International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 10,2018

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 10, October 2018 (Serial Number 61)
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International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 10, October 2018 (Serial Number 61)
Contents
American Power
Trump’s America: International Relations and the Construction of They-Images 527

Stephen Mennell
Gulf Crisis
The Gulf Crisis: An Insight Into Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts 537

Abdulhadi Alajmi
Cyber security
SCO and Cybersecurity: Eastern Security Vision for Cyberspace 549

Bruna Toso de Alcântara
University Culture
Function of University Culture in the Era of Development and Integration Approach From
the Reality of Vietnam 556
Huynh Quoc Thang
Arab Foreign Aid
Arab Foreign Aid in the View of Islamic Faith 567

LI Yi
International Relations and Diplomacy, October 2018, Vol. 6, No. 10, 527-536
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.10.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Trump’s America: International Relations and the Construction

of They-Images∗
Stephen Mennell
University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Unequal power balances (or power ratios) between human beings, including unequal power ratios between nations,
distort mutual perceptions in systematic, recognizable ways. And changes in power ratios over time are associated
with shifts in perception. The power position of the USA in global affairs affects Americans’ “we-images” of their
own country and their (often inaccurate) “they-image” of the outside world. It also affects the outside world’s
they-images of the USA. Norbert Elias’s theory of established-outsider relations is drawn upon to suggest how
these may all be affected by the relative decline of American power.
Keywords: Norbert Elias, established-outsider relations, we-images, they-images, US foreign policy
It is rarely granted to the strong, the powerful, and the ferocious to understand their own strength, power and ferocity.
(Bucholc, 2015, p. 13)
The sole advantage of the repulsive and uncouth lout who currently occupies the White House is that he
may enable people to see the USA as it really is. And by “people” I mean both Americans themselves and
non-Americans in the rest of the world.
After that provocative opening remark, I want to offer an academic hypothesis about how unequal power
ratios between human beings, including unequal balances of power between nations, distort mutual perceptions
and self-perceptions in systematic, recognizable ways.
I write as an academic, and moreover as a European academic. Let us start by mentioning one source of
distorted perception on our own part. People like me tend to know hundreds of American people—but they are
overwhelmingly fellow academics, publishers, and similar intellectuals like ourselves, well-educated and
well-informed, and often over here in Europe. More generally, European people at large—perhaps especially
the British 1—seem to be influenced in their perceptions of the USA mainly by images derived from New
England, New York, and Pennsylvania with an historical component going back to upright Pilgrims and
Quakers; in short, they still tend still to see the USA as an offshoot of Europe, one instance of what Louis Hartz
(1964) called “fragment societies”. Alternatively, or in addition, Europeans often appear to have adopted
elements of Americans’ own collective self-perception (or, to use Norbert Elias’s term (2010, pp. 164-170),
∗
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on “Trump’s America”, in the Clinton Institute, University
College Dublin, 5-6 May 2017.
Stephen Mennell, Professor Emeritus, School of Sociology, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
1
Long ago, Allan Nevins (1948) pointed out that, as the balance of power between Britain and the USA gradually swung in the
latter’s favour over the period of two centuries, the British, who had started by rather looking down on Americans came very
much to look up to them.
528 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEY-IMAGES
we-image). This may extend to unconsciously accepting what Robert Bellah (1967) famously called American
“civil religion”, with its implicit biblical analogies: the city upon the hill, Washington as a Moses figure leading
his people to freedom, the assassinated Lincoln as a re-crucified Christ, and so on. As we shall see in a moment,
this “rubbing off” of Americans’ we-image on to outsiders is highly significant.
Yet when Europeans set foot outside the ivied towers and beyond the eastern and western seaboards and
major university towns in between, they very often express shock at how badly informed too many Americans
are about the world outside the USA, or even outside their own state. This has been documented in social
scientific research over many years. For decades, it has been noted how little a part foreign affairs play in
Presidential elections, even though it is arguable that the powers of a President in dealing with other countries
are more extensive and less constrained than his domestic reach (see the study by Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida,
1989, and for the last two Presidential elections, Friedman, 2012 and Saunders, 2016). Perhaps most impressive
is Arlie Russell Hochschild’s outstanding ethnography of Tea Party supporters in Louisiana (2016). Hochschild
(2016) showed that, in spite of their far-right political beliefs, these ordinary working- and middle- class people
are not monsters devoid of sympathy with their fellow human beings. In their relations within their local
community, they are kind and well-meaning people, not conspicuously selfish. But their human sympathy or
“circle of mutual identification” (Swaan, 1995) is of limited radius. 2 It calls to mind a remark by the historian
David Potter:
In the twentieth century the United States developed what was perhaps the first mass society, but the American cult of
equality and individualism prevented Americans from analysing their mass society in realistic terms. Often they treated it
as if it were simply an infinite aggregation of Main Streets in Zenith, Ohio. (1968, p. 136)
But I think the problem extends to a much higher stratum, including those who have made American
foreign policy since the Second World War. There is not space enough here to list all the catastrophes of
American foreign policy, but perhaps it is enough to mention just Vietnam and the destabilization of the entire
Middle East. Andrew Alexander (2012) had depicted in forensic detail how the construction of the post-war
American Empire was guided by an “imperialism of ignorance”.
To return to the main point, concerning perception in international relations, yes, the USA did begin as a
fragment of Europe that broke away politically a couple of centuries ago. But so did the countries that we now
call “Latin America”, and we still tend to think of them as distinctly un-European in overall character
(Huntington, 1999). The Hispanist and international relations scholar Charles Jones (2007) had drawn attention
to this anomaly, arguing in effect that the USA is a lot more like Latin American and a lot less like Western
Europe than we are accustomed to think. To simplify a complex argument, Jones suggested that the USA and
its hemispheric neighbours to the south share a number of historical experiences that give their societies certain
common features and set them to some extent apart from Western Europe. These include the legacy of conquest
and of slavery (both of which have contributed to race and racism as salient traits), marked religiosity, and
relatively high rates of violence. We may add a rapacious attitude to natural resources, born of the abundance
that confronted settlers.
We are, however, concerned with a problem of reciprocal misperception, and I have suggested that
unequal power ratios between human beings, including those between nations, distort mutual perceptions and
2
Another, perhaps better, way to conceptualize this is to employ Norbert Elias’s idea of the “we-I balance” (Elias, 2010, pp.
137-208).
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEY-IMAGES 529
self-perceptions in systematic, recognizable ways. Let me explain the possibly unfamiliar concept of “power
ratio”.
The term “power ratio” was introduced by Norbert Elias because of the risk of misunderstanding of its
more familiar near-synonym “balance of power”. The word “balance” can conjure up the implication of equal
power between parties: One thinks of the nations of late nineteenth-century Europe striving to maintain stability
in the polygon of forces among the powers of the continent. But “balance” can also imply inequality as in
“balance of probability”, and that meaning is more useful in understanding most social relations between
individual and groups. Power ratios are found in all human relationships:
ﬂicts … are characteristic of the interdependent functions of workers and
Today, built-in tensions and con
entrepreneurs, as of those between groups of states. In previous periods, they were characteristic of the triangular
relationship between kings, nobles and citizens, or between segments of a tribe. They are no less characteristic of the
functional interdependences between husbands and wives or parents and children. At the root of these trials of strength are
usually problems such as these: Whose potential for withholding what the other requires is greater? Who, accordingly, is
more or less dependent on the other? Who, therefore, has to submit or adapt himself more to the other’s demands? (Elias,
2012, pp. 73-74)
When some people have a large power advantage, the experience affects in quite specific ways how they
perceive themselves and others. This can be seen at every level from the microcosm—the partners in a marriage,
for instance—right up to the macrocosm of international relations. The principle can be derived from Hegel’s
(1977, p. 111) discussion of the master-slave relationship, but its relevance struck me through the findings of a
study of a Dutch refuge for battered women and of their violent partners. These were marital relationships with
a very unequal power balance, and the authors (Van Stolk & Wouters, 1987) found that the women took much
more notice of their men than the men did of the women, and the women were much more attuned to their
men’s wishes and needs than the men were to theirs. When the women were asked to give a character sketch of
their partner, they could do so with considerable precision, nuance, and insight, while the men could not
describe their wife’s except in terms of clichés applicable to women in general. It appears to be a general
characteristic of the unequal power ratios that the weaker party “understands” the stronger better than the
stronger do the weaker. As a naturalized Irish citizen of British origin, I am very much aware of Irish people at
large knowing vastly more about their larger neighbour, the United Kingdom, than British people know about
Ireland.
A more comprehensive insight into this principle is provided by the theory of established-outsider
relations.
Established-Outsider Relations
Around 1959-1960, Norbert Elias and his MA student John Scotson conducted a study (2008) of a small
industrial settlement on the periphery of Leicester. Briefly, it contained two working-class groups. 3 The two
groups worked in the same factories, and by ordinary sociological classifications based on their occupations,
they were indistinguishable. The main difference, however, was that one group lived in the “Village”, an area
of housing dating from the 1880s, where many of the families were old-established and had intermarried over
the generations, weaving dense social networks. Being long established in the neighbourhood, they had also
3
White working-class, one should perhaps say now—it was before the advent in Leicester of large numbers of South Asian and
other migrants.
come to occupy all the main centres of local power—in the churches, charities, clubs, pubs, political parties,
and so on. The other group, living in the “Estate”, built on the eve of the Second World War, were relative
newcomers, many of them relocated with their employers from London during the war. The essential point is
that the “established” Villagers contrived to despise the extremely similar “outsiders” in the Estate. One of
Elias’s most interesting insights was into the role played by gossip. The Villagers gossiped among each other
about themselves, in terms of a “minority of the best”. That is, they constructed a we-image—a kind of group
self-stereotype—based on the most upright and worthy members of their own group. That was “praise gossip”.
It provided the basis for strong we-feelings and a collective sense of virtue. But there was “blame gossip” as
well. They gossiped about the people of the Estate, in terms of a “minority of the worst”, constructing another
stereotype, a “they-image” of the Estate based on the behaviour of just two or three families who were violent
and drunk and promiscuous, and whose kids were in danger of becoming “juvenile delinquents”. Most people
in the Estate were not like that. But they could not retaliate with a wave of counter-gossip, because their social
networks and their positions of power were not as well developed as those exploited by the “Villagers”. Still
more significantly, Elias and Scotson (2008) found that the people of the Estate had tended to absorb the
Villagers’ adverse image of them into their own we-image—they had begun to think of themselves as to some
extent “not as good as” the Villagers. But outsider groups—the less powerful parties to a power ratio—are
generally marked by ambivalence, by a fluctuating balance between acceptance of and resentment at their
position of inferiority. And, in general, when the power ratio between an established and an outsider group
comes to be more evenly balanced, the resentment will come more to the fore. Elias later elaborated and
extended this model to form an important component of his overall theory of power ratios. 4
The USA as a Global Establishment

Now, how does this apply to the USA’s position in the world today? America has very obviously occupied
the main loci of world power since 1945, and—at least at first impression—more emphatically since 1990. It is
not just a matter of military power, although, as is well known, the USA’s expenditure on its military forces
roughly equals that of all the other 195 or so countries of the world combined. This military apparatus, it should
be noted, represents a decisive break with American history prior to the Second World War, when, in times of
peace, its forces were modest in scale. 5 It is also a matter of overwhelming economic power. The USA was
already an enormous industrial power, but emerged from the war in an unprecedentedly dominant position, the
economies of both its European allies and enemies and of Japan having been wrecked in course of the conflict.
The entrenchment of the dollar as the principal world trading and reserve currency meant that the USA
could in effect “print money” and borrow at favourable rates without limit. But it has also provided, as we
have seen in recent years, the basis for a great measure of extra-territorial jurisdiction. By US law, all trades
in dollars must pass through New York, and thus—for example—European banks have been fined
massively under US law for breaking the economic sanctions imposed by the USA on states, such as Iran and
4
See Elias’s essays “Towards a Theory of Established-Outsiders Relations” (2008a [1976]) and “Further Aspects of
Established-Outsiders Relations: The Maycomb Model” (2008b [1990]), in Elias and Scotson, 2008, pp. 1-36 and pp. 207-231
respectively.
5
For calculations of the “military participation ratio” (the ratio of military personnel to the whole population) in the USA since
the late eighteenth century, see Mennell (2007, pp. 243-244).
Cuba. 6 The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the credit ratings agencies also serve to impose
the American economic regime and its model of capitalism on (most of) the rest of the world.
Then there is the more debatable question of cultural “soft power”. Certainly, the American mass media
have extended their global reach beyond merely the distribution of Hollywood films, to the point where—for
instance—the extreme right-wing Fox News television channel, as well as many American entertainment
channels, are transmitted right round the world. Just how much this is convertible directly into political power
and ideological domination is possibly exaggerated by American politicians, because the dissemination of
American “culture” probably stokes the ambivalence typical of outsider groups, especially if the power
ratio—although still unequal—is beginning to shift in their favour.
What is not very much in doubt is the capacity of the mass media within the USA to provide a functional
alternative to “praise gossip” in the formation of a we-image of collective virtue prevalent among the American
people. The “social media”, notably Facebook and Twitter, may now be coming to play some part in this, too. It
was argued in the early stages of their development that such social media could become a democratizing
influence, rectifying the power imbalance between the mass media controlled by big business and a hitherto
mainly passive public. In principle, they make possible the dissemination of heterodox points of view as a
counterbalance to the mainstream media. It is too early to be sure about this; the evidence is as yet inadequate.
Since the 2016 Presidential election and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom among other dubious
events, the concern has been more predominantly with their use as tools of demagogic manipulation with the
potential to subvert the institutions of representative democracy (Mennell, 2017). For the moment, it seems
safer to assume that the social media reinforce or subvert mainstream opinion in about the same ratio as the
older mass media do. They certainly appear to do little to moderate the apparent insularity of American people
at large. Among the striking symptoms of that insularity may be mentioned the 2014 American film The
Imitation Game, about the cracking of the German military codes at Bletchley Park during the Second World
War; the crucial episode of the capture of a naval Enigma machine was shown as being accomplished by
American submariners, when the achievement was by the British and Poles, with no American involvement—a
crass distortion of history. Equally symptomatic is that, whereas European audiences watched the hugely
successful 2007 Danish crime series The Killing with subtitles, for an American audience the entire story had to
be reshot in English and set in Seattle.
This trait of insularity has often been discussed (including by me—Mennell, 2010) in terms of American
“individualism”. This is not an invalid idea: As the British writer Hari Kunzru, now resident in the USA,
observed, “Americans are culturally averse to any explanation not based on the feelings and doings of the
sovereign individual” (2015). This can often make it quite difficult to persuade individuals to restrain their own
wishes in favour of a wider public good, at least beyond a fairly restricted local community in which most
people know each other; “gun rights” are an obvious example, but perhaps an even better case of a public good
is the insistence (and not just in America) on parental rights over whether or not their children be vaccinated
against diseases ailments like measles, even though if a sizable minority remains unvaccinated the whole
6
Another example is the judgement of a federal court in favour of an American vulture fund (led by a right-wing Republican),
ruling that Argentina must repay at full face to value the bonds that the fund had bought at junk prices after Argentina’s 2002
default. This ruling forced Argentina, which had been making a good recovery from its 2002 default, to default all over again on
31 July 2014. Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for economics, and formerly chief economist of the World Bank, said,
“We’ve had a lot of bombs being thrown around the world, and this is America throwing a bomb into the global economic system.
We don’t know how big the explosion will be—and it’s not just about Argentina” (Stiglitz, 2014).
community will be at much greater risk of an epidemic.

I think, however, that “individualism”, though real, is a side issue. More serious is that Americans in effect
base their view of themselves on a “minority of the best”, and often perceive the rest of the world in terms of a
“minority of the worst”. The USA is, and has long been, a great country. In its history and its institutions, there
is an abundance of material on which to construct a we-image of virtuous superiority. They are so familiar that
there is no need to list them here. A process of selection is involved in the incorporation of these virtues, but it
is less rigorous that the selective exclusion of vices. There are many examples of what is not included in the
American we-image, but which play a considerable part in the rest of the world’s they-image of America, and a
brief listing of some of them may be useful here. They include:
In the world at large:
-the USA’s bloated military machine.
-the USA’s continuous record of military intervention in countries in many parts of the world; a depressing
catalogue is provided by Alexander (2012, already cited), or more briefly Jansen (2017), while on the
destabilizing effects of the decades-long war in Afghanistan, see Sopko (2018). These interventions have
usually been justified as promoting “democracy”—always a dubious idea (Mennell, 2017); and often the
flimsiest of veneers. As Alan Greenspan (2008) said of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, “I’m saddened that it is
politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: The Iraq war is largely about oil”.
-its programme of kidnappings and targeted assassinations of people deemed to be its enemies; its routine
use of torture; 7 and its use of long-term imprisonment without trial at Guantanamo Bay.
-its interventions in countless elections in other countries (which make the furore about Russian
intervention in the 2016 Presidential election especially piquant).
-its highly selective adherence to international law.
-its programme of spying, even on supposed allies, and indiscriminate surveillance throughout the world.
-its highly selective rhetoric of “human rights”, without any corresponding code of “human duties”.
-its support for corrupt authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Within the USA:
The rest of the world tends to know a lot more about the internal workings of America than Americans
know about the rest of the world, so that many features of American society and politics also provide
ingredients for their they-image of the USA:
-an electoral system corrupted notably by the manipulation of the franchise to disqualify millions of
citizens (especially African-Americans and Hispanics), and gerrymandering of electoral boundaries—a
State-level rather than federal responsibility so that election outcomes are increasingly distorted. There is a long
tradition of corrupt elections in America (Gumbel, 2005), but the scandalous Presidential election of 2000 drew
the world’s attention to the fact that the conduct of elections in the USA does not measure up to modern
standards in the wider democratic world. It had world-historical consequences.
-a highly politicised judiciary.
-the power of the military-industrial complex, President Eisenhower’s warning (1961) against which has
7
To his credit, President Obama (2013) used the word “torture” instead of the usual euphemism “enhanced interrogation
techniques”. In his speech at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, on 23 May 2013, he remarked that “in some cases, I
believe we compromised our basic values—by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran
counter to the rule of law”.
been studiously ignored—to the detriment of American democracy (though no doubt to the profit of its
manufacturing economy).
-more generally, the extreme domination of government by big business and big finance. It has been
estimated that one-thousandth of the population provides 25 percent of electoral campaign funding, and there is
little doubt that public policy in the USA follows the sources of political donations rather than public opinion.
The Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010 has effectively abolished all limits on electoral
donations and expenditure short of specific quid pro quo bribery (Gilens & Page, 2014; Teachout, 2014).
Teachout contends that corruption in the broad sense of the privileging of private interest over the public good
was the major threat to democratic government anticipated by the framers of the Constitution, and that it is now
pervasive. A stunning example was the USA’s objection to a resolution at the World Health Organization
promoting breast feeding, on the grounds that it could diminish the profits of American manufacturers of baby
formula (Jacobs, 2018).
-the gross, and growing, social and economic inequality of American society, which (through America’s
global economic power) is increasingly being imposed in other countries too.
-the power of groups who deny large parts of modern scientific knowledge—on the basis of religious
belief in the case of banning the teaching of evolution, but also from short-term economic self-interest in the
case of obstructing measures to ameliorate the problem of climate change.
-America’s high rates of violence; these have fallen somewhat in recent years (as they have in many
countries), but are still very much higher than in other modern societies. This is linked to the gun culture, the
obsession of a large proportion of Americans with the right to own guns, which is incomprehensible to most
outsiders. 8
-America’s exceptionally high rates of incarceration, its vast prison population being very
disproportionately composed of African-Americans, one symptom of the enduring legacy of racism in
American society.
-the retention of the death penalty, now considered unacceptable in most Western countries.
Several items in this list would constitute a disqualification for any country wishing to be a member of the
Council of Europe or the European Union. 9
And of course, to this list can be added the election of Donald Trump in 2016. His advent offers
fascinating case-study of old debates about how much the actions or character of particular individuals can
produce historically lasting changes. He may prove to be an aberration, but the abrogation of international
agreements, the denigration of old friends, and derogation of old alliances, may have lasting consequences. It is
true that, as Elias remarked, that there is a duality of normative codes within the nation state:
most of the sovereign interdependent nation states which together form the balance-of-power figuration in the
twentieth century produce a two-fold code of norms whose demands are inherently contradictory: a moral code descended
from that of rising sections of the tiers état, egalitarian in character, and whose highest value is “man”—the human
individual as such; and a nationalist code descended from the Machiavellian code of princes and ruling aristocracies,
inegalitarian in character, and whose highest value is a collectivity—the state, the country, the nation to which an
individual belongs. (Elias, 2013, p. 169)
8
For a persuasive explanation of the origins and persistence of the gun culture, see Spierenburg (2006).
9
The death penalty has been abolished in many states, and executions in the USA today are not very numerous outside states,
such as Texas, but again African-Americans are very disproportionately represented among those who are executed; see Garland
(2011).
Nevertheless, today’s relatively “civilized” standards of diplomacy, negotiation and the conduct of
meetings have taken centuries to take shape (Van Vree, 1999; Mastenbroek, 1999; Linklater, 2016), and those
who breech them are despised.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential ingredients for the they-image of the USA that is being
constructed by increasing numbers of people across the world. Different individuals will differ in the selection
they make, although it is likely that this process of selection will be strongly influenced by their group
membership. Of course, features of the USA that outsiders find admirable will also find their way into their
they-images, but one suspects that negatively valued elements tend to carry the greater emotional charge.
Conclusion
I have argued (Mennell, 2007, p. 319) that the central experience shaping Americans’ social
habitus—what comes to them as “second nature”—is of becoming, over many generations, ever more powerful
in relation to their neighbours. That process began almost immediately after the first European settlements in
North America in the early 17th century. In accordance with the established-outsiders relations model, this
tilting of power ratios in their favour assisted the formation of a certain blindness towards others. But this
long-term process now appears to be changing direction: Power ratios between the USA and other major
players in world politics would seem to be shifting relatively against America. It seems likely that Americans
may already be starting to become more aware of this, and they may find the experience humiliating. As Elias,
once again, comments, there are
analogous connections between a people’s long-term fortunes and experiences and their social habitus at any
subsequent time. At this layer of the personality structure—let us for the time being call it the “we-layer”—there are often
complex symptoms of disturbance at work which are scarcely less in strength and in capacity to cause suffering than the
neuroses of an individual character. (Elias, 2013, p. 24)
And, he says, “Britain in the recent past is a moving example of the difficulties a great power of the first
rank has had in adjusting to its sinking to being a second- or third-class power” (2013, p. 3).
The USA is a long way from sinking to the status of a second-class power. Yet, it has suffered some
reversals and humiliations since the years of hubris following the fall of the Soviet Union. A sense of national
humiliation is dangerous. Scheff and Retzinger (1991) advanced a theory of “shame-rage
spirals”—self-escalating processes they initially observed in interpersonal situations such as the breakdown of
marriages. Scheff (1994) had extended the theory to war, nationalism, and international relations. At the
beginning of the 21st century, the attacks on New York and Washington known as “9/11” were not only
revolting acts of terrorism and mass murder, but also successful attempts to inflict humiliation, and America’s
subsequent wars have been disastrous. There are already—among some American citizens—signs of a sense of
decline: witness the slogan “Make America Great Again”. A sense of collective humiliation may make the
USA an even more dangerous force in world affairs.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.10.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
The Gulf Crisis: An Insight Into Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts
Abdulhadi Alajmi
Kuwait University, State of Kuwait, Kuwait
Mediation is an important peaceful means of resolving international disputes. In such cases, the mediator invites
member states in dispute to roundtable negotiations to bring about a reconciliation. In the late GCC crisis between
Qatar on one hand and Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other, Kuwaiti mediation tries to bridge the
gap and prevent escalation that might lead to military confrontation against Doha to force a change of regime.
However, this mediation is always in danger of an elongated crisis that might worsen the situation and hinder the
parties reaching a reconciliatory settlement of their dispute. This is a challenge that confronts the Kuwaiti mediator
and jeopardizes the very existence of the GCC in case the Kuwaiti mediator fails to reach a settlement. The dispute
went beyond a limited geographic one with Egypt joining the boycott and the symbolic presence of Turkish troops
in Qatar. As such, the dispute has created an unprecedented political rift among Gulf States and their rulers and
somehow worries the existing regimes. This worrying situation threatens the core principles of some of these States,
including those who are still neutral towards the dispute.
Keywords: Kuwait, mediation, dispute, Gulf crisis, Qatar, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
The Kuwaiti Mediation Efforts and the Gulf Crisis Test

Mediation efforts are considered an important peaceful means that contributes to the settlement of
international disputes whereby the mediator takes it upon themselves to solve existing disagreements through
negotiations and discussions and sitting down at one table. 1
Mediation has emerged in the charter of several international organizations in a very explicit way;
foremost amongst these organizations are the United Nations and the League of Arab States. These mediators
sometimes call for the interests of some of the neighboring or regional parties and even the international
community especially when a conflict between two or several states occurs. These mediation efforts strive to
settle such conflicts quickly and satisfactorily to all parties concerned. The aims of the mediation are to narrow
divergences between views and allow discussions between the conflicting parties. The mediators themselves
have to be impartial and acceptable by all the parties of the conflict.
In the recent Gulf crisis, Kuwaiti mediation efforts were an attempt to bridge the Gulf rift that occurred
between more than half of the GCC countries―Qatar, on the one side of the rift, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Bahrain on the other―especially with regards to an escalation of tensions to an armed conflict
that might lead to regime change in Doha.
Kuwaiti mediation efforts are confronted by the constant threats represented by the long duration of the
crisis and the failure to reach a satisfactory settlement. This not only jeopardizes the Kuwaiti position but also
that of the Gulf Cooperation Council, rendering the latter useless.
1
Ago (R), science juridique et droit international, R.C.A.D.I. 1956, p. 859.
538 THE GULF CRISIS: AN INSIGHT INTO KUWAIT`S MEDIATION EFFORTS
Thus, the Kuwaiti decision-maker realizes that length of time is a factor which will limit his ability to
preserve Kuwait’s political prestige and to find quick solutions to settle the conflict, especially with the
intensity of the regional and international presence as a multi-element influencer which imposes itself on any
solutions or agendas that are suggested by the mediator to settle the situation. This reflects a very complicated
issue that will require complex solutions.
Therefore, the recent Gulf crisis is a complicated mixture that faces the Kuwaiti mediator in terms of his
ability to see the facts and what lies “underneath the surface”. Between the conflict, problem, or maybe the
setback, the parties concerned, especially Kuwaiti mediation efforts, are not familiar with the political issue that
is represented by the recent crisis; particularly the intensive presence of scenes of complexity, intersection, and
mutual conflict at the same time.
After the setbacks or the “faltering” of the most current mediation efforts, the crisis is back to square one.
Kuwaiti efforts face an unusual challenge that they have not faced since the 1990s, particularly since the Iraqi
invasion. A challenge that has contributed to the clash of agendas of the mediators involved on the one hand
and the complexities of internal affairs and the multiplicity of powers on the other hand.
The crisis has gone beyond the immediacy of the Gulf region; as Egypt and Turkey have become
components, the latter having military forces in Qatar. This has created a deep political rupture for the Gulf and
its regimes (Mitroff & Pouchant). 2 The crisis might also threaten the impartial countries, Kuwait and Oman.
Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts Between Reality and the Unknown

The aim of analyzing the role of each country and its position is to highlight its actual value and what it
can offer, its vital interests and the role it can play as a party in a conflict or crisis, or as a mediator.
When looking at Kuwait one realizes that it is located in the middle of a triangle of three major powers
with large geographic and population densities (Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia). It is not surprising that each one
of these countries has a history of conflict and attempts of expansion of which Kuwait itself was the target. 3
Kuwait is fully aware of its position and its existential “jeopardy” vis-à-vis the above countries.
This recent Gulf crisis is not seen as simply a geopolitical conflict by Kuwait, rather it reminds Kuwait
and has all the elements of the Iraqi invasion of 1990, sans military action. Even though military action has, for
the moment been postponed and replaced by the 13 demands 4, the “ghost” of military action looms large as
there have been countless incidents of air and sea space penetrations on the part of the parties in the crisis.
Why the Efforts Are Overlapping

The ability of the Kuwaiti mediator in accurately identifying the components of the crisis and its causes is
an important factor. The recent Gulf crisis events are rapidly evolving, almost daily. It is also difficult to decide
the cause of the conflict and those who are driving it. Add to this is the importance of being able to offer
appropriate views that meet the minimum requirements of the disputed parties.
Parallel to this, the mediator is faced with the obstacle of the causes of the crisis itself. The crisis probably
2
Mitroff & Pouchant, Transforming the Crisis-prone Organization: Preventing Individual, Organizational and Environmental
Tragedies, Jossy-Bass, San Francisco, CA 1992.
3
For example, Kuwait was the target of Saudi aggression in the years 1793 and 1797 and has gone through the bitter experiment
of the Saddam invasion of 1990 from its Iraqi neighbor and of course the constant Iranian threats at the present time.
4
These demands that have since been reduced and some even abandoned, but remains the possibility of reducing more or even
increasing.
THE GULF CRISIS: AN INSIGHT INTO KUWAIT`S MEDIATION EFFORTS 539
revealed an important fact to the Kuwaiti mediator which is that historical disagreements, postponed or
overcome at times, are subject to the ability of the parties concerned to maintain one another’s interests. Any
confusion or reversibility in the political interests, in particular, will lead to a more dangerous setback, which is
actually what occurred here. There is also the unsolved “surplus power” that some parties feel they possess.
Another factor is the temperament of some parties in dealing with the crisis.
This crisis and its rapid worsening was the main cause behind the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al
Ahmed’s announcement in his last speech 5 (took place during the opening of the second ordinary session of
the 15th legislative session of the National Assembly, 24th October, 2017) following a visit to Saudi Arabia,
where he warned of the “collapse of the Gulf House”, stressing that any escalation would have damaging and
destructive consequences to the security of the Gulf and its peoples. 6
The Kuwaiti mediation effort undeniably achieved an important step as it was able to hold the 38th Gulf
Summit in Kuwait on 5 of December 2017, despite the fact that this success was accompanied by a low
representation of several participating countries; namely that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, thus forcing the Kuwaiti mediator to reduce the duration of the summit to one day instead of the
usual two.
The Kuwaiti mediator is certainly in the middle of an unusual crisis which is molded with a legacy fraught
with fear and unease; a legacy that is torn between history from one side and the view of failure from the other.
The minimal loss of this legacy is the end of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) system which survived the
first Gulf War (1980s) and the second Gulf war (the last decade of the 20th century) (Sa’id Idris, 2000). The
GCC system has witnessed torn countries and people that became a victim of ongoing wars and conflicts and
thus lead to the sovereign decisions to be in the hand of direct foreign interventions; Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen are examples of this. Thus, the motives, flexible attitude, and the keenness of the Kuwaiti mediator and
its confirmation that its role as a mediator will remain as it is during the crisis are understood.
When discussing Kuwait’s mediation role, it is important to note Kuwait’s investment in the GCC. The
Kuwaiti mediator views the GCC as a realistic and permanent experiment compared to other systems. It was
able to maintain its existence since its establishment in 1981 and no one could deny this fact. An alternative for
such a system, for everyone in general and Kuwait in particular, is absent and no party has any guarantees in
case this system disintegrated or some parties withdraw from it. 7 There are certainly some differences in the
policies of some GCC countries but this, compared to other issues and problems, can be contained and
controlled. Kuwait has actually succeeded several times in resolving the issues. This could be explained by the
strong desire on the part of the four Gulf States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Emirates, with the
exception of Egypt on several occasions. Kuwait considers this issue a Gulf issue that is governed by the idea
of permanence and national characteristics that Gulf countries and their people have in common. “The Kuwaiti
mediator views these as characteristics that drive him to continue to fix the situation and fortify the Gulf
“house”. 8 These words still draw attention to the crisis and indicate that the issue will remain inside this
context and that Kuwait is only concerned with the Gulf parties.
5
Speech in front of the Parliament 24th October, 2017.
6
See http://ahewar.org/rate/ys.asp.
7
The Kuwaiti Amir has warned in a similar case during an American press conference that Kuwait was able to stop military
options that were being considered by some parties to the crisis.
8
It is important to note that the US State Department always insisted that an important step in solving the crisis is to have direct
talks among the Gulf countries.
Historical Legacy or a Tied Fate

Mediation, whatever its source, form, and mechanism, cannot be embodied as practice. The mediators and
the rest of the parties have to understand that the political outcome that is desired must not result in one party
being loser and the other victorious.
Kuwait’s role on the diplomatic level is significant. It has performed several actions and made efforts to
reproduce the success it has achieved throughout history. This policy is derived from a long heritage of playing
the role of mediator and successfully intervening in solving disputes and struggles within the Gulf area.
Therefore, the Kuwaiti mediation efforts seem to rely on its historical heritage which is rooted and stable
in this regard, in addition to the structure of the authority and the political system that remained powerful from
its inception to this day. This is evident in Kuwait’s active role and influential presence in several international,
regional, and Arab issues. Kuwait was active on a diplomatic level for several decades that coincided with the
establishment and the emergence of the emirate itself.
History reveals the roots of Kuwait’s political and diplomatic development through several stages. Four
centuries ago, the visit of Kuwait’s first ruler, Sheikh Sabah I, to the Ottomans after the establishment of
Kuwait, and away from Bani Khalid (Burn, n.d.), confirms that the Kuwaitis sought early to be present as a
party that seeks peace and did not desire any conflict with other parties in the region. Perhaps that led the Bani
Khalid to contact the Sheikh of Kuwait to address this situation. Sources point out that they contacted the
Sheikh of Kuwait (Sabah bin Jabir), and then signed, with his son Abdullah on behalf of his father, a friendship
and good neighbor agreement under the condition that Kuwait should not join their opponents (Qal’aji, 1962;
Al-Din, 1987). One Western historian describes this visit stating, “Influential people held a meeting and agreed
to send an envoy to the Pasha in Basra to explain that they (Kuwaitis) do not intend to harm anyone”.
During the reign of Kuwait’s second ruler, Sheikh Abdullah al-Sabah, the Ottoman authorities asked him
to hand over some refugees. He refused despite the fact that the British told him that the governor of Baghdad
intended to attack Kuwait if he refused to hand over the refugees. He replied that he was “ready to fight and
protect his guests”. This was the new approach adopted by the Kuwaiti authority as it continued to follow the
same neutral approach when dealing with controversial issues and political conflicts between some of the
neighboring parties at the time.
Sheikh Mohammed al-Sabah (r. 1892-1896), the fifth ruler of Kuwait, performed the role of a mediator
when two rival siblings were vying for power in Bahrain. The Kuwaiti mediation efforts were successful and
Sheikh Mohammed al-Sabah (Al-Nabahani, 1923) arrived in Bahrain to end the dispute in 1864.
We should also point out that, following the independence of 1961, the Kuwaiti political process
continued to follow a balanced approach to solve pending issues between Kuwait and other parties. The
Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis in 1961 is a proof of this, as Kuwait was able to maintain the peace by moving the crisis
into the corridors of the Security Council and the League of Arab States.
At the beginning of the conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1965, which developed into military
threats that would undoubtedly cast a shadow over the Gulf region especially since Egypt’s military was
already present in Yemen, the Kuwait Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem intervened as a mediator with the
approval of the rest of the parties. Kuwait succeeded in holding a dialogue session which the three parties
(Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) participated in.
Kuwait was also present in the Bahraini case after the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in 1971 and the
consensus on conducting a referendum for independence of it. Kuwait had an active part once again through the
mediation efforts it made. It became the center of attention for a number of British officials especially since the
Kuwaiti attitude seemed calm and pragmatic in this case, in the contrary to the position of other parties and
other Gulf States. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah supported those who said
that the issue should be referred to the United Nations who would determine the appropriate way to identify the
opinion of the Bahraini people on the issue of self-determination.
Kuwait also made good and satisfactory mediation attempts to reach an agreement with Iran regarding this
issue. Kuwait led secret negotiations that were attended by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah
Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah. 9
When a military conflict occurred in 1971 between East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and India on the one hand
and the State of Pakistan on the other hand, Kuwait was one of the first Gulf countries to recognize the
independence of Bangladesh. In the same year, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait was the head of the mission
formed by the Islamic Conference Organization together with the Foreign Ministers of Somalia and Lebanon.
Moreover, when the conflict broke out between South and North Yemen in 1972, Kuwait continued its
mediation efforts to pave the way for resolving the dispute between Yemenis. In the same region in 1984, when
conflicts arose once more, Kuwait introduced itself as an impartial neutral mediator. It created a suitable
atmosphere for an effective mediation to solve the crisis that erupted between its Arab brothers (Oman and
Yemen).
Kuwait’s mediation efforts were also present when conflict between Senegal and Mauritania took place in
1989. Kuwait was keen on deploying the Minister of State for Foreign affairs in an attempt to activate the
mechanisms and means of resolution and allow direct dialogue between the two parties to solve the crisis
amicably away from any escalation or military conflict between the two countries. 10
During the Palestinian-Jordanian crisis, which broke out in 1970 and was accompanied by unfortunate
events that came to be known as “Black September”, the Kuwaiti role contributed in pacifying and defusing the
dispute between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Jordan. Similar to Kuwait’s influential role in
1989 in Lebanese affairs, its mediation efforts, along with other parties, helped to establish the Taif Agreement.
Kuwaiti mediation efforts were also present in the dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria back in the eighties.
The Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, played a prominent role in the resolution of
matters between the two countries.
Kuwaiti mediation efforts played a major role in cooling off issues between Saudi Arabia and Libya
especially since the two countries (Libya and Saudi Arabia) had had several differences throughout history.
This discrepancy reached its the highest point at the Arab Summit in 2010, as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi clashed during the summit.
As for Iraq, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait did not, at any stage or period, escalate
things between itself and the strongest and largest neighbor in terms of geographical size and military strength.
Even in Iraq’s dispute with Syria, Kuwait was neutral and made positive mediation efforts in this crisis. It
attempted to make efforts to get the neighboring countries to negotiate as it was the most appropriate thing to
do to resolve disagreement between them, especially as these were political differences and not military or
9
According to Abdallah Bishara in the magazine Dirasat al-Khaleej wa-al-Jazeera al-Arabiyya, 7, July 1976.
10
See http://www.moqatel.com.
border disputes.
When signs of a crisis in Gulf relations emerged during the Gulf Summit, hosted by Kuwait, the subject of
a single currency was raised and Oman was the first to reject it. Kuwaiti mediation efforts succeeded in easing
things between the parties and it was agreed to postpone the case. Not to mention that Qatar was in some cases
subjected to such dangers, previous to the current crisis. Before the Arab Spring revolutions, when the
Egyptian-Qatari conflict appeared on satellite television, media outlets, and newspapers Kuwait made a lot of
efforts to contain the crisis between the two countries. Moreover, when the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood
collapsed in Egypt and Qataris stood firm against this, Kuwait’s efforts and mediation were once again
deployed, in an attempt to bridge the rift in relations between Egypt and Qatar.
This brief presentation of examples of Kuwaiti policy efforts and effectiveness in mediation is an
undeniable proof of Kuwait’s important role in solving issues. On the other hand, the outstanding question is:
Will this conventional history support mediation efforts in an unconventional crisis?
Kuwaiti Mediation Efforts Are Plausible…but Remains at Square One

In order to understand the basic elements of danger facing the Kuwaiti mediator, it is necessary to address
the current crisis and the fact that it has become an unusual ideological challenge for the mediator. This crisis
could affect the mediator’s previous efforts, target its course of movement, and put it in a sensitive position.
Indeed, Kuwait intervened on June 5, even though the crisis predated this in its start time and also its issues. 11
This article addresses the role of Kuwait and the future of its current mediation efforts and does not
address of other problems and aspects related to this issue; both in terms of policy or economics, which had
been addressed and analyzed in several other articles and studies.
After the withdrawal of the ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain
from Qatar in 2014, Kuwait increased its mediation efforts significantly. Although it has achieved some success
in the past, it has failed in solving some issues. Recent moves seem more determined and shaped more firmly.
The mediation effort had more ground to work on and it was relatively stable, which resulted in increasing
hopes. These hopes were boosted by the people who were performing the mediation efforts, represented by the
head of the political leadership itself, the Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad.
The Kuwaiti mediator is aware that he has the elements that qualify him for success. The most important
characteristics of these elements are the following:
1. The Kuwaiti mediator focuses on the environmental dimension. For example, devoting most of the
efforts to the four Gulf States (by only visiting them) despite the fact that there are major parties involved in
this crisis including Egypt and Turkey; in addition to some countries that have already cut off their relationship
with Qatar, such as the Comoros. The direct visits made by Kuwait’s most powerful representative, formed a
special Gulf dimension for the crisis. It sent messages to the people of the region itself that the crisis will
remain mainly a Gulf issue.
2. Kuwait has focused during most of its speeches on stating that this crisis involves brothers and
11
The Kuwaiti mediator is today much more aware than in previous times because of the fact that most of the parties in this crisis
are members of the Cooperation Council and any discovery or failure will be followed with a reactive outcome, the least
disastrous would the “hammering of the nail on the coffin of the Gulf Cooperation Council” and even defining the Kuwaiti
mediator as with or against (one or more of the parties involved).
neighboring countries and it is an urgent problem that can be and needs to be solved. 12 Therefore, certain
parties should stay away if they fail to provide solutions or proposals that help to solve this issue. These
messages implied that Kuwait refused to internationalize the issue. It was also an attempt to stop the Gulf
region from being a scene for unresolved conflicts between existing international forces that are already
deployed in nearby areas (Syria, Yemen, and Iraq).
3. The Kuwaiti mediator had a clear-cut position in the crisis from the first few moments. It asserted
constantly that its efforts would remain ongoing as long as the crisis persisted, but the Kuwaiti mediator was
aware that timing is a double-edged sword; that is, the longer the crisis takes the crisis, the more complex it
becomes and the gap widens, which make it detrimental to these efforts. Thus, this could be the reason behind
Kuwait’s fears and pessimism about the collapse of the Gulf system; a pessimism and fear that justifies concern
about the effectiveness of completing the mediation efforts. This all has made Kuwait seem incapable of
performing its role to solve the situation. Thus, the Kuwaiti mediator needs to overlook this problem of time
and be ready to accept it to solve this crisis within its environmental framework.
4. The parties concerned with this conflict understand that Kuwait’s efforts do not have the authority to
make or impose a decision which makes them accept and accede to its intervention in this matter. Kuwait, for
example, has not encountered complex problems with Doha’s foreign policy, a problem of the kind that has
angered the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt. 13 This is an additional factor that gives
Kuwaiti efforts a wider area of movement and communication between the parties to the conflict.
5. The flexibility of the Kuwaiti mediation, in addition to its simplicity and quickness, in leaves the parties
with the freedom of choice without pressure or using working-papers or agendas of any kind. It also takes into
account the interests of the parties more than their positions.
A Transitional Scene or a Political Reality

The fundamental elements embodied in the nature of the role of mediation in the current crisis are closely
related to some of the previous events and conflicts between the countries in disagreement. The differences
between Qatar and the rest of the parties to the crisis, including Egypt, have existed for decades. The Arab
Spring Revolutions, especially the January 2010 revolution in Egypt, were a major concern for some systems in
the Gulf region. Qatar supported those revolutions from day one and the Al-Jazeera network was one of the
most important forums for the people of the countries where the revolutions occurred, despite the opposition of
some Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the wake of the overthrow, by the army, of the
democratically elected president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Qatar’s Sheikh Tamim, who took power in
succession of his father in 2013 after the latter’s concession of the throne to his son, visited Saudi Arabia in
what seemed like a “subpoena” by the Saudis. The young prince was told of the necessity of adopting a policy,
with regards to the Egyptian issue, that is consistent with the policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Perhaps
in this particular request there were important indicators of the Qatari side, specifically Qatar ignored or
challenged these requests. Qatar refused to remain neutral when it came to the Arab Spring revolutions and
12
And in spite of Kuwait knowing-or owning-what evidence that there might be an announced escalation-that is the use of force
by all three neighbors against Qatar. And this was indeed in the mind of the Kuwaiti representative even more evident when
Turkey sent its forces.
13
It should be noted that Kuwait was aware from the very beginning of the crisis that the Qatari side took quick and
precautionary actions to counter the siege imposed on it, without having to rely on Gulf States. Everyone knew that Qatar will not
rely on Gulf States within the GCC and that there are regional and international actors who have indeed stepped into the crisis.
counter-revolutions. In 2014, suddenly after the Riyadh Agreement, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia
recalled their ambassadors from Doha citing Qatar’s interference in their internal affairs as the cause. This was
a new turn in the course of the crisis for Kuwaitis—as well as the Omanis—who did not act in a similar fashion.
A new issue rose to the surface; in April Qatar paid a ransom to some of the Iraqi militias and the Syrian
opposition to liberate Qatari hostages. Qatar was defying Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, especially with regard
to Syrian and Iraqi matters. Saudi Arabia was quick to accuse Qatar of supporting armed terrorist groups.
Kuwait did not comment on this matter nor did it take any actions similar to those taken by Saudi Arabia. On
May 23, 2017, Qatar claimed that the site of Qatar News Agency was broken into and described the alleged
statements attributed to Sheikh Tamem that were broadcast in Saudi Arabia were all fabricated and therefore
false. 14 On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain, supported by
Egypt (which is outside the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council), announced that they had cut off
relations with Qatar. They closed air, sea, and land routes between them and Qatar. The four countries gave
Qatari residents and visitors, in their lands, a few days to leave. That was followed on June 8, 2017 by the
publication of a list, that included 49 individuals, 12 organizations, and one group, who were all said to support
terrorism that Qatar financed. This was accompanied by the publication of these afore mentioned countries’ 13
demands, which were handed over to the Kuwaiti mediator to be presented to Qatar, which declined these
demands through the same mediator.
What was remarkable is that the Kuwaiti mediator became the only candidate that was capable of dealing
with the mediation burdens, especially after the emergence of confusion and the absence of some of the major
powers in this role. It also appeared that the Kuwaiti mediator was working alone without following a certain
agenda and did not wait―as was mentioned―for any of the major powers to coordinate with him, more
specifically the United States of America. The latter may have been viewed by Kuwait with suspicion and
uncertainty because of its ambivalent attitude. 15 The Amir of Kuwait requested, on the same day in which
relations were cut off with Qatar, not to escalate things and provide an opportunity to solve the tension. Kuwait
also refused to coordinate with Turkey despite the ratification of the Turkish Parliament, on the 7th of June,
2017, a law that included deploying 5,000 Turkish troops to one of the Turkish military bases in Qatar.
Nonetheless, the results of these efforts were not satisfactory, not to mention that the roots of some political
ideologies are also beginning to show clearly, especially the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood and the position
of Qatar and its political leaders and elite. Kuwait is aware of this and how difficult it is to change any of it.
The author believes that the Kuwaiti mediation efforts which until now have been characterized by
dynamism, flexibility, and a balanced vision and have not been able to provide an appropriate forum, despite
holding the 38th Gulf Summit for the conflicting parties to meet and work and agreeing to an acceptable
solution. On the other hand, it succeeded in other measures, including ensuring privacy between the parties
concerned and making sure that the crisis remained in the framework of the united Gulf House. 16
14
CNN, Arabic, May 25, 2017, aired June 5, 2017: http://cnn.it/2qjjaTu.
15
What supports this argument is the contradictory statements stemming from the US Secretary of State and President Trump:
Trump made several statements regarding the Qatari issue that were close to the Saudi Position particularly his hope that the
isolations of Qatar will bring an end to the “terrorism scare”. See French News Agency, June 5, 2017 seen on June 5, 2017 also
https://arabic.cnn.com and https://www.afp.com/ar/news/27/doc-p98fr.
16
It was revealed, by the Amir of Qatar, during his interview on CBS, October 2017, on President Trump’s request to come to
Camp David, his willingness to do so in person. This, in spite of the leaders of the other parties being missing, is a
ground-breaking achievement on the part of the Kuwaiti mediation efforts.
Qatar’s Position…a Bridge for the Kuwaiti Mediator

Qatari policy views the current Kuwaiti mediation efforts as a last resort before the crisis reaches a critical
mass stage. Qatari statements, referring to Kuwait’s stand, reflect gratitude and welcoming. In addition,
Kuwait’s statements are always balanced. This had a huge impact on moving things forward, as they revealed
reportedly that Doha was willing to negotiate. This perhaps gives the Kuwaiti mediator enough wiggle room to
continue the negotiations between the parties in the crisis. 17 Up to this moment, Qatar seemed the most
spacious and quiet bridge that the Kuwaiti mediator could cross to solve the crisis. Perhaps Kuwaiti mediation
knows that pressuring Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, or Manama to do anything will point the finger at Kuwait and
accuse Kuwait of lining up with Qatar. Kuwait would have a lot to lose if that happened.
Therefore, there is no alternative but to seize the opportunity of Qatari flexibility and Qatar’s willingness
to sit at the negotiating table. The success of Kuwait in contacting all the parties in this crisis at this stage will
probably save the day. Everyone will eventually find themselves compelled to accept the intervention of
foreign parties, but when, where, and at what loss or gains, no one knows!
The Gulf Summit…Kuwait Resumes Its Efforts

Kuwait declined requests to relocate the 38th Gulf Summit. 18 Moreover, strategic threats and tensions
escalated after the announcement of a partnership between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh and after the killing of Saleh
in Yemen. Despite all the conditions, there seemed to be an extraordinary Kuwaiti insistence to hold the
summit and gather the parties, even though the Kuwaiti mediator, a few days before the summit was not sure
that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain would attend. Kuwait seemed to be close
to cancelling the summit. Speculations increased in the last few moments because of unusual diplomatic
activities. For the first time since 1981, most of the Gulf leaders were absent. Therefore, the Amir of Kuwait
insisted on welcoming the guests at the airport personally. Minister of State of Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash
represented Saudi Arabia, the Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa represented Bahrain,
a Deputy Prime Minister represented Oman, while the Emir of Qatar was the representative of his country.
Despite aspirations and hopes that the parties will sit at one table to negotiate, “charges against Doha after
the assassination of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa”, added more pressure to the efforts of the
Kuwaiti mediator. This was evident at the preparatory meeting of foreign ministers which reflected the
continuing divisions.
Kuwait’s ability to bring together the parties of the crisis at one table was a good step, compared to other
international efforts which had failed so far. Kuwait’s efforts to be a substitute and host to “Gulf 23” also
reflected a state of political détente. The Amir of Kuwait, who is clearly more concerned that geopolitical
conditions sooner or later will put the fledgling system and all its countries in crisis, calls for the
commissioning of a committee to amend the system’s statute to ensure a mechanism to resolve disputes
between the member states. However, it is surprising that the final statement of the shortest summit, in the
history of the summits, did not focus on resolving the crisis or discussing it. Observers noticed that the summit
was held to prevent the dissolution of the GCC Council and conceal the fractures that hit, and is still hitting, the
17
This is especially the case when one sees that the crisis, by that time, had taken a Geopolitical form with the input of both
Turkey and Iran. And that Qatar has maintained, in its external and internal statements, that it will support the Kuwaiti
mediation and will do so until there is a resolution to the crisis.
18
Fearing the exclusion of Qatar, as the Bahraini foreign secretary had asked for Qatar’s membership to the GCC suspended.
Gulf system. One could conclude that the situation will remain as it is and this crisis is here to stay.
The Future of Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts

Just before warning of the collapse of the Gulf House, the Amir of Kuwait declared that he was surprised
by the outbreak of the crisis after the Riyadh meeting of 2017. The declaration was made in September 2017 in
a joint press conference with the US President, in the White House. He added that there was no disagreement
between Qatar and the rest of the countries during the summit, adding that success in stopping the military
option meant that hope of resolving the Gulf crisis had not ended.
Whether there are direct parties pushing for authorization and disclosure or not does not change the fact
that Kuwaiti mediation efforts still take into account the option of the use of power which remains strongly
present in the imagination of the decision-maker in Kuwait. The question that remains is to what extent the
mediator will be able to efficiently keep his efforts going. The answer to this question is subject to two main
factors that must be taken into account:
1. The Kuwaiti mediator, who has remained neutral till now, will not be able to move forward with these
efforts unless they are turned into tangible results that can be seen. The reality is that the Kuwaiti mediator is
surprised by the developments that often bring him back to “square one”. This raises questions about the ability
of the Kuwaiti mediator to continue despite his assertion that the efforts will remain as long as the crisis
remains.
2. It must be taken into consideration that there are new factors that may affect the position of the Kuwaiti
mediator. It is clear that the outcome of his mediation efforts is not stable at this stage, which may increase the
complexity of the crisis and its impact on the domestic situation of the GCC countries including Kuwait and
Oman who are not part of the conflict. This raises the question of whether the prolonged duration of the crisis
will lead to a qualitative or even a minor change in the position of the Kuwaiti mediator if the Kuwaiti mediator
assesses that the continuation of the situation as it is or an increase in its severity will have greater
consequences than military intervention or internationalization. It is too early to talk about this option or factor,
despite the fact that the air and sea penetrations that prompted Qatar to file a complaint with the Security
Council had significant ramifications.
With the continued acceleration of the crisis and the Telerson dismissal, as the secretary of state, it can be
said that the level of optimism which was high during the negotiation period is now very low. This view is
backed by the response of the Qatari Foreign Minister to the question about the possibility of resorting to the
military option. He addressed the reporters in Washington and said: “Although Qatar hopes it will not resort to
such measures, it is well prepared and can rely on its partners”. 19
The most prominent question in the meantime and what several reports and the BBC have indicated
revolves around “the role of one Gulf country in the crisis”. Will the dismissal of Telerson change the Trump’s
administration attitude towards Kuwaiti Mediation efforts? The answer is that the dismissal will indeed, not
only affect the parties of the crisis but is also a great setback for Kuwait’s mediation efforts (Which Tellerson
himself was comfortable with). 20 At the same time, the commentaries of analysts, politicians, and journalists
published in some newspapers and foreign websites should not be neglected: “the Gulf conflict has nothing to
19
See Bloomberg News and BBC Arabic March 13, 2018.
20
See http://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity.
do with the dismissal of Telerson”. 21

It is necessary to rule out the assumption that existing Kuwaiti mediation efforts take into account that its
future interests will be better served without putting all its eggs in one basket or placing its bet on one side or
another etc. It is also important to understand the future impact of these efforts, but will this assumption survive
the quick changes of events?
The Kuwaiti mediator may not rely heavily on the media statements that come from the parties to the
conflict. Repetitive statements that state that Doha is willing to negotiate are met by the UAE foreign minister,
Abdullah Bin Zayed’s assertions that the “four countries are keen on ending the Gulf crisis as soon as possible”.
There is also the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia (al-Jabir) and his statement about the willingness of the
boycott countries to negotiate with Qatar and that “the military solution is not an option”. 22 The Kuwaiti
mediator realizes that these media statements were not followed by practical actions; this is not new, although it
could contribute to the growth of the crisis. It should be taken into consideration that Kuwait’s efforts are not
treated with doubt and suspension, unlike other Gulf efforts. For example, Omani efforts are mostly unwelcome.
The Saudis previously accused Masqat of affecting national security and economically cooperating with Tehran.
Moreover, old feuds between Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat could affect the way Saudis and Emiratis deal
with Oman; they think Oman is on Qatar’s side because it has stayed close to Doha since the beginning of the
crisis. 23
The gap between the demands of the various parties and the conditions for the re-establishment of
relations through negotiation is growing. Some concerned parties are maximizing the issues because
lengthening the period of the crisis could lead to political and economic gains. We can say that the acceptance
of Kuwaiti mediation by all the parties is considered an opening to a solution, not a final one. All the parties
should accept this intervention which will lead to concessions and compromises and even dictations and
conditions needed until a solution and settlement are achieved. Mediation is a path that all the parties (victor
and loser) agreed on under the framework of the Gulf institute.
Conclusion
The vision Kuwait has had for its mediation in foreign political efforts has been the same for centuries.
The nature of this mediation is bound to the abilities of the current political system and its historical heritage
and what is has to offer, impartially, for all of the parties in a conflict.
We realize that Kuwaiti mediation when we analyze it is leading to success. This success was expressed in
the earlier statements of the Amir of Kuwait, when he said, “We received a response from Qatar and it is ready
for negotiation” and that “resolving the Gulf crisis is coming soon”. However, drastic changes have occurred
which led the Kuwaiti mediator to announce that he fears for the collapse of the Gulf House!
How then to predict the chaotic future of the crisis? The author will not force the opinions on anyone but
convinces that Kuwait is performing its most vibrant role at this stage. The success of the Kuwaiti efforts and
its ability to continue them is determined by two factors:
1. To mitigate or neutralize the demands that effect sovereignty and impose trusteeship on any party.
21
For example, the British site Middle East I.
22
This statement was made by the Saudi Foreign Minister on the Egyptian TV program “This Capital” on November 2017.
23
When we use the term “internal” we mean the Arab family and the GCC in particular. That is why Kuwait seems to be the most
neutral of states to deal with the crisis even more than the US or the Europeans.
2. The mediator’s ability to maintain and sustain itself on the basis of realistic considerations depends on
the flexibility of the situations and historical experience. However, efforts, until now, have not made any
progress in resolving the issue and changing any static attitudes. What matters is that this historical legacy is
still present in the mind of the Kuwaiti decision-maker and will continue to be inherited and practiced. It will
work under the same ideology and at the same level of practicality and effectiveness.
This is probably what was hinted by the Kuwaiti decision-maker when he noted that “history, the people
of the gulf, and the next Arab generations will not forgive those who contribute to escalating the Gulf conflict,
even if it was only by means of a single word”.
References
Al-Din, B. (1987). Abbas al-Khususi. Dirasat fi Tarikh al-khalij al-Arabi al-hadith wa-al mu’asir, 1, 104.
Al-Nabahani, (1923). Al ToHfa al-Nabhaniya in the History of the Arabian Jazeera (2nd edi.). Cairo: Al-Mahmoudiya Press.
Burn, J. (n.d.). Discovering the Arabian Jazeera. (Q. Qal’aji, Trans.). Riadh: Al-Faghiriya Publications.
Qal’aji, Q. (1962). Adwa’ ‘alla tarikh al-Kuwait. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi.
Sa’id Idris, M. (2000). Al-Nizam al-Iqlimi lil-khalij al-‘Arabi. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-Arabiyya.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.10.003
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
SCO and Cybersecurity: Eastern Security Vision for Cyberspace
Bruna Toso de Alcântara

Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil
Cyberspace is presenting not only new challenges for states but also new opportunities for power projection. Thus,
analyzing how non-Western perspectives have been developed around this subject becomes relevant to understand
some dynamics of contemporary international relations. In this way, in order to understand how China and Russia
have been behaving in this area, the present paper seeks, through a constructivist approach based on the perspective
of the regional complexes, to develop an exploratory research toward the existence of an Eastern regional strategic
thinking to cybersecurity, materialized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). To achieve this objective,
the paper will use the qualitative document analysis as a method, seeking not only to verify if such Eastern thought
for cyberspace is cohesive within the organization, but also to explain what the implications for international
society of this thought are.
Keywords: Cyberspace, SCO, Security
Introduction
Established in 2001, and as an evolution of the Shanghai Five Group, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) becomes a relevant institution in the Eastern scenario, as it establishes a link between
Russia and China, not only with Central Asian countries (i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan) but also, and more recently, with South Asia, through the incorporation of India and Pakistan.
Therefore, its relevance comes not only from its size, as it comprises about 40% of the world’s population
and its economic weight, accounting for 20% of world GDP (Harada & Yamada, 2017), but also from its own
constitution, which differs from other Western military alliances. This difference emerges since SCO: (1) goes
beyond security issues; (2) embraces the cultural and political diversity of its members; (3) operates by
consensus; and (4) originated from the necessity over the border and regional affairs management in the
post-collapse of the Soviet Union (Bin, 2013).
In this sense, being an organization that congregates independence and interdependence, it is natural that
several international issues and threats are perceived in a proper way by the SCO. Moreover, given its
geopolitical position, it involves nuclear powers and states with a great international projection into the power
table. This ends up shaping much of the SCO orientations, especially towards security, including cyberspace.
Cyberspace gains importance in this context once one considers that critical infrastructures 1, whether
Bruna Toso de Alcântara, Ph.D. candidate in the Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI), Economic
Sciences Department, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.
1
The connection between physical and virtual means occurs through Industrial Control Systems, used in large-scale industrial
processes, as is the case of processes that maintain critical infrastructures. In addition, Industrial Control System technologies are
often employed in infrastructure industries “to allow a single control center to manage multiple sites” (Shea, 2004, p. 3).
550 SCO AND CYBERSECURITY: EASTERN SECURITY VISION FOR CYBERSPACE
wired or not2, are attached to it. Thus, cyberspace has a direct impact on the flow of information and the
maintenance of these infrastructures, being relevant within SCO scope when considering the energy and
transport sectors that interconnect its members. In this way, thinking about cybersecurity and defense is a step
towards both the security of national information and the maintenance of SCO itself in its physical or virtual
media.
In this sense, this paper seeks to develop an exploratory research toward the existence of an Eastern
regional strategic thinking to cybersecurity, materialized by the SCO. To achieve this objective, the paper will
use a constructive approach based on the perspective of the regional complexes (Buzan & Weaver, 2003).
Additionally, it will use as a method, the qualitative document analysis, seeking not only to verify if such
Eastern thought for cyberspace is cohesive within the organization but also to explain what implications for
international society of this thought.
Geopolitics of Central Asia and SCO

Based on the assumptions that a region if formed beyond geographical boundaries―being constructed
through interdependence and its interactive recognition both internally and externally (Algappa, 2003, p. 25)
and that security matters come from speech acts, that is, the idea of threats arises through a social process of
securitization―it is feasible to use the concept of Buzan and Waever (2003, p. 44) of Regional Security
Complexes (RSC) in the area covered by the SCO: the Asian one. After all, an RSC is “a set of units whose
major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another”. In addition, an RSC can be transformed and
defined by two types of relationships: the balance of power which gives the tone of the polarity of the system
and the pattern of friendship and enmity, generated by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions
(Buzan & Waever, 2003).
In this sense, SCO encompasses both central and southern Asia with its effective members. However, in
this paper, we will focus on the central region since it was part of the core of the Organization and its states
participated in formal discussions on the cybersecurity in the mid-2000s. Thus, what is important to note in the
Central Asian region is a balance of power among China, Russia, and the United States, where the patterns of
friendship and enmity involves a former Soviet’s power space which, more recently, depends on Chinese
material capabilities for its development and at the same time suffers from external security interferences from
the United States.
Roughly speaking, the SCO attracts the attention of Russia, China, and the United States given the energy
importance of the central Asian region, as well as its natural representation as a bridge between the Middle East
and the rest of Asia―facilitating, for example, the displacement of terrorists. Hence, on the one hand, there is a
US oscillation towards the region, being more prominent after September 11 and recently, according to Bin
(2003), more cooperative with the SCO which seems to give the tone of ideologies and strategic thoughts of the
central countries towards the region. And on the other hand, there is an intern dynamic of the Organization
materialized by a dual engine encompassing Russia with greater security responsibility and China with greater
economic responsibility.
On the Chinese side, the country’s influence on the Organization is growing in scope, extrapolating
2
Wired means refers to those based on fiber optics, telephone cables, and coaxial cables, as well as non-wired and satellite
signals and signals that propagate through electromagnetic waves (Fernandes, 2015, p. 607, my translation).
SCO AND CYBERSECURITY: EASTERN SECURITY VISION FOR CYBERSPACE 551
non-security issues and creating a slight Russian animosity in the sense of region control. According to Guang
(2013, p. 26), the Chinese influence is projected in the: (1) formulation of theoretical guidelines; (2) the
promotion of institutionalization; and (3) the financial support for large projects among the central Asian
countries. This movement facilitates the pursuit of national interests for China, including the construction of a
stable and secure region for the implementation, for example, of its One Belt One Road project (i.e., new Silk
Road), while allowing the country’s conduct of a multilateral diplomacy and the development of political,
cultural, security, and economic ties with Central Asia. These directives directly influence the heart of
friendship or enmity links within the region.
Russia, on its side, does not want to lose its historical influence zone, seeking to soften Chinese influence
with initiatives, such as the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and the maintenance of
Moscow’s power over the Eurasian Economic Community (Bin, 2013, p. 49). In addition, the country seeks to
maintain its integration plans within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and therefore, according
to Danilovich (2013, p. 34), unlike China, it does not act unconditionally for the development of SCO, taking
special care with the presence of other powers in the region.
Thus, this same security mix of influences presents itself in the cyber sector, which in spite serving
national objectives, becomes complementary for the construction of a coherent discourse in the area of
cybersecurity within the SCO.
Cybersecurity and China

The notion of Chinese cybersecurity differs from the Western one by understanding not only the technical
security of networks but also the very content of the Internet, so they prefer in their documents to use the
concept of information security (信息安全) rather than cybersecurity. In this sense, according to Lindsay (2015,
p. 11), the country has developed a legal and institutional framework more focused on building a censorship
and surveillance infrastructure (i.e., the Great Firewall of China) than coordinating technical standards and
enforcement mechanisms. In this way, they can better defend against imagined threats, such as terrorism,
separatism, and extremism, rather than crime or cyber espionage.
This defensive perception is replicated in the SCO, not only because it allows greater scope for combating
the three evils, but also because it fits into the Chinese International Strategy for Cooperation in Cyberspace, of
2017. This strategy foresees as its main objectives:
(1) safeguard sovereignty and security;
(2) develop a system of international rules;
(3) promote fair Internet governance;
(4) protect legitimate rights and interests of citizens;
(5) promote cooperation in the digital economy;
(6) build a platform for cyberculture exchange (China, 2017).
These objectives would be based on 04 principles (i.e., peace, sovereignty, shared governance, and shared
benefits) which demonstrate a vision of inequality towards the West, especially the United States, regarding the
control of flows of cyberspace (Mckune, 2015, p. 266).
In addition, by allowing a defensive use for “imagined” threats, the country is able to enforce its principle
of active defense in cyberspace. This allows greater guarantee of security of national infrastructures and
networks, as the National Defense Strategy of 2006 states:
China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance
with the state’s overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to
make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed
forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century. (China, 2006, Section II para 2)
In this sense, it is possible to see Chinese influence in the SCO. The country is using it as a platform to
achieve national goals, following a line of thought that merges security with development, and which is
replicated within SCO strategies. This replication can be seen through the declaration of Xi Jinping in
2014―during the Group’s first meeting Central Security and Computerization of the Internet―when he
mentions that “No internet safety means no national security. No informatization means that there is no
modernization” (Panda, 2014, para 6).
Cybersecurity and Russia

In a similar way to China, Russia understands cybersecurity as information security. Moreover, Russia’s
Information Security Doctrine (Доктрина информационной безопасности), created in 2000, is the most
relevant document for the Central Asian region, as according to doctrine:
The state’s interests in the information sphere consist of creating conditions for harmonious Russian information
infrastructure development and for the exercise of the constitutional rights and freedoms of man and the citizen with
respect to receiving and using information to ensure the inviolability of the constitutional system, the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Russia, and political, economic and social stability; the interests of the state also consist of the
unconditional maintenance of law and order and in the promotion of equal and mutually advantageous international
cooperation. (Rússia, 2000, Section I.1.para 5)
In addition, in a 2013 document entitled “The Basic Principles of the Federative Republic of Russia in the
field of Information Security for 2020”, there is a need for engagement with the area within the SCO, on a
bilateral and multilateral basis of dialogues (Russia, 2013), including advancing the template of the agreement
in the area of information security among members (Russia, 2013, p. 5). Objectives that, on the one hand,
become tangible in Central Asia due to its dependency on the Russian digital infrastructure, as according to
Maness and Valeriano (2015, p. 88), the majority of the Internet, the traffic that comes in and out of the country
passes through the Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) or by the FSB. On the other
hand, these objectives emerge against Chinese interconnection projects in the region.
In this sense, what is observed is that Russia in general, while advocating multilateral dialogue in the
cyber field, aims to maintain its security control over the region, reinforcing the idea of the Commonwealth of
Independent States and the Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), not only in the basic principles document for
2020, but also in the National Security Strategy for 2020, when it is stated that:
The development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States is a priority direction of Russian foreign policy. Russia will seek to develop the potential for regional
and subregional integration and coordination between the CIS Member States, first in the Commonwealth, as well as the
CSTO and EvraZEs, which exert a stabilizing influence on the overall situation in the regions on the border with the CIS.
(Russia, 2009, p. 5)
Cybersecurity and SCO

The SCO took its ideas of respect to sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, equality
and mutual respect in the fulfillment of international norms (without double standards) and the fight against the
three evils (i.e., separatism, extremism, and terrorism) to the cyber realm. In fact, it is interesting that in line
with Chinese and Russian security visions, the SCO proposes information security as equivalent to what
Westerners call cybersecurity, embodied in the Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of
the SCO on Cooperation in the Field of Guarantee of International Information Security, signed by China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
The Agreement on the Information Security Area was created in 2009, following the repercussion of cyber
attacks in Estonia (2007) and during the conflict in Georgia (2008). And, in its second article, it identifies the
following threats:
(1) the development and use of weapons of information and preparation to undertake information warfare;
(2) information terrorism;
(3) information crime;
(4) use of dominant position in cyberspace to the detriment of interests and security of other states;
(5) dissemination of information harmful to political systems;
(6) natural and/or human threats to safe and stable operations of the global and national information
infrastructure (SCO, 2009, p. 203).
Thus, in addition to the ideas of the SCO embedded in these perceptions, a criticism is made of the
Internet governance pattern centered in the United States, since the country has 10 of the 13 root name servers
in the world (Pollpeter, 2015, p. 147). Definitions of war and information terrorism―in the annexes to the
document―becomes very close to Sino-Russian visions, bearing at the same time the influence of a multilateral
approach and mutual trust (SCO, 2009, p. 204). Also, there is the proposition of international engagement in
the debates on cybersecurity/information infrastructure (SCO, 2009, p. 204).
This international engagement can already be seen in two moments within the scope of the United Nations.
The first was on September 12th , 2011, when four members of the SCO (i.e., China, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan) presented a draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations
General Assembly (i.e., A66/359), which was rejected. The second moment was in 2015 (i.e., A69/723), when
six SCO members, presented a new draft of the code to the UN General Assembly, which was also rejected.
This rejection was given based on a perception of excessive state control ideas for cyberspace. However, it is
important to highlight that the document also offered an approach of equal rights within a new international law
framework, suited (i.e., specific) for the cyber challenges, hence presenting an opposite view of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) regarding international law, since NATO advocates for the use of the
current developed international law framework, with minor adaptations―proposed in the Tallinn Manual made
by the NATO Center for Excellence in Cybernetic Co-operation and Defense (CCDCOE).
Final Considerations
Information security is relevant to SCO members since practical implications in the physical world,
especially in the energy and transport infrastructures that interconnect the region, are possible. Likewise, in
light of the present paper, it can be said that although there is a clash between two powers in the Asian RSC,
covered by the SCO, there is a cohesion of thought and similar international goals. In other words, there is a
thought, at least in the hardcore of the Organization, which has a structured cybersecurity project.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that there is a difference between the conception of cybersecurity and
information security, and that information security is a proposal that seems to rebound the Soviet collective
memory of the need for strong and centralized state control since it is up to the State to secure the content of
cyberspace. Therefore, even if this fact could lead to a possible breach of international rights in relation to
freedom of expression and privacy, it seems that in the eyes of the East this would be the best way to balance
power in cyberspace.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is a clash of Sino-Russian influences on the Asian region
reaching the cyber arena, but in a complementary way. Additionally, they go against the preponderance of the
North American power projection in cyberspace at the same time the countries search for already consolidated
organizations, such as The United Nations, to propose new models of international legislation in the digital
field.
References
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.10.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Function of University Culture in the Era of Development and

Integration Approach From the Reality of Vietnam
Huynh Quoc Thang

Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
In essence, universities are part of the national education system and university culture is a “subculture” of the
national culture. In the era of development and integration, the existence of the university network therefore
certainly has a dialectical relationship with objective requirements both in terms of education and culture—the rule
of laws and inevitable conditions for that existence and development, is the basic content of the university cultural
function. It includes general functions (social and cultural functions) related to the location, nature, characteristics
of the university in social life and is relevant both to the present, the past, and the future; specific functions
(educational organizational functions) related to teaching, learning, scientific research, management
organization—direct activities for the existence and development of the university itself as an educational
institution. The article is approached from the reality of Vietnam and based on the perspective of Culturology
(combining Pedagogics and some other disciplines) in order to initially analyze and clarify the specific contents of
these functional relations, especially about the interaction effect from those functions.
Keywords: university culture, functional relations, higher education
Introduction
The paper is made and developed from a speech to the requirements of an international scientific
workshop entitled “Academic culture of Vietnam’s higher education in the era of development and integration”
organized by the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh
City on April 27, 2018. The database for the essay is based on the current reality of Vietnam, a country with a
tradition of culture and education for ancient. Based on the common educational orientations that have been
developed with the world’s major experiences in education, the content of the paper focuses on the facets of the
university’s cultural function as a cultural and educational entity of strategic importance in many aspects,
especially in the context of the current development and integration of Vietnam.
Some Concepts
Function and Functionalism
The notion of function is referred by the social sciences, especially Sociology, Anthropology, and later
Cultureology; it talks about “The ability of something, what it can do” in a particular relationship of an object
as an entity that has a certain character and role in the reality of cultural and social life. Loss of that “ability”
Huynh Quoc Thang, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
FUNCTION OF UNIVERSITY CULTURE 557
can lead to the risk of functional disorder, meaning that the existence of social entities become meaningless
(loss of functional basis). Thus, functional theory or functionalism is the system of theoretical views or
methods of analysis of social research, primarily by analogy based on social function as already to speak. It has
long been a word in ancient Greek thought and the ancient East, later the social philosophy of the
Enlightenment, especially in the minds of 19th century and 20th century sociologists. Typical of this period
was H. Spencer (1820-1903) with a theoretical basis for “structural-functional” theory and E. Durkheim
(1858-1917) with a social perspective as an organic whole of a body mobilized by “function” of each part
constitutes a “social organism” or “social institution” operated by “necessity needs for survival” ... By the early
20th century in the United Kingdom and the American, functionalism reached a common position, accepted as
a foundation of modern sociological reasoning until the years before and after World War II with two distinct
tendencies, the “Individual functionism” of B. Malinowski (1884-1942) and “Structural functionism” of R.
Brown (1881-1955).
The development of these theories until the second half of the 20th century was somewhat fragmented but
by the 1980s; it was revived with the “Neo-functionalism” school on the basis of improving existing theories to
better fit the demands of contemporary society. Most recently, functionalism has continued to evolve, for
example, the “System and Multidisciplinary Theory of Modern Functionalism: Static Functionality” by I.
Even-Zohar (1939- ). The results of the study as presented by the sociologists or the anthropology (culture)
seen on the whole can now be considered as one of the reference bases for the cultural approach “on the level
of the ontology” in both directions “culture is understood and studied as a whole organic system” and “culture
(or cultural phenomenon) is first explained as an ideal object” or “observation see the parts and structural
stability as well as parts and structural transformation in culture” (Ro Din, 2000, pp. 272-273).... This is also
the main direction used by the author in the article because it suits the object of study which is about university
culture.
School (University) Culture and the Function of University Culture
The term “school culture” appeared in some Western countries around the early 1990s and initially had
research centers in the United States and Australia. In fact, “school culture” includes the content of the organic
relationship between culture and education, a social phenomenon that has existed for thousands of years before
school models came into being in Eastern countries (Middle East, Egypt, China ...) as well as in the West
(Greece, Rome ...) and in Vietnam (forms of teaching in villages and in the Temple of Literature ...). In terms of
terminology, the cultural-educational relationship begins with the concept of “culture” originating from
“cultura” in Latin, then “culture” in English, French with meaning “cultivated” material, spiritual and about
human personality. Accordingly, a great function of culture is education and vice versa; the important function
of education cannot be to contribute to cultural development. In essence, culture (including its educational
function) is the process of self-promotion along with the development of human consciousness in order to take
over cultural values. At the same time, education is also the active activity of self-awareness of people mainly
to impart knowledge, experience...thereby contributing to the development of national culture and humanity.
From a historical perspective, cultural history associated with human history, culture came into being as
soon as humans formed and developed with the development of human society and humanity. In the meantime,
education appears later and narrower as an activity to transmit knowledge and experience through a variety of
modes, particularly teaching and learning. On the whole, education itself is in fact a specific part of a cultural
558 FUNCTION OF UNIVERSITY CULTURE
activity in the sense that it is a conscious activity of individuals and societies in the same way as C. Marx has
been said that “the production, distribution, consumption of cultural values” and all aim to “directly contribute
to the realization of the intrinsic strengths of the human person, and self-realization” (Kogan & Barsuk, 1982, p.
40).
In this sense, “school culture” is considered “a special human, social and historical operating environment.
Depending on the educational philosophy of each age or country, one can build different structures ...” (Trung,
2010, p. 35). On the whole, those are the values, material, and spiritual inheritance created and accumulated in
the process of construction and operation of the education system in general and each school in particular. More
specifically, it is a system of cultural values embedded in the academic-cultural space of the school as an
educational cultural institution, including the organization, material-technical conditions and social
relationships including school-students, schools-families-students, and schools-society-students in which the
teacher is the main actor and the student is the object center. And so university culture is a part of school
culture, along with the characteristics of higher education; it all contributes to the common goal of building the
culture and education in the nation and humanity. Accordingly, the function of university culture is essentially
related to/derived from social needs and has an organic and interrelated relationship to assert roles, positions,
and capacities. For it is the realization of the twin objectives of “education-culture, culture-education” in all
practical activities of universities in general and of specific universities in particular.
General Function (Social-Cultural Function) of University Culture

As an important part of national education, university culture will exist as a cultural and social entity that
is attached to all the development processes of the nation and beyond humanity through its particular social
functions, first of all those functions which directly relate the social requirements directly or indirectly to the
school.
Cultural Exchange and Acculturation, Preservation and Promotion of Cultural Values
As a “subculture” of the national culture as well as the culture of the whole world, university culture can
be seen as an integral part of the national culture and human culture. In the general trend of deepening
globalization, with more and more international teaching content, international research cooperation
increasingly developed exchanges of teachers and students more and more among the countries..., so there are
opinions “Universities are part of global cultural, industrial and social integration” (Arnold, 2008). That is true
of reality and, moreover, it has become a major direction of the motto of most universities in the world. The
introduction to the University of Bordeaux on the internet clearly states the slogan: “The University of
Bordeaux is a privileged place of creativity, exchange and diffusion of culture, connected with the fundamental
mission of training and research” 1. For Vietnam this is a strategic issue that has been confirmed in the general
viewpoints and guidelines on education. Resolution No. 29-NQ/TW dated November 4, 2013 of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 2 on basic and comprehensive renovation of education and
training has clearly stated: “Renovation of the education system in the direction of opening ... Standardization
and modernization of education and training. Encourage, actively integrate internationally to develop education
and training...” (2013). The philosophy of “Comprehensive education, Liberation and Multiculturalism” of the
1
Original: “L’université de Bordeaux est un lieu privilégié de création, d’échange et de diffusion de la culture, en lien avec ses
missions fondamentales de formation et de recherche”. https://www.u-bordeaux.fr/; https://www.u-bordeaux.fr/Campus/Culture.
2
The 8th Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (XI) on November 4, 2013.
University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City can also be
considered as one of the proof of such necessities. The building and development of university culture should
promote “openness”, that is, the process of “cultural exchange and acculturation”, in order to make the cause of
development. The culture and education of each university is the dynamic process of absorbing new things in
order to continuously change the quality in the direction of advancing to meet the requirements of life and on a
part with modern times.
Because of the general requirements mentioned above, the preservation and promotion of cultural values
of the nation and humanity are also a central issue during the process of building and developing the university
culture. The nature of the problem is due to:
i) The school is a place to preserve and transmit the values of human culture; ii) The school is the place where new
classes of people are cultivated, the owners preserve and create culture for the future; iii) The school is a place where
people (people who teach with learners) work together to achieve cultural goals, in cultural ways, on cultural means, in the
cultural environment. Representing each region, region and locality. (Huan, 2011)
Accordingly, one side of university culture should be aimed at both the modern world and the preservation
of traditional values of Vietnam, such as the spirit of “Honor the teacher and respect the moral” and “The
virtuous and talented man is the elite of the nation”... are cultural traditions—education is very meaningful for
today’s school culture. At the same time, on the other hand, university culture also has to pay attention to
preserving and promoting all the traditional and cultural heritage of its own school, which is “the set of norms,
values and beliefs, rituals, symbols, and traditions that have been built over a long period of time that affect the
minds, motives and actions of members of the school” (Peterson & Deal, 2009, p. 221).
Top Educational Center
This is in line with both social education (extracurricular education) in general and school education in
particular. For school education, unlike previous levels of “general education” for young people, higher
education courses are designed to train “bachelors”. It means directly contributing to the development of
“adults” who have the capacity of citizenship and self-sufficiency to be able to master their lives. Further, it is a
postgraduate program that contributes to the training of highly qualified people and the ability to undertake
intensive research in the fields of science and life. For such a purpose and demand, university culture cannot be
matched by the standard of a “higher education” or “academic education” in the same way as Philippe De Lara,
a lecturer in Philosophy and Political Science at the University of Paris II, said: “University culture consists of
a mixture of encyclopedias and particularities of research being made” (Lara, 2018) 3.
Transfer of Science and Technology—Training and Building Human Resources for Comprehensive
Development of Society
In essence, education is a form of transmitting knowledge culture, experiences, and achievements of
civilized science and technology between generations. It is about “vertical”, which from “horizontal” education
can also be a pathway, effective way to transfer technology between social subjects within the country or wide
with other countries in the world. This issue of reality has been viewed as an indispensable part of building and
developing university culture in the current context. It was noted by S. Arnold, director of Cambridge Partners,
3
Original: “la culture universitaire consiste dans une synthèse entre la totalisation encyclopédique et la singularité de la recherche
en train de se faire”; Leblog de Philippe De Lara: Qu’est-ce que la culture universitaire? http://blog.educpros.fr/philippedelara/
2009/11/14/qu’est-ce-que-la-culture-universitaire/.
an education consultancy firm in Sri Lanka and Australia, when it comes to “Higher education in the new
context, the global economy, science and technology, the environment, the role of universities in education and
skills development, the transfer of research and teaching labor, graduates, recognition of degrees, transnational
university degrees are increasing among nations, regions ...” (Arnold, 2008). The problem is not just the
increase in the use of computers and the internet in teaching and learning but also the achievements of science
and technology which will contribute to changing the quality of education, teacher qualifications, and academic
needs of students in universities. This is why universities are increasingly interested in domestic and
international joint ventures, while paying close attention to strengthening cooperation with local businesses and
authorities, quickly transfer knowledge, technical and scientific achievements in technology with the
knowledge and skills more and more in line with the actual needs.
Moreover, the highest goal of university culture in the present period is to contribute to the training of
individuals so that they can keep up with the trend of progressive society increasingly demanding human
development in both technical level, cultural needs, and aesthetic taste ... because of such requirements, the
content and methods of the training programs in the university must be both multidisciplinary
(multi-knowledge) as a basic foundation in combination with specialized career orientation (depth) to a certain
degree and must pay attention to the goal of comprehensive education “mind, virtue, beauty” including “Role
of education in ensuring the psychological and physical development of students is a common trend” (Rhoda,
2008). In the same spirit, Resolution 29-NQ/TW on fundamental and comprehensive reform of education and
training has identified the target. “Educating the Vietnamese people to develop comprehensively and bring into
full play the potentials and creativity of each individual; love the family, love the country, love the people; live
well and work effectively ...” (2013). On that basis, this Resolution sets out the tasks and solutions:
To renovate the program in order to develop the learner’s capacity and qualities, to harmonize the moral, intellectual,
physical and aesthetic aspects; teaching people, teaching words and vocational training ... Focus on personality education,
ethics, lifestyle, legal knowledge and civic consciousness. Focus on the fundamental values of culture, traditions and
morals, quintessence of human culture ... Strengthening physical education, knowledge of defense, security and vocational
guidance ... (2013)
On the whole, university culture is the “dynamic culture” aimed at the highest goal which is to contribute
to the development of human beings comprehensive development, harmony in relation to national culture and
humanity, transmission both the present and the future.
Private Function (Educational Organization Function) of University Culture—Culture of

Teaching, Learning, Scientific Research and Management Organization
These are functions that have a general and consequential relationship to the general functions (cultural
and social functions) that are primarily influenced by the outside of university culture as outlined above. It is a
function of the actual activities within each university because of the existence and development of each
institution through direct response to the needs of learners and the demands of society.
Culture of Teaching-Learning
This function is first of all directly related to teachers/educators and students/learners, who are central
actors who have a dialectical relationship with each other and are critical to survival and the development of the
university culture itself. In that relationship, the role of teacher/educator as the subject matter of the
pedagogical-educational process in the school must be properly identified in relation to the student/learner who
is the central object/target. In fact, it is no coincidence that the “Honor the teacher and respect the moral” has
long been a profound cultural and educational tradition of Vietnam. This has a special cultural significance in
respecting and promoting the teacher in accordance with the morals of the Vietnamese people. The image of the
teacher is the image of morality, because the society needs to “moral” the need to have “teacher”, even “No
teacher you cannot succeed!”... From that common sense, even today there are many conditions for
self-learning in the spirit of “learning with the teacher cannot be with same friend” ... but one can still assert
that without good teachers, it is difficult to have good students and it is more difficult to have “better students
than teachers” according to traditional conception of Vietnam “The children are better than their father that is
fortune”! Building a good teacher team is important because it is not only “have knowledge and understanding
of the subject; have the skills and experience to impart knowledge and understanding to students effectively
under different teaching conditions...” (Minichiello, 2008) but also
good educators-pedagogists who have both basic and applied qualification, can help students acquire useful and
useful information and methods of scientific thinking to be able to step up in the process of self-study, self-research,
shaping the world view, human right. (Trung, 2010, p. 38)
Of course, the role and position of the teacher can only be realized and promote the practical effect in
relation to students/learners. After all, according to the purpose of every pedagogical-educational process which
is also of university culture, the student/learner is the ultimate goal. Thus, a common principle of modern
education in the world and the important content of education reform policy in Vietnam today are to take
learner-centered. Students/learners in the environment of the university culture must be the subjects who decide
the quality of learning, who are active in all learning and training to become people with cultural personality, in
order to adapt to the process of industrialization, modernization, and globalization, to initially be capable of
scientific research, striving to become talents and useful persons for the commune. Accordingly, every student
here should be considered as a specific personality that must be respected and promote every possibility of
independence, creativity (including unique personality) in a positive way, to be active without falling into the
extremes of individualism which is the very essence of the problem.
Culture of Scientific Research
Associated with the teaching and learning culture mentioned above, cultural issues in university research
are very important. It is a part of the scientific-practical value of university culture. To say that scientific value
refers to the objectivity of the laws of nature, society is perceived; the achievements of science and technology
are captured from many different angles and are well applied in the content of research, teaching, application
right in the process of building the school culture of the university itself. It is said that the practical value is
about the conditions, the actual situation, the orientation and practical goals, and the specific effect that the
training and research of the university should achieve. Combining these two aspects, the scientific basis-the
reality of university culture will be both a target and a real driving force for the development of universities in
general, education and training of each school in particular. In fact, the training disciplines of the faculties and
departments of the university must be based on the social recognition of specific results as evidenced by the
level and ability to apply the learning capital of student, learners in their success on the basis of meeting the
practical requirements of life takes place locally, in the country through teaching-learning associated with
scientific research. When the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University of
Ho Chi Minh City defined Vision (until 2030) “is a research university ..., is in the forefront of the social
sciences and humanities in Asia”, it is a commitment that research science is one of the measures that
contribute positively to confirm the position of the university in implementing the mission and objectives that
has its own definition.
Culture of Organization and Management
As a social entity, namely an educational institution, each university exists in reality through a system of
organization and an inclusive management process. Thus, university culture can be seen as a entity of
“organizational culture”. The organizational culture of a university is essentially a value system that creates
quality and efficiency in the development of mechanisms and relationships that create collective bonds tightly
and firmly embedded in the machinery general operation of the school. Among them, there are two main
subjects: students/collective learners and teachers/collective pedagogy. Especially for the collective learners in
the current situation of Vietnamese universities, organizational culture is very decisive “in order to build an
educational environment, a cultural environment, a special struggle of eliminating social evils, building a
healthy lifestyle, organizational advocacy and organizational building is still important” (Thang, 2010a, p. 41).
In the context of modern industrial society and market economy, it is no coincidence that university
culture can be seen as a model of “corporate culture” (cultural enterprise) or, more broadly, the “organizational
culture” as stated:
In essence, each school is an administrative organization-pedagogy. It’s a miniature world with structures, norms,
rules of behavior, values, strengths and weaknesses created by specific people of all generations. As an organization, every
school exists, more or less, a certain culture. (Huan, 2011)
Accordingly, the content of the management approach to building the university system in general and
the university culture in particular need to have appropriate methods. Professor Lee Sing Kong, director of the
National Institute of Singapore, said that in university management, the “Transactional Leadership” model with
a primary focus on keeping things going is needed. Transforms into “Transformational Leadership” in order to
focus on achieving “change in practice” in which it is important to both “shape the culture based on the
traditional organizational structure” and “Building a school culture involves actions that develop the standards,
values, beliefs of the school” (Kong, 2008) ... raises the issue: “The quality of the team is the name language
and efficiency of the school”, “Team development not only focused on the capacity of the team but also the
construction”, “The ability to change the flexibility to be able to develop more ability”, “Encouraging the
culture of innovation ... and support this process in their organizations without interfering with it”, “Awareness
and understanding of the school’s values and values are guided and proven by the leaders” (Minichiello, 2008).
Of course, the management of university culture is not without contradictions, but the most favorable condition
for “university autonomy” is the inevitable trend of the future. All aim at building a culture of university
management to become a “self-governing culture” both at the macro and micro levels.
Interactive Effectiveness Between the Functions of University Culture

In fact, all the functions of university culture always have an organic relationship with one another as a
unified entity. Each function will involve and relate the other functions to the end; all forming a whole contributes
to the overall consequence, the most direct of which is the interaction between the functions: social-cultural
function (general functions) with the educational function (the specific functions) of university culture to create
certain “effects” for the operation of each university in particular and the system of universities in general.
About the Effectiveness in Quality-Effect of Training
All social activities are purposeful. Education and training activities in schools with its social functions
and tasks, especially for the purpose of building university culture in the period of development and integration
today, are subjected to such high demands. That purpose for any university is precisely the urgent requirements
of the practice of building socio-economic life of each locality and the whole country. It becomes a force that
acts as a “red thread” throughout the objectives, content, training methods, and motivates all efforts to be led in
a certain direction; the highest is aimed at the quality and effectiveness of training necessarily attained as the
highest demonstration for university culture. All must start with quantity, but as Resolution No. 29-NQ/TW on
fundamental reform, comprehensive education and training has put the issue of “Transition of education and
training development mainly from numbers quality to focus on quality and efficiency, and meet quantitative
requirements”, which expresses the special meaning of science-practicality of the problem. Talking about
quality-effectiveness training refers to the main purpose and actual outcome of any educational process, in any
higher educational institution, with a certain university-building process, broadly speaking of school culture
throughout the whole national education system. Quality-effectiveness evaluation of training is a constant,
continuous, and very important task for every institution with different educational models in the education
sector. It is done in a variety of ways and eventually is often quantified into numbers that include statements,
evaluations of achievement or existence. On the basis of that, the objectives and measures are designed to
improve more and more quality and efficiency.
Of course, the size of the development (in terms of the total number of students, staff, technical facilities,
types of training ...) and the organizational system, subjects in particular, the school in general in each period
should also be concerned. But all of them must be in the right direction and suitable conditions and conditions
are always attached to the requirements to constantly improve the quality of training. This quality at the macro
level is now determined at the target training properly to reflect and meet the social needs, especially the
demand for human resources to contribute to building social life and the main economy, culture of the country
in the context of development and integration. The quality of the micro level is not only cultural capital
(knowledge, ideological, ethical, physical, ability to participate in national defense ...) and capital professional
(knowledge-professional skills ...) is transmitted and received the best through the process of active teaching
and learning in specific departments and disciplines to train people who can adapt well to the reality of
industrialization and modernization, to promote and develop their own occupations in the market economy,
professional skills, citizenship, and personality in the process of international integration....
The basic content of such training quality is really only one side of the problem. The other side is the
training effect, including: effectiveness in (the effects during training) that is the results of learning, training of
students, students at school and efficiency outside (the results after training) that is their ability to contribute
after graduation to the cause of development of social-cultural life with specific employment. As a result, the
quality and the effectiveness of the training though having their own content and position, are at the same time
a mutually consistent relationship, such as the two sides of a matter of high purpose with special requirements
related to the strategic goals of university culture in each specific period. It should be stressed here that,
although the quality of training is preceded by the pre-condition and the condition of the training effect, the
inter-disciplinary relationship between them is still dialectical and consistent contributing to the formation of a
core value system that creates a university culture. The relationship can be summarized as follows: To find the
effect of training must start from the quality of training and vice versa, because the effect must be quality. In
other words, without quality, it certainly cannot be said to be effective and that performance is a concrete
manifestation of quality; it is both a concurrent, purpose-orientated, and a motivating factor that constantly
contributes to the quality of every education and training process in the university in particular, for university
culture in general. In short, the quality-effectiveness training, the central factor of the sustainable development
of university culture is decided and shown first of all in the good resolution of the relationship between goals
and tasks of training together with the actual situation of the training, the results of the organization and
management of the operation of the functional sections and the stages of the training process from input to
output at all times of instrumental history accommodation on all fields of activity in the school.
About the Effectiveness in Postgraduate Training
In essence, postgraduate training is one of the important activities that affirms the nature of “higher
education, academic education” of universities, which is one of the evidence vivid and clear about the
relationship of specific functions of university culture. There may be qualifications; quality is not equal but
generally each master’s dissertation (Master), doctoral thesis (Ph.D.) that is serious research, valuable
experiments in the direction research and writing activities of individual learners with the help of the instructors
and the contribution of serious comments by members of the Graduation Council. Broadly speaking, each
thesis is a product of an educational background, a country’s scientific level, the result of a whole process of
training, teaching and learning, funding conditions, policy regimes, material and technical facilities for teaching
and learning during a specific training process ... All must be standardized in all three aspects: (1) Legality:
ensure compliance with the regulations and regulations on education and training in general, on the
organization of examinations in postgraduate in particular; (2) Scientific-practicality: Cognitive and living
processes aiming to dominate basic and specialized sciences, methods, and methodology to grasp the rules of
cognitive theory, creativity; and (3) Expertise: Each dissertation, thesis is protected, and each graduate
protection workshop is a deeper step in the different aspects of the specificity of each type of science/discipline
of occupation in particular....
Due to such requirements, the results of thesis quality, dissertation and the effectiveness of organizing the
dissertation thesis, the thesis is actually the quality-effective of the training postgraduate, an important
expression of the university culture of a particular university. Accordingly, the process of carrying out theses
and dissertations is the process of learning the method of thinking, reading, and solving academic problems in
order to improve the quality of professional theoretical and scientific in general. It is the process of discovering
the truth about subjects and occupational knowledge as well as the process of self-improvement of the scientific
capacity that no one can replace. In particular, facilitators contribute to training in the direction of methods,
encouraging and motivating independent, and creative thinking. The trainees are self-educated people with the
attitude, method, work plan, continuous effort self-discipline which is strictly planned in relation to the
instructor. Finally, the protection of postgraduate graduates from related procedures from procedural safeguards
to the regulations scoring and grading procedures...are all “standardized” to date. The higher quality and
effectiveness of the traineeship, content, and attitude in exchange are first and foremost in the content and form
of the dissertation text of the members of the Council which are judged scientifically in the whole of the
organization of protection in general (Thang, 2010b, pp. 10-13).
Conclusions
University culture is primarily a cultural space covering all major fields of activity established throughout
the history of the formation and development of each university and closely related to life of the society in the
present, in the past, and in the future. It is both a product of interactive relationships between external demands
that characterize the quality and effectiveness of the school, and it is also the result of regular activities with
specific tasks within the school to directly meet the needs of learners and society. On that basis, the relationship
of university culture in the whole of Vietnam’s culture in particular and with the culture and education of the
nation in general, in the context of globalization today, each activity in the school cannot be self-reliant in a
local sense, but it is always connected with other activities because of the common functions: the function of
university culture. These functions derive from social requirements, which are determinants of the specific
character and level of university culture of each particular university. At the same time, the organic relationship
and interactions between these functions can also be synthesized into positive effects for the development of the
university itself in particular, for university development in general through their specific activities. With that
in mind, it is perfectly possible to say that education can only be “the eternal category” as it has been and has
become a “top priority” as a standpoint. It has been confirmed that when it is truly standard, it is part of
national culture and humanity. In such an orientation, the consideration of the functions of “university culture”
and “school culture”, in particular the study of the well-functioning of the relationship of these functions in the
context of the cause of innovation and comprehensive development of higher education in particular, education
in Vietnam in general will be a strategic issue both in science and in practice.
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D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Arab Foreign Aid in the View of Islamic Faith
LI Yi
Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China
In the field of international development assistance, Arab foreign aid has become an indispensable component
because of its strength, proportion, and scope. Compared with traditional aid countries, Arab donor countries pay
more attention to the infrastructure construction and economic development indicators of recipient countries. In
addition to taking into account the needs of foreign policy and economic development, they also strictly adherence
to the Islamic teachings. This paper focuses on the analysis of Arab foreign aid from the perspective of religious
motives, which contains the most central part of Islam, such as Islam’s commitment to the ideal realm of
“goodness”, the “Worshipping Allah and benevolence” as the core values of its teachings, and the linking of
Muslim beliefs and good deeds. In concrete practice, Arab foreign aid is guided by the charitable concept of Islam;
it is committed to strengthening Arab solidarity, practicing the humanitarian spirit, and playing an increasingly
important role in the international aid system.
Keywords: Arab foreign aid, Islamic faith, South-South cooperation
In recent years, emerging economies are gradually becoming a new force behind international
development and co-operations. As economic development and humanitarianism lead to more and more
conflicts, South-South co-operation with equal and mutually beneficial results have attracted more and more
attention of the international community. The foreign aids from these emerging countries are taking place under
the framework of the South-South cooperation; their aid principles, policies, and ideals should keep in line with
the core concepts of the South-South cooperation; the ultimate goal is to promote common development of the
developing countries, and to promote the realization of the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable
Development Goals. In these countries, the affluent Gulf oil producing countries formed an Arab aiding
alliance, providing large sum of financial support to other Arab countries and developing countries. The Arab
Aids focus more about the infrastructure construction and economic development measures of the recipient;
comparing to traditional aids, the preaching of Islamism is also an important factor to consider, alongside
foreign policies and the needs of economic development. This article will analyze the foreign aids of Arab
countries through religious motives.
General Situation of Arab Foreign Aid

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are the main components of the Gulf Aid Alliance.
This article will focus on the first three Gulf countries as the information on Qatar is relatively limited.
LI Yi, Ph.D., associate research fellow, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai,
China.
568 ARAB FOREIGN AID IN THE VIEW OF ISLAMIC FAITH
Saudi Arabia Oversea Aid Programs

Saudi Arabia is the largest economic entity in the Arab world; it has an important part in global economic
management and development with its diversity, enormous oil reserves, and the oil dollars thus accumulated.
Saudi Arabia seized the chance to turn profits from oil into political weapons in the 1970s, and enhanced the
nation’s international influence as well as winning the oil war. During this period, Saudi has provided large
sum of aids to developing countries. When some countries experienced emergency situations like abnormal
weather, economic instabilities, and sudden fall into poverty, etc., Saudi often provided direct aid. For example,
to Algeria in 1980, Italy in 1980, Iran in 1978, Pakistan in 1975, and for the earthquake in Turkey in 1977;
helped Jordan to reconstruct after the flood and snow storm in 1980; assisted Somali in the fight against
poverty and drought; provided aids to support the development and government expenses of Yemen, Oman,
Tunisia, Nigeria, South Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Egypt, Lebanon, Djibouti, Sultan, and Syria. Moreover it also
loaned large sums to developed countries, including one billion loans to Japan and 200 million loans to France
(Paleslay, 1984, p. 25).
Saudi’s foreign aid programs consist of the institutions for policy making and execution on behalf of the
royal household. Report in 2015 shows, 604 loans a total of more than 47 billion Riyals have been provided to
more than 82 development programs and projects in 578 developing countries, since the founding of Saudi
Fund dor Development in 1974. 1 At present, Saudi invests 1.9% of its gross national income in oversea aids
every year, which is much higher than the 0.7% suggested by United Nation Development Program (UNDP).
By the end of 2016, the total sum of foreign aid has accumulated to 139 billion dollars, ranked 4th in the world.
Asia, especially mid-Asia, has always been an emphasis in Saudi’s aid program, as a result of its “Riyal
Diplomacy”. What Saudi lacks in military power, is made up by its economic strength, with its profound
religious heritage and rich oil reserves; Saudi won its place as the head of the Islamic World through multiple
Islamic diplomatic actions, like humanitarian support, religious propaganda and education. In a political forum
held by Saudi and Uzbekistan in 2012, both parties agreed that Saudi and other mid-Asian countries share
common interests in the fields of culture and humanitarianism, 2 which demonstrates the diplomatic results of
Saud’s oversea aids to mid-Asian countries.
Kuwait Oversea Aid Programs
Kuwait has always been a forerunner in the area of foreign aids amonst other Arab countries. Kuwait was
one of the few countries in the Gulf region, which were the first to be industrialized. After realizing both
industrialization and financial modernization, its national economy began to develope and diversify. Kuwait
has accumulated large amount of oil dollars using its advantagous oil resources and excellent modern oil
industry, which layed a strong foundation for it to implement aid programs. In the 1970s, many developing
African countries, which just declared independence, were in desperate need of external support to maintain
economic, social, and political stability. Kuwait drafted policies towards Africa under the framework of
Organization of African Unity (OAU), which were based on principles of universal equality, respect for
national constitution, and forbided any intervention in the internal affairs; it aims to solve conflicts through
negotiation, reconciliation, bilateral agreements, and international arbitration. Meanwhile Kuwait also supports
non-Alliance, international organizations, and the independence movements in Africa. These principles helped
1
Relevant data are retrieved from the official website, http://www.sfd.gov.sa.
2
“Uzbekistan—Saudi Arabia Relations Discussed in Tashkent”, http://www.azernews.Az/region/51514.html.
ARAB FOREIGN AID IN THE VIEW OF ISLAMIC FAITH 569
to promote co-operations between Kuwait and African countries, thus Kuwait Oversea Aid Programs have been
successfully implemented. The official statistic given by Kuwait amounts to 20 billion USD in aids between
1973 and 2008 (Li, 2017, p. 51), which is far higher than 0.7% of its gross national income (GNI).
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development is the main executor of Kuwaiti foreign aids. The Fund did
not stop granting loans even in the midst of the chaos of the Gulf War in 1990. During the occupation, the Fund
signed 11 new agreements, which value more than 330 million USD in total, to fund development programs in
other Arab and non-Arab countries (Turki, 2014, p. 425). On the other hand, the Fund also provides support to
Arab citizens, who are forced to leave their country because of wards. This charitable act at a country’s most
desperate moment has helped Kuwait to establish a profound relationship with the countries that received aids
from it. The Fund, apart from loans, also gave grants to foreign institutions or countries in need. These grants
cover all aspects of economic development of the recipients and the recipients come from all over the world.
Studies show that African countries south of the Sahara and heavily populated Asian countries are emphasized
in Kuwaiti foreign aid programs. Note that Kuwate was the first Arab countries to offer Chinese government
loans at discounted rate. By the end of 2015, the Fund provided China a total of 952 million USD in loans, to
be used in 37 middle to large sized projects in areas like infrastructure, education, health, agriculture, and
environments (Cheng, 2017), etc., which proved to be a strong support to the economic and social development
in the mid-west regions in China.
United Arab Emirates Oversea Aid Programs
United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) economic growth reached 6.1% between 2005 and 2010, which is 4.3%
higher than the average in the Gulf region, and even 5.3% higher than the global average (Neumayer, 2004, pp.
281-300). As UAE’s economy gradually developes, it becomes more focused on its diplomatic power and tries
to gain a higher status in the Gulf and Middle East with its oversea aiding schemes. As one of the important
sponsors of the global official development programs, UAE has provided funds totaling more than 255 billion
dirhams (70 billion USD), to over 100 countries worldwide by 2013 (Li, 2013, p. 196). According to the report
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2015, UAE’s total foreign aids were
32.339 billion dirhams (8.8 billion USD) in that year, which is 2.72% of its GNI and ranked No. 1 in the
world. 3
Oversea aid is an important element in its foreign diplomacy; rant aids (about one third of the total) and
loans (about two thirds of the total) are channelled to the recipients. The main charities include UAE
government, UAE Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, and UAE Red
Cross, etc. Emirates’ own charities and private institutions take up a smaller proportion. Unlike other Arab
countries, UAE has a clear foreign aid strategy: first of all, an effective decision making platform and a
complete and comprehensive archive; then help UAE to become a main aid sponsors worldwide; last but not
least, provide high quality, effective, transparent, and timely complementing services (Li, 2013, p. 197). Just
like the president of the UAE’s words,
Foreign aid is a core pillar in our foreign diplomatic policy. Because we believe, that our own wealth is not real,
unless it helped those in need, no matter where they are and no matter what their nationalities or faiths. 4
3
Relevant data are retrieved from the official website, http://www.oecd.org/dac/.
4
“Foreign Aid”, http://www.uae-embassy.org/about-uae/foreign-policy/foreign-aid-0.
UAE’s overall foreign aids have been increasing in recent yeasr, especially after the establishment of the Office
of Foreign Assistance (OCFA).
Religious Thoughts of Arab Foreign Aid

Islam is committed to achieving the ideal of perfectness. “By worshiper” and “doing good” link Muslim
faith and good deeds together, giving Islamic charity ideas and practicing a very unique and broad spirit and
philosophy. Islamic charity is the spiritual or material concern that Muslims personally or collectively give to
others. Its ultimate goal is to obey Allah’s intentions, to gain its joy, and to expect to gain happiness in this life
and afterlife. Under the stipulations of the Islamic Shariah, Islamic charities have established a lasting and
stable operating mechanism with zakats and charity (including Waqf System of Islamic Law) as the core, and
have become the ideological source of Arab foreign aid. It mainly includes four aspects: first of all it is
embodying the concept of Islamic charity; the second is embodying a systematic and normative construction;
thirdly, it advocates invisible funding; and fourthly, it encourages various forms of donation.
First of all, Islamic teachings advocate Muslim compassion and magnanimity. One of the important acts is
charity, which includes money, clothing, food, material, time, labor, service, knowledge, and technology. Islam
believes that the most direct manifestation of the fear of Allah is to give all forms of wealth that Allah has
bestowed to those who are in urgent need, and that the givers will also receive compensation and various kinds
of assistance. Although the alms giver, he received the rewards of Allah virtually, not only material and
spiritual gain, but also to avoid the current world disaster and Hell Penalty. The Holy Quran states: “For those
who give property for the Lord, like a farmer sowing a grain, and a grain of 100 grains per ear. Allah doubles
his reward, Allah is generous and omniscient” (2:261) (Ma, 1996). “The people, who give away their
possessions day and night, regardless of their ability, will enjoy the reward of their Lord. They will have no fear
and will not be troubled in the future” (2:274). The “Hadith” also discusses this issue. The Prophet Muhammad
said: “Alms! Even if you give someone a candied fruit, it will help you to avoid the punishment in the prison”
(Yu, 2009, p. 231). “Every Muslim should give alms. Even if he persuades others to do good things, and exhort
others to do bad things, is also a charity act” (2009, p. 232).
Moreover, Islamic charities have positive factors that respect the systematic and normative construction.
Like other religions, Islam guides Muslims to pursue justice and friendship, which is committed to eliminating
the gap between the rich and the poor, and does not admit individuals’ absolute rights to their own properties.
Not only that, but from the perspective of Islamic teachings, Islamic charities are a collective obligation with a
certain religious obligatory, not entirely personal and voluntary. The Holy Quran states that, “Wealth originates
from Allah, and the wealth of the rich has its own rational composition of the poor” (24:33). “The rich do good
is not only his duty but also the natural gift of the poor” (70:24). Caliph Oumeier (AD 592-644) had explicitly
emphasized that alms is not to help the poor, but to realize the rights of the poor included in wealthy property.
For example, the main aid agency development fund is similar to the Wagf system in the Islamic charity system,
which is the “reservation” of Allah’s ownership of all human wealth in the world, or the retention of part or all
of the wealth or the land and industry that can generate revenue value. It is used exclusively for religious and
social charities that comply with Islamic law. This system later developed into a special economic system, and
the related laws and regulations became the “Wagaf Law”. It can be seen that these Islamic provisions give
philanthropy a clear basis for religious jurisprudence, which has obvious mandatory meaning, and is very
similar to the “institutional aid” of modern society.
Once again, advocating invisible funding, but not advocating the promotion of Islam is another distinctive
feature of charity ideology. The Holy Quran states: “It is good if you openly give alms; it will be better if you
secretly give aid to the poor. This will eliminate some of your sins” (2:271). The teaching jurist further
elaborated on the religious doctrine of secretly doing good in this principle. They pointed out that
The right to give is your “accumulation” and your deposit in Allah which you should know. It does not require any
witnesses, because you know that secretly (what others don’t know) for Allah is more convincing than doing openness. It
is commendable that this alms only you and Allah know and will not be seen... this matter will only benefit you. (Zeng,
2012, pp. 76-82)
The formation and development of this idea is consistent with Islam’s advocacy for protecting the dignity of the
recipient. The Holy Quran stresses in many places that “secrecy is better”, respecting the recipient, and
prohibiting “blaming the grantee”, while “the highest principle of relief is to protect the dignity of the recipient”.
The prophet said that seven people on the resurrection birthday were shaded by Allah, and one of them was
“secretly giving away property, and his left hand did not know the right-hander” (Yu, 2009, p. 129) (The other
six are just officials, the youth who grew up in praying Allah, those who care about the mosque, the people who
cooperate or disassociate with each other for Allah, people say “I fear Allah” when being tempted by a
beautiful woman, prayer weep in silent to Allah). Islam promotes secrecy and good deeds, fully revealing the
main reasons why the Arab foreign aid is secretive and not transparent.
Eventually, Islam encourages various forms of donation. In addition to the donation of charitable statutes
and the donation of interest for banned obligations, there is also a more extensive donation known as affair,
which is performed in a very convenient and flexible manner, with money, behavior, and substance which can
become a donation carrier. In addition, there is a special form of charity: Wagf, which is a religious fund
organization (form) that benefits both long-term recipients and donators. These donations are based on
self-conscious and voluntary psychology, aiming at helping the poor and helping others. The Holy Quran says:
“You must not receive all goodness until you give away your loved things” (3:92). The “Hadith” also
emphasizes: People who do not love their brothers and only love themselves do not have faith. People who are
full whilst their neighbors are hungry are not believers. Regardless of the difficulties of removing a Muslim in
this world, Allah will remove his difficulties on Judgment Day. In this way, Islam encourages Muslims (this
life) to actively forge ahead and create wealth, and on the other hand, encourages them to vigorously promote
the spirit of the charity, alms to wealth, and builds good for future generations.
Under the guidance of religious doctrine, a large amount of Arab aid flows to countries dominated by the
Muslim population. Taking the Islamic Development Bank as an example, its main task is not only to provide
financial loans, but also to improve economic behavior in accordance with religious rules and to bundle aid and
religion to promote Islam. This model of assistance is similar to the Western model of traditional aid, that is,
the Christian organizations provide assistance and are labeled Christian. This can also explain why the Sudan
has always been the main target of Arab aid. The civil war between northern Sudan (mainly Muslim) and
southern Sudan (mainly Christian and primitive religious believers) began in 1955 (Jiang, 2004, p. 145). The
Sudanese civil war is the result and manifestation of the intensification and continuation of religious conflicts.
The inherently different political views of the two religions are the essential causes of the conflict between the
North and the South. And it also determines the difficulty of the solution to the conflict. Therefore, the Sudan
has always been considered to promote Islamic advancement to South Sudan, which is dominated by Christians
and atheists, through the implementation of Islamic law.
Humanitarian Spirit: The Basic Principles of Arabian Foreign Aid

Islam advocates that people should deal with interpersonal relations with benevolence, which means
human beings should show sympathy and mercy to each other and should help, love, and get along well with
others. It is against hostile acts, such as animosity, hurts, or even arms between humanity. According to the
Koran, we should do good to partners, kinsfolk, orphans, those in need, neighbors who are near, neighbors who
are strangers, the companion by your side (4:36). Islam sees helping the poor and the weak as righteous action
which includes love for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the
ransom of slaves (2:177). As a basic factor of religious practice for Muslim, non-Muslims can also be
beneficiaries of humanitarian aid (Zhang, 2016, p. 37). The Prophet has clarified that “helping the poor and
giving peace greetings to acquaintances and strangers is the most noble merits”, “People who bullies
peace-loving infidels are also bullying me”. So, helping and loving each other not only consists of the
theoretical basis of Islamic humanism. It is also a guideline for Arabian foreign aid.
Saudi Arabia is the largest country for humanitarian aid in the Middle East. It has long carried out these
programs through more than 70 international and local organizations such as the International Red Cross (IRC)
and the World Health Organization (WHO). In order to further coordinate resources and effectively push
forward the work of humanitarian aid, the government established the Salman King Relief and Humanitarian
Assistance Centre in May 2015. Until the end of 2016, the center has provided $600 million foreign aid,
benefiting 22 million people in 19 countries and has carried out 52 aid programs, covering various fields such
as aid supplies and security safeguard. In July 2014, the Saudi government has offered $500 million
humanitarian assistance for homeless Iraqis without regard to their religions, sects, or races. In 2015, it
provided various emergency aid for Yemen, including medical and sanitary products, drinking water and food,
which has totally reached $274 million and refugees, women as well as children are among its main
beneficiaries. In February 2016, Saudi Arabia voluntarily donated $59 million to United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It is reported that the Saudi government has
provided a total of $500 million unconditional assistance to UNRWA since its establishment. 5
Humanitarian assistance is a priority for Kuwait’s foreign aid. For example, it offered $5 million
assistance for Pakistan in 2010 and 20 tons of relief supplies to Somalia in 2011. Since the outbreak of the
Syrian civil war, Kuwait has been a role model in providing assistance to Syrians and its neighbor countries.
Kuwait held two UN assemblies for donations to Syria in 2013 and 2014. The assemblies have collected $3.4
billion, among which Kuwait donated $800 million (Shukr, 2015). The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development (KFAED) has also offered $50 million of help for Syria’s neighbor countries, especially Jordan
and Lebanon, for relevant aid programs for Syrian refugees: About $23 million was used to finance the
Jordanian government and emergency aid programs determined by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) (Shukr, 2015).
Foreign aid of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) consists of three parts: development assistance,
humanitarian assistance, and charitable assistance, in which the humanitarian one makes up 7%. 6 During the
Iraq war, UAE proposed to maintain Iraq’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity and suggested that the UN
should play an important role in restoring Iraq’s security and in its reconstruction. In 2014, its humanitarian
5
“Saudi Humanitarian Aid Has Developed Rapidly”, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201612/20161202158397.shtml.
6
“UAE Aid Organisations Show Compassion to Refugees”, The National, January 21, 2015.
assistance was mainly used to help Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and the Kurdish region in Iraq. In May,
the UAE established the UAE Committee for the Coordination of Humanitarian Foreign Aid, whose members
include humanitarian and charitable institutions in the country and relevant institutions for humanitarian
assistance. In 2015, its priority moved to Yemen in assisting comprehensive programs such as, food, health,
and drinking water.
In short, humanitarian crisis is frequent in the Middle East. Arabian assistance starts from humanitarian
principles and focuses on undeveloped countries, so it has little geopolitical considerations. It also works hard
to “maintain current situation to avoid the dissolution of the beneficiaries’ governments as well as the collapse
of the countries’ domestic order in order to keep the current balance of power” (Hans, 1962, p. 302).
Humanitarian assistance has become an important tool for improving the soft power of donor countries in Arab
and has played an ever essential role in foreign affairs.
Conclusion
Similar to the principle of “salvation and saving heart” followed by Christianity, the Islamic charity
concept is regarded as the spiritual or material care of Muslims individually or collectively, and its ultimate
goal is to obey Allah’s intentions and gain its joy to get the happiness of this life and afterlife. Islam believes
that aid is giving the blessings given by Allah to people in need. After the efforts for more than half a century,
Arabian aid countries have become an indispensable part of the international aid field. They use foreign aid as a
booster to actively practice the spirit of South-South cooperation, highlight the international social
responsibility that developing countries have assumed, and gain recognition and support in international
political and diplomatic affairs.
No matter it is a short-term emergency humanitarian assistance or long-term development assistance,
Arabian aid countries are striving to follow the doctrine of Islamic teachings, generously and secretly. In this
regard, Saudi Arabia and UAE have performed most prominently. In times of distress for fraternal countries,
they secretly provided massive amounts of humanitarian assistance. They not only contributed to the promotion
of global economic recovery and development, but also effectively increased countries’ soft power. In addition,
Arabian aid countries not only assist Islamic countries, but also provide assistance to non-Islamic countries. In
this regard, Kuwait has performed most prominently, particularly in terms of aid to African countries; Kuwait’s
funds and technology have spread over almost every corner of Africa. While granting new impetus to Kuwait’s
relations with Africa, Kuwait also constructed the strong presence and influence on the African continent.
References
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Jiang, H. K. (2004). Religious factors in the Sudan Civil War. West Asia and Africa, 187(4), 145.
Li, Y. (2017). The assistance of Kuwait to African countries and its influence. Arab World Studies, 171(4), 51.
Li, X. Y., Xu, X. L., Wang,Y. H. (2013). International development assistance of foreign aid from non-developed countries.
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International Relations

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David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

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The Gulf Crisis: An Insight Into Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts 537

SCO and Cybersecurity: Eastern Security Vision for Cyberspace 549

Arab Foreign Aid

Arab Foreign Aid in the View of Islamic Faith 567

Trump’s America: International Relations and the Construction

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The USA as a Global Establishment

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The Gulf Crisis: An Insight Into Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts

The Kuwaiti Mediation Efforts and the Gulf Crisis Test

Kuwait’s Mediation Efforts Between Reality and the Unknown

Why the Efforts Are Overlapping

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SCO and Cybersecurity: Eastern Security Vision for Cyberspace

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Geopolitics of Central Asia and SCO

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