Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent
to 30% of the employee’s one-month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and
financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future
years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO
268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits
without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed
all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment
of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of
P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.
Issue:
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/blaquera-vs-
alcala-gr-no-109406.html
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to seek
redress from the Court.
RULING
Yes. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands. While the actual bidder was a consortium composed of
petitioner, and two other corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings
(Phils.) Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc., it is only
petitioner HPPL that has brought the controversy before the
Court, arguing that it is suing only on an isolated transaction to
evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must be
licensed to do business in the Philippines to be able to file and
prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
Source: https://joparcon.blogspot.com/2015/10/hutchison-ports-
v-sbma.html
NEA vs COA
377 SCRA 233 (2002)
n/a
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the
President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce
their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to
Source: https://jamesmamba.blogspot.com/2012/05/political-
law-digests-2.html
Bermudez vs Torres
G.R. No. 131429 (August 4, 1999)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of Quiaoit
Held:
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of
designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of
an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions
of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The
appointing authority has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the
power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/bermudez-vs-
torres-gr-no-131429-august.html
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino.
The said appointment made by the President is being questioned
by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are
both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since
the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President
without the confirmation from COA is valid.
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed
from the list of officers that needed confirmation from the
Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups
whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public
minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank
of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose
Source:
https://letstalkaboutthelaw.blogspot.com/2015/04/sarmiento-v-
mison-g-r-no-79974-december.html
Concepcion-Bautista vs Salonga
172 SCRA 160 (1989)
FACTS:
On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed
petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on
December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and
immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her
presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on
January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review
hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino
appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his
appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her
post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the President's appointment is considered
constitutional.
2) Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
3) Whether or not President should extend her appointment on
January 14, 1989.
HELD:
The Court held that the it is within the authority of the President,
vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoints Executive
officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16,
Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to
appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government
officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which
are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore
follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the
President is to be made and finalized even without the review or
participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of
CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took
her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance,
expressly stated in her oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is
unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The
Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the
President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must
have a term of office.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is thus GRANTED and the
restraining order for Mallillin was made permanent.
Source: https://reeseisreal.blogspot.com/2012/11/bautista-vs-
salonga.html
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the
Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall
come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by
the CoA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the CoA.
RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is
required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint,
no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required.
Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16,
Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress
and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Source: https://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/calderon-vs-
carale.html
Manalo vs Sistoza
G.R. 107369 (August 11, 1999)
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of
Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the
PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15
police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and
Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez
III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other
emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to
assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements
made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of
senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin
to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires
confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in
allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent
officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their
appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are
four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging
to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa
vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under
Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed
force which shall undergo military training and service, as may
be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for
the security of the State.”
Source:
https://politicallawcasedigests.blogspot.com/2016/05/manalo-vs-
sistoza.html
Soriano vs Lista
G.R. No. 153881 (March 24, 2003)
Held:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show
not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant
petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because
petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve
the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was
transferred from the Department of National Defense to the
Office of the President, and later to the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
Source: https://researchcasedigest.blogspot.com/2007/01/2006-
political-law-case-digests.html
Facts:
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur
Yap (Agriculture), Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul
Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino Cruz Jr
(National Defence), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph
Durano (Tourism) and Michael Defensor (Environment and
Natural Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on 15 August
2004. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties. The
Congress commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and
Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile,
Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim,
Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition against respondents. The Senators
contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292
the undersecretary shall be designated as acting secretary in case
of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while Congress is in
session there can be no appointments without first obtaining
consent from Commission on Appointments. When Congress
adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad
interim appointments to the same respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretary
without the consent of the Commission on Elections while
Congress is in session.
Decision:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the
appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim
immediately after the recess of the Congress, the petition has
become moot. However, as an exemption to the rule of
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
Source: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/pimentel-
In re Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (Nov. 9, 1998)
Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by
the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City
and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear
prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision
prohibits the President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution
“two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that
Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This
prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/in-re-
appointments-of-hon-mateo.html
De Rama vs CA
G.R. No. 131136 (Febuary 28, 2001)
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, petitioner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC
seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the
allegation that the appointments of said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation
of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied
petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14
employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s
allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out
that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials.
The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue
appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee
meets the qualification standards for the position.
Held:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on
so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made
within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Source: https://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/de-rama-vs-ca-
gr-no-131136-february-28.html
Matibag vs Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036 (April 2, 2002)
Facts:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en
banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed
twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile,
then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein
respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments
were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency
of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their
appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC
Chairman, issued a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting
Issue:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
prohibited under the Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were
temporary in character
Ruling: NO.
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall
be independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the
President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate
the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter
to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. The original
draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments
because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess.
However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it
wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present
Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President
was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital
Source:
https://thestudentandthelaw.wordpress.com/2018/07/13/matibag-
v-benipayo-g-r-no-149036/
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the
ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a.
Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due
process observed c. What is the effect of the petitioner’s
acquittal in the criminal case d? Does the president have the
power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad
faith?
HELD:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the
category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the
president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the
president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the
fact that the constitution grants the president the power to
appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not
Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
G.R. L-1278 (January 21, 1949)
Facts:
Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the
crime of murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment
while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before the period for
appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation
No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the
period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area
of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was
liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez decided
to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty Commission returned
the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Issue:
Is admission of guilt necessary in amnesty?
Held:
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,"
and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"; while
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that
Source:
https://politicallawcasedigests.blogspot.com/2016/05/barrioquint
o-vs-fernandez.html
Facts:
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all)
were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the
amnesty proclamation of the president and the case was referred
to the 8th guerilla amnesty commission. none of the petitioners
admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only one
who took the witness stand and denied having killed lozanes.
The commission said it could not take cognizance of the case
because the benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by
defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of the
crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of
the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who
aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the
appeal, adding that the facts of the case showed that the victim
was a member of another guerilla group and that the murder
seemed to have stemmed from a rivalry between the two groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to
also rule, one way or another, of the murder case. But the CA
ruled that amnesty applies only to those who had admitted the
fact but said they should not be punished for the crime done was
in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not
take cognizance of the murder case because that came from the
amnesty commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder
case.
The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People
vs Llanita, which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to
Source:
https://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/executive-
clemency/
Cristobal vs Labrador
71 Phil. 34 (1941)
Facts:
Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to six months
of imprisonment. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued
to be a registered elector and was even seated as the municipal
president of Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357) was passed, sec. 94 (b) of which
disqualifies Santos from voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Because of
this, Santos applied for absolute pardon with the President. This
was granted and he was restored to his full and civil political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office
or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving
no money or property responsibility.
Issue:
Whether the presidential power of pardon applies to legislative
prohibitions
Held:
There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power
be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not
extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the
present case, the disability is the result of conviction without
which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes
upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends
to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is
left of the consequences of conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent
Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is
Source: https://legalvault.blogspot.com/2017/05/labrador-vs-
cristobal-case-digest.html
Pelobello vs Palatino
Facts:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which
he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, four mos and one
day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon.
In 1915, however, he was granted a conditional pardon by the
Governor General and on Dec 25, 1940, an absolute pardon by
the President.
Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings questioning his
right to hold office as mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque
province. It was based on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from
the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under
paragraph a of sec 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having
been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law
for assuming office.
Ratio:
Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning
power is only subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative
action.
HELD:
Thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921;
was elected municipal president of that municipality three times
in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose
in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the
position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was
thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the
date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office.
We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the
Source:
https://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/executive-
clemency/
In re Lontok
43 Phil. 293 (1923)
Facts:
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and
sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment on February 27 1918. This
was confirmed by the Supreme Court on September 18, 1919.
On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General
“on the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
misconduct.”
A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon “reaches the offense and
blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.”
Ratio:
When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held
that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to
any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the
pardon has been granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the
professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has
culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while
the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the
disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a
HELD:
Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the
proceedings must be dismissed.
Source:
https://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/09/27/executive-
clemency/
Torres vs Gonzales
152 SCRA 273 (1987)
FACTS:
Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner
Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at National Penitentiary
in Muntinlupa.
Sometimes before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court
of First Instance of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10
months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. The
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioned would not again violate any of the penal laws.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon. The
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not conviction of crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence?
HELD:
The Grant and Determination of breach of condition of pardon is
purely executive acts and it is no subject to judicial scrutiny
under Sec. 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Violation of conditional pardon - prior conviction by final
judgment of subsequent crime necessary before parolee or
convict may suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Source: https://saudilawstudent.blogspot.com/2010/03/torres-vs-
gonzales.html
IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 (august 15, 2000)
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive,
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide
the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
Source: https://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/ibp-vs-
zamora.html
Issue:
Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General Order No 4?
Decision:
Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist
and has rendered the case moot.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it
is capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is
one such case. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
Source: https://chanrac08.wordpress.com/2015/03/11/sanlakas-
vs-executive-secretary-reyes-gr-no-159085-03-february-2004/
Aquino vs Enrile
59 SCRA 183 (1974)
FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners
having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of
Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held
pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and
to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2
was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he
assumed by virtue of Proclamation1081 placing the entire
country under martial law.
ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise
of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the
declaration of martial law?
HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not
subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is
a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
Source: https://www.coursehero.com/file/p4hcedo/CASE-3-
Aquino-v-Enrile-59-SCRA-183-FACTS-The-cases-are-all-
petitions-for-habeas/
Olaguer vs MC No. 4
150 SCRA 144 (1987)
FACTS:
Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of
subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created
a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try
criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted
and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from
taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be
considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation
of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a
previous case – Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as
decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners
contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling
is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be
abandoned and/or modified in so far as the case at bar is
HELD:
Yes.
REASONING:
First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been
lifted during the case is still pending, military tribunals, which
were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void
already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on
the dissenting views of some justices in Aquino v. MilComm,
stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for
civil offenses under general law are entitled o trial by judicial
process, not by executive or military process…xxx..Judicial
power exist only in courts’. Moreover, the Court emphasized
that “Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot
prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand
otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or
modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all,
more important than anything else is that this Court should be
right.’
Source: https://dennieidea.wordpress.com/2014/07/14/olaguer-
etal-v-military-commission-case-digest/
Navales vs Abaya
G.R. No. 162318 (October 25, 2004)
FACTS
Petitioners consisting of more than three hundred junior officers
and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP who all
took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, Makati,
filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court
questioning the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General in
filing charges against them for violations of the Articles of War
Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court acquitted 290
of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can divest the military
courts of jurisdiction.
HELD:
RA 7055 provides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall
be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as
determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in
the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected
crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In imposing the
penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take
into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised
Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.
The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies
what are considered “service connected crimes or offenses”
under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also
known as the Articles of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the
military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. In
Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/375150069/Navales-
v-Abaya-Gr162318
FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party
caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP
889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et
al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring
that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD:
The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that
it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by
Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to
receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door
sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged
by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that
there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-
Source:
https://lawskooliscool.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/teodosio-
lansang-vs-garcia-g-r-no-l-33964/
In Re De Villa
G.R. No. 158802 (November 17, 2004)
FACTS:
This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a
two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify
the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa;
and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs
are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence,
gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child
born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found
petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza when she was 12
years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the
offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit,
and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Petitioner’s defense, at
HELD:
No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained
via some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that
review of judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty
has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus
is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may
be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment.
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence
of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight
with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or
on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however,
this negligence is binding upon petitioner.
Source: https://jeffsarabusing.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/case-
brief-in-re-the-writ-of-habeas-corpus-for-de-villa-v-the-director-
of-new-bilibid-prisons/
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members
and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5.
The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA
I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and
other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the
Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided
by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles
and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency
(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded
on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions
against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because
of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA
issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis
and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power
is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD:
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason
of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged
violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual
basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
Source: https://ulandi-digest.blogspot.com/2012/04/david-v-
arroyo.html
Constantino vs Cuisia
G.R. No. 106064 (October 13, 2005)
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a
scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution
resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts –
they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion
programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and
they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee”
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power
to the respondents.
HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers
and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in
behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a
debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand,
the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance
implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-
relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of
the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required
amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet
any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President
were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods that may be
taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal
Source:
https://thelawiscool.wordpress.com/2012/10/26/constantino-v-
cuisa/
FACTS:
Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass media, were
seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the
state of the then ongoing negotiations of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement
A collision between governmental power over the conduct of
foreign affairs and the citizens right to information.
ISSUE:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public
concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege?
HELD:
The Court adopted the doctrine in US vs Curtis-Wright Export
Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
negotiations with foreign countries
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "Secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press
nor of the freedom of access to information."
Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/326344792/PMPF-
vs-Manglapus