Arturo Fernández, Sindicalismo e Iglesia (1976-1987) (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de

América Latina, 1990)

Introduction

p. 9

Previous studies have showed tightening relationship between union and church leadership
1976-83
 Ideological evolution of union leadership towards social doctrine sustained by the
episcopate?
 Common political projects?
 What were common interests?
 What were the implications for trade union and church grassroots?

p. 10

Two hypotheses

1) TU and Church leadership both fragmented in different political tendencies, though

divisions somewhat toned down by corporative solidarity
2) More fluid relations among dominant groups generally between those more or less
aligned ideologically

Chapter 2 – The Catholic Church: Sociopolitical Tendencies and Attitudes of its Hierarchy

p. 31

For internal reasons, bishops chose Tortolo to lead CEA

 Mariano Grondona (intellectual of dominant bloc) October 1975: image of the
church only two years ago was that of the MSTM, while now it is that of the bishops
calling out moral crisis of the country –

p. 32
o “the bishops today are closer to the Army and its anti-subversive struggle”
 Iron will to preserve institutional unity – fragmented sectors chose

p. 33
 strengthen the institution, and so conservatives and soft reformists accepted
leadership of the “integrists” and those with a crusading mentality
pp. 33-34

MSTM line in the Church became silent in 1974-5

 Alberto Carbone claimed in 1975 that it was largely due to different political options
 Many of those that maintained social commitment would pay with repression –
consolidated the process of verticalisation by Bonamín and Tortolo

pp. 35-55

1) Ultra-conservatives (10 bishops)

a. Controlled strategic roles of influence – CEA president; military vicariat
b. Bonamín, Tortolo, Bolatti, Plaza, Grasselli, Medina, Laise, Kruk, Derisi,
c. Mostly admirers of falangismo
2) Conservatives (majority)
a. Included Primatesta, Aramburu, Pío Laghi, Quarracino, Di Stefano
b. Many had only vague political ideas and mostly concerned with politics in
order to safeguard institutional power of the church
c. Others sympathized with authoritarian state that declared itself Catholic
d. This sector sustained Tortolo in 1974, but in 1976 he was replaced by
Primatesta, who better represented their positions
e. With Primatesta, the Church stopped openly and actively endorsing the
proceso, and would now fluctuate according to the circumstances
f. Condemned disappearances and torture – but never explicitly attacked the
dictatorship
g. Suspension of union and political activity made the Church a privileged
channel for discontent
h. Conservatives had previously made gains with popular sectors, and the image
of being anti-Peronist had been diluted – Caggiano acted as mediator with
CGT
i. Conservatives around 1979 recognised that the dictatorship’s social and
economic agenda was too elitist – added their voices to progressives and
moderates to condemn union law and initiated a fluid dialogue with trade
unions
j. These sectors exalted anti-communist crusade of JP2, and part of the strategy
was to forge links with the trade unions
k. Supported the transition to conditional democracy, while also endorsing the
self-amnesty and full stop laws
l. Conformed to idea of “Catholic social movement”, seeking power and
combatting liberalism, capitalist modernization and above all socialism and
communism
3) Modernists (15 bishops)
a. Supported western political democracy, socio-cultural pluralism and
ideological tolerance, acceptance of certain autonomy of temporal realities
from religious and ecclesial
b. Influenced by socio-political precepts of Vatican II, and social Christianity of
Maritain and Mournier
 c. Institutionally weak – the political form that these privileged, Christian
Democratic Party, was mostly a failure, and the conservative episcopal sector
dominated
d. Included Zazpe, Justo Laguna (who rebuked Plaza for explicitly supporting
Herminio Iglesias), Bufano, Casaretto, Sueldo, Castagna, Sigampa
e. Modernists played significant role in role in episcopal declaration on union
rights (August 1979), and Union Law of November 1979 was censured – from
then a fluid dialogue was established with CGT that became a priority in the
episcopate after 1982
4) Progressives (4-6 bishops)
a. Proceso was implacable against this sector – Angelelli and Ponce de León
murdered
b. Only 4 continued this line: Novak, Hesayne, De Nevares and Devoto – and
only the first three joined the human rights groups
c. Hesayne sent strong letter to Interior Minister, Harguindeguy (who had
justified torture in an interview)
d. Weakness of this sector allowed its repression – but why did the rest of the
episcopate not show solidarity with disappeared priests, nuns, laity and
bishops?
i. Fear – certainly possible, especially for modernists/moderates (but
less convincing for conservatives and pro-military)
e. This sector simply too small to impose influence on episcopate

Chapter 3 - Trade Unionism: Tendencies and Attitudes of its Leadership

pp. 56-86

1) Participationism
a. Objectives: Considers task of unions to defend professional interests
b. Tactics: Vis-à-vis adverse governments, tries to negotiate survival of union
organization and improvements for workers through a certain integration
into the political system
c. Institutionalised through Comisión Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) from 1978;
Grupo de los 20 in 1979; and finally in the CGT (on Azopardo) in May 1982
with adhesion of the first two
d. This sector maintained a “dialoguist” position with the regime – CNT did not
support strikes of April 1979 and July 1981, nor the Plan de Movilización
Pacífica in 1981-2 that was repressed
2) Vandorismo
a. Objectives: Holds that unions must adhere to Peronism, and has as its
objective its own development and strengthening
b. Tactics: Alternates negotiation with frontal struggle against adverse political
systems – “strike and negotiate” or “negotiate and strike”
c. Identifies with justicialista ideas
 d. Since many of the key unions were led by Vandoristas, this sector found
many of its notable figures imprisoned during the dictatorship – finally
decided to keep them alive and tolerate certain strictly union activities
e. Lorenzo Miguel, the main figurehead, imprisoned and released in 1980 – but
the CGT and UOM had been dissolved, while other large unions intervened or
divided
f. This sector agreed to reinstall the 62 Organizaciones Peronistas in November
1980 – maintained a position equidistant to participationists and
confrontrationalists
g. Miguelismo and los 25 adhered to formation of the CGT at the end of 1981
3) Confrontationismo
a. Objectives: Opposes project of the proceso
b. Tactics: Takes up vandorista strategy of “strike and negotiate” – a “renewed”
vandorismo since it recaptures its confrontationist stage (1955-1964)
c. Led by Ubaldini
d. Despite repression, organized certain acts of resistance that gradually
became more frequent
e. Consisted of unions that had not been intervened, led by diverse figures in
Peronism – old vandoristas and participacionistas, orthodox and verticalist
and some combativos – this heterogeneity was projected onto formation of
“los 25”
f. After trying to mobilise with growing success from April 1979, the
Commission of los 25 managed to refloat CGT at the end of 1980 – Lorenzo
Miguel supported, but the CNT did not yet support
g. With the demonstration of 30 March 1982, the division of organized labour
accentuated, and the CGT (calle Brasil) was strengthened – Ubaldini
appeared to be the figure capable of uniting opposition to the regime
(Malvinas War changed the political course of events, as the regime suddenly
lost credibility)
h. Different internal factions
i. Ubaldinismo – developed in opposition to regime’s economic policies,
close to certain Church sectors but not allied to CLAT (Central
Latinoamericana de Trabajadores, a social-Christian union federation)
ii. Los 25
1. Christian sector – unions and groups connected to CLAT, grew
significantly after 1976, acted as a bridge between trade
unions and social-Christian Church sectors from 1979,
emerged as an influential forces at heart of the new CGT at the
end of the dictatorship
2. Social Democratic sector – developed closer links with CIOSL,
mostly Peronists (which presented a new experience given the
traditional Peronist rejection as “imported” of social
democratic unionism)
4) Combativismo
a. Objective: Revolutionary class-based struggle against the system
b. Tactics: Grassroots activism and unrest
 c. Hardest hit by the genocidal dictatorship – many disappeared (René
Salamanca and Jorge Di Pasquale) or exiled (Raimundo Ongaro)
d. Integrated by left Peronists and diverse range of Marxists – developed in
union bases and the interior
e. Expressed the emergence of a new working class emergent in the 1960s –
mostly youth who had not known the popular-nationalist state and therefore
saw the state as an antagonistic social actor

Chapter 4 – Relations between Union and Church Leaderships 1976-1985

pp. 87-104

Political objectives of each sector do not strictly correspond – but there exists a relative
symmetry, in which certain union sectors are more inclined to dialogue to particular church
sectors
 Participationists => Integrists
 Vandoristas => Conservatives
 Confrontationists => Modernists
 Combativos => Progressives

CLAT, of a social-Christian orientation, found a field of discussion and reflection in CIAS

 CIAS published article by Juan Taccone in 1976 on experience of self-management of
SEGBA
 CIAS preserved a moderated critical attitude and a defence of some social rights
 Padre Luzzi catalyzed opening to unions in the Centro de Promoción Social,
dedicated to formation of young union leaders
 Identified a diverse range of bishops associated with CIAS pastoral action: Hesayne,
De Nevares, Devoto, Novak, Laguna, Quarraccino, Di Stefano

1976-1978 the majority of episcopate abstained from contact with moderate CGT leaders,
suspected of corruption
 However, likely that Italo Di Stefano (Equipo de Pastoral Social) had contact with
unionists, probably from CLAT


August 1979 – Equipo de Pastoral Social published declaration on right to unionization,

mediated by CIAS
 Upheld right to unionization under social doctrine, and attempted to influence
imminent decision of the military government on TUs
 November – statement ignored by regime – drew up a restrictive law that limited
union rights and sought to atomise worker organisations
 14 December – CEA backed the Equipo de Pastoral Social declaration as its position
on trade unions – a rare instance of criticism
1978-1982 – majority of episcopate cared little for developing union links, but the minority
progressives did along with some modernists and conservatives associated with Equipo de
Pastoral Social
 Comisión de los 25 most permeable to dialoge with church – Ubaldini, a Catholic
 But all all sectors within each leadership exchanged contact with each other without
sketching out common strategies of power

After Malvinas War defeat, a difficult transition towards democracy generated new
attitudes in the union and church leadership
 Church hierarchy tried to bring together the position of the military governors and
the political parties – attempt to prevent any new military putsch with a clear
pronouncement in favour of democracy 30 June 1983
 Church was silent on the Documento Final and the Amnesty Law, with which the
armed forces tried to draw a veil of forgetting over the past
 Equipo de Pastoral Social (now led by Laguna) tried to mediate between businesses,
workers and the government of Bignone – a clear confluence between points of view
of bishops and CGT leaders
 CGT leaders during this “social dialogue” delivered an economic proposal to the
episcopate who would communicate to the Unión Industrial Argentina, the
Multipartidaria and the Government itself
 This exchange did not alter economic policy during the proceso but helped to
reinforce civil society and generate a propitious social climate to ensure the
transition
 Above all, the CGT (both calle Brasil and calle Azopardo) were reunited with the roles
they had lost in 1976, and reinforced the image of a conciliating church sensitive to
social problems