitioners assert that respondent's appeal of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution dated
September 2, 2003, which dismissed the latter's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341, was
filed out of time. Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003,
and he only had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003.
Respondent, instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution on October 10, 2003,
which left him with only one more day to file his appeal. The RTC-Branch 227 subsequently
denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which
the respondent received on February 20, 2004. Respondent only had until the following day,
February 21, 2004, to file the appeal. However, respondent filed his Notice of Appeal only on
March 1, 2004. Hence, petitioners conclude that the dismissal of respondent's complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-02-48341 already attained finality.

ISSUES:
Was the Notice of Appeal timely filed? YES.
May the Neypes doctrine apply in the present case? YES.

HELD:
Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal
from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall
be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court
or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented
a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically
declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the
Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is
allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.

Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases
pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases
where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September
14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,
stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general
rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do
not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the
complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test,
therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment
could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.

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4. GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, petitioner, vs. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE, respondent.

FACTS:
Luis and one Ifzal Ali entered into a contract of lease stipulating, among others, that Ali will be
leasing the subject property located at Dasmarinas Village, Makati City and that Luis was the sole
owner of said property

Generosa filed an action for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, Luis, and Ali before RTC Muntinlupa

Generosa contended in her complaint that she and Luis were co-owners of the property. To protect
her rights as co-owner, Latorre formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the
rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.

Luis filed an MD on the ground that the venue was improperly laid
Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should
have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

Ali also filed his MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit
because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an international organization.

RTC issued a TRO restraining Ali from paying his rentals to respondent and enjoining the latter
from receiving from the former the aforesaid rentals and directing Ali and Luis to pay Generosa’s
share in the rentals

RTC denied Luis’ MD


RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or personal was determined by the
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover
upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial.

Luis filed an Answer Ad Cautelam insisting, among others, that the case was a real action and that
the venue was improperly laid and that the funds from the rentals were used to take care of
Generosa’s needs

RTC dismissed Generosa’s claim against Ali

RTC then dismissed the action; ruled in favor of Luis; denied Generosa’s MR
While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a real property
situated at 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, the same should have been
filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to
hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

Generosa filed a Rule 45 before SC


During the pendency of the petition before the SC, Generosa died. Thus, petitioner's counsel
prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the
proceedings herein be sent to petitioner’s other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.

ISSUES:
Did Generosa correctly file her complaint before RTC Muntinlupa? NO.
Should RTC have granted the MD on the ground of improper venue? YES.
Was Generosa correct in resorting to a Rule 45 in assailing the Order of the RTC dismissing her
complaint? NO.

HELD:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. The action in the RTC,
other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
involving the subject property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village,
Makati City. The venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City,
where the real property or part thereof lies, not the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. It is also a settled
rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. In
her Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of
two basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still
owned one half (½) of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint is a real action
involving the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to
Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as
the denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is
clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his
ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
Petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in
relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v.
Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court. The first mode of appeal, governed by
Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with
the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006) is instructive: A question
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question
to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is
one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

In her Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the
merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the
evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy
on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of
the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this
doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained
unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

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5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO DELOS SANTOS @


“ONDONG”, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Reyes was employed by Maxim’s as driver with the duty of fetching and bringing the employees to
their homes.

Reyes met an accident and collided with a truck while he was about to fetch some employees

He and 7 of his passengers sustained physical injuries

Maxim’s asked Reyes for a written explanation

Maxim’s then terminated Reyes

Reyes filed an illegal dismissal case against Maxim’s

LA sustained the validity of his dismissal


Reyes instead of filing an appeal, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC

NLRC treated it as an appeal

NLRC reversed LA; ordered reinstatement; denied Maxim’s MR

Maxim’s filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA


CA reversed NLRC

HELD:
Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with respect to
material dates is “a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision.” We
rule that petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s
decision on September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed
by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the motion in question was filed with the NLRC on
October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt by petitioner of his copy of the
Labor Arbiter’s decision. Otherwise put, said pleading was filed within the reglementary ten-day
period, as provided for in Section 1, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law on the
timeliness of an appeal from the decision, award, or order of the Labor Arbiters, states
clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof to appeal to
the Commission. Needless to say, an appeal filed at the last minute of the last day of said period
is, for all intents and purposes, still seasonably filed.

In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict
application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities
must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial
justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed.

===========================================================================

6. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE
LEON, respondents.

FACTS:
Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of the subject land located in
Tarlac

They filed a petition to fix the just compensation of a parcel of land before RTC Tarlac (acting as a
Special Agrarian Court)

RTC rendered summary judgment fixing the compensation of the subject property as follows:
(1) P1,260,000 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and (2) P2,957,250 for the 30.4160 hectares
of sugarland.

DAR and LBP filed separate appeals using different modes


DAR petition for review
LBP ordinary appeal by notice of appeal

CA 3rd division gave due course to DAR’s petition for review:


trial court is ordered to recompute the compensation based on the selling price of palay at
213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6% of the compensation so fixed
from 1990 until full payment is made by the government.
CA 4th division dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal; denied LBP’s ensuing MR
LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal

LBP brought a Rule 45 to SC

ISSUE: Did LBP avail of the correct mode of appeal?

HELD:
On the first ground, we find it needless to re-discuss the reasons already propounded in our
September 10, 2002 Decision explaining why Section 60 of RA 6657 does not encroach on our
constitutional rule-making power. Be that as it may, we deem it necessary to clarify our Decision’s
application to and effect on LBP’s pending cases filed as ordinary appeals before the Court of
Appeals. It must first be stressed that the instant case poses a novel issue; our Decision
herein will be a landmark ruling on the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts. Before this case reached us, LBP had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of
Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657.

More importantly, the Court of Appeals has rendered conflicting decisions on this precise issue. On
the strength of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Feliciano Buenaventura, penned by
Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, Jr. of the Court of Appeals, certain decisions of the appellate
court held that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode. On the other hand, a decision of the same
court, penned by Associate Justice Romeo Brawner and subject of the instant review, held that the
proper mode of appeal is a petition for review. In another case, the Court of Appeals also
entertained an appeal by the DAR filed as a petition for review. On account of the absence of
jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to
appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court
of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own
interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an
ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Hence,
in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the prospective
application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our Decision is
not only grounded on equity and fair play but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules of
procedure shall not impair substantive rights.

In accordance with our constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts, our
Decision in the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the
proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights, the test is
laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto, which provides that: [I]n determining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter, but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. (italics
supplied)

We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive
rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because
pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a
pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good
faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.

===========================================================================

7. SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO


SAVELLANO and EDITHA B. SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, SPOUSES DELFIN F.
ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S. ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH TUAZON, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo are the registered owners of the subject land located in Bataan

They mortgaged the subject land to DBP for P7,000.00

To pay the debt, they allegedly sold the same to Spouses Borras
for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance
to be paid in cash to the sellers.

The debt was paid, mortgage cancelled and OCT delivered to Spouses Borras

Spouses Borras learned, however, that Spouses Alfredo re-sold certain portions of the land

Spouses Borras filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan
Learned that Spouses Alfredo acquired a new OCT after filing a petition before the court for the
issuance of a new copy

Spouses Borras filed a complaint for specific performance against Spouses Alfredo before RTC
Bataan
They then amended their complaint to include the following persons as additional defendants:
the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B. Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses
Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon (“Subsequent Buyers”)

Spouses Alfredo and Subsequent Buyers filed an Answer


unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds

there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the Subject Land in
favor of Armando and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence Armando and
Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale unless the same was in writing and subscribed
by Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were buyers in good faith and
for value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of attorney’s fees and incidental
expenses.

RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Borras


here was a perfected contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and Carmen and the
spouses Armando and Adelia.

The trial court concluded that the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers. Not one of
the Subsequent Buyers testified in court on how they purchased their respective lots.

Spouses Alfredo and Subsequent Buyers appealed to CA

CA affirmed RTC in toto


ruled that the handwritten receipt dated 11 March 1970 is sufficient proof that Godofredo and
Carmen sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia upon payment of the balance of the
purchase price. The Court of Appeals found the recitals in the receipt as “sufficient to serve as
the memorandum or note as a writing under the Statute of Frauds.” The Court of Appeals then
reiterated the ruling of the trial court that the Statute of Frauds does not apply in this case.

The Court of Appeals held that the contract of sale is not void even if only Carmen signed the
receipt dated 11 March 1970. Citing Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, the appellate court ruled
that a contract of sale made by the wife without the husband’s consent is not void but merely
voidable

Spouses Alfredo and Subsequent Buyers brought a Rule 45 to SC raising factual issues as to the
case.

ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and
not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court.
This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete
agreement on their factual findings.

===========================================================================

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH “BETH” CORPUZ, appellant.

FACTS:
Private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian
Surio applied as factory workers in Taiwan through Alga-Moher International Placement Services
Corporatio

Corpuz was the one who received their documents and processing fees and informed them to
await their contracts

Private complainants demanded for refund but Corpuz failed to comply

They then filed their complaint before the NBI

Corpuz was then charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage
under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l995

During the pendency of the case before RTC, private complainants received their refund, hence,
executed an affidavit of desistance

RTC convicted Corpuz

Corpuz appealed directly to SC

ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?

HELD: YES
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded
by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial
court ignored misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in
this case.
===========================================================================

9. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE
GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO
BENITEZ represented by JOSEPHINE BENITEZ, respondents.

Judy Amor purchased 3 confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo Amor, and
her sister Jane Gamil for flight PR 178 (7:10 a.m) bound for Manila from Legaspi

They arrived at the Legaspi airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178

Since the minor Gian was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of one Dra. Emily Chua, Judy went
to the counter to make arrangements therefor while one Atty. Owen Amor and the latter’s cousin,
Salvador Gonzales wait for them in line

They were not able to board the flight, which left at 7:30AM

They then sought an afternoon flight


Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m. flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to “aircraft situation”.

Private respondents were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180.

They checked-in their luggage and gave their tickets

However, they were again unable to board the same because they were only waitlisted and
considered as non-revenue passengers

Judy Amor et al filed a complaint for damages against RTC Sorsogon

RTC in favor of Judy Amor et al

CA affirmed in toto; denied PAL’s MR

ISSUE: Should SC review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?

HELD: YES
Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in
complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to
wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of
facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or
are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

===========================================================================
10. RUBEN AUGUSTO and ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE
TEODORO K. RISOS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City,
CLEOFE OMOLON, respondents.

FACTS:
Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto were the
co-owners of the subject land located in Cebu

They then sold the same to Guillermo Omolon.

Guillermo and his wife, Cleofe, caused the aforesaid document to be registered in the Office of the
City Assessor

In the meantime, the same property was registered in the names of Monico, Felisa, Jose,
Filomeno, Teofilo and Sinfroso, all surnamed Augusto

Guillermo died

Cleofe filed a petition for reconstitution of her OCT before the RTC
RTC granted

RD informed Cleofe, upon presentation of the OCT, that the owner’s copy had already been issued
to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court dated August 23, 1996, and that
based on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival.

Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC


alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every right to have
and hold the owner’s duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due proceedings, the
respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the owner’s copy
of the said title

Augusto et al contend that the deed of sale executed in favor of Guillermo and Cleofe was fictitious

RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560 to
allow the annotation of Cleofe’s interest, upon which the owner’s duplicate copy of the title may
thereafter be returned
The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings of the parties, the issue of ownership over
the property had been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court, could not
pass upon. The trial court further ruled that pending resolution of the issue of ownership over
the property in an appropriate proceedings therefor, there was a need for the annotation of the
petitioners’ interest over the property.

Augusto et al suggested in their motion for partial reconsideration:


it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to partially reconsider its Order dated 22
October 1997 and issue a new order enjoin (sic) the respondent to produce the owner’s copy of
OCT No. 3560 before the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lapu-Lapu City on 25 November
1997 at 2:30 p.m. Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the premises.

RTC denied the motion

Augusto et al filed a Rule 65 before SC

ISSUES:
What is the nature of the subject Order of the judge? Ad cautelam.
Is Rule 65 the correct remedy? NO.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final
order, and not from an interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole
subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if
it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes
them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact
of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable. In contrast, an order
is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.

The order of the public respondent is merely an interlocutory order and not final; hence, not
appealable by means of a writ of error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of the case as
it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondent’s prayer for the surrender of the
owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560. As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge, he believed
that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property and
was disposed to dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he believed it was necessary that the
petitioner’s claim over the property be annotated at the dorsal portion of the title before the
institution of an ordinary motion for the resolution of the conflicting claims of ownership over the
property.

In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook of the nature of an ad cautelam order.

===========================================================================

11. CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E. RUBIO,
THE HEIRS OF LUZ R. BALOLOY, namely, ALEJANDRINO R. BALOLOY and BAYANI R.
BALOLOY, petitioners, vs. RUFINA LIM, respondent.

FACTS:
Rufina Lim alleged that she bought the hereditary shares of Ignacio Rubio [and] the heirs of Luz
Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs, paying therefor [a down payment] or
earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000

However, Rubio allegedly refused to receive the balance of P100,000

Escueta, in spite her knowledge of the said sale, was executed in her favor a deed of sale by
Rubio

Escuata, Rubio, Baloloys filed separate Answers


Lim has no COA

Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial

RTC declared the Baloloys in default; allowed evidence ex parte in favor of Lim; rendered a partial
decision against Baloloys

Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and supplemental petition
RTC denied

On appeal, CA initially affirmed RTC BUT later on reversed; then denied Baloloys’ MR

Hence this petition for review. Baloloys’ arguments:


First, the CA did not consider the circumstances surrounding petitioners’ failure to appear at the
pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time.
As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect,
because petitioner Bayani was in the United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-
trial or order. Neither did the former counsel of record inform him. Consequently, the order
declaring him in default is void, and all subsequent proceedings, orders, or decision are void.

Furthermore, petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on
behalf of Bayani at the pre-trial conference.

Second, the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding. Petitioner Rubio did not authorize
Virginia to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the property. The Special Power of
Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the latter was not empowered to designate a
substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special
Power of Attorney," which constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling
Rubio’s properties.

Third, the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.
The real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties. They
intended to reserve ownership of the property to petitioners pending full payment of the
purchase price. Together with taxes and other fees due on the properties, these are conditions
precedent for the perfection of the sale. Even assuming that the contract is ambiguous, the
same must be resolved against respondent, the party who caused the same.

Fourth, Respondent failed to faithfully fulfill her part of the obligation. Thus, Rubio had the right
to sell his properties to Escueta who exercised due diligence in ascertaining ownership of the
properties sold to her. Besides, a purchaser need not inquire beyond what appears in a Torrens
title.

ISSUE: w/n the baloloys were properly declared in default?

HELD:
Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former
counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is “charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him.” He must “see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-
trial.” What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift Order
of As In Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s special power
of attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have not received the notice or been
informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of
attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at
this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared
in default

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification.—A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order
was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. There is no
reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. “The 60-day period is
reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings
and not from the date he actually read the same.”

===========================================================================

12. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Misamis Oriental,
Br. 40, Cagayan de Oro City
FACTS:
Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City. She then sold Lot No. 2291-C
to Springfield

DAR then issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

Heirs of Piit filed an opposition thereto before the DARAB (Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board)

DARAB rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for
agriculture

DAR filed a Notice of Appeal before the Provincial Adjudicator


Provincial Adjudicator disallowed the same for being pro forma and frivolous

The DARAB decision then became final and executory and Springfield proceeded with the
possession of the property

DAR filed a petition for relief from judgment before the DARAB
DARAB granted the same; gave due course to the Notice of Coverage; ordered Springfield and
Heirs of Piit to pay the farmer-beneficiaries

Springfield and Heirs filed a petition for annulment of the DARAB decision before RTC CDO

RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction

Springfield and Heirs filed before CA a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of
judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color. According to
petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not
certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due
process of law

CA dismissed the petition


ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-
equal body

Springfield and Heirs filed an MR

CA thereafter issued an Order to elevate the DARAB records before it


declaring that it "overlooked the fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition
against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which they claim to be patently void."

upon receipt of the records the CA simply denied the MR of Springfield and Heirs without
resolving the issues raised concerning the writ of prohibition.

ISSUES:
Is DARAB a co-equal body with the RTC? YES.
Did the RTC correctly dismiss the petition for relief from judgment for lack of jurisdiction? YES.
Was a Rule 65 the correct remedy of Springfield and Heirs from the RTC order dismissing said
petition for relief from judgment? NO. But the case was remanded to CA for the resolution of
the application for writ of injunction
Should the SC review the factual circumstances of the case? NO.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions
of the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with inferior
courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior
court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the
RTC had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior courts and
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the “pre-B.P.
Blg. 129” rulings of the Court recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul
final judgments. Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the RTC had the authority to
annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts
and quasijudicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts.

The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A.
No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure adopted on December 26, 1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of
its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states: SECTION 1. Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals.—Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any
agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be
brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the
Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately
executory. Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides
for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the
DARAB is a coequal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC’s control. The
CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of the petition for annulment of the
DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the
same.

This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be
brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those
rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of
quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, 413 SCRA 669 (2003), the Court
affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final
and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only
vests in the CA “exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts.” This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, 472 SCRA 259 (2005), where the Court
ruled that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final
decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In Cole v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 692 (2000), involving an annulment of the judgment of the
HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President (OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that,
“(U)nder Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to
decisions of the Regional Trial Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction x x x.”

In Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 424 SCRA 741 [2004]), the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions covers
“annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no
fault of the petitioner.” Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The
Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives
and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the right to appeal
is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in
criminal or nonadministrative cases.

It must be stressed at this point that the Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The Court finds
no compelling circumstances in this case to warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule. The Fortich
case is not analogous with the present case such that the Court is not bound to abandon all rules,
take primary jurisdiction, and resolve the merits of petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibition.

The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of the writ
of prohibition, which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision dated
October 5, 1995. On this score, the CA found that the application for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB decision. But, a final and
executory judgment may be set aside in three ways; and a collateral attack, whereby in an action
to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof,
is one of these. This tenet is based upon a court’s inherent authority to expunge void acts from its
records. Despite recognizing the need to resolve petitioners’ application for the writ of prohibition in
its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless summarily denied petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000, leaving the matter hanging and
unresolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals which is DIRECTED to resolve petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition
in their Motion for Reconsideration. Upon finality of this Decision, let the records be remanded
forthwith to the Court of Appeals.

===========================================================================

13. LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, petitioner, vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN
A. BALANGUE, JR., respondents.

FACTS:
The Balangues obtained a loan of Php 45K from Diona which was secured by a REM over the
subject property the subject property in Valenzuela. They failed to pay notwithstanding demands

Diona filed an action before RTC praying that the Php45K amount be paid and for the issuance of
a decree of foreclosure of sale at public auction

Balangues failed to file Answer and were thus declared in default; Diona was thus allowed to
present evidence ex parte

RTC ruled in favor of Diona; ordered the Balangues to pay the amount and, in case of non-
payment, that an order of foreclosure will be issued

Diona filed a Motion for Execution

Balangues filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, as they were not informed of their co-defendant
Sonny of the existence of the case against them; prayed that a new trial be conducted
RTC granted Motion for Execution; issued Writ of Execution

The Writ, however, cannot be satisfied. Diona then moved for the public auction of the mortgaged
property
RTC granted

Diona won in the public auction and a certificate of sale was issued in her favor

Balangues filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale
claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded
5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly,
their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001
ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.

RTC granted said motion; modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum

Balangues filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation in the total amount of
P126,650.00

Diona filed a Rule 65 before CA

CA declared RTC decision null and void


declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the
same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing
the rate of interest to 12% per annum.

Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5%
monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the
proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation (Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from
a resolution that is null and void

Balangues filed with CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.
They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest
rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due
process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal
agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can continue occupying
respondents’ residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully
paid.

CA initially dismissed petition

Balangues filed an MR

CA granted MR and reinstated petition

CA reversed RTC
In setting aside portions of the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA ruled that aside from
being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by the
parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per annum.
Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that
the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint
ISSUES:
Was CA correct in taking cognizance of the Balangues’ petition for annulment of judgment? YES.
May the RTC judgment still be set aside, notwithstanding that it has attained finality? YES.

HELD:
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of
finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue
or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.”

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997), this Court declared that a final and executory judgment
may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having
been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

===========================================================================

14. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. JOSE EVANGELISTA, respondent.

FACTS:
The subject property located in QC was originally awarded in 1968 by the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (NHA’s predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon

After Adela’s death, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement where the property was
transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-
Kulphongpatana

However, in the case entitled Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding
Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al. the SC nullified and set aside the award in
favor of Salindon for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction; Florendo was declared the owner
of the property

Despite said decision, the Florendos auctioned off the property, where one Luisito Sarte was the
highest bidder

Sarte was then issued a TCT by the RD

NHA then filed a case against Sarte, the QC Treasurer and QC RD

While the case was pending, Sarte sold the same to Jose Evangelista

NHA then filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint seeking to include respondent
Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as
defendants

NHA filed another action for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate
Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development
Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
RTC dismissed the same on the ground of the pendency of the 1st action

RTC (1st case of recovery) rendered a decision in favor of NHA; provided, among others:
Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of
this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the
pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer
certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs

Evangelista filed before CA a petition for annulment of the trial court’s judgment
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer,
assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte

alleged extrinsic fraud as ground

since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, he was prevented from ventilating his
cause, right or interest over the property, and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.

CA granted the petition; denied NHA’s MR


declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision insofar
as petitioner’s title to the property is concerned. The CA found that respondent was not a party
to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his
person. The CA also ruled that the judgment violated respondent’s right against deprivation of
the property without due process of law

NHA brought a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE: Was Evangelista’s resort to annulment of judgment of RTC before the CA correct?

HELD:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Jurisprudence and Section
2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment
of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final
order and resolution are void. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons.

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the
assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or
mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito
Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby
declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the
aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel
or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.” Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as
he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was already
transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be nullified
without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible
ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Clearly, the trial
court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned

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