International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 11,2018

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 11, November 2018 (Serial Number 62)
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★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open ★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
University of Nigeria, Nigeria); Turkey);
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland); ★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
★Ahmed Y. Zohny (Coppin State University, USA) Academy, Ukraine);
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Rome); UK);
★Ali Bilgiç (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary); Canada);
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University, ★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
Philippines); Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK); ★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University, ★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
Poland); ★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK); Public Policy, Singapore);
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
Zealand); ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of Ukraine, Ukraine);
Taranaki, New Zealand); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); Australia);
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and University, India);
Cultures, Morocco); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Giuseppe Caforio (Torino University, Italy); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); Canada, Canada);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); ★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA); ★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK); ★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Léonie Maes (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium); ★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
★Lomarsh Roopnarine (Jackson State University, USA); France);
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan Cel Mare University of ★Xhaho Armela (Vitrina University, Albania);
Suceava, Romania); ★Yi-wei WANG (Renmin University of China, China).
★Marek Rewizorski (Koszalin University of Technology,
Poland);
★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 11, November 2018 (Serial Number 62)
Contents
Free Speech
Is There Free Speech or “Fake Free Speech” in Israel? 575

Yaron Katz
European Neighbourhood Policy
Erasmus Student or EU Ambassador? People-to-People Contact in the European

Neighbourhood Policy: The Cases of Georgia, Ukraine, and Tunisia 583
Andrea Perilli
Islam
Islam and International Relations: Ontological Perspective 606

Davoud Gharayagh Zandi
Exploring Namık Kemal’s Understanding of European Concepts: An Islamic-European
Synthesis or a Reversion Back to “True” Islam 617
Kaan Namli
International Relations and Diplomacy, November 2018, Vol. 6, No. 11, 575-582
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.11.001
D
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Is There Free Speech or “Fake Free Speech” in Israel?
Yaron Katz
HIT-Holon Institute of Technology, Holon, Israel
The impact of technology on Israel changed the perception of free speech and forced changes in policy and
approach for the government and the media. For decades, in the era of traditional media, Israel allowed free speech
in all areas, but security issues. Society has traditionally seen national security as more important than the need of
the public to be exposed to sensitive information. According to this policy, it was commonly agreed that the press
should work along the lines of social responsibility, and although Israel is a democratic state where freedom of
speech and freedom of the press are cornerstones of its existence—in all that relates to security, things should be
different. This has changed, since technology is shaping the political discourse, and Israel, as a high-tech nation,
has been in the front of global changes. New policy has been adopted not by the will of the media or the
government but through the supremacy of new technology. Despite this, there still exist legal limitations on free
speech and the Israeli society requires social responsibility of the media. The paper examines the restrictions
imposed on free speech and the social responsibility policy adopted by the media in relations to security. This
examination brings up the question: Is there free speech in Israel or is free speech still dominated and directed by
the government, creating a situation of “fake free speech”?
Keywords: free speech, security, Israel, censorship, social responsibility
Introduction
The role of the news media in dealing with security issues is a topic that has received a great deal of
scholarly attention, especially in the field of political communication. This is a major issue that has emerged
with the advent of the digital media and the contrast of free media and the limitation on freedom of speech
(Wolfsfeld, 2017). Although independence and autonomy from political power are core values among
professional journalists in most western societies, research has shown that news media organizations rely
heavily on official actors for the construction of news (Shehata, 2010). Levi (2016) claims that although free
speech has become an essential and fundamental right in Israel, and its limitations are legitimated only in a
tangible danger to national security, the media have a long history of being closely associated with government
interests.
Traditionally the policy of the government was based on the need to prevent advertisement of information
on the army and sensitive issues (Kimberling, 2003). The perspective of security stems from a situation of
prolonged war between Israel and Arab states and armed organizations, and the daily exposure to terrorist
attacks against civilians (Peri, 2001). For years a wide national consent was created, beyond ideological and
political stands, for the need to prevent advertisement that could endanger the national security. This stand was
accepted by the public and by the media, since the army and the security system were a principle factor in the
Yaron Katz, Dr., Department of Multidisciplinary Studies, HIT-Holon Institute of Technology, Holon, Israel.
576 IS THERE FREE SPEECH OR “FAKE FREE SPEECH” IN ISRAEL?
gathering of information on security subjects and as such controlled vital information (Liebes, 2011). But with
the changes that have taken place in society, culture, and media, as a result of technology, it is crucial to define
what issues the government, the army, and the security services face today (Magen, 2013).
The contrast between free press and the limitation on freedom of speech imposed on security issues has
always been apparent in Israel, but the impact of global media and social networks forced changes in the policy
of the government and the security system (Ahren, 2017). Significant changes in Israel’s society and media
have created new challenges to the government, the army, and the intelligence services (Magen, 2015) as global
and technological trends that influenced the change of coverage policy on security matters caused a change in
the role of the media in society: While in the past, the army had sole authority to ban advertisement of
information in different fields, with social media there is a new balance between the right of the public to know
and the protection of state security. This is defined by Himelfarb (2009) as new insight into the shifting
perspective of the military towards “information engagement”.
The change in global media coverage of Israel’s affairs has been the result of new technology and social
developments, creating a new reality of media dominance of global issues (Schejter, 2009). Whereas in the past
Israeli authorities could prohibit publication of classified information for national security reasons, it was the
availability of new technology and global media that forced the government to permit publication of sensitive
information. The global flow of cultural media products means that cultural distinctions have become less
powerful than the free flow of information and the spread of commercial programming (Katz, 2009). According
to Sparks (2005), there is a general consensus that the contemporary world is best understood through the prism
of globalization. Opinions differ as to whether globalization is a positive or a negative development, but there is
general agreement that whatever is going on is either a symptom or a consequence of globalization.
Censorship Policy
The paper raises a critical question to freedom of the press: Does free speech exist in Israel—a globalized
country with highly developed technology sector that produces more start-up companies than large, peaceful,
and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Senor & Singer, 2009)?
There is no easy way to answer this question. Israel does have freedom of expression and free media, but
there are many contrasts. Israel is known as a “startup nation”, but the role of the government is still superior to
all other forces. The media enjoys freedom of speech, but in all that relates to security issues, things are
different. As a result, the 2016 Freedom of the Press annual report by Freedom House ranked Israel as the
Middle East and North Africa’s most free country, but only 65th globally.
Limitations on free speech are embedded in the Israeli society. The common belief is that Israel’s security
issues stand at the heart of its very existence and the interests of the army are considered as an issue of national
security (Kimberling, 2003). As a result, legislation limits free speech on security issues—and this identifies the
very existence of Israel. However, this situation causes contradiction between freedom of speech and legal
constraints on publication of security issues.
The government generally respects freedom of the press, which is protected by the Basic Laws of Israel
and independent judiciary, but nevertheless the authority to limit publications is given to the government by
law. Publication of a newspaper is illegal without a permit from the government according to the Press
Ordinance enacted by the Mandatory Government in 1933. The laws on censorship are based on British
emergency regulations from 1945, before the establishment of Israel, and they apply to domestic and foreign
IS THERE FREE SPEECH OR “FAKE FREE SPEECH” IN ISRAEL? 577
media, with the result that the media are limited to censorship in security issues (Lebel, 2005). The Government
Press Office (GPO) requires journalists operating in Israel to have proper accreditation in order to attend
official press conferences, gain permission to access government buildings, and pass through Israeli military
checkpoints (Freedom House, 2016). As a result, journalists are subject to military censorship and the media
are expected to carry social responsibility duties of not publishing information that is sensitive to national
security.
Under British Mandate Law, all publications had to receive prior clearance from the military censor. Israel
neither abolished nor applied this law. In 1948, an agreement signed among the government, the army, and the
press determined that censorship would be based on mutual agreement in order to prevent breaches of state
security. Under the agreement, as subsequently amended, the censor supplies to the press, a limited list of
topics pertaining mostly to military and security-related issues, but not to political ones. Any news item related
to these topics has to be vetted by the censor. This means, in effect, that only a small fraction of the news for
publication—only matters pertaining to military or security issues—has to be submitted for scrutiny. A ruling
of the High Court of Justice in 1989 imposed limitations on the censor: Censorship may be exercised only
when it is certain that publication of the item in question would harm public safety. When an item is censored,
the newspaper may appeal the censor’s ruling to a “committee of three”, composed of a member of the public
(who serves as the chairman), a representative of the army and a representative of the press. The decisions of
the committee are binding, and over the years it has in many cases overruled the decision of the censor (Limor,
2011).
The changes in the role of censorship seem to be acceptable on all parties—the media, the government, the
army, and the public. Nossek and Limor (2001) claim that all parties to the unique Israeli censorship
arrangement are reconciled to live in a framework of flexible, loosely defined boundaries. They also argue
(2011) that military censorship is not necessarily the enemy of the media and the public’s right to know, since it
not only performs its task of preventing the publication of information that threatens the national security and
sustains the country’s freedom of the press, freedom of information, and the public’s right to know.
However, despite changes in censorship policy, the army still controls publications that relate to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli authorities operate under military and civilian legal codes in the occupied
territories. Israeli military law applied to Palestinians in the West Bank, while Israeli civil law applied to Israeli
settlers. Israeli law provides for certain protections to Palestinian residents of the West Bank, but continues to
restrict press coverage and place limits on certain forms of expression by restricting Palestinian journalists’
rights of movement and through violence, arrests, and intimidation (Human Rights Reports, 2015).
The social responsibility agreement between the government and press is dominated in the Press Council,
which was established in 1963 on a voluntary basis. It functions largely along the lines of the Press Complaints
Commission in Great Britain. The council brings together the National Association of Journalists, publishers,
and editors of the daily press and members of the public. Its goals include protecting the freedom of the press in
Israel, maintaining professional ethics, and ensuring free access to information. The Council’s most important
achievement has been the enactment of a code of ethics, intended to serve as guidelines for the press. The
council is also the body to which complaints on matters of ethics are referred. It maintains ethics tribunals,
which can try newspapers and journalists suspected of practices which violate the code of ethics.
The role of Press Council is important to maintain the social responsibility of the media. Social
responsibility is required to reconcile both free press and national security. This topic that has long occupied
Israeli society has traditionally seen national security as more important than the need of the public to be
exposed to sensitive information. According to Maoz (2006), the news media are a major source of public
information on political processes and can be regarded as a crucial tool for mobilizing opinions in political and
social conflicts and disputes. However, what makes Israel different from other countries is the need to balance
national security issues against the imposition of the media, as national security and freedom of the press are
two grand domains of its society. This situation requires limitations on publication of information that relates to
national security affairs (Peri, 2006). Levi (2016) argues that despite the parliamentary and judiciary defense of
freedom of expression, the government has found ways to limit free speech. As he explains, the government
uses laws and sanctions to limit certain narratives related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and thus freedom of
expression is limited in Israel, in both written law and its practice.
With the rise of global media, and furthermore with the growing impact of social media, the restrictions
imposed on security issues faced public debate, which focused on the imperative of providing full coverage of
events even during wartimes or other security threats while not harming state security (Sucharov, 2005). Still
however, journalists who bypass the censorship system on these sensitive issues could face criminal
prosecution and jail time (Meckman, 2017), although Israeli media have their way to circumvent the censorship
and can quote information based on foreign news sources, which are not subject to the Israeli censorship
(Surkes, 2016).
Social Responsibility
Social responsibility identifies the relationship of the government and the press, as the conflict between
security issues and freedom of the press is an issue that identifies the development of the country since its
establishment. On the one hand, the media are expected to carry social responsibility duties of not publishing
information that is sensitive to national security. On the other, there is a fundamental conflict between the
principles of open coverage and security needs handled by security agencies and intelligence services that need
to rely on secrecy by preventing the publication of their activities.
The supremacy of new technology and global media coverage enforce new standards on the media in
Israel, creating a new reality of media dominance of global issues. Media policy significantly transformed as
global coverage took center stage and social networks provide instant and unlimited information (Katz, 2009).
Following the rise of new media technologies and globalization of the media, there is a growing demand in
Israel for investigative journalism, alternative voices, accurate information, and, in particular, specialization
and in-depth interpretation (Nossek, 2009).
Still however, the social responsibility mode of the media has not changed. Israel can be described as a
modern example of a country whose way of life has been molded by war (Zeevi, 2009), and the media are
experiencing the intensity of the conflict on a daily basis and particularly during intense military and political
events. According to Peri (2001), during periods of tensed security the Israeli press tends to present unifying
information, even though in other periods it tends to be critical of the government.
The main dilemmas that the media face in reporting issues of national security are whether to publicize
events that might elicit violence or weaken morale; the way of maintaining credibility despite security needs
and censorship limitations; and how to properly balance between the public’s right to know and the restrictions
of censorship. Arlich (1993) claims that the Israeli media considers the army as an integral part of society and
thus the criticism is on the functioning of the system and not instrumental criticism on the role of the army in
the Israeli society and its security policy. The Israeli army is generally perceived as a “nation builder”—a
school for national identity and unity, and in addition to its primary role of defense, the army has taken on
many other social tasks (Kaplan, 2015). According to Melman (1993), Israel is considered to be “an enlisted
society”, where the entire public, and not only army personnel, is always ready to be drafted for a goal defined
by the government as having national interest. The social responsibility aspect means that the security issue
takes a central place in the national consciousness and the goal of the leadership is to create national consent
and faith in the government and the state.
Amazing as it is, there is no law that protects the freedom of the press in Israel. Two Knesset members,
Zehava Gallon and Mickey Rosenthal, promoted a new law that will protect journalism confidentiality. Gallon
wrote in her Facebook page: “freedom of the press cannot be hostage to the good will of the police. The legal
vacuum puts journalists in a dilemma of breaking the law to protect their sources. There is no democracy
without free press, but freedom of the press is not protected”. Carmi (2012) claimed that a written constitution
that anchors freedom of expression is needed, which would be framed to resemble the First Amendment. But
without such constitution, a number of laws passed by the Knesset are infringing on freedom of expression for
minority groups and human rights (Nigel, 2016). Among them: a law that criminalizes those who encourage
soldiers to desert, a law that sets a jail term of three to 15 years for people who seek to persuade a volunteer to
quit the military or anyone who helps a volunteer to desert, the expulsion law which permits a majority of
Knesset members to expel elected lawmakers, and an anti-boycott law that allows for fines to be imposed on
groups who call for a boycott of Israel or its settlements in the occupied territories.
That brings up the question: Is there freedom of speech in Israel? As can be seen in this research, this
cannot be answered easily, since Israel has traditionally granted freedom of expression to the media in every
area, but in the coverage of state security, and the media are limited to censorship in security issues (Lebel,
2005). On the one hand, according to the US Department of State Report on Israel (2016), the law provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the government generally respected these rights in practice, subject to
restrictions concerning security issues. In contrast, media watchdog Reporters without Borders ranked Israel
96th in their Press Freedom Index, after Kuwait, North Cyprus, Kosovo, and Mozambique, claiming that media
freedom is unequalled in the region and tempered by military censorship. The Foreign Press Association
(FPA)—representing nearly 500 journalists who are employed by international news organizations and report
from Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip—called into questioning Israel’s commitment to protecting civilians
and ensuring freedom of the press (Halon, 2017).
In its annual report released 2016 spring, Freedom House, an American democracy advocacy organization,
downgraded Israel’s freedom of the press ranking from “free” to “partly free”. The report explained that Israel
enjoys a lively, pluralistic media environment in which press freedom is generally respected. However,
economic pressures have undermined the sustainability of key outlets in recent years, threatening long-term
media pluralism. The financial viability of private print and broadcast outlets remained a concern. The report
explained that the Israeli media collectively offer a diverse range of views, and they are generally free from
overt political interference. However, some private outlets are highly partisan in their news coverage, and
broadcast stations have regularly faced instances of political pressure in recent years.
It seems that even the Israeli government believes that free speech is limited. According to the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), there is direct connection between security censorship and government
control of the media. As they explain, Israel has a constant state of instability because since the establishment is
in a state of war and wars shape the form and nature of a community. The threat that Israel has always faced
affects the structure of society and determines the way society allocates resources. However, as they explain,
the most prominent effect of putting security before everything else is that the government has the power to
control information and to censor what is considered to be a risk for the state (Israel Ministry of Foreign affairs,
2013).
Conclusion
The environment, in which the Israeli media is operating in, with the advent of new media technologies
and massive media campaign conducted by the government in major political and military events, is not
different than other countries. But the dilemma of free speech is mounted due to the long-lasting struggle for
the very existence of the country. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been an ongoing dispute since the
establishment of the State of Israel and shows no definite endpoint. Its magnitude changes according to periods
of war and violence and periods of truce and temporary intervals of violence, but its impact is central and
constantly reflected in the life of the Israeli society. As a result, the common consensus among the government,
the army, the media, and the public is that the media should operate with social responsibility of putting
national interests before their need to publish and the desire of the public to know.
Despite the development under global influence, free speech is still limited in Israel, as there are different
laws that limit the media from publishing information on security issues. What makes things different is the
social responsibility culture that identifies Israel. According to this policy, the media can publish sensitive
information while maintaining the limitations imposed by law, although Israeli journalists have been known to
pass their information to foreign journalists, who aren’t dependent on keeping good relations with the censor
and are not obligated to the Israeli laws that limit their freedom to publish information of security issues.
It seems that the social responsibility agreement among the government, the army, and the media works
best for all parties here: On the one hand, no sensitive information is published directly by the media, while on
the other hand the army and the government are not obligated to enforce limitations on publications of foreign
sources. Another aspect of this compromised situation is that the public receives information on security and
sensitive issues—but only after it was published by foreign sources. Under the structure, the government and
the army are not obligated to approve or disapprove the sensitive information. In that way, freedom of the press
and freedom of speech can be officially maintained, while unofficially not the media nor the government and
the army break any law or the social responsibility agreement that identifies the Israeli society.
This compromised structure is defined by this research as “fake free speech”—since while Israel is
considered to be a country with freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, in reality
free speech is limited by law and through the social responsibility requirement that identifies the media and
Israeli society.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.11.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Erasmus Student or EU Ambassador? People-to-People Contact

in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Cases of Georgia,
Ukraine, and Tunisia
Andrea Perilli
EU funds officer, Dijon, France

This paper investigates to what extent and why the key Action 1 of the Erasmus+ programme, namely learning
mobility of individuals, can be considered a soft power’s instrument on European neighbourhood countries. The
core assumption is that due to people-to-people contact, Erasmus participants are most likely to become EU
informal ambassadors, in the sense that they become carriers of EU soft power leading to changes in cultural and
social perceptions. However, what will the place of Erasmus+ be in the ongoing debate on international cultural
relations’ strategy? Erasmus+ can play a major role in this new strategy considering the huge growth of mobility
flows between EU and ENP countries, since the new programme was launched. Moreover, EU institutions are
looking for new strategic tools of public diplomacy. Have they realised that the external dimension of Erasmus+
lends itself to being one of these? Therefore, the topic of this work is of high interest because it is closely related to
the debate about both the means and the ends of the EU external policy. For the sake of this research, three case
studies, from different geographical regions neighbouring the EU, have been chosen: Tunisia, Ukraine, and Georgia.
A comparison among these three countries will reveal under which conditions Erasmus+ can be considered a soft
power’s instrument. Hence, the identification of conditions applicable to all EU partner countries in order to
evaluate whether the EU can spread its soft power through Erasmus+, represents the paper’s added value which
opens new avenues for further research on the topic.
Keywords: Erasmus+, People-to-people contact, Soft power, Public diplomacy, Cultural diplomacy, International
cultural relation, European Neighbourhood policy
Introduction
This year, the Erasmus Programme is celebrating its 30th anniversary. This programme has become more
challenging at every step. In fact, since 2014, Erasmus+ has been available for countries participating at the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The rationale behind this political choice is that the involvement of
ENP countries in EU programmes is a means to promote reform and innovation in the EU’s neighbourhood.
Also, it is a means to support administrative and regulatory convergence of partner countries with the EU.
Therefore, the causal explanation is that the EU is aware of the importance of higher education (HE) as a tool
of soft power (Botonero, 2013).
Andrea Perilli, MA in European Political and Administrative Studies, EU funds officer, Dijon, France. Email address:
andrea.perilli@coleurope.eu
584 PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACT IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
The Erasmus programme, through the so-called “Erasmus effect” (Sigalas, 2010; Mitchell, 2015), has
significantly contributed to EU member states’ socialisation over thirty years. Hence, the main assumption is
that it could have the same effect on ENP countries. The ENP countries are the six Eastern Partnership (EaP)
countries of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan plus the 10 Southern Mediterranean
countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Israel.
However, the study does not aim to give a comprehensive assessment of the whole Erasmus+ programme
on all ENP countries. The objective is to analyse the impact of the Erasmus+ key Action 1 (i.e., learning
mobility of individuals) and of the former programme Erasmus Mundus on the countries of Tunisia, Ukraine,
and Georgia. The main research question is why and to what extent the Erasmus+ programme is an instrument
of EU soft power on European neighbourhood countries. The aim is to measure the impact of the EU’s mobility
programmes towards cultural and geographical different ENP countries. The hypothesis of the study is that, due
to socialisation through people-to-people (P2P) contact, Erasmus participants are most likely to become EU
informal ambassadors. In fact, they become carriers of EU soft power in ENP countries leading to changes in
cultural and social perception. However, the differences among the three case studies reveal under which
conditions Erasmus+ can be considered a tool of EU soft power.
With respect to the structure of this paper, Section 1 will emphasise the theoretical and methodological
framework of the research and the research design concerning the surveys that have been conducted. Section 2
will describe the contextual background from the origin of the Erasmus programme to the current Erasmus+, as
well as the brain drain/circulation phenomena. Section 3 will assess the EU HE cooperation programmes
towards Ukraine, Tunisia, and Georgia and present the surveys’ outcomes. Section 4 will analyse the potential
and limits of Erasmus+ and will attempt to theorise the external dimension of the programme. Finally, the
conclusion will present final considerations and provide policy recommendations for both the Erasmus+ and
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) regulations’ mid-term review and the upcoming Erasmus+
programme 2021-2027, as well as the EU strategy for international cultural relations.
Theoretical and Methodological Framework

The concept of soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye as the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than through coercion (Nye, 2004). This concept has been sometimes associated with the idea
of public diplomacy (PD). The latter can be defined as “how a nation’s government or society engages with
external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics’ perception of that nation” (Cross, 2013, as cited
in Zichner & Vladislav, 2016, p. 166). It is important to highlight at this stage that the European External
Action Service (EEAS) is looking to differentiate the new narrative of EU PD from the concept of soft power
as conceptualised by Nye. In fact, in future, the EU may wish to move away from a unilateral understanding of
soft power as theorised by Nye, preferring a new approach based on the exchanges of points of views or mutual
attraction.
The concept of social and cultural perception refers to what people think about the EU from both a cultural
and a social point of view, while the idea of P2P contact refers to mobility between both EU and ENP nationals
and ENP nationals themselves. As far as this work is concerned, Erasmus activities are considered P2P
contacts.
The Erasmus effect is the impact that the Erasmus experience has on participants and their countries. For
the purposes of this study, Erasmus participants are all ENP nationals that are or have been studying/training in
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACT IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 585
a EU country through an EU mobility programme. Also, EU citizens who participated in one of these
programmes in an ENP country are considered Erasmus participants.
The EU Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
According to Nye, the soft power of a country can be enhanced by increasing international student and
cultural exchange programmes. Based on Nye’s concept, many scholars have highlighted the reliance of the EU
on soft power tools to influence international affairs (Casey, 2006; Colson, 2009). Even though some authors
have already written about the soft power of education (Lo, 2011; Nye, 2005; Jones, 2010), there has been little
research concerning the role of EU’s educational policies as a source of soft power in ENP countries.
Nonetheless, Zichner and Saran (2016) had written about the power of attraction of the EU’s education policy
abroad, and they state that “it represents a resource for creating ‘soft power’; this is important to convince
people of the attractiveness of a political offer” (p. 163).
Moreover, one of the priorities of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) launched in June 2016 is enhancing EU
PD as a new narrative for the EU foreign policy. Before analysing it, one should try to answer the question of
what PD means for the EU institutions. It means building trust and understanding in non-EU countries
according to the following definition adopted by the EEAS: “Public diplomacy refers to the process whereby a
country seeks to build trust and understanding by engaging with a broader foreign public beyond the
governmental relations that, customarily, have been the focus of diplomatic effort” (European Parliament
Preparatory Action, 2014, p. 136).
Cull (2008) distinguished five elements of PD: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange
diplomacy, and international broadcasting (Cull, 2008). This work will dwell on three of these elements:
cultural diplomacy, advocacy, and exchange diplomacy.
Cultural diplomacy is “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its
cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad” (Cull,
2008, p. 33). As will be shown later in this paper, Cull’s definition fits quite well the aim of the key action two
and Jean Monnet activities of the Erasmus+ programme. However, the term of cultural diplomacy “is
increasingly used as a synonym for international cultural relations” (European Parliament Preparatory Action,
2014, p. 134).
For Cull (2008), “exchange diplomacy is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by
sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or
acculturation” (p. 33). In his analysis, Cull observes that past experiences, for example the Franco-German
rapprochement after WW2, are based on the element of reciprocity in which both parties benefit. However,
Cull also highlights that exchange diplomacy could be conceptualised as a one-way process, according to which
“my students will go overseas and tell you how wonderful my country is; your students will come here and
learn how wonderful my country is” (Cull, 2008, p. 33).
Methodological Framework and Research Design
It is not easy to find relevant data for ENP Erasmus participants; the main existing findings stress on the
economic and employability benefit of the programme, but they provide little evidence on the social and
cultural impact. Conducting surveys, therefore, was necessary. Survey data from students participating in
mobility exchanges (to and from ENP countries) were collected to have some preliminary insights. In addition,
quantitative data analysis was based on complementary data sources from the European Commission’s and
UNESCO’s websites.
Erasmus participants were recruited via Erasmus+ national offices, which agreed to forward standardised
emails and post the surveys on their websites. However, the Erasmus participants included were primarily ENP
alumni and students of the College of Europe, as the ENP scholarships were granted at the beginning by the
European Commission under the Jean Monnet programme that is now part of Erasmus+. From one perspective,
this could be regarded as a limitation of the surveys conducted, since someone might argue that these
individuals are more likely to have been attached to the EU. However, it is also possible to argue that the
individuals surveyed were the most suitable for the aim of this paper, as they are expected to be the most aware
of the EU functions and processes and are, thus, in a better position to provide reliable replies which could lead
to insightful results.
The outcomes of the first general survey were by and large as expected, and the replies were used to test
them with more precise questions in the second one. Moreover, as the questions used in the second survey
come from the Eurobarometer, it was possible to conduct a comparative analysis between the results. For
instance, it was possible to check whether EU values according to Ukrainian respondents (the author’s survey)
are the same according to EU citizens (Eurobarometer survey).
Contextual Background and Erasmus+ International Dimension’s Budget

The external dimension of the Erasmus+ programme derives especially from the heritage of Tempus and
Erasmus Mundus. The latter was launched in 2004 and had three actions. The first one called Erasmus Mundus
Joint Programme (EMJP), the second called Erasmus Mundus Partnership (EMP), and the third is promotion
projects. Figure 1 gives an idea of the umbrella characteristic that put an end to the fragmentation of the
extra-EU programmes merging them with intra-EU programmes.
Figure 1. From Erasmus to Erasmus+ (Source: European Commission, 2015c).

Concerning the current Erasmus+ international dimension’s budget, it is important to highlight that the
most part of it is dedicated to the European neighbours. In fact, these funds come from the European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and reflect the EU foreign policy’s priorities.
1
Figure 2. Budget allocated for the international dimension of Erasmus+ (Source: European Commission ).
As shown in Figure 2, the Southern dimension of the ENP is where more funds are allocated (20%), while
15% is allocated to the EaP countries. Two percent is allocated for Tunisia because of the high-level
commitment or Tunisia window that will be explained in Section 4. In total, 37% is located for ENP countries,
whose percentage is significant if compared to the 9% for Russia. Also, it is worth underlining that the EU only
has a complementary and supporting competence2 and not an exclusive one in the field of education. This
represents a big limit for the EU capability in this area.
Brain Drain vs. Brain Circulation
When dealing with mobility programmes, one of the main concerns is the brain drain issue. For the EU PD,
this phenomenon is really negative for two reasons. The first one is a matter of image. In fact, ENP countries
could see these programmes, just as a way for the EU to steal their best brains.
The second reason is that, if most ENP Erasmus alumni remain within the EU, no soft power can be
exercised on these countries. However, a recent study (not yet published) carried out by the Directorate-General
for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) on the impact of the EU support to HE in ENP
countries through the previous programmes (e.g., Tempus, Alfa, and Erasmus Mundus) shows that EU support
is not producing brain drain3. In fact, only 14% of Erasmus alumni took their first job outside their home
1
Data presented during the UniMed week conference, Brussels, 29 March 2017.
2
European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), Art. 6.
3
Informal discussion with EU policy officer, UniMed week conference, loc. cit.
country, with a slight tendency to move back home in the long-term4.

The regulation establishing Erasmus+ makes clear that promoting brain circulation and EU’s
attractiveness are the main objectives of the external dimension of Erasmus+ (European Parliament and the
Council, 2014). That is why major changes will be in force starting from mid-2018:
 Students and researchers will be allowed to work during their mobility;
 At the end of the mobility, participants will be allowed to remain in an EU country for up to nine months;
 Participants’ family members will be allowed to come to Europe;
 ENP nationals will be allowed to move around Europe without applying for a visa by just notifying the
country to which they are moving (European Commission, 2017b).
Assessing HE Cooperation Programmes Towards Ukraine, Tunisia, and Georgia

Ukraine is the ENP country with the highest number of mobility exchanges with the EU due to the size
and geographic proximity of the country.
Table 1 shows that Ukraine is the first among the EaP countries between 2004 and 2013 for the number of
participants to Erasmus Mundus under Actions 1 and 2. The grand total for Ukraine is 1,830 participants over
10 years. Table 2 shows the figures of the first two calls of Erasmus+ that awarded 4,524 participants (planned
mobility flows). In just two years, the number of participants more than doubled compared to the first 10 years,
a growth of 147%.
Table 1
Erasmus Mundus Combined Mobility for EaP Countries Under Actions 1 & 2
Country Action 1 Action 2 Total
Armenia 83 644 727
Azerbaijan 24 644 668
Belarus 69 829 898
Georgia 79 838 917
Moldova 67 775 842
Ukraine 373 1,457 1,830
Total 695 5,187 5,882
Note. Source: European Commission―DG EAC.
Table 2
Erasmus+ Mobility Planned With EaP Countries for 2015 & 2016 Calls Combined
Country Total participants Incoming (to EU) Outgoing (from EU)
Armenia 1,013 746 267
Azerbaijan 888 618 270
Belarus 770 566 204
Georgia 2,449 1,686 763
Moldova 827 601 226
Ukraine 4,524 3,456 1,068
Total 10,741 7,673 2,798
4
Ibid.
Also, UNESCO’s figures on tertiary-level student mobility flows (see Table 3) reveal that most Ukrainian
students prefer coming to the EU than to other regions of the world. Moreover, even if the first destination
country for Ukrainian students is Russia, eight out of the first 10 countries are EU member states. Of around
45,000 Ukrainian students abroad, almost 12,000 are studying in Russia. The number of students in the EU is
more than double (around 28,000 students), with Poland and Germany as the most popular destinations.
Table 3
Ukraine Tertiary-Level Student Mobility Flows
Destination country Number of Ukrainian students
Russia Federation 12,043
Poland 9,485
Germany 5,850
Czechia 2,098
Italy 2,063
United States 1,509
France 1,131
Austria 1,099
United Kingdom 1,035
Hungary 913
5
Note. Source: adopted from UNESCO Institute for statistics .
As highlighted in Table 2, Georgia is the second largest EaP country for the number of student mobility
flows within Erasmus Mundus (European Commission, 2014a) and now Erasmus+. With 2,449 grants (1,686
outgoing to Europe and 763 incoming from Europe), Georgia is one of the most popular countries for credit
mobility, ranked 8th among 131 EU partner countries. In relative numbers, Georgia can be defined as the most
enthusiastic country about the EU mobility schemes, with 2,603 Erasmus participants since 2004 which
correspond to almost 66% of Georgian students currently studying in Europe, and more than twice the number
of Georgian students currently studying in Russia.
Table 4 shows the number of Tunisian participants in Erasmus Mundus. Six hundred and forty-two
Tunisians have benefited from mobility activities since 2004 to 2013, under the Actions 1 and 2 of Erasmus
Mundus (European Commission, 2014a).
This figure is disappointing, considering that the importance of contacts between peoples has been stressed
for a long-time in the region. In fact, the concept of P2P contacts was introduced in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region, even earlier the launch of the ENP. The social, cultural, and human affairs pillar was
one of the three pillars of the Euro-Med partnership that aimed to promote “understanding between cultures and
exchanges between civil societies”6. This declaration recognised “the importance of encouraging contacts and
exchanges between young people”7.
5
Retrieved 25 March 2017, http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow.
6
Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona declaration, 28 November 1995.
7
Ibid.
Table 4
Erasmus Mundus Combined Mobility for Southern Mediterranean Nationals Actions 1 & 2
Country Action 1 Action 2 Total
Algeria 67 612 679
Egypt 239 115 1,000
Israel 117 462 579
Jordan 31 412 443
Lebanon 50 476 526
Libya 2 56 58
Morocco 77 642 719
Palestine 29 359 388
Syria 47 319 366
Tunisia 101 541 642
Total 760 4,640 5,400
Note. Source: European Commission (2014a).
As shown in Table 4, Tunisia is only the fourth country after Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria for the number
of mobility flows. This means that not enough has been done to promote P2P activities in that country. That is
why in 2011, the Commission recalled that: “Exchanges at university level are valuable, and fuller use should
be made of Erasmus Mundus, Euromed Youth and Tempus to increase substantially the number of persons
from Southern Mediterranean partner countries participating in these programmes” (European Commission,
2011c).
Figure 3 shows that, in the first year of mobility exchanges under Erasmus+, 639 people benefited from
Erasmus grants from or to Tunisia, practically the same number of participants that Erasmus Mundus could
mobilise over 10 years. Consequently “Tunisia has been nominated as the focal point of the Erasmus+
programme for the next years in the Neighbourhood South region” (Euro-Med Youth IV, 2016, p. 46).
8
Figure 3. Erasmus+ HE in South Mediterranean countries 2015 (Source: European Commission ).
In the composition of mobility flows, the percentage of staff moving is almost the same as that of students.
Seventy-seven percent of participants come to the EU, while only 23% are EU nationals going to the South
Mediterranean. Finally, Tunisia is still not the first country for the number of mobility exchanges in the region,
but it is expected to become the first one soon.
8
Retrieved 26 March 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/updates/20161011-tunisian-participation-erasmus-plus_it.
Table 5
Mobility Planned for 2015 & 2016 Erasmus+ Calls Combined
Country Total participants Incoming (to EU) Outgoing (from EU)
Algeria 822 677 145
Egypt 1,463 1,091 372
Israel 3,835 2,425 1,410
Jordan 1,190 829 361
Lebanon 1,022 773 249
Libya 32 32
Morocco 2,480 1,830 677
Palestine 828 635 193
Syria 86 86
Tunisia 1,316 1,035 281
TOTAL 13,074 9,386 3,688
As shown in Table 5, under the first two years of Erasmus+, 1,316 grants were planned for Tunisia, more
than the double that the whole preceding period 2004-2013. This is also a direct effect of the 2015 ENP Review,
in which it was foreseen that “the EU will significantly step up the scope for engagement of neighbourhood
partners in Erasmus+, including a higher level of funding” (European Commission, 2015b, p. 9).
However, when summing up the number of mobility flows under Erasmus Mundus and Erasmus+, the
result is 1,677 participants so far. Consequently, even though, over the last two years, the growth of
participation has been remarkable, the overall figure is too small, especially if one compares with Georgia
where the participants have been almost the double, although Georgia’s population is one-third the size of
Tunisia’s. Therefore, as shown later in this work, the small number of mobility flows in Tunisia so far, does not
leave room to talk about a consistent spreading of EU soft power through Erasmus+ in this country.
Results of the Surveys
Regarding the first survey, 204 people representing all 16 countries taking part in the ENP participated.
The results are in line with the outcomes of a 2013 Erasmus impact study (European Commission, 2014b): “in
all regions, Erasmus students as well as alumni feel significantly more related to Europe than non-mobiles”
(European Commission, 2014b, p. 3). Moreover, “more than 80% feel that their European attitude has been
strengthened by mobility and this perception is especially strong in Southern and Eastern Europe (each 85%)”
(European Commission, 2014b, p. 3).
Nevertheless, the Erasmus impact study was addressed only to EU citizens as at that time Erasmus was
still an intra-EU mobility programme. From the author’s survey, this perception is even stronger among
Erasmus participants coming from Southern and Eastern European neighbours. In fact, 92% of respondents feel
closer to the EU’s values after the Erasmus experience (Q3).
Regarding the data analysis, the first set of four questions aims to assess the EU soft power through the
indicators of the EU’s attractiveness, EU affiliation, and EU preferences. To this end, each question starts with
the following formula: After studying/training in an EU country, in order to measure the impact that the
experience in the EU had on the respondents. Not surprisingly, more than 90% strongly agree or tend to agree
that they are now more interested in some topics, such as national and European identity, multiculturalism and
European cultures, EU perspectives, and policies (Q2). Moreover, they feel closer to the EU’s fundamental
values, such as human rights, gender equality, democracy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, and they
are more open to cultural and linguistic diversity (Q3). Finally, they would like their country to deepen its
relations with the EU (Q4). Only the question about membership to the EU (Q5) did not reach 90% but was
81%. This is understandable, taking into account the sensitivity of the question.
The second set of questions aims to assess the changes in cultural and social perceptions that the Erasmus
participants experienced. These changes were measured through the following indicators: tolerance, respect for
other cultures, and development of intercultural skills. Each question starts with the formula, thanks to my
experience abroad, in order to measure the causal relationship between the Erasmus experience and the
changes. Also for this set of questions, more than 90% strongly agree or tend to agree with the statements
formulated. In particular, thanks to the experience abroad, they can tolerate the behaviour and values of other
individuals better without compromising their own values (Q6). Also, they feel more comfortable if confronted
with different values and other people’s way of life (Q7). They feel more tolerant and respectful of other
cultures (Q8). Moreover, they learned how to interact with people of different nations and became more open to
cultural issues and foreign humour (Q9). Finally, they have a more positive social and cultural perception of
other people with backgrounds different from theirs (Q10).
The survey’s results outline a broad consensus on two key issues. First, ENP nationals feel more attracted
by the EU after the Erasmus experience. Second, the mobility experience had a positive impact on the
perception of others. De facto, the 2013 Erasmus impact study’s results are corroborated with higher scores
among ENP nationals. To investigate these phenomena in depth, a second survey, only addressed to my case
studies’ nationals (Ukrainians, Georgians, and Tunisians), was set up.
The first question of the second survey was taken from the standard Eurobarometer 85 on public opinion
in the European Union9. It aims to double-check how much Erasmus participants from Tunisia, Ukraine, and
Georgia are interested in European political matters. Indeed, the objective is to test the high score of the first
survey through a more precise question.
Table 8
(Q1) How Often Would You Say You Discuss About EU Politics?
Country Frequently (%) Occasionally (%) Never (%)
Tunisia 23.53 76.47 0
Georgia 45.95 48.65 5.41
Ukraine 18.42 68.42 13.16
The first survey showed that, around 90% of ENP Erasmus participants feel more interested in EU politics.
As shown in Table 8, this trend is confirmed in the second survey on the case studies’ nationals. In fact, they all
talk about EU politics frequently or occasionally. Georgian stand out with the higher score. Table 9 compares
these results with the 2016 annual surveys on EU perceptions in the author’s case studies.
9
Standard Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016, Public opinion in the European Union. Retrieved 28 March 2017,
file:///C:/Users/Andrea/Downloads/eb85_anx_en%20(1).pdf.
Table 9
Comparing How Often Erasmus Participants and Public Opinion Talk About the EU
Country Frequently (%) Occasionally (%) Never (%)
Tunisian Erasmus 23.53 76.47 0
Tunisian public opinion 7 10 74
Georgian Erasmus 45.95 48.65 5.41
Georgian public opinion 7 37 57
Ukrainian Erasmus 18.42 68.42 13.16
Ukrainian public opinion 8 28 65
Concerning Ukraine the 2016 annual survey on Ukrainian public opinion’s perceptions of the EU asked:
“How often do you look for/access information on EU?” (European Commission, 2016e). Just 8% stated
“Frequently” and 65% “Never”. The difference is huge when comparing these results with the survey. Indeed,
18% of Ukrainian Erasmus alumni assert that they frequently discuss about EU politics, 68% occasionally, and
only 13% never. The same consideration applies for Georgia. In the annual survey of the EU Neighbours east
platform (European Commission, 2016e) on Georgian public opinion, only 7% of respondents look frequently
for information on the EU and 57% never. In the survey, the results are the other way around, with 46% and 5%,
respectively. Regarding Tunisia, data from the opinion pool of the Southern Mediterranean countries report
(European Commission, 2016f) show that 74% of Tunisians never look for information on the EU, while all
Tunisian participants in the survey discuss frequently (24%) or occasionally (76%) EU politics.
This evidence is enough to assume that Erasmus participants are likely to become EU informal
ambassadors for the simple reason that they speak more about the EU than their fellow nationals do. In the
second question, the author asked about their three most important personal values. This question, taken from
the standard Eurobarometer 8410, aims to assess the eventual difference between the most important values for
my case studies’ Erasmus participants and EU nationals. Table 10 shows that peace is always present among
the three most important values for Ukrainian, Tunisian, and Georgian Erasmus alumni, while for EU citizens,
peace is only the sixth most important value11. Indeed, most Europeans surveyed did not experience war, and
for them, it is a value given by default. This is not the case for Ukrainians, Tunisians, and Georgians. The other
values are almost the same, namely rule of law and human rights.
Table 10
(Q2) Three Most Important Values Personally
EU 28 Tunisia Georgia Ukraine
1 The Rule of law Human rights Human rights Peace
2 Respect for HRs The rule of law Peace The rule of law
3 Human rights Peace Individual freedom Democracy
The fourth question, also from the standard Eurobarometer 8412, aims to measure their EU affiliation. As
shown in Table 11, ENP Erasmus participants feel even more attached to the EU than EU citizens themselves.
In other words, Europeans appreciate the EU less that non-Europeans. This phenomenon deserves deeper
10
Standard Eurobarometer 84―Autumn 2015―Public opinion in the European Union, p. 211. Retrieved 28 March 2017,
file://C:/Users/Andrea/Downloads/eb84_anx_en.pdf.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid, p. 176.
research that is out of the scope of this work. Indeed, it would be interesting to compare ENP Erasmus feelings
with EU Erasmus feelings and feelings of the public opinion from Ukraine, Tunisia, and Georgia. However, as
far as this work is concerned, the main finding is that the rate of EU affiliation among ENP Erasmus is high and
this makes them carriers of EU soft power.
Table 11
(Q4) How Attached You Feel to the EU
Countries Very attached (%) Fairly attached (%) Not very attached (%) Not at all attached (%) Do not know (%)
EU 28 11 38 34 15 2
Tunisians Erasmus 25 56.25 12.5 6.25 0
Georgians Erasmus 27.27 51.51 15.15 6.06 0
Ukrainians Erasmus 38.89 47.22 8.33 2.78 2.78
The fifth question is not taken from any Eurobarometer. In fact, the rationale behind it is not to compare
the results with EU nationals’ opinions, but to see how far the mobility experience has influenced ENP Erasmus
participants regarding their European host. In the first survey, 81% of respondents want his/her country to join
the EU. In the second survey, the question has been reformulated in order to have a less personalised answer.
Table 12 summarises the answers.
Table 12
(Q5) How Likely is That Your Country Join the EU One Day?
Country Most likely (%) Likely (%) Not likely (%) Impossible (%)
Tunisia 18.75 12.5 18.75 50
Ukraine 16.67 41.67 36.11 5.56
Georgia 24.24 51.52 24.24 0
Concerning Tunisia, 50% of respondents think that it is impossible that their country will join the EU and
around 19% that it is not likely. Regarding Ukraine, almost 60% assert that Ukraine will join the EU. However,
the most interesting outcome is in regards to Georgia. Almost 75% of Georgian Erasmus participants are
persuaded that Georgia is going to join the EU and nobody states that it is impossible. It shows that Georgian
Erasmus participants are the most in favour of a European choice. This is very interesting when comparing
Georgia with Tunisia and Ukraine. The last two countries are much closer to the EU’s borders than Georgia.
Ukraine even has common land borders with four EU member states (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania)
and Tunisia is just a few kilometres from Italy, but it is Georgia, located in the Caucasian region between
Turkey and Russia, which seems to be the most attracted by the EU. This Georgian enthusiasm is confirmed by
the 2016 annual survey report of the Eastern partnership countries, in which is stated that “Georgia is the
country that is the most positively-oriented towards the EU” (European Commission. 2016e, p. 12).
Potential and Limits of Erasmus+ in Ukraine, Georgia, and Tunisia

From the Erasmus+ early results’ evaluation and from the position papers of important stakeholders, some
initial findings about the international dimension of Erasmus+ can be already highlighted. Firstly, incoming and
outgoing mobility flows are not always balanced and the budget is too low to respond adequately in certain
regions (i.e., MENA). The latter is a problem concerning the whole programme in both intra and extra-EU
dimensions. In fact, there is gap between the political priorities and economic means. Consequently, the
Erasmus+ budget represents just the 1% of the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). This seems too
little for one of the most important and successful programmes of European integration’s history that is
considered a political priority also in EU external relations.
Summing up, the first two years of Erasmus+ brought about three principal positive developments
regarding its external dimension: the increase in the number of planned mobility flows compared to the
previous programming period; the involvement of less traditional European countries in the region (i.e.,
northern countries); and the visible impact on some partner countries’ universities through the creation or the
strengthening of international relations offices.
Georgia & Ukraine
It is important to highlight that the EaP cooperation is more structured than the southern dimension of the
ENP. A clear example is the Eastern Partnership Youth Window, which aims to promote active citizenship
among young nationals of EaP countries. It is part of the EU for Youth programme that includes a young
European neighbour’s network. The latter was launched in June 2016 to foster the cooperation between young
people and youth organisations within the EU and its Eastern Neighbours13. It includes a young European
ambassadors’ initiative wherein participants “to exchange experience(s), discuss matters of direct concern to
young people, share best practice and work together for a better future”14.
The idea of European ambassadors is strictly related to the new concept of EU PD. As a matter of fact, the
2015 Riga declaration (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2015) has strengthened the platform four of
the EaP dedicated to contacts between people. Consequently, all the aforementioned activities are the direct
effect of this reinforcement reflecting the core objectives of the 2014-2017 platform four’s work programme
(European Commission, 2014c).
Indeed, the new Eastern Partnership Youth Window is one of these activities directly financed by
Erasmus+ under the key action two (capacity building). It will be possible to measure the impact of these
initiatives recently launched only in the coming years. To date, they prove how the EU believes that
investments in young European ambassadors can spread its PD.
Moreover, the recent achievements in the field of visa liberalisation will foster the mobility between
Georgia (EEAS, 2017) and Ukraine (European Conseil, 2017) and the 26 countries of the Schengen area. In
fact, these initiatives represent the premises for an increase of contacts and socialisation between peoples.
Indeed, the Erasmus programme has a higher potential in the EaP than in the Southern Mediterranean countries.
First, because it is easier to deal with six countries rather than with 10. Second, because EaP countries are in the
EHEA and this stimulates European universities to cooperate with them. Third, because of the size of the
countries. In fact, apart from Ukraine and Belarus, the EaP countries are medium/small-size countries where
Erasmus’s funds can make the difference. Fourth, because there is less differentiation. In fact, the Youth
window is open to all EaP countries, while in the MENA region, as shown later, a youth window is open just
for Tunisia. The same happens with the association to the Horizon 2020 programme and to the key Action 2
(i.e., capacity building) of the Erasmus+ programme. In order to explore potential and limits of Erasmus+, it is
necessary to narrow the analysis on the two case studies from the EaP. Regarding Georgia, the high number of
Georgian respondents in the first survey (almost 30%) has been an incentive to deep the analysis on this
13
European Commission, Youth info pack, loc. cit.
14
Ibid.
country. Indeed, from a superficial investigation, one can easily realise that the number of Erasmus exchanges
in proportion with the population is huge. Especially when comparing Georgia and Ukraine, which are the two
EaP countries having the most important number of students coming to the EU under Erasmus+, respectively
1.686 and 3.456 mobility flows planned. The same proportion is respected in the data of students and staffs
coming to Europe from 2004 to 2014 under Erasmus Mundus15. This means that the number of Erasmus
participants in Ukraine is a little more than the double of Erasmus participants in Georgia. Nevertheless,
Ukrainian population (45.2 million) is 10 times the size of the Georgian population (4.4 million). Moreover, the
age structure of the population is similar. In fact, the age group from 15 to 29, which is the greatest beneficiary
of the Erasmus actions, represents 20.2% of the population in Georgia16 and 18.2% in Ukraine17. Therefore, on
a weighted average, the Erasmus+ programme has an impact on Georgian population much higher than on
Ukrainians. As a measure of that, the ratio of the Erasmus participants over the total population of the country
is provided for both Georgia and Ukraine. The results show that for Georgians the possibilities to benefit from
Erasmus grants is much higher in proportion to the whole national population. For this reason, when it comes to
EU soft power, Erasmus+ has an enormous potential in Georgia while in Ukraine, it is limited by the high
number of inhabitants.
Tunisia
Tunisia has a privileged status under Erasmus+. In fact, among the South Mediterranean countries, it is the
only one that can participate in the key Action 2 (i.e., capacity building). Moreover, EU and Tunisia recently
launched a Youth partnership, called “Tunisia window”. This makes Tunisia the only ENP country to have a
dedicated entry in the international dimension budget of Erasmus+. This entry amounts to 2% of the total
budget on top of the 20% already foreseen for the ENP South dimension. In short, 10 million more for
Tunisians distributed as following: three for HE cooperation and capacity building, six for learning mobility,
and one for youth organisations. The European Commission is passing to Tunisian universities the following
messages. First, to work with non-traditional partners in Europe. That is to say, with Nordic countries, like
Ireland or Netherlands and also with Eastern Europe countries. Second, to be involved in the drafting of the
application by the European universities and to negotiate carefully their inter-institutional agreements. Third, to
benefit from the specific Tunisia window in general18. This shows the EU’s commitment to invest in Tunisian
young people.
Concerning the learning mobility of individuals, under the first two years of Erasmus+, “9,386 grants were
provided to students and teachers from southern Mediterranean countries, who came to study, receive training
or teach in Europe”19. Among them, 1,035 Tunisians (planned figures) went to the EU between 2015 and 2016
thanks to Erasmus+ and around 800 participated to Erasmus Mundus from 2004 to 2014. Comparing with
Ukrainian and Georgian figures, Tunisia is, among the case studies, the country with less participants ever. But,
like Georgia for the EaP, Tunisia is the first among the North African countries when considering the Erasmus
participants’ ratio over the total national population. Indeed, Tunisia has 12 million of inhabitants, Morocco 35
15
European Commission, Erasmus―Facts, figures & trends. The European Union support for student and staff exchanges and
university cooperation in 2013-2014, loc. cit.
16
Population pryramid.net, Georgia, retrieved 27 April 2017, https://www.populationpyramid.net/georgia/2017/.
17
Population pryramid.net, Ukraine, retrieved 27 April 2017, https://www.populationpyramid.net/ukraine/2016/.
18
Informal discussion with EU policy officer, UniMed week conference, loc. cit.
19
European Commission, Erasmus+: An important link for the modernisation of university education in Tunisia, EU Neighbours
south. Retrieved 20 March 2017, http://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/Features/2017-02/Erasmus%2B%20Tunisia%20EN.pdf.
million, Algeria 40 million and Egypt 91 million, while Libyans have not been granted so far. Erasmus+ “also
funded 3,688 Europeans in the opposite direction”20. Moreover, the EU “hopes to finance the mobility needs of
at least 3,000 Tunisians over the period 2015-2020”21. This will be salutary for a country, like Tunisia, that has
a young profile with a median age of 30.5 years. For this reason, the programmes of HE cooperation can be
efficient in Tunisia because of the high level of school life expectancy (primary to tertiary education) around 15
years. Therefore, many students reach the level of education in which they can beneficiate from EU mobility
programmes. However, Erasmus’s potential in Tunisia has been limited so far by the low number of grants.
Theorising the Erasmus+ Programme
Figure 4 shows that PD aims to enhance EU’s values and interests among non-EU students through P2P
activities. So, if someone was wondering why EU awards grant to ENP nationals to study at the College of
Europe, the answer is that it is a matter of PD. In fact, these grants were distributed in the past through the Jean
Monnet action that “aims to support the College of Europe as it is an institution pursuing an aim of European
interest”22.
23
Figure 4. Partnership instrument’s infographic (Source: European External Action Service’s website ).
The Jean Monnet action is a clear tool of EU PD. Indeed, this action is part of Erasmus+ since 2014, as
noted above. The main goal of Jean Monnet activities is “to increase knowledge about European integration in
20
European Commission, Erasmus - Facts, Figures & Trends, op. cit.
21
Ibid.
22
European Parliament and the Council, Regulation establishing “Erasmus+”: The Union programme for education, training,
youth and sport, Official Journal of the European Union, L347, 20 December 2013, p. 59.
23
European External Action Service’s website. Retrieved 20 April 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/20160620_fpi_
publicdiplomacy_infographic_web.pdf.
strategic countries by promoting teaching, research and debate” (European Commission, 2016a, p. 3). This
proves that Erasmus+ is financing activities considered EU PD that are supposed to increase EU soft power.
Moreover, the same fiche refers to Erasmus+ and underlines that one of the objectives is to enhance
cooperation in HE through the promotion of students and academic staff mobility (European Commission,
2016a). The aforementioned fiche is part of the implementation of the PI24. The latter has four main objectives
and one of these is to promote EU PD. The PI “can fund activities in any non-EU country, with an emphasis on
partner countries of strategic interest to the EU” (European Commission, 2016c). That is exactly the case of
ENP countries.
It is worth underlining that Zichner and Saran, writing about the impact of Erasmus Mundus in Moldova,
have already highlighted that “recalling the layer of identity politics inherent in the Erasmus programme, one
can look at it through a similar lens, namely that of cultural or public diplomacy” (H. Zichner and V. Saran,
2016, p. 166). In fact, spreading EU PD has been one of the main goals of the ENP since the 2015 review as
“better communicating and promoting EU policies will be at the heart of the new ENP” (European Commission,
2015a, p. 20). What is more, “improved public diplomacy will contribute to better explaining the rationale of
EU policies and the positive impact of concrete EU actions” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 20). In addition,
in the same communication, it is clearly underlined that “the EU should engage more on this public diplomacy
agenda with governments, civil society, the business community, academia and other citizens in partner
countries, in particular youth” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 21). Moreover, the European Commission
(European Commission, 2016c) makes explicit reference to the Erasmus Mundus programme as the best
example of “inter-cultural exchanges of students, researchers and alumni” (European Commission, 2016c, p.
14).
Furthermore, it asserts that “the Commission will support the establishment of Erasmus+ alumni groups in
partner countries and cooperation between these groups and EU delegation” (European Commission, 2016c, p.
14). Also, the European Parliament is working on an own-initiative about a new strategy to put culture at the
heart of EU international relations (European Parliament, 2017a,). In the Committees’ draft report, the MEPs
ask “the Commission to strengthen the international dimension of Erasmus” (European Parliament, 2017b, p.
8).
As a result of all these considerations, it seems that the EU considers the external dimension of Erasmus+
a tool of PD. For this reason, even if this work focuses mainly on the key action one (i.e., learning mobility of
individuals), it was interesting to combine all Erasmus+ key actions with the PD’s elements according to Cull’s
theory. This exercise illustrates that the key actions of Erasmus+, as implemented in the extra-EU mobility,
meet some elements of PD.
Table 13
Comparison Between Erasmus+ Key Actions and Public Diplomacy’s Elements
Erasmus+ key actions Public diplomacy’s elements
Learning mobility of individuals One-way exchange diplomacy
Capacity building Cultural diplomacy
Policy reform Advocacy/Cultural diplomacy
Jean Monnet Cultural diplomacy/One-way exchange diplomacy
24
European Commission, Service for foreign policy instrument. Retrieved 14 April 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/
partnership_instrument_en.htm.
To date, key Action 1 (extra-EU mobility of individuals) can be considered a one-way exchange
diplomacy rather than an exchange diplomacy tout court. This happens for two reasons. The first one is the
imbalance between mobility flows, with around 75% of ENP nationals coming to the EU and only 25% of EU
nationals going in ENP countries. The second reason is the composition of EU participants. In fact, they are
mostly staff (professors and academics). This means that it is not possible to talk about a peer education’s
phenomenon; instead, it can be better considered as a passage of knowledge’s phenomenon (how to do things)
from EU staff to ENP nationals.
Key Action 2 (i.e., capacity building) is an example of cultural diplomacy. In fact, capacity building
means exchange of good practices and it fits very well the notion of cultural diplomacy in the sense of
exchange of cultural ways of life.
Finally, Erasmus+, through the policy reform’s action, aims to support and facilitate “the modernisation of
education and training systems, as well as support for the development of European youth policy, through (…)
the structured dialogue with young people” (European Parliament and the Council, 2014, p. 56). According to
Cull, the PD’s element of advocacy: “is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by
undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s
general interests in the minds of a foreign public” (Cull, 2008, p. 32).
It therefore seems that the key action three of Erasmus+ can be considered an example of advocacy or, at
least, of cultural diplomacy, while the Jean Monnet action aims to make known the EU achievements overseas,
making it a clear example of cultural diplomacy. However, when it subsidises the mobility of non-EU nationals
(like at the College of Europe in the past), it can be considered a one-way exchange diplomacy as well.
Conclusion
The survey results prove that Erasmus+ leads to changes in social and cultural perceptions independently
of being a tool of EU soft power. In order for Erasmus+ to be also an instrument of soft power, the three
following conditions must be satisfied:
1. Avoiding brain drain and promoting brain circulation. The EU must encourage people coming to
Europe, thanks to Erasmus+, to go back to their countries and help the development over there. Otherwise, the
personal Erasmus experience cannot have an impact on the alumni’s home country or region.
2. Small country with limited population in which the EU funds can make the difference. This condition
excludes Ukraine from being considered a fertile ground to exercise EU soft power through Erasmus+.
3. A high level of mobility flows in both directions (to and from the EU). In fact, EU nationals going to
ENP countries reach people that are outside the range of Erasmus+ targets. In other words, they meet and
socialise with people who are not likely to participate in mobility exchanges because of age, social or economic
obstacles. This condition excludes Tunisia from being considered a fertile ground to exercise soft power
through Erasmus+. In fact, as shown in Section 4, the number of mobility flows has not been high. Moreover,
the balance of participants’ origin is too heavily in favour of Tunisia. Just one participant out of four is a
European going to Tunisia. In short, there are too few EU nationals going to Tunisia in order to reach enough
Tunisian people outside the range of Erasmus+ targets. The last consideration applies to Ukraine as well. In this
case, even fewer than one participant out of four is European. Finally, in Georgia, the figures show that more
than one participant out of three is a EU citizen. So, once again, Georgia meets the condition to be considered a
fertile ground to exercise EU soft power through Erasmus+.
Table 14 applies the three conditions stemming from my case studies. Consequently, the hypothesis is not
supported for Tunisia and Ukraine. However, there is a significant difference between these two countries.
Table 14
Conditions Under Which Consider Erasmus+ a Tool of EU Soft Power
Soft power conditions Georgia Tunisia Ukraine
Avoiding brain drain & promoting brain circulation
Small country with limited population
High level of mobility flows from and to the EU
Tunisia does not fulfil just the condition related to the level of mobility flows and their direction. This
means that an increase of funds would be enough to fulfil all conditions. Ukraine also does not fulfil the
territorial and demographic conditions. This means that the EU budget’s efforts would be too onerous to reach
substantial numbers of Ukrainians through Erasmus+. In addition, Russia, as shown in Section 3, has a greater
influence on Ukrainian students’ mobility, while this is not the case for Georgia and Tunisia.
In conclusion, the answer to the research question is that Erasmus+ is a tool of EU soft power because EU
institutions believe it is a means to clinch the European choice of ENP countries. This is proved to the extent
that the hypothesis is supported in the Georgian case study. However, in the light of the research, and of the
ongoing debate on the EU PD and international cultural relations’ strategy, a consistency between the external
dimension of Erasmus+ and the concept of PD has been highlighted. Hence, future research should take this
into account. To this end, an interesting hypothesis would be that Erasmus+ is a PD’s tool rather than directly a
soft power’s one, but useful to spread EU soft power. Therefore, further research on the relationship between
PD and the external dimension of Erasmus+ in all its actions could provide valuable complementary findings.
Then, it would be interesting to apply the conditions stemming from my research to all EU partner countries,
even beyond the ENP countries, to assess whether they are fulfilled in other cases as well.
Policy Recommendations
In order to conclude this paper, in view of the aforementioned new programme for the period 2021-2027,
the mid-term review of both the Erasmus+ and the ENI regulations and the ongoing debate on international
cultural relations’ strategy, relevant policy recommendations are listed below.
First, it is advisable that in the next programme proposal, the European Commission defines the nature of
the external dimension of Erasmus+. Currently, the situation is paradoxical, as mobility and capacity building
actions are used by the European institutions in all kind of documents on PD and international cultural relation.
However, these are not aims recognised in the Erasmus+ legal basis itself. In fact, in the regulation establishing
Erasmus+ (European Parliament and the Council, 2014), there is no reference to public or cultural diplomacy.
This could be also a way to help the EEAS in legitimising the new PD’s narrative.
Also, many have underlined that social goals in the Erasmus+ programme are not clearly operationalised
and EU institutions are stressing too much the employability benefit of the programme and not enough the
social and cultural benefits. That is why, it is recommended to provide explanations on how more substantial
intercultural understanding for the benefit of strengthened inter-regional co-operation, particularly between
Europe and other parts of the world can be achieved.
The third recommendation would be to respect and implement the co-ownership principle of the ENP.
This means that ENP countries should be programme countries and not partner countries. In this way, they
would share the same rights and duties foreseen by the Erasmus+ regulation for programme countries. This
would also encourage EU stakeholders (i.e., universities) to boost the number of exchanges with these countries,
as they will have the same responsibilities. Moreover, this possibility is already foreseen in the regulation
establishing Erasmus+ in Article 24 (European Parliament and the Council, 2014). With a full implementation
of this provision, ENP countries would have a national agency rather than a small Erasmus+ office. Therefore,
it is crucial for the interest of both EU and ENP countries to implement Article 24.
The fourth recommendation would be to balance the mobility flows. In other words, it is important to
encourage more Europeans to cross the EU’s borders and spend some time working or studying in an ENP
country in order to fully implement the ENP co-ownership principle. Mobility should not be just unidirectional
(from ENP countries to EU) but also bidirectional, from EU to ENP countries. Already in view of the 2015
ENP review, some stakeholders have asked the European Commission to “allow for better reciprocity in the
exchanges between EU and neighbourhood countries” (European Universities Association, 2015). Therefore,
the “EU should stimulate and support measures for promoting outgoing mobility to institutions in
neighbourhood countries” (European Universities Association, 2015), for instance, “by supporting universities
and thus providing incentives for developing and enhancing mobility towards the ENP partners” (European
Universities Association, 2015). This is also important, as noted above, to reach people that are outside the
range of Erasmus+ targets.
The fifth recommendation is to promote a South-South mobility scheme, as the main problem of the
Mediterranean region is that it is the less-integrated region in the world. That is why the EU should promote an
intra-MENA academic mobility scheme, following the example of the intra-Africa Academic mobility
programme. The latter is a kind of Erasmus among African countries. In fact, it “grants scholarships to students
(at master’s and doctoral level) and to university staff members (academic and administrative) to carry out
studies, research, teaching, and training assignments in another African country”25. Similarly, the European
Commission should enhance labour market orientation given that in 2050 Africa’s population is set to double
(Population Reference Bureau [PRB], 2016), making Africa the most populated continent.
Another valuable recommendation is that Commissioner Navracsics should join the European
Commission’s project team “Europe in the world” which is the cluster of Commissioners dealing with EU
external policy and led by the High Representative Federica Mogherini. In fact, regarding the role of Erasmus+
in the EU strategy on international cultural relations, Erasmus+ should become a pillar of this strategy. Other
EU actors also think so: Some MEPs believe that Erasmus “would be the single most efficient instrument of
EU international cultural relations if it could be enhanced through much increased funding and staff, notably
for the youth exchange program with third countries” (European Parliament 2017a, p. 107).
Finally, if the EU wants to build a “European Neighbourhood Erasmus generation” that can make the
difference in shaping political decisions in ENP countries close to the EU preferences, the EU must foresee
more funds and finance more mobility exchanges. In Europe, the Erasmus scheme achieved amazing results
over the last 30 years. This means that it is not something that can happen in few months. It is a long-term
process that can lead to important and valuable results only step-by-step.
25
European Commission, Intra-Africa Academic mobility scheme leaflet. Retrieved 2 April 2017
http://www.erasmusplus.tn/uploads/FCK_files/IntraAfrica_Leaflet_A4_100x210_EN_PRINT(1).pdf.
Acknowledgement
This paper is based on the author’s Master’s thesis at the College of Europe supervised by Professor
Wolfgang Wessels. I wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Professor Wolfgang Wessels, for comments and
suggestions during the research period. I would like to thank Brice Cristoforetti for his constant availability and
his advice on the research design of my surveys. I am grateful to all the experts that I interviewed who helped
me in framing my thesis and in developing the main ideas. A special thank goes also to the Erasmus+ national
offices that helped me in spreading the surveys, and to all my surveys’ respondents, especially the ENP alumni
and students of the College of Europe.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.11.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Islam and International Relations: Ontological Perspective
Davoud Gharayagh Zandi

Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
Studied on the relation between the Islam and the IR up now mentioned them from one side to side; the world
divide into two or more sections from the Islamic view and introducing the Islam as a new challenge of the world in
the IR surveying’s. Knowing the better understanding needs what entity to be taken of the Islam ontologically. Four
entities of the Islam are discussed here: Islam as religion, Islam as ideology (Islamic Fundamentalism), Islam as
identity, and Islam as international ethics. Main theme of the paper is to delineate the latter as the best entity that
compromised it to International Relations (IR) course.
Keywords: Islam, IR, ontology, religion, identity, ideology, international ethics
Introduction
There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the right path has become distinct from the wrong path.
Whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah, and then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold
that will never break. And Allah is All-Hearer, All-Knower (Al-Baqarah: 256).1
Recently the ideational concepts are growing into many academic spheres including the International
Relations (IR) too. Because the interestings on the non-Westphalian order like the canon, sanctuary, and
fundamental literatures are in growing, religion may become more to affect in the domestic and International
environments. That is why the interesting is going to know whether this literatures pursuit to replace of this world
order or it is just a reactionary response for revising it into the justified order.
The Islam among the rest is more under consideration in concerning to active political Islam in the Middle
East and beyond. In the one side some studies try to introduce a moderate Islam in conciliation with the world and
some of them from the Islamic countries side just reach the scene from ethnocentric perspective. The latter is a
neglected chain that made some misperceptions and unflavored picture of Islam in the world. In Iran since 1979,
for example, the government are in office claimed that like to substitute the ideational manner into the
materialistic current one of the world has not mention it as it necessity. In while this ideational portrait made
better echo in the other branch of the world perchance such as:
What appeared to be an anomaly when the Islamic revolution in Iran challenged the supremacy of Western culture
and its secular politics in 1979 has become a major theme in international politics in the 1990s. The new world order that is
replacing the bipolar powers of the old Cold War is characterized not only by the rise of new economic forces, a crumbling
of old empires, and the discrediting of communism, but also by the resurgence of parochial identities based on ethnic and
religious Allegiances. (Mark Juergensmeyer, Quoted from Kubalkova, 2000, p. 767)
Davoud Gharayagh Zandi, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Political Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University,
Tehran, Iran.
‫ام لَ َها َو ه‬ َ َ‫سكَ بِ ْالعُرْ َوةِ ْال ُوثْق‬ َّ ِ‫ي ِ فَ َم ْن يَ ْكفُرْ ب‬
‫الر ْشدُ مِ نَ ْالغَ ه‬ ِ ‫الَإِ ْك َراهَ فِي الده‬
1
)652 :‫ (البقره‬.‫سمِ ي ٌع َعلِي ٌم‬
َ ُ‫ّللا‬ َ ‫ص‬َ ‫ى الَان ِف‬ َ ‫اّللِ فَقَ ِد ا ْست َْم‬
‫ت َو يُؤْ مِ ن بِ ه‬
ِ ‫الطاغُو‬ ُّ َ‫ِين قَد تَّبَيَّن‬
ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 607
or the other one deemed that Iranian State pattern inspired of many fundamentals in throughout the world
(Heywood, 2000, p. 520).
It is necessary to focus on the mutual implementations, Islamic perspective, and international conventional
obligations. It is not only preparing to the good religious manner in the world but also make an introducing, an
up-to-date Islamic theory on the IR positively not negatively (Tadjebakhsh, 2010). Therefore the ontological
view would be prior than the epistemological. The ontology as a philosophic scene is “thinking about thinking”
(Pierce, 2008, p. 22); meanly its necessity to know on what is Islam perceived itself in the IR. By what said
which entity on Islam would be ontologically more corresponding with the IR. Among the four existing
entities—Islam as religion, Islam as ideology (Islamic Fundamentalism), Islam as identity, and Islam as
international ethics, main theme of the paper is to delineate the latter as the best entity that compromised it to
IR course.
In this regard, the independent variable is what the Islamic endeavors are going to think to itself in the
world and accordingly doing so. The dependent variable is the IR; by result, the main idea of paper does
consider Islam what like to do on the IR and also which entity of Islam would be applicable, on one side, and
being acceptable to the nature of the IR on the other side too. It is not only to prevent the current conflictual
manner of the international relations that we witnessed in owing to peaceful ends, but also it gets onto for
comprehensive approaches to the IR studies.
Some Theoretical Implications

It is precious to introduce some important considerations for understanding obviously on the main theme
of the article such as:
First of all it is related to reasons of flourishing the religion into the IR especially Islam here. That is to say
that there is a concern on the relationship between the religion and Modernity. From the first wave of
modernity there was an expectation on to impose the religion into marina’s like the private and individual
spheres (Heywood, 2007, pp. 94-95; Nabavi, 2010, p. 8). That is why the Islamists opposite with the modernity
in any forms. But today’s living necessities are inevitably engaged with the manifestation of
modernity—modernization. Apart from that paradoxical implication—living with what denied it, the Islamists
faced with a dialectic unfolding (Thomas, 1999, p. 86) in modernization process in the Islamic countries such
as: on one hand taking step into modernization made some different social crises by which propionates the
religious inclinations extremely in path. And also getting the economic growth and political development in the
Islamic countries lays a democratic context for spreading the religion on the other hand. It naturally made in the
countries in which the religion have rooted in social aspect profoundly and to the effect the trajectory made so
contradiction with the west one.
Additionally, the modernization theory deemed that the authoritarian regimes could be pushing the
underdevelopment society by laying the social crises into margins. That gave a pretext to the Islamists to
opposite with their regimes by some motives likes that they didn’t follow the Islamic law (Shari’s); they are
ineffective in policy-making and dependent to the western countries indeed (Fox & Sanders, 2008, p. 306).
Secondly in the post-colonial age the Islamic countries commended what is perceived as the western
deceptive life style and tried hard to reach an indigenous modern way of life. It means that they introduced the
Islam internationally.
608 ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Third reason is related to the unsuccessful model of Islamic socialism in Libya’s Qaddafi and Iraq’s
Saddam and Syria’s Assad regimes in the contradiction with the capitalized model of development. Resulting
the imported and foreign model for the Islamic countries could not be suitable and appreciate one that does not
to come to work in reality so it is necessary to come back to the Islamic one.
And the last globalization and also what comes then, meanly globalization (globalization + localization)
made a good fortune for flourishing normative ideas on the global issues like the Islamic one too (Heywood,
2000, pp. 497-499).
From the second consideration, the Islamists perception on the social role of Islam in modern life is more
anthropological perspective than the humanistic one (Revers, 2004, p. 14). The anthropological behavior is the
same as what the West colonialists do against the East in the 19th and 20th centuries. By which supposed that it
is necessary to make the East exactly resemble as the West. Strictly speaking, the Islamists wish to ratify what
the colonialists do in the past reversely. In a while, the Islam would be manifested as the humanistic for
everyone and forever. To the effect, in escape of the western globalization preciously needs to make a
consensus upon the wildly different worldviews (Tibi, 2008, pp. 270-271). By the mean, it prepares a life world
in which facilitating the communicative and multilateral relations among nations for exporting the Islamic
message to others. Self-realizing from the perspective made first priority than refusing others. Because of
possibility of abstraction and cultural interaction in the IR level it would be applied it internationally (Revers,
2004, p. 223). From this viewpoint, not only the Islam doesn’t pursuit complete different construction in
reacting the currencies in exigency but also the Jihadi endeavors are not in refusing the others. Because the
Islam is an innate and the humanistic religion, there is no compulsion in religion and it does not set in ruined
place of the human heritages. But whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the
most trustworthy handhold that will never break.
In third consideration I like to differentiate between the IR and the global order. It is necessity. The global
order usually made some principals, rules, and norms to regulate the mutual and multilateral interactions. It
does protect by its construers whenever this global order challenged in any way. The IR comes to appear in a
global order, based on its norms and rules and it made from trial sections: structure + agent + unit. But let to
note that forming a global order doesn’t mean that the whole countries come into an order under a superpower
umbrella. The global leadership makes its duty to reorder or reconstruct the world system in challenges and
crises time. In a sense not making a new global order possible for any country and not establishing a global
government is within power of any superpower. Meanwhile any wishes to collapse or transit into new order are
unreasonable; it would be task in agenda to query in acquiring a new “multilateralism”. Without painting any
landscape destroying any order is not possible or favor. It is not possible because the hegemonic power is
checking the system and not favor so we don’t know how it could be worked (Huntington, 1998;
Gharayagh-Zandi, 2011). Then demise of the west by the Islamists is just a nostalgic endeavor and it is a better
option for them trying to introduce the Islam in spite of it (Turner, 2009, p. 3). Because establishing a new
order needs materialistic sources not normative one (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 184), it is precious to introduce a
universal religion instead of the global order.
These considerations not only browse from the Islamists activities in the 20th century experiments but also
it is a social capital of the Muslim in the century coming. The rest of the paper by reviewing four entities of the
Islam makes proper situation for coming the Islam into view in the world.
Islam as Religion
What represented on the religion internationally touched with the Christian and its doctrines. There is a
distinct sphere of the religion in this picture that is just focused on the spirituality rather the materialistic. That
is because of the positivists claimed on to be contradictions between the religion and rationality (Kubalkova,
2000, p. 677). In a sense the religious postulates could not be verifying via the empiricism. Meanwhile what it
is known to each other in the religion internationally is oddness. Interest and conflict are as a two IR keywords
blamed ethically in the religion (Acharya & Buzzan, 2010, p. 1). As a result those are two different geniuses
that cannot be co-exist but contrast together.
Strictly speaking, because of institutionalized complex interdependencies in the international system what
the realists and neo-realists speeded in the IR on the national interest—meanly in the subject of zero-sum
game—could not be justifying yet. That would be for one the vital interest not for other and in reverse. It’s that
of surplus sum game in the IR. It does demonstrate that the interest is re-defined in subject of those norms and
cultures are in concern.
Islam as the archetype religion proposes very comprehensive and complete rad-book for the humankind.
The logical premise comes in support of the claim such as: “Innate construct of the all humankind is oneness,
the final end of every is the same at all, and then the agent, the final and the material all originated from one
source” (Djavadi-Amoli, 2011, p. 51). Based on the claim, the Islamic law (Shari’h) would be at the zenith for
the human. That supplies a practical pamphlet for living of the human from the outset up to the end too (Haniff
Hassan, 2007, p. 2). To the effect following the Islam would be first priority for the Muslims and it put their
shoulder to wheel the human to follow of the Islam too.
As a whole the Islam here is a totality and organic construct, self-fulfilling prophecy; it has a differentiate
spirituality and customs that make so distinct it with the others; it has an ad hoc viewpoint to the world and
humanistic issues and also there is an inclination in it to shape a political system, domestically and
internationally. As a matter of fact it is not neutral politically.
In Islamic perspective, there are some perceptions on the world: firstly divided the world into the land of
Muslims (Dar-o-l-eslam) and land of war (Dar-o-l-harb) (Lewis, 1991), secondly from the Muslim side to the
world, relation of Muslims with who believe in the other divine religions except of the Islam, relation with who
do not believe in the divine ones, and also relation with the colonial states are so different implementations
(Djavadi-Amoli, 2011, p. 51). Thirdly from the Quranic view, divided the world into the migrants
(Modjahedin), the deprivers (Mostazafin), who believe in the divine religions and who do not believe in them,
who are in peace relation with the Muslims, who are in compact with the Muslims and who are in war and who
like to make corruption in Islamic realm (MirAhmadi, 2011, pp. 215-217). Any category views the world from
the Islamic stand of point meanly just on one side perspective; there is no any expectation that made an IR; it is
as same as constructing the Islamic order most.
In conclusion it is not good strategy for Muslims to do in currency situation not because that this
perception is incorrect or in corresponding with the Islamic view, but it made more challenges for Muslims by
which there are not suitable responding instruments for it. There are some causes for the proposition: At the
first the religious particularistic viewpoints may be made the reactionary or resistance in the other religions by
the reason of accepting it would be meaning that delegitimizes the others in their followers. Second, on the
Islamic side because there is no more than one Dar-o-eslam (Haniff Hassan, 2007, p. 2), it is necessary to echo
a unique voice of Islam. Third, the Islamic worldwide view would be made in contradiction with the national
allegiances in the Islamic countries. As a matter of fact, by making some probably suspiciousness about the
Islamists’ intentions in the Islamic countries, the Islamic theories faces with the domestic disputes before
entrancing into the international system. As Edward Saied deemed that firstly most disputes of the third world
made into the “civilizations”. Secondly what often made conflicts in the countries comes from the religious
opposing rule of life indeed (Heyness, 1999, p. 23). Lastly for escaping from these challenges it is necessary to
find out new realms and spheres for the religion within which would send the message effectively.
Islam as Ideology (Islamic Fundamentalism)

What made the cause to grow the concern on the Islam internationally is related to the Jihadi
fundamentalist movements which attack on the powerful centers of the capitalistic system in the US as its
symbol in 11/9 2001. It often occurs ideologically. Ideology made to appear by three elements: describing the
current situation; what’s the utopian; and lastly what to be done politically to transit from the now day to the
wishfully one (Heywood, 2007, p. 41; Plamenatz, 1979, p. 78). By these elements it does four functions in the
society: the explanatory, apprising, orientated, and planning (Ball & Dagger, 2003, p. 45). Ideology influences
not only in the domestic public policy, but also effects on the foreign policy and the international politics
increasingly. Ideology has some more figures which are so critical to our discussion here such as: At first, it
tries to differentiate self from the other. The more the powerful is differentiating; the less it comes to
compromising. This situation leads to a kind of strictly polarization among the contrasting ideologies. Second,
ideology is so critical on any transformation in its contents. So it is weakening the content made to disappear
the ideal situation that leads to despairs in followers. Third, what it makes the ideology alive is that it
compresses all contradictive interests of followers in an umbrella via a nodal point. Fourth, ideology mobilizes
the mass politically so that it would be successful whereby it is powerful more (Plamenatz, 1979; Heywood,
2000; 2007; MacLelan, 1995; Ball & Dagger, 2003).
That’s taken on the figures above: it would be find out in the Islamic fundamentalism too. The Islamists
wishfully trace to reach a kind of religious idealism wherein we shall not witness any forms of corruption;
within a virtuous Islamic state all are not going to heresy the god willing. In a sense, the Islamic
fundamentalism “expected to reach in future what the old-fashionable was in the past far” (Arkon, 2008, p.
406). It delineates nostalgia in advance retroactively.
Second, the Islamic fundamentalism perceived the Islam as a totality therefore should be implementing
without any tolerance. Regardless to any time or place qualifications, the Islamic law (Shari’h) must be
enacting in the society and any violating made strictly punishment in after thereupon.
Third, the Islamists do just believe in their reading of the Islam and perceived it as a warrant truth
thereafter because of preventing the weakening of the Islam would not be permission to discuss on it more.
Fourth, the Islamists think of the world via a dualism of the good and the evil in view by making of the
Manichean; the world perceived theirs as the winner in at the end or even as the chosen for cleaning any
ugliness as a matter of fact (Heywood, 2007, p. 514). By the literally reading of the Quran, Seyed Qoutb—the
Egyptian Islamist, i.e., explained the world in a scene within which made a dispute upon the Islam (as the light)
and the ignorance (as a darkness) eternally and in ever (Nabavi, 2005, p. 174). It strictly leads to a very
delimitation between the self and the others.
Fifth, from the fundamentalists’ perception, the acceptance would be making appearance in the practice as
the duty. So that, they delineated all phrases from the propaganda to mobilization and did all by reality. Sixth,
the Islamists preserve for theirs to exegesis the novel situations. It helps them to come alive whenever made a
contradiction between the ideology and what appears in fact. By the means, it seems that novel situation as a
justified and forecasted is not a regret one.
The last reason comes after the sixth one is that they play the game in zero sum manners. In binary
perception of the world it is good or bad and there isn’t any distinct between them so that it is necessary to do
fundamentally to remove all the evils on the surface of the earth in endless (Heywood, 2007; Huntington, 1998;
Thomas, 1999; Fox & Sandler, 2008; Tibi, 2008).
The effect that those mentioned in above makes three challenges for the Islamic fundamentalists. Firstly,
any other ideologies that target by the Islamists would not be quiet for surviving theirs. It provokes the disputes
ideologically as said by Huntington that the states which come from the different civilizations compete and
dispute together for taking the economic and military supremacy and controlling the international institutions.
By the means they are actively trying to dominate and spread their religious and political values (Thomas, 1999,
p. 82). It substitutes the force, domination and supremacy for belief, faith, and truth. In this manner “might is
right”.2
The second challenge of the Islamic fundamentalists made when they are trying to absorb other Islamic
branches. It leads to actuate the conflict in the Islamic world instead of making an Islamic front line against the
rest. As a result the insider line would be weakening in the manner.
As the last challenge, they would be coping with what is as such “the myth of the establishing” (Heywood,
2000, p. 538) when they take office. Because of solving the contradiction between the spiritual needs and the
materialistic ones of the followers, they would be changing their protesting postulation.
Islam as Identity (Constructive Perspective)

The constructive theory in the IR focuses on the ideational ideas beside of the materialistic one. Because
the religion, norms and identities are our international currency indeed; it believed that they are of help for
mutual understanding of the IR. The constructivists deemed that the religion would be studied under subject of
the rational choice theory too (Kubalkova, 2000, p. 677).
The Islam as the identity implies to a rule system by which the individual defines her/his placement in the
world and understanding what to be done and what is her/his duties as a Muslim too. Nowadays one witnesses
of the homo religious and the Homo sapiens shoulder to shoulder (Kubalkova, 2000, p. 684).
As a matter of fact the identity preferred when the religion settles in the private sphere therefore the
individual doesn’t feel any protective gesture from the interventions in public sphere. It is so matter in the
countries with the deprived such as the Islamic countries most. The secular ideas cause the public sphere
insensible to the identity. Eric Hubs Baum named the human in modern time as “the fatherless in new world”
(Heywood, 2007, p. 505).
From the Islamic perspective one should not be apathy to the problems of modern public sphere such as
corruption, immodesty, incorporeal, greedy, crime, and social morality. All gone on the human before in the
international system like conflicts, wars, and being careless on the environment are the net result of being
neglect of the religion role as the school of Happiness and emancipation.
2
Its Arabic proverb is ‫الحق لمن الغلب‬
Oppositely, because of the main cause of the Islamic countries it is materialistic one, persuading the
identity how could be solving their needs. As if Muslims have a balmy air for the world, why is it not to work
up to it in their countries? Additionally, the Islamic identity proves itself just by the rejecting others. This
manner should be change. The Muslims would be reflecting their values in their realms and thereafter they will
be echo in thought out the world. This path is more a cognitive rule than a participative one. “Self-reflecting”
does not make in isolate. It needs to be connecting to the others. In the communitive process norms could be
emerging, social self-consciousness appears, improves, and promotes as a political strategy for acquiescing the
particular interests deliberately (Katzenschian, 1996, pp. 32-33).
Islam as International Ethic

Spreading the ideational issues in the IR implies that it is necessary to focus on the ethics more. In the
Islam as a religion there are messages that could be of help for getting a peaceful context in the IR. Let to
explain more on the current IR and then it introduces why it needs to the ethics to relieve the insecurities in the
world, and what’s the Islam to rejuvenate the situation.
The IR as the other human relations has some basic rules to conduct in-between relations of countries.
Three important rules of it are as follows: One, the in-between relations of the countries is so different with the
domestic one. There is not a state as one witnesses in domestic environment in the world. The state
domestically has the ultimate authoritarian force to relieve those conflicts and insecure usually made in the state
of nature. What’s so called the “anarchic situation” (Buzan, 1991, chap. 4) that dominated in the international
system now is the same as the state of nature which introduced by the contract adherents like Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau. It follows the natural rules governs in the IR such as self-helping, that the countries are unequal
and there are hierarchical relations among nations, and also that power guaranties the vital interests and
national security in the IR. As a result, “it is needless to the ethics and justice” as said George Kennan correctly
(Arkes, Child, Kegley, & Nardin, 1997, p. 38).
Two, the security and independence of the countries prioritize than the individuals’ in the IR. “The rules of
the countries are superior then the human rights” as said Kennan (Arkes, Child, Kegley, & Nardin, 1997, p. 38).
That is why it violates the individual’s right more in the state of affairs within that there isn’t any state.
Three, because there are very different cultures in throughout the world, those define their interests in so
divergent. In while, any country does act in its favor; the conflicts and dissimilarities flow in the IR more than
peace and consensus.
What described in above is so called “descriptive realism” that authorized by the Hans J. Morgenthau in
the power among nations. And what occurs based on the realism in the IR since the recent two centuries
enkindle the war and conflicts more. And in the non-war situations one witnesses the rivalry and contradictions.
After balance of power of the 18th century or balance of threat in the cold war i.e. that made some conflicts up
to reshape the new order too. As a matter of fact living in the shadow of the realism is inescapable the reason
why the human avoids of fear of the war but it is hardly ever a favorite choice.
Even so the ethics use in the descriptive realism in the situation within which does not permit to force
restore except of ius ad bellum and self-defense (Sassoli, 2009, p. 7). The non-war periods does not really lead
to the global peace and international security necessarily. That is said in the 1992 conference of UNSC that lake
of war and military conflicts in turn would not be guarantee the international peace and security (Sassoli, 2009,
p. 13). Consequently the ethics not only do not believe in the long-time of idealists but also do not accept what
is the currency in the IR. As a result it is looking forward to introduce the Islam as the international ethic in
which the values are the compass in finding out the right path for the politicians (Arkes, Child, Kegley, &
Nardin, 1997, p. 67).
What may the Islam carry out for the IR as the international ethic? One, Islam literally means the peace
and comfortable. It is mentioned in the Quran as said there that “And remember the favor of Allah upon
you—when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers”3
(Ali-imran: 103).
Two, the Islam pays attention on the invitation (Ad-davah) not by the means of compulsion. There is
strictly provision in handling a war in the Islam except of self-defense. Additionally the Muslims have not free
hand in doing any in contrary to the ethics. The Islam believes in the just war absolutely. It’s a Quranic
message that “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like
transgressors”4 (Al-Baqarah: 190).
Three, in the Islam the peace is the principal and the war has a marginal space. It is needless to fight
whenever is unnecessary. “If they make terms of settlement between them and settlement is best”5 (Al-Nesa’:
128). And also in the other place it writes that “And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely
upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing”6 (Al-anfal: 61).
Four, the Islam recommends with high pressure in doing what promised such as “O you who have
believed, fulfill [all] contracts”7 (Al-Mai’dah: 1) and also “Indeed, the commitment is ever [that about which
one will be] questioned”8 (Al ’Isra’: 34).
Five, the justice is the pivot subject-matter in the Islam. According to Quran “Indeed, Allah orders justice
and good conduct9” (An-Nahl: 90). And also “when you judge between people to judge with justice10”
(An-Nisa: 58). And the last one “O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah, witnesses in
justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness11”
(Al-Mai’dah: 8).
But how is it possible to deploy these divine messages into the international relations in practice? It could be
introducing the three ways at this stage. First, it is trying to expand the Islamic ideas into the context of
international ethics as new institution, beside all other going international norms and regimes. It reduces the costs
of interactions; making co-ordination in-between the Islamic countries on the one hand and the rest on the other
hand; helping to resolve the conflicts and regulating the interest in any parts of interactions (Katzenstein, 1996,
pp. 31-34).
Secondly, it is precious to flourish the cultural relations within which foster the mutual interactions,
international cooperation, and open-minded ideas. It increases the consciousness—raising and preventing of any
miss-perceptions in the critical situations especially (Revers, 2004, pp. 53-60).
3
ْ َ ‫ف بَيْنَ قُلُوبِ ُك ْم فَأ‬
)301 :‫صبَحْ تُم ِبنِ ْع َمتِ ِه إِ ْخ َوانًا (آل عمران‬ َ َّ‫ّللاِ َع َل ْي ُك ْم إِ ْذ ُكنت ُ ْم أَ ْعدَاء َفأَل‬
‫َوا ْذ ُك ُرواْ نِ ْع َمتَ ه‬
4
)390 :‫و قتلوا فی سبيل هللا الذين يقاتلونکم و التعدوا ان هللا اليحب المعتدين (البقره‬
ُ ‫و ان يصلحها بينهما صلحا ً و الصلح‬
5
)361 :‫خير (النساء‬
6
)23 :‫و ان جنحوا للسلم فاجنح لها و توکل علی هللا انه هو السميع العليم (االنفال‬
7
)3 :‫يا ايها الذين آمنوا اوفوا بالعقود (المائده‬
8
)13 :‫و افوا بالعهد ان العهد کان مسوالً (االسراء‬
9
)90 :‫ان هللا يامر بالعدل و االحسان (النحل‬
10
)51 : ‫و اذا حکمتم بين الناس ان تحکموا بالعدل (النساء‬
11
)1: ‫با ايها الذين آمنوا قوامين هلل شهداء بالقسط و اليجر منکم شنئان قوم علی االه تعدلوا هو اقرب للتقوی (المائده‬
Third, making any attempts to briefing an international multi-dimensions by which condemns any religious
conflicts; committing to the peacefully culture, the just order, and just war; engaging the honesty and the
cooperation; concentrating on the self-sacrifice and devotes herself/himself to the way of the peace and friendship;
denying to demonizing the rivals; rejecting to any discriminations and the last resists on any violence (Cox, 1997;
Hazenclever & Ritberg, 2008).
At last what’s of the intentions to introduce the Islam as the international ethics is that it could change the
hierarchical relations in the IR, declining the supremacy and inferiority, donating the social equality,
de-escalating the racial, ethnical, and religious conflicts, and also protecting the environment. The peaceful world
is the consequent upon of the Islamic international ethics.
Concluding Notes
Not only does the Islam introduce the way of life to the followers but also it is the religion of the happiness.
Moreover it is the religion of the emancipation indeed. So that, it needs to address it preciously to others. What
the paper persuaded up now is how could be possibly done it in accordance with the Islamic and IR requirements
mutually. That is very common question why the Islam represented at the absolute contrary to its original ends.
In conclusion, presenting the Islam in the world would be intent; some critical subtleties such as: firstly the
ontological perspective should be a prior than the epistemological or the methodological in returning the past.
Virtue of it makes appear a common sense of the both sides.
Second, as discussed in above from the four entities—religion, ideology, identity, and ethic—the latter has
the most compromised than with the IR. It could be making a better contextualizing the Islam in the international
system.
Third, in any, theorizing the Islamic IR should be appreciating the realities, dynamics, and landscapes which
are in coming. Regardless to these elements, it may be coming the reversed outcome in consequence.
The last subtlety that resulted from the paper is the most significant finding here. At first it is not necessarily
to make a successful model of Islam in the local and national context as pre-condition of entrancing it into the IR
and then introducing it to others. Because, any model of Islam has the savory of that where originated. The
Islamic content is the worldwide most. In addition the IR sphere comes overheated the localities by the virtue of
its deliver that the Islamic massage to the world with the less challenges may be appeared.
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International Relations and Diplomacy, November, Vol. 6, No. 11, 617-626
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.11.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Exploring Namık Kemal’s Understanding of European Concepts:

An Islamic-European Synthesis or a Reversion Back to
“True” Islam
Kaan Namli
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
A simple reading of the Ottoman history during the 19th century displays a diverse ray of intellectual thought and
discussion. The so-called clash between Islam and European political structures was a serious debate within the
Empire: one that was usually polarized along the lines of progressives and conservatives. Namık Kemal through his
writings aimed to overcome the dichotomous view between Islam and European political and social concepts
through a reversion to what he called “true” Islamic understanding and principles. Namık Kemal throughout his
writings touches upon and interprets many different European concepts and their relationship with Islam. This
paper examines Namık Kemal’s observation of three European ideals: “sovereignty of the people”, “nation”, and
“parliamentarianism”. The study argues that Namık Kemal understands and interprets these concepts in a manner
that creates a harmonious relationship with Islam. The paper utilizes different writings of Namık Kemal to
comprehend how he understands the above-mentioned concepts. The study is mainly based on Namık Kemal’s
primary works and specifically on Kemal’s writings on sovereignty, nation, and parliamentarianism in the Ibret
Gazette.
Keyword: Ottoman history, Namık Kemal, Islamic conceptualizations, Euro-Islam
Introduction
The study of the developments within the Ottoman Empire in the latter part of the 18th century and
throughout the 19th demands a more comprehensive analytical framework to understand the social and political
transformations that were taking place within the Empire (Karpat, 1973, p. 243). Most commonly studies
dealing with the Ottoman Empire and its modernization emphasize and evaluate this period through an analysis
of external (European) impacts and influences. Consequently, the internal changes occurring within the Empire
has often been ignored, causing a limited understanding of the inner social and political transformations that
largely affected the future trajectory of Ottoman political, social, and economic life (Karpat, 1973, p. 246).
This paper seeks to move away from “outside” interpretation of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire to
provide an “inside” perspective to the transformations and discussions taking place in the intellectual circles at
the center of the Empire. A simple reading of the Ottoman history during the 19th century shows the diverse
ray of intellectual thoughts and discussions that were prominent at the time. However, this study concentrates
on Namık Kemal (1840-1888) and his understanding of European social and political concepts that were widely
Kaan Namli, Ph.D. candidate, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.
618 EXPLORING NAMIK KEMAL’S UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN CONCEPTS
debated in the Empire. The so called clash between Islam and European political structures was a serious
debate within the Empire: one that was usually polarized along the lines of progressives and conservatives.
Namık Kemal through his writings aimed to overcome the dichotomous view between Islam and European
political and social concepts through a reversion to “true” Islam which according to him was already inclusive
of these concepts and structures of governance.
For Namık Kemal, European political structures did not contradict the verdict of Islam. It reinforced the
central tenets and teachings of the “original” Islam. The European ideals of separation of powers, parliamentary
liberalism, and sovereignty of the people were consistent and compatible with Islamic values. Namık Kemal
along with other intellectuals within this approach interpreted the language of Islam in ways that came to justify
and legitimize European ideals as being inherently part of the true Islam. What was needed then was not a
rejection of these European ideals, but a return to true Islam which prescribes a system that is based on the
sovereignty of the people, namely constitutional and parliamentary one practiced in Europe.
Kemal’s method in attempting to combine European ideals with Islamic values and decrees was based on
(re)interpreting the meaning of Islamic words. Verses from the Quran and Hadiths were interpreted in a manner
that supported constitutional democracy along with other European ideals of the time. For example, Namık
Kemal equated nation with ümmet transforming the meaning of Islamic words to resemble that of European
ones. Namık Kemal’s intention in trying to build a harmonious relationship between Islamic traditions and
values and European ones of the time was for the more pragmatic purpose to save the Ottoman Empire from
dismemberment and collapse (Berkes, 1964, p. 259).
Namık Kemal throughout his writings touches upon and interprets many different European concepts and
their relationship with Islam. This paper aims to examine Namık Kemal’s observation of three European ideals:
constitutional government, nation, and freedom. In this research paper, I argue that Namık Kemal understands
and interprets these concepts in a manner that creates a harmonious relationship with Islam. The paper utilizes
different writings of Namık Kemal to understand how he understands the above mentioned concepts. The study
is mainly based on Kemal’s works and specifically on Kemal’s writings on constitutional government, nation,
and freedom.
For the purpose of this study, I have thoroughly investigated the writings of Namık Kemal in İbret
Gazetesi in Mustafa Nihad Özön’s book Namık Kemak ve İbret Gazetesi. This book helped me build a
foundational understanding of Namık Kemal’s political conceptualizations that run through most of his articles.
However, I have heavily relied on secondary sources to compliment and deepen my understanding of Namık
Kemal’s ideas due to the fact that my “older” Turkish is limited in understanding such complex discussions.
The first section of the paper briefly provides a background to the environment during the 19th century to
build the foundation on which Namık Kemal’s ideas are formed. The next section explores Namık Kemal’s
philosophical underpinnings to grasp his general approach which will set the tone in the next section where
specific concepts are studies. Then, the paper will provide a brief discussion which will bring together the
previous sections. Finally the paper will end with the concluding remarks.
Background
The Ottoman Empire for centuries had been one of the world’s greatest imperial powers. The influence
and rule of the Empire stretched across three continents and its hard power able to rival any opponent of the
time. The 1700s witnessed a weakening of the leadership and internal problems, which instigated a stall in
EXPLORING NAMIK KEMAL’S UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN CONCEPTS 619
Ottoman expansion. By the 19th century, the Empire was in decline and struggling to retain control of its vast
territory. Rising nationalism and demands from ethnic and religious groups for more self-determination situated
the Empire in great danger. The frail economy and the incapacity of the Ottoman military to wage war forced
the Ottoman’s to seek for alliances with European nations. As the Ottoman Empire entered a boundless
trajectory of degradation, European powers were advancing in all spheres.
European nations such as Britain, France, and Germany were overtaking the Ottoman’s in economic,
military, and political power. The clear prosperity in Europe and the infiltration of European ideas culminated
in the mid-1800s with the European-inspired Tanzimat reforms. These reforms reorganized the public
administration, the military and segments of the economy; however, the initiations of reforms were not enough
to keep the Empire from degeneration. Not only in terms of territorial deterioration but social disintegration
became a major barrier for the reformists as well. While there was a strong will and attempt to reform the
Empire to reach European standards, the social fabric of the Empire limited radical reforms which would
contest the social structure that had dominated for centuries throughout the Empire. For example, wide
reactions from Muslims within the Empire for equating non-Muslims as equals were not uncommon (Demirdag,
2005, p. 146).
The rise of national consciousness in combination with ethnic nationalism, which the Ottoman structure
had not been immune to, formed a significant problem. Different groups of the clergy, statesmen, intellectuals,
writers, and poets envisioned the future of the Empire from a diverse ray of perspectives (Demirdag, 2005, p.
142). Some groups believed the decline of the Empire was due to the European style reforms which were
undermining the role of Islam in the Empire (Mardin, 2006; Demirdag, 2005, p. 142). Ottoman religious
leaders and conservatives rigidly opposed reforms while liberal or more progressive circles pressed for more
improvements. The dichotomy between progress through adoption of European social and political structures
and traditional values and foundations posed as the leading obstacle in the way of adopting European style
arrangements that could possibly help the Empire prosper again. The ideological clash between the “old” and
the “new” seemed to be irreconcilable and European concepts were viewed as alien from conservative and
religious groups because those ideas were deviating from the traditional values of Islam and Islamic Law
(Sharia) (Worringer, 2016, pp. 210-220).
European ideals (constitutionalism, parliamentary liberalism, separation of powers, responsibility of
officials, equality, freedom of thought and press and enjoyment of private property) mixed with their greater
technical and scientific progressions eventually arose the Ottoman’s to the idea that there needed to be some
form of a rearrangement within the Empire if it was to survive and compete with Europe in any significant way
(Black, 2004, pp. 283-289; Demirdag, 2005, pp. 140-142).
The deterioration and the internal debates in the empire forced discussion of new modes of thought to
emerge. The works of Voltaire, Fontenelle, and Montesquieu were gaining significance amongst Ottoman
intellectuals who were deeply inspired by European philosophies. Fatma Muge Gocek, in her book Rise of the
Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change explains this important phase in the
empire as:
The Ottoman epistemological transition from such Western imitation to interpretation occurred through the agency of
the newly group of Ottoman intellectuals. Before the late eighteenth century, such intellectuals had mostly existed within
the official household structure and had an independent standing only within the context of religious foundations. By the
end of the eighteenth century, a sufficient number of new institutional forms had appeared to sustain their social position
independent of the sultan. Employment as instructors in the new Western-style schools, as journalists and columnists in the
newly emerging newspapers and periodicals both in the Empire and abroad, as novelists, essayists, poets, and actors
provided them with enough resources to be independent of the sultan and the households. The first group of Ottoman
military and medical students and faculty trained in the Western-style state schools were taught that the epistemological
origins of knowledge were not located in Islamic moral principles but instead in the secular, rational maxims of the
Enlightenment. Some tried to merge Islamic ethics and Western morality; others became militantly secular and materialist.
All constantly debated Western science, philosophy, and its implications for Ottoman society. The Ottoman minorities
strove alongside the Muslims to create a truly multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. Many served as faculty in the newly
established Western-style state schools, some wrote novels and plays, others founded and acted in theater companies, and
still others founded and managed newspapers. (1996, pp. 123-124)
It is within this context and out of the need for Ottoman reform to compete with Europe that different
streams of intellectual thought developed in the later 19th century. Namık Kemal is also witnessing these
events thought that European values can be taken and developed within traditional values of the Ottoman
Empire leading to a conceptualization that is rooted in a harmonious relationship with Islam or more precisely
put, that the European concepts were not alien or outside of the confinements of Islam. They were concepts
rooted in the “true” Islamic traditions and values and in symphonic relationship with Islamic understanding of
the political world. Against this backdrop, we proceed to understand Namık Kemal’s philosophical foundations
in terms of his political and Islamic system and how they relate to each other.
Philosophical Foundations of Namık Kemal’s Political System

Before moving forward to explore Namık Kemal’s understanding of specific European ideals it is critical
that a foundational understanding of his general political conceptions is explored. Throughout his writings,
especially in his articles for the Hurriyet and Ibret, Namık Kemal’s philosophical foundations of his political
conceptions can be understood.
According to Serif Mardin (2000), Namık Kemal’s focal point in his political conception starts with the
understanding of the people. The starting point for Namık Kemal’s liberal ideas starts with the
conceptualization of natural rights. People were endowed with certain natural rights that were given to them by
birth. The political motivation is based upon securing these rights and providing a condition in which
sovereignty can be exercised. In order for this to come into existence, Namık Kemal believed that this can be
only possible through an association of men agreeing to protect this sovereignty (Mardin, 2000, p. 289).
Namık Kemal understood sovereignty to be the protection of freedom which he exemplifies as, “the
service rendered by society in the world is the invention of an absolute normative force for the protection of
freedom. The life of humanity is dependent on the continuation of this force” (Mardin, 2000, p. 291). For
Namık Kemal than the initial political motive is the coming together for people to exercise their sovereignty
and protect their freedom through an association of men—the philosophy of politics. Furthermore, Namık
Kemal built his foundation of the individual on the basis of progress. He held a progressive view of human
history and believed that the force of progressive was an onward move which is a characteristic of every
society.
Although Namık Kemal had certain assumptions about the nature of the individual and of the coming
together of society his aim was more practical than philosophical. For Kemal Karpat (2002, p. 50), Namık
Kemal’s goal was not for Islamic reform rather it was about the restructuring of institutions. In this sense, his
political foundation did not rest in reforming Islam to fit the political institutions, but it depended on adapting
European style institutions within the Ottoman Empire (Karpat, 2002, p. 52). According to Bernard Lewis
(1992, pp. 316-320), Namık Kemal tries to present his arguments as notions that are encapsulated in traditional
Islam, however, they are actually ideas developed in Europe and tactically employed by Namık Kemal through
a consolidation of them with Islam.
In this sense, Namık Kemal’s philosophical foundation of political concepts was primarily based on
Islamic discourse. He formulated his ideas of European concepts through a reference to Islamic texts, traditions,
and values. Namık Kemal created new vocabulary from Islamic words providing old words with new meanings
which resembled 19th century European liberal ones. For instance vatan, the Arabic word for ones birthplace
became equated with the French understanding of patriotism, hurriyet, being a freeman associated with liberty,
millet with nation (Zurcher, 2010, p. 64). Islam for Namık Kemal would serve as the unifying factor in the
Empire while still initiating a transformation of institutions to resemble European ones and propagating for a
secular citizenship of equality based on Ottomanism. The next section dwells into specific concepts that were
part of Namık Kemal’s writings to explore how he used these terms in conjunction with Islam to formulate his
ideas of Ottomanism.
State, Constitutionalism, and Government

Namık Kemal did not differentiate between the state and government as it was ordinarily understood in
Europe. Mardin (2000, p. 300) argues that Namık Kemal used state and government interchangeable.
Government or state referred to the delegation of the powers of the community and the manner in which it is
implemented. In referring to the community, Namık Kemal understood it much more broadly: namely using it
to refer to the whole society rather than its parts. He saw the state not as a separate entity from the people that
can exercise certain rights for the good of the general public, but as the sum of the individuals who composed it.
In contrast to the moral state of Europe, Namık Kemal understood the state in more practical terms as being the
embodiment of the individuals. The state did not have personalities that can be attributed to that are not found
in the parts that form it. The role of the state for Namık Kemal is to act justly and secure the political rights of
the individual. In order to accomplish such a goal, he believed that the state institutions need to be arranged in a
manner to reflect constitutional and representative government. Namık Kemal in his article in the Ibret Gazetesi
(1872, No. 18) points to two devices in government that can safeguard the political rights of the people:
To keep the government within the limits of justice, there are two basic devices. The first of them is that the
fundamental rules by which it operates should no longer be implicit or tacit, but should be published to the world.... The
second principle is consultation, whereby the legislative power is taken away from the government. (Translation from
Lewis, 1992, p. 317)
Namık Kemal understands justice of the state to mean freedom and the process of consultation as
representation (Lewis, 1992, p. 317). He believed that the notion of representative government, commonly
regarded as alien to Muslim societies, are in fact ideas that are expressed in the Quran and ones that have been
applied in earlier periods of Islamic history (Mardin, 2000, p. 303). Furthermore, Namık Kemal argues that the
constitutional expression of separation of powers and the check and balances was exercised in the Ottoman
Empire in the past. For example, the different powers and roles of the Ulema, Janissaries, and the Sultan create
a system which limited the absolute actions each organ can take.
Although the Empire would be following liberal European practices by adopting a constitutional
government structure, Namık Kemal believed that this would be a return to the original Islamic principles. In
the eye of Namık Kemal, baya, the oath of allegiance to the leader of the Islamic community was essentially a
social contract between the people and the state (Zurcher, 2010, p. 68). Namık Kemal explains the structure of
the baya as:
The sovereignty of the people, which means that the powers of the government derive from the people, and which in
the language of the Holy Law is called baya…is a right necessarily arising from the personal independence that each
individual by nature possesses. (Gazetesi, 1872, No. 18; Lewis, 1992, p. 318)
By taking Islamic principles and relating European concepts to the expression of them, Namık Kemal
attempts to build an understanding of the state, constitutionalism, and government.
He envisions three assemblies within the government resembles the different assemblies in the political
structures of Europe. Sura-yi-Devlet or Council of the State would have the responsibility to draft bills; a
Meclis which would serves as a check between the legislative body and the executive power; and a
Sura-yi-Umma, a national assembly, which would enact bills passed by the Council of the State. The
culmination of these Islamic traditions and the interpretation of them by Namık Kemal enabled him to visualize
a European style government with sovereignty of the people and separation of power through different
assemblies. Moreover, using Islamic ideals and attaching liberal connotations to them to create institutions of
constitutional governance based on liberal principles.
States are governed by laws and regulations that are generally entrenched in constitutions. To further
explore Namık Kemal’s vision of constitutional government it is important and critical to understand his
perspective on law. At this point, it is important to highlight a critical difference in Namık Kemal’s source of
law and European liberal notions of law. Namık Kemal, although a liberal in practical terms differed from his
European counterparts because in belief he was advocate of Islamic orthodoxy, understood the sources of law
to be religious and believed that the Islamic Law is comprehensive enough to provide fundamental rights to
individuals.
The European obsession with public law of the state gave too much superiority to the moral state which
according to Namık Kemal was disadvantageous. Religious law on the hand would provide a serve to create
laws that are universally compelling to Islamic communities and which would serve to protect non-Muslims as
well. In this manner, when Namık Kemal referred to the just state as the source of freedom, he was making
reference to God’s laws that dictate what is just and unjust. Departing from Islamic Law would mean a parting
from a just state. Namık Kemal then envisions a government or state that is governed by Islamic Laws which
according to him provides individual liberties and secures them in a higher providence.
Nation, Fatherland, and Vatan

Although Namık Kemal was immersed in many different European liberal ideas he considered “vatan” to
be a very important one. Namık Kemal understood the notion of fatherland to be much more than the
geographical spatial territories that were explicit in European approaches. Fatherland consisted of an emotional
bond made up of memories, experiences, and past (Mardin, 2000, p. 327). Furthermore he attributed
characteristics to vatan that was much more personal, individualistic, and sacred. For example, he viewed vatan
as a combination of honourable feelings such as brotherhood, sovereignty, liberty, family, and childhood
memories (Mardin, 2000, p. 340).
The personification of the fatherland served a specific purpose for Namık Kemal. By attaching an intimate
and subjective association to fatherland Namık Kemal aimed to build the individual’s allegiance to the vatan in
hope to create an Ottoman overarching identity that would encapsulate all the citizens within the territorial
boundaries of the empire. Through his famous play Vatan, Namık Kemal attempts to gather support for his
understanding of the fatherland which differed from the previous conceptualizations of it (Guida, 2011, p. 67).
Vatan in its original Arabic form referred to a place where one lives, but Namık Kemal innovation was to go
beyond residence to an understanding of love and attachment to the fatherland. Namık Kemal elucidates his
understanding of fatherland as:
The fatherland is not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a
sacred idea resulting from the conglomeration of various noble feelings such as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest,
sovereignty, and respect for one’s ancestors, love of the family, and childhood memories. (Mardin, 2006, p. 326)
Through defining the fatherland in these terms, Namık Kemal envisioned an Ottoman society in which
individuals bonded together through shared experiences. This was an attempt to fuse together all the people of
the Empire regardless of their religious and ethnic diversions, and a constitutional government would provide
equal rights to all of them.
Even though Namık Kemal had liberal institutional visions for the Ottoman Empire, he based his
intellectual vigor on pan-Ottomanism identity with Islamic philosophical undertones. In this way, he assumed
he could solidify the ethnic and nationalist issues the Empire faces. By providing an Ottoman identity for all
inhabitants of the Empire, he assumed he could build loyalty through patriotism from all segments within the
Empire. Islam would play the role of solidifying patriotism because people in the Empire were for centuries
religious based and using it as the underpinnings of vatan would help to unite and marry the two
together—Ottomanism and Islam.
Freedom and Hürriyet

Out of the many ideas Namık Kemal writes about freedom or hürriyet takes a central focus of attention for
him. This is because of the god given freedom that Namık Kemal builds his political and philosophical views
on. In Europe freedom came to be understood as spheres of action allowed for individuals by the state.
However, Namık Kemal had a deeper understanding of freedom beyond state-given liberties. He understood
freedom to mean the sovereignty of the people which would be upheld and protected through representational
and constitutional model of government. In this sense, a just state as we discussed earlier becomes very
important for freedom because a just state has the duty to protect and respect the political rights of the subjects.
Another important feature of Namık Kemal’s vision of hürriyet is its source. Namık Kemal saw the
meaning of freedom as a notion that is rooted in Islamic tradition (Mardin, 2002, p. 359). Within Islam it was
noted by Namık Kemal that individuals have personal freedom and the goal of the government is to uphold the
divine hürriyet provided to them by God through the creation of institutions that would guarantee this. Namık
Kemal foresaw the French constitutional model as the one most appropriate and capable of accomplishing the
goal of securing hürriyet for the people of the Empire. For Namık Kemal hürriyet derived from sovereignty of
the people which in his Islamic expression was the ability to deliberate, thus informing his ideas on a
consultative body as a branch within the government structure he proposes (Turnaoğlu, 2017, p. 63). Hürriyet, a
natural right in Namık Kemal’s understanding, required a form of political structure that is in opposition to the
absolutist power because individuals entered into a political society to protect their freedom through association
of the people.
Freedom is the ultimate aim of political society because it is through Islamic Law that hürriyet is given to
people and it is an ideal that should be protected and secured by people because Namık Kemal did not believe it
was justifiable to expect this from God. As mentioned earlier freedom or hürriyet is much more than the state
confined rights provided to people, Namık Kemal went even further to understand freedom in moral and
spiritual sense. Stretching the meaning means that Namık Kemal sees freedom as transferring from the moral
and spiritual to the conscious which comes to define the state and the nation (Erçetin, 2014, p. 62). Namık
Kemal explains his idea of freedom by highlighting that, “All men are born free. The state is not an entity
separate from the people and cannot have interests separate from theirs” (Aksin, 2007, p. 35). Freedom then is
the natural right of individuals that is provided by divine providence and the goal of the state should be to
secure these rights through a governmental structure of representative and constitutional institutions.
Discussion
Looking at the discussions earlier it is clear that Namık Kemal wanted to reform the Ottoman Empire in
several important ways. Namık Kemal took many ideas from the European conceptualizations of state
structures and institutions. However, the interpretation and philosophical foundations he used to justify the need
for such institutions differed. He believed that the most desirable way to enact reforms was through the
stressing the importance of Islam. Şeriat or Islamic Law, he foresaw as the main organizing principle for the
constitutional legal framework in which the state would function. By combining European ideals with Islamic
traditions within the Ottoman Empire, Namık Kemal thought that the government can be reformed while still
preserving Islamic essence and practices.
Namık Kemal’s philosophical foundational understanding of Islam as a source of sovereignty and freedom
allows him to combine the European ideals with that of Islam. In doing so, he does not aim to synthesis Islam
with European ideas, rather Namık Kemal finds that these ideas are not new to Islamic civilization. Islam and
Islamic traditions and values already inherently have these ideas within its structure. The god given sovereignty
of the individual is one example among many in how he interprets concepts borrowed from Europe. Although
he attaches differing meanings to these concepts, he emphasizes that these are Islamic concepts that had been
practices in the past but had been disregarded. Namık Kemal’s motive is to return to the “true” Islam which in
his view would dictate a representational and constitutional government based on freedom and liberties for the
“people”.
From the above starting point Namık Kemal builds his understanding of the state or government. He looks
at Islamic traditions of şura, meclis, and baya to exemplify how the European state structures are already
present in Islamic notions. Furthermore, he discussed the notion of vatan which is present in Islamic tradition as
meaning birthplace and innovates this to mean patriotism that is widespread in Europe at the time. Finally,
Namık Kemal understood freedom or hürriyet to be much deeper in essence than presented in Europe. He
believed freedom rises from natural right but even further provides a romantic understanding of it.
Encapsulating in freedom the moral and the spiritual which the state rises out of are to protect the hürriyet of
the people.
Overall, all these conceptualizations of Namık Kemal come together by his understanding of Islam and his
attempt to reconcile European concepts with Islam. He does this not through an understanding of Islam as in
need of reform, but an understanding of Islamic traditions and values as being expanded to include the
European ideas of sovereignty of the people, constitutionalism, freedom, or representational government.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to understand the 19th century intellectual developments within the Ottoman
Empire from an “inside” point of view. More specifically, it explored one prominent thinker of the time, Namık
Kemal, to deepen the knowledge on social and political transformations and discussion being held at the center
of the Empire. It has found that the European ideas that were openly influencing the Ottoman’s were not a
direct external influence but the internal processes also played a major role in giving rise to debates about the
future of the Empire. Various schools of thought imagined the future of the empire in different ways. Namık
Kemal saw the solution in Islam as the basis to formulate the future structure of the Empire. This paper argues
that Namık Kemal did not synthesize Islam with European ideas, instead he found the intersection of European
ideas in Islam and built an intellectual and a political system based on this premise. Although many studies
investigate the Ottoman Empire, the exacerbated readings of the Ottoman from the “outside” need to be
readdressed with readings that deal with the internal dynamics as well.
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David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Is There Free Speech or “Fake Free Speech” in Israel? 575

European Neighbourhood Policy

Erasmus Student or EU Ambassador? People-to-People Contact in the European

Islam and International Relations: Ontological Perspective 606

Is There Free Speech or “Fake Free Speech” in Israel?

Keywords: free speech, security, Israel, censorship, social responsibility

Freedom House Press. (2016). Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/israel

Erasmus Student or EU Ambassador? People-to-People Contact

Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Contextual Background and Erasmus+ International Dimension’s Budget

Figure 1. From Erasmus to Erasmus+ (Source: European Commission, 2015c).

country, with a slight tendency to move back home in the long-term4.

Assessing HE Cooperation Programmes Towards Ukraine, Tunisia, and Georgia

Potential and Limits of Erasmus+ in Ukraine, Georgia, and Tunisia

Islam and International Relations: Ontological Perspective

Davoud Gharayagh Zandi

Keywords: Islam, IR, ontology, religion, identity, ideology, international ethics

Some Theoretical Implications

Islam as Ideology (Islamic Fundamentalism)

Islam as Identity (Constructive Perspective)

Islam as International Ethic

Exploring Namık Kemal’s Understanding of European Concepts:

Keyword: Ottoman history, Namık Kemal, Islamic conceptualizations, Euro-Islam

Philosophical Foundations of Namık Kemal’s Political System

State, Constitutionalism, and Government

Nation, Fatherland, and Vatan

Freedom and Hürriyet

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