[ 1 6 2 .

CHAPTER FIVE
Upamana Pramana (Comparison)

Upamana, in Indian Philosophy, is the means of valid knowl­

edge, denotative relation between a word and certain class of
objects through the intermediary knowledge of similarity, dissimi­
larity or particular characteristics conveyed by the authoritative
statement. When we see a certain object and recall another, this
knowledge that we have of the similarity of the recalled object to
the seen one is said to be due the the Upamana. The stock case
of the knowledge of Upamana arises when a citydweller familiar
with the cow but unfamiliar with the object denoted by the word
‘gavaya’ (or ‘gayal’) hears from a reliable forest-born person that
the ‘gavaya’ is an animal resembling a cow. Sure enough, he
happens to go to the forest and comes across such an animal
which is similar to a cow. Then he recollects the sense of the
statement of the forest-born person and comes to know that the
object before him is denoted by the word ‘gavaya’ .

The two factors are involved in such argument by Upamana,

viz., (i) the knowledge of the object (=gavaya) to be known and
 [ 16^ ]

(ii) the perception of similarity. As such, Upamana involves the

following steps- (a) A person hears an authoritative statement,
e.g. ‘the gavaya is like cow’, (b) He observes similarity of a gavaya
with a cow. (c) He remembers the statement received from the
reliable person, (d) He argues by comparison that this kind of
object is denoted by the word ‘gavaya’.

Upamana is derived from the words ‘ U pa’ and ‘ Mana’ ; here

‘ Upa’ means contiguity(samipya) or similarity, i.e. ‘sadrsya’ and
‘ M ana’ means cognition. Etym olog ica lly, Upam ana=Upa-
>/_ M a+(bhave) ‘ ly u t’ , here ‘ U p a ’ means contiguous and
‘ Mana’ means knowledge and therefore ‘ Upamana’ is the knowl­
edge of contiguity (samipya) or the knowledge of the similarity
/
between two things. Contiguity or ‘samipya’ means the posses­
sion of common characteristics (cf. samanya => samananarfi
bhabah). Derivatively it is the knowledge gained by comparison.
This derivative meaning, however, requires certain qualifications
in order to give a complete definition of Upamana. Though the
word Upamana has been variously translated as Analogy, Com­
parison, Indetification, knowledge by similarity and knowledge
by assimilation, yet its derivative meaning suggests, that Com­
parison is proper substitute. In general sense, Upamana is the
standard of comparison, that with which anything is compared,
 [ 16.4 ]

just opposite of Upameya (comparable with).

The Advaita Vedanta, the Mimartisa and the Nyaya system

agree in adopting Upamana as an independent source of valid
knowledge, but the other system reject Upamana as an indepen­
dent source of knowledge. While going through its details in the
texts, we find that the conceptions of different schools or of the
same school in different works do not absolutely concide. The
upholderes of Upamana as an independent source of valid knowl­
edge also differ in details.

Gautama aphorises that Upamana is way of proving what is

to be proved through a thing’s sharing quqlities with what is
already known1. According to him, there are quite a few different
theories about precisely what kind of knowledge this resulting
knowledge is. He argues that it is exceptional, being neither a
Pratyaksa (perception) nor an Anumana (inference). The reason
for its not being perceptional is that its content includes a refer­
ence to linguistic usage of the word ‘gavaya’ , and usage can not
be perceived. Gautama states that it is not Anumana since
Anumana gives us knowledge about things which can be verified
through Pratyaksa.

1. p r a s i d d h a - s a d h a r m y a t s a d h y a - s a d h a n a m
upamanam. N S . , I. 1.6 , p. 4 2 4 .
 [ 165]
In the Nyaya system, we have divergence of view regarding
instrumentality in Upamana. Guatama equates Upamana with the
well known similarity, Vatsyayana accepts it as the authoritative
statement conveying similarity, whereas Uddyotakara takes it as
the knowledge of the well known similarity.

Jayantabhatta defends Vatsyayana and attacks Uddyotakara.

He finds a divergence of opinion among his predecessors re­
garding the nature of Upamana. According to him, we cannot

perceive similarity since both ex-hypotheses of the things whose

similarity is supposed to be perceived are not present. The simi­
larity is grasped directly from the verbal authority, and as
Vatsyayana believes, it is the memory of this similarity which is
the first of the two conditions. According to Vacaspati, the word
> "V

‘prasiddhasadharmaf forms the essential part of the definition

o
of Upamana . According to him, the term sadharmya is used el-

liptically for the properties in general. He suggests that the word

‘yatah’ should be inserted in the sutra forming the definition of
Upamana, so that it should without doubt be applicable to the
karana (instrument) only.

2. sadhyasadhanamityucyamane pratyaksadisa
dhanesu sukhaduhkhasadhanesu prasangah.
atah uktamprasiddhasadharmyaditi. NVTT.,1.1.6
 [ 166 ]

T h u s , a c c o rd in g to th e N a iy a y ik a s , U p a m a n a is th e s o u rc e

of k n o w le d g e of re la tio n e ith e r b e tw e e n na m e (s a rh jn a ) a nd a

th in g (s a rh jn in ) o r b e tw e e n w o rd a n d its d e n o ta tio n 3.

T h e M fm a rtis a k a s a ls o a c c e p t U p a m a n a a s an in d e p e n ­

d e n t s o u rc e of k n o w le d g e , b u t it is fu n d a m e n ta lly d iffe rs from the

N a iy a y ik a s . It is re m a rk a b le th a t J a im in i, th e a u th o r o f th e

M im a m s a -s u tra d o e s n o t s p e a k of U p a m a n a . It is S a h a ra w h o

d is c u s s e s th e n a tu re of U p a m a n a . T h e P ra b h a k a ra a n d the B h a tta

s c h o o l of M im a rfis a co m m e n te d u p o n S a h a r a ’s e x p o s itio n .

S a b a ra s v a m in d e fin e s U p a m a n a a s k n o w le d g e of an u n ­

p e rc e iv e d o b je c t a s b e in g sim ila r to so m e k n o w n o b je c ts 4. H e

u s e s th e sa m e term fo r th e m e a n s of k n o w le d g e a n d th e re s u lt­

an t k n o w le d g e . T h e d e finition le a v e s th e n a tu re of re su lta n t kn ow l­

e d g e u n e x p la in e d .

H e h a s e x p re s s e d it w ith th e h e lp of an e x a m p le - ‘ju s t a s

3 . ‘y a t h a g a u r e v a r t i g a v a y a h ’ i t y u p a m a n e p r a y u k t e
g a v a s a m a n a -d h a r m a m a r t h a m in d riya rth a -sa n n i
karsad u p a la b h a m a n a h a s y a g a v a y a -s a b d a h
s a r h j n a iti s a r h j n a - s a r h j n i - s a m b a n d h a r h
pra tipa d ya te . N B . , p p . 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 ( 1 .1 .6 )

■4. u p a m a n a m api s a d rs y a m a sarm ikrsterthe

b u d d h im u tpa d a ya ti. S B . , I . 1. 5.
 [ 167 ]

the perception of the gavaya is the cause of the remembrance of

the cow’56
. Kumarila Bhatta rejects his interpretation on the ground
c
that it would amount to remembrance .

The Prabhakara also understands similarity as the means

of Upamana. He construes the term ‘gosmarana’ , from the ex­
ample of Sahara, in the sense of the agent in Upamana and ren­
ders it as in the case of pratyaksa (perception) of one who has
already seen a cow7.

Th e Va isesika system accepts two pram anas, viz. (i)

Pratyaksa and (ii) Anumana. This system reduce Upamana to
Anumana. They refuse to accept Upamana as an independent

source of knowledge. The Vaisesika-sutra does not refer to

Upamana. Prasastapada says that it is the means of conveying
the knowledge of ‘gavaya’ by an authoritative person through
the similarity to the cow to a man who does not know it earlier.
However, it is nothing other than Sabda (verbal testimony). On

5. y a th a g a v a y a d a rs a n a m g o sm a ra n a sya . ib id .

6. s a d r s a d u p a j a y e t a y a m a tih s a d r s a n t a r e /

d h y a n a d is m r tit u ly a tv a t s a n a r a n a m k a th a m

b h a v e t // S V . , ( u p a m a n a 4 ) ,, p. 30 8.

7. g o s m a r a n a s y e ti, a n u b h u ta g o h p u r u s a s y a .

B r h ., p. 107.
 [ 168 ]

the other hand, verbal testimony is also a case of Anumana (in­

ference), and hence, Upamana (comparison) is also a case of
inference. The Paribhasakara question the Vaisesika as to what
the knowledge of the mark (lihga) is in arriving at similarity to
gavaya (gavayasadrsya) in the cow. The author argues that even

if such inference (anumana) is made deliberately, the knowledge

of similarity of ‘gavaya’ which exists in the cow (gonistagavaya-
sadrsyajnana) is arrived at by ordinary experience. Therefore,
that should be a vyabhicari lihga. In addition to this Dharmaraja
argues that there is the apperception ‘ I am com paring’
(upaminomi) in such cases and as such it is only a case of Ana­
logical knowledge. So Upamana, i.e. Comparison cannot be re­
placed by inference.
, i

The Sarhkhya-Yoga system explains Upamana as a form of

Anumana and therefore, neither accept Upamana as a distinct

type of knowledge nor as an independent way of knowing. The

Sarhkhyakarika states that the additional means postulated by

other systematists are included under Pratyaksa, Anumana, and
Sabda only. As ‘gavaya is like the cow’, thus Upamana has been
illustrated by means of Sabda (verbal testimony). This is purely

8. u p a m in o m i it y a n u v y a v a s a y a c c a .t a s m a d u p a m a -
n a m m a n a n ta ra m . V P .,p .8 4
 [ 169]
verbal when it is uttered by an elderly-experienced person
(vrddhavyavahara) to cognise an unexperienced people about
the unknown beast ‘gavaya’. The Yuktidlpika takes notice the
view of the Nyaya on Upama only and includes Upamana under
verbal testimony(sabda). It is the valid statement which lead one
g
to the knowledge arrived at through Upamana .

The Sartikhya system objects that Upamana is not a sepa­

rate means of valid knowledge, i.e. pramana but say it is a case

of perception (pratyaksa). The Sartikhya thinkers argue that the

features from which a statement of similarity between the ‘gavaya’
and the cow is obtained are identical in the cow and the ‘gavaya’.
So they hold that just like the knowledge of similarity to the cow
(gosadrsyajnana) present in the‘gavaya’ due to ‘sannikarsa’, so
also in the recollected cow also (gavayasadrsya jn an a) is
(pratyaksa) perceptible. Therefore, Upamana cannot be a sepa­
rate pramana. The Advaita Vedantin rejects the view of the
Sartikhya on the ground that the cow is not in proximity with the

sense organ when the resulting knowledge (jnana) is produced

and hence it cannot be a case of pratyaksa.

9. yatha gaurevarh gavayaiti captopadesabalat
pratipatta aprasiddharti gavayamupalabhate na
sadrsyamatrat. tasmat na sabdat prthagupama.
YD., 4.
 [ 170 ]

The Carvakas contend that Upamana is not a source of

knowledge, if knowledge at a l l; since Upamana can not give us
any true or valid knowledge about the denotation of words.

The Bauddha recognise Upamana as a form of valid knowl­

edge, but do not admit Upamana to be an independent source of
valid knowledge. The Buddhist logicians include it within Pratyaksa
or Sabda.

The Jain system reduces Upamana to ‘pratyabhijna’ (rec­

ognition). According to the Jains pratyabhijna is a kind of syn­
thetic judgement of perception and remembrance. As for example,
‘the cow is like the gavaya’ . This is the example of judgement
arising out of similarity.

The Advaita Vedanta like the Mimarfisa gives an indepen­

dent status to Upamana, but the other schools of Vedanta dis­

agree in this matter.

The Visistadvaita school of Vedanta accepts Pratyaksa (per­

ception), Anumana (inference) and Sabda (verbal testimony) only
as the independent source of knowledge10, and includes the ad­
ditional sources postulated by other systematists under these

10. tan i p r a m a n a n i p r a t y a k s a n u m a n a s a b d a k h y a n i
t r im . Y M D . , p. 8
 [171 ]

three only. Regarding sources of knowledge or epistemology,

Ramanuja states that valid knowledge is the knowledge which
apprehends an objects as it really exists. Srlnivas and some other
post-Ramanuja Visistadvaita philosophers have admitted one
more source of valid knowledge and that is Upamana.

According to the Visistadvaita school, Upamana can be in­

cluded under any of the perception, inference and verbal testi­
mony in accordance with the stress upon a particular aspect of
Upamana.

The Dvaita school of Vedanta also admits Pratyaksa,

Anumana and Sabda only as independent source of knowledge,
any other sources are included under one or the other of these
three. Madhvacarya states that like Arthapatti, Upamana is the
particular forms of inference11. Specially, Jayatfrtha, a famous
commentator on the Pramanas Prakarana of Madhvacarya dis­
cusses the inclusion of Upamana under other source of knowl­
edge more elaboretely.

Vallabhacarya, the founder of the pure non-daulistic school

or Suddhadvaita and Nimbarka, the founder of the Dvaitadvaita
(dualistic monism) of the Vedanta also accept only above men-

11. a r t h a p a t t y u p a m e a n u m a n a v i s e s a . P P R ., p . 4 4
 [ 172]
tioned three sources of valid knowledge, viz. (i) perception, (ii)
inference and (iii) verbal testimony. According to them, Upamana
is included under these three.

The Advaita Vedanta is one of the upholders of Upamana

as an independent sources of knowledge or pramanas. However,
the Advaita Vedanta account of Upamana fundamentally differs
from that of the Naiyayikas. There is the divergence of opinion
regarding the nature of resultant knowledge through Upamana^
According to Naiyayikas the resultant knowledge is the knowl­
edge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. But,
according to the Advaita Vedantins, like the Mimaitisakas, the
resultant knowledge pertains to the similarity which the remem­
bered object bears to the directly perceived one.

Upamana has been defined by Dharmarajadhvarlndra in the

Vedanta Paribhasa as the instrument, i.e. karana of Upamiti which
in turn is the resultant knowledge in the form of similarity . The
stock case of the knowledge of Upamana arises when a man
perceives a cow in the city and comes across a ‘gavaya’ in the
forest, he comes to understand that object perceived is like the
cow. Sure enough, ‘my cow is like the object perceived’ and as-

12.tatra sadrsyapramakaranam upamanam. VP.,p.83

 [ 173]
serfs and knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to the
‘gavaya’ 13.

The Paribhasakara is of opinion that the instrumentality is

the knowledge of the similarity which the gavaya bears to the
cow and the resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity
which the cow bears to the ‘gavaya’14. Here, the psychological
process involves four steps : first, there is the knowledge or per­
ception of points of similarity in the ‘gavaya’. Secondly, through
the similarity is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the
city. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible
‘gavaya’ is like the cow and lastly there is the consequent knowl­
edge that the cow seen earlier is similar to teh ‘gavaya’ seen at
present, or, in other words, the cow seen earlier is qualified by
the similarity to the ‘gavaya’ seen at present.

Anandapurna Munlndra also called AnandapGrna Vidya-

13. t a t h a h i . . . n a g a r e s u d r s t a g o p i n d a s y a p u r u s a s y a

v a n a r ih g a t a s y a g a v a y e n d r i y a s a n n i k a r s e s a t i

b h a v a t i p r a t i t i h - ‘ a y a r f i p i n d o g o s a d r s a h ’ iti.

t a d a n a n t a r a r f i c a b h a v a t i n i s c a y a h - ‘a n e n a

s a d r s l m a d i y a g a u h ’ iti. ib id ., p . 8 3 .

14. t a t r a n v a y a v y a t i r e k a b h y a r f i g a v a y a n i s t a g o s a d f -

s y a jn a ja rh k a r a n a m , g o n is t a g a v a y a s a d r s y a jn a n -

a r fi p h a l a m . ib id ., p . 8 3 .
 [ 174]
sagara in his Nyayacandrika defines Upamiti as the knowledge
of similarity which the object situated at a distance bears to that
pressent near the observes15. He explains the position with the
help of the example containing the psychological process in
Upamana that the resultant knowledge through it refers to the
hi a
cow qualified by the similarity to ‘gavaya’ .

The Advaita Vedantins try to established the independent

position of Upamana. Accordingly they opine that the knowledge
of cow qualified by its similarity to the gavaya can not be a case
of Pratyaksa or others. This can be accepted that the similarity
is perceived through sense-object contact which makes it a case
of Pratyaksa, but still, it cannot be a case of Pratyaksa. Because,
the knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to gavaya is
not perceived at the time of knowing it. Hence, it remains to be
1 7
classed apart .

Keeping in view the independent status to Upamana, the

Advaitins state that Upamana cannot be a case of Anumana as

15. sannikrstenasannikrstasya sadrsyamiti upamiti.

• • • • » • *

NC., p. 279.
16. sadrsyavisistagojnanamupamiti. Ibid., p. 279
17. na cedarh pratyaksena sambhavati, gopindasya
tadendriyasannikarsat. VP., p. 84.
 [ 175]
well. To put it more clearly, the Advaita Vedanta argues that the
resultant knowledge supposed to be acquired through Upamana
is acquired through Anumana also. This cow bears the similarity
to that gavaya, because of having same quality etc., as that
gavaya. Dharmarajadhvarindra further says that the knowledge
of similarity cannot be acquired through Anumana, because the
similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow can not serve as a
18
mark or probans in Anumana . It can not be acquired from
anumana, for similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow cannot
serve as a mark of anumana as follows : My cow is similar to this
wild cow (gavaya), because she is the correlate of similarity ex­
isting is this wild cow, whatever is the correlate (pratiyogi) of
similarity with another thing is similar to it, as Caitra, the corre­
late of similarity existing in Maitra, is similar to Maitra.

The Advaitins and the Mlmarhsakas consider Upamana as

a distinct means of mediate knowledge, which is different from
Anumana or inference. According to the Vedantin who follows
the Mimarhsaka, knowledge obtained through Upamana is as: A
person who has the knowledge of the cow goes to a forest and
sees a gavaya, then he cognises the similarity that the gavaya is

18. n a p y a n u m a n e n a , g a v a y a n is t a g o s a d f s y a s y a a ta
Ilin g a tv a t. j b id . , p .8 4
 [ 17/6 J

like his own cow. At that moment the person forms the judge­
ment that his cow is like that gavaya. This perception of the simi­
larity to the cow present in the gavaya is the special cause of the
upamiti , the cognition of the similarity in the cow to that of the
19
‘gavaya’ is the result . This type of knowledge by comparison is
neither perception nor inference.

But some thinkers like the Vaisesikas argue that the

Vedantins Upamana can be reduced to an inference. The
Vaisesikas say that is possible to derive Upamana through a
syllogism as : ‘My cow is similar to this gavaya, since it is the
correlate (pratiyogl) of similarity present in this’.

In reply to this objection, our author argues that even the

form of syllogism is not actually observed in our common life as
leading to the knowledge that my cow is similar to the ‘gavaya’
present before. On the other hand, the similarity which the cow
bears the gavaya is cognised through common experience and
is not deduced through syllogism. However, the ‘anuvyavasaya’
which determines the nature of the source of the knowledge is in
the form that ‘I know through similarity’ and not through the func­
tion of the syllogism. Upamana cannot be brought under Sabda

19. gavayanistagosadrsyajnajarh karanam, gonistaga

vayasadrsyajnanarft phalam. Op.Cit., p. 83.
 [ 177 ]

o r v e rb a l te s tim o n y a lso . S u c h k n o w le d g e d o e s not o b v io u s ly

a rise from v e rb a l te stim o n y, sin ce the p e rs o n w h o h e a rs that a

g a v a y a is like a c o w is not g ive n a n y fu rth e r id e a of the g a v a y a ’ s

a ttribu tes a n d s o d o e s not know that g a v a y a d e n o te s the anim al

until h e s e e s it. In o th e r w o rd s , v e rb a l te s tim o n y is not a factor to

d e c id e th e in va ria b le c o n co m ita n ce .

D h a rm a ra ja s u g g e s ts to the V a is e s ik a s tw o a lte rn a tiv e s ,viz.

Is it that, in a rriv in g at the k n o w le d g e o f th e sim ila rity of g a v a y a

w hich e x is ts in th e c o w (g o n is ta g a v a y a s a d rs y a ) the k n o w led g e

o f sim ila rity of a c o w in ‘g a v a y a ’ (g a v a y a n is ta g o s a d rs y a ) is the

lin g a in w h ic h c a s e , sin c e th e sim ila rity to th e c o w p re se n t in the

‘g a v a y a ’ (g a v a y a n is ta g o s a d rs y a ) is not p re s e n t in th e cow , it

c a n n o t b e h e ld to b e p re s e n t in th e su b je c t (p a k s a ) a s it will b e a

fa lla c io u s re a s o n in g . In th e a lte rn a tive if it b e a rg u e d that it is

‘ g a v a y a n is ta g o s a d rs y a p ra tiyo g itv a m ’ th at is th e lin g a in a rriv ­

ing at ( ‘g o n is ta g a v a y a s a d rs y a jn a n a ’), the k n o w le d g e of the sim i­

la rity of ‘g a v a y a ’ w h ich e xists in th e c o w a n d th e re fo re , A n u m a n a

20
(in fe re n c e ) is p o s s ib le .

O u r a u th o r is o f o p in io n that th e in stru m e n ta lity is the know l­

e d g e o f th e sim ila rity w hich the g a v a y a b e a rs to th e co w a n d the

20. V P .,p.84 .vide SM., pp. 233 - 234

 [178 ]

resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity which the cow

bears to the gavaya21 . It is seen here that the psychological pro­
cess involves four steps, viz. : first, there is the knowledge or
perception of points of similarity in the gavaya. Secondly, through
the similarity is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the
city. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible
gavaya is like the cow and lastly, there is the consequent knowl­
edge that the cow seen earlier is similar to the gavaya seen at
present, or, in other words, the cow seen earlier is qualified by
the similarity to the gavaya seen at present.

The Advaitins hold that a knowledge of the relation of the

sarhjna and the samj'nin is the result of a knowledge of similarity
(sadrsya). According to them, knowledge of similarity (i.e.
i

upamana) is the instrument (i.e. karana) and recollection of a

forester’s statement is the activity (vyapara).

As such, it should be noted that the Advaitin accepts the

essentials of Upamana as postulated by the Mimarhsaka, but
still, the practical utility of Upamana accepted by the Mimarhsaka
may not be accepted by the Advaita Vedanta. The Mimarhsaka

21. gavayanistagosadfsyajnajam karanam, gonistaga

vayasadrsyajnanarfi phalam. Op.Cit.
 [ 179]

hold that Upamana In replacing one object by the other similar to

it in the context of the sacrifical rites. It would not be consistent
with the spirit of the Advaita Vedanta. They would accept Upamana
for the purpose of explaining super natural experience on the
analogy of common worldly experience,i.e. to explain the unob­
served fact through its similaritym to the observed one. Thus, the
sole purpose of the Vedanta unlike the Mimarfisa, is not fulfilled
with the ritualistic interpretation of the scriptural statement. On
the contrary, the Vedanta system aims at providing the correct
interpretation of scriptural statement regarding the knowledge of
ultimate reality. Therefore, the purpose of the Upamana should
be accepted as the explanation of the analogy of the common
experience. The Advaita Vedantins would accept Upamana for

explaining the passages speaking of super natural experience of

reality which reminds the experience of common life.

Thus Dharmarajadhvarindra who follows the Mimarfisaka,

in the Upamana-pariccheda of his Vedanta Paribhasa try to es­
tablished Upamana (Comparison) as a distinct means of mediate
knowledge.

♦♦♦