EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs.

THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, who was then the Director of the Morong
Emergency Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly committed on December
26, 1965 by Dr. Emiliano and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal. An information against the petitioners was filed and both were found guilty of simple
slander instead of grave oral-defamation. A patient named Lourdes Cruz had a vaginal bleeding.
She was first diagnosed with H-mole, abortion and pregnancy but x-ray examination revealed that
she was not pregnant. When the bleeding did not stop, Cruz was operated and three dead fetal
triplets were found in her uterus and were also removed. The bleeding stopped but the two
petitioners made certain remarks that caused the complainant to file the case. While the case
was pending, Atty. Bernardino died.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the CA to be the offense
committed by the petitioners has prescribed.

2. Whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the prescription of an
offense.

HELD:
1. Yes. An accused cannot be convicted for the lesser offense necessarily included in the crime
charged if at the time of the filing of the information, the lesser offense has already prescribed. To
hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

2. Yes. Prescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without jurisdiction,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. Thus, the filing of the
complaint in the Fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON

and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: De Guzman was charged with estafa thru falsification of public document on March 29,
1974. As the attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera (complainant), in 1964, De Guzman forged his
signature on the special power of attorney (SPA) to use it to mortgage Carrera’s parel of land and
obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power of Atty. and mortgage contract)
were later registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the
land was bought by someone else, and Carrera only knew about it when an action for ejectment
was filed against him by the new owner in 1972. The trial court dismissed the case against De
Guzman on the grounds that the said crime, which was punishable by prision correcional, already
prescribed, pursuant to Art. 90 of the RPC. The SC affirmed the challenged decision of the trial
court, ruling that the crime prescribed upon the public registry of the power of attorney which is
considered a notice to the whole world.

ISSUES:1. W/n the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to
exist in law and in fact

2. W/n the crime has prescribed

HELD:
1. YES. Falsification is only the means necessary to commit the estafa because before the
falsified document is used to defraud another, the crime of falsification was already
consummated. The damages were caused by the commission of estafa.The alleged authorization
given to De Guzman to get a loan from the Bank only pertains to the half owned by Mariano’s
brother. In his testimony, Mariano only quoted his brother.

2. YES. The start of the prescriptive period was when the falsified SPA was registed in the
Registry of Deeds on Feb. 13, 1964. In a crime of falsification of public document, the prescriptive
period commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery
after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGOL, as Judge of

the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. IV, and EDGARDO CABALLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37837 August 24, 1984
GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS:A criminal complaint was filed against Caballas for the crime of serious physical injuries.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Before the presentation of evidence, the
private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to amend the complaint from serious physical injuries to
frustrated murder contending that from the affidavits of the witnesses, it was shown that the
accused had the manifest intention to kill the victim. On the other hand, the defense filed a
memorandum arguing that since the accused had been arraigned, the court can no longer
entertain the motion for amendment of the complaint. The motion was denied. Trial ensued. The
court rendered a decision on November 29, 1972 stating that the case can be amended to
frustrated murder because of the evidence presented.. The case of serious physical injuries was
dismissed to give way for the filing of frustrated murder.On June 6, 1973, the Provincial Fiscal of
Quezon filed an information of frustrated with the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The accused
moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The court granted the motion.
The Solicitor-General filed a petition for review contending that the granting of the motion to
quash filed by the accused deprived the State his day in court and its duty to prosecute the
accused.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint for serious physical injuries against the
accused bars the filing of the information for frustrated murder on the ground of double jeopardy.

HELD: NO. The Order of dismissal issued by the Municipal Court did not actually terminate or put
an end to the prosecution against herein private respondent for the felonious act he was alleged
to have committed. On the contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order expressly directed that
the records of the case be forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal could file a complaint for frustrated murder. The Municipal Court find that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of private respondent beyond reasonable doubt for in fact
said Court in effect stated that private respondent was guilty, not only of the crime charged of
serious physical. injuries, but of the graver offense of frustrated murder. There is, therefore, no
reason why the dismissal Order of the Municipal Court should be deemed as a judgment of
acquittal of the charge for serious physical injuries.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas
City) and MARIO N. AUSTRIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 148000 February 27, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:An in formation was filed against Mario N. Austria, who was the Officer-in-Charge
Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail, falsified a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment
Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, a public/official document. When in truth and
fact, when in truth and in fact said statements are absolutely false when he has the legal
obligation to disclose the truth, as said firearm is not a property of the Provincial Government of
Batangas; that it is not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas PNP
Command, Batangas City and Camp Crame, Quezon City; and that Alberto Tesoro is not an
employee of the Provincial Government of Batangas, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial. Apparently, out
of the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the first three witnesses were notified of
said arraignment and pre-trial. On motion of the accused and over the objection of the public
prosecutor, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to
appear before it. The bail bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty was thereby
cancelled. The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were
mere errors of judgment, which are not correctible by a writ of certiorari. Also the CA stated that a
reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 would place the private respondent in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of the case would be in double jeopardy

HELD: NO. The Court ruled that legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for
the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy

HELD: YES. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses.The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.The
doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365.
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for childabuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for strongerdeterrence and special protection against child abuse,exploitation and
discrimination, providing penalties for itsviolation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without awarrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3,
1997, the parents of complainant LorelieSan Miguel reported to the police that their daughter,
then 16years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignationthat night at petitioner’s
room at the Metropolitan Hotel inDiliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time
thepolice received reports of petitioner’s activities.When petitioner opened the door, the police
saw him withLorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,whereupon they arrested
him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers,
whichwere submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art.III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
was filed against petitioner. Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For JudicialDetermination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Releaseof the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an
Unlawful WarrantlessArrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident,
Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as aMatter of Right under the Law on which he is charged.
Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant,
Lorelie San Miguel, and bythree other minor children. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless,
petitioner filed separateapplications for bail in the nine cases.
ISSUE:Whether or not the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his
presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.

HELD:YES. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused.
Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.To condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he
has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to
bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's
constitutional rights.

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 124680-81. February 28, 2000
PARDO, J.:

FACTS:Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway
Transit. On August 12, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash/dismiss
the two informations, raising the following grounds, namely: (a) the informations are fatally
defective for failure to adequately inform the accused of the charge against her in violation of due
process guaranteed by the Constitution; (b) the informations state no offense; and (c) the court
has no jurisdiction over the cases because the accused are protected by immunity from suit. The
Sandiganbayan issued an order that virtually denied the motion to quash even before the
scheduled date of hearing thereof, ruling that the information’s actually state a valid accusation;
that immunity from suit was applicable only to acts upon orders of the President which are
legitimate, and that a motion to quash at that stage was not proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to quash the information’s filed after she had pleaded thereto.

HELD: YES. It is clear that a motion to quash is not improper even after the accused had been
arraigned if the same is grounded on failure to charge an offense and lack of jurisdiction of the
offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. In this case, petitioner’s
motion to quash is grounded on no offense charged and lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Hence, the Sandiganbayan erred in disregarding the plain provision of the Rules of
Court and in cavalier fashion denied the motion.Nevertheless, the consistent doctrine of this
Court is that from a denial of a motion to quash, the appropriate remedy is for petitioner to go to
trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and

ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners, vs.ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent
(accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner
Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal
grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused
respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in
lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven
(11) hours.Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the
investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial
Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a
public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted
the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of
Arbitrary Detention.

HELD: YES. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to
be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers
and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except
that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

SILVESTRE CANIZA petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE and HON. JAIME AGLORO
Presiding Judge, Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53776 March 18, 1988
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:OnMarch 20, 1974, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filedan Information for falsification of
public documentsallegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 byCaniza.On May 24, 1974, Caniza filed
Motion to Quash saying that allegations inthe information did not constitute an offense, and that
the information containedaverments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification.TheTrialcourt granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza. Fiscal’s
Motionfor Reconsideration of this Order was denied.On June 13, 1979, a second Informationwas
filed charging Canizawith substantially the same offense as that charged under the
previousinformation.Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that1) the
offense charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Informationhad been on the merits,
3)the allegations of the second Information did notconstitute and offense.The judge issued an
order denying the motion to quash. He alsodenied Caniza’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not filing of the second Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense a second time

HELD: NO. The application of the doctrine of waiver is subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions:
first, dismiss must have been sought or induced by the defendant, either personally or through
counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the merits and must not necessarily
amount to an acquittal. Upon which the trial court anchored its 27 November 1974 Order of
dismissal, are clearly directed at the sufficiency of said information to sustain the conviction of
petitioner Caniza and, hence, indicate the absence of the first requisite in double jeopardy.
Consequently, petitioner Cañizas plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively
waived his right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first Information filed against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ERNESTO DE LA

PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y DELEJERO and WILFREDO
JOCHICO y MAGALONA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

FACTS:That sometime on January 4,1974, accused PacificoSensio, Romeo Millan and

WilfredoJochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars
No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the
sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be
heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent
moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not
sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court
issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the
crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts
that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because
according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving theredefense of
double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to
lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar
the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the
accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan
and Jochico in double jeopardy

HELD: YES. The requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy are first, that there should
be a valid complaint and second, that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to
which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or
dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all
present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against
the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on
the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of
trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ELISEA

YLAGAN,defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-38443 November 25, 1933
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: A complaint for physical injuries was filed against EliseaYlagan, the defendant in the
justice of the peace court in the Province of Batangas. After preliminary investigation, the case
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information charging
her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the
information; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial
fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney
for the defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the case. 11 days later, the acting provincial
fiscal filed another information in the same justice of the peace court, charging the same
defendant with the same offense of serious physical injuries. After another preliminary
investigation, the case was again forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information
filed in the justice of the peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a
plea of double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After hearing,
the court sustained the plea and dismissed the case. From this order of dismissal, an appeal was
taken by the Government.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a double jeopardy.

HELD:NO. This is the principle underlying Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as
follows: A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined, when the case is dismissed or
otherwise terminated before judgment without the consent of the accused. The Court ruled that
the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not
constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the offense is as important as the other
constitutional right of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be
predicated on mere silence.