CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 1

[No. 1272. January 11, 1904.]

THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. BALDOMERO NAVARRO ET
AL., defendants and appellants.
1.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT; SPANISH LAW.—Under the system
of criminal procedure existing in the Philippine Islands under the Spanish Government it was
lawful to require a suspected or accused person to give evidence touching the crime of
which he was charged or suspected.
1 2.
 ID.; INFORMATION.—Under the present system of criminal procedure the complaint or
information must charge the accused with acts committed by him prior to the filing
of the information, and which, of themselves constitute every necessary ingredient
to the offense of which he is charged.
1 3.
 ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.—The right of a defendant
to be exempt from testifying applies equally to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt
of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry or
indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involving an issue
between other parties.
1 4.
 ID.; ID.; ID.—Where the law permits an accused person to testify as a witness no
presumption of guilt can be based upon his omission to testify.
1 5.
 CRIMINAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ILLEGAL DETENTION.—The provisions of
section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal cause to be a witness against himself, repeal by implication article
483 of the Penal Code, under which, upon proof by the Government of the illegal
detention of a person by the defendant, a heavier penalty was imposed upon him in
case of failure on his part to prove that he had set the person detained at liberty or
to show his present whereabouts.
Per MAPA, J., dissenting:
1 6.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT; SPANISH LAW.—Under the
system of criminal procedure existing in the Philippine Islands under the Spanish
Government accused persons were absolutely exempt from testifying, and no
unfavorable presumption arose from failure to do so.
1 7.
 ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; REASONABLE DOUBT.—The presumption of
innocence in favor of accused persons and the requirement that guilt be established
beyond a reasonable doubt are not innovations introduced by General Orders. No.
58, and the Philippines bill, but were embodied in the seven Partidas and for
centuries have been part of the laws of the Philippine Archipelago.
1 8.
 CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL DETENTION.—The elements of the offense defined by
paragraph 2 of article 483 -of the Penal Code are: (a) The illegal detention of a
person, and (b) the disappearance of that person, both of which must be proven by
the prosecution to justify a conviction.
9.
 ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.—Paragraph 2 of article 483 of the Penal Code does not
impose upon the accused an obligation to testify or authorize any unfavorable presumption
from his failure to do so. It simply indicates a defense available to the accused. It is not,
therefore, in conflict with the constitutional guaranty of the right to be exempt from self-
incriminating testimony and of the presumption of innocence.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
No. L-29169. August 19, 1968.
ROGER CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA,
respondents.
Constitutional law; Privilege against self-incrimination; Its basis.—The privilege against self-
incrimination is based on the constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself" (Sec. 1, No. 18, Art. III, Phil. Constitution), fully echoed in
Section 1, Ru!e 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall
be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself."
Same; Its origin, nature, and purpose.—An early Philippine case (U.S. v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143)
speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States;"
as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused
person," and as having been adopted in the Philippines" to wipe out such practices as formerly
prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations,
and to give testimonies regarding the offenses with which they were charged." The rule
positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule, otherwise
stated, is the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent.
So it is then that this right is not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is
left to the discretion 01 the court; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and
substantive right (14 Am. Jur. 869); it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Mr. Justice
Harlan warned that "the constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and
imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted" (Marchetti v. United States, U.S. Supreme
Court, No. 2-October Term, 1967, Jan. 29, 1968).
Same; Concept of compulsion.—Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily
connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure
which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or
impair his capacity for rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant" (State v. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116, 104
ALR 464).
Same; "Accused, as a prosecution witness" distinguished from "an ordinary wibness".—An
accused, as a prosecution witness, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim
the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him (Gonzales v.
Secretary of Labor, 94 Phil. 325), an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions (Cabal v. Kapunan, L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962). For,
in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate
him (Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., p. 302). This rule may apply even to a co-
defendant in a joint trial.
Same; Guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept.—The guide in the
interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of
abuse" (Allen v. State, 171 ALR 1138).
Same; Waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination; Meaning; When waiver is effective.—
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
SESSION 8 2
understandably, and willingly made; such waiver follows only where liberty of choice has been
fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege
on vague and uncertain evidence. It has been pointed out that courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.
Same; Effect of violation of constitutional right to be represented by counsel—upon the
jurisdiction of the trial court.—A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the
course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court—by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement is not complied with, the
court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
Remedial law; Habeas corpus; Remedy of an accused who is illegally confined.—Section 1 of
Rule 102 extends the writ of habeas corpus, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the
accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to
the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Constitutianal law; Early cases of violation of right against self-incrimination.—In 1901, early
in the history of constitutional government in this country, this Court in U.S. v. Junio, 1 Phil.
50, reversed the conviction of an accused who, having pleaded "not guilty", was required by
the judge to testify and answer the complaint. The Supreme Court said, "The judge had no
right to compel the accused to make any statement whatever," and declared the proceedings
void. The Philippine history of the privilege, however, did not end with the Jnnio case.
Violations of the privilege took other, and perhaps subtle forms (Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil.
570; Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483) but not the form directly prohibited by the privilege.
Even in the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan (L19052, Dec. 20, 1962) it was assumed as a
familiar learning that the accused in a criminal case cannot be required to give testimony and
that if his testimony is needed at all against his co-accused, he must first be discharged. If
Cabal, the respondent in an administrative case, was required by an investigation committee
to testify, it was because it was thought that proceedings for forfeiture of illegally acquired
property under Republic Act 1379 were civil and not criminal in nature.
Same; Taking the witness stand is within the privilege.—It is not disputed that the accused
in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the
witness stand.
Scime; Aim of the privilege against self-incrimination.—The constitutional provision that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against "himself" is aimed against a more far-
reaching evil—the recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their
stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more importance than
occurrence of the lesser evil. As Dean Griswold put the matter with eloquence: "We do not
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 3
make even the most hardend criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or
pull the lever that springs the trap on which he stands." The Government must thus establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured; it can not by coercion prove a charge
against an accused out of his own mouth (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1; accord, Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n. 378 U.S. 52)
Same; Preservation of liberties does not depend on motives.—The motives of men are often
commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not
depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be
a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness to
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty
to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the
Bill of Rights is a never endinR one (Douglas, A Livhnj Bill of Ricjhts, 1961, pp. 61, 62, 64).
Same; Habeas corpus; Itx office.—The fact that the judgment of conviction became final
with the dismisal of the appeal to the Court of Appeals for failure of the petitioner's former
counsel to file a brief is of no comment. That judgment is void, and it is precisely the
abiding concern of the writ of habeas corpus to provide redress for unconstitutional and
wrongful convictions. Vindication of due process, it has been well said is precisely the
historic office of the Great Writ (Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 4
No. L-19052. December 29, 1962.
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON.RUPERTO KAPUNAN,JR., and THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.
Anti-Graft Law; Forfeiture of Unexplained Wealth; Nature of Forfeiture as Penalty. —The
purpose of the charge against petition is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture by the State
of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the
nature of a penalty.

Same; Exemption of defendants from obligation to be witness against themselves. —

Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal and, hence, the exemption
of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witness against themselves are
applicable thereto.

Same; Forfeiture of property in substance is a criminal proceeding for the purpose of

protection of the rights of the defendant against self-incrimination; Case of Boyd vs. U.S. and
Thurston vs. Clark, cited.—In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that
the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the
evasion of a certain revenue law, “though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and
effect a criminal one”, and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of
criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case
to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held,
in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said
portion of the Fifth Amendment applies ‘‘to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to
establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged
with the commission of public offenses” and “a criminal case is an action, suit or cause
instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters
not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case x x x”.

Same; Same; Case of Almeda vs. Perez, distinguished.—In Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August
30, 1962) the theory that, after the filing of respondents’ answer to a petition for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to
our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture
proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of
said proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein
particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 5
No. L-25018. May 26, 1969.
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenorsappellants.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Rights of accused; Rights against self-incrimination; Applies
to administrative proceedings.—The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Applies to administrative hearing against a doctor. —In an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x x x the x x x
Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.—A proceeding for malpractice possesses
a criminal or penal aspect in the sense that the respondent would suffer the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extends to right not to take the witness stand.—The right against
self-incrimination extends not only to the right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on the witness stand, but also to forego testimony, to remain silent and refuse
to take the witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.— The reason is that, the right against self-incrimination,
along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded
the human personality.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 6
[No. 7081. September 7, 1912.]
The United States, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Tan Teng, defendant and appellant.
1.Rape; "Abusos Deshonestos."—Held: Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos" and that the crime was
committed in the house of the offended party, and that therefore the maximum penalty
of the law of six years of prisión correccional and the costs should be imposed.
2.Id.; Admissibility of Evidence; Right of Accused.—At the time of the arrest of the defendant
he was apparently suffering from some private disorder. A portion of the substance was taken
and scientifically examined, with the result that such substance showed that he was actually
suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The result of the scientific
examination was offered in evidence, during the trial of the cause. The defendant objected
to the admissibility of such evidence upon the ground that it was requiring him to give
testimony against himself. The objection was overruled upon the ground that "the accused
was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that
an object found upon his person was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked,
than would the introduc-tion of stolen property taken from the person of a thief."

The substance was taken from the body of the defendant with-out his objection. The
examination of the substance was made by competent medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. Such evidence was clearly
admissible. The prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort
com-munications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evi-dence, when it may be
material. The prohibition contained in the Philippine Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be
com-pelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 7
[No. 32025. September 23, 1929] Wigmore on Evidence 864', 865, latest edition.) In the case before us, writing is
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not a purely
District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents. mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing
2 1.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT FlSCAL'S means for the petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against
INVESTIGATIONS; REFUSAL OF WlTNESS TO WRITE FROM DICTATION.—The fiscal himself.
under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the competent judge, at the 4 6.
 ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF CRIMES; PRIVILEGE, REASON FOR EXISTENCE OF.—It
request of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of
crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. The
constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to write petitioner is a municipal treasurer, and it should not be difficult for the fiscal to obtain
down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose of verifying his a genuine specimen of his handwriting by some other means. But even supposing
handwriting and determining whether he had written certain documents alleged to that it is impossible to secure such specimen without resorting to the means herein
have been falsified, seeks protection—his constitutional privilege. complained of by the petitioner, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
2 2.
 ID.; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT; TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.—This right was guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
promulgated, both in the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 and in succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law, which provides (in Spanish); "Ni se le constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for
obligará (defendant) a declarar en contra suya, en ningún proceso criminal," and the protection of innocent persons.
recognized in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) 7.
 ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN VILLAFLOR-SUMMERS CASE AND CASE AT BAR.—The
and section 56. The English text of the Jones Law reads as follows: "Nor shall he be difference between this case and that of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), is that in the
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," thus, the prohibition latter the object was to have the petitioner's body examined by physicians, without being
is not restricted to not compelling him to testify, but extends to not compelling him compelled to perform a positive act, but only an omission, that is, not to prevent the
to be a witness. examination, which could be, and was, interpreted by this court as being no compulsion of
3 3.
 ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.—"The rights intended to be protected the petitioner to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act; all of which is entirely
by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to different from the case at bar, where it is sought to make the petitioner perform a positive
be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation testimonial act, silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a sample of his
so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it is handwriting for comparison.
the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights,
and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the
well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to
giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other
means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., par. 20, page 434, and notes.)
3 4.
 ID. ; ID. ; CASES INAPPLICABLE.—There have been cases where it was lawful to compel
the accused to write in open court while he was under cross-examination (Bradford
vs. People, 43 Pacific Reporter, 1013), and to make him write his name with his
consent during the trial of his case (Sprouse vs. Com., 81 Va., 374, 378); but in the
first case, the defendant, in testifying as witness in his own behalf waived his
constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as witness; and in the second, he
also waived said privilege because he acted voluntarily.
2 5.
 ID. ; ID. ; PREPARATION AND CREATION OF EVIDENCE BY TESTIMONIAL ACT.—This
constitutional prohibition embraces the compulsory preparation and creation by a
witness of self-incriminatory evidence by means of a testimonial act. "For though
the disclosure thus sought" (the production of documents and chattels) "be not oral
in form, and though the documents or chattels be already in existence and not
desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person
in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which
treats him as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to
make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles produced." (4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 8
G.R. No. 110357. August 17, 1994.* merely corroborative and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was himself
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS TRANCA Y presented and who took the witness stand for the precise purpose of attesting to the sale of
ARELLANO, accused-appellant. the illegal drug.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Self-Incrimination; There is no violation of the right against self-
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.—Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the incrimination where the accused was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination.—The
rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not defense contends that the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination. The defense also argues that Chief
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel before subjecting
and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of him to the examination. These contentions are without merit. What is prohibited by the
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. We do not find constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion
any such oversight on the part of the trial court. to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties; Where may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
the accused was not able to prove that the police officers had any improper or ulterior motive from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt.
in arresting him, the latter are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty.—The Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; The conduct of an ultraviolet ray examination to
NARCOM agents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their determine the presence of ultraviolet powder is not considered as custodial investigation
official duties. The accused was not able to prove that the police officers had any improper warranting the presence of counsel.—Nor can the subjection of the accused’s body to
or ulterior motive in arresting him. The police officers are thus presumed to have regularly ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered
performed their official duty in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-Bust Operations; Frame-Up; An allegation Dangerous Drugs Act; Penalties; The penalty in Sec. 15 of R.A. 6425 is now based on the
that one has been framed must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.—Likewise, his quantity of the regulated drugs involved.—The penalty then in Section 15 is now based on
contention that the marked money was wiped on his hands and pocket was supported by the quantity of the regulated drugs involved, except where the victim is a minor or where the
nothing more than his bare allegation. We have stated that an allegation that one was framed regulated drug involved in any offense under Section 15 is the proximate cause of the death
can be made with ease. That allegation must therefore be proved by clear and convincing of the victim, in which case the maximum penalty prescribed in Section 15 shall be imposed
evidence. The presumption that law enforcers have regularly performed their duties perforce regardless of the quantity of the regulated drugs involved.
requires that proof of a frame-up must be strong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of
an entrapment operation.—The accused also assails the fact that there was no prior
surveillance before the alleged entrapment was effected and contends that this casts doubt
on the regularity of the police operation. This contention is untenable. A prior surveillance is
not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation. There is no rigid or textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A mission order is not an essential requisite for a valid
buy-bust operation.—The accused also harps on the fact that there was no mission order for
the buy-bust operation and that there was no investigation report made after the operation.
A mission order is not an essential requisite for a valid buy-bust operation. The execution of
an investigation report is likewise not indispensable considering further that SPO3 San Jose
had testified that he prepared the booking sheet, receipt of property seized, and the affidavit
of arrest. To ask that every buy-bust operation be conducted in a textbook or blue ribbon
manner is to ask for too much from our law enforcers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The testimony or identity of the informer may be dispensed
with if other witnesses had sufficiently established how the crime was committed.—The
defense questions the non-presentation of the informer. There is no merit in this objection.
The testimony of the informer would at best be corroborative since the testimonies of Sgt.
Latumbo and SPO1 Matundan had sufficiently established how the crime was committed. The
testimony or identity of the informer may be dispensed with since his narration would be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 9
G.R. No. 91374. February 25, 1991.* having been illegally secured as well as the results of its ballistic examination in relation to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHN GABRIEL the empty shells, still there is adequate evidence in the record to justify a verdict of conviction.
GAMBOA, defendant-appellant. Indeed, the Court did not even consider it necessary to inquire into the motive of the appellant
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Credibility of witnesses; Contradicting statements of in the light of his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.’
prosecution witnesses on minor details rather than affect the credibility of these witnesses, Same; Same; Same; Paraffin test; Paraffin test conducted without the presence of the
are badges of candor.—By and large, the Court is not persuaded that the appellant’s claim of accused’s lawyer does not violate the right against self-incrimination.—As to the paraffin test
contradictions and inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into serious to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned
doubt their credibility. Different persons who witnessed an incident from different angles and error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
situations could not be expected to give uniform details of what they saw and heard . Such person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission
minor discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected because of the human differences may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
in perception. Such contradicting statements are on minor details, as hereinabove discussed, and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated
and rather than affect the credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of candor. by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay of the witnesses to immediately report the identity of the testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as
offender to the police investigators does not affect their credibility especially so when the in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again,
witnesses are related to the victim.—It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence more especially
when they are related to the victim as they just had a traumatic experience. More so as in
the case of Major Impas who is the victim’s father and Soledad, his common-law wife.
Nevertheless, a delay of about a few hours before the identification of the offender by the
prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their credibility.
Same; Same; Same; Confession; Verbal confession is inadmissible where the confession was
extracted through maltreatment; Case at bar.—The inadmissibility of the alleged verbal
confession of the appel-lant is raised on the ground that he was maltreated as a result of
which he suffered twenty-seven injuries in the form of contusions, lacerations and abrasions.
It does not appear, however, that the prosecution proposed to rely on this alleged confession
of the appel-lant, or that the trial court considered the same at all in the resolution of the
case. If it were to be considered at all, it would be worthless because of the undeniable fact
that the appellant was not only arrested without a warrant and entry into his house was
effected without a search warrant, but worse, he was maltreated since his arrest so much so
that he suffered multiple injuries. The police investigators responsible for this manhandling
should be investigated and held to account. Such involuntary confession cannot help the case
of the prosecution. It is a stain in the record of the law enforcement agents who handled the
case.
Same; Same; Same; Seizure of the shotgun without search warrant unless it falls under the
exception violates accused constitutional rights.—The Court observes that the police
investigators confiscated the shotgun from the premises of the residence of the appellant
without a search warrant. Such violation of the constitutional rights of a person should be
investigated and inquired into.
Same; Same; Same; Ballistic examination shows that it was fired from the very shotgun of
the appellant.—-The Court is not persuaded that the police investigators in this case would
willingly allow themselves to be instruments to frame the appelant for so serious a crime as
murder. It appears that the three empty shells were actually recovered from the vicinity of
the scene of the crime. The ballistics examination shows that it was fired from the very
shotgun of the appellant. This evidence corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very
strongly, that the appellant was the assailant of the victim.
Same; Same; Even if the shotgun and the results of the ballistic examination are disregarded,
there is adequate evidence to justify conviction.—Even if the Court disregards the shotgun as
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 10
G.R. No. 136051. June 8, 2006.*
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, petitioners, vs.
JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination; The right against self-
incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.—The right against
self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a
party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse
to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take
the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed
to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is
entitled among others, to the following.—An accused “occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness.” Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant
is entitled among others—1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to
testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him.
Same; Same; Same; As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether
decline to take the witness stand—it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature
of the proceedings that controls.—It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal
case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not
generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only
refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the
exception—a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness
stand—in administrative cases/ proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of the Court that
said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the
suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand.
It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Issues; Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded
their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the court.—Issues are
joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute
are plain before the court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when
petitioners, as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and
defenses of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have
been laid down.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
G.R. No. 111193. January 28, 1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERDINAND SUAREZ, alias
“Jojo,” LORETO REYES, alias “Dondon” and “Larry”; WILFREDO LARA, alias
“Cortal” and “Willy”; MARIA VICTORIA G. SUAREZ; NOLI LICSI, alias “Niño”;
VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, alias “Waway”; and MORRIS SANTOS, alias “Wanky,”
accused, WILFREDO LARA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Hearsay Rule; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule;
Doctrine of Interlocking Confessions; Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other
facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.—It is important to note at the outset
that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of conviction imposed upon Suarez
and Reyes for they have not filed any notice of appeal for themselves.
And while we are cognizant of the rule that the right to claim the inadmissibility of an
extrajudicial confession is personal in nature, in the sense that only the confessant whose
rights during an investigation were violated can raise an objection, we deem it necessary to
discuss in this appeal the circumstances surrounding the execution of Reyes’ sworn statement
in evaluating appellant Lara’s own extra curia declaration. Although an extrajudicial confession
is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative
evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of interlocking confessions has been
accepted and recognized as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule;
Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of
participation by an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against
him.—The lower court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking
confessions sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused’s own incriminating
statements. This doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in
numerous decisions of this Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the
hearsay rule. Reyes’ confession is thus admissible against Lara to show the probable
involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the confession is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by an accused co-conspirator,
that confession is receivable as evidence against him.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; Once the prosecution has
shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of
proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue.—Once the prosecution has shown that
there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a
confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that
his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this
presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given
as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Extrajudicial confessions independently made without
collusion, almost identical with each other in their essential details which could have been
known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other evidence against the person or
persons implicated to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission
of the crime are impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution. —Extrajudicial
SESSION 8 11
confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other in their
essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by
other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter’s
actual participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of
voluntariness in their execution. Also, the failure of an accused to complain to the swearing
officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had
all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of the confession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; While the initial choice of the lawyer in
cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one; A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against
the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. —We find no merit in
herein appellant’s contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes’ own choice as counsel for the
interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during
the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client—the presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it
was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false.—To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop
an accused from saying anything which might in-criminate him but, rather, it was adopted in
our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, absent any showing that the lawyers who assisted the
accused were remiss in their duties, it can be safely concluded that the custodial investigation
of Reyes and Lara were regularly conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not necessary that an eyewitness should testify to
having seen the accused committing the crime or had seen him under circumstances
indicating his having committed the crime before the accused may be held liable under the
confession.—Even disregarding for a moment Reyes’ extrajudicial declaration, appellant Lara
can still be held accountable under his own sworn statement. Well-entrenched is the rule that
it is not necessary that an eyewitness should testify to having seen the accused committing
the crime or had seen him under circumstances indicating his having committed the crime,
before the accused may be held liable under his confession. This is how much weight and
credence our jurisprudence gives to a confession. The Rules of Court provide that "(t)he
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; When the confession is made outside of
court proceedings, it must be accompanied by evidence of the corpus delicti to be sufficient
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 12
for conviction.—Of course, when the confession is made outside of court proceedings, it must
be accompanied by evidence of the corpus delicti to be sufficient for conviction. If it is made
freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported
by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of a normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Reenactments; Pictures of the
reenactment depicting the accused’s role in the commission of the crime cannot be utilized
as evidence of his participation where that reenactment was conducted without any lawyer
assisting the accused.—The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara’s role in the
commission of the crime cannot be utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal
therein as that reenactment was conducted without any lawyer assisting appellant. We have
held that reenactments are covered by the right against selfincrimination. Atty. Ranin himself
admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the reenactment because
he could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his counsel.
Same; Robbery with Homicide; Conspiracy; Where one accused merely introduced the other
co-accused to the principal by inducement, the Court cannot conscientiously declare that the
first accused was a co-conspirator or a principal by inducement or indispensable cooperation
in the crime of robbery with homicide.—From Reyes’ and appellant’s confessions, which we
believe bear the mark of truth and credibility, it can only be inferred that Lara merely
introduced the group of Reyes to Suarez. With such a nominal role, we cannot conscientiously
declare that Lara was a co-conspirator or a principal by inducement or indispensable
cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Same; Same; Same; Accomplice; Where an accused does not fall under any of three concepts
of principals defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty
as an accomplice.—Where the accused does not fall under any of the three concepts of
principals defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty
as an accomplice. And where there is no showing of conspiracy or confabulation on his part,
and the extent of the accused’s participation in the crime is uncertain, he should be given the
benefit of the doubt and be declared as a mere accomplice therein. We are sufficiently
persuaded to declare appellant as a mere accomplice in the crime charged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 13
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005.* to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law .—
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents. arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Recognition; That the two causes of action, one to compel patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The special civil action for certiorari
our jurisprudence.—That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed
as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
we said: The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom
must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder or legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—
of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of
is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x The conclusion above remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said
stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some Rules.
extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person
may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff
to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before
the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation; Paternity; DNA Testing; Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available; fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing.—Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability
to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed
to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
No. L-63419. December 18, 1986.*
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, us. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B.
FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
Nos. L-66839-42. December 18,1986.*
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Executive Judge, Branch V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court,
sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA
LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents.
No. L-71654. December 18, 1986.*
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII,
HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Nos. 74524-25. December 18, 1986.*
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Nos. L-75122-49. December 18, 1986.*
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 139, Makati, and FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON, JR., in his capacity as Trial
Fiscal, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati, respondents.
Nos. L-75812-13. December 18, 1986.*
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but temporarily
presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, Branch 153, Court of First Instance
of Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
Nos. 75765-67. December 18, 1986.*
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE
JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
No. L-75789. December 18, 1986.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of a worthless check,
not the non-payment of an obligation.—The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
SESSION 8 14
Same; Same; The legislature may not validly punish nonpayment of a debt ex contractu, and
an act may not be considered and punished as malum in se, but such act may be penalized
under police power as malum prohibitum because of harm it causes to the public.—It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a
debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only
acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power.
Same; Same; Police power defined.—The police power of the state has been described as
"the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or
conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing
upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
Same; Same; Negotiable Instruments; Any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks
as currency substitutes can be deterred to prevent havoc in trade and banking community.—
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a
written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment
of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash,
and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay
an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation
that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or
assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have
become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal
tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is
confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes
would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy
that confidence should be deterred, for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
Same; Same; B.P. 22 is constitutional.—In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid
exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
Same; Same; Judgments; Foreign judgments on worthless checks legislation must be read in
context We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose is not
sauce for the gander.—lt is needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with
abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between our
statute and the worthless check acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved.
One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute.
Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the
facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social, economic and political
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 15
environment—in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph
of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander. in question which the body approved on Second Reading. Part of the confusion was due
Same; Same; Same; B.P. 22 does not conflict with constitutional prohibition against apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment
imprisonment for non-payment of debt Police power may override a constitutional period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted by the
guarantee.—There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions of
constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records
constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually
state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved
imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been Minutes for that day. In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on Third
reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Committee in its report, which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Checks are not mere contracts, but substitutes for money. that "the clause in question was . . . an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed
Non-impairment of contract clause applies only to lawful contracts.—We find no valid ground copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading.
to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the
which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not
be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day
and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system
and theref ore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Same; Same; Same; B.P. 22 reasonably differentiates between the swindler and the swindled.
It does not violate the equal protection clause.—Neither do we find substance in the claim
that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just
as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This
argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of
the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Same; Same; Same; B.P. 22 does not involve an undue delegation of legislative power of the
payee.—lt is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative
powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or
drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the
check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of
the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What
cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws, which means, as
applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to
prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to
define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefore has been in any manner delegated to
the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how
remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully
delegates its enf orcement to the off ended party is f arfetched.
Same; Same; Same; The text of the 2nd paragraph of B.P. 22 was what was approved on
second reading as per minutes of the Batasan and a committee report, contrary to the
argument that said text was clandestinely amended on 3rd reading.—A careful review of the
record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed, there
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 16
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance
G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998.* that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent
RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution.
LVI, Angeles City, respondents. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites in order to successfully voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
invoke the defense of double jeopardy.—In order to successfully invoke the defense of double Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or
jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached inadvertence of its officials and employees.—Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same should not be
second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule otherwise
or a frustration thereof. could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and
give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Essential requisites in determining when the first jeopardy may be said Same; Same; Information; Even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110,
to have attached.—In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an
is necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.—Petitioner avers
Valid complaint or information; (c) Arraignment; (d) Valid plea; (e) The defendant was that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of
consent of the accused. Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information
administrative policy of any trial court.—Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal
arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction
over instant case. Writ large in law-books is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law
and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another.—It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the
City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga
but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting
attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent .—
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor
in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash
may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by
a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view,
an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Same; Same; Same; Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.—In fine, there must have been a
valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
G.R. No. 97471. February 17, 1993.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISABELO PUNO y
GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom; Presidential Decree No. 532; Evidence; In the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances
where his acts partakes of the nature of variant offenses, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.—Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in
criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable
in those instances where his acts partakes of the nature of variant offenses, and the same
holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no showing that appellants had any motive other than
the extortion of money from complainant under the compulsion of threats or intimidation .—
ln the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured
prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is
admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the
actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.—With respect
to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim,
we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the court holds that the crime committed is robbery as
defined in Article 293 of the Code, the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532 is rejected;
Ransom defined.—Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to
or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment
that releases from captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave
the cash and checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave under the circumstances
of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
There were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a
robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold
that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in
and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention but of Articles 306 and 307
on brigandage.—Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No.
532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that
SESSION 8 17
the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in
the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage."
This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.
Same; Same; Same; Brigandage; Salient distinction between brigandage and robbery. —The
following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity: "The main object of the Brigandage Law
is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the
formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306.
Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation ,of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven
when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated
by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not
primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime
would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a
band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band
of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band 'sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar.'"
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery.—ln fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or . robbery in
band if there are at least four armed participants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person
or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim.—Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532
punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants
in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.—We do not entertain any
doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition
of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage"
and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by
appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage
Same; Same; Same; Same; The offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined
in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. —
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in
Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Court holds that there is no procedural obstacle to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 18
the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them
with kidnapping for ransom.—We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the
conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them
with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily
included in the latter offense with which they are charged. For the former offense, it is
sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property
through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the
case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information
where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the
offender of the things subject of the robbery.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
No. L-24447. June 29, 1968.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WILLY OBSANIA,
defendant-appellee.
Criminal law and procedure; Complaint or information; Allegation of lewd design in crime of
rape not necessary.—In a complaint for rape, it is not necessary to allege “lewd design” or
“unchaste motive”. To require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lascivious
intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself—the carnal
knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.
Same; Same; Sufficiency of complaint or information in the crime of rape. —The complaint
here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency of an indictment for rape. It unmistakably
alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant by means of violence and
intimidation. The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the proffered ground that the
complaint was defective for failure to allege “lewd design”.
Same; Double jeopardy; Requisites.—In order that the protection against double jeopardy
may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court: (c) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Waiver of double jeopardy; Dismissal with express consent of defendant
constitutes waiver.—When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant,
the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action
in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for
the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
Same; Same; Provisional dismissal with express consent of defendant; Salico case.—Where
a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with express consent of the accused but
even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double jeopardy under section 9, Rule
113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes
substantially to the doctrine on waiver established in People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722.
Same: Same; Estoppel; When defendant estopped from pleading double jeopardy. —When
the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the
accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in
support of his plea of second jeopardy.
Same; Same; Estoppel and waiver; Similarities.—The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence
the same as the doctrine of waiver. The truth of both is that a dismissal, other than on the
merits, sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent
and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in
a new prosecution for the same offense.
Same; Same; Estoppel; Rule on estoppel should be maintained; Reasons.—This Court
forthrightly stated that the rule of estoppel applied in the Acierto case should be maintained
because: (1) It is basically and fundamentally sound and just: (2) It is in conformity with the
principles of legal ethics, which demand good faith of the highest order in the practice of law:
(3) It is well settled ‘that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory
inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court; (4) The operation of the
principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the
SESSION 8 19
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
Same; Same; Doctrine on waiver in Salico case not impliedly abandoned.—We cannot agree
that this Court in Bangalao impliedly abandoned the Salico doctrine on waiver. Bangalao was
decided solely on the question of jurisdiction. This Court. after holding that the lower tribunal
had jurisdiction, decided outright to repress the appeal by the Government on the ground of
double jeopardy without considering whether the appealed order of dismissal was issued with
or without the express consent of the accused. The ruling in Salico—that the dismissal was
with the express consent of the accused because it was granted upon his instigation thru a
motion to dismiss—was not passed upon in Bangalao.
Same; Same; Salico doctrine on dismissal of criminal case on defendant’s motion
repudiated.—But said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in
subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of double jeopardy despite the fact
that the dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused.
Same; Same; Inapplicability of waiver and estoppel; Dismissal considered as acquittal. —In
Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles which are cited above, like in Cloribel, the dismissals
therein, all sought by the defendant, were considered acquittals because they were all
predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government
to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a dismissal
not amounting to an acquittal.
Same; Same; Case at bar with Cloribel and cases cited therein.—Here the controverted
dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was
defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right
of the accused to a speedy trial and failure of the government to prosecute. The appealed
order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the
merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an
acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a
case against the accused, who, in the f irst place, is presumed innocent.
Same; Same; Applicability of waiver and estoppel; Conditions for their application. —The
application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua, non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 20

No. L-30250. September 22, 1977.*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO PILPA,
defendant-appellee.
Criminal procedure; Double jeopardy; Cases where the defense of double jeopardy may be
invoked.—Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
in cases of (a) previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois convict) of the
same offense, or (c) when the case against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Requirements for successful plea of double jeopardy. —In any of these three
cases, in order that there be former legal jeopardy, it is necessary in the first case that (a)
there was a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (c)
and that the accused had been arraigned and had entered his plea. When these conditions
or requisites are present, the subsequent acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and
is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included
therein.
Same; Same; “Intent to kill” may be inferred from the allegation that stab wound, would have
caused death of the victim.—It is conceded that the first information is valid. The absence of
an averment as to intent to kill was not a fatal defect because the intent to kill may be inferred
from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused the death of the victim.
Same; Same; Oral manifestation of counsel that he had no objection to dismissal of the case
is equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal. No double jeopardy exists.—We
hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused that he
had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to
its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of section 9 of
Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court had already acted
upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel’s assent to the dismissal.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 21
No. L-43790. December 9, 1976.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY,
ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SEMECIO, JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y
DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y MAGALONA, respondents.
Criminal law; Constitutional law; Double jeopardy; Double jeopardy exists even if the accused
was the one who filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case where such motion was filed after
the prosecution had rested its case.—It is true that the criminal case of falsification was
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution
had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
Same; Same; Same.—In the case of the herein, respondents, however, the dismissal of the
charge against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from
other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here
present, wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal
of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the
accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a
plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 22
recovery of indemnity.—Petitioner contends that “the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April
G.R. No. 128540. April 15, 1998.* 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court’s decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion
EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x x.” In other words,
PHILIPPINES, respondents. petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point. The Court is not persuaded.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Essential requisites before a petition for As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence,
certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Meaning of grave abuse of a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused.
discretion.—A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
the following requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an Same; Same; Same; Same; Grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has the trial court void; Double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.—As earlier observed, the
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge
in the ordinary course of law. Grave abuse of discretion “x x x implies such capricious and rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of as a defense.
law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The persistent refusal of the trial court to promulgate the earlier
Court of Appeals’ decision is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion.—Manifestly
erroneous then is the trial judge’s justification that he has previously promulgated the Court
of Appeals’ Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil indemnity. In ordering only the
payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA Decision in its entirety.
Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying—and this Court’s dismissal of the
petition questioning—the said earlier CA Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do
so. The persistent refusal of the trial court is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Petition for mandamus, when warranted.—Under Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted “[w]hen any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x.” Obedience to a
superior court’s order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.
Same; Same; Same; A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari
where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity.—Petitioner contends that the petition
for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was improper, because the People had not filed
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. This contention is bereft of
merit. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where the
questioned resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Elements to substantiate a claim of double jeopardy.—To
substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: “x x x (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy
attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).”
Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 23
No. L-54110. February 20, 1981.*
GENEROSO ESMEÑA and ALBERTO ALBA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY,
City Court of Cebu City, Branch III, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RICARDO
B. TABANAO, as Special Counsel, Office of the City Fiscal, Cebu City, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Double jeopardy or legal jeopardy; Requisites for existence of legal
jeopardy; Effect of existence of legal jeopardy upon accused. —In order that legal jeopardy
may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent
jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the
accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes
res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the of-fense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
included therein (4 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240).
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right to speedy trial; Rivival of grave coercion case
provisionally dismissed after the accused had been arraigned due to complainant’s failure to
appear at the trial placed the accused in double jeopardy, as the provisional dismissal lacks
express consent of the accused.—In the instance case, we hold that the petitioners were
placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional
dismissal would not have placed the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken
the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not
very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. The petitioners were
insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal
was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition
provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity
to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Use of the word “provisional” in dismissal of the case, would not
change the legal effect of dismissal.—Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal
would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word “provisional” would not change the
legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88
Phil. 299).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of criminal case upon motion of the accused because
the prosecution was not prepared for trial is a dismissal equivalent to acquittal barring further
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.—The dismissal of a criminal case upon
motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complaint
and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 24
No. L-49375. February 28, 1979.*
LEOPOLDO SALCEDO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE FILEMON H. MENDOZA
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Dismissal of criminal case based on right of accused to
speedy trial amounts to an acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of
accused for the same offense.—In our resolution of December 8, 1978, the Court required
the respondents to comment on the petition. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents, filed his comment on January 23, 1979 agreeing with the petitioner that “a
reinstatement of this case would operate to violate his right against double jeopardy”. x x x
The stand of the petitioner and the Solicitor General is well taken. Time and again, We have
said that the dismissal of a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to speedy
trial, amounts to an acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of the
accused for the same offense.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law, General rule is that dismissal of criminal case upon motion
or with express consent of accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of accused
for the same offense; Exception to the rule; Effect of dismissal; Attempt to prosecute accused
for the same offense violates constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy; Case at bar .—
The effect of such dismissal is at once clear. Following the established jurisprudence, a
dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or
express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused
for the same offense. This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon the motion or
with the express consent of the accused, will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of
the accused for the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The moment the dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused to
speedy trial, even if it is upon his own motion or express consent, such dismissal is equivalent
to acquittal. And any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same offense will violate the
constitutional prohibition that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense” (New Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 22).
Same; Same; Grave abuse of discretion committed when order of dismissal was set aside and
revived or reinstated the criminal case against accused; Case at bar.—The setting aside by
the respondent Judge on May 8, 1978 of the order of dismissal of March 28, 1978 and thereby
reviving or reinstating Criminal Case No. C-1061 places the petitioner twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. The respondent Judge therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of May 8, 1978 setting aside the order of dismissal issued on March 28,
1978.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 25
G.R. No. 173421. December 14, 2006.*
OSCAR Z. BENARES,1 petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE LIM, respondent.
Criminal Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites; A dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit—
(1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation
of the accused’s right to speedy trial.—Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid
indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has
been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the instant
case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements. As to the last element,
there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioner’s guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to
prosecute. A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based on
insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused’s right to
speedy trial.
Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of
the time involved—each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it.—Delay is not a
mere mathematical computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided upon the
facts peculiar to it. The following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay. In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances
excuses the delay occasioned by the late filing of the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence.
Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioner’s right to speedy
trial was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke his right against double
jeopardy.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Formal Offer of Exhibits; Failure of the prosecution
to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case where, even without any documentary
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. —
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine that when a judge dismisses a case for failure to
prosecute, the termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the
case when the time therefor comes. In the instant case, testimonial evidence were presented
against petitioner. Thus, even without documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be
proven. Second, petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of
respondent’s documentary evidence, thus the prosecution need not even present such
documents in view of his admission. With or without these documents, therefore, the
prosecution has enough evidence left for the trial court’s determination of his guilt.
Thus—We agree with the OSG’s contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a
violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a
ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could
still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial
court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 26
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY and
GLORIA BERMOY, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites for Double Jeopardy to Apply; A dismissal
with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy,
exceptions.—For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the
first criminal case: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused
had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent. On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with
the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy.
However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on
insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the
merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
Same; Same; Instances Where the Right Against Double Jeopardy Can Be Invoked.—The
right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same
offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same
offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution
appeals from a judgment in the same case. The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court which provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order,
except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 27
[No. L-3580. March 22, 1950]
CONRADO MELO, petitioner and appellant, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondents and appellees.
5 1.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES OF; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; THE SAME OR IDENTICAL
OFFENSE.—One who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged
with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former. "As the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then go down step
by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither
can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same
result."
4 2.
 ID.; ID.; SECOND OFFENSE NOT IN EXISTENCE; RULE OF IDENTITY OF OFFENSE DOES
NOT APPLY.—The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that
in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
3 3.
 ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes f or which
the def endant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense"
(15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted
for the new offense.
4.
 ID.; ID.; "STARE DECISIS"; FORMER PRECEDENTS OVERRULED.—The ruling laid down in
People vs. Tarok (73 Phil., 260), as followed in People vs. Villasis, G. R. No. L-1218,
promulgated September 15, 1948 (Supp. to Off. Gaz., January, 1950, Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 268),
is expressly repealed. Such ruling is not only contrary to the real meaning of "double jeopardy"
as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court, but is also obnoxious to the
administration of justice.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 28
No. L-41863. April 22, 1977.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV’L. FISCAL F, VISITACION, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.
Criminal law; Double jeopardy; No double jeopardy exists where an information for serious
physical injuries was filed after the filing of an information for slight physical injuries against
the same accused arising out of the same incident where the information for serious physical
injuries was filed after the wounds inflicted on the offended victim had healed and it was
found that there was a permanent deformity on the victim’s face.—In brief, what happened
here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of Janiuay, the charge
against Fama, Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the
certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar,
would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only “barring complications.” Indeed,
when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only 3 days had passed since the incident in
which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver
injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after
Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed,
that the alleged deformity became apparent. Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone
to understand that the scar or deformity that would be left by a wound on the face of a
person cannot be predetermined. On the other hand, whether or not there is actually a
deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be determined by the trial
court. The only issue we are to resolve here is whether or not the additional allegation of
deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element winch should
take this case out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court. x x x In People
vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be considered as a supervening
fact. x x x In other words in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double
jeopardy of private respondent Fama, Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error
correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

No. L-36528. September 24,1987.*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 29
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE CITY COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH VI and AGAPITO GONZALES Y VENERACION, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; The defense of double jeopardy
cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offense charged.—Considering these
diferences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which
legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is
not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot
prosper. As aptly put in People v. Doriquez: "It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A single act
may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal
or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. (People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People v. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24). Phrased elsewhere,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as
to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil 472)."
Same; Same; Same; Failure to file motion to quash the complaint or information before
pleading thereto shall be taken as a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion
to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense.— "SEC. 10.
Failure to move to quash—Effect of—Exception.—If the defendant does not move to quash
the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the
defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to quash on some other ground that the
offense for which he is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned, or of
which he has been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion
entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon,
conviction, acquittal or jeopardy."
Same; Same; Same; An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial
court shall not constitute double jeopardy.—The People (petitioner) rightly appealed the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348. For, as ruled in People v. Desalisa: " As a general
rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of the def endant to a
valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by
the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion,
or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or
based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question
to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.''

No. L-45129. March 6,1987.*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN
RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; When the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available.—The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution,
but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV
(22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts.
Same; Same; Claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an
ordinance is different from subsequent offense charged in a statute where both offenses
spring from the same set of acts.—The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy
is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear
sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero.
Same; Same; Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different
statutes, the inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy, is on identity of offenses charged. In
contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the
identity of acts.—Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates
to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double j eopardy is
available only-where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance
while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which
the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two
offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the
same acts which constitute or have given rise to the of fense charged under a statute.
Same; Same; The question of identity of offenses must be addressed by examining the
elements of the two offenses, while the question of identity of acts punished by an ordinance
and a statute must be addressed by examining the locus of such acts in time and space.—
The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of identity of the acts which are
claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute
must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and
space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent
or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral
whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments
(a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
Same; Same; Ordinances; A person who was charged for violating a City Ordinance for having
30
installed a metering device to lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of
the offense may not be charged again for theft of electric power under the Revised Penal
Code.—In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from
November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed
or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining
the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded
that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing
his electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized
installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric
current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
Same; Same; For double jeopardy to be available, not all 'the technical elements of the first
offense need be present in the definition of the second offense.—lt is perhaps important to
note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness.
The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily
includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional
plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks
to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements.
Same; Same; Same.—It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court
of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for
"total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion
to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same of fense.
Same; Same; Damages; Action; Where there is double jeopardy, the fact that there was no
reservation of the right to file separate civil action will not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action which shall continue to be tried in the second charge.—The civil liability aspects
of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action
both before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The
extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does
not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present
case, as we noted earlier, accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police
investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and use of unauthorized
electrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court
of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. However, there is no
evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel
Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the
Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 SESSION 8 31
not have appealed) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has
not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with
such evidence. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the
civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas
City for further proceedings as indicated above.