HABEAS CORPUS – CASE DIGEST AND DOCTRINES from a criminal offense.

It means any liability to pay arising out of

a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as
A. In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara et. al. vs. recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by
Gedorio the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix.

FACT SUMMARY: Petitioners were tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a certain  Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason
property located in Parañaque City. that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to
pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had
Pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anselma Allers, originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the
respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe to payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee
petitioners in the inventory of the estate. In the Order dated October 9, against imprisonment.
1999, the probate court directed petitioners to pay their monthly rentals

to Bolaño, the duly appointed Special Administratrix.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt
For failure to comply with the said order, Bolaño filed a motion to cite under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court because herein
petitioners in contempt. The court found petitioners guilty of indirect subject order is not a special judgment enforceable under Section
contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to 11, Rule 39. The order directing the payment of rentals falls within
undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for the purview of Section 9. Until and unless all the means provided
them to pay rentals. for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed,
imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil
Petitioners were then arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioners were temporarily released but the CA later
denied the petition and recalled the release order. Hence, the appeal.
B. LEE YICK HON vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
DOCTRINES:
FACT SUMMARY: It appears that on July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ
of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one
 The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be
Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was presented
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must
from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who was detaining him
exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with
for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited the
utmost self-restraint.
collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas
corpus should not be issued as prayed.
 Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as
used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising

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This citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had
already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat
scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; and
either by oversight or design the Insular Collector failed to contermand the
order for his embarcation on that boat.
The result was that Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours
after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to show cause
in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were
instituted against the Insular Collector, with the result already stated.
DOCTRINES:
 The writ of habeas corpus may be classified as:
o Preliminary citation – If the person is detained under
governmental authority and the illegality of his detention is
not patent from the petition for the writ, the court issues the
citation to the government officer having custody to show
cause why the habeas corpus writ should not issue; and
o Peremptory writ – If the cause of the detention appears to be
patently illegal, the court issues the habeas corpus writ
noncompliance with which is punishable
 The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in
section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate forms are
supplied in section 534 of said Code and in section 82 of General
Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case before us was merely a
preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show
cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted.
 The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this character, upon
applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners
are aware, become common in our courts; and upon considerations of
practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases
where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory
writ is not manifest.
 In proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of
court, it is not to be forgotten that such proceedings are commonly
treated as criminal in their nature even when the acts complained of
are incidents of civil actions. For this reason the mode of procedure
and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far
as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. (6 R. C. L., p.
530.)
 Moreover, it is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for
contempt in the violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial
order unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is
clearly and exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
(U.S. vs. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 146 Fed., 176, 183.) A party cannot be
punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the
order. (13 C. J., 15.)
 In the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner was not
forbidden by any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be
considered as disobedience to the court.
 The result was that the proceedings upon the application for the
writ habeas corpus were frustrated and the writ was in fact never
issued — as occurred in the case now before us. The judge before
whom the application for the writ of habeas corpus was pending
thereupon caused Lake to be arrested and fined him 50 dollars for the
supposed contempt. It was held by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals that his action could not be sustained and the judgment was
reversed
C. Caballes v. CA
FACT SUMMARY: Caballes was charged with rape. During the trial, he was
denied bail, the judge inhibited himself, and the trial suffered from
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numerous delays. As a result, invoking his right to speedy trial, he filed a
“petition for habeas corpus and/or certiorari” to appeal.
The CA and SC both dismissed the case. Habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy. Its only purpose is to inquire into the propriety of detention, not
to impute error on the part of a court.
DOCTRINES:
 Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period
for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases
shall be 48 hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.
While that provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending
Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, provides that appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Thus,
Caballes should have appealed from the CA’s denial of his petition
rather than filing a petition for certiorari. Certiorari cannot co-
exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to
the availment of the special civil action for certiorari.
 A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
court’s denial of the MTD, the denial of the petition for bail, as
well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal
act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty,
even if the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief
from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to
arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom.
 A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a “palladium of
liberty” is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of
right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by
proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which
a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding
the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ
of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of
the restraint under which a person is held.
 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral
attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court,
while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or
judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
 A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no
other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be
considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches
the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches
the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters
but does not reach the record. However, when jurisdiction is
obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the
body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is
necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is
based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as
an ancillary proceeding
D. CALVAN v. CA
FACT SUMMARY: On 02 August 1999, at about 11:30 a.m., in a shootout at
a sitio in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, Reynolan T. Sales, incumbent town
mayor of Pagudpud, fatally shot former Mayor Rafael Benemerito. After
the incident, Sales surrendered his handgun, placed himself under the
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custody of the Municipal Police and thereupon asked to be brought to the
Provincial PNP headquarters in Laoag City.
Contending that his right to due process was violated by the cavalier and
perfunctory manner by which Judge Calvan suddenly terminated and
concluded the preliminary investigation, without even allowing him to
submit counter affidavit and present his witnesses, Mayor Sales filed a
Petition For Habeas Corpus and Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 54416) before
the Court of Appeals. He questioned his detention on the thesis that the
Order and Warrant of Arrest were improvidently and illegally issued by
Judge Calvan, the latter being a relative of complainant Thelma
Benemerito within the third civil degree of affinity and, therefore,
disqualified from conducting the preliminary investigation.
DOCTRINES:
 Keeping in mind the limitation that in habeas corpus the concern is
not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or
holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is
sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process, an
inquiry into the validity of the proceedings or process can be
crucial in safeguarding the constitutional right of a potential
accused against an obvious and clear misjudgment. The intrinsic
right of the State to prosecute and detain perceived transgressors
of the law must be balanced with its duty to protect the innate
value of individual liberty.
 Quite evidently, the circumspection and objectivity required of the
judge could not be assured in the case at bar. Stringent standard
should be applied in order to avoid hasty and improvident issuance
of a warrant for the arrest of an accused. The deprivation of
liberty, regardless of its duration, is too invaluable a price even
just to stake for any wrongful prosecution and unwarranted
detention.
 Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ, which furnishes an
extraordinary remedy and may not thus be invoked under normal
circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained,
the illegal order and warrant of arrest issued by petitioner Judge
subsists and private respondent is offered no speedy, adequate
remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of law.
 The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the
orderly administration of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the
attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate
action.
 Such a special circumstance is here present considering that
respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to quash, the
case no longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he
ask for a reinvestigation because the preliminary investigation for
purposes of filing the information has already been taken over by
the Provincial Prosecutor.
 The latter, upon the other hand, does not have the authority to
lift the warrant of arrest issued by the disqualified
judge.Meantime, respondent is being held and detained under an
illegal order and warrant of arrest which has no legal standing.
E. Ilusorio v. Bildner
FACT SUMMARY: Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio refused to live with his wife,
Erlinda Ilusorio for personal reasons. One day, after a meeting, he did not
come to their home in Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in
Makati. The petitioner was barred from visiting her husband so she files a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that
the respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband
and barred Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. On April 1999, after due
hearing, CA DENIED the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention but GRANTED visitation rights to ERLINDA.
DOCTRINES:
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 The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
caters only to involuntary and or illegal restraint. According to the
evidence, there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the issuance
of the writ.
 The fact that Potenciano is about 86 years of age or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated – soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern
his actions.
 Potenciano was of sound and alert mind having answered all
relevant questions asked by the court hence, he posses the
capacity to make choices. He also made it clear that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people.
 The CA, exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in
a petition for habeas corpus where ERLINDA never even prayed
for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of
subject’s insanity. b. Missed the fact that the case did not involve
the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to
visit a husband.
 In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he
is at liberty to do so without the threat of any penalty attached to
the exercise of his right. With his full mental capacity coupled with
the right of choice, Potentciano may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice because such shall deprive
him of his right to privacy.
 No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by
any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.
F. BARREDO V. VINARAO
DOCTRINE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL NOT ISSUE IF DETENTION IS BY
VIRTUE OF VALID JUDGMENT
FACTS: Samuel Barredo prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison on the ground that he has already
served the sentence imposed on him for carnapping and Illegal possession
of firearms.
The Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the
commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He further
points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections' revised computation
table for determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct
while serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18
days.
ISSUE: WON petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus? No.
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement,
detention or deprivation of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a
remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them
from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a
judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, the writ may be
allowed as a post- conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the
conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional
circumstances:
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(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to
such excess.
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will
not be allowed.
While Barredo has already served the minimum penalty in the carnapping
case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession
of firearms case. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only
prisoners who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be
released on parole on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by
the Board of Pardons and Parole.
G. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ENGR.
KUNTING
FACTS: Ashraf Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian
Police in Kuala Lumpur, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force
Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela,
Basilan. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention.
DOJ filed a motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Basilan to
Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have
been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the
PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility
that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan
due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to
the area of operation of the ASG.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty he was
never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his
family to research in Zamboanga City. He stated that since no action was
taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to
his illegal detention classified in the records as "for safekeeping purposes
only."
ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus can prosper. No.
HELD: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of
a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee.
If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.
Kunting's detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He
was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by
Judge Danilo M. Bucoy.His temporary detention at PNP- IG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court. A
The writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has
been charged with a criminal offense. Petition for writ of habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED.
H. SALIENTES, ET AL V. ABANILLA, ET. AL
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FACTS: Private respondent Loran Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette
Salientes, parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla are living
with the parents of the Marie Antonette. Due to in- laws problems, Loran
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie
Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes and was
thereafter prevented from seeing his son.
Loran Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son,
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody. The RTC of Muntinlupa
directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003.
CA affirmed the order of the trial court but held that it did not award the
custody of the 2-year-old child to anyone but was simply the standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court
held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a
summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor's detention and the
matter of his custody.
ISSUE: WON the CA err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against
the trial court's orders
HELD: Salientes contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the
Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason
but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
The proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for
custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of
custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary
restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the
mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.
Abanilla asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any
person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa.
Under the law, he and his wife have shared custody and parental authority
over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is
out of the country as required of her job as an international flight
stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the
maternal grandparents.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family
Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint
parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents
are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private
respondent's cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child
as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available
to him.
The RTC did not err in this case. Petition is denied
I. MADRIÑAN V. MADRIÑAN
FACTS: Felipe N. Madriñ an and Francisca R. Madriñ an were married on July
7, 1993 in Parañaque City. Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter: Ronnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter
quarrel, Felipe allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons
with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Francisca sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things
up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.
Francisca filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis
Angelo in the CA alleging that petitioner's act of leaving the conjugal
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dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of
their children and deprived them of their mother's care. She prayed that
petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court
and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
Felipe filed his memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently
went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of
her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed
that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was Francisca who left, taking
their daughter with her.
Felipe questioned the jurisdiction of the CA claiming that under Section 5
(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition
for habeas corpus filed by respondent
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus. YES.
HELD: CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of
the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code,
respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who
were at that time aged 6 and 4, respectively, subject to the visitation rights
of petitioner. Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that
his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special
proceeding.
RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on
May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by
different judicial regions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one
place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the
exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary
matters. Petition is hereby DENIED.
J. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN BEHALF OF ROGELIO ORMILLA, ET. AL. V. THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
FACTS: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed for and
in behalf of Rogelio Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera and Alfredo Navarro, praying
for their release from confinement on the ground that an excessive penalty
was imposed on them. It is only Ormilla who signed his conformity to the
petition while Rivera and Navarro failed to manifest their conformity or
sign the verifiation.
Petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro, was convicted of two counts
of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. He is
presently con fied at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa and has
served approximately 17 years of his sentence.
Ormilla alleged that he should be released by virtue of Republic Act No.
8353 otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." He claimed that
under the new rape law, the penalty for rape committed by two or more
persons was downgraded to prision mayor to reclusion temporal. Thus, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is excessive and should be
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modified. He prayed that he be released so he could apply for pardon or
parole.

Respondents, represented by the OSG, contended that the penalty

imposed under R.A. No. 8353 for rape committed by two or more persons
is reclusion perpetua to death. Under Article 70 of the RPC, the duration of
perpetual penalties is 30 years. Since petitioner was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape, the aggregate of the two penalties is 60
years. Respondents argued that petitioner has yet to complete the service
of his first sentence, as he has been in confinement for only 17 years.
Respondents further argued that petitioner is ineligible for parole, because
Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law prohibits its application to
persons convicted of offenses punished by life imprisonment.

ISSUE: WON the writ may be granted in favor of Ormilla. NO.

HELD: Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of in cases of illegal
confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The Court held that the writ may also be issued where, as a consequence
of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess. None of the above circumstances is
present in the instant case.

Considering that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed

and that petitioner is confined under authority of law, the petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.