Republic of the Philippines
After succeeding in untying
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Saleto J. Erames for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked, JUANITO
GARAY, a lawyer, was found dead with three (3) gunshot wounds. For his death and
the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, AURELIO BANDULA, PANTALEON
SEDIGO, TEOFILO DIONANAO and VICTORIANO EJAN were haled to court for
robbery with homicide.
On 5 May 1989, after hearing twelve (12) prosecution and nine (9) defense
witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of
the crime charged. However, his three (3) co-accused were acquitted "for
insufficiency of evidence." 1
As found by the court a quo, 2 on 27 January 1986, at around ten o'clock in the
evening, six (6) armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in
Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio
Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and
Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore masks were simply referred to as
"Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the two (2) masked men held Salva who was
manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back.
They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General
Foreman of the plantation,
hog- tied him, and divested him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38
cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the six (6) armed men with Salva and Pastrano in
tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the Polo Coconut
Plantation. Accused Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while accused
Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty.
Garay. After forcing their way into the house, the masked men and Bandula
ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Thereafter, the
hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside his
house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots
coming from the direction of the gate of the compound.
themselves, Pastrano and Salva went to report the matter to the police. On their way,
they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay.
In arriving at its conclusions, the trial court considered the alleged confession of
accused Bandula that after the incident he gave his .38 cal. revolver for safekeeping
to Jovito Marimat, Jr., from whom three handguns were recovered by the police, i.e.,
a .38 cal. revolver with four (4) live ammunitions and one (1) empty shell, a .22 cal.
"paltik" revolver, and a revolver with M16 bullets. It likewise took into account the
supposed admission of accused Victoriano Ejan that he kept a 12-gauge Winchester
shotgun, a tape recorder, a bayonet and a pair of binoculars in the house of his
relative Emilio Rendora who was found to have the goods in his possession. The
court also noted that a sum of money suspected to be part of the loot was recovered
from accused Pantaleon Sedigo.
Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused
Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission
of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." "These extrajudicial confessions made by
accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula extracted during custodial
investigation," the trial court ruled, "have all the qualities and have complied with all
the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself
that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial
investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)." 3
Thus the trial court disregarded the following defenses of the four (4) accused:
(a) Teofilo Dionanao — that he was arrested without a warrant and brought to the
Tanjay Police Station on 28 January 1986 for no apparent reason; that there he was
made to sit on a bench for about an hour when Cpl. Kagawasan Borromeo, Pat.
Tomas Borromeo and Pat. El Moso arrived and took turns in mauling him until he spat
blood, after which, he was locked up in the municipal jail; that his repeated requests
to see a doctor were ignored; that the following morning, he was taken out of his cell
and again mauled, after which, he was forced to sign a piece of paper without a
counsel and the contents of which he did not know; that, prior to his detention, he did
not know his three (3)
co-accused as he met them for the first time only when they were detained together in
the Municipal Jail of Tanjay. 4
(b) Aurelio Bandula — that in the evening of 27 January 1986 he was in the house of
Jovito Marimat, Sr., a quack doctor; that he was bedridden as he was undergoing
treatment for an inflamed stomach which, at that time, was fully covered with herbs;
that, the following morning, at around six o'clock, he was awakened and dragged by
Cpl. Borromeo and Pat. Moso from his sickbed into a waiting motorcycle and brought
to the Municipal Hall where he was interrogated by Pat. Melvin Baldejera; that, later
that afternoon, he was brought to a room where four (4) persons, including Antonio
Salva, took turns in beating him up until he became unconscious; that that evening,
he was made to sign a blank paper purportedly for his release; that he was then put
behind bars; that because of the mauling, he felt extreme pain on his left rib; that he
1
saw accused Dionanao for the first time only on 28 January 1986 in the Municipal
Hall, and his two (2) other co-accused Sedigo and Ejan only the following day when
they were locked up together with him in his cell; that his relatives were not allowed to
see him; and, that he did not know nor ever met Atty. Ruben Zerna. 5
(c) Victoriano Ejan — that he first met his three (3) co-accused only on
29 January 1986 when he was confined in the Municipal Hall; that after taking supper
on 27 January 1986, he slept with his wife and four (4) children; that he was not
aware of the incident that transpired that night until he was arrested at gunpoint by
Pat. Moso, Pat. Gaste and Pat. Esparicia at around five o'clock the following
afternoon; that he was brought to the Municipal Hall and there mauled until he lost
consciousness; that his relatives were barred from seeing him; that during his four-
month detention in Tanjay, he was never investigated; that he has not relative by the
name of Emilio Rendora. 6
(d) Pantaleon Sedigo — that on 29 January 1986, at around six-thirty in the morning,
Pat. Esparicia and Cpl. Borromeo, with their guns drawn, just barged into his house,
searched his belongings and arrested him without a warrant; that when he refused to
go with them, he was hit on the chest and eye; that he had never met any of his co-
accused prior to his detention, neither did he know the deceased Atty. Garay; and,
that he did not know anything about the charges against him. 7
On 6 June 1986, the four (4) accused were transferred from the Municipal Jail of
Tanjay to the Negros Oriental Provincial Rehabilitation Center in Dumaguete City. It
was there where accused Bandula asked to see a doctor; that, as a result of his
request, he was brought to the provincial hospital where he was examined 8 and
diagnosed to have an "[o]ld healed fracture with callous formation at the 6th and 7th
rib along the mid-auxiliary line, left;" 9 that when prosecution witness Pat. Baldejera
was asked on 15 September 1987 in open court if he saw any contusions or bruises
on any of the four (4) accused after their arrest, he admitted that he noticed accused
Sedigo with a "black eye." 10
Although the respective alibis of all four (4) accused were disregarded considering
their positive identification by Salva as the ones who raided Polo Coconut Plantation,
the trial court nevertheless acquitted Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo on the ground that
while "these three accused were present at the scene of the crime . . . from the
inception of the crime to its final termination, they were merely bystanders and did not
participate in one way or another in the commission thereof . . . The mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is
not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy." 11 Hence, the instant appeal by
the lone convict.
Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused
Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in
evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and
were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his
position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
The prosecution witnesses themselves disclosed that on 28 January 1986 accused
Dionanao was "picked-up for investigation" and interrogated by
Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he implicated accused
Sedigo. 12 The following day, on 29 January 1986, he was brought to the Office of the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he supposedly executed his
extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter. 13 On 4 February 1986, upon the
suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the Supplementary Sworn
Statement of Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna. 14 In his Sworn
Statement, Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with Bandula when the latter,
together with "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall," shot Atty. Garay. He added that he was
going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also said that Sedigo and Ejan were
with them that evening. 15 Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he
implicated three (3) more persons but they were not thereafter included in the
Information. 16
The prosecution likewise asseverated that accused Bandula was arrested on 28
January 1986, at around six o'clock in the morning, brought to the
Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated. 17 He was investigated by
Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso and Pat. Baldejera. 18 In that
investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with two (2) others shot
Atty. Garay with a .38 cal. revolver. 19 At that time, there was no counsel present
"because that (investigation) was not yet in writing." 20 Two weeks after his arrest,
Bandula allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his
participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In
that statement, Bandula narrated that after "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty.
Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot the latter which he
did. 21
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and
accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation
with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant
Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the
Constitution which mandates in
Sec. 12, Art. III, that —
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
2
 (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
In the twin cases of Morales, Jr., v. Enrile 22 and Moncupa, Jr. v.
Enrile, 23 and the subsequent case of People v. Galit, 24 all promulgated even before
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, we laid down the procedure for peace officers
to follow when making an arrest and conducting a custodial investigation —
. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 25 that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon
the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense." Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any
statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been
taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 26
Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De
Jesus 27 where we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be
a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty.
Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal
officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and
the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including
the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the
accused during custodial investigations. 28
What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they
were mauled into owning the crime. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to
the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the
accused.
For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even
before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the
investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the services of
counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge before conducting any
investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests
of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his "black eye"
which even
Pat. Baldejera admitted? How and why did accused-appellant Bandula suffer a
fractured rib?
We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly
disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot
accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or
any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be
rejected in toto. 29
Consequently, the prosecution is left with nothing but the alleged positive
identification of appellant Bandula by witness Salva. But this by itself does not
measure up to the required standard of moral certainty.
3
We cannot give credence to the lone identification by witness Salva of all four (4)
accused who were supposedly bold enough to bare their faces. For, Maria Paz Garay,
widow of the victim, recounted that except for Pastrano and Salva whose hands were
tied behind their backs, she could not recognize any of the men as all their faces were
fully covered, although according to Salva only two (2) were hooded. She could only
see their eyes. 30 Thus, even Pastrano who witnessed the crime together with Salva
was not able to recognize any of the armed men as they were hooded. In fact, even if
there was light, he said he would not be able to recognize the
malefactors. 31 Contraposed with the testimonies of Garay and Pastrano, the alleged
positive identification by Salva crumbles.

With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused-appellant Bandula
beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. We have
oftentimes said that while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, this claim
assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature
of the prosecution evidence. 32 The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the
defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to
convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. In this, the
state has utterly failed.

Indeed, it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all
appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform do
not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put
words into his mouth. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an
accused, 33 a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners 34 and a statute
which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional
rights. 35

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the conviction of accused-appellant AURELIO

BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged.Costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.

4
SECOND DIVISION
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigations; Extra-judicial
Confessions; Evidence; The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 133188 exhibit written in any language other than the official language (Filipino or English), if
Appellee, there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the official interpreter of the
Members: court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both the original and
the translation sent to the Supreme Court; Where the accused does not interpose any
PUNO, Chairman, objection to the fact that there is no official translation of his extrajudicial confession in
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the dialect, and the parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appear
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., to be familiar with or knowledgeable of such language in which the document is
TINGA, and written, such confession may appropriately be considered by the trial court as
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. evidence for the prosecution.—The rule is that when there is presented in evidence
an exhibit written in any language other than the official language (Filipino or English),
Promulgated: if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the official interpreter of the
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and
Appellant. July 23, 2004 translation sent to this court. In this case, there is no official translation of appellant’s
extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly
follow the rule, then appellant’s extrajudicial confession should not have been
admitted by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution. Nevertheless, considering
that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties and the judicial
authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of
Cebuano in which the document was written, such extrajudicial confession was
appropriately considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Barangay Captains; A barangay
captain cannot be considered as an independent counsel for purposes of assisting
one undergoing custodial investigation.—The words “competent and independent
counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to
accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer. As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the
barangay captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government
Code, a barangay captain performs the following duties and functions: (a) The
punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise
such powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and
other laws; (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall: (1) Enforce all laws and ordinances
which are applicable within the barangay; . . . (3) Maintain public order in the
barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and the
sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; . . . Simply put,
Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances
in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times. In fact, as barangay captain,
Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit: ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority.—Who
shall be deemed as such.—In applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. On these bases, it is not legally
possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of appellant.
5
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What the Constitution requires is the
presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.—Similarly in
this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of
providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a
crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent
counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the
Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one
who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of
interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession; The lawyer should also ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights.—Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a
competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant
counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As
held in People vs. Velarde: . . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged
should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a
while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic
to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer who already suspected the accused as
having committed the crime is not an effective and vigilant counsel—the Court cannot
imagine how the counsel could have effectively safeguarded the rights of the suspect
during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that the latter is
guilty of the crime charged.—That Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant
counsel is bolstered by his own testimony that he already suspected appellant as
having committed the crime when the latter was brought to his house by the barangay
tanods, viz.: * * * The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively
safeguarded appellant’s rights as an accused during the investigation when he
himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and
naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The facts that a suspect chose a particular lawyer
during the custodial investigation does not estop him from complaining about the
latter’s failure to safeguard his rights.—As provided in Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, “(A)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right . . . to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should
be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning,
but the word “preferably” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by
a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. What is imperative is that the
counsel should be competent and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan
does not estop appellant from complaining about the latter’s failure to safeguard his
rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An extrajudicial confession executed by a suspect
assisted by a counsel who failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent
and competent counsel is deemed an uncounseled confession and, therefore,
inadmissible in evidence.—Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting
standards of an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution.
Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is
deemed an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites.—Under Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty. The circumstantial evidence in this case does not
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
appellant is the guilty person.
6
Same; Same; Same; Where it was a civilian who obtained and received the evidence,
the possibility that the integrity of these articles could have been compromised cannot
be ignored; Sloppy handling of evidence renders the chain of custody of pieces of
evidence dubious, and damaging to the prosecution’s case, such as when the
marking made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in
the canal located in front of the police station and they had to clean and wash the
shoes.—Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes
and tres cantos were given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned
over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not
identify the person who turned over the objects to the police. There was no showing
who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented to identify if
these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn’s house and
turned over to the police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as
to confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later
presented in court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the prosecution to
allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence
are crucial to the prosecution’s case. Also, the fact that a civilian obtained and
received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these articles could have
been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his direct
examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented
in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the
marking he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell
in the canal located in front of the police station and they had to clean and wash the
shoes! Such sloppy handling renders the chain of custody of those pieces of evidence
dubious, and damaging to the prosecution’s case.
Same; Same; Witnesses; The doctrine of long standing that the testimony of a lone
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to
eyewitnesses.—The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of
appellant’s guilt is mainly the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however,
is uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain
a conviction, if such testimony positively establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of a lone
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to
eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not
sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. Rico’s lone
testimony is not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Even though the accused’s defense is
weak, conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not
from the weakness of the defense.—Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be
tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant’s defense is weak, conviction must come
from the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not from the weakness of the
defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to justify a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 18.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an
extrajudicial confession. This appeal particularly involves the question of whether
a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within
the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information
charging appellant with Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about
2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing her with
said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries causing:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO
SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB
WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR
ASPECT)
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost
instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, [2] and trial
thereafter ensued.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence,
aside from appellants extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar
Tomaquin @ Hapon, together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a
certain Cardo, were drinking Red Horse beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu
City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the morning,
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to
Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as
the latter heard Jaquelyn[3] Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two
flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns house.The first to go up was a
certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and
Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the walling of the main
7
door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the kitchen was
turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which he
claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn
bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic
container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later
found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be
appellants.[4] A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres cantos for safekeeping
which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos
Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not
identified.[5]
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods
Julius Yosores and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant
because of the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres
cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they
went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and
found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing
bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the
killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato
Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and he told
them that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his
shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his
tanods to take appellant to the police station.[6]
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was
investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in
Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2
Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan,
the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter
told him that he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00
in the afternoon, he conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan
then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant was ready to give his statement.
[7]
Appellants extrajudicial confession, which was taken down completely in the
Cebuano dialect,[8] reads:
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa
atong batakang balaod (Constitution) aduna kay
katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga
katungod, sama sa imong katungod sa
pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa
pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban
aron motabang kanimo niining maong
imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa
kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas
2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong
petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996, didto sa
Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong
ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o
pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo
karon, ako isip negrepresenttar sa Estado
mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba
kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong
Batakang Balaod, anfg tanan nga imong isulti
karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya
pabor o batok kanimo sa bisan asaing husgado
sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao
nimong mga katungod ug anadam ka ba nga
moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw
nga nga pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa
pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod
a lamang gayud?
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty
Parawan ang among Brgy Captain nga maoy
akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga
maoy motabang kanako karon. Aron sa
pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa
16 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996.
...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar
Tomaquin kon dili ang matuod lamang
gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa
resulta o linugdangan niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan
nga circumstacia o rmay kalambigitan sa imong
pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho,
imong pinuy-anan ug uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o
apelyedo sa akong mama sanglit dili man kasado
and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa
akong papa, Cabagui ug and akon angga
Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug
kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega
proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako
lumad nga taga Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin
didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa
Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?
8
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang
kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico Magdasal didito sa
Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw
ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong saka
sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega
nianang pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong
petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa
akong tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga
colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored
TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa
ilang TV, diin ka man punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang
ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si
Jaqueline Tatoy nga naghidga sa ilang may
terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila
ug diha-diha akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug
gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres
kantps nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres
Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga
Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline
Totay?
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko
makahinumdom kon diin to siya maigo. Basta
manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko
ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo
pahimudsi and iyang pagkapbabye o wala ka bay
plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo
sa pag rape niya. Ang ako ra gyud nga tuyo mao
ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay
nisiyagit man siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako,
nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang
pagkawat sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang
gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si
Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug imong
gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may
kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong
nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may
sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan
agi sa pultahan nga akong gisikaran dayon
kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako
ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson
Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996,
didtoy mga Brgy Tanods sa balay ni Wilson
Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa
maong hitabo og igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong
white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig
sa planggana sa tumong nga makuha ang mansa
sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab
patay ni Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong
slaveless white shirt nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang
TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa iyang pagsiyagit ako
siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar
Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo ug niangkon sa
maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha
didto so hagdan sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy
human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong
ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang
hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain sa akong
pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang
container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay
aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti o bakwion ba hinoon sa
9
 mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa
duha ka pahina lakip niining maong pahina?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba
hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay
tawo nga nagpugos, naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate
o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong
kaugalingon nga kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini
akong permaahn ning petsa 16 sa Diusyembre
1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas.[9]
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree
with Rico Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was
Rico who committed the crime and not him.Appellant testified that Rico asked his help
in stealing the television set from the Tatoys residence.When Jacquelyn saw them,
she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her on the
back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos,
as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoys house. Afraid of what happened,
appellant went home to Wilson Magdasals house and slept there. He was awakened
the next morning by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also
boxed and poked a gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal
maltreated him in the presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he
was brought to the latters house. He was made to admit committing the crime
because Rico has a family while he is single.[10]
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty.
Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty.
Parawan promised to assist and help him with his expenses.[11]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for
brevity) rendered its decision on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime
of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
accused Elizar Tomaquin is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the
law; to indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however,
credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided he
will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE
FULL CREDENCE AND FULL FAITH ON THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;[13]
Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the
Cebuano dialect.Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial
language.-- Documents written in an unofficial language shall not
be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino.To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties
or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any
language other than the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal,
that exhibit should be translated by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation
should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this
court.[14] In this case, there is no official translation of appellants extrajudicial
confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the
rule, then appellants extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the
trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, and the parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared
to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written,
[15]
such extrajudicial confession was appropriately considered by the trial court as
evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato
Parawan, is admissible in evidence against him. There is no need at this point to
secure an official translation of the confession to English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
10
 counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The words competent and independent counsel in the constitutional
provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under
the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on
the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.[16]
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was
the barangay captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local
Government Code, a barangay captain performs the following duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the
barangay government, shall exercise such powers and perform
such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances
which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay
and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in
the performance of their duties and functions; . . .
[17]
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and
ordinances in hisbarangay and ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority
under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In applying the provisions
of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall
be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an
independent counsel of appellant.
In People vs. Culala,[18] the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney
cannot be an independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying
out the delivery of basic services to the people,including the maintenance of peace
and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court held
that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused
during custodial investigations.[19]
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,[20] and People vs. Velarde,[21] where
we further ruled that a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as
required by the Constitution.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawans role as
a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in
direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who
was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his
extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an
independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients
defense without any intervening conflict of interest.[22]
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective
and vigilant counsel.An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the
time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs. Velarde:[23]
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be
present at all stages of the interview,counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused
that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate
the interview.[24]
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made
voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and
the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional
rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.[25]
The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly
described as effective and vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted
verbatim, this was what transpired when he went to the Ramos police station to assist
appellant during the investigation:
11
Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at
around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of December 16,
1996?
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused
and had a conversation with the accused.
Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?
Q And may we know what did he answer?
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.
Q When you said Cap what did he mean by that word Cap.
A Being a Barangay Captain.
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of
choice. What did you do next if any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the
implication of your admission, you will be imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his
confession that could be because of that confession. What
was his reaction?
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: Because of this
confession you will be imprisoned.
Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would
execute that affidavit of confession he would surely be
imprisoned?
A No I even continue that why did he do that?
Q And what did he answer?
A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
Q And so what transpired next?
A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then
policeman Monilar went inside the room and we had that
investigation.
Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?
A It was made in a question and answer form.
Q And in what language were the questions framed?
A In the vernacular, vesaya.
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of
investigation?
A I just observed them.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession
was over?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my
Barangay.
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an
Attorney did you immediately inquire what had happened
before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did
you inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
INTERPRETER:
Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the
signature to that portion above the names typewritten
thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top
most portion to that portion immediately right before the
typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato
Parawan you were not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with
Monilar.[26]
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the
morning of December 16, 1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to
confess and requested the presence of Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty.
Parawan and informed him of appellants decision. Atty. Parawan arrived at the
Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon.[27] By the time Atty. Parawan
arrived, the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked
and elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely observed during
the entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being
propounded by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the
extrajudicial confession he was about to execute was being voluntarily given.
Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is
bolstered by his own testimony that he already suspected appellant as having
committed the crime when the latter was brought to his house by the barangay
tanods, viz.:
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting
tanods was where was he arrested and how was he
arrested and what is the reason why he was
arrested. Correct?
A Yes.
...
12

Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the
Barangay Tanods could explain to you the circumstances
of his arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why
did you have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you
wore. Where did you get that information since you were
not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab
wounds. So when I saw blood stains with all probability it
might come from the victim. It was conclusion something
like when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the
conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar Tomaquin one of your
constituents in the Barangay was already on your
conclusion in mine (sic) the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before
your tanods turned it over to the police for investigation. Is
that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring
him to the Homicide.[28]
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively
safeguarded appellants rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself
entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally,
he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawans qualification
as a competent and independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, (A)ny
person under investigationfor the commission of an offense shall
have the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be
as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but
the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense.[29] What is imperative is that the
counsel should be competent and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan
does not estop appellant from complaining about the latters failure to safeguard his
rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was
the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently,
appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter, however, fell short in
tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not
know how to read and write.[30] As between him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellants
predicament, Atty. Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound
judgment before conceding to appellants choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit
himself from acting as appellants counsel and instead, he even let appellant go
through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial confession knowing fully well
that he was biased as regards appellants innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan
testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a
graduate of Batchelor (sic) of Law compared to your
constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low
intelligence. The question is this: It did not occur to your
mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by telling
the accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict
of interest and bias that I would not be in (sic) effective
counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine
(sic) or not?
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you
assist a suspect in the police station and the
circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a
lawyer could give is would be to tell the accused to remain
silent. Would you agree?
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.[31]
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of
an independent and competentcounsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an
uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court
in People vs. Deniega,[32] stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that
extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task
of taking a hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial
confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole
basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable
for their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at
any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and
disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring
about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are
punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing about
this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence
gathered by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets
13
 exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the standards
are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding
remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny
confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III,
Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellants extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case now
teeters precariously on circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasals testimony that:
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of
December 16, 1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyns
residence belongs to appellant; and
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and
white sando shirt on the night of the crime, which blood-stained shirt was
found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasals house;
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendozas testimony that the blood
stains on appellantssando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin.[33]
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively
and convincingly that it was appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[34] As
jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilty.[35]
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellants act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning
does not establish appellants whereabouts at the time the crime was
committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico Magdasal and the other
prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to Jaquelyns house
after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what
was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in
the afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody of
these valuable pieces of evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes
and tres cantos were given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned
over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not
identify the person who turned over the objects to the police. [36] There was no showing
who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented to identify if
these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyns house and
turned over to the police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as
to confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later
presented in court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the prosecution to
allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence
are crucial to the prosecutions case. Also, the fact that a civilian obtained and
received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these articles could have
been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his direct
examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented
in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the
marking he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell
in the canal located in front of the police station and they had to clean and wash the
shoes![37]Such sloppy handling renders the chain of custody of those pieces of
evidence dubious, and damaging to the prosecutions case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that
it was found in the scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of
Jaquelyn at some point in time. But it does not prove when particularly he was there,
his authorship of the crime or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in
this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial.[38]
The prosecutions evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellants
guilt is mainly the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is
uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction, if such testimony positively establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[39] Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the
testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial
evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious
doubt.[40] Ricos lone testimony is not sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Ricos allegations. According to
appellant, it was Rico who actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was
he who bid appellant to go to the Tatoys residence and lift their TV set; and that it was
Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering appellants denial and his different version of
the incident, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant's
allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be
noted that there were other persons present during their drinking spree, namely,
Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo. These persons could have been
14
presented as witnesses to back up Ricos claim but the prosecution did not do SO ORDERED.
so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres cantos found by the stairs; but Rico
also stated he only heard that the tres cantos was found by the stairs.[41] Who found
the tres cantos that was supposed to have been used to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor
who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in court to identify if the tres
cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in the stabbing of
Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points of Ricos
testimony weakened their case.

The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the
white sando shirt that appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing
Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found bloodstained among the soiled clothes.

First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he
was wearing, he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. According
to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt,
somewhat wet and bloody, among the soiled clothes.[42] Edgar Magdasal, however,
was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in
when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.

Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the

bloodstains on appellantssando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood.
[43]
Mendoza, however, did not conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood
found on these pieces of evidence nor did he match it with the victims blood type,
[44]
hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein victim. In People vs.
Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and
found positive of type O blood has no probative value since the blood type of
appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison.[45]

The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres
cantos.

Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proven. Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with
ambiguity. Although appellants defense is weak, conviction must come from the
strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. In
this case, the prosecutions evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[46] Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.

WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and

ordered RELEASEDimmediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal
cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate

release of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court of the date of his release, or the ground for his continued confinement,
within ten (10) days from notice of herein decision.

Costs de oficio.

15
 Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; Meaning of Custodial
Investigation; Rights guaranteed a person under custodial investigation.—A custodial
investigation is understood to mean as “any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner.” It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. A person under custodial investigation
is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the commencement thereof. These
are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights. The
prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was
accorded said rights before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.

Same; Same; Same; An accused under custodial investigation must continuously

have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.—The Court has stressed
that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. In People vs. Lucero, where the suspect’s
counsel left just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel
and the trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the accused.

Same; Same; Same; For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the
right to counsel from its inception so does he enjoy such right until its termination—
indeed, “in every phase of the investigation.”—Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his
abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the
“material points,” referring to the three accused’s respective participation in the crime.
For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from
its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination—indeed, “in every
phase of the investigation.” An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the
time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the extrajudicial confession.”

Same; Same; Same; Section 2 (a) of RA. No. 7438 requires that any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.—
Republic of the Philippines Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “[a]ny person arrested,
SUPREME COURT detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.”
Manila The last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that “[i]n the absence of
any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.”
EN BANC
Same; Same; Same; Fact that the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001 in the presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects.—Even granting that
appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to answer
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his
vs. right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the
EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABIÑON * Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in
alias "NOLY", defendants-appellants. the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was

16
offered in evidence. That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the
presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is well settled that where there is independent
evidence, apart from the accused’s alleged uncounselled confession, that the
accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a conviction.—Notwithstanding
the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Leonardo Morial, the
conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by
the prosecution. It is well settled that where there is independent evidence, apart from
the accused’s alleged uncounseled confession, that the accused is truly guilty, the
latter nevertheless faces a conviction.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Witnesses; The weight of testimony of a witness is not
impaired or in any way affected by his relationship to the victim when there is no
showing of improper motive on the part of the witness.—The defense has tried to
discredit Guilao by harping on the latter’s relationship with private complainant,
Benjamin Morial, who is the brother of Gabriel’s wife, conveniently forgetting that
Gabriel is also related to all of the accused who are all his nephews. On this score,
the Court has held that the weight of testimony of a witness is not impaired or in any
way affected by his relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper
motive on the part of the witness. A person who was close to the victim would not
callously violate his conscience by blaming it on someone he believed innocent
thereof, especially if the accused were his blood relatives.
Same; Same; Same; Different people react differently to an unusual event and there
is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to something so
shocking or gruesome as murder especially if the assailant is near.—Anent the failure
of Guilao to either attend to the victims or to report the matter immediately to the
authorities, it should be remembered that different people react differently to an
unusual event and there is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a
witness to something so shocking or gruesome as murder especially if the assailant is
near.
Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is practically worthless in the face of positive identification
of the accused.—The accused have no other excuse other than alibi. Interestingly,
they all testified that they were in their respective homes at the time of the incident.
Edwin Morial was sleeping, Leonardo Morial was cooking, while Nonelito Abiñon was
at home, not doing anything. In a number of cases, the Court has ruled that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is
practically worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. The Court
noted that none of the accused even presented any of their supposed home
companions to prove that they were at home when the killings took place. In addition,
it was not established that it would have been physically impossible for them to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be liable as
principals; To exempt himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to
commit the felony.—The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to
commit the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. It may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the crime, which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where
the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstance; Dwelling; The home is considered a sacred
place to its owners, and one who goes to another house to slander or hurt him, or do
him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.—Dwelling was correctly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of the sanctity that the law
accords to the privacy of the human abode. The home is considered a sacred place
to its owners, and one who goes to another house to slander or hurt him, or do him
wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, Branch 24.
PER CURIAM:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced
to suffer only the penalty ofreclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of
conviction is now before this Court on automatic review.
The information charging appellants reads as follows:
That on the 6th day of January 1996, at about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the
evening more or less, in [B]arangay Cagnituan, [M]unicipality of Maasin,
[P]rovince of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with intent of [sic] gain,
entered into [sic] the house of Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial and
once inside did then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, box, beat and stab the victims Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas,
with the use of sharp-pointed weapons and stones which the accused had
provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victims
mortal wounds which caused their instantaneous death, after [which], said
accused took, stole and carried away therefrom Cash in the amount of
Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00) Philippine Currency, belonging to said
17
 Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial, to the damage and prejudice of the
victims and of social order.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early
evening of January 6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the dance later
that night. To obtain the money or to silence any witnesses, the accused killed the
occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her three-year old grandson Albert. In
proving its theory, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Gabriel Guilao, Benjamin
Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and Dr. Teodulo Salas.
The crime allegedly took place at 6:00 in the evening in Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin,
Southern Leyte. Gabriel Guilao, 62, had just finished pasturing his horses and was on
his way home. He was passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial
when he heard the voice of Paula Bandibas pleading, "[P]lease don't kill me[.] I am
going to give you money." Finding what he heard "weird," Gabriel paused and
remained at a distance of about eight (8) meters from the yard of the house. From
where he stood, Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula Bandibas' neck.
Paula fell and was stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed
weapon. Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his
grandmother's garden. Gabriel then heard the crushing sound of a stone against
flesh.
The three accused stayed in the house for about ten minutes after the killing the
victims. Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses.2
Paula Bandibas' common-law husband, Benjamin Morial, 56, was in neighboring
Barangay Maria Clara when the incident took place. He, along with the father of
accused Leonardo Morial, and two others, Heracleo Alonzo and Leo Padilla, were
having drinks in his Maria Clara residence.
Benjamin left Barangay Maria Clara the next day at 2:00 in the afternoon. He arrived
in Barangay Cagnituan, 7½ kilometers away, two hours later. As was his wont,
Benjamin called out Paula's name when he was some five (5) meters from the house.
This time, however, there was no answer.
Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There, he found the
clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned
upside down. Someone had ransacked their house.
Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He
shouted for help. Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, includingbarangay
kagawads Patricio Abiñon and Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked
his neighbors to help search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from
the house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground with two stones near his head.
Benjamin requested Patricio to send someone to report the incident to the police.3
Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao also
hurried to Benjamin's house.4 He revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed
Paula's killing and that the three accused, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and
Nonelito Abiñon, were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone
about what he knew for fear that they would all be killed since the Abiñons were
"saturated in [their] place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice.5
The police arrived at around 10:00 that evening. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with
four other police officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula
Bandibas' stomach, breast and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a
contusion on the right side of his head. Beside him were two stones.6
After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with Benjamin Morial,
proceeded to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00 was
missing from the moneybox. Other than the cash, nothing else was missing.
Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused
in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into
custody and not to include Nonelito Abiñon, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As
a former barangay captain of 22 years, he knew that the Abiñons were "most feared"
in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the
incident.7
The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abiñon and
invited the two to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres
Fernandez. The investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial
confession from accused Leonardo Morial,8 who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
On January 8, 1996, Dr. Teodulo Salas, a rural health physician, conducted a post-
mortem examination on the bodies of the victims. Dr. Salas found an incised wound at
the upper portion of Paula Bandibas' neck, which he believed was caused by a sharp-
edged weapon or instrument, possibly a knife. Two stab wounds on the chest below
and above the right nipple, both punctured the lung. Another stab wound at the
abdomen pierced the intestine. Dr. Salas concluded that the cause of death of Paula
Bandibas is severe hemorrhages secondary to the incised wound.
On the remains of Albert Bandibas, Dr. Salas found multiple angular corrogated
wounds on the head, which could have been caused by a heavy object such as a
stone. Multiple stab wounds punctured the skull. There was also an abrasion on the
right side of the face, which was grossly swollen and disfigured. The abrasion,
18
according to Dr. Salas, might have been caused by a piece of wood, by friction with
the ground, or by some rough material that struck the child's face. The last injury was
a stab wound on the right forehead. Dr. Salas believed that the cause of death of
Albert Bandibas is the intra-cranial hemorrhages secondary to the violent injury to the
head.9 The foregoing findings and conclusions were reduced to writing in the doctor's
Necropsy Reports.10
The accused, all first-degree cousins, interposed denial and alibi as their defense.
They denied being together at the time of the incident.
Accused Nonelito Abiñon, 22, claimed that he was in his house at around 6:00 in the
evening of January 6, 1996. An hour later, he went to the house of his sweetheart,
Rosalie Mepico, and the two later attended a dance at around 9:30 that evening. At
the dance, they occupied a table with Renida Mepico, Renato Montederamos and
Edwin Morial. Leonardo Morial, he said, was not with them.11
Accused Edwin Morial, 18, maintained that he was also at home on January 6, 1996.
He slept from 6:00 until 7:30 in the evening. At 9:00 p.m., he went to the dance with
Renato Montederamos. Nonelito Abiñon and Reneda Mepico were also at the
dance.12
The defense pinned its bid for exculpation on the lengthy testimony of accused
Leonardo Morial, 20. He narrated as follows:
At around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of January 6, 1996, he was at home washing dishes. He
had supper at approximately 7:00 and went to sleep at about 7:30 or 8:00. Unlike his
fellow accused, Leonardo did not go to the dance.13
At 4:00 in the afternoon of the next day, he was in the basketball court of their
barangay watching Nonelito and Edwin playing basketball with Jaime Morial, Renato
Montederamos, Jimmy Abiñon, Danilo Morial and Christopher Morial, among
others.14 Suddenly, they heard Benjamin Morial shout for help several
times.15 Nonelito and Edwin, along with the others in the basketball court, all rushed
to Benjamin Morial's house.16 Leonardo Morial also proceeded to Benjamin's house
after bringing home his two-year old sister.17
At the house of Benjamin Morial, they found the lifeless body of Paula Bandibas on
the floor underneath the kitchen table. Her hands were on her breast, one foot
crooked and the other straight. She had wounds in her neck and breast. The corpse
exuded a bad odor. Benjamin Morial was crying. He said that whoever killed Paula
shall pay.18 Edwin asked Daniel Morial who the suspects to the killing were. Daniel
said he did not know. Edwin went home after about five minutes.19
After viewing Paula Bandibas' remains, Leonardo went out of the house because of
the unpleasant smell and then headed home. 20 Nonelito, on the other hand, departed
as people started looking for the body of Albert Bandibas since it was getting late.
That was about 5:15 in the afternoon.21
That night, Edwin and Leonardo slept at Nonelito's house. Nonelito had invited Edwin
to sleep over as they were going to dress a chicken, 22 and Edwin had told Leonardo
about it. The cousins had the chicken for dinner. It was quite late when they finished
their supper so Leonardo also decided to spend the night at Nonelito's house. 23They
slept at past 8:00 in the evening. 24 According to Nonelito, that was not the only time
that the two had slept over. He said there were previous occasions that his cousins
had spent the night at their place.25
The Abiñon household was to be roused from its slumber three hours later. At 11:00
p.m., the police arrived to investigate the killing of the Bandibases. A police officer
asked Edwin where he was at 6:00 in the evening of January 6, 1996. Edwin replied
that he was in their house sleeping. They also asked the same question to Leonardo
Morial, who answered that he was at home taking care of his younger siblings.
Nonelito, however, was not questioned. A policeman informed Edwin and Leonardo
that they would be brought to the police station for the continuation of the
investigation.26
Edwin and Leonardo went with the police officers and arrived at the station at around
3:00 dawn the next day. The police told them to go to sleep.27
The suspects were interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that same morning.
Edwin was advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he
refused to admit his alleged participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left
hand with a pistol. His hand swelled. A policeman in uniform warned him that if he did
not tell the truth, he would be brought to the toilet.
Sure enough, Edwin was subsequently brought to the lavatory where he was boxed
at the back and instructed to undress. As Edwin stood naked, hands on his side, six
tires were placed around his body. A towel soaked with water was pushed into his
mouth. Fortunately, the towel did not go all the way to his throat since another
policeman, a certain Leoni Egido, advised Edwin's tormentors to stop and have pity
on him. Edwin said that around seven policemen were in the toilet with him though he
could not identify any of them in court. He claimed that he did not have his hand
examined by a physician since he was afraid.28
Like Edwin, Leonardo was also asked where he was on January 6, 1996 at 6:00 in
the evening. Leonardo reiterated that he was at home. He was then brought to a
separate room where his interrogation continued.
Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two other
policemen and directed them to gag Leonardo. The two held Leonardo's arms while
the other stuffed a shirt into his mouth. One of them inflicted three successive painful
blows on Leonardo's left side as the two others continued to hold his hands.
Leonardo was then seated and his gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess
to the killings. Leonardo professed that he did not witness the incident and could not
tell them anything about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman
19
who had hit him then boxed him twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they
released their hold and advised him to confess so they would not kill him. Leonardo
repeated that he did not know anything about the incident. When a policeman
attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abiñon and Edwin
Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation
lasted one and a half to two hours.
Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up, Leonardo said
he could not recall their faces. He did not look at the policemen during his
interrogation and did not see their nameplates.
Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor did he tell anyone
about his injuries because he did not know he was permitted to do so.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that
they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation. Leonardo
was told that his counsel would be a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near
the police station. Leonardo consented.
Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo to come with
them to Atty. Aguilar's office, which was about 50 meters from the police station.
There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for the first time. The lawyer read to him the document and
asked him whether its contents were true. The police had instructed Leonardo to
answer "yes" if he was asked that question, and Leonardo heeded the instructions.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar did
ask Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-judicial confession.
Leonardo, however, did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had
warned him that he would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then signed
the extra-judicial confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over,
Leonardo was brought back to the police station. 29 Later in court, Leonardo claimed
that he merely made up all the statements in the document because he was afraid.
At around 8:30 that morning, Nonelito visited Leonardo and Edwin at the police
station. A police officer informed Nonelito that he was one of the suspects and
handcuffed him.30
To belie Gabriel Guilao's eyewitness account, the defense also presented Patricio
Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla. Patricio and Eulogio purportedly saw Gabriel in Barangay
Maria Clara at the alleged time of the incident as well as the morning after.
On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Flora Bandibas, Martin Galope
and Erlito Bandibas.
Flora and Martin were presented to disprove the testimony of the accused that Edwin
Morial was not at the dance with his co-accused. Flora claimed that she saw the three
together at the dance with Rosalia and Reneda Mepico occupying one table. Nonelito
and Edwin danced joyfully, even somewhat unusually, and caught the attention of
other people. Leonardo also danced but did not seem to enjoy himself.31
Martin, abarangay tanod, was at the dance to help preserve the peace. He
maintained that he saw all the three accused, including Leonardo Morial, at the
dance.32
The defense attempted to diminish these witnesses' credibility by showing their
relation to the victim. On cross-examination, Flora admitted that she is the wife of
Ireneo Bandibas, the barangay captain, and the son of Paula Bandibas. 33 Martin
Galope, for his part, said that the same Ireneo Bandibas had appointed himbarangay
tanod.34
Erlito Bandibas' testimony, on the other hand, was intended to refute the testimonies
of defense witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla that Gabriel Guilao, the
alleged eyewitness to the killings, was in Maria Clara at the purported time of the
incident.
On sur-rebuttal, the defense again presented Eulogio Padilla to dispute the testimony
of Erlito Bandibas.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused,
namely: LEONARDO MORIAL, NONELITO ABIÑON and EDWIN MORIAL,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE as defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Accused LEONARDO MORIAL and NONELITO ABIÑON to each suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection; and
2. Accused EDWIN MORIAL, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Civilly, the three (3) accused aforenamed are held liable JOINTLY and
SEVERALLY as follows:
3. To indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity;
4. To indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity;
20
 5. To indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as
actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses;
6. To pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of P60,000.00 for
each death; and
7. To restitute or restore to private complainant Benjamin Morial the
P11,000.00 amount robbed;
8. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Appellants' conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial
confession of appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness account of Gabriel
Guilao.
The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was
effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant manner." 36 It begins when there is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect,i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.37
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon
the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
informed of the two other rights.38 The prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said rights before he extra-
judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.39
Thus, the prosecution offered the testimonies of SPO4 Andres Fernandez and Atty.
Tobias Aguilar. SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted
in an admission by Leonardo Morial that he was one of those who participated in the
robbery with homicide. SPO4 Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to
reduce his statement into writing and to sign the same. The suspect answered
positively. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right "to remain silent and [to]
have a counsel[,] [and informed him that] whatever will be his answer will be used as
evidence in Court."40
Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the services of
counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their
municipality and named some of them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the
lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the
suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty.
Aguilar.41
Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being
introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He
asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by
the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may give
might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the
questions voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what
really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in
Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material
points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very
important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request.42
Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions
in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had
been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be
brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for
less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.
At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at
Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while
he was away and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo
told him that he was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the
document to determine whether its contents conformed to the answers given by the
accused in his (counsel's) presence. He propounded questions to Leonardo with
reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he understood its
contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and
signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.43
SPO4 Fernandez confirmed that Atty. Aguilar left during the investigation. On direct
examination, SPO4 Fernandez said the lawyer left the station while the investigation
was still going on, saying that he had so many things to do in his office. 44 On cross-
examination, SPO4 Fernandez hesitated a little when he testified that Atty. Aguilar
"might" have probably gone out in the middle of the investigation. 45 Later, he clarified
that while in the process of drafting the statement, Atty. Aguilar told him that he had to
go to his office to attend to some matters.46SPO4 Fernandez added that while Atty.
Aguilar was "in the police station during the investigation," "he (Atty. Aguilar) [would]
come and go but within the police station."47
During and despite Atty. Aguilar's absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the
investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter
answered.48
21
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. 49 InPeople vs.
Lucero,50 where the suspect's counsel left just when the interrogation was starting,
this Court chastised both counsel and the trial court for their lack of zeal in
safeguarding the rights of the accused.
SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the
lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that he
(Leonardo) and his companions committed the crime.51 Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had
admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective participation
in the crime.52 For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to
counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination — indeed,
"in every phase of the investigation."53 An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily
and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."54
Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7438 55 requires that "[a]ny person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel."
The last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of
any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted."
The right of appellant to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate
departure of Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation.
InPeople vs. Deniega,56 we explained the rationale for the rule requiring counsel's
continuing presence throughout the custodial investigation:
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation.
What may satisfy constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the
investigation's onset may not be sufficient as the investigation goes on. . . .
The competent or independent counsel so engaged should be present from
the beginning to end,i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising
caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to
abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the
same to be continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the
suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even
asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's
absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his
right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation started.57
Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by
his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure
before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the
word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel
that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the
custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court condemns.
His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right, which is to:
. . . curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What
is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very
evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him." These
constitutional guarantee have been made available to protect him from the
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.58
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the
investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was
an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section
12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is
made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled
waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of
counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. InPeople vs. Compil,59 this Court held:
. . . it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an
interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon.
He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further
questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again
elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the
commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those
instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the
actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for
the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from
accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has began to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his
supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus inPeople v. de Jesus [213 SCRA
345 (1992)] we said thatadmissions obtained during custodial interrogations
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in
the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. [Emphasis
supplied.]
22
Moreover, appellant's policeman-escort was also present in the lawyer's office as Q So, after pasturing your horse for two minutes, after that you went
attorney and client discussed the voluntariness of the latter's confession. One can home? Now, on your way home, do you remember what happened if any?
hardly expect the suspect, in the face of such intimidating presence, to candidly admit A Yes, Sir.
that he was coerced into confessing. Q What was that incident are you referring to?
A When I went home, I passed by on the road near the house of
As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during Benjamin Morial, then I heard the voice of Paula saying: "please don't kill me
custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence I am going to give you money."
against him.60 Q Now, when you said, Paula are you referring to Paula one of the
victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
The confession is also inadmissible against appellant Leonardo Morial's co-accused, PROS. RUIZ
Nonelito Abiñon and Edwin Morial. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the Q Now, when you heard that voice of Paula, what did you do?
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.61 A I paused for a while because what I heard I found it weird.
Q Where did you stay at that moment as what you have said that you
An exception to theres inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. stayed for a while?
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the A I stayed at a distance of about 8 meters from their yard.
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in Q Were there trees in the place where you were staying at that time?
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by A Yes, Sir.
evidence other than by such act or declaration. The exception, however, does not Q While staying at the distance of 8 meters away from the yard of the
apply in this case since the confession was made after the alleged conspiracy and not house of Benjamin Morial, what did you observe if any?
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.62 A I saw that the old woman was slapped by Nonelito Abiñon on her
neck.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Q What else have you observed if any?
Leonardo Morial, the conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of A Then the old woman was down and when she was down, this Edwin
evidence adduced by the prosecution. It is well settled that where there is Morial stabbed her.
independent evidence, apart from the accused's alleged uncounseled confession, Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court what was that weapon
that the accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a conviction. 63 Here, the used in stabbing the old woman by Edwin Morial?
testimony of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao certainly deserves credence. He recounted A A small sharp pointed weapon, Sir.
before the trial court: Q Now, have you seen Leonardo Morial in the house of Benjamin
Morial?
WITNESS:
Q Now, do you still recall Mr. Witness where you were on January 6, A Leonardo Morial was just outside the house of Paula Bandibas.
1996 at more or less 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon? PROS. RUIZ:
A I can remember, sir. Q What was Leonardo Morial doing outside the house of Benjamin
Q Where were you if you can recall? Morial?
A I was pasturing my horse. A He was just standing thereat.
Q How many horses do you have? Q Now, in your estimate, how long did Nonelito and Edwin were inside
A One mature and one young horse, the young one is not yet tied up. the house of Benjamin Morial?
Q So you have two horses all in all? WITNESS:
PROS. RUIZ: After they have killed the old woman, two minutes . . .
Q Do you have carabao, Mr. Witness? ATTY. GABUCAN:
A None, Sir. The answer is not responsive, the question was how long?
Q Now, while you were pasturing your horse at more or less 6:00 PROS. RUIZ:
o'clock in the afternoon of January 6, 1996, I withdraw that question, Your That is the answer of the witness.
Honor. COURT:
COURT: Continue with the answer.
Reform. WITNESS:
PROS. RUIZ: A After killing the old woman, they stayed inside the house for about ten
Q Now, how long did you stay in that pasture land? minutes, Sir.
A Two minutes, Sir, then I went home. Q Now, after ten minutes, what did they do Mr. Witness?
23
 A They went out of the house.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q After getting out from the house, what did they do?
A They went home, Sir.
Q In what direction?
A Towards the houses nearby.64
The defense has tried to discredit Guilao by harping on the latter's relationship with
private complainant, Benjamin Morial, who is the brother of Gabriel's
wife,65 conveniently forgetting that Gabriel is also related to all of the accused who are
all his nephews.66 On this score, the Court has held that the weight of testimony of a
witness is not impaired or in any way affected by his relationship to the victim when
there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness. 67 A person who was
close to the victim would not callously violate his conscience by blaming it on
someone he believed innocent thereof,68 especially if the accused were his blood
relatives.
Anent the failure of Guilao to either attend to the victims or to report the matter
immediately to the authorities, it should be remembered that different people react
differently to an unusual event and there is no standard of behavior when a person
becomes a witness to something so shocking or gruesome as murder especially if the
assailant is near.69 The initial reluctance of the eyewitness to disclose what transpired
was sufficiently explained: Gabriel, who was 62 years old at the time of the incident,
was too afraid to share what he saw even to his wife, 70and while he wanted to tell
their barangay captain, the latter was in Davao at that time. 71 Instead, he made up his
mind to tell only Benjamin, 72 the common-law husband of the victim Paula, which he
promptly did upon Benjamin's arrival at his house from Maria Clara. 73 The failure of
Gabriel to execute an affidavit on what he witnessed was in fact due to the request of
Benjamin who advised him not to tell anybody for fear that they might all be
killed,74 as the Abiñons were the most feared persons in this place.75
The defense, likewise, tried to show that Gabriel could not have possibly witnessed
the crime because he was in Maria Clara at that time. Patricio Abiñon, a relative of the
accused Nonelito Abiñon,76 testified that he saw Gabriel at Maria Clara at around six
o'clock in the evening of 06 January 1996, 77 and again at around eight o'clock in the
morning the following day.78 He surmised that Gabriel stayed in Maria Clara because
it would take him about two (2) hours of hiking to travel from Maria Clara to
Cagnituan. However, it could not be discounted that Patricio was merely making an
opinion as to the travel or hiking time of Gabriel and he also admitted that he was not
wearing a timepiece.79 Hence, as observed by the trial court, it was not farfetched that
Gabriel was in Maria Clara in the afternoon of 06 January 1996, hiked to Cagnituan in
time to witness the incident and then returned to Maria Clara in the morning of 07
January 1996 to buy some fish.
As regards the defense testimonies that Gabriel could not have possibly seen the
incident from the trail, it should be stressed here that Gabriel categorically stated that
he was about eight (8) meters from the yard of Benjamin's house when he saw
Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula on the neck after which Edwin Morial stabbed her.80 In
addition, defense witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla even contradicted
each other when the former stated it would be possible to see the inside of the house
if the light was on81 while the latter stated that any person inside could not be seen
even if the light was on.82
Pending review of this case, Gabriel Guilao filed before this Court a three-page
"Manifestation with Prayer," dated 22 June 2000, which in effect, was a recantation of
his testimony in the trial court. He declared that he was "utilized" by Benjamin Morial
against the three accused because the latter had a long-standing grudge against
them and was impelled by "hatred" and a "false sense of anger." Since Benjamin
could not "pinpoint" the killer of Paula and Albert Bandibas, it was decided that the
three accused be implicated to the crime "as a way of getting revenge." Gabriel's
relation to Benjamin, whose wife is the sister of Gabriel's wife Regina, accounted for
Benjamin's influence over him. In sum, Gabriel maintained that appellants Edwin
Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon had "nothing to do with the crime
charged."
The attitude of courts towards affidavits of retraction is one of distrust, if not of
disapprobation, because —
. . . affidavits of recantation can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses for monetary consideration or through intimidation. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that it
may later be repudiated. Courts thus look with disfavor at affidavits of
retractions of testimony given in open court, and are wary or reluctant to
allow a new trial based on retracted testimony. Indeed, it would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice
simply because the witness later on changed his mind for one reason or
another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and will place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.83
Further, the defense, during the trial of this case, failed to establish any grudge or
animosity between and against the accused and Benjamin Morial, as well as against
the accused and Gabriel Guilao. In fact, when Edwin's father died, Benjamin
accommodated Edwin and his mother in his nipa house "kamalig" for more than two
(2) years.84Nonelito Abiñon also testified that he could not recall having personal
differences with Benjamin.85
The accused have no other excuse other than alibi. Interestingly, they all testified that
they were in their respective homes at the time of the incident. Edwin Morial was
sleeping,86 Leonardo Morial was cooking,87 while Nonelito Abiñon was at home, not
doing anything.88 In a number of cases, the Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is practically
worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. 89 The Court noted that
none of the accused even presented any of their supposed home companions to
prove that they were at home when the killings took place. In addition, it was not
established that it would have been physically impossible for them to be at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.90 The house of Edwin Morial was about two
24
hundred (200) meters from the house of Benjamin, 91the house of Leonardo Morial
only about sixty (60) meters away, 92 while the house of Nonelito Abiñon was about
seven hundred (700) meters from the house of Benjamin and he could negotiate the
distance in about ten (10) minutes. 93 Equally unnatural were the respective reactions
of the accused when the bodies of Paula and Albert were discovered. Leonardo
Morial went home after seeing the body of Paula,94 Edwin Morial looked at the body of
Paula for five (5) minutes after which he went home,95 while Nonelito Abiñon left the
house of Benjamin while the others who went there upon hearing the shouts of
Benjamin were still searching for the body of Albert. 96 The prosecution was also able
to establish that the three accused were in one table during the benefit dance which
transpired on the eve of the incident,97 contrary to statements of Edwin Morial and
Nonelito Abiñon.
The trial court correctly ruled when it found the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide. It was established that all the elements of the crime were present;i.e., (1)
the taking of personal property perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation
against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain oranimus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.98
In this case, Benjamin, upon arrival at his house, found that their room was in
disarray, the clothes were scattered and the box where they kept their money was
already turned upside down.99 The amount of P11,000.00 contained in the box was
already missing,100 Paula was already lifeless101 and Albert was nowhere to be
found.102
The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to commit the crime.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.103 It may be inferred from the acts of
the accused before, during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.104 Where the acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals. 105 To exempt himself from criminal liability, the
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
unlawful plan to commit the felony.106
In this case, it was established that after the killing of Paula, the accused even stayed
inside the house for about ten (10) minutes,107 presumably to look for the hidden
money. After about ten (10) minutes, they left the house of Benjamin and went
home.108 Clearly, Paula and Albert were already dead or dying but not one of the
accused lifted a finger to show any pity or remorse. Hence, they should all be made
liable for the crime.
Dwelling was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of the
sanctity that the law accords to the privacy of the human abode. 109 The home is
considered a sacred place to its owners, and one who goes to another house to
slander or hurt him, or do him wrong, more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.110However, evident premeditation is inherent in robbery and should not
have been considered against the accused.111 Treachery could only be appreciated in
crimes against persons,112 the same way with disregard of respect due to sex and age
which can be considered only in cases of crimes against persons and honor.113
Nevertheless, accused Edwin Morial should still be spared the death penalty. The
records would show that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the
crime.114 InPeople vs. Villagracia,115 the Court ruled:
In this case, the trial court failed to consider the age of appellant Nixon
Ledesma when the crime was committed. At the time he testified on May 17,
1989, he stated that he was only 15 years old (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 31).
No contradictory evidence was presented by the prosecution. So, when the
crime was committed on September 23, 1987, or more than a year before he
was presented as a witness, Nixon Ledesma was less than 15 years old.
InPeople vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990], we held that the accused has the
burden of proof that he was minor at the time of the commission of the
crime. However, inPeople v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991], we upheld
appellants' claim that he was 17 years old at the time the crime was
committed even without any proof to corroborate his testimony. Considering
that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence, we applied to
appellant therein the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under the
second paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lugto appears to be an aberration from the long line of decisions antedating
it. From U.S. v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 [1903] to People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA
282 [1986], we have consistently ruled that, although the accused did not
offer any evidence to support his claim of minority, this fact will remain as
such, until disproved by the prosecution (See also U.S. v. Barbicho, 13 Phil.
616 [1909]; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 247 [1917]; People v. Ebora, 141
SCRA 282 [1986]; People v. Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 [1986]).
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. As the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
attended the commission thereof, the greater penalty,i.e., death, shall be
imposed116 upon appellants Nonelito Abiñon and Leonardo Morial.
However, appellant Edwin Morial, who was over 15 but under 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime, is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Accordingly, the penalty next lower, 117i.e.,reclusion temporal,
shall be imposed upon him in its maximum period,118 there being one aggravating
circumstance (dwelling).
Said appellant is further entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.119 Under Section 1 thereof, the court shall sentence the accused to an
25
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the SO ORDERED.
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed in the Code for the offense. Thus, appellant Edwin Morial is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
ofreclusion temporalas maximum.

As regards the civil liability of appellants, the award of P60,000.00 to the heirs of each
victim as moral damages is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 each, in conformity with
recent jurisprudence.120

Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the
ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty should be imposed accordingly.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
"Robbery with Homicide," with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, Leonardo
Morial and Nonelito Abiñon are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection, while Edwin Morial, on account of his minority, is hereby sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as
minimum; to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion
temporal as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced, jointly and severally, to:

(1) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as death indemnity;

(2) indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as death indemnity;

(3) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each death as moral damages;

(4) indemnify Benjamin Morial in the amount of Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Forty-
Six (P20,546.00) pesos as actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses;

(5) restitute Benjamin Morial the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos
representing the stolen money.

Costs against accused-appellants.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of
executive clemency or pardoning power.
26

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132154. June 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACITO ORDOñO
Y NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA Y NOSUELO
alias POLING, accused-appellants.
Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; Fundamental
Requirements for Admissibility.—Under the Constitution and the rules laid
down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible in
evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession
must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express;
and, (d) the confession must be in writing.
Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Exclusionary Rule; Among all the
fundamental requirements for admissibility of extrajudicial confessions, none
is accorded the greatest respect than an accused’s right to counsel to
adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation.—Among all these
requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused’s right
to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from
the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person
being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips
of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense.
Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any
statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him.
This exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the police requested the presence of the
Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor as well as the relatives of the accused
to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution
by the accused of their statements before the police did not cure in any way
the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.—In the instant case,
custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoño and Medina
voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating
officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from
them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically
attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the
police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none could be
furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La
Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of
Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage,
the police should have already desisted from continuing with the
interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to
proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as
the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to
witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements before
the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer
during the investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 7438; In providing that during the taking
of an extrajudicial confession the accused’s parents, older brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may
be present, Republic Act 7438 does not propose that they appear in the
alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause.—In
providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused’s
parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor,
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose that
they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any
condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the above-
27
mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel
of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed.
RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the
necessity of counsel but underscores its importance by requiring that a
substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned persons be made with
caution and with the essential safeguards.
Same; Same; Same; Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days
later does not remedy the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.—Securing
the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not
remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO
lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused,
enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their admissions, and
even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice
given by counsel still came several days too late. It could have no palliative
effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.
Same; Same; Same; Admissions obtained during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later signed
in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.—The
second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their
confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer,
in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and
other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one.
Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of
counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer’s role is
diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police
authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the instant
case therefore fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and
the law.
Same; Same; Same; The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer gives an advice in a
cursory manner as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning.—The advice proffered by the investigating
officer to Ordoño starkly resembles that given to Medina, thus leading us to
conclude that the advice was given perfunctorily and belonged to the
stereotyped class—a long question by the investigator informing the
appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic answer—which this Court
has condemned for being unsatisfactory. The desired role of counsel in the
process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer
gives an advice in a cursory manner as opposed to a meaningful advocacy
of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If advice is given casually
and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the part of the accused is
sacrificed and the unconstrained giving up of a right becomes impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Tape Recordings; Where the accused
admitted that the tape presented was the original copy of the taped interview
and the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise, the court may
admit the authenticity of the same.—With the extrajudicial confession of the
accused rendered inadmissible in evidence, we are left with the interview
taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped
interview was offered to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite
to whom the admissions were made and to prove through electronic device
the voluntary admissions by the two (2) accused that they raped and killed
Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground that
its integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been
spliced and tampered with. However, as Roland Almoite testified, it was the
original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the voices therein
were the voices of the two (2) accused; and, the defense never submitted
evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances, we are inclined, as
was the lower court, to admit the authenticity of the taped interview.
Same; Same; Same; Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible
in evidence; When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not
talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.—
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted
to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the
crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to
a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not
in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in
answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer,
they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not,
hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional
rights.
Same; Same; Same; Section 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution
do not cover the verbal confessions of a suspect to a radio announcer.—
Section 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the
verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed
to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
28
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual.—The
Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to
the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken
away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these
limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Custodial Investigation; Evidence; Where the accused did not make
assertions that they were maltreated during their detention and when they
were in the presence of persons who could have helped them, they cannot,
on a later date, make such complaints.—As to the assertion of the accused
that they were tortured and subjected to inhuman treatment, we find such
allegations baseless. The accused were given several opportunities to decry
the maltreatment they allegedly suffered in the hands of the police but at no
time did they complain about it. First, they could have told the radio
announcer outright of the abuses they were subjected to before signing their
confessions. Second, when they were brought before the PAO lawyer they
likewise did not make any such claims but instead chose to ponder over the
lawyer’s advice and deferred the signing of their confessions. Lastly, they
had the chance to tell the MTC judge about the fatal defect of their
confessions, if there was any, when the latter asked them whether they
voluntarily signed the same and whether coercion was used in extracting
their confessions; however, they answered in the negative. The accused
cannot therefore on a later date make assertions that they were maltreated
when at no time—during their detention and when they were in the presence
of persons who could have helped them—did they make such complaints.
Alibi; Alibi becomes worthless when it is established mainly by the accused
themselves.—To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi.
Ordoño testified that at the time of the incident he was at work in the place of
Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente, while Medina claimed that he went to
carry bananas for a certain aunt Resurreccion. However, such allegations
deserve no credit as alibi becomes worthless when it is established mainly
by the accused themselves. The defense of alibi is always considered with
suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it can easily be fabricated.
Same; For alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any
doubt about the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the
locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.—Other
than their lame assertions that they were with the above-mentioned persons,
the accused failed to substantiate their defense and to give details on what
transpired that fateful day, especially since they were in the same town
where the crime happened. For alibi to prosper, it must be convincing
enough to preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility of the
presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident. Since the accused failed to convince the Court
otherwise, their defense must fall.
Criminal Law; Rape with Homicide; Conspiracy; For conspiracy to exist,
proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition
precedent—it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.—The
lack of prior design or plan to rape and kill the victim prior to the commission
of the crime does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, proof of an
actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent.
It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. From the foregoing,
it is evident that the accused helped each other in carrying out their beastly
acts.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan,
La Union, Br. 34.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of scrutinizing the
sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions as basis for convicting the accused.
The drive to apprehend the culprits at any cost, particularly in crimes
characterized by brutality and savagery, not too infrequently tempts law
enforcement agencies to take unwarranted shortcuts and disregard
constitutional and legal constraints that are intended to ensure that only the
guilty are punished. In the delicate process of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, courts play a crucial role in assuring that the evidence
gathered by government agents scrupulously meets the exacting
constitutional standards which if not met impose a strict exclusionary rule,
i.e., "any confession or admission obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12 (1),
shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This case is on automatic review of the 11 December 1997 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 34, Balaoan, La Union, in Crim. Case No. 2415
finding both accused Pacito Ordoo y Negranza alias Asingand Apolonio
Medina y Nosuelo alias Poling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide and imposing upon each of them two (2) separate death penalties.
The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young
girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion,
Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15)
years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who
29
three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed
that the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the
authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the two
(2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they
were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned
to the police station one after another and acknowledged that they had
indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police
immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing.
The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to
assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there
were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the
Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2)
accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were
apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and
to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their
acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not
require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the
Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their
participation in the crime.
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish
Priest, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other police officers was also
accompanied by his wife and mother. Apolonio Medina narrated that in the
morning of 2 August 1994 while he was walking towards the house of Pacito
Ordoo in Sitio Buacao, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, he noticed a young
woman walking towards the school at the Poblacion. Upon reaching Sitio
Buacao, he saw Pacito Ordoo standing along the road. When the woman
reached him he suddenly grabbed her, held her tightly and covered her
mouth with his right hand. As Medina neared them, Ordoo turned to him and
said, "Come and help me, I am feeling uneasy."
Although Medina claimed he was surprised at the request, he nonetheless
went to Ordoo, helped him hold the legs of the young woman including her
bag and umbrella and together they carried her to the bushes where they
laid her down. Medina held her legs as requested while Ordoo continued to
cover her mouth with his hand and boxing her many times on the head.
When she was already weak and weary Ordoo knelt near her, raised her
skirt and lowered her panty down to her knees. Medina continued to remove
her panty as Ordoo removed his short pants, then his briefs. Ordoo then
raped her, boxed her head continuously, with Medina continuously pinning
her legs down and boxing those legs every time she struggled.
After Ordoo had satiated himself Medina took his turn in raping the same
victim with Ordoo holding her legs. After they were through, Medina left to
watch out for intruders while Ordoo tied a vine around the girl's neck,
hanged her on a tree that ended her life. Then, they went back to the road
and parted ways.
After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears.
He then affixed his signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed
by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession.
Pacito Ordoo narrated his story in the afternoon. According to him, in the
morning of 2 August 1994 he was on his way to Sitio Guesset, Barangay
Manggaan, Santol, La Union, when he saw a girl followed by Apolonio
Medina. When the girl was near him he immediately grabbed her and
covered her mouth. Medina drew near, held her two legs, bag and umbrella
and together they carried her into the thicket. After laying her down Ordoo
boxed her breasts and face while Medina boxed her legs. When she became
weak Ordoo raised her skirt and lowered her panty while Medina completely,
removed it. Ordoo then removed his pants and walker briefs, went on top of
Shirley and as Medina spread her legs Ordoo immediately inserted his penis
into her vagina. After ejaculating Ordoo turned to Medina for him to take his
turn in raping the girl. Ordoo was now holding her legs. At the end of his
narration Ordoo affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his
signature as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were detained at the Santol
police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits of
the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading
radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the
interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their
complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their
commission thereof. According to Medina, his remorse in having committed
the crime was so great but his repentance came too late.[1] He and Ordoo
hoped that the parents of Shirley Victore would forgive them.[2] Upon
conclusion of the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station
DZNL and played the taped interview on the air. The same interview was
played again on the air the following morning and was heard by thousands
of listeners.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of
the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a
closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the
accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were
already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and
answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder
30
the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of
their second signature/ thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for
the second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz
apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights, explained the
contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to
Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further
apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if
they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge
Bautista that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon
such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their
confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused Pacito Ordoo and
Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective
confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed
their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of
the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not
guilty.
In his defense, Pacito Ordoo testified that on 5 August 1994, while he was
cooking at home, the police arrived and invited him to the headquarters for
questioning. The police asked him his whereabouts on 2 August 1994 and
he answered that he worked in the farm of Barangay Captain Valentin
Oriente. According to Ordoo, the questioning took one (1) hour with the
police boxing him several times on his stomach and on his side. They even
inserted the barrel of a gun into his mouth in an effort to draw out answers
from him. This being fruitless, he was placed in jail and released only the
following morning, 6 August 1994. Three (3) days later, or on 9 August 1994,
the police once again invited him to the headquarters where he was told that
he was responsible for the rape and death of Shirley Victore.
Accused Pacito Ordoo insisted on his innocence and maintained that he was
working with a certain barangay captain; nonetheless, he was detained.
Later that night the police took him out from jail and brought him to the room
of investigator SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga where he was hit with the butt of an
armalite and forced to admit to the rape and slay of Shirley Victore. On 10
August 1994 SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga took a typewriter and asked questions
from him for one (1) hour without a lawyer assisting him nor a priest
witnessing the investigation. A barrel of a gun was placed inside his mouth
forcing him to admit the commission of the crime and to affix his thumbmark
on the document. He was also brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice
but did not affix his thumbmark on any document because he could not
understand its contents. A radio announcer visited him inside his cell for an
interview but he declined to answer his questions. He only answered the
radio announcer during his fourth visit when SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga
threatened to hit him if he did not admit to the commission of the crime. As to
Apolonio Medina, he heard from the police that he was also detained but
maintained that he (Ordoo) did not know Apolonio.
For his part, Apolonio Medina testified that on 5 August 1994 while he was
pasturing his carabaos at Barangay Guesset, in Santol, La Union, the police
came and invited him for questioning. They asked him where he was on 2
August 1994 and he replied that he was carrying bananas for his aunt
Resurreccion. The interrogation lasted for about an hour with neither a
lawyer assisting him nor a relative being present, after which he was placed
in jail. Later, he was brought out and taken to a hut near the headquarters
where he was boxed, kicked and hit with a nightstick. He lost consciousness
and recovered only after he was brought back to his cell. That same night he
was returned to the hut outside the police headquarters where he was again
boxed. On 8 August 1994, with his legs tied to the ceiling beam, he was
hanged upside down. His breast was hit with the butt of a gun which was
fired near his ear. A barrel of a gun was inserted into his mouth. He was
threatened that he would be salvaged if he did not admit to killing the victim.
He was forced to sign a statement but could not recall its date of execution.
He was brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but he did not sign the
document. The investigator warned him that if he did not sign he would be
buried in the pit which he himself dug. On his third visit to the office of the
PAO lawyer he signed the document. He could not remember having gone
to the office of the MTC Judge of Balaoan; La Union. He was interviewed by
a radio announcer and was instructed by the investigator to narrate those
that were in his statement. He admitted he knew Pacito Ordoo. He showed
his bruises to his mother when the latter visited him in jail, prompting the
latter to request medical treatment for her son but the request was denied.
On 11 December 1997 the trial court adjudged accused Pacito Ordoo and
Apolonio Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with
conspiracy, and imposed upon each of them two (2) death penalties on the
basis of their extrajudicial confessions.
The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on the ground that
constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial
confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial
investigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence.
Under the Constitution[3] and the rules laid down pursuant to law [4] and
jurisprudence,[5] a confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four
(4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must
be in writing.[6] Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest
respect than an accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his
ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a
custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by
31
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense.[7] Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from
the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule
is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent.[8]
In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo
and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the
investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of
their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in
Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town
of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that
stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the
interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to
proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as
the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to
witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements before
the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer
during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the
accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the
gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not
propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel
without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the
above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a)
counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be
executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly
eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its importance by
requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned persons be
made with caution and with the essential safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the
Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other
police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's
presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with
the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be
made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.[9] Consequently, any
admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such
uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later
does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that the
PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused,
enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their admissions, and
even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice
given by counsel still came several days too late. It could have no palliative
effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.[10]
The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the accused on their
confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer,
in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and
other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one.
Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of
counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. [11] If the lawyer's role is
diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police
authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the instant
case therefore fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and
the law.
It should further be recalled that the accused were not effectively informed of
their constitutional rights when they were arrested, so that when they
allegedly admitted authorship of the crime after questioning, their admissions
were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights against self-
incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of Rights.
As testified to, the police informed the accused of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel in a dialect understood by them, but despite the accused's
apparent showing of comprehension, it is doubtful if they were able to grasp
the significance of the information being conveyed. Pertinent portions of the
extrajudicial confessions of Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina, translated
into English, read -
PRELIMINARY -
Mr. Pacito Ordoo, I am informing you that you are
being investigated of an offense but before we
continue, I tell you that you have the right to
remain silent under the new Constitution of the
Philippines.
32
 And you are also herein reminded that all
statements you give may be used for or against
you in any Philippine court as evidence and it is
herein likewise reminded that you have the right
to secure the services of a lawyer of your own
choice to represent you in this investigation, do
you understand all these?
A:....Yes, sir because all that I will state will only be the truth.
Q:....Do you want that we will continue with this investigation after
having been appraised of all your rights?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....And, do you want that we continue wit the investigation even
without a lawyer of your own choice to represent you?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement
consisting only the truth, without any lies whatsoever?
A:....Yes, sir x x x x
PRELIMINARY -
Mr. Apolonio Medina, I inform you that you are
being investigated of an offense but before we
proceed with this investigation, I am informing
you that you have the right to remain silent to all
questions asked of you, according to the new
Philippine Constitution.
And you are likewise reminded that all
statements you give may be used for or against
you in any Philippine court and you have a right
to have a lawyer of your own choice to represent
you in this investigation, do you understand this?
ANSWER - Yes, sir.
Q:....After having known all your rights, do you want that we
continue with the investigation?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....Do you want that we continue with this investigation even
without a lawyer to represent you?
A:....Yes, sir because all that I will state are the truth.
Q:....Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement
consisting only the truth, nothing but the truth?
A....Yes, sir.
The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoo starkly resembles
that given to Medina, thus leading us to conclude that the advice was given
perfunctorily and belonged to the stereotyped class - a long question by the
investigator informing the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic
answer - which this Court has condemned for being unsatisfactory. [12] The
desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer gives an advice in a cursory manner as opposed
to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning.
If advice is given casually and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the
part of the accused is sacrificed and the unconstrained giving up of a right
becomes impaired.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough
for the interrogator to merely enumerate to the person under investigation
his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution; the interrogator
must also explain the effect of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what
the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the
subject fairly understands.[13]
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible in
evidence, we are left with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer
Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview was offered to form part of
the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made
and to prove through electronic device the voluntary admissions by the two
(2) accused that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense objected
to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity had not been preserved as
the tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with.[14] However, as
Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it
was not altered; the voices therein were the voices of the two (2) accused;
and, the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the
circumstances, we are inclined, as was the lower court, to admit the
authenticity of the taped interview.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's
testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence
or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by the accused.
Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced the
accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police
officers were around since the interview was held in the police station, there
was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity
where the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the
police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted
to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the
crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
33
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.[15] By analogy, statements made by herein accused
to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was
not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was
made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or
any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio
announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he
was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their
constitutional rights.
Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the
verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed
to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[16]
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual.[17] It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to
the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken
away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
[18]
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its
agencies.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-
recorded are further bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem
Findings. The narration of the accused Apolonio Medina that Asing boxed
the victim, who was struggling as she was being raped,[19] was proved by
the Autopsy Report stating that the victim suffered contusions on the leg,
right, lateral aspect, middle third, etc.;[20] that accused Pacito Ordoo boxed
the face of the victim to make her weak [21] was proved by the testimony of
the NBI Medico-Legal Officer that there was blackening on the face of the
victim due to hematoma caused by violence or boxing on her face; [22] and,
that accused Pacito Ordoo hanged the victim on a tree by tying a vine
around her neck,[23] was proved by the finding of a depressed mark involving
the anterior and lateral portions of the neck.[24]
As to the assertion of the accused that they were tortured and subjected to
inhuman treatment, we find such allegations baseless. The accused were
given several opportunities to decry the maltreatment they allegedly suffered
in the hands of the police but at no time did they complain about
it. First, they could have told the radio announcer outright of the abuses they
were subjected to before signing their confessions. Second, when they were
brought before the PAO lawyer they likewise did not make any such claims
but instead chose to ponder over the lawyer's advice and deferred the
signing of their confessions. Lastly, they had the chance to tell the MTC
judge about the fatal defect of their confessions, if there was any, when the
latter asked them whether they voluntarily signed the same and whether
coercion was used in extracting their confessions; however, they answered
in the negative. The accused cannot therefore on a later date make
assertions that they were maltreated when at no time - during their detention
and when they were in the presence of persons who could have helped
them - did they make such complaints.
The doctor who physically examined them further disproved their assertions
when she testified thus -
FISCAL TECAN:
Q:....Now, you said that you talked with the prisoners, Pacito Ordoo
and Apolonio Medina, what did you actually tell them?
A:....I said, "What do you feel on your body?" and I also said, "What
part of your body are (sic) painful?"
Q:....What did they answer?
A:....They did not answer me, sir.
Q:....More or less, how many questions did you ask?
A:....Only that, sir.
Q:....After you have observed the prisoners, did you notice any
injury?
A:....None, sir x x x x
Q:....x x x x You noticed any injury on their bodies?
A:....None, sir, that is why I looked to see what was really painful.[25]
Considering that the doctor was a witness for the defense, it was surprising
that she never mentioned about any maltreatment. She saw not a single
scratch on the bodies of the accused. She even inquired into their physical
well-being but they did not tell her of any pain or injury. They could have
easily asked the doctor for immediate treatment if indeed they were
physically harmed, but they did not. This puts their claim of maltreatment into
serious doubt. With this, the testimony of the mother of the accused Apolonio
Medina alleging that the police refused treatment for her son despite his
critical condition becomes a fabrication, a mere figment of the imagination.
As found by the lower court, her tale of buying an antibiotic for her son, all on
her own, without the prescription of a doctor, is hard to believe since she is
already an elderly woman, seventy-three (73) years of age, unschooled and
illiterate.[26]
To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi. Ordoo testified
that at the time of the incident he was at work in the place of Barangay
Captain Valentin Oriente,[27] while Medina claimed that he went to carry
34
bananas for a certain aunt Resurreccion.[28] However, such allegations
deserve no credit as alibi becomes worthless when it is established mainly
by the accused themselves.[29] The defense of alibi is always considered with
suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable, but also because it can easily be fabricated.[30]
Quite interestingly, Bgy. Capt. Valentin Oriente was presented as a witness
for the prosecution, not for the defense, while "aunt Resurreccion" was not
presented at all. Bgy. Capt. Oriente testified that Pacito Ordoo did not work
with him on 2 August 1994; on the contrary, he saw him on the bridge at Sitio
Guesset.[31]
Other than their lame assertions that they were with the above-mentioned
persons, the accused failed to substantiate their defense and to give details
on what transpired that fateful day, especially since they were in the same
town where the crime happened. For alibi to Prosper, it must be convincing,
enough to preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility of the
presence of the accused at the locus criminisor its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident.[32] Since the accused failed to convince the Court
otherwise, their defense must fall.
The lack of prior design or plan to rape and kill the victim prior to the
commission of the crime does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to
exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a
condition precedent. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the
offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the accused helped each other in
carrying out their beastly acts. The taped interview as played in open court
clearly revealed thus -
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED APOLONIO MEDINA) -
INTERPRETER:
When I was walking there already about to be
near him, he was already holding the woman and
said, come and help me because I was (sic) not
feeling well. Well, I was shocked of what I saw,
sir. But later on, as usual I regained my
composure and so I finally went to help him, sir.
FISCAL TECAN: We will continue, Your Honor.
INTERPRETER:
And then we laid her down among the bushes
then Asing boxed her because she was
struggling, Your Honor. And Asing did what he
wanted, sir. And then he asked me to take my
turn and then I went outside to look and see if
there are (sic) people and then Asing went to get
a vine, sir. And when I arrived at their place, he
was already tieing (sic). After that, we left for
home, sir.[33]
xxx
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED PACITO ORDOO)
Q:....But Apolonio Medina was already there as your companion?
A:....He was there already, sir. He was the one who held her legs,
sir.
Q:....Who was the first one to rape or use her?
A:....Me, sir. And after that, Apolonio Medina, sir.
Q:....And after you were through, what did you do, was she still
conscious?
A:....She was practically unconscious, sir.
Q:....What did you do then?
A:....We tied her neck and hanged her on a tree, sir.[34]
The modifying circumstance of conspiracy being present, each of the
accused shall be liable for the other's acts as well. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
In 1971, in People v. Jose[35] this Court convicted the four (4) accused with
forcible abduction with rape, and three (3) counts of simple rape, and
imposed upon each of the accused four (4) death penalties in view of the
existence of conspiracy.
In 1981, in People v. Yutila[36] this Court affirmed the judgment of the court a
quo declaring each of the three (3) accused guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer a single
penalty of death. However, Justice Barredo in his separate opinion
interposed that in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the Jayme
Jose case, three (3) death penalties should have been imposed on each of
the accused.
In People v. Vizcarra[37] where the four (4) accused were charged with rape
with homicide, the Court held that only one of them should be held liable for
the crime of rape with homicide and all the rest for simple rape. But since
four (4) successive offenses were charged and proved, each of the accused
was imposed four (4) death sentences for four (4) separate and distinct
crimes of rape. The existence of conspiracy among them, the overwhelming
35
evidence as to the nature and the number of crimes committed, as well as
the attendance of the aggravating circumstances, fully justified the
imposition of four (4) death penalties.
In 1988, in People v. Dio[38] where the three (3) accused took turns in
ravishing the victim and thereafter killed her, the Court declared each of
them guilty of three (3) crimes of rape with homicide and sentenced each of
them to three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua. The penalty in fact should
have been death but with its proscription in the 1987 Constitution the penalty
imposed was reduced toreclusion perpetua.
In 1991, in People v. Flores[39] a registered nurse was successively raped by
four (4) men and then killed. The trial court convicted each of them with the
special complex,crime of multiple rape with homicide on four (4) counts and
as a consequence thereof sentenced each of them to four (4) death
penalties. This Court affirmed the decision of the lower court with the
modification that the accused should instead suffer four (4) penalties
of reclusion perpetua by reason of the constitutional proscription on the
imposition of the death penalty. The four (4) death penalties for each of the
appellants were explained to be ordained by the fact that conspiracy had
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
MODIFICATION that the two (2) accused PACITO ORDONO y NEGRANZA
alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA y NOSUELO alias POLING are held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide on two (2) counts and are sentenced each to two (2) DEATH
PENALTIES. Each of the accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Shirley Victore in the amount of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P100,000.00 for moral damages for both counts of rape. Costs against
both accused.
In consonance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Art. 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of
his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

In 1996, in People v. Laray[40] this Court convicted two (2) of the accused
charged therein with multiple rape and sentenced each of them to suffer two
(2) counts of reclusion perpetua because of the existence of conspiracy.

Accordingly, herein accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina should be

held liable for the special complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2)
counts as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659.

We have held that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the amount
of P100,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
applicable amendatory laws.[41] In addition, this Court has likewise ruled that
in crimes of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages must be
awarded to the victim without need of proof nor even pleading the basis
thereof.[42]

Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the

unconstitutionality of RA 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the 11 December 1997 Judgment rendered by the Regional

Trial Court-Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union, is AFFIRMED with the
36

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
GARCIA, appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Evidence; Confession; Requisites for a confession
to be admissible.—However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was
under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo
PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution.
Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession
must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. In the instant case, the
testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment
by the police of said constitutional guarantees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Even if the admission or confession of
an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.—While the investigating officer was aware of the appellant’s right to
be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the
flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer
proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of
counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an
accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.
Same; Same; Same; Custodial Investigation; The right of a person under
interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed.—The right of a person under interrogation “to be
informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding
of what is conveyed. Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right “to be
informed,” as it cannot be said that the person has been truly “informed” of his rights.
Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought
not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation
(known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or
those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the
offense.—Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession
to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to
his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as
the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights
slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to admit
something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
Same; Evidence; Res Gestae; Requisites for a declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.—As the
Solicitor General points out, appellant’s statements to Campos are admissible for
being part of the res gestae. Under the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part
of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in the instant
case.
Same; Same; Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during
a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.—The TV news
reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals
when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the
police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also
shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time,
37
the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly
admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in
Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a
televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.
Same; Treachery; Essential requisites for treachery to be appreciated.—Treachery or
alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the
offended party might make. Two essential requisites must concur for treachery to be
appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.
Same; Same; Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as to the
manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in
the victim’s demise.—The gap in the prosecution’s evidence cannot be filled with
mere speculation. Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as to the
manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in
the victim’s demise. Any doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved in favor
of appellant.
Same; Damages; The purpose of the award of moral damages is to compensate the
heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.—The
amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, as the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim
for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.
Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; Awards for the loss of earning capacity
partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and
satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.—The award of P500,000 in
compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The victim’s mother,
Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a month as
shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co. However, said receipt
shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show
what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the actual value of the loss of earning
capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning capacity
partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and
satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Br.
73.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724,
finding appellant Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death.
In an Information dated March 23, 1998, appellant was charged by State
Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor
Francisco Keyser, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a piece of wood and a saw, with intent to kill, by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of wood and thereafter, cut into
pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
injuries which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned on April 3, 1998, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded guilty to the charge.[3]
On April 23, 1998, however, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and
prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on April 28, 1998,
he was re-arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty.
[4]
The case then proceeded to trial.
The facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows.
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser
Plastic Manufacturing Corp. (Keyser Plastics for brevity), with principal place of
business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. [5] Keyser Plastics
shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets.
[6]
Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations
was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the
upper portion was of lawanit boards.[7] The part of the wall made of lawanit had two
large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on
the other side.[8]
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard
assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G.
Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he
knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he
saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which
was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the
building occupied by Keyser Plastics.[9]Campos paid scant attention to Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook,
when he heard some loud noises (kalabugan) coming from the Keyser Plastics area.
38
He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used
to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound.[10]
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of
his duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the
dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor
Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage
dump where he could burn it.[11] Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately
dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the
premises and not let the suspect escape,[12] while a reaction team was being
dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito
Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National
Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an
official police photographer.[13] They were immediately met by Campos, who informed
them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the
premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then
talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys.
This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1
Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko
ako, haharapin ko ito. (Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the
consequences.)[14] Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist
up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo
pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victims head was
found stuffed inside a cement bag.[15]
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness,
Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw. He then mopped up the
blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a
bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters saw.
[16]
Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the
implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing,
Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees.[17] He
expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions.[18]
The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further
investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising the
appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of
counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct a post-mortem examination on Keysers remains. The Antipolo police then
turned over the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus
delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, autopsied
Keysers remains. He found that the cadaver had been cut into seven (7) pieces. [19] He
found that the head had sustained thirteen (13) contusions, abrasions, and other
traumatic injuries,[20] all of which had been caused by forcible contact with hard blunt
object,[21] such as a lead pipe, baseball bat, or a piece of wood.[22] He found the cause
of death to be traumatic head injury.[23] Dr. Baluyot declared that since the amputated
body parts had irregular edges on the soft tissues, it was most likely that a sharp-
edged, toothed instrument, like a saw, had been used to mutilate the corpse. [24] He
further declared that it was possible that the victim was dead when sawn into pieces,
due to cyanosis or the presence of stagnant blood in the body,[25] but on cross-
examination, he admitted that he could not discount the possibility that the victim
might still have been alive when mutilated.[26]
Dr. Olga Bausa, medico-legal pathologist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified
that she subjected the bloodstained piece of coco lumber as well as the saw
recovered from the crime scene to a bio-chemical examination to determine if the
bloodstains were of human origin. Both tested positive for the presence of human
blood.[27] However, she could not determine if the blood was of the same type as that
of the victim owing to the insufficient amount of bloodstains on the items tested.[28]
Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police
custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters,
namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7.
Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to David
that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. [29] He disclosed to
David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up
his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. [30] When asked why he
killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not
feed him properly, and treated him like an animal. [31] Both Abelgas and David said that
Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the
course of their respective interviews with him.[32]
At the trial, appellant Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged
he was a victim of police frame-up. He testified that he had been an employee of
Keyser for more than a year prior to the latters death. On the date of the incident, he
was all alone at the Keyser Plastics factory compound as a stay-in employee. Other
employees have left allegedly due to Keysers maltreatment of them.[33]
In the morning of March 22, 1998, appellant said Keyser instructed him to report
for overtime work in the afternoon. He proceeded to the factory premises at one
oclock in the afternoon, but since his employer was not around, he said, he just sat
and waited till he fell asleep.[34] He was awakened sometime later when he heard
people calling him from outside. He then looked out and saw persons with firearms,
who told him that they wanted to enter the factory. Once inside, they immediately
handcuffed him and looked around the premises. When they returned, they were
carrying boxes and sacks. He said he was then brought to the police station where he
was advised to admit having killed his employer since there was no other person to
be blamed.[35]When he was made to face the media reporters, he said the police
instructed him what to say.[36] He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told
the reporters. The appellant denied having any grudge or ill feelings against his
employer or his family.
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he was the shirtless person in the
photographs taken at the crime scene, while the persons with him in the photographs
were policemen wearing uniforms.[37] He likewise admitted that the cartons and sacks
found by the police inside the factory premises contained the mutilated remains of his
39
employer.[38] He claimed, however, that he was surprised by the contents of said
cartons and sacks.[39] Appellant admitted that a bloodstained piece of wood and a saw
were also recovered by the police, but he insisted that the police made him hold the
saw when they took photographs.[40]
The trial court disbelieved appellants version of the incident, but found the
prosecutions evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the
appellant, thus:
The guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of
murder as charged in [the] information. WHEREFORE, the accused is meted the
maximum penalty and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the mother of the victim, Victor Keyser, the
following amounts:
1. Death Indemnity P50,000.00
2. Funeral Expenses P50,000.00
3. Compensatory Damages P500,000.00
4. Moral Damages P500,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages P300,000.00
6. Attorneys Fees P100,000.00 plus P3,000.00 per Court appearance.
SO ORDERED.[41]
Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE FOLLOWING
DAMAGES: DEATH INDEMNITY P50,000.00; FUNERAL EXPENSES P50,000.00;
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES P500,000.00; MORAL DAMAGES P500,000.00;
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES P300,000.00; AND ATTORNEYS FEES OF P100,000.00
PLUS P3,000 PER COURT APPEARANCE.[42]
Briefly stated, the issues for resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) the
propriety of the death penalty imposed on appellant; and (3) the correctness of the
award of damages.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He
points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional
rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he
says, he was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the
police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial
investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he
had waived his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any evidence gathered
from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the
evidence clearly shows that the appellant admitted committing the crime in several
instances, not just during the custodial investigation. First, he admitted having killed
his employer to the security guard, Campos, and even sought Campos help in
disposing of Keysers body. This admission may be treated as part of the res
gestae and does not partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to
the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said statement is admissible as evidence against the
appellant. Second, the appellants statements before members of the media are
likewise admissible in evidence, according to the OSG, as these statements were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by police or other investigating
officer. The OSG stresses that appellant was interviewed by media on two separate
occasions, and each time he made free and voluntary statements admitting his guilt
before the news reporters. He even supplied the details on how he committed the
crime. Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed to the killing
even before the police could enter the premises and even before any question could
be posed to him. Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the factory,
the appellant pointed to the place where Keysers corpse was found. The OSG
submits that at these points in time, appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation. Rather his statements to the police at the crime scene were
spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and hence must be
treated as part of the res gestae and thus, says the OSG, admissible in evidence.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the police by a suspect in
a crime falls within the ambit of constitutional protection. Hence, if not made under
custodial investigation or under investigation for the commission of an offense, the
statement is not protected by the Bill of Rights.
However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was under
investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP
Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Under
Article III of the Constitution, [43] a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession
must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.[44] In the instant case, the
testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment
by the police of said constitutional guarantees. This can readily be gleaned from the
transcript of Reyes testimony, which we excerpt:
40
Q: What did you do next upon arriving at the police station?
A: When we arrived at the police station, I pointed to him and asked him to
read what was written on the wall which was his constitutional rights.
Q: Did he read the same?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: Did you ask the accused if he did understand what he read?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: So Mr. Witness, you did continue your investigation at the police
station?
A: Yes, mam.
COURT:
What did the accused say when you asked him if he understood what was
written on the wall which was his constitutional rights?
A: He said he understood what was written on the wall and he has no
regrets.
COURT:
Proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Who were present at the police station during your investigation?
A: There were many people around when I conducted the investigation at
the police station. My companions were there but I do not know the
other persons who were present.
Q: How was the investigation that you conducted at the police station?
A: I inquired again from Eric Guillermo why he did it, the reason why he did
it.
Q: And was your investigation being recorded in the police station?
A: No, mam.
Q: Let me just clarify, I did not mean like a tape recorder. Was it written?
A: I only asked him but it was not written down or recorded.
Q: During the investigation, was there any lawyer or counsel that was
called during the investigation?
A: None, mam.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a counsel during
the investigation?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort to
provide him with counsel before you asked him questions?
A: No, mam.
Q: Why?
A: Because during that time, it was Sunday afternoon and there was no
counsel around and because he already admitted that he perpetrated
the crime and that was explained to him, his constitutional rights
which was on the wall. We did not provide anymore a counsel.
Q: I would just like to ask the reason why you made the accused read the
written rights that was posted on the wall of your police station?
A: So that he would be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Q: So, you mean that you made him understand his rights?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: So, you mean to say before you asked him to read his rights, you
presumed that he does not understand what his constitutional rights
are?
A: I think he knows his constitutional rights because he admitted the crime.
Q: And did the accused understand his rights?
A: I believe he understood because he answered, wala akong dapat
pagsisihan. (I have nothing to regret.).[45]
Appellants alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required
by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make
appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the
investigating officer was aware of the appellants right to be represented by counsel,
the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said
investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived
his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said
in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth,
if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.[46]
The right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an
effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed.
[47]
Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right to be informed, as it cannot
be said that the person has been truly informed of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in
the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants confession to
SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his
acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as
the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited
through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights
enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit
something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the
crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony
of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant
called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of
the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor
General points out, appellants statements to Campos are admissible for being part of
the res gestae. Under the Rules of Court,[48] a declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.[49] All these requisites are present in the instant
41
case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death
of his employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the
influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or
contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding
the killing of Keyser. Appellants spontaneous statements made to a private security
guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by
the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not
only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted
his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime
to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7, who testified in court, to wit:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: Could you tell us what you found out in the interview?
A: The first question I think I asked was, if he admits the crime and he
gladly said yes he did it, the details about the crime, how he saw the
body and where he put it, and the reason why he did it.
COURT:
To what crime did he admit?
A: He said he got mad with (sic) his boss, so he got a piece of wood, dos
por dos, he hit his boss in the back and then after that, I think he got
a saw and sawed the body to eight pieces.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
You said the interview was done inside the room of Col. Quintana, how
many were you inside the room at that time?
A: I really could not remember but I was with my cameraman, an assistant,
Col. Quintana and I think two more escorts. I could not remember the
others.
Q: You mentioned a while ago that he gladly admitted what he did, can you
explain gladly admitted?
A: Usually when I interview suspects, either they deny or [are] in hysterics,
but Eric seems (sic) calm when I interviewed him.
I said, ginawa mo ba ang krimen, and he said, Oo. Hindi ka ba
nagdalawang isip? Hindi. It was kind of eerie.
Q: You also mentioned that he gave details of the crime he committed,
aside from what you already mentioned like his boss being hit in the
head and cut to eight pieces, what did he tell you?
A: He told me where he put it, like he looked for sacks and cartons, and he
told me where he put the head but I could not remember.
But I remember him saying he put the head in the bag and he said he
asked help from the security guard, Campos. Basically, thats it. And
he told me the reason why he did it.
Q: Why did he do it?
A: Because he was not being paid for what he has done and Mr. Keyser
treated him like an animal, things like that.
He said that what he did was just right, just justice.[50]
The TV news reporters testimonies on record show that they were acting as
media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the
direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV
cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions,
not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence.
Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of
Keysers killing. As held in Andan,statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.
[51]
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of
appellants alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the
appellants guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the
appellant in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court
admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas
and David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together
with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution
witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco
Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.
But was appellants offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death
penalty, or only homicide for which a lesser penalty is appropriate?
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove either treachery or evident
premeditation to qualify the killing as murder. He points out that there was not a single
eyewitness to show how the crime was committed and hence, absent an eyewitness
to show the manner in which the crime was committed, he cannot be held liable for
murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted by the appellant himself,
he repeatedly struck the victim, with a piece of coco lumber (dos por dos), at the back
of his head, while the victims back was turned towards him. The suddenness of the
attack, coupled with the manner in which it was executed clearly indicates treachery.
The OSG agrees with appellant, however, that evident premeditation was not
adequately established. Hence, we shall now deal only with the disputed
circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from
any defense which the offended party might make. [52] Two essential requisites must
concur for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b)
the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[53]
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and
increases the imposable penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[54] In the instant case, we find insufficient the
prosecutions evidence to prove that the attack on the victim came without warning
and that he had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, or to escape. None of
the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was initiated or carried out,
simply because there was no eyewitness to the offense. In addition, appellants
narration in his taped interview with Channel 7 is not too clear on this point, thus:
ERIC GUILLERMO:
42
 Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na lamang
kainit ito. Bigla niya akong inano dito sa batok ko tapos itinuturo niya
ang dito ko (pointing to his head) itinuturo-turo niya ang dito ko.
Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko iyong
kahoy.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Sa mga oras na yon, nagdilim, napuno ng galit ang kanyang mga
mata, nakita niya ang isang dos por dos sa kanyang tabi at agad
dinampot habang nakatalikod ang kanyang amo.
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Nang gawin ko sa sarili ko iyon kalmadong kalmado ako noong ginawa
ko yon. Nasa sarili ako noong ginawa ko iyon.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Hawak ang mahabang kahoy, hinampas ni Eric si Mr. Keyser,
hinampas hanggang sa mawalan ng malay. Tila hindi pa nakuntento
sa kanyang nagawa, napagbalingan naman ni Eric ang isang lagare
sa kanyang tabi at isinagawa na ang karumal-dumal na krimen.[55]
From the foregoing, all that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the
appellant, and the victims back was turned towards the appellant when the latter
picked up the piece of wood. It does not, however, show that there was any deliberate
effort on the part of the appellant to adopt the particular means, method, or form of
attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means
to defend himself.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, the NBI pathologist who autopsied the victims
body, observed that it was difficult to determine the position of the victim in relation to
his assailant.[56] Nor was the expert testimony of Dr. Baluyot definitive as to the
relative position of the assailant and the victim, to wit:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I would like also to ask from your medical knowledge thru the blows
that the deceased received in his head which caused the head injury,
would you be able to ascertain also in what position was the attacker
or where the attacker was?
A: Based on the location of the injuries at the head, it would be very
difficult to determine the relative position of the victim and assailant
as well as the position of the victim when he sustained said injury,
because there are injuries located at the front, at the left and right
portions of the head although there were none located at the
back (stress supplied). Based on these injuries, I would say that the
position would probably be maybe in front, maybe to the left or the
right in order for him to inflict the injuries to the front, to the left and
right sides of the head.[57]
Noteworthy, Dr. Baluyot pointed out that based on the injuries sustained by the
victim, there is an indication that he tried to defend himself against the blows being
inflicted upon him, thus:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: The wound that you found at the back of the hand, which is at the back
of the right hand, would you characterize this as [a] defense wound?
A: It is a defense wound. All injuries especially at the upper extremities
they could be tagged as defense wounds to fend offattacks and these
upper extremities are usually used to protect the head and the body.
[58]
The gap in the prosecutions evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation.
Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in the victims demise.
[59]
Any doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved in favor of appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecutions
evidence which shows that the victims corpse was sawn by appellant into seven (7)
pieces. Under Art. 248 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, outraging or scoffing at the
corpse is a qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner
of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. [60] In the instant case, the corpse of
Victor F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant who sawed off the head, limbs, and
torso. The Information categorically alleges this qualifying circumstance, when it
stated that the appellant thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F.
Keyser. This being the case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is guilty not just
of homicide but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the instant case, the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon appellant.[61]
Both appellant and appellee claim that the trial court erred in awarding
damages. They submit that the trial courts award of P50,000.00 for funeral expenses
has insufficient basis, for only receipts amounting toP38,068.00 as proof of funeral
expenses were presented in evidence. Thus, this award should be reduced
accordingly. Concerning the award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000,
compensatory damages also for P500,000 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P300,000, appellant submits that these cited sums are exorbitant, and not in
accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG agrees, hence modification of said
amounts is in order.
The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, as the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of
the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.[62] Award of
exemplary damages is justified in view of the gruesome mutilation of the victims
corpse, but the amount thereof should also be reduced to only P25,000, following
current case law.
43
 The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be
deleted. The victims mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning
around P50,000.00 a month[63] as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics
Phils. Co.[64] However, said receipt shows that it was made out to her, and not the
victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the
actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards
for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved
not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.[65]
Civil indemnity for the victims death, however, was left out by the trial court,
although now it is automatically granted without need of proof other than the fact of
the commission of the crime. [66] Hence, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be awarded in favor of the victims
heirs.
Nothing on the record shows the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of the
victim for attorneys fees and lawyers appearance fees. Attorneys fees are in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages and allowed under the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,[67] one of which is when the court deems
it just and equitable that attorneys fees should be recovered.[68] In this case, we find
an award of P25,000 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses reasonable and
equitable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding
appellant ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA GUILTY of the murder of Victor Francisco
Keyser is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants sentence is hereby
REDUCED TORECLUSION PERPETUA. He is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P38,068.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral
damages,P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as attorneys fees,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

44
 ( P D ) N o . 1 6 1 3 , q u o t e d h e r e u n d e r, t o w i t : R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e : A RT.
320. Destructive Arson.—x x x x If as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
supplied.] Presidential Decree No. 1613: SEC. 5. Where Death
Results from Arson.—If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended,
with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 1613
respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the
commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise,
where death results therefrom. The raison d'être is that arson is
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 170470 itself the end and death is simply the consequence.
Appellee, S a m e ; S a m e ; S a m e ; I n c a s e s w h e r e b o t h b u r n i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r, i n
Present: order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—
w h e t h e r a r s o n , m u r d e r, o r a r s o n a n d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r, i t i s d e
PA N G A N I B A N , C . J . , r i g u e u r t o a s c e r t a i n t h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e o f t h e m a l e f a c t o r. — I n c a s e s
PUNO, w h e r e b o t h b u r n i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r, i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t
QUISUMBING, crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—whether arson, murder or arson
YNARES-SANTIAGO, a n d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r, i t i s d e r i g u e u r t o a s c e r t a i n t h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e
S A N D O VA L - G U T I E R R E Z , of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
CARPIO, building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
- versus - CORONA, absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
CARPIO MORALES, particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
CALLEJO, SR., resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
AZCUNA, c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r o n l y ; l a s t l y, ( c ) i f t h e o b j e c t i v e i s , l i k e w i s e , t o
TINGA, k i l l a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n , a n d i n f a c t t h e o ff e n d e r h a s a l r e a d y d o n e s o ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there
GARCIA, and are two separate and distinct crimes committed—homicide/murder
VELASCO, JR., JJ. and arson.
Same; Witnesses; The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution
E D N A M A L N G A N y M AY O , Promulgated: witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts
Appellant. can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them,
September 26, 2006 p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r d e m e a n o r, c o n d u c t , a n d a t t i t u d e , d u r i n g t h e d i r e c t
and cross-examination by counsels.—All the witnesses are in accord
t h a t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t ’s a g i t a t e d a p p e a r a n c e w a s o u t o f t h e
D E C I S I O N o r d i n a r y. R e m a r k a b l y, s h e h a s n e v e r d e n i e d t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n . We
g i v e g r e a t w e i g h t t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e RT C a n d s o a c c o r d c r e d e n c e
Criminal Law; Arson; Homicide; There is no complex crime of arson to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the
with (multiple) homicide—Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e m d i r e c t l y. T h e c r e d i b i l i t y g i v e n b y t r i a l
as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence
PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity
penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive t o o b s e r v e t h e m , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r d e m e a n o r, c o n d u c t , a n d a t t i t u d e ,
or otherwise, where death results therefrom.—The Information in this during the direct and crossexamination by counsels. Here, Remigio
case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a complex crime, Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested
i . e . , A r s o n w i t h M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e . P r e s e n t l y, t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2 ) l a w s witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to
that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom— i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y a r e s u b o r n e d w i t n e s s e s . T h e r e c o r d s o f t h e RT C
Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept
Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, and Section 5 of Presidential Decree
45
accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of
the barangay hall.
Same; Same; Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is
that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and
credence.—Accusedappellant has not shown any compelling reason
w h y t h e w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t e d w o u l d o p e n l y, p u b l i c l y a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y
l i e o r c o n c o c t a s t o r y, t o s e n d a n i n n o c e n t p e r s o n t o j a i l a l l t h e w h i l e
knowing that the real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition
defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full
faith and credence.
S a m e ; S a m e ; S a m e ; C i r c u m s t a n t i a l E v i d e n c e ; R e q u i s i t e s ; Wo r d s a n d
Phrases; Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference—it is founded on experience and observed
facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known
and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.—While the
prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually
starting the fire that burned several houses and killed the Separa
f a m i l y, h e r g u i l t m a y s t i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts
in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought
to be proved. In order to bring about a conviction, the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person.
Same; Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine; Extrajudicial
C o n f e s s i o n s ; R e q u i s i t e s f o r A d m i s s i b i l i t y. — We h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e
abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation
—when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but
h a s m e r e l y b e e n “ i n v i t e d ” f o r q u e s t i o n i n g . To b e a d m i s s i b l e i n
evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2)
it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
S a m e ; S a m e ; S a m e ; S a m e ; A r g u a b l y, t h e b a r a n g a y t a n o d s , i n c l u d i n g
t h e B a r a n g a y C h a i r m a n , m a y b e d e e m e d a s l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o ff i c e r s
for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution—the confession of accused, given to the Barangay
Chairman, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in
v i o l a t i o n o f h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . — A r g u a b l y, t h e b a r a n g a y
tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance,
m a y b e d e e m e d a s l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o ff i c e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p l y i n g
Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in
the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole
f a m i l y o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. S h e w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a l r e a d y u n d e r
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III,
Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been
o b s e r v e d o r a p p l i e d t o h e r. A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t ’s c o n f e s s i o n t o
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the
“interrogation” made by the latter—admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or
done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo,
as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible
in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not
apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
v e r b a l l y a d m i t s t o h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e o ff e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d —
the Bill of Rights solely governs the relationship between the
i n d i v i d u a l o n o n e h a n d a n d t h e S t a t e ( a n d i t s a g e n t s ) o n t h e o t h e r,
and it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
i n d i v i d u a l a n d a n o t h e r p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l . — B e t h a t a s i t m a y, t h e
i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t ’s c o n f e s s i o n t o B a r a n g a y
Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not
apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
v e r b a l l y a d m i t s t o h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e o ff e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n
the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita
M e n d o z a , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o r s o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , t o h a v i n g
started the fire in the Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-
appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by
the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution,
or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the
individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another private individual—as both accused-appellant and
prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here,
there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting
u n d e r p o l i c e a u t h o r i t y, s o a p p r o p r i a t e l y, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t ’s
46
uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
a d m i t t e d b y t h e RT C . destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being
Same; Arson; Homicide; In the crime of arson, the identities of the improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence of proof of
victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims. Concerning the
one of the elements of the crime.—In the crime of arson, the award of exemplary damages, the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating
identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them circumstance had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.
particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
c l a r i f i e d e a r l i e r, t h e k i l l i n g o f a p e r s o n i s a b s o r b e d i n t h e c h a r g e o f
arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only prove, that The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is
a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e o r d w e l l i n g . A g a i n , i n t h e c a s e o f P e o p l e v. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Soriano, we explained that: Although intent may be an ingredient of
the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. The Case
There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of
his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of G . R . C R H C N o . 0 11 3 9 p r o m u l g a t e d o n 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , a ff i r m i n g
his wrongful intent. w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e J u d g m e n t [ 2 ] o f t h e R e g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t ( RT C ) o f
Same; Same; There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson—(1) Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated on
destructive arson, and (2) simple arson, which classification is 13 October 2003, finding appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo (Edna)
based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
regardless of the value of the damage caused.—There are two (2) Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people, and
categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e p e n a l t y o f d e a t h .
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659;
and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said The Facts
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; What is controlling is not the facts are as follows:
t i t l e o f t h e c o m p l a i n t , n o r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e c h a r g e d o r
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, but the From the personal account of Remigio
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well
recited.—As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant as the personal account of the pedicab driver named
was charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January
residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw
s p r e a d a n d d e s t r o y e d s e v e n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g h o u s e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y, i f the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a
proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and h o u s e m a i d b y R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , w i t h h e r h e a d
s e n t e n c e d a c c o r d i n g l y, o f t h e c r i m e o f s i m p l e a r s o n . S u c h i s t h e t u r n i n g i n d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , h u r r i e d l y l e a v i n g t h e
c a s e “ n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e e r r o r i n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e i n house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street,
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e m a i n s e ff e c t i v e i n s o f a r a s i t s t a t e s B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a . S h e w a s s e e n t o h a v e b o a r d e d a
the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.” “What is controlling pedicab which was driven by a person later identified
i s n o t t h e t i t l e o f t h e c o m p l a i n t , n o r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her
therein recited.” mind and asked that she be brought instead
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof to Balasan Streetwhere she finally alighted, after
of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims.—Apropos the paying for her fare.
civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current jurisprudence dictate that the civil
indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the Thirty minutes l a t e r, at around 5:15
victims. However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary damages given by a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later
the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, discovered that a fire gutted the house of the
have to be deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals award of employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman
47
Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon
h e a r i n g s h o u t s f r o m t h e r e s i d e n t s a n d t h e r e a f t e r,
firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire
scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to
the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab
driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that
shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a
woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at
N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t r e e t , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a a n d h e
received a call from his wife telling him of a woman
(the same housemaid) who was acting strangely and
suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods
proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman
who was later identified as the accused-appellant.
After Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as
the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street,
B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , B a r a n g a y C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o
and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to
the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay
Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa,
S r. a n d w h o s e h o u s e w a s a l s o b u r n e d , i d e n t i f i e d t h e
woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the
h o u s e m a i d o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. U p o n i n s p e c t i o n , a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
E D N A s b a g . T h e r e a f t e r, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A
confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the
presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on
fire because she had not been paid her salary for
about a year and that she wanted to go home to her
province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over
to arson investigators headed by
S[F]O4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , w h o b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e S a n
Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz,Manila where she was
further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San
Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she
had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at
the latters detention cell why she did the burning of
her employers house and accused-appellant EDNA
replied that she set the house on fire because when
she asked permission to go home to her province, the
w i f e o f h e r e m p l o y e r R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , n a m e d
Vi r g i n i a S e p a r a ( s i c ) s h o u t e d a t h e r : S i g e u m u w i k a ,
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis,
pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002,
p.6) (Go ahead, when you arrive your color would be
f a i r a l r e a d y. R i d e a b r o o m s t i c k , w h e n y o u a r r i v e y o u r
c o l o r w o u l d b e f a i r a l r e a d y. ) A n d w h e n M e r c e d i t a
Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how she
burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told
her: Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko
ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng
lamesa sa loob ng bahay (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.
7.) (I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a
disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table
inside the house.)
W h e n i n t e r v i e w e d b y C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a
reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant
EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4
( s i c ) D a n i l o Ta l u s a n a s h a v i n g a d m i t t e d t h e c r i m e a n d
even narrated the manner how she accomplished it.
S F O 4 ( s i c ) D a n i l o Ta l u s a n w a s a b l e t o h e a r t h e s a m e
confession, this time at his home, while watching the
t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m Tr u e C r i m e h o s t e d b y G u s A b e l g a s
also of ABS-CBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the
h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d o t h e r a d j o i n i n g
h o u s e s a n d t h e d e a t h o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d
Vi r g i n i a S e p a r a t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r f o u r ( 4 ) c h i l d r e n ,
n a m e l y : M i c h a e l , D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r.
On 9 January 2001, an Information [4] was filed before the
RT C o f M a n i l a , B r a n c h 4 1 , c h a r g i n g a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w i t h t h e
crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-188424. The accusatory portion of said
Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
c a u s e d a m a g e , d i d t h e n a n d t h e r e w i l l f u l l y, u n l a w f u l l y,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-
s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R O B E RTO S E PA R A a n d
family mostly made of wooden materials located at
N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , t h i s c i t y, b y
lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of
disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same
to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly
populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together
with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses,
48
 were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion
o f t h e s a i d f i r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g , n a m e l y, Witness:
Ye s , s i r.
1. Roberto Separa, S r. , 45
years of age Pros. Rebagay:
2. Vi r g i n i a S e p a r a y M e n d o z a , When was that?
40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of A : O n J a n u a r y 2 s h e w a s i n t e r v i e w e d b y t h e m e d i a , s i r. T h e o n e w h o
age t o o k t h e c o v e r a g e w a s C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z o f C h a n n e l 2 , A B S - C B N .
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of T h e y h a v e a f o o t a g e t h a t E d n a a d m i t t e d b e f o r e t h e m , s i r.
age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of Q: And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or
age a d m i s s i o n t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z o f A B S - C B N ?
6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , J r. , 11 y e a r s
of age A : I w a s a t o u r o ff i c e , s i r.

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of Q : Wa s t h e r e a n y o t h e r o c c a s i o n w h e r e i n t h e a c c u s e d m a d e a n o t h e r

t h e i r d e a t h i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r. [ 5 ] confession relative to the admission of the crime?

A : Ye s , s i r.
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of
counsel de oficio, pleaded[6]Not Guilty to the crime charged. Q: When was that?
T h e r e a f t e r, t r i a l e n s u e d . [ 7 ]
A : L a s t F r i d a y, s i r. I t w a s s h o w n i n Tr u e C r i m e o f G u s A b e l g a s . S h e
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n t e d f i v e ( 5 ) w i t n e s s e s , n a m e l y, was interviewed at the City Jail and she admitted that she was the
S P O 4 [ 8 ] D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , Rolando Gruta, Remigio Bernardo, o n e w h o a u t h o r e d t h e c r i m e , s i r.
Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that
accused-appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple Pros. Rebagay:
homicide. And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?

S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , a r s o n i n v e s t i g a t o r, t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e
was one of those who responded to the fire that occurred on 2
January 2001 and which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut,
To n d o , M a n i l a . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i r e k i l l e d R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d
a l l t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s o f h i s f a m i l y, n a m e l y h i s w i f e , Vi r g i n i a , a n d h i s
c h i l d r e n , M i c h a e l , D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r. ; t h e f i r e a l s o
destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He likewise
testified that he twice heard accused-appellant once while the latter
w a s b e i n g i n t e r v i e w e d b y C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a r e p o r t e r o f A B S - C B N ,
and the other time when it was shown on channel 2 on television
d u r i n g t h e a i r i n g o f t h e t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m e n t i t l e d Tr u e C r i m e
hosted by Gus Abelgas confess to having committed the crime
charged, to wit:
A : I w a s i n t h e h o u s e a n d I j u s t s a w i t o n t v, s i r.
Q : W h a t w a s t h a t a d m i s s i o n t h a t y o u h e a r d p e r s o n a l l y, w h e n y o u
were present, when the accused made the confession to Carmelita
Va l d e z ?
A: Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay
niya sa ibabaw ng mesa yung mga diyaryo at sinunog niya.
x x x x
Q: Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made
by the accused Edna Malngan?

Pros. Rebagay: A : Ye s , s i r. K a y a p o n i y a n a g a w a y o n g a l i t p o s i y a s a k a n y a n g a m o
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the n a s i Vi r g i n i a , h i n d i s i y a p i n a s u w e l d o a t g u s t o n a p o n i y a n g u m u w i
accused Edna Malngan admitted to the burning of the house of na (sic) ayaw siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na,
the Separa Family? Sumakay ka na lang sa walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic)
Yo n p o a n g s i n a b i n g k a n y a n g a m o .
x x x x
49
A t t y. M a s w e n g : x x x x
T h a t w a s a s t a t e m e n t o f a n a l l e g e d d e a d p e r s o n , y o u r H o n o r.
Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is
Court: that of the house of the Separa Family?
S a b i n i Va l d e s , h a ?
A: Mismong nakita po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa
Pros. Rebagay: b a h a y n g S e p a r a F a m i l y.
S a b i n i E d n a M a l n g a n k a y C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , Yo u r H o n o r.
Q : H o w l o n g h a v e y o u k n o w n t h e S e p a r a F a m i l y, i f y o u k n o w t h e m ?
Court:
Double hearsay na yon. A : A b o u t t w o y e a r s , s i r.

Pros. Rebagay: Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago?
N o , Yo u r H o n o r, t h e w i t n e s s w a s p r e s e n t , Yo u r H o n o r, w h e n t h a t Do you know her prior to January 2, 2001?
c o n f e s s i o n w a s m a d e b y t h e a c c u s e d t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z . [ 9 ]
A : Ye s , s i r. I k n e w ( s i c ) h e r f o r t w o y e a r s .

Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the Court:

barangay tanods in the area, testified: Why?

Pros. Rebagay: Witness:

M r. W i t n e s s , w h a t i s y o u r p r o f e s s i o n ? Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.

A : S i d e c a r d r i v e r, s i r. Pros. Rebagay:
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall
where were (sic) you? A : T h e y w e r e t h e e m p l o y e r s o f E d n a , s i r.

A : I w a s a t t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a S t r e e t , s i r. Q : Yo u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a
F a m i l y. W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e
Pros. Rebagay: house of the Separa Family?
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if
a n y, M r. W i t n e s s ? A : Wa l a p a p o n g a n o y a n n a i s a k a y k o n a s i y a s a s i d e c a r.

A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming
S e p a r a , s i r. out from the house of the Separa family?

Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa Family? A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.

A : 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r. x x x x

x x x x Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?

Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
S e p a r a F a m i l y. H o w f a r i s t h a t h o u s e f r o m t h e p l a c e w h e r e y o u w e r e
waiting at the corner of Moderna and Paulino Streets? Q: Where?

A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my A : To N i p a S t r e e t , s i r.

p e d i c a b w a s p l a c e d . M y d i s t a n c e w a s a b o u t t h r e e m e t e r s , s i r.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
50
 A : N o , s i r.
A : Ye s , s i r.
Pros. Rebagay:
x x x x And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was
apprehended or not?
Q : Yo u s a i d t h a t y o u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d
when you go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any? x x x x

A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po. A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna,
s i r.
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three
minutes? x x x x[10]

A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly

t o B a l a s a n S t r e e t , s i r. Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire
occurred, stated:
x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
Q: What happened after that?
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred
A : W h e n w e a r r i v e d t h e r e , s h e a l i g h t e d a n d p a y ( s i c ) P 5 . 0 0 , s i r. somewhere in your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?

Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab? A : Ye s , s i r.

Witness: Q : N o w, w h e r e w e r e y o u w h e n t h i s i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d ?
I w e n t h o m e a n d I l o o k e d f o r a n o t h e r p a s s e n g e r, s i r.
A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa
Pros. Rebagay: barangay Hall mga siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng
After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house sunog nirespondehan namin iyongsunog eh me dala kaming fire.
to look for passengers?
Court:
A Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab Yo u j u s t a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n . W h e r e w e r e y o u w h e n t h i s i n c i d e n t
n a a p o y. happened?

Q: From what place was that fire coming out? Witness:

I w a s a t t h e B a r a n g a y H a l l , Yo u r H o n o r.
A : F r o m t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a F a m i l y, s i r.
Pros. Rebagay:
x x x x And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?

Pros. Rebagay: Witness:

After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto
S e p a r a F a m i l y, w h a t d i d y o u d o i f a n y ?
A : S i y e m p r e p o , i s a n g B a r a n g a y Ta n o d p o a k o , n a g r e s p o n d e n a p o
kami sa sunog. Binuksan na po ng Chairman naming yung tangke,
binomba na po naming yung apoy ng tubig.
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog
mukha talagang arson dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga
tipong Iyong namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro
n a p a k a r a m i n g k a l a t n g m g a p i n t u r a , m g a c o n t a i n e r, k a y a h i n d i
p o n a m i n n a a p u l a k a a g a d i y o n g a p o y, n a s u n o g u l t i m o i y o n g f i r e
t a n k n a m i n s a l a k a s , s i r.

Q : A f t e r t h a t i n c i d e n t , M r. W i t n e s s , h a v e y o u s e e n E d n a A g a i n ( s i c ) . Pros. Rebagay:
N o w, w i l l y o u p l e a s e t e l l u s w h e r e t h i s f i r e o c c u r r e d ?
51
 eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng probinsya ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko
A : A t t h e h o u s e o f t h e s i x v i c t i m s , s i r. s u m a k a y n a l a n g d a w p o a k o n g w a l i s t i n g t i n g p a r a m a k a u w i , s i r.

Q: Whose house is that? A t t y. H e r m a n :

We w o u l d l i k e t o o b j e c t , Yo u r H o n o r o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h a t i s
A : T h e h o u s e o f t h e v i c t i m s , s i r. h e a r s a y.

x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
Yo u s a i d t h a t y o u r e s p o n d e d t o t h e p l a c e , w h a t t r a n s p i r e d a f t e r y o u
responded to the place?
A: Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po noon sa
bahay na nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod
po akong nagsabi may humahangos na isang babae na may dalang
b a g p a p u n t a p o r o o n p a l a b a s n g s a s a k y a n , s i r.
Q: And so what happened?
A: Siyempre hindi naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may
dumating galing na sa bahay naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si
Konsehala Alfonso na may isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa
Calle Pedro Alfonso, ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito
g a n o o n n i r e s p o n d e h a n k o p o , s i r.
Q: Where did you respond?
A : A t B a l a s a n , s i r, b u t i t s n o t t h e a r e a o f m y j u r i s d i c t i o n .
x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
T h a t i s n o t a h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t , Yo u r H o n o r, s t r a i g h t f r o m t h e m o u t h
of the accused.
A t t y. H e r m a n :
I t s n o t u n d e r t h e e x e m p t i o n u n d e r t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , Yo u r H o n o r.
He is testifying according to what he has heard.
Court:
Thats part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, thats another
m a t t e r. L e t i t r e m a i n .
Pros. Rebagay:
N o w, w h o w e r e p r e s e n t w h e n t h e a c c u s e d a r e t e l l i n g y o u t h i s ?
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid,
siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga
mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng
m a y n a m a t a y e h a n i m n a t a o a n d n a m a t a y, k a y a i y o n g m g a t a o
k i n o k o n t r o l s i y a m a d i d i s g r a s y a s i y a d a h i l p i n - p o i n t e d p o s i y a , Yo u r
H o n o r, i y o n g d a m i n a i y o n l i b o i y o n g n a k a p a l i g i d d o o n s a b a r a n g a y
hall napakahirap awatin. Gustong-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-
b a y a n , n a g a l i t d a h i l a n g d a m i n g b a h a y h o n g n a s u n o g . [ 11 ]

Q: What happened when you reached that place? For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa
Family and whose house was one of those destroyed by the fire,
A : S i y a p o a n g n a h u l i k o d o o n , s i r. recounted:

Court: Pros. Rebagay:

Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan. M a d a m Wi t n e s s , o n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , d o y o u r e c a l l w h e r e w e r e y o u
residing then?
Pros. Rebagay:
And what happened? A : Ye s , s i r.

A : I b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g a y h a l l , s i r. Q: Where were you residing at?

Q: And what happened at the barangay hall? A : A t N o . 1 7 0 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r.

A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya Q : W h y d i d y o u t r a n s f e r y o u r r e s i d e n c e ? Aw h i l e a g o y o u t e s t i f i e d

eh. Inamin niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya t h a t y o u a r e n o w r e s i d i n g a t 1 4 7 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a ?
pinasasahod ng more or less isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko bakit
A : B e c a u s e o u r h o u s e w a s b u r n e d , s i r.
52
 Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara
Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of (sic) family?
your house (sic)?
Witness:
A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir E d n a M a l n g a n , s i r.

Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan? Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of
A : Ye s , s i r. the Cifara (sic) family?

Q: Why do you know her? A : W h e n t h e f i r e i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , s i r, o n J a n u a r y 3 , w e w e n t t o

S a n L a z a r o F i r e S t a t i o n a n d I s a w E d n a M a l n g a n d e t a i n e d t h e r e , s i r.
A : S h e i s t h e h o u s e h e l p e r o f t h e f a m i l y w h o w e r e ( s i c ) b u r n e d , s i r.
Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the
Q: What family? culprit or the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A : C i f a r a ( s i c ) f a m i l y, s i r. A : I t a l k e d t o h e r w h e n w e w e n t t h e r e a t t h a t d a y, s i r.

Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family? Q: What transpired then?

A : T h e w o m a n , s i r. A : I t a l k e d t o h e r a n d I t o l d h e r, E d n a , b a k i t m o n a m a n g i n a w a y u n g
ganun?
Q: What is the name?
Q: And what was the answer of Edna?
A : Vi r g i n i a M e n d o z a C i f a r a ( s i c ) , s i r.
A: She answered, Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng
Q : A r e y o u r e l a t e d t o Vi r g i n i a M e n d o z a C i f a r a ( s i c ) ? probinsya, nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi
daw po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara (sic) na, (sic)Sige umuwi ka,
A : M y h u s b a n d , s i r. pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo
maputi ka na.
Q : W h a t i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f y o u r h u s b a n d t o t h e l a t e Vi r g i n i a
Mendoza Cifara (sic)? Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house
A : T h e y w e r e f i r s t c o u s i n s , s i r. of the Cifara (sic) family?

Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family? A : I a l s o a s k e d h e r, P a a n o m o g i n a w a y u n g s u n o g ? S h e t o l d
me, Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable
A: Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan. l i g h t e r a t h i n a g i s n i y a s a i b a b a w n g l a m e s a s a l o o b n g b a h a y. ( s i c )
[12]

Q : Yo u s a i d t h a t E d n a M a l n g a n w a s w o r k i n g w i t h t h e C i f a r a ( s i c )
f a m i l y. W h a t i s t h e w o r k o f E d n a M a l n g a n ?
L a s t l y, t h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n t e d R o d o l f o M o v i l l a , o w n e r o f
A : N a n g a n g a m u h a n p o . H o u s e h e l p e r, s i r. t h e h o u s e s i t u a t e d b e s i d e t h a t o f t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t
his house was also gutted by the fire that killed the Separa family
Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the and that he tried to help said victims but to no avail.
Cifara (sic) family?
The prosecution presented other documentary
A : I c a n n o t e s t i m a t e b u t s h e s t a y e d t h e r e f o r t h r e e t o f o u r y e a r s , s i r. evidence[13] and thereafter rested its case.

53
 When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory [W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the
evidence, instead of doing so, accused-appellant filed a Motion to accused in the act of burning the house or actually
Admit Demurrer to Evidence[14] and the corresponding Demurrer to starting the subject fire, the following circumstances
Evidence[15] with the former expressly stating that said Demurrer to that show that the accused intentionally caused or
Evidence was being filed x x x without express leave of court x x x. was responsible for the subject fire have been duly
[16]
established:

In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that 1. that immediately before the burning of the
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u ff i c i e n t t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t b e y o n d house, the accused hurriedly and with head turning in
reasonable doubt for the following reasons: [17] (a) that she is d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ( p a l i n g a - l i n g a ) w e n t o u t o f t h e s a i d
charged with crime not defined and penalized by law; (b) that house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u ff i c i e n t t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t b e y o n d where to go x x x;
reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the
w i t n e s s e s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w e r e h e a r s a y, t h u s , i n a d m i s s i b l e i n 2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report
e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r. that there was a woman in Balasan St. who appears
confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused- Chairman and his tanods went there, found the
appellants Demurrer to Evidence. accused and apprehended her and brought her to the
O n 1 3 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 , a c t i n g o n t h e D e m u r r e r t o E v i d e n c e , t h e RT C barangay hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay
promulgated itsJudgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
s u b j e c t c a s e b a s e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . T h e RT C
considered accused-appellant to have waived her right to 3. that when she was apprehended and
present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without i n v e s t i g a t e d b y t h e b a r a n g a y o ff i c i a l s a n d w h e n h e r
leave of court. bag was opened, the same contained a disposable
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable Barangay Chairman.
d o u b t o f t h e c r i m e o f A r s o n w i t h M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e , t h e RT C r u l e d
that: [T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous
demeanor immediately before the fire when she left
The first argument of the accused that she is the house and rode a pedicab and her same
charged with an act not defined and penalized by law d e m e a n o r, p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n w h e n f o u n d
is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the and apprehended at the same place where she
accused with the crime of Arson with Multiple alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the
Homicide is merely descriptive of the charge of Arson lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated
that resulted to Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the indisputably show her guilt as charged.
accused is charged with Arson which resulted to
Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and that charge If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the
is embodied and stated in the body of the information. c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r, t h e s a m e i s
What is controlling is the allegation in the body of the removed or obliterated with the
Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x x. confessions/admissions of the commission of the
o ff e n s e a n d t h e m a n n e r t h e r e o f t h a t s h e m a d e t o t h e
x x x x prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media,
The second and third arguments will be r e s p e c t i v e l y.
discussed jointly as they are interrelated with each
o t h e r. x x x . x x x x

x x x x [H]er confessions/admissions are positive

acknowledgment of guilt of the crime and appear to
have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These
54
 confessions/admissions, especially the one given to Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the
her neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M.
uncounselled and made while she was already under No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which
the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not b e c a m e e ff e c t i v e o n O c t o b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e C o u r t o f
violative of her right under the Constitution. Appeals, after rendering judgment, hereby refrains
from making an entry of judgment and forthwith
T h e d e c r e t a l p a r t o f t h e RT C s J u d g m e n t r e a d s : certifies the case and elevates the entire record of
t h i s c a s e t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t f o r r e v i e w. [ 2 0 ]
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is
hereby denied and judgment is hereby rendered It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence
f i n d i n g t h e a c c u s e d E D N A M A L N G A N Y M AY O g u i l t y p r e s e n t e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i s n o t s u ff i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In
Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of support of said exculpatory proposition, she assigns the following
s i x ( 6 ) p e o p l e a n d s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e errors[21]:
mandatory penalty of death, and ordering her to pay
t h e h e i r s o f t h e v i c t i m s R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d I.
Vi r g i n i a S e p a r a a n d c h i l d r e n M i c h a e l , D a p h n e ,
P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r. , t h e a m o u n t o f F i f t y THE H O N O R A B L E C O U RT E R R E D I N R U L I N G T H AT
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the THE C I R C U M S TA N T I A L E V I D E N C E P R E S E N T E D B Y
amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) THE P R O S E C U T I O N I S S U F F I C I E N T TO C O N V I C T
Pesos as temperate damages for their burned house THE ACCUSED; and
or a total of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00)
Pesos and to Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One II.
Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.
T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U RT E R R E D I N A L L O W I N G A N D
G I V I N G C R E D E N C E TO T H E H E A R S AY E V I D E N C E
Due to the d e a t h p e n a l t y i m p o s e d b y t h e RT C , t h e c a s e w a s A N D U N C O U N S E L L E D A D M I S S I O N S A L L E G E D LY
directly elevated t o t h i s C o u r t f o r a u t o m a t i c r e v i e w. C o n f o r m a b l y G I V E N B Y T H E A C C U S E D TO T H E W I T N E S S E S
with our decision i n P e o p l e v. E f r e n M a t e o y G a r c i a , [ 1 9 ] h o w e v e r, w e B A R A N G AY CHAIRMAN REMIGIO BERNARDO,
referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action M E R C E D I TA M E N D O Z A A N D T H E M E D I A .
and disposition.

O n 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a ff i r m e d w i t h THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH

m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e RT C , t h e f a l l o o f w h i c h r e a d s : ( M U LT I P L E ) H O M I C I D E .

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-
assailed October 13, 2003 Judgment of the Regional appellant with a complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide .
Tr i a l C o u r t o f M a n i l a , B r a n c h 4 1 , f i n d i n g a c c u s e d - P r e s e n t l y, t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2 ) l a w s t h a t g o v e r n t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n
appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond where death results therefrom Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code
reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple homicide and (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, [22] and Section 5
s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e D E AT H P E N A LT Y i s o f P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e ( P D ) N o . 1 6 1 3 [ 2 3 ] , q u o t e d h e r e u n d e r, t o w i t :
h e r e b y A F F I R M E D w i t h M O D I F I C AT I O N i n t h a t s h e i s
further ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages Revised Penal Code:
and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each of the victims who perished in the fire, to be paid A RT. 3 2 0 . D e s t r u c t i v e A r s o n . x x x x
to their heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, If as a consequence of the commission of any
one whose house was also burned, the sum of of the acts penalized under this Article, death results,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damage. the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]

55
 Presidential Decree No. 1613: to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when
fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by c o m m i t t e d i s m u r d e r o n l y ; l a s t l y, ( c ) i f t h e o b j e c t i v e i s , l i k e w i s e , t o
reason of or on the occasion of the arson death k i l l a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n , a n d i n f a c t t h e o ff e n d e r h a s a l r e a d y d o n e s o ,
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there
shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and
arson.

Where then does this case fall under?

Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended , with respect to destructive arson,
and the provisions ofPD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson From a reading of the body of the Information:
provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether
considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City
The raison d'tre is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
consequence.[24] c a u s e d a m a g e , d i d t h e n a n d t h e r e w i l l f u l l y, u n l a w f u l l y,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R O B E RTO S E PA R A a n d
h a v e t o b e a s e p a r a t e c r i m e a l t o g e t h e r, t h e j o i n t d i s c u s s i o n [ 2 5 ] o f t h e family mostly made of wooden materials located at
l a t e M r. C h i e f J u s t i c e R a m o n C . A q u i n o a n d M m e . J u s t i c e C a r o l i n a No. 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , this c i t y, by
C. Grio-Aquino, on the subject of the crimes of arson and lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of
murder/homicide, is highly instructive: disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same
to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly
Groizard says that when fire is used with the populated place and as a consequence thereof a
intent to kill a particular person who may be in a conflagration ensued and the said building, together
house and that objective is attained by burning the with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses,
h o u s e , t h e c r i m e i s m u r d e r o n l y. W h e n t h e P e n a l C o d e were razed by fire;that by reason and on the occasion
declares that killing committed by means of fire is o f t h e s a i d f i r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g , n a m e l y,
m u r d e r, i t i n t e n d s t h a t f i r e s h o u l d b e p u r p o s e l y
adopted as a means to that end. There can be no 1. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , 4 5 y e a r s o f
murder without a design to take life. [26] In other words, age
i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t o f t h e o ff e n d e r i s t o k i l l b y m e a n s o f 2. Vi r g i n i a S e p a r a y Mendoza, 40
f i r e , t h e o ff e n s e i s m u r d e r. B u t i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e i s years of age
the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may 3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
be absorbed by the crime of arson. [27] 4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
x x x x 6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , J r. , 11 y e a r s o f
age
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein
were killed, fire would not be a qualifying sustained burn injuries which were the direct
circumstance. The accused would be liable for the cause of their death immediately t h e r e a f t e r.
[29]
s e p a r a t e o ff e n s e s o f m u r d e r or homicide, as the case [Emphasis supplied.]
may be, and arson.[28]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It it is
A c c o r d i n g l y, i n c a s e s w h e r e b o t h b u r n i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r, i n o r d e r clear from the foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her
to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, employers house through the use of fire.
m u r d e r o r a r s o n a n d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r, i t i s d e r i g u e u r t o a s c e r t a i n
the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the We n o w g o t o t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . U n d e r t h e f i r s t a s s i g n m e n t o f
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on e r r o r, i n a s s e r t i n g t h e i n s u ff i c i e n c y o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s e v i d e n c e t o
the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is argues that the prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial
56
evidence hardly enough to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
She ratiocinates that the following circumstances:
1. That immediately before the burning of the
house , the accused hurriedly and with head
t u r n i n g i n d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ( p a l i n g a - l i n g a )
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab
apparently not knowing where to go for she
first requested to be brought to Nipa St. but
upon reaching there requested again to be
brought to Balasan St. as shown by the
testimony of prosecution
Rolando Gruta;
Q : Yo u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e
o f t h e S e p a r a F a m i l y. W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n
you saw Edna coming out from the house of
the Separa Family?
A : Wa l a p a p o n g a n o y a n n a i s a k a y k o n a s i y a s a
sidecar.
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw
her coming out from the house of the Separa
family?
witness
A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.

2. That immediately after the fire, upon a x x x x

report that there was a woman in Balasan St.
who appears confused and apprehensive Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his any?
tanods went there, found the accused and
apprehended her and brought her to the A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
barangay hall as shown by the testimony of
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and Q: Where?

3. That when she was apprehended and investigated A : To N i p a S t r e e t , s i r.

b y t h e b a r a n g a y o ff i c i a l s a n d w h e n h e r b a g
was opened, the same contained a disposable Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of
the Barangay Chairman.[30] A : Ye s , s i r.

fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her x x x x
employers house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, given that it is a fact that housemaids are the first persons in Q : Yo u s a i d t h a t y o u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t . W h a t
the house to wake up early to perform routine chores for their happened when you go (sic) there at Nipa
employers,[31] one of which is preparing and cooking the morning Street, if any?
meal for the members of the household; and necessity requires her
to go out early to look for open stores or even nearby marketplaces A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong
t o b u y t h i n g s t h a t w i l l c o m p l e t e t h e e a r l y m e a l f o r t h e d a y. [ 3 2 ] S h e minuto po.
then concludes that it was normal for her to have been seen going
out of her employers house in a hurry at that time of the day and to Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop
look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and that there for three minutes?
t h e r e a r e n o o t h e r p e r s o n s i n t h e v i c i n i t y. [ 3 3 ]
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her
We a r e f a r f r o m p e r s u a d e d . d i r e c t l y t o B a l a s a n S t r e e t , s i r.

Tr u e , b y t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r j o b s , h o u s e m a i d s a r e r e q u i r e d t o x x x x
s t a r t t h e d a y e a r l y ; h o w e v e r, c o n t r a r y t o s a i d a s s e r t i o n , t h e
actuations and the demeanor of accused-appellant on that fateful
early morning as observed firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the We q u o t e w i t h a p p r o v a l t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e RT C i n
w i t n e s s e s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , b e l i e h e r c l a i m o f n o r m a l c y, t o w i t : discrediting accused-appellants aforementioned rationale:

57
 [O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to
leave the house in such a disturbed, nervous and Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why
a g i t a t e d m a n n e r, d e m e a n o r a n d c o n d i t i o n . T h e t i m i n g t h e w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t e d w o u l d o p e n l y, p u b l i c l y a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y l i e
of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor o r c o n c o c t a s t o r y, t o s e n d a n i n n o c e n t p e r s o n t o j a i l a l l t h e w h i l e
immediately before the fire when she left the house knowing that the real malefactor remains at large.Such proposition
a n d r o d e a p e d i c a b a n d h e r s a m e d e m e a n o r, p h y s i c a l defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or
and mental condition when found and apprehended at improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
the same place where she alighted from presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full
the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag faith and credence.[36]
thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.[34] While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-
appellant actually starting the fire that burned several houses and
k i l l e d t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y, h e r g u i l t m a y s t i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellants circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
a g i t a t e d a p p e a r a n c e w a s o u t o f t h e o r d i n a r y. R e m a r k a b l y, s h e h a s circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
never denied this observation. proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [37]
We g i v e g r e a t w e i g h t t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e RT C a n d s o
accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact
i t h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e m d i r e c t l y. T h e c r e d i b i l i t y g i v e n or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of by inference.[38] It is founded on experience and observed facts and
evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e m , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r d e m e a n o r, c o n d u c t , proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. [39] In order to bring
and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must
counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
Rolando Gruta and MerceditaMendoza are disinterested witnesses conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the
and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that guilty person.[40]
t h e y a r e s u b o r n e d w i t n e s s e s . T h e r e c o r d s o f t h e RT C e v e n s h o w
thatRemigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept accused- In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution
appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of w i t n e s s e s , t a k e n t o g e t h e r, e x e m p l i f y a c a s e w h e r e c o n v i c t i o n c a n b e
the barangay hall: upheld on the basis of circumstantial evidence. First, prosecution
witness Rolando Gruta, the driver of the pedicab that accused-
Pros. Rebagay: appellant rode on, testified that he knew for a fact that she worked
N o w, w h o w e r e p r e s e n t w h e n t h e a c c u s e d a r e as a housemaid of the victims, and that he positively identified her
(sic) telling you this? as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims on 2
J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 a t 4 : 4 5 a . m . , a n d a c t i n g i n a n e r v o u s m a n n e r. T h a t
A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon while riding on the pedicab, accused-appellant was unsure of her
nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, intended destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally
gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan picked up accused-appellant only a few minutes after dropping her
para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya o ff , R o l a n d o G r u t a s a w t h e S e p a r a s h o u s e b e i n g g u t t e d b y a b l a z i n g
gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo testified that he and his tanods,
n a m a t a y, k a y a i y o n g m g a t a o k i n o k o n t r o l s i y a including Rolando Gruta, were the ones who picked up accused-
madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, appellant Edna atBalasan Street (where Rolando Gruta dropped her
Yo u r H o n o r, i y o n g d a m i n a i y o n l i b o i y o n g o ff ) a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a c a l l t h a t t h e r e w a s a w o m a n a c t i n g s t r a n g e l y a t
nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap said street and who appeared to have nowhere to go.Third,
awatin. Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n o v e r h e a r d accused-appellant admit to
taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a r e p o r t e r o f C h a n n e l 2 ( A B S - C B N ) t h a t s a i d
hong nasunog.[35] accused-appellant started the fire, plus the fact that he was able see
the telecast of Gus Abelgas show where accused-appellant, while
being interviewed, confessed to the crime as well. The foregoing
58
testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza
validating the fact that accused-appellant confessed to having
started the fire which killed the Separa family as well as burned
seven houses including that of the victims, convincingly form an
unbroken chain, which leads to the unassailable conclusion
pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind the crime of
simple arson.
I n h e r s e c o n d a s s i g n e d e r r o r, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t q u e s t i o n s
the admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given
to prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita
Mendoza, and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that
being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions to
having committed the crime charged should have been excluded in
evidence against her for being violative of Article III, Section 12(1)
of the Constitution.
P a r t i c u l a r l y, s h e t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f
prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for
being hearsay and in the nature of an uncounselled admission.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-
appellant is of the position that the remaining proof of her alleged
guilt, consisting in the main of circumstantial evidence, is
inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We p a r t l y d i s a g r e e .
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
c o m m i s s i o n o f a n o ff e n s e s h a l l h a v e t h e r i g h t t o b e
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
o w n c h o i c e . I f t h e p e r s o n c a n n o t a ff o r d t h e s e r v i c e s o f
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
x x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
We h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e a b o v e q u o t e d p r o v i s i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e
stage of custodial investigation when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. [41] Said constitutional guarantee has
also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning. [42]
To b e a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t a n a c c u s e d , t h e
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.[43]
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
e n f o r c e m e n t o ff i c e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p l y i n g A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 )
and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to
thebarangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already
a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
h o u s e s a s w e l l a s k i l l e d t h e w h o l e f a m i l y o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. S h e
was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should
h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n o b s e r v e d o r a p p l i e d t o h e r. A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s
confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in
response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly
conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the
latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such
were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
B e t h a t a s i t m a y, t h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s
confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter
as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well
be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning
by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the
o ff e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r w h e n a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto
S e p a r a , S r. , t o h a v i n g s t a r t e d t h e f i r e i n t h e S e p a r a s h o u s e . T h e
testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is,
unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against
her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee.
Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and
its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another private individual as both
59
accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza Such assertion is bereft of merit.
undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no evidence on record to show
t h a t s a i d w i t n e s s w a s a c t i n g u n d e r p o l i c e a u t h o r i t y, s o a p p r o p r i a t e l y, In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are
accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not one of the
w i t n e s s w a s p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d b y t h e RT C . e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e . A s w e h a v e c l a r i f i e d e a r l i e r, t h e k i l l i n g o f a
person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructive.The
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the prosecution need only prove, that the burning was intentional and
testimony of S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n . C o n t e n d i n g that [w]hen that what was intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n t e s t i f i e d i n c o u r t , h i s s t o r y i s m o r e o f e v e n t s , d w e l l i n g . A g a i n , i n t h e c a s e o f P e o p l e v. S o r i a n o , [ 4 6 ] w e e x p l a i n e d
which are not within his personal knowledge but based from that:
accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the
accused or some other persons x xx. In other words, she objects to Although intent may be an ingredient of the
t h e t e s t i m o n y f o r b e i n g m e r e l y h e a r s a y. W i t h t h i s i m p u t a t i o n o f crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the
i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y, w e a g r e e w i t h w h a t t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s h a d t o s a y : accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown
Although this testimony of that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the
S F O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n i s h e a r s a y b e c a u s e h e w a s n o t prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence
present when Gus Abelgas interviewed accused- of his wrongful intent.[47]
appellant EDNA, it may nevertheless be admitted in
evidence as an independently relevant statement to The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-
establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement appellant guilty of?
or the fact that the statement was made [People
v. M a l l a r i , G . R . N o . 1 0 3 5 4 7 , J u l y 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 , 3 1 0 S C R A As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the
621 citing People v. C u s i , J r. , G.R. No. L- crime of arson: 1)destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised
20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple
Ve l a s q u e z , G . R . N o s . 1 3 2 6 3 5 & 1 4 3 8 7 2 - 7 5 , F e b r u a r y arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is
21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled based on the kind, character and location of the property burned,
that: regardless of the value of the damage caused, [48] to wit:

Under the doctrine of Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as

independently relevant statements, amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r t r u t h o r f a l s i t y, t h e burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
fact that such statements have been buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
made is relevant. The hearsay rule and other m i l i t a r y, government or commercial
d o e s n o t a p p l y, a n d t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e establishments by any person or group of persons .
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to [[49]] The classification of this type of crime is known
the making of such statement is not as Destructive Arson, which is punishable
secondary but p r i m a r y, for the by reclusion perpetuato death. The reason for the law
statement itself may constitute a fact in i s s e l f - e v i d e n t : t o e ff e c t i v e l y d i s c o u r a g e a n d d e t e r t h e
issue or be circumstantially relevant as commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the
to the existence of such a fact. [45] destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration
As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the leaves only destruction and despair in its wake;
media, we need not discuss it further for the reporters were never hence, the State mandates greater retribution to
presented to testify in court. authors of thisheinous crime. The exceptionally
severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant asserts consideration the extreme danger to human lives
that since the identities of the burned bodies were never exposed by the malicious burning of these structures;
conclusively established, she cannot be responsible for their deaths. the danger to property resulting from the
c o n f l a g r a t i o n ; t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s n o r m a l l y d i ff i c u l t t o
60
adopt precautions against its commission, and the Simple Arsonmay nevertheless be converted into
d i ff i c u l t y i n p i n p o i n t i n g t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s ; a n d , t h e Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
greater impact on the social, economic, security and circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.] [52]
political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any
of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the
result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the
imposed. Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed with the crime of Simple Arson for having deliberately set fire upon
Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code t h e t w o - s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R O B E RTO S E PA R A a n d f a m i l y
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
decree contemplates the malicious burning of public thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
and private structures, regardless of size, not conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire .
classified as other cases of arson. These [Emphasis supplied.]
includehouses, dwellings, government buildings,
farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts
airports, wharves and other industrial establishments . o f t h e c a s e o f P e o p l e v. S o r i a n o . [ 5 3 ] T h e a c c u s e d i n t h e l a t t e r c a s e
[[50]] Although the purpose of the law on Simple c a u s e d t h e b u r n i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r h o u s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y, t h e b l a z e
Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and s p r e a d a n d g u t t e d d o w n f i v e ( 5 ) n e i g h b o r i n g h o u s e s . T h e RT C
other crimes involving destruction, protect the therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under
national economy and preserve the social, economic paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers b y R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 7 6 5 9 . T h i s C o u r t , t h r o u g h M r. J u s t i c e B e l l o s i l l o ,
t h e p e n a l t y t o b e m e t e d t o o ff e n d e r s . T h i s s e p a r a t e h o w e v e r, d e c l a r e d t h a t :
classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to
lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec.
the act or acts committed, depending on the particular 3 , p a r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 , w h i c h i m p o s e s a p e n a l t y o f
facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other
supplied.] cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses,
To e m p h a s i z e : contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the
a f o r e s a i d l a w. T h e d e s c r i p t i o n s a s a l l e g e d i n t h e
The nature of Destructive Arson is second Amended Information particularly refer to the
distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of structures as houses rather than as buildings or
p e r v e r s i t y o r v i c i o u s n e s s o f t h e c r i m i n a l o ff e n d e r. T h e edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec.
acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal 3 , P a r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 , a n d n o t A r t . 3 2 0 , p a r. 1 o f t h e
Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
o d i o u s a n d h a t e f u l o ff e n s e s a n d w h i c h , b y r e a s o n o f construed strictly against the government, and
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, liberally in favor of the accused.
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and T h e e l e m e n t s o f a r s o n u n d e r S e c . 3 , p a r. 2 , o f
m o r a l i t y i n a j u s t , c i v i l i z e d a n d o r d e r e d s o c i e t y. [ 5 1 ] O n PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser d w e l l i n g . I n c i d e n t a l l y, t h e s e e l e m e n t s c o n c u r i n t h e
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law c a s e a t b a r. [ 5 5 ]
p u n i s h e s w i t h a l e s s e r p e n a l t y. I n o t h e r w o r d s , S i m p l e
Arsoncontemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant
t h a n D e s t r u c t i v e A r s o n . H o w e v e r, a c t s f a l l i n g u n d e r was charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey
61
residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise
s p r e a d a n d d e s t r o y e d s e v e n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g h o u s e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y, i f
proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
s e n t e n c e d a c c o r d i n g l y, o f t h e c r i m e o f s i m p l e a r s o n . S u c h i s t h e
c a s e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e e r r o r i n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e i n
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e m a i n s e ff e c t i v e i n s o f a r a s i t s t a t e s
the facts constituting the crime alleged therein. [56] What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
o ff e n s e c h a r g e d o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r l a w o r p a r t t h e r e o f a l l e g e d l y
violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. [57]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the
RT C a s S e c . 5 o f P D N o . 1 6 1 3 c a t e g o r i c a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e
penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or
on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
supplied.]
A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e r e b e i n g n o a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e a l l e g e d
in the Information, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current
jurisprudence[58] dictate that the civil indemnity due from accused-
appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims.
[59]
H o w e v e r, t h e m o n e t a r y a w a r d s f o r m o r a l a n d e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s
given by the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00,
due the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of material
b a s i s . S i m i l a r l y, t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a w a r d o f e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s
to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of
his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being
i m p r o p e r. M o r a l d a m a g e s c a n n o t b e a w a r d b y t h i s C o u r t i n t h e
a b s e n c e o f p r o o f o f m e n t a l o r p h y s i c a l s u ff e r i n g o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
heirs of the victims.[60] Concerning the award of exemplary damages,
the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating circumstance
h a d b e e n a l l e g e d a n d p r o v e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e a t b a r.
[61]
To s u m m a r i z e , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s a l t e r n a t i v e p l e a t h a t s h e
be acquitted of the crime must be rejected. With the evidence on
r e c o r d , w e f i n d n o c o g e n t r e a s o n t o d i s t u r b t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e RT C
and the Court of Appeals. It is indubitable that accused-appellant is
the author of the crime of simple arson. All the circumstantial
e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e t h e RT C , v i e w e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y, i s a s
convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates accused-
appellants innocence, and when considered concurrently with
her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza, the formers guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is twice as evident. Hence, her conviction is
e ff e c t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d . M o r e s o , a s i t i s p r o p i t i o u s t o n o t e t h a t i n s t a r k
contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the prosecution,
accused-appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for
the proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
I N V I E W W H E R E O F, t h e D e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s
d a t e d 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , i n C A G . R . C R H C N o . 0 11 3 9 , i s h e r e b y
AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA
M A L N G A N Y M AY O i s c o n c e r n e d . T h e s e n t e n c e t o b e i m p o s e d a n d
t h e a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s t o b e a w a r d e d , h o w e v e r, a r e M O D I F I E D . I n
accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-
appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of each of the
v i c t i m s P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s c i v i l i n d e m n i t y.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-69971 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS, accused/appellant.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Re-enactment of rape not admissible where no
evidence that suspect was informed of his constitutional rights was ever adduced.—
The decision itself, however, states thatthe re-enactment took place before Luvendino
was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the
reenactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional
rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right
before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must
decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
Same; Same; Extra-judicial confession admissible where it was signed in the
presence of the mother of the accused and his attorney.—Luvendino next claimed
that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights before his confession was
given by him or extracted from him. In the first place, Police Sgt. Galang testified as
prosecution witness that he had indeed informed Luvendino of the latter’s
constitutional rights before he commenced investigating Luvendino at the police
head-quarters. In the second place, the written extrajudicial confession itself stated
that Luvendino was informed of his constitutional rights and that he was waiving those
62
rights. In the third place, according to Luvendino himself, he first signed his
extrajudicial statement, which also set out a separately signed waiver of his rights, at
the police department and that later, when he was brought to the office of Provincial
Fiscal Mateo, he subscribed to or signed once more the same document, this time
under oath. As already noted from the trial court’s decision, when Luvendino
subscribed under oath to his extra-judicial confession in the presence of the
Provincial Fiscal, his mother and Atty. Eustacio Flores were also present.
Same; Same; Same.—It is, however, claimed by appellant Luvendino that at the time
he had first signed his extrajudicial confession at the police headquarters, he was
without counsel. Luvendino thus apparently seeks to distinguish the initial signing of
his Salaysay” (Exhibit “L”) at the police headquarters from his subsequent subscribing
thereto under oath in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. There is no question
that on the latter occasion, Luvendino was questioned or investigated by the Fiscal in
the presence of his mother while Luvendino was assisted by Atty. Eustacio Flores.
Same; Same; Uncounseled waiver of right to counsel initially a judge-made one. The
doctrine cannot be given retroactive effect as to confessions done before April 26,
1983.—But even if appellant Luvendino’s contention were to be accepted at face
value (and we do not so accept it), the same result must be reached. The doctrine
that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was
initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit.
Same; Same; Same.—While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant
Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galithave no
retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983, the date of
promulgation of Morales.
Due Process; Attorneys; Criminal Procedure; Representation by attorney who had
“mental reservations” about his client not violative of due process.—Luvendino
asserts, as his third principal assignment of error, that he had been deprived of due
process because he was represented, or continued to be represented, by a lawyer
who had manifested mental reservations. Neither Luvendino nor his counsel Atty.
Sardillo—had indicated what precisely the latter’s mental reservations were. We
assume that those mental reservations consisted of private doubts as to the
innocence of Luvendino of the crime with which he was charged. Atty. Sardillo was
Luvendino’s choice as defense counsel. Atty. Sardillo had appeared in at least two (1)
previous hearings and had cross-examined prosecution witness Cemitara before he
(Sardillo) offered in open court to withdraw as defense counsel on 14 November
1983. The trial court could scarcely be faulted for declining Atty. Sardillo’s offer to
withdraw, considering that such offer had been made without the conformity or
permission of Luvendino. Atty. Sardillo himself did not insist on withdrawing as
defense counsel. If appellant Luvendino in truth had entertained substantial doubts as
to the sincerity or capability or impartiality of his lawyer, he could have easily
terminated the services of that counsel and retained a new one or sought from the
trial court the appointment of counsel de officio. Instead, Luvendino continued to
retain the services of Atty. Sardillo until the trial court rendered its decision. In any
event, an examination of the record will show that Atty. Sardillo continued to represent
appellant Luvendino as defense counsel with reasonable competence.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—We would note, finally, that doubts on the part of a
lawyer as to the ultimate innocence of a client accused of a serious felony do not, in
themselves, constitute bases for claiming miscarriage of justice or failure of due
process or assailing the professional work done by the lawyer. Of course, complete
confidence in the innocence of one’s client may lend added sincerity and even
passion to the lawyer’s pleading and argumentation. It is, however, precisely one of
the demanding requirements of the legal profession that the lawyer must present all
the defenses and arguments allowed by the law to a person accused of crime, without
regard to the lawyer’s private beliefs or suspicions as to his client’s guilt.
ROMERO, J., Concurring:
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; A confession with defective waiver of the right to
counsel is generally inadmissible in evidence; but if the same waiver is repeated by
the accused at the Office of the Provincial Fiscal with the aid of counsel and in the
presence of his mother, there is ratification.—Although at first blush, it would seem
that said provision may be applied retroactively by way of exception to the general
rule that laws should only be applied prospectively as it is clearly beneficial to the
accused, appellant’s conviction, however, stands. Although he was not assisted by
counsel when he signed his confes sion with the waiver of his right to counsel at the
police headquarters, it may be deemed to have been ratified when he repeated the
same at the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in Pasig with the aid of counsel and in the
presence of his mother.
CRUZ, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Criminal Procedure; A decision of the Supreme Court can be reexamined anytime,
and amend or even reverse it if warranted regardless of the number of times it has
been reiterated.—The present ponenciasays that the Magtoto decision “has been
reiterated many times and it is much too late in the day to consider re-examining the
doctrine laid down.” I regret I have to disagree. It is never too late to re-examine any
decision of this Court and amend or even reverse it whenever warranted regardless
of the number of times it has been reiterated. Rectifying error is better than persisting
in it. APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br.
157.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FELICIANO, J.:
On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at
Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of
Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home
63
by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, 1 but on that tragic day, she would not reach
home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from
work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other
children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of
Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found
dropped in the middle of a street in the village. 2
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the barangay captain of Hagonoy,
Taguig. Not being satisfied with the latter's promise to send for a "tanod" to help
locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig Police Station to report his
daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him that a search party would be
mounted presently. 3
Panfilo returned home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party
for the missing Rowena. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva
Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap residence, where lay
the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her
blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and there were
bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a
hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead. 4
An autopsy was conducted on the following day by the National Bureau of
Investigation and the autopsy report disclosed the following:
Cyanosis, lips and fingernail beds with pupils dilated and bloody
froths coming out of nostrils.
Abrasions, 1.0 x 3.0 cm., area of the buttocks, left side; 1.5 x 3.0
cm., area of right elbow.
Contused-abrasions, 3.0 x 8.0 cm., area of the lateral aspect of the
right chest; 4.0 x 5.0 cm., area of the antero-lateral aspect, middle
third, left arm.
Contusion, 7.0 x 13.0 cm., area of the anterior aspect of the neck
from left to right in varying sizes and shapes.
Interstitial hemorrhages among the muscles and soft tissues in the
anterior aspect of the neck with petechial hemorrhages noted and
severe congestion of the pharynx with subpleural, subpericardial
puntiform hemorrhages.
Fracture, laryngeal cartilage.
Lungs, presence of multiple petechial hemorrhages along the
surface of both lungs; cut sections showed severe congestion.
Heart, covered with moderate amount of adipose tissues with right
chamber distended with dark fluid blood.
Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
Stomach, one-third filled with digested food materials.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Asphyxia by manual strangulation (throttling).
REMARKS:
Genital examination revealed the presence of an old healed
hymenal laceration at 6:00 o'clock position corresponding to the
face of the watch, edges rounded, base retracted and non-
coaptable. Smears taken for presence of spermatozoa yield a
positive a positive result. 5
The autopsy report also stated that the multiple injuries indicated the victim had
struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa showed
that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to
asphyxia by mutual strangulation. 6
By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C.
Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with
the crime of rape with murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1983, in the Municipality
of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
Rowena Capcap y Talana, against her will and consent; that by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the said accused in pursuance
of their conspiracy, with intent to kill and treachery and taking
advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and strangulate the
said Rowena Capcap y Talana which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law. 7
Warrants of arrest were issued against all the above accused but only accused-
appellant Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other two (2) have
64
remained at large. At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty. Luisito
Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial.
On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty,
sentencing him to death, requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in
the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Appellant Luvendino contends that the trial court committed grievous error in —
I fact, in the January 22 and 23, 1983 issues of TEMPO, a
. . . having required Atty. Luisito Sardillo to continue as counsel of
the accused-appellant notwithstanding his [Sardillo's] express
mental reservations.
II
. . . believing the insidious machinations of third persons and
witness Salvador B. Cemitara surrounding the alleged threats
[against] Cemitara, including Exhibit "D."
III
. . . admitting and giving credence to the evidence of re-enactment
and admission of guilt, both of which were uncounseled.
IV
. . . giving credence and weight to the identification of appellant
Ernesto Luvendino by witness Cemitara.
V was informed by Ernesto Uy that a certain Bayani Cemitara had
. . . finding appellant Luvendino guilty of rape with murder. 8
The above assignments of error may be condensed to three (3), that is, whether or
not the trial court erred in: (1) not holding that his "demonstration" or re-enactment of
the crime as well as his subsequent written admission of guilt as inadmissible for
having been made without the benefit of counsel; (2) according credence to the
identification and other statements made by prosecution witness Cemitara; and (3)
allowing Luvendino's counsel before the trial court to continue as such
notwithstanding such counsel's express mental reservations.
Under his first assignment of error, appellant Luvendino contends that the
"demonstration" or re-enactment and his extrajudicial confession were effected and
secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his constitutional rights and that
the re-enactment and the confession should be held inadmissible in evidence
because they had been involuntarily made.
We turn first to the admissibility of the testimony (of Panfilo Capcap) relating to the
contents of the demonstration or re-enactment of the crime. The decision of the trial
court had the following to say about the re-enactment:
For sometime, the suspects had not been known. As a matter of
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, it was reported
that the group of men who waylaid her were still unidentified, (Exhs.
C & R). However, Panfilo Capcap stated that at about midnight of
February 10, 1983, he was awakened by the police at their
residence. They went to the vacant lot where they found dead body
of Rowena. A police officer, whom he later knew to be Sgt. Birxo,
told him they had arrested Ernesto Luvendino, alias "Joey". The
accused was then demonstrating how they brought the girl to the
vacant lot. While Luvendino was re-enacting the events that
transpired in the evening of January 17, pictures were taken by a
photographer brought by the police officers. As the re-enactment
was going on, Capcap said he heard the accused said that he and
his companion boxed her in the stomach, dragged her to the lot
and raped her there. The accused allegedly admitted he and Cesar
Borca had strangled Rowena and he likewise admitted he had
abused her. Capcap stressed that in the course of the
demonstration Luvendino remarked: "Inaamin ko po na kasama ko
si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." Luvendino allegedly
demonstrated how she was boxed, dragged and abused and
pointed to the place where they had left her remains. Capcap drew
a sketch of the scene (Exh. I). He also narrated that after the re-
enactment, he and Luvendino were taken to the Eastern Police
District in Pasig and were investigated separately. He likewise
testified that sometime before the apprehension of Luvendino he
seen Rowena with several men by the entrance of Deva Village in
the early evening of January 17, 1983.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The records indicate that immediately after his apprehension,
the police officers brought him to the Deva Subdivision where he
demonstrated how the victim was boxed, dragged and taken to the
vacant lot where she was raped and throttled to death. According to
the evidence for the prosecution,Luvendino in the re-enactment,
had not only admitted his presence in the commission of the crime
but had likewise admitted he was with Borca in abusing Rowena.
65
 Significantly, the evidence for the prosecution in this regard was not
rebutted nor denied by the accused.
xxx xxx xxx 9
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on
what had occurred during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We note
that the re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of
Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. 10 The
decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional
rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters" and
cited the "Salaysay" 11 of appellant Luvendino. 12 The decision itself, however, states
that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station.
Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his
right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the
demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to uphold the
admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment. 13
We consider next the extrajudicial confession of appellant Luvendino. Luvendino
claimed first of all that the extrajudicial confession had been extracted from him by
means of a beating administered by many policemen at the police station and that a
chain had been wrapped around his neck. The trial court disposed of this claim in the
following manner:
In an extra-judicial confession, the confessant carries the burden of
convincing the court that his admissions are involuntary and untrue.
(People v. Manabo, 18 SCRA 30). This Luvendino had failed to do.
He claimed he was given fist blows by many policemen and his
neck was strangled with a chain when he refused to admit guilt at
the Eastern Police District and then later given the "7-up treatment"
in another place. Although he said he sustained injuries, no proof
was submitted to that effect except his bare and uncorroborated
testimony. He admitted that his mother and Atty. [Eustacio] Flores
were present when he subscribed before the fiscal the next day, but
he did not say that he had told them about the torture employed on
him. If it were really true that he was abused in the manner he
described it, tale-tell signs of the maltreatment could have been
visible the following morning and would not escape the notice of his
mother and his lawyer and appropriate steps could have been
taken so that he may be examined by a competent physician. It is
interesting to note that Atty. Flores made no mention of such
injuries when he was called as a defense witness. 14
The trial court disbelieved and rejected Luvendino's claim that he have been beaten
into making his confession. Appellant has given us no basis for overturning this
conclusion of fact. The presumption of the law is one of spontaneity and voluntariness
of an extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, for no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to being the perpetrator of a
crime, especially a heinous crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. 15 Thus
the Court has ruled that where the confessant failed to present any evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of extracting a
confession; where he failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths,
such as the Fiscal in this case; where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where he did
not have himself examined by a reputable physician to buttress his claim of
maltreatment; and where the assailed confession is replete with details which could
not have been known to the police officers if they merely concocted the confession,
since the statements were inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial confession may
be admitted, the above circumstances being considered as factors indicating
voluntariness. 16
Luvendino next claimed that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights
before his confession was given by him or extracted from him. In the first place,
Police Sgt. Galang testified as prosecution witness that he had indeed informed
Luvendino of the latter's constitutional rights before he commenced investigating
Luvendino at the police headquarters. 17 In the second place, the written extrajudicial
confession itself stated that Luvendino was informed of his constitutional rights and
that he was waiving those rights. 18 In the third place, according to Luvendino himself,
he first signed his extrajudicial statement, which also set out a separately signed
waiver of his rights, at the police department and that later, when he was brought to
the office of Provincial Fiscal Mateo, he subscribed to or signed once more the same
document, this time under oath. As already noted from the trial court's decision, when
Luvendino subscribed under oath to his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the
Provincial Fiscal, his mother and Atty. Eustacio Flores were also present. Said the
trial court:
But even as he had waived the right to counsel while interrogated
by Sgt. Galang, the accused was nevertheless assisted by one
before he signed the "Salaysay", Exhibit "L". From the narration of
the accused himself it can be gathered that the was brought to the
Fiscal's Office in Pasig in the morning of February 10, 1983. At that
office, he was at first aided by a lawyer from the CLAO. He did not
sign the statement for he wanted to talk to his mother. He was
returned to the police station where his mother saw him in the
afternoon. In the headquarters, they requested that they be allowed
to engage a lawyer of their choice and their request was granted.
The mother called for Atty. Flores who arrivedwhen the accused
was already back in the Office of the Fiscal. In the presence of Atty.
Flores and his mother, the accused was investigated by the
fiscal after which, also in the presence of his mother and assisted
by Atty. Flores, the accused signed Exhibit "L". 19 (Emphasis
supplied)
66
Although Atty. Eustacio Flores, a former Mayor of Pateros, did not serve as defense
counsel during the trial, it is clear that Luvendino and his mother regarded Atty. Flores
as Luvendino's counsel at least in respect of that specific occasion in the Fiscal's
office, and that Atty. Flores did so act as counsel of Luvendino.
It is, however, claimed by appellant Luvendino that at the time he had first signed his
extrajudicial confession at the police headquarters, he was without counsel.
Luvendino thus apparently seeks to distinguish the initial signing of his "Salaysay"
(Exhibit "L") at the police headquarters from his subsequent subscribing thereto under
oath in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. There is no question that on the
latter occasion, Luvendino was questioned by the Fiscal in the presence of his mother
while Luvendino was assisted by Atty. Eustacio Flores.
In People v. Burgos, 20 the Court did make the following general statements:
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the
accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the
appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported
by reliable evidence but the failure to present the investigator who
conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have
been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to
be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower
court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his
statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was
being taken. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
The above statements in Burgos were not, however, intended to establish a
rigid and automatic rule that the subsequent presence of and assistance by
counsel of the accused prior to and during the subscribing under oath of an
extrajudicial confession and an accompanying waiver of right to counsel,
cannot have any legal effect at all. For one thing, under the factual
circumstances of People v. Burgos — where the trial court believed the
statements of the accused that he had been "exhaustively subjected to
physical terror, violence and third degree measures" and where the
investigating officer was not presented as a witness by the prosecution —
the above statements were clearly appropriate. In the case at bar, Police
Sgt. Galang who had interrogated Luvendino at the police station was, as
already pointed out, presented as a witness by the prosecution and had
testified in extenso, that Luvendino had been informed by him (Police Sgt.
Galang) of his constitutional rights, that Luvendino had waived his rights
voluntarily and intelligently, being convinced that he did not need the
assistance of a lawyer and could, by himself, clarify what had taken place.
Moreover, Luvendino in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in Pasig, had
initially been assisted by a Citizens Legal Aid Office (CLAO) lawyer. But he
at that time nonetheless declined to swear to Exhibit "L" and later, together
with his mother, insisted that he be allowed to retain a lawyer of their own
choice, which requests was honored. Moreover, and perhaps more
importantly, the trial court in the instant case did not accord any credence to
Luvendino's claim that he had been physically beaten up by the police
officers at the Taguig police station. In the afternoon of the same day,
Luvendino had every opportunity in the presence of his mother and his own
chosen counsel, Atty. Eustacio Flores, to denounce to the Provincial Fiscal
at the latter's office any maltreatment that the police officers might have
earlier in the day administered to him, to abjure the extrajudicial confession
or the waiver of his right to counsel there incorporated as non-voluntary of
non-intelligent and to refuse to sign once more under oath his "Salaysay".
He did not do so; Atty. Flores did not do so either then and there or when he
testified as a defense witness. Their failure to do so deprives his contention
before this Court of any real force. Luvendino may be deemed to have in
effect ratified, before the Fiscal and with the aid of counsel, the extrajudicial
confession and waiver of the right to counsel which he had earlier signed
without the presence of counsel in the police station.
But even if appellant Luvendino's contention were to be accepted at face value (and
we do not so accept it), the same result must be reached. The doctrine that an
uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. Enrile 22 and
reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit. 23 In Morales, the Court explained that
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution required that:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he choses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,shall be inadmissible
in evidence. (Emphasis supplied).
67
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect
and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983, the date of promulgation
of Morales.
In People v. Nabaluna, 24 the Court upheld the validity of the waiver of the right to
counsel which had been made on 5 December 1977, that is, prior to 26 April 1983,
which waiver had been made without the assistance of counsel, for the reason that at
the time such waiver was made, there was no rule or doctrine or guideline requiring
the waiver of the right to counsel should itself be made only in the presence and with
the assistance of counsel. The trial court admitted in evidence the extrajudicial
statements made by appellant Nabaluna and found the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide in a decision rendered on 26 September 1981. In affirming the decision of
the trial court, the Court said:
The court in mindful of the strictures and pronouncements found in
the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile, G.R. Nos. 61106 and 61107,
promulgated on April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, quoted and
reiterated in the case of People v. Galit, L-51770, March 20, 1985
and in the case of People v. Pascual, 109 SCRA 197, promulgated
on November 12, 1981, particularly as to the requisite steps before
a person under custodial investigation may be deemed to have
properly waived his right to counsel, such as a counsel being
present to assist him when the accused manifests such waiver.
However, the stated requirements were laid down in the said cases,
to serve as governing guidelines, only after the judgment in this
case had already been rendered by the trial court. Consequently,
no error should attach to the admission by the trial court of the
extra-judicial statements given by the accused as evidence in this
case. The trial court was then sufficiently convinced that the
accused had waived assistance of counsel and there was at that
time no pronounced guidelines requiring that the waiver of counsel
by accused can be properly made only with the presence and
assistance of a counsel. . . . . 25 (Emphasis supplied)
It may be recalled that even before Nabaluna, the Court had already determined that
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, was to be given prospective effect only.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 26 the Court sustained the admission in evidence of an
extrajudicial confession which had incorporated an uncounseled waiver by the
confessant of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation established in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, upon the ground that such confession
and waiver had been executed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The
decision in Magtoto v. Manguera was not unanimous, but the majority decision has
been reiterated many times 28 and it is much too late in the day to consider
re-examining the doctrine there laid down.
Applying Nabaluna to the case at bar, we believe and so hold that appellant
Luvendino validly waived his right to counsel so far as his extrajudicial confession
was concerned, although he was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his
confession at the police headquarters (disregarding for present purposes only, the
subsequent events in the office of the Provincial Fiscal). At the time the extrajudicial
confession and waiver were first executed (i.e., 10 February 1983), there was no rule
of doctrine prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be validly made only
with the assistance of counsel. It is scarcely necessary to add that we are here
referring only to extrajudicial confessions and waivers which were made voluntarily
and intelligently.
Coming now to the second error assigned by appellant Luvendino — that the trial
court had erred grieviously in believing the testimony of prosecution witness Cemitara
— the Court finds no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the assessments
by a trial court of the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses who testified before it,
are to be accorded great respect by appellate courts. The trial court gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Salvador Cemitara in view of the
straightforward character of his testimony. We need only to note that appellant
Luvendino presented no evidence to show any personal grudge on the part of
Cemitara against Luvendino, nor any evidence of any ill motive weighty enough to
have moved Cemitara falsely to testify for the prosecution. Indeed, there was nothing
to show that Cemitara was in the least bit acquainted with appellant Luvendino before
the events which culminated in the slaying of Rowena Capcap.
Luvendino asserts, as his third principal assignments of error, that he had been
deprived of due process because he was represented, or continued to be
represented, by a lawyer who had manifested mental reservations. Neither Luvendino
nor his counsel — Atty. Sardillo — had indicated what precisely the latter's mental
reservations were. We assume that those mental reservations consisted of private
doubts as to the innocence of Luvendino of the crime with which he was charged.
Atty. Sardillo was Luvendino's choice as defense counsel. Atty. Sardillo had appeared
in at least two (2) previous hearings and had cross-examined prosecution witness
Cemitara before he (Sardillo) offered in open court to withdraw as defense counsel on
14 November 1983. The trial court could scarcely be faulted for declining Atty.
Sardillo's offer to withdraw, considering that such offer had been made without the
conformity or permission of Luvendino. Atty. Sardillo himself did not insist on
withdrawing as defense counsel. If appellant Luvendino in truth had entertained
substantial doubts as to the sincerity or capability or impartiality of his lawyer, he
could have easily terminated the services of that counsel and retained a new one or
sought from the trial court the appointment of counsel de officio. Instead, Luvendino
continued to retain the services of Atty. Sardillo until the trial court rendered its
decision. In any event, an examination of the record will show that Atty. Sardillo
continued to represent appellant Luvendino as defense counsel with reasonable
competence.
We would note, finally, that doubts on the part of a lawyer as to the ultimate
innocence of a client accused of a serious felony do not, in themselves, constitute
bases for claiming miscarriage of justice or failure of due process or assailing the
professional work done by the lawyer. Of course, complete confidence in the
68
innocence of one's client may lend added sincerity and even passion to the lawyer's
pleading and argumentation. It is, however, precisely one of the demanding
requirements of the legal profession that the lawyer must present all the defenses and
arguments allowed by the law to a person accused of crime, without regard to the
lawyer's private beliefs or suspicions as to his client's guilt.

Appellant Luvendino's principal defense on the merits was that of alibi. It is too well-
settled to require documentation that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must not only prove that he was somewhere else during the approximate time of the
commission of the crime; he must further prove that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission. Luvendino testified
that on or about that time the rape with homicide was committed, he was at his house
in Pateros, recuperating from a wound allegedly sustained from a beating inflicted
upon him by one Romy Boy. Except for his own uncorroborated testimony, however,
Luvendino failed to present any evidence showing that he was medically
incapacitated to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. He filed no
complaint against his alleged assailant "Romy Boy." Besides, Pateros and Taguig are
neighboring municipalities which public transport readily and quickly available
between the two (2) locales; there was simply no showing that Luvendino could not
have been in Taguig during the time the crime was committed.

Republic of the Philippines

Finally, in respect of the civil liability aspects of the crime, the Court considers that the
SUPREME COURT
amount of P4,500.00 representing funeral expenses actually incurred by the family of
Manila
Rowena Capcap, should be awarded to them as actual damages. 29 Further, given the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, especially the ruthless and mindless
slaying of Rowena after she had been raped, the Court believes that the amount of EN BANC
P30,000.00 should be awarded to Rowena's heirs as moral damages, over and
above the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 which was awarded by the trial court. G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 54537 is hereby
MODIFIED by changing the enforceable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua and
by requiring appellant Ernesto C. Luvendino to pay the heirs of Rowena Capcap the
amount of P4,500.00 as actual damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages, in
addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court. In all other
respects, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Capital
Offenses; Judicial Notice; An arraignment is null and void where the reading of the
complaint or information to the accused is not in the language or dialect known to
him; Judicial notice is taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding
either of the Pilipino or English language.—The arraignment of the appellant is null
and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect
known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant “x x x to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” The new rule also responds
to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a
national language is still in the process of evolution. Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English
language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. The

69
importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; When life is at stake,
the Court cannot lean on the rebuttable presumption that the arraignment of the
accused was regularly conducted.—One need not draw a picture to show that the
arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to
due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the
appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this
rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The plea of guilt to a capital offense is null and
void where the trial court inadequately discharged the duty of conducting a “searching
inquiry.”—The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial
court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.
Said section provides: “Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.” The records reveal
how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a “searching
inquiry.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The bottom line of the rule embodied in Section 3
of Rule 116 is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment.—
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People v. Apduhan, Jr., and reiterated in an
unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court
must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension
of the consequences of the plea.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a
conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt—after a free and
intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt.—
Appellant’s plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to
death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a conviction in
capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt Section 3 of Rule 116 requires
that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without
need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the
criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that
“it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an
innocent person than let a guilty man go free.”
Same; Custodial Investigation; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; Evidence gathered by
the police as a result of custodial interrogation where the accused verbally confessed
to the crime without the benefit of counsel is inadmissible.—Some prosecution
evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant. Thus,
the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution To quote its Decision, viz: “x x x Further, there are physical evidence to
prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center and
the T-shirt of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical
evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony
of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped” These are inadmissible evidence for they
were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of
counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine; Words and
Phrases; Under the exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” once
the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible.—We
have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have
also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of
Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the “tree”)
is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
“fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence
is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” is at least
once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taintsall evidence subsequently obtained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The prosecution has the burden
of proving that an accused waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel as well as
of showing that the evidence derived from confession under custodial interrogation is
not tainted as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”—The burden to prove that an accused
waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession
under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the
prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as “fruit
of the poisonous tree.” The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure of the accused to object to the
introduction of constitutionally proscribed evidence does not satisfy the heavy burden
on the part of the prosecution to prove a valid waiver of rights under custodial
70
investigation.—In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed
to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant
failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally
proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof
that rested on the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Penalties; In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment
even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in
our escutcheon of justice.—Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice
system is not only to convict and punish violators of our laws. We are equally
committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction and
incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and without
impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot
rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will
leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.
Criminal Procedure; Arraignment; Judgments; No valid judgment can be rendered
upon an invalid arraignment.—In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in
the electric chair on the basis of the procedural irregularities committed by, and the
inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., a
ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment
can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the
arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In
fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that
allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and justice.
KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting:
Criminal Procedure; Rule 116, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the
information was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the
same was in fact actually complied with by the lower court.—It is plainly obvious from
an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1) there is
absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information was
not read in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment
and plea does not absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every
criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate
in the record the fact that the information was read in the language or dialect known
to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the lower
court.
Same; Capital Offenses; Things that need to be accomplished after the accused in a
criminal case enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense.—Consequently, three things
need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of guilty to
a capital offense: (1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused’s plea; (2)
the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court should inquire whether or not
the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if
he so desires. A judge who fails to observe this requirement commits a grave abuse
of discretion.
Same; Same; There is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail
which furthers the end of justice and an attention to detail and minutiae bordering on
obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law.
—The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant’s plea
was entered into voluntarily and that the defendant understood the conse quences of
his plea. There is no hard and fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number
and character of the questions propounded Judges are not required to go into
obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background of
the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of
questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of
difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the end of justice and
an attention to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately
obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law.
Same; Same; We cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement
of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.—Moreover, it is a matter of
common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an interpreter is
always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the
language or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of
stenographic notes submitted to the court only reflect the court proceedings
conducted in the English language. While again, the records do not categorically
indicate that the information was read in the language or dialect known to the
defendant or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect
understood by him it is presumed, as we have actually done in many cases before
this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary. In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense to
prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have
varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement of procedural rules based on
the gravity of the penalty.
Same; Arraignment; A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the infor mation without need of further
proof.—The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt
freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his
act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the
complaint or information. A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment is
sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further
proof. This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in several
cases) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting
his guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient evidence adduced
to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts charged.
71
Constitutional Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”
Doctrine; Exceptions.—Courts have generally approved the view that it is not
necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. Under one of the
recognized exceptions, the more appropriate question in such cases is whether the
evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for
the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures
independent of the illegality. Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as
absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered
under normal conditions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that
evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible
under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence
would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.—I submit, that
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have
been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized
that evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible
under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence
would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Br. 38.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we
are asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or
take away life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be
irrevocable. Worse, our error can result in the worst of crimes — murder by the
judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide 1 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means
of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning
down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age,
choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia
by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and lacerations of the
vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and
other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct
cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so
desired. 2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo
Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil
Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1,
Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and
return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from
Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2)
arm's length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the
victim at the window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but
appellant closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached
appellant's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The
sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her
neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and
informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw.
Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find
Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their
effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their
daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant
from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied
he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his
house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae
under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m.,
Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie
Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow
up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house,
Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer.
His autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
72
 1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and
right anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right
infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left
chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero- inferior chest wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal
arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left
iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-
ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial
hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia.,
posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior
middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral
aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the
dome of the rectum..
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the
rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up
to the level of the promontory of the sacrum with
a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily
passes the vaginal and anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO
LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.
Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to
prove that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to
death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with
Homicide penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic)
penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party,
Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under
sentence to death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as
facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of
carrying out his sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must
suffer for the grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no
mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by
the trial court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his
Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot
full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of
inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow
section (1) (a) — of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with
the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than
those named in the complaint or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language
or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . .
73
 to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 3 The
new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided
by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of
evolution. 4 Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have
limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official
languages for purposes of communication and instruction. 5 The importance
of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant
was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the
appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant
knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the
appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty
transcript during his arraignment, reads: 6
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama — Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera — For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for
arraignment.
Interpreter — (Reading the information to the accused for
arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads
guilty)
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is
a nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to
due process of law. 7 It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment
of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot
lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial
court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant.
Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the
transcripts reveal the following: 8
Note (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime,
because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of
the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty because of the crime
charged, do you understand?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or
intimidation from any one or whatever?
Accused None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will
just be the consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body
from waist up.)
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a
physician to the order of the court?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will be a
mandatory death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil
rights hut not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.)
In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz: 9
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.
74
Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution
Arnel Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the
court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution
after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or
whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is
mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court Okey, proceed.
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in
an unbroken line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must
be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed
to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions
demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The
records do not reveal any information about the personality profileof the appellant
which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English
yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be
noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness
of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply
inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant
when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated,
whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited
its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is
caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the
following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP
(Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while
in jail and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, — P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th
PNP MFC, informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that
at about 9:00 AM this date when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y
BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP,
been arrested and mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal,
Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape with Homicide case
wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old,
residence of same place who was discovered dead under the
house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on
lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing
upon him hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the
appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning
of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the
death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil
rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of
his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to
death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in
capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires
that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in
capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without
need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the
criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that
"it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an
innocent person than let a guilty man go free. 12
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the
appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the
appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by
the prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped.
These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-
shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom.
These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They
strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim
was raped.
75
 These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan
of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of
counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
A Yes, sir.
Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the
raping of Khazie Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, sir
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?
A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.
Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and
investigating Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same date?
A Yes, sir.
Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated Arnel
Alicando.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.
Q What date did you stop your investigation?
A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never informed the court that you
apprised the accused of his constitutional rights, is that correct?
A I apprised him.
Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct examination
of the prosecution you never informed the court that you apprised the accused of his
constitutional rights?
Pros. Fama:
I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?
Court:
Sustained.
Atty. Antiquiera
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his Constitutional
rights?
A On June 13.
Q On what hour did you inform him?
A After the witness identified him.
Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?
A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in
Visayan language.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never
represented by counsel, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his
constitutional rights?
A Yes, sir.
That is all, Your Honor.
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized
as inadmissible evidence uncounselledconfession or admission. Section 12
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all
important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and
independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right,
the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly
used it in sentencing him to death.
76
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains
were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the
police from the appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point?
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he used
the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already dead.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and
the pillowwherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla
Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time?
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my
companion, who went to the place of the incident.
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place did you recover those things?
A Inside the room where he raped the child.
Q Whose house is that?
A The house of Imelda Alicando.
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place is that situated?
A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of Imelda
Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused Arnel
Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold earring of the victim and her
clothes inside the room of the house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took
place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the bamboo post
of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right side.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items
accompanied by the accused?
A No more, I only followed his direction.
Q He made verbal direction to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)
Q Please examine that white t-shirt?
A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction.
We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once
the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also
inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is
the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is
at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. 20 We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People
vs. Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the
appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was,
however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave him a
body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later
identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons ,
we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is
inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree." 22
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence,
still, the trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of
Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial
court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains.
The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were
human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains
77
were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court
no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly for further proceedings. No costs.
committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to
have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation. Romeo Penecilla SO ORDERED.
himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because he used to
accompany me during butchering of animals." 23

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to
counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the
prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived
from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be
discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III
of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the
prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of
the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these
constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy
burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Republic of the Philippines
Court should be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its Supreme Court
despicable perpetration against a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. Manila
The Court should also be concerned with the multiplication of malevolence in our
midst for there is no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition FIRST DIVISION
of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws of our
land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the HO WAI PANG, G.R. No. 176229
transitoriness of time. Petitioner,

Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict
and punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the Present:
process of detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should
be accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual.
In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of
justice. - versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of DEL CASTILLO, and
the procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R.
Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the
victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further proceedings. There Respondent. October 19, 2011
is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of
fairness and justice.
DECISION
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused
Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
78
Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The infractions of the so-called “Miranda rights” render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation;
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation.—While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals
of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose
sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 555
SCRA 255 (2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and
[are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.”
Same; Same; Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction.—In the case at bench, petitioner did not make
any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present
any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no
statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court
based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476 (2000), “[a]ny
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes
the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding
evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Same; Right to Confrontation; The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.—As borne out by the records,
petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not
been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important
thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other
witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Conspiracy; Conspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or
among the participants to a crime; It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.—“Conspiracy is [the]
common design to commit a felony.” “[C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability need
not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among the
participants to a crime.” “It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.” “The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole” as
we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr., 179 SCRA 303 (1989). Here, it can be deduced from petitioner
and his co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a
witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts.—
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. “In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.”
Same; Same; The act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is
punished as an offense under a special law; As such, the mere commission of the act is what
constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual
caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent.—Petitioner tried to show
that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was provided
by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the
mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of
criminal intent.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called
Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.[2]
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6,
1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case
No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,[5] Wu
Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 15, Article III[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion
for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight
No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the
passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the
arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage
Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8
of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn
came up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing,
shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she
noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first
bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of
them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in
a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate
superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the
79
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier
discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest
and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three
chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects.
Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane
belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the
baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar
chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six
accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to
the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white
crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-
Agent Test.[10] The result of his examination[11] of the white crystalline substance yielded positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled
together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to the
Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is
31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425
only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against
petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-
1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [13] which the
trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information [14] under Criminal
Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations. [15] The Amended
Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the
country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less,
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as
SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost identically,
invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided
by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision [18] finding all the accused guilty of violating
Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the
accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHITYUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING
SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of
Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines 31.112
kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu,
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF
IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being
imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to
the accused though retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that
of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine
of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it
being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659
WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE.
The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was committed
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG
KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND
INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.[19]
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records
were forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later, all the accused except
for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after
being satisfied that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their
action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18,
1997.[22] Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory onJuly 7,
1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief [25] for the respondent People of
the Philippineswas filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Per Resolution[26] datedAugust 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper
disposition and determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While
conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was
indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to
warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his
80
constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [28] which the CA denied in its
Resolution[29] datedJanuary 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES
AGAINST HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION.
[30]
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution prohibits as evidence
only confessions and admissions
of the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was
not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his
choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under
what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of
the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32]the Court categorically ruled that
the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him
as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention
and subsequently used in evidence against him.Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner
and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held inPeople v.
Buluran,[33] [a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court
erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming[34] to
exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case
of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the
evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their
respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied
heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit
admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda
rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for
having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the
trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it
presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment
of conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of
his having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the
basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct,
positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the
entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission
of the crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a
81
testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of
corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a
case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when
there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own
unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his
right to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section
14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to.According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to
would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute
it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his
accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could
not do so, he should have manifested it before the court.At any rate, the OSG contends that
petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such
examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an
interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced
him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-
examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is
essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should
know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to
cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if
the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and
test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being
merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused
was duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy
which was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again
herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to
conclude conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is
not usually established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence,
the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if
taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that
the accused somehow have known each other prior to their [departure] in
Hong Kong forManila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any
of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang
identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the
Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that]
Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai
Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel
agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused Ho Kin San
for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant
in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to
accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These
relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have the
capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances
confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes of
similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their luggages.
The Court agrees with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the
given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been perpetrated
only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the
accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in order
to ensure its success.[37]
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
82
 Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which
determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.[39] It need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design.[40] The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced
from petitioner and his co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a
common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime
committed.
Petitioners guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling
bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong
who took charge in ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that
she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners bag.
[42]
Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were at
the ICU.[43] To us, this slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor the
veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its
Order[44] ofFebruary 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the
testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely
missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai
Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was
going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda
Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after
the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4)
chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the
other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang.
Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai
Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she
nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof,
pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They
are facts from the personal perception of the witness and out of her
personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.[45]
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in the
records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate
the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence
or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any
improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced
that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so
eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the
very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabuinto the country. In stark contrast, the
evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage
considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the
act of transporting a prohibited drug is amalum prohibitum because it is punished as an
offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the
offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught
committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare
denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for
the prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the
events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.[47]
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty
of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of
Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court,
we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of
the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48]The decree provided that for violation of said
Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed
from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 to reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging fromP500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A.
No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
83
retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled
(a) that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the
accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should
be accorded retroactive application, x x x.

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the
rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive
effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the
Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which isreclusion perpetua, as well as the amount
of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16,
2006 Decision andJanuary 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01459 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

84