Kay Suico Conales AB POSC 4

POSC 124 10:30 – 12:00 nn Ms. Brenette L. Abrenica

Defining the Politico-Economic Landscape of Danao: The Durano Jigsaw Puzzle

ABSTRACT

One of the critical features of Philippine politics is the enduring existence of political
dynasties. The same political clans occupy various governmental positions – be it local,
provincial, regional or national politics. These political dynasties highlight patronage and
nepotism in political processes. This paper sought to explain the thriving of these political
families in the system despite constitutional prohibitions and issues of inefficiencies and
corruption in office. The frameworks used in this paper are the concepts of patron-
clientelism and bossism. Patron-clientelism is a mutual relationship between a more
powerful, influential and prominent individual who provides benefits to a particular client.
The client, in return, supports or renders service to the patron in exchange for whatever he
receives from him. The Duranos, the most dominant political figure in Danao, are used as
the illustrative case of analysis. Especially that their political reputation has been very vibrant
and controversial. Specifically, this paper asked the following questions: 1) How the Duranos
have become economic and political oligarchs of Danao and 2) The political machineries
that Duranos utilize in order to maintain their dominance in the socio-economic and
political spheres of Danao. By utilizing and analyzing secondary data, answers to the
questions were gathered. The entrenchment of the Duranos in almost every aspect of life in
Danao City has been brought about by strong and powerful political machineries. Guns,
goons and gold as political machineries were highlighted being aware of the fact that politics
in Danao, especially elections, are marred with violence, coercion, intimidation and vote-
buying. The Duranos‟ success in winning the hearts of national patrons have allowed them
political and business favors which brought the creation of the Industrial Complex. The
critical businesses of the Duranos were discussed. Its effects to the economic capacity and
the building of Duranos as economic oligarchs and the implications of these businesses to
the people of Danao were examined. The Industrial Complex is, was and will always be
pivotal and crucial in sustaining the political dominance of the Duranos as it allowed them to
acquire more wealth, build more connections and links with more powerful and influential
patrons and have allowed employment to thousands of people in Danao hence inculcating to
them the culture of dependency and giving back. The Duranos have become economic and
political oligarchs of their own by securing national patrons for themselves – these patrons
capacitated and enabled the Duranos. Through their national patrons, the Duranos were
granted political and economic favors which would later on fundamentally shape their
political reputation and prominence in Danao.

Keyword(s): Duranos of Danao, Patron-Client Relationship, Bossism

 INTRODUCTION & RATIONALE

The Philippines, being a democracy and a republican state, is expected to espouse the
value of equal opportunities for all. Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution speaks of
the supposed principles that the State must pursue. More specifically, the fundamental law of
the land provides for safeguards from possible abuses and inequalities that the government
may commit. Section 26 of the same article provides the right to equal opportunities in
public office and prohibits the existence of political dynasties. Reality is however the blatant
contrast.

Politics in the Philippines is characterized as politics of patronage. The same families

occupy government positions – local, national, elective or appointive. Traditional political
families or dynasties prove to be its glaring features. Alongside this feature are sad realities of
corruption and nepotism. These families have exhausted several means of various sorts –
however exploitative and destructing they are to the common good – just to preserve and
advance their interests. Political dominance and economic monopolization have
fundamentally become their weapons to take hold of enduring power and control.

The call of the present administration to eradicate corruption and attain good
governance in the country is undeniably noble. A closer scrutiny however reveals a very
ironic reality: even the President, the supposed exemplary of its banner for an effective
government, belongs to the traditional politicking lineage. This call becomes a dream that is
too cliché, a dream that is forlorn.

Local politics in Cebu is seen to be very vibrant and dynamic. Given the socio-
economic standing of the province in the regional, national and international spheres, it is a
most likely assumption that good governance or the practice of good administration is
observed, to say the least, in the province. Behind the prideful ranks and values of economic
statistics however are also traditional political machineries that allow political families to
thrive. Cebu may be considered as one of the most developed provinces in the country but
behind this curtain are alarming political realities.

Patron-client relationship, a continuing cause and effect of this kind of politics, is

also prevalent. More than the demands and dictates of the conscience in the framing and
formulation of political decisions is the outward calculation of the costs and benefits. The
criterion on efficiency is overshadowed by the foreseen benefits that the client can
apparently acquire from the patron. This actually affirms the vicious cycle of social, political
and economic deprivation and inequalities in the Philippines. No wonder the social structure
of the Philippines, even for decades, has remained to be unfair and wealth is becoming more
and more confined to a small number of people.

Hence, the discourse on these political machineries and how they permit political
families, despite grave issues on corruption and inefficiency, thrive in the system become
very interesting. Not to mention, these political families and their workings shape the
political culture of the Philippines in entirety.

This paper features the Duranos of Danao, Cebu as an illustrative case of analysis on
patron-clientelism. Duranos have proven to be those of guns, goons and gold.

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 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

This paper seeks to define the politico-economic landscape of Danao, Cebu by examining
the political and economic oligarchy of the Duranos. Furthermore, it also aims to explain
why and how the Duranos have thrived in the arena of politics. The following questions
shall be answered:

1) How did the Duranos become an economic and political oligarch of Northern Cebu?

2) What are the political machineries that Duranos utilize in order to maintain their
dominance in the socio-economic and political spheres of Danao?

METHODOLOGIES

This paper is a qualitative study that utilized the descriptive and historical approaches in
understanding its subject. The illustrative case of analysis in this study is the Durano political
dynasty of Danao. Secondary data are used to gather and provide information and arrive at
answers and analyses to achieve the objectives. Specifically, this paper used the concepts of
patron-client relationship and bossism to explain the political prominence of the Duranos in
Danao and how they have thrived in the system for the past years. Michael Cullinane‟s
„Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao‟ was used as primary source of
data.

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 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

As Joel Migal argues, in his work Strong Societies and Weak States, third world countries
continue to fail in attaining political stability and the other requisites of a strong state and
society because of the well-entrenched and persistent survival of chiefs, landlords, bosses,
rich peasants, clan leaders or strongmen, to simply put, it in the political, socio-cultural and
economic spheres. These strongmen hold critical positions in local, provincial and national
offices that allow them to create and even expand their political and economic resources at
the expense of the public. Policies or rules promulgated by state institutions are impeded if
not absolutely disregarded. In the end, these strongmen exercise a substantial, if not
outstanding, social control. To put it more concretely, these strongmen, because of the vast
power, authority, not to mention their legitimacy they enjoy, are able to advance their
interests instead of the authentic needs and demands of the people. To place their
disposition at a regular and acceptable stance instead of an unfair and improper reality in the
eyes of the public or to forcibly justify their persistence and existence, these strongmen rely
on strategies that are as concrete and as encompassing as delivering services and material
needs to the people. Ultimately, strongmen appear to be already indispensable in the system
because of the dependency it creates and imbibes to the people and that which it tolerates.

The embedment of strongmen in the system eventually leads to the rise and the enduring
existence of patron-clientelism. It is defined as “an exchange relationship or instrumental
friendship between two individuals of different status in which the patron uses his own
influence and resources to provide for the protection and material welfare of his lower status
client and his family, who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and
assistance, including personal services, to the patron.” This dyadic and unequal relationship
is actually a manifestation, much more a disheartening magnification, of the intrinsically
terrible divisions that social structures and classes create. Worse, this relationship is
irreversible and very difficult to put into a close.

The Philippines is not exempt from these realities. It, being a Third World country, is easily
subjected to or is vulnerable to threats and barriers in achieving stability in politics, in the
government and the economy. Reality is, governance in the Philippines has increasingly
become ineffective given the longstanding issues of corruption, political dynasties and
nepotism. Despite constitutional prohibitions on the existence of political dynasties, same
political families hold offices in government. These political families, unsurprisingly, are also
placed at privileged and powerful posts in the socio-economic arena. Aside from political
longevity, they also enjoy control in most economic activities.

Social structure is crucial in the play of Philippine politics. The socio-economic system is
considered to be one of the most critical determinants of the country‟s political culture. The
Philippines has often been described as a two-class system. David Wurfel, in The Socio-
Economic Setting from Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, however magnifies the difficulty in
fully demarcating the social classes in the country. Wurfel argues that classes are not clearly
bounded, self-conscious entities. Thus making it very arduous to define the boundaries
between the upper and lower strata because within these two bifurcations exist even more
specific divisions. The existence of “big people” and “little people” however is clear. These
big people occupy only a very minimal space in the pyramid while the little people compose
the larger portion. This structure inevitably affects the conduct of politics. Lesser people take

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hold of power and have economic capacity while many struggle to survive each day.
Consequently, these little people succumb to the control, manipulation and monopoly of the
big ones with the belief and the hope that they can acquire benefits from them. Case in
point, local political leaders find national patrons. These national patrons acquire provincial
and local support, especially electoral votes, by granting local leaders, their clients, political or
economic favors. At a more microscopic lens, the public patronize particular politicians in
exchange for benefits, jobs, medical help, and appointment to government office or
economic opportunities among others.

Socio-economic elites in the Philippines, owning various business firms and controlling
enormous industries, if not directly involved, exercise a large influence in politics. Hence the
unavoidable births of patron-client relationships where more powerful, more influential and
wealthier individuals entice and eventually acquire clients who need material support or even
the most basic necessities of survival. It in this vein of thought that patron-clientelism
thrives and endures in the system despite the inherent inequality in the relationship. Business
tycoons or icons are known to donate or extend financial assistance and support to certain
politicians during elections. In turn, politicians give these business tycoons biases and favors
– like a payback, “utang na loob”.

Modernization theorists, as John Sidel in his work Bossism and State Formation cites, viewed
patron-client ties as drawing strength from a traditional Filipino political culture that
valorised reciprocity, smooth interpersonal relations, kinship and fictive kinship bonds. This
is also highlighted in David Wurfel‟s aforementioned work where he argued that the
widespread value of accommodation to others or pakikisama reinforces the pattern of not
resisting political and socio-cultural inefficiencies and therefore repressing the need to
express or articulate their frustrations on these inefficiencies. On the other hand, scholars
influenced by historical materialism believed that clientelist relationships were contingent
upon concrete socio-economic circumstances: marked by social inequalities, material scarcity
and the failure of kinship, village units and state institutions to guarantee personal
subsistence and security to the bulk of the population. The view of the latter essentially
strengthens the fact that the socio-economic setting is a largely powerful determinant of
political behaviour and ultimately, of political culture.

Noticeable also in Philippine politics is the progressive expansion of local strongman power.
Bossism, as defined by John Sidel, refers to the interlocking, multi-tiered directoriate of
bosses who use their control over the state apparatus to exploit the archipelago‟s natural and
human resources. “Bosses” are the most influential and powerful in a particular jurisdiction
– in the political, socio-cultural and economic aspects.

Guns, goons and gold – this very common yet precise phrase sums up the workings of
Philippine politics. Patronage politics has long characterized the politics in the Philippines.
Families utilize various machineries to stay in power. Various political machineries that range
from vote-buying to violence and coercion also fundamentally contribute to the thriving of
patron-clientelism and bossism in the country. The dominance of political families centrally
lies in the fact that the socio-economic setting of the country leaves no choice, on the part of
the little people, but to succumb to the more powerful ones. If otherwise, there is no way
that even the most basic of their needs are met. These families are so well-entrenched that if
not impossible, it is most difficult to remove them from the system.

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 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

The diagram basically shows patron-clientelism as a dominant feature in Philippine politics.

This relationship, being dyadic and mutual, speaks of an exchange of benefits. The patrons,
who are usually socio-economic and political elites, have vast wealth, influence and power.
They provide the material needs or benefits of the clients, who are usually the little people,
such as job opportunities and medical help among others. In turn, clients support their
patrons. This support is concretely expressed through electoral votes. Patrons, specifically
political elites, utilize political machineries in order to influence, if not supervise, the political
judgments and decisions of its clients.

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 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE OF ANALYSIS*

One of the most interesting manifestations of patron-clientelism and bossism in Philippine

politics is the Durano political dynasty of Danao. The Duranos are known to have built and
kept Danao as its strong and infallible bailiwick. “Durano Country”, a term coined to refer
to Danao, has been with the hands of the Duranos for generations. True enough, the
Duranos have well imbedded and entrenched themselves in almost every aspect of the City.

The very colourful, vibrant and often controversial political reputation of Duranos all rooted
from the hard work of Ramon Durano Sr. or “Mano Amon”, the father of Danao City.
Mano Amon was known for juggling politics and business – two rather delicate and ideally
separate fields. Outstandingly, he had afforded to rise above the hurdles.

Mano Amo‟s leadership, and ultimately, the Duranos, resembles the “guns, goons and gold”
portrayal of Philippine politics. Guns and goods imply the use or threat of force in
influencing electors and gold implies the use of money or materials for vote buying.

Danao‟s electoral and political processes are smeared with violence, coercion and
intimidation. Deaths or assassinations of political rivals are nothing new. Goons or the hired
private army or political enforcers are what make Danao politics as notorious and infamous
as it was then and as it is today. These goons have allowed the Duranos to fearlessly pursue
their plans. This tactic may have been motivated by Mano Amo‟s experience in wartime
politics. Vote-buying was and continues to be rampant. The Duranos, having assigned
loyalists to schools and so, had a strong say on the conduct and results of elections as public
teachers are corrupted and bought. This strategy is a manifestation of politicians taking
advantage of the incessant dictates of poverty that tends to override the regard for efficiency
and efficacy.

The Duranos have managed to exercise direct control over the voters and the people of
Danao because of the very powerful and strategic political machineries they employ. Aside
from establishing well-built relationships with political actors, the Duranos, especially Mano
Amo, have touched the very heart of the Church. Mano Amo was known for his
overgenerous donations to the Church, international causes, foundations and charities.
Apparently, these donations amounted to 37 million pesos. Though often criticized, as Mano
Amo‟s leadership has grown to be two-faced: an unmerciful political leader to a devout
Catholic, this highlights the profoundness of the Church in influencing the political decisions
of the people. A fact that the Duranos knew and a fact that they took advantage of.

Duranos being the bosses and patrons of Danao are not exempt from seeking support from
national politicians. The Duranos‟ most critical and significant national patrons were
President Carlos Garcia and Ferdinand Marcos. Garcia, when he ran for president, was
desperate of the support of Cebu. Being so, he displayed himself to be the patron of local
political leaders. Garcia granted Duranos certain political and economic favors which
allowed the Duranos to convert Danao to an industrial complex.

Through negotiations and existing connections with members of the Congress, in 1961,
Danao was proclaimed as a City despite its failure to comply with the requirements of
population and revenues. From here, it can be told that the proclamation was not for

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administrative reasons but for political ones. The very fundamental advantage that the
Duranos have acquired from this was the independence of Danao from the supervision of
the provincial government. Inevitably, the Duranos were given a free hand to pursue their
plans and goals. Duranos were now in control. If Garcia provided them concrete benefits,
from government grants to other political favors, Marcos was but a distant patron. Even so,
the Duranos positively saw this as an opportunity to be free from any external control. They
can do their business in Danao on their own – without fear and without inhibitions.

This Industrial Complex was what attached the Duranos to Danao. More than the arduous
attempt to introduce and even hasten the progress of Danao, the creation of the industrial
complex was a political manoeuvre. It allowed the Duranos to extract more wealth, build
more connections and convey a culture of dependency among the people of Danao. The
businesses of the Duranos fundamentally paved the way to the creation of more linkages and
political alliances. Being so, this has strengthened the Duranos as a political dynasty. Ranging
from mills to banks, the businesses of the Duranos have allowed thousands of the people of
Danao employment. The opportunities that these businesses created have driven Danao
away from the traditional fishing and farming livelihood. In turn, these people have, if not
absolute loyalists of the Duranos, imbibed the very common culture of giving back.
Needless to say, the giving back was manifested during elections.

The Duranos introduced and operated several businesses in the area – most notable of
which were the Universal Cement Company (UNICEMCO) and the Durano Sugar Mill.
UNICEMCO, at a certain point, was at a height because of several transactions with the
government, cement being a basic ingredient of infrastructure projects. Apparently too, the
cement industry has been considered as a political enterprise since the government is often
engaged in both production and sales. The family controlled the coal and limestone required
to fuel the cement plant, owned milling facilities financed by the national government and
busied themselves in creating political networks that would keep them in their stance.
Construction of the “2,000-ton daily capacity sugar mill” began in 1967 with government
financing totalling some 86 million pesos from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP).

Danao has also long been a major center for the illicit manufacture of firearms. The gun
industry contributes to the Duranos‟ revenues through the proceeds of sales from family-
controlled factories as well as informal “taxes” collected from other manufacturers operating
in Danao. Consequently, the industry keeps the family well-stocked with the weapons
necessary for local political control.

Though the economic prominence of the Duranos already commenced even before the
WWII, it is undeniable that the businesses indirectly or indirectly fuelled by political favors
from national patrons have led to them to becoming one of the wealthiest political families
in the Philippines. Family members, relatives and trusted or loyal supporters of the Duranos
controlled and operated these businesses. More than a political oligarch, the Duranos are
also, like any other prominent political family in the Philippines, economic oligarchs in their
own bailiwicks and even beyond.

*Main Source: Cullinane, Michael (1993) „Patron as Client: Wrlord Politics and the Duranos of
Danao‟, in An Anarchy of Families. Madison: Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Pp 163-215.

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 CONCLUSION

The Duranos have won hearts of national patrons to feed them with various political and
business favours. Through these, the family has been capacitated with the resources
necessary for them to become bosses and patrons of Danao. The strategic guns, goons and
gold have brought them to the place that Mano Amon has fought and sweated for. With
clients, the ever loyalists and the people of Danao who have been driven by their political
machineries and desperate to uplift their lives, the Duranos have managed to garner votes
and support, placing them to critical government positions.

As the Duranos have successfully managed to embed themselves in Danao as they continue
to hold offices in government, appoint loyalists to various posts, map out their strategies and
put everything in place, it is almost unlikely and impossible that the Duranos will lose hold
of Danao. Not today, not tomorrow. Another generation would have to battle off all that the
Duranos have become and have made to rise as another political and economic oligarch in
Danao. The Duranos will stay.

True enough, politics is but an arena of exchanges and favours. Patron-client relationships
and bossism, being long-standing features of Philippine politics, are what sustain the
entrenchment of political dynasties in the country.

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 REFERENCES

Wurfel, David (1988) „The Socio-Economic Setting‟, in Filipino Politics: Development and Decay.
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Pp 57-73.

Sidel, John (1999) Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. California: Stanford
University Press.

Migdal, Joel (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cullinane, Michael (1993) „Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao‟, in
An Anarchy of Families. Madison: Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Pp 163-215.

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