Why We Give, Testing Economic and Social Psychological Accounts of Altruism

Northeastern Political Science Association
Why We Give: Testing Economic and Social Psychological Accounts of Altruism

Author(s): Leonard Ray
Source: Polity, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring, 1998), pp. 383-415
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Why We Give:
Testing Economic and Social
PsychologicalAccounts of Altruism*
LeonardRay
BinghamtonUniversityand Centrefor AdvancedStudy,
NorwegianAcademyof Scienceand Letters
Altruisticbehaviorposes a challengeto prevailingmodels of individu-

als as rationalself-interestedactors. Thisexaminationof individual
donationsto overseascharitiespermits an evaluationof competing
economicand social psychologicaltheoriesabout altruisticbehavior.
Data drawnfrom a 1983Eurobarometerpublic opinion survey were
used to investigatethe determinantsof the variousmotives-moral
duty, concernfor others, and self-interest-commonly thought to
guide altruisticbehavior,to test the impactof these motives on
reportedgiving, and to evaluatethe natureof strategicinteraction
among donors to see whetherperceivedgiving by others encouragesor
discouragesgiving. Beliefs about the causes of poverty werefound to
affect moral duty and concernfor others.Moral duty and concern
havefairly consistentimpactson giving whileself-interestwas less
consistentlyrelatedto giving. The resultsalso call into question tradi-
tional models of strategicinteractionsuggestingthat others' actions
serve as cuesfor giving.
LeonardRay is a Professor of Political Scienceat Binghamton

University.He is currentlya visitingfellow at the Centrefor
AdvancedStudy of the NorwegianAcademy of Scienceand Letters,
Drammensveien78, 0271 Oslo, Norway, wherehe is pursuinga study
of politicalparties and public supportfor Europeanintegration.
*An early draft of this articlewas presentedat the annual meetingof the Southern
PoliticalScienceAssociationin Atlanta, November2-5, 1994. I thank KathleenBratton,
George Rabinowitz,Stuart Macdonald,Timothy McKeown,Michael Munger,Wendy
Rahn, Marco Steenbergen,and the anonymousreviewersof Polity for their criticism,
advice, and encouragement.
Polity Volume XXX, Number3 Spring 1998

Polity Volume XXX, Number3 Spring 1998

384 Why We Give
"Private foreign aid," aid provided by non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), has occupied a growing place in the literature on development.
Estimates of total NGO spending on overseas relief and development
hover around $6 billion annually.1 Though it accounts for only a fraction
of the total foreign aid flow,2 NGO aid has received much attention
because of widespread perceptions it is more effective than official aid in
meeting basic human needs,3 the neoliberal preference for private charity
over government welfare programs, and the decrease of foreign aid
budgets in recent years.
Governments are also funnelling an increasing proportion of remain-
ing public aid through NGOs. The percentage of NGO income derived
from official sources has risen from only 1.5 percent in the early 1970s to
approximately 30 percent at present.4 Nonetheless private donations
remain a vital source of income for NGOs, particularly in the three
nations included in this analysis. In 1993 individual donations provided
62 percent of the income of German organizations, 72 percent of the
income of British organizations, and 78 percent of the income of French
organizations.5
One would expect NGOs to have developed considerable knowledge of
individual donors' motivations. However, Jdrgen Lissner argues that
they work largely in the dark.
Generally, voluntary agencies have little accurate information

about the individual contributor's attitudes and motives for giving.
. . . Consequently, when designing fund-raising campaigns geared
to large numbers of people, voluntary agencies are forced to rely
extensively on intuition and enlightened guesses.6
1. OECD Development Assistance Committee, Development Co-operation: Efforts

and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee (Paris: OECD,
1997), pp. 64-65.
2. Even at this level, NGO aid accounts for under 10% of all aid flows. OECD, Devel-
opment Co-operation, p. 59.
3. For a critical assessment of the effectiveness of NGO's, see Roger Riddell and Mark
Robinson, eds., Non-Governmental Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995).
4. Overseas Development Institute, "NGOs and Official Donors," Overseas Develop-
ment Institute Briefing Papers (document downloaded from internet http://www.
oneworld.org/odi 1995).
5. Ian Smille, and Henry Hemlich, eds., Non Governmental Organizations and Gov-
ernments: Stakeholders for Development (Paris: OECD, 1993).
6. Jdrgen Lissner, The Politics of Altruism: A Study of the Political Behavior of Pri-
vate Voluntary Organizations (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation Department of
Studies, 1977), p. 128.

Leonard Ray 385
The "enlightened guesses" made by NGOs tend to focus on either posi-

tive or negative emotions assumed to spur giving. One British agency
claims that the most effective way to do this is to "show babies, all the
time show babies and more babies."7 In the rush to elicit emotional reac-
tions from donors, NGOs forgo analysis of the causes of third-world
poverty and focus on heart wrenching images. As Smille puts it, "The
most successful fund-raising NGOs in many, if not most OECD coun-
tries use highly emotive techniques, outweighing intelligent development
education by a wide margin."8 The need for private donations may also
skew development efforts of voluntary organizations. Hibbert Roberts
asserts that "a PVO may be induced to tailor its overseas program to
maximize its fundraising potential among donors in the United States."9
The focus on emotional rather than cognitive factors has negative
implications for both the short and the long terms. In the short run, PVO
fundraising may be less effective because it neglects an important aspect
of the motivation behind individual donations. The lack of development
education may also have an effect on long-term trends in broader public
support for overseas aid. There has been a steady decline in public sup-
port for official foreign aid. 0 Changing prevailing cognitive models and
perceptions of the third world and of the relationships between the third
and first worlds may be a means of reversing this decline in public
support.
I. Altruism Research
Since Auguste Comte introduced the term in the nineteenth century, the
word "altruism" has been used to refer to a wide range of motives and
behavior. In SystWmede Politique Positive, Comte argued against the
view that humans are exclusively self-interested. He viewed the motiva-
tion to help others as an important check on self-interest, and coined the
term altruism to refer to this motivation.1I This concern with the well-
7. Lissner,ThePolitics of Altruism,p. 131.

8. Smille and Hemlich, Non Governmental Organizations.
9. HibbertRoberts,"The DomesticEnvironmentof AID-RegisteredPVO's:Charac-
teristicsand Impact,"in Private VoluntaryOrganizationsas Agents of Development,ed.
RobertGorman(Boulder:WestviewReplicaEditions, 1984):264-76,p. 186.
10. See Alvin Richman,"AmericanSupportfor InternationalInvolvement,"Public
OpinionQuarterly,57 (Summer1993):99-114at p. 100,on trendsin publicsupportfor aid.
11. See ChristianRutten, Essai sur la Morale d'Auguste Comte (Paris: Les Belles
Lettres,1972).Comtealso heldthataltruisticmotivationsemanatefroma specificorganin
the brain, one above and superiorto the organresponsiblefor egoisticmotivations.See
Comte, Systemede Politique Positive (Paris: R6publiqueOccidentale,1851), Tome I,
ch. 3.

386 Why We Give
being of an "other" has been the defining mark of altruism in much of

the economic and psychological literature. A typical definition is offered
by David Kennett, who considers altruism "the gift of money, time, or
some other commodity or service contributing to the economic well being
of another without obligation and without the expectation that some
future benefit is dependent on the present action." 2 Ribar and Wilhelm
consider donations to overseas charities to be a particularly good exam-
ple of altruistic behavior, since there are very few ways donors in the
developed world would benefit materially from their donations.13
Though the term "altruism" is widely used, there is much disagreement
about identifying what behavior qualifies as "altruistic." Some insist
that the degree to which an act is "altruistic" depends upon the purity of
its motives. David Kennett admits that some behavior intended to aid
others may also bring benefits to the "altruist" and refers to these
behaviors as "quasi-altruism."14 Daniel Batson would consider even
self-sacrificial behavior to be egoistic, and not altruistic, if it were moti-
vated primarily by a desire to avoid guilt or shame and not primarily by a
desire to help another.15Other researchers have proposed defining altru-
ism as action costly to the doer. Shalom Schwartz criticizes the focus on
"simple and even trivial self sacrifices."16 Researchers who have studied
the rescue of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe have generally required sub-
stantial sacrifice or risk of sacrifice on the part of "altruists." The
Oliners argue that such a definition allows one to forgo -speculation on
the "internal psychological states" of altruists.17 Kristen Monroe also
emphasizes the importance of self-sacrifice as a defining characteristic of
"altruism."'8 Arguing for the existence of a continuum of behavior
ranging from altruism to egoism, Monroe places rescuers of Jews at the
altruistic pole of this continuum, egoists at the other pole, and philan-
12. David Kennet, "Altruism and Economic Behavior, I," American Journal of Eco-
nomics and Sociology, 39 (April 1980): 183-98, p. 184.
13. David Ribar and Mark Wilhelm, "Charitable Contributions to International Relief
and Development," National Tax Journal, 48 (June 1995): 229-44.
14. Kennet, "Altruism and Economic Behavior," p. 187.
15. Daniel Batson, Jim Fultz, and Patricia Schonrade, "Distress and Empathy: Two
Qualitatively Different Vicarious Emotions with Different Motivational Consequences,"
Journal of Personality, 55 (March 1987): 19-39.
16. Shalom Schwartz, "Elictation of Moral Obligation and Self-Sacrificing Behavior,"
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15 (August 1970): 283-93.
17. See Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The Altruistic Personality (New York: The Free
Press, 1988), p. 6.
18. Kristen Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Leonard Ray 387
thropists somewhere in the middle with their "quasi-altruistic" behavior.

According to this definition, philanthropy is quasi-altruistic not because
of the mixed motives of donors, but because of the small scale of their
sacrifice. Some authors such as Alfie Kohn argue that such a restrictive
definition of altruism is demoralizing.19
This terminological debate is important because factors associated
with one type of "altruistic" behavior may not be relevant to all behav-
iors labeled "altruistic." Monroe, whose analysis covers a broad range
of actions from donations to rescues, finds that many of the factors iden-
tified by the existing literature seem to motivate philanthropists but are
irrelevant to rescuers.20The present analysis focuses on a rather weak
form of altruistic behavior, individual donations to international chari-
ties. While the sacrifice demanded of donors is generally rather small, the
motivation is usually assumed to be altruistic because of the low like-
lihood that a donor will benefit materially from the donation. The empir-
ical analysis is based on a survey of popular attitudes toward aid to the
third world.
Scholars investigating altruism have used a wide range of research
designs. Some research, particularly on rescuers of Jews, is based on in-
depth interviews with altruistic individuals.21 Other work, mainly from
psychology, employs experimental techniques.22 Survey research has
been used most extensively by economists.23 Each of these methods has
strengths and weaknesses because of the different degrees of internal and
external validity they provide.24 Internal validity refers to the degree to
which the research results apply to the individuals under study. External
19. Alfie Kohn, TheBrighterSide of HumanNature:Altruismand Empathyin Every-

day Life (New York: BasicBooks, 1990),p. 197.
20. Monroe, TheHeart of Altruism,p. 17.
21. See Oliner and Oliner, The AltruisticPersonality, and Monroe, The Heart of
Altruism.
22. For example,ShalomSchwartz,"Elicitationof MoralObligation";Batsonet al.,
"Distress and Empathy";and Robert Cialdini, Betty Lee Darby, and Joyce Vincent,
"Transgressionand Altruism:A Case for Hedonism?"Journalof ExperimentalSocial
Psychology, 9 (November1973):502-16. But see also GeraldMarwelland Ruth Ames,
"EconomistsFreeRide,Does AnyoneElse?:Experimentsin the Provisionof PublicGoods
IV," Journalof PublicEconomics,15 (June 1981):275-310.
23. See H. Kitchenand Dalton, "Determinantsof CharitableDonationsby Familiesin
Canada:A RegionalAnalysis,"AppliedEconomics,22 (March1990):285-99;andAndrew
Jones and RichardMarriott, "Determinantsof the Level and Methods of Charitable
Givingin the 1990FamilyExpenditureSurvey,"AppliedEconomicsLetters,24 (Novem-
ber 1994):200-03.
24. Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimentaland Quasi-Experimental
Designsfor Research(Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1963).

388 Why We Give
validity refers to the applicability of research findings to individuals not

directly studied, i.e. to the general population.
In-depth interviewing generally has high internal validity. While there
are complications arising from the possible projection of the researcher's
expectations onto the interviewees, interview techniques generally yield a
detailed and nuanced understanding of the mindset of the individuals
under study. We generally have confidence that the findings from narra-
tive techniques accurately describe the individuals studied. However, the
applicability of these findings to a broader population is more prob-
lematic. Given the high time costs of narrative techniques, these studies
cannot cover a representative sample of the general population, and their
external validity is questionable.
Experimental techniques are also characterized by high internal valid-
ity. The controlled environment of an experiment allows for the exclu-
sion of extraneous influences. We can be fairly certain that experimental
results reproduce a causal link accurately. It is less certain, however, that
experimental findings are generalizable. Two issues call the external
validity of experimental results into question. First, the experimental set-
ting is often highly artificial and experimental results may be harder to
reproduce under "real world" conditions. Second, the populations
studied in psychology experiments are rarely representative of the general
population.
Survey research generally has high external validity. The use of
random sampling and the relatively large sample sizes in survey work
allow greater certainty that research results apply to the general popula-
tion. However, survey work does raise questions about internal validity.
Responses to survey questions can be difficult to interpret. The meanings
researchers impute to survey questions may not coincide with the under-
standing respondents had of those questions. Responses are also affected
by question order and wording.25 The results of survey research must
therefore be interpreted with caution.
There is little academic literature dealing specifically with individual
donations to international charities. However, a number of disciplines
ranging from philosophy to sociobiology have studied helping behavior
or altruism broadly defined. This paper will draw primarily from the
fields of economics and social psychology. Economists have generally
focused on private and collective generosity that appears, at first, to
violate common assumptions about the self-interested motivations of
25. Readers wishing to evaluate the appropriateness of the survey instrument used in this
analysis will find the questions in the appendix.

Leonard Ray 389
economic actors. Social psychology has devoted much of its attention to

the study of helping behavior. Spurred on by dramatic examples of
people aiding or failing to aid strangers,26psychologists have used elabo-
rate experimental designs to investigate the motives of helping behavior.
The following section will survey economic and social-psychological
accounts of other-interested behavior to identify factors that may aid in
the explanation of individual donations to overseas charities.
II. Economic Accounts of Giving
Altruism may seem difficult to reconcile with traditional economic ac-

counts of behavior, which posit self-interested rational actors. Attempts
to construct an economic account of altruism or giving behavior have
tended to rely on one of two general arguments. An orthodox approach
reinterprets the behavior in question, revealing it to be only superficially
"altruistic." This approach reconciles economic theory and altruism by
revealing such behavior to be ultimately in the self interest of the "altru-
ist." An alternate approach redefines the "self-interest" of the altruist to
include the material conditions of the recipient. Once a model includes
the utility of the recipient in the function describing the utility of the
altruist, utility maximizing models can predict altruistic behavior. Since
both of these approaches assume that altruistic behavior is instrumental
behavior intended to increase the well being of the recipient, they raise
the possibility of a public goods problem. A third economic explanation
of altruism disregards the recipient of the altruistic behavior and focuses
on more immediate and private benefits donors derive from altruistic
behavior.
Altruism as Narrow Self Interest

The view that altruistic behavior hinges on its beneficial effects for the
donor has often been used to account for official foreign aid. National
aid policies often reflect the material interest of the donor nations.
United States and European Union food aid is closely linked to domestic
agricultural price support systems and serves as a dumping ground for
surplus produce. Many nations direct development aid to traditional
trading partners who can be expected to spend their increased resources
on imports from the donor nation. In many cases, aid is explicitly "tied"
26. The case of Kitty Genovese is often cited as an inspiration for studies in this field.
Genovese was assaulted and murdered in Queens, New York. Thirty-eight neighbors wit-
nessed her assault and murder; not one of them intervened to help or even to call the police.

390 Why We Give
and recipients are required to spend it in this way. Finally, the threat of a
sudden cutoff of aid is used to exert political pressure on poorer
nations. 27
One can question the extension of this line of argument to voluntary
donations by individuals. Private aid is usually targeted at poor popula-
tions rather than third world governments. Unlike official aid, private
aid is subject to far fewer conditions and is very rarely cut off for polit-
ical reasons. However, one could argue that private aid causes improved
economic conditions in the third world which lead to increased imports
or reduced immigration, and thus improve the donor's well-being.
Material self-interest is a potential, though unlikely, explanation for
donations to overseas relief.
Altruism as Other-Interested Behavior
If altruistic behavior cannot be reinterpreted as self-interested, then self-

interest must be redefined if an economic explanation is to account for
altruism. The standard assumption of self-interested actors is mute on
the exact specifications of actors' "interests." Some economists have
been willing to allow that individuals may care about the welfare of
others. They may take their cue from Adam Smith's observation: "How
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles
in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render
their happiness necessary to him, though he derive nothing from it except
the pleasure of seeing it."28
Formal models of such "other-interested" behavior generally rely
upon interdependent utility functions. Once the utility of one actor
becomes a partial function of the utility of other actors, a range of altru-
istic behaviors becomes "rational." In their formal treatment of charity
and the welfare state, Hochman and Rodgers demonstrate that redis-
tribution of income can be pareto optimal under assumptions of utility
interdependence.29 Another example is Frolich, who uses graphical
27. See Louis M. Imbeau, Donor Aid-The Determinants of Development Allocations

to Third World Countries: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); and
R. D. McKinlay, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the
Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and Germany 1960-1970," Comparative Political Studies, 11 (January 1979):
411-62.
28. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1983). Cited in
Morton Hunt, The Compassionate Beast: What Science is Discovering about the Humane
Side of Humankind (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1990), p. 27.
29. Harold Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," The
American Economic Review, 59 (September 1969): 542-57.

Leonard Ray 391
analysis to explore the implications of various assumptions about utility

interdependence.30
This literature provides some interesting illustrations of the types of
behaviors that are consistent with rationality assumptions once self inter-
est is redefined. While the economic literature does not indicate when we
should expect utility interdependence versus utility independence, the
literature does sensitize us to the possibility of strategic interaction
among altruists.
The Strategic Dilemma I: The Collective Action Problem
Both economic approaches presented above-uncovering egoistic bene-

fits of altruism and assuming utility interdependence-portray giving as
instrumental behavior. Common to each is the fundamental assumption
that donors derive utility not from the act of giving but from the result of
giving. According to the first approach, the effects of aid yield a later
improvement in the material well-being of the donor. According to the
second, it is the observed increase in income of the recipients that pleases
donors. In either case, donors derive utility not only from the conse-
quences of their own donations, but also from the consequences of dona-
tions made by others. Donations are thus a public good, subject to col-
lective action problem. As Jeffrey Obler notes,
Private voluntary transfers are efficient as long as there are only

two persons, a donor and a recipient. But efficiency becomes more
elusive when there are many potential donors and recipients. Under
these circumstances, increments in recipients' income become
public goods enjoyed by all those who care about the recipients'
welfare whether or not they make any contribution to that
welfare.31
The domestic welfare state is an effort to prevent free riding. "Redis-
tribution through the fiscal process is just as necessary for the attainment
of pareto optimality in these circumstances as in the collective provision
of conventional public goods."32 Individual contributions to NGOs pre-
sent a similar problem. "A calculating individual, realizing that Oxfam's
development efforts would not be significantly affected by his or her par-
30. Norman Frolich, "Self Interest or Altruism, What Difference?," Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, 18 (March 1974): 55-73.
31. Jeffrey Obler, "Generosity, Duty, and the Welfare State," Polity, 85 (Spring 1986):
408-30, 409.
32. Hochman and Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," p. 543.

392 Why We Give
ticipation, might decide not to contribute (taking a free ride at the

expense of those that do)."33 This argument suggests that individuals will
be less likely to donate when there are significant levels of giving (or
perceived giving) by others.
Caveat I: Aid as a Private Good
While the well-being of individuals in poor countries may be a public

good for donors in wealthy nations, this does not automatically imply a
collective action problem. If donors derive private benefits from their
altruistic acts, then rational donors will give regardless of what others
do. Selective incentives, benefits that accrue solely to contributors, have
long been recognized as a means of overcoming the collective action
problems inherent in the provision of public goods.34 NGOs themselves
have a range of selective incentives at their disposal. These include
"regular publications, conferences with prominent speakers, bumper-
stickers, film-rentals, T-shirts, and membership cards."35 Free riders can
be, though often are not, excluded from enjoying these incentives.
The selective incentives may be intangible as well. Some theories of
impure altruism argue that the public goods problem is overcome pri-
marily through the "warm glow" associated with charitable giving.36
The economic theory of "warm glow" giving has a direct parallel in the
psychological literature in the form of the "negative state relief" model
which will be discussed later. Despite the explanatory usefulness of the
"warm glow," the economic literature tells us little about its causes or
nature. The "warm glow" may be derived from the gratitude of the
recipients of voluntary donations. Of course, this gratitude must be
somehow communicated to the donor. Child sponsorship programs, for
example, offer "progress reports," photos, and letters from recipients.
These are apparently effective fund raising techniques, although they
may not accurately portray the way in which the donor's money is being
used.37
While the economics literature does suggest a number of hypotheses
33. Arthur Blaser, "Developmentand the PVO: Incentivesfor Participation,"in

Private VoluntaryOrganizationsas Agents of Development,p. 90.
34. MancurOlson, TheLogic of CollectiveAction: Public Goods and the Theoryof
Groups(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1965).
35. Blaser,"Developmentand the PVO," p. 91.
36. See, for example, James Andreoni, "ImpureAltruismand Donations to Public
Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving," The Economic Journal, 100 (June 1990):
464-77.
37. Brian Smith, "U.S. and CanadianPVOs as TransnationalDevelopmentInstitu-
tions," in Private VoluntaryOrganizationsas Agents of Development,p. 151.

Leonard Ray 393
about factors that impede or encourage charitable contributions, it is

largely silent on the nature of donors' motives. Instead, most of the
recent empirical work on donations has taken the motivation to donate
as given and constant, and restricts the analysis to the impact of tax
policy on contribution rates.38 The economic literature is best able to
accommodate altruistic behavior through the assumption that an individ-
ual's utility is in some way a function of the utilities of others. The causes
of this mutual dependence of utility functions are never explored. For an
analysis of the conditions which favor this imputed utility interdepen-
dence we must turn to social psychology.
m. Social Psychology and Helping Behavior
There is a sizable literature on helping behavior in the field of social

psychology. While some of this work has focused on charitable dona-
tions, the bulk of it has investigated other kinds of helping behavior. This
literature suggests mechanisms which prompt individuals to react to the
perceived needs of others by offering assistance. Two such mechanisms
will be explored below. Social psychology also highlights the impact of
bystanders on helping behavior, findings that parallel economic argu-
ments about collective action problems. Finally, one social psychological
model presents altruistic behavior as essentially unrelated to the recipient
of assistance. Altogether, this research is a rich source of hypotheses
about altruistic behavior.
Psychological Accounts of Helping

While economic theory may model concern for the well-being of others
through the assumption of interdependent utility functions, an explana-
tion for this utility interdependence must be gleaned from other disci-
plines. Social psychology has proposed a number of mechanisms, such as
personal norms and empathy, to account for our consideration for the
well-being of others. Research traditions built about both of these
explanations identify factors that affect the degree of utility interdepen-
dence, and thus encourage or retard helping behavior.
38. For a discussionof this approachsee JeffreyObler, "PrivateGivingin the Welfare

State," BritishJournalof PoliticalScience, 11 (January1981):17-48.Recentexamplesof
this type of analysisincludeRibarand Wilhelm,"CharitableContributionsto Overseas
Development";Kitchenand Dalton, "Determinantsof CharitableDonations";and Jones
and Marriott,"Determinantsof the Leveland Methodsof CharitableGiving."

394 Why We Give
Research focusing on the role of personal norms holds that individuals

feel distress when they fail to act according to internalized values. 39This
type of personal distress is central to the work of Jane Allyn Piliavin.40
While her original cost-benefit model of helping behavior was intended
to describe helping in emergency situations, this model can help to iden-
tify important factors which encourage helping or altruistic behavior in
general. Piliavin's model assumes that individuals weigh the costs (to
themselves) of helping a victim against the costs (again to themselves) of
not helping. The faiure to meet one's own moral standards is one of the
costs of a failure to intervene. This cost increases with an individual's
feelings of solidarity toward the person in need and varies depending on
the individual's beliefs about the causes of that other person's problems.
Although most of this work is on emergency intervention, the impact of
moral obligation and personal norms seems most effective in non-
emergency situations.41
Judgments about the cause of a victim's need affect the likelihood of
helping. Causal attributions about an individual's need affect a potential
donor's emotional orientation toward the victim, with the emotional
state directly affecting the probability of assistance.42Help is more read-
ily forthcoming for individuals whose need is perceived as involuntary, a
result of forces beyond their control. A related factor is the degree to
which an individual feels responsible for the condition of another.
Experiments indicate tht subjects who feel they have somehow caused the
condition of the victim will be more likely to offer help. These factors
increase subjects' sense of moral responsibility to help, and thus increase
the psychic distress (guilt) associated with a failure to help.43Conversely,
if the person in need can be blamed for their fate, the pressure to help is
lessened.
A second school of researchers stress the role of empathy as a motiva-
39. See ShalomH. Schwartz,"NormativeInfluenceson Altruism,"Advancesin Social

Psychology, 10 (1977):221-79.
40. See Jane Allyn Piliavin,IrvingPiliavin,and JudithRodin, "Costs, Diffusion, and
the StigmatizedVictim," Journalof Personalityand Social Psychology, 32 (September
1980):429-38;and Jane Allyn Piliavinet al., EmergencyIntervention(New York:Aca-
demicPress, 1981).
41. Piliavin,EmergencyIntervention,pp. 196-97.
42. Nancy Eisenberg,Altruistic Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ:
LawrenceErlbaumAssociates, 1986).
43. See RobertCialdini,et al., "Transgressionand Altruism."These social psycho-
logical findingsare echoedby sociologicalwork on the presentationof "needycases" in
press accounts in the 1910s. See Donileen Loseke and KirstenFawcett, "Appealing
Appeals: ConstructingMoral Worthiness,1912-1917,"The Socological Quarterly,36
(Winter1995):61-77.

LeonardRay 395
tion of helpingbehavior,44and claim that empathizingwith a personin

need is a more powerfulmotive for helping than is the desireto avoid
personaldistress.Empathy,as used in the psychologicalliterature,is a
"vicariousemotion" resultingfrom an individual'sability to imagine
herselfin the placeof anotherindividual.This "role-taking"can be cog-
nitive, involving an understandingof the thoughts and intentions of
another, or affective, involvingemotions and feelings.45The claim that
empathyand personaldistressare distincthas been backedup by factor
analysisand experimentalwork. WhilePiliavinfinds that helpingbehav-
ior is impededby increasesin the cost of helping, Batson finds that the
influenceof cost dwindlesonce subjectsfeel empathyfor the recipientof
help.46
Empathy is in part a function of the perceivedsimilaritybetween
helperand the recipient.People aremore likelyto drawinferencesabout
the emotions and thoughts of others who seem similarto themselves.
Experimentalmanipulationsof empathyhave involved supplyingpro-
spectivehelperswith fictitiousinformationportrayingthe victim'sback-
groundand interestsas very similaror dissimilarto the backgroundand
interestsof the prospectivehelper. Higherperceivedsimilarityis associ-
ated with increasedemotional response to the victim, and thus with
increasedlikelihoodof helping. Personalcontact also increasesfeelings
of attachment,and thus of empathy. Accordingto Batson, increased
empathymay extend beyond the specific individualcontactedto other
individualsof the same type. "Such contact should encourageempathy
for membersof the outgroupin two ways. First, it should increasethe
likelihood of accuratelyperceivingthe other's needs-his or her hopes
and fears. Secondit should increasethe likelihoodof takingthe other's
perspective."47
Someresearchindicatesthat the effect of empathydependson the type
of altruisticbehaviorinvolved.Familiarityor similaritywith the person
or group being helpedappearsmost relevantto altruisticacts involving
low levels of sacrifice.More risky helping, such as emergencyinterven-
tion or the rescueof Jewsin Nazi Europe,does not appearrelatedto the
characteristicsof the victimsbeing helped.48
44. See Daniel Batson et al., "Distress and Empathy"; and Daniel Batson, TheAltruism
Question: Towards a Social Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1987).
45. Eisenberg, Altruistic Emotion, p. 102.
46. Batson, The Altruism Question.
47. Batson, The Altruism Question, p. 218.
48. Monroe, The Heart of Altruism, pp. 54, 168, 190.

396 WhyWe Give
StrategicInteractionII: Diffusion of Responsibility

One of the most interestingfindings from social psychologicalresearch
on helpingis the "bystandereffect." Experimentalresearchhas shown
that the time elapsingbefore attemptsat helpingaremade increaseswith
the numberof potentialhelpers.49This inverserelationshipbetweenthe
numberof witnessesand the time requiredto offer assistanceholds in
both emergencyand non-emergencysituations. Bibb Darley and John
Latin6,two of the first psychologiststo addressthis phenomenon,argue
that it is a resultof "diffusionof responsibility."Whenseveralbystand-
ers are perceivedto be present,pressureto intervenedoes not fall on any
one person. The responsibilityto help is experiencedand sharedby all
the bystanders."50The standard argument is that the obligation to
respondis experiencedcollectivelyand that each potentialhelperis wait-
ing for someoneelse to act, whichwould dischargethe collectiverespon-
sibility. This account is in many ways parallelto the collective action
problemin economics.
CaveatII: Bystandersas Cue Givers

Yet researchhas also shown that the bystandereffect can be overcome
even when a large numberof others is present.The effect disappearsif
the bystandersare believedto be incapableof helpingand is enhancedif
one of the bystandersseemsparticularlyqualifiedto renderassistance.5
The diffusion of responsibilitythesis holds that this variationin the by-
stander effect results from the greater temptation to pass along the
responsibilityfor acting to the apparentlybetter qualified bystander.
However, there are plausiblealternativeexplanationsfor these experi-
mental results. One is that subjectsare receivingcues about the appro-
priate responsefrom the action, or inaction, of the other personspres-
ent. That is, it is not the presenceof other bystandersper se, but their
49. See Bibb Latine and John Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He
Help? (New York: Meridith Corp., 1970); and Dennis Hurley and Ben P. Allen, "The
Effect of the Number of People Present in a Nonemergency Situation," The Journal of
Social Psychology, 92 (February 1974): 27-29.
50. Leonard Bickman, "The Effect of Another Bystander's Ability to Help on By-
stander Intervention in an Emergency," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7
(May 1971): 367-79, p. 368.
51. This is simulated experimentally by introducing a person dressed as security or
medical personnel into the helping scenario. Their presence dampens helping behavior.
Bibb Latine and Stephen Nida, "Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping,"
Psychological Bulletin, 89 (March 1981): 308-24, p. 318.

LeonardRay 397
failure to respond to the "victim," which impedes helping behavior.

Piliavinalludesto this possibility.52 If thereis some uncertaintyaboutthe
need to interveneand assist, an individualmay interpretthe inactionof
othersas a signthat assistanceis unnecessaryor improper.Conversely,if
other bystandershad actually helped, this would have signaledto the
individualthat they as well should help. Accordingto this interpretation
of the bystandereffect as a resultof cue giving, we would expecta posi-
tive relationshipbetweenperceivedgivingby othersand the donationsby
an individual.Alternatively,some researchindicatesthat the actions of
otherpotentialhelpershave no effect on altruisticbehavior,53thus chal-
lengingthe whole notion of a bystandereffect.
TheNegativeState Relief Model: A Null Hypothesis

Parallelto the debate on economics, some social psychologistsdo not
regardaltruismas other-interestedbehavior. Accordingto one alterna-
tive model, altruisticbehaviorin and of itself is a sourceof gratification.
"Implicitin the NegativeState Relief modelis a conceptionof the nature
of altruismas considerablymore selfishthan selfless. One who feels bad
acts charitablyin order to make himself feel better."54This model is
strikinglysimilarto the economic theory of "warm glow" giving men-
tioned earlier.
However,the negativestate reliefmodeloffers very few testableimpli-
cations. One implicationis that helpingbehavioris largelya functionof
people'semotionsof the moment.If the subjectwishesto cheerup, help-
ing someoneelse is a possiblemeansto that end.s5For the presentanaly-
sis, testing the version of the negativestate relief model would require
unobtainableinformationabout the mood of the respondentsat the time
they wereaskedto donate to the thirdworld. Thereare, however,other
implicationswhichcan be investigatedwith surveys.The model suggests
that helping is related to the mood of the helper, ratherthan to the
impactthe assistancehas on the recipient.If this is the case, donations
shouldbe unrelatedto the perceivedeffectivenessof givingas a meansto
improvingthe conditionof the ThirdWorld.
52. Piliavin, "Costs, Diffusion, and the Stigmatized Victim."

53. Monroe, The Heart of Altruism, p. 194.
54. Robert Cialdini, et al., "Transgression and Altruism."
55. See Baumann, et al., "Altruism as Hedonism."

398 Why We Give
IV. Hypotheses about Individual Donations to NGOs
Several hypotheses about individual decisions to donate to an inter-

national charity can be drawn from economic and social psychological
literatures. This section presents hypotheses about donors' motivations,
their reactions to the donations of others, and the impact of the cost and
perceived effectiveness of aid. These hypotheses will be tested using data
from a public opinion survey conducted in the Fall of 1983.56After each
hypothesis, the variables used to operationalize this hypothesis are
discussed.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first three hypotheses deal
with the factors that underlie the motives of donors. These hypotheses
attempt to explain the attitudes and beliefs that lead to "utility inter-
dependence" whether through moral duty, concern, or perceived mutual
self-interest. The remaining hypotheses deal directly with predictors of
donations to overseas charities. The three motives hypothesized to drive
donations were modeled both as independent variables driving dona-
tions, and as dependent variables caused by a number of the factors sug-
gested in the social psychological literature.
Hypothesis I: Self-Interest
The emphasis on self-interested motivations in the bulk of the economic
literature makes it imprudent to exclude a priori the possibility that
donations to non-governmental organizations are prompted by donors'
perceptions that aid is in their own self-interest. A reduction in third-
world poverty could increase first-world exports to the recipient country,
reduce pressures for immigration to the donor's country, and provide
first-world control over necessary resources located in the third world.
The measure of self-interest was based upon the response to the question
"Is it in our self interest to aid [the third world]?" A respondent's belief
that aid is in her self-interest was assumed to depend on any or all of four
factors: perceived trade with the third world, dependence upon the third
world for raw materials, possible economic competition from the third
world, and perceived impact of third world conditions upon the respon-
dent's nation. A control for information about the third world was also
included.
56. Respondents from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are included in the
analysis. Data were taken from Jacques Rene Rabier, Helene Riffault, and Ronald Ingle-
hart, Eurobarometer 20: Aid to Developing Nations, October 1983 [Machine Readable
Data File] 1st ICPSR ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research). Data from 1983 are used because the questions necessary for this analysis
were not included in more recent Eurobarometer surveys.

LeonardRay 399
HypothesisII: Moral Duty

A senseof moralduty providesanothermotivationto donateto overseas
charities.Drawingupon notions of complicityand "deservingness,"it
seemsreasonableto arguethat an individual'sopinionaboutthe causeof
third world poverty will affect her feeling of moral obligation. If resi-
dents of the thirdworldare held responsiblefor theirpoverty,or seen as
undeserving,feelings of moral obligation should be attenuated.Alter-
natively, if third world poverty is believed to be the result of actions
beyondthe control of populationsof developingnations, then the sense
of obligationshouldbe greater.The senseof obligationshouldbe accen-
tuated if the developednations are identifiedas a cause of third world
poverty. In this case, respondentswho are residentsof such nations
should have a correspondinglygreatersense of moral obligation.
Moraldutywas measuredby the responseto the question"Do we have
a moralduty to aid [thethirdworld]?"Perceived(un)deservingness was
tapped by the respondent'sopinion that the third world nations were
poor becausetheirpopulations"don't reallywantto work." First-world
culpabilityfor third-worldpoverty was capturedby responsesto two
questions, one blamingcurrentexploitationby developednations, and
the other pointingto legaciesof colonialism.
Hypothesis III: Concern

The third categoryof motivations suggestedby the literatureinvolves
feelingsof empathyor concernfor people in the third world. Increased
concernfor the problemsof people in the thirdworld should indicatea
propensityto see these problemsfrom the perspectiveof these people.
Concernshouldbe positivelyrelatedto informationlevelssinceincreased
information about the third world facilitates such perspectivetaking.
Two factorsthat are expectedto heightenconcernfor the thirdworldare
perceivedsimilarityand personalcontact.
Concernfor the problemsof the thirdworld was measuredby the fre-
quencywith whicha respondentclaimedto think about the problemsof
thirdworld countries.This frequencywas expectedto dependupon per-
ceived similaritymeasuredby culturaland historicalties with the third
world, and upon personal contact either with the third world, or with
individualsfrom third world nations.
HypothesisIV: CollectiveAction/Diffusion of Responsibility

Social-psychologicalfindings about "diffusion of responsibility"sug-
gest that individualswho believe that the third world alreadyreceives

400 Why We Give
assistance are likely to feel that their collective obligation is being met by
the donations of others. Economic models imply that the alleviation of
third-world poverty is a public good. Potential donors who derive
benefits from the donations of others are less likely to donate themselves.
Both of these accounts suggest that an individual's giving should be
inversely related to the perceived giving of other individuals or organiza-
tions. Two variables were included to tap the respondent's perceptions of
others' generosity: the number of aid sources (EEC, UN, business, the
respondent's government, etc.) mentioned by the respondent, and the
number of private organizations the respondent identified as working to
aid the third world. While a negative effect of these variables is predicted
by the collective action hypothesis, this effect could be attenuated if the
public goods nature of giving is offset by the provision of selective
incentives.
Hypothesis V: Cue Giving

The opposite prediction is offered by an interpretation of others' dona-
tions as a source of cues. If other individuals or organizations are seen to
give to overseas charities, the observer may conclude that the conditions
in the third world do warrant such aid, or that donation is somehow an
appropriate action. This hypothesis would predict that the greater the
number of individuals or organizations perceived to contribute to over-
seas aid, the greater the likelihood of individual giving. This suggests a
positive relationship between these variables and reported donations.
Hypothesis VI: Costs

The cost of giving should play a significant role in the decision to donate
if individuals make a rational calculation when they decide whether to
give to NGOs, as suggested by economic models and by Piliavin's cost
benefit model. There are several components to the cost of donating. The
most obvious is the monetary sacrifice involved. Other less tangible (and
less measurable) costs include the inconvenience of writing checks and
mailing in donations. If such giving is primarily empathetic, then costs
should have a much smaller impact on donations.
No direct estimate of the size of individual donations was available. As
an indirect measure of the cost of donation, information on the income
of the respondent was included. Income was measured in quartiles in
order to use a uniform scale in all three nations, eliminating the problems
of conversion between currencies. The respondent's marginal utility of
money is assumed to be a decreasing function of income, and as the

LeonardRay 401
marginalutility of money decreases,the effective cost of a donation of

any given amountdecreases.As a result, cost was presumedto decrease
as income increases.
Hypothesis VII: Instrumentality

The "warmglow" and negativestate relief models assertthat the act of
helping, not its result, motivatesaltruisticbehavior.If these models are
correct,then we should see little relationshipbetweendonationsand the
perceivedefficacy of private aid. Conversely, a positive relationship
would indicate that giving is instrumentalbehaviorintendedto ameli-
orate the situationof the recipient.
Two variableswere includedto capturethis effect. One measuredthe
respondent'sbelief that foreignaid could, in fact, havea positiveimpact
on conditionsin the third world. The second measurewas the respon-
dent's rankingof the effectivenessof privateaid comparedto various
types of official aid. If donations are instrumental,these variables
should have a positiverelationshipto reporteddonationsto privateaid
organizations.
Control Variables:
Religiosity, Ideology, Education, and Information
Variablesto control for effects of ideology, religiosity,and education
wereincludedin the analysis.Some past literaturesuggestsa relationship
between these characteristicsand donations. Researchinto rescuersof
Jewsin Nazi-occupiedEuropehas generallyfound that rescuerscamefor
a wide varietyof social backgrounds.57 However, Ribarand Wilhelm58
find a positive relationshipbetween both educationalattainmentand
"liberalism"(in the Americansenseof the term)and donationsto chari-
ties. More surprisingly,they also find a negative relationshipbetween
churchattendanceand giving. While these variableswill be includedin
the analysis as controls, there are reasons to expect them to have a
somewhatdifferentimpactin the presentanalysis.The meaningof ideol-
ogy certainlyvariesgreatlyfrom Europeto the U.S. The impactof religi-
osity may vary accordingto differencesin the type of NGOs in the three
nations studied.Whilemany Americanand BritishNGOs are secularor
nonsectarian,much Frenchand GermanNGO aid is channeledthrough
57. See Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The Altruistic Personality; and Monroe, The
Heart of Altruism.
58. Ribarand Wilhelm,"CharitableContributionsto OverseasDevelopment."

402 WhyWe Give
Catholicor Lutheranorganizations.59 As a resultreligiosityshould be a

more importantfactor in Franceand Germanythan in the UK.
A controlfor informationwas also includedin the regressionequation
predictingreporteddonations. It is reasonableto suppose that general
informationabout the ThirdWorldhas a positiveeffect on donations.In
addition, severalother independentvariablesare linked to information
levels. Informationlevels are predictorsof self-interest,moral duty, and
concern. Information is also associated with familiarity with NGO
organi7ations(the correlationbetweenthese measuresis a highlysignifi-
cant .20). By includinga control for informationlevels, we insurethat
the relationshipsreflected in the regression results are not spurious
resultsof the unmeasuredeffect of information.
V. Resultsand Evaluationsof Hypotheses

Four regressionequationswere estimatedto test these hypothesesabout
the motivationsand considerationsbehind charitabledonations. Mea-
sures of each of the three potential motivations-self interest, moral
obligation,and concernfor the thirdworld-were regressedon variables
hypothesizedto accentuateor attenuatethese motivations.Measuresof
these motivations were then used, along with contextual and control
variables,to predict a respondent'sreporteddonationsto overseasaid
organizations.60Because the number of significant cross-nationaldif-
ferencesin regressionparametersprecludedpooling observationsacross
nations, these equationswereestimatedseparatelyfor respondentsfrom
France, Germany,and the United Kingdom.
Determinantsof Motivationsfor Giving

Self Interest. Table I reports results of the regressionspredictinga
respondent'sperceptionthat providingaid is in theirself-interest.Of the
five variablesassumedto affect belief that aid is in the self-interestof the
developedworld, the importanceof the thirdworld as a tradingpartner
has the most consistent effect with a significant impact in all three
nations. A belief that life in the developed world will be affected by
59. Smille and Hemlich, Non Governmental Organizations.

60. The measures of moral duty, concern, and self-interest are all rough interval
measures with multiple response categories. Ordinary least-squares regression was
employed to analyze the determinants of these motivations. The measure of reported dona-
tions is dichotomous, respondents either donated or did not donate. Logit regression was
thus used for the analysis of reported donations.

Leonard Ray 403
Table I. Determinants of the Belief that Aid is in the Interest

of the Developed World
AID TO THIRDWORLD UNITED
IN SELFINTEREST FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
Impacton DevelopedWorld .161 .248*** .293***

(.074) (.108) (.168)
Fear of Competition -.075* k . 105** f.g -.075 uk
(-.085) (. 100) (-.074)
Importanceof Trade .072** .075*** .048*
(.126) (.184) (.113)
Need for Raw Materials .002 .038 .023
(.002) (.055) (.036)
Information .227** .117 .233*
(.104) (.053) (.106)
Intercept 2.879*** uk 2.209*** f,g 2.675*** uk
N 718 928 569

AdjustedR2 .03 .08 .08
Standardizedestimatesin parentheses.
*p < .05
**p <.01
***p < .001
f = coefficientsignificantlydifferent(p < .05) from Frenchsample
uk = coefficient
significantlydifferent(p < .05) from UnitedKingdomsample
g = coefficientsignificantlydifferent(p < .05) from Germansample
events in the third world has a significant positive effect in two nations,
and a moderate positive effect in the remaining nation. A similar pattern
is found for information levels. Perceived dependence on the third world
for raw materials has a trivial and insignificant effect in all three nations.
The most surprising result from this analysis is the disparate effect of the
perception that the third world is beginning to compete with the devel-
oped world. In France and Germany, this variable has the expected nega-
tive effect, presumably indicating the conflict of interest arising out of
competition. In the UK, perceived competition is related to increased
willingness to view aid in the self-interest of donors. An admittedly ad
hoc explanation of this effect is that increased competition could indicate
that aid is successful in improving the economic condition of the third
world.
The social psychological literature asserts that feelings of empathy are
distinct from feelings of guilt arising from a failure to live up to personal

404 Why We Give
Table I. Determinants of Belief in Moral Duty to Aid Third World

MORAL DUTY UNITED
TO AID THIRD WORLD FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
Colonial History .099** .120*** .139***

(.116) (.120) (.155)
Exploitation .082* uk,g .204***f .228***f
(.090) (.191) (.261)
Laziness -.197*** -.203*** -.240***
(-.223) (-.188) (-.244)
Cultural Ties .087** g .0348 -.045* uk,f
(.116) (.048) (-.073)
Personal Contact -.032 uk,g .085** f .063 f
(-.041) (.098) (.061)
Information .221** .118 .264***
(.101) (.046) (.120)
Religiosity .109 .260*** .174**
(.060) (.120) (.098)
Ideology -.014 -.004 .011
(-.032) (-.008) (.025)
I nr*** f ? AAI *d* f
Intercept 2.745*** uK` ...- .wi-
N 723 932 643

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p <.001
uk = coefficient
norms and perceived obligations. The rather modest correlations be-

tween our measures of moral duty and of concern offers some support
for this view (r= .26 in France and Germany, .35 in the United King-
dom). In an additional test of this hypothesis, measures of each motiva-
tion were regressed on all of the hypothesized determinants of both
motivations. A comparison of the coefficients and significance levels of
these otherwise identical regression equations reveals significant dif-
ferences in the determinants of each motivation.
Moral Obligation. The regression results (Table II) support the hypothe-
sis that feelings of moral obligation to aid the third world depend on

LeonardRay 405
respondents'perceptionsof the causes of third-worldpoverty. In the

regressionresults for all three nations, the perceptionthat third world
nations are poor becausetheirpopulations"don't reallywant to work"
has the strong negative effect expected. The combined effects of the
measures of external responsibilityfor third world poverty are even
larger,with the effect of presentexploitationloomingslightlylargerthan
that of past exploitation(the colonial legacy), in the UK and Germany,
whilethe two variableshave similareffects in France.Informationlevels
are also positivelyrelatedto feelingsof moralobligation,suggestingthat
the formation of such a feeling of obligation depends upon some
thresholdattentionlevel. Personalcontactand culturalties withthe third
worldwereexpectedto predictconcernratherthan moralobligation,and
their effects on moral obligation are relativelyweak and in most cases
insignificant.The control variablesof religiosityand ideology had very
differentimpacts. Religiositywas positivelyrelatedto a sense of moral
obligation, while ideology had no discernibleimpact.
Concernfor the Third World. Concern for the problemsof the third
world was expected to depend upon personal contact with the third
world, perceivedsimilarity(reflectedin culturalties to the thirdworld),
and exposureto the plightof the thirdworldthroughhigherinformation
levels. The regressionpredictingthis motivationis presentedin TableIII.
Personal contact and information did have the large positive effects
expected,with informationplayinga particularlylargerole in Germany.
Perceivedculturalties had a very modest and insignificantimpact. This
suggests that empathy arises more readily from familiaritythan from
similarity.Some of the causalattributionsabout thirdworldpovertydid
have significant effects, although these effects were smaller than the
effects of personalcontact or information.Religiosityagain had a posi-
tive impactin Franceand the UK, though not in Germany;ideologywas
insignificantexceptin the UK wheretherewas a weaklink betweenleft-
ism and concern.
The parallelregressionsof the measuresof moral obligationand con-
cernfor the thirdworldsupportthis viewthat thesearetwo distinctmoti-
vations.Whileconcernand moralobligationdo sharea numberof deter-
minants,the patternsamong these predictorsare quite different.Beliefs
about the causes of third world poverty play a more importantrole in
predictinga sense of moral obligationwhile personalcontact and infor-
mationweigh more heavilyon concernfor the plightof the thirdworld.

406 WhyWe Give
Table III. Determinantsof Concernfor the Third World

UNITED
CONCERN FOR THIRD WORLD FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
Colonial History .084* uk -.029 g .083 uk

(.086) (-.029) (.078)
Exploitation .098* .106** .092*
(.094) (.099) (.089)
Laziness -.105** -.106** -.063
(-.105) (-.098) (-.054)
CulturalTies .050 .055* -.004 h
(.059) (.079) (-.005)
PersonalContact .133*** .093*** g .209*** uk
(.150) (.107) (.172)
Information .282'** .382*** .611*** f
(.113) (.148) (.236)
Religiosity .268*** .390*** .076uk
(.128) (.182) (.037)
Ideology -.015 -.053** -.025
(-.030) (-.097) (-.047)
Intercept 1.930*** 2.210*** 1.587***
N 723 932 643

*p <.05
**p < .01
***p < .001
uk = coefficient
Determinantsof Giving
Motivations:HypothesesI, II, and III. The regressionpredictingre-
portedgivingto overseascharitiesallows us to determinethe impactand
importanceof each of these three motivations under discussion (see
TablesIV and V). The dependentvariablefor this analysiswas dichoto-
mous: respondentseither did or did not donate. This type of data
requiresthe use of logistic regressioninsteadof ordinaryleast squares.
The interpretationof logistic regressioncoefficients is not straightfor-
ward since the parametersindicatethe impact each of the independent
variableshas on an underlyingprobabilityfunction, ratherthan directly

Leonard Ray 407
Table IV. Determinants of Reported Donations to Charities
REPORTED DONATION UNITED

TO THIRD WORLD FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
Self Interest .337*** uk .072 f, .377*** uk

(.224) (.045) (.256)
Moral Duty .197* uk .446*** f .386***
(.133) (.320) (.267)
Concern .463*** B .357*** .183**f
(.365) (.262) (.149)
Other Aid Sources .052 .039 .064
(.053) (.030) (.060)
Number of PVOs .750* uk 2.864*** f,g .880* uk
(.112) (.321) (.138)
Private Aid Efficacy .254 .414** .155
(.078) (.144) (.059)
Futility -.031 -.014 9 -.470*** ukf
(-.024) (-.009) (-.333)
Information .276 .641*** .728*** f
(.087) (.184) (.229)
Religiosity .705*** ukg .115f .340** f
(.263) (.039) (.133)
Ideology .006 -.031 .081*
(.010) (-.041) (.128)
Income Quartile .1196 .206** .298*** f
(.088) (.147) (.249)
Education Level .0183 .0048 -.087** uk,f
(.037) (.006) (-.175)
Intercept -4.812*** 8 -4.448*** g -2.450*** ukf
% Predicted Correctly 73.1% 76.7% 73.9%

Distribution 45% 75% 56%
N 747 998 671
Adjusted R2 .03 .08 .08
Standardized estimates in parentheses.
*p <.05
**p < .01
***p <.001
f = coefficient
significantly different (p < .05) from French sample
uk = coefficient
significantly different (p < .05) from United Kingdom sample
s = coefficient significantly different (p < .05) from German
sample

408 Why We Give
Table V. Likelihood of Donating to Overseas Charities Given Each

Value on Moral Obligation, Concern, and Self Interest a
UNITED
FRANCE KINGDOM GERMANY
Value on Self Interest 1 .24 .55 .57

2 .31 .57 .66
3 .39 .58 .74
4 .47 .60 .81
Difference over Range +.23 +.05 +.24
Value on Moral Duty 1 .26 .78 .40

2 .29 .85 .50
3 .34 .90 .59
4 .38 .93 .68
Value on Concern for Third World 1 .41 .53 .36

2 .52 .62 .40
3 .64 .70 .44
4 .74 .77 .49
aBased on the hypothetical case where all other variables are set to their mean values.
on the dependent variable.61For ease of interpretation, Table V presents

the probability that a respondent reported a donation given each value
on the independent variables measuring moral obligation, concern, and
self-interest.
All three appear to be important motivations for donations. Moral
obligation and concern have large and significant effects in all of the
nations studied. Respondents who strongly agreed that the first world
has a duty to aid the third world were much more likely to donate than
were those who strongly disagreed about the existence of such a duty. In
the German sample, a change from strong disagreement to strong agree-
ment produced an increase of 28 percent in the probability of a respon-
dent donating. Concern for the third world had even stronger effects.
French respondents who voiced high concern for the problems of the
third world were almost twice as likely to donate as were those who
voiced no concern for the problems of the third world. Self-interest also
has a particularly strong effect in France and Germany, while it was
61. John Aldrich and Forrest Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984).

LeonardRay 409
almost irrelevantin the UK. A Britishrespondentwho stronglyagreed

that givingaid was in the interestof the developedworldwas only about
5 percent more likely to donate than a respondentwho strongly dis-
agreed. This cross-nationaldifferencemay result from the lower likeli-
hood of Britishrespondentsto reportthat givingaid to the thirdworldis
in their self-interest(see interceptsin Table I). The impactof perceived
self-interestin Franceand Germanyis somewhatsurprising.However,
despitethe relevanceof self interest,thereis no indicationof a collective
action problemat work here.
StrategicInteractionand Cue Giving:HypothesisIV versusHypothesis

V. These regressionresultspermittesting the impact of strategicinter-
action among potentialdonors. The cue-givinghypothesispredictsthat
the numberof organizationsand institutionsperceivedto be providing
aid should be positivelyrelatedto actual donationswhile the collective
action thesis predictsa moderatenegativeeffect of the numberof per-
ceived donors.
The results clearly contradictthe collective action and diffusion of
responsibilityhypotheses. Awarenessof other aid sources and of the
numberof NGOs did not have a negative impact in any of the three
nations. The implicationis that donationsto NGOsdo not suffer froma
collectiveaction problem.The social psychologicaltheoryof "diffusion
of responsibility"is likewise unsupported.Diffusion of responsibility
suggests consistent negative effects instead of the pattern of positive
effects revealed in the data. There are two major reasons why these
theoriesmay not hold. PVO givingmay providemoreprivatethanpublic
benefits. Donorsmay receiveprivategoods eitherin the form of selective
incentivesor internalpsychic benefits which by themselvesoffset the
costs of donating.Alternatively,the relief of third world sufferingmay
be a publicgood, but donorsare moreconcernedwith questionsof moral
obligationand fairnessthan with rationalcalculationsof the benefitsof
free riding.62
The only account of possible strategicinteractionbetween potential
donors supportedby these resultsis the interpretationof donations by
others as a source of cues that encouragedonation. The number of
NGOs believedto be helpingthe thirdworld had a significantand posi-
62. An account of experimental work relating concerns with "fairness" to free riding
behavior, see Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, "Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone
Else?" On the limitations of rational choice as a normative paradigm see Michael
McIntyre, "Altruism, Collective Action, and Rationality: The Case of Le Chambon,"
Polity, 27 (Summer 1995): 537-57.

410 Why We Give
tive effect on donations in all three nations, an effect that was particular-
ly strong in the UK. This effect is all the more striking since a control for
the impact of information about the third world has already been
included in the model.
Costs: Hypothesis VI. The measure of the costs of donations had a sig-
nificant effect on reported giving in the UK and in Germany. Admittedly,
this variable was far from an exact measure of cost. The amount of
giving may vary widely across respondents, and the present operation-
alization tapped the income elasticity of charity as much as it did direct
costs. However, the cost of donating does appear to have deterred giving
in some cases.
The Instrumentality of Aid: Hypothesis VII. The data generally contra-

dict the negative state relief model suggestion that the impact the
behavior has on the condition of the recipient is not a consideration for
donors. The belief that private aid is particularly effective is positively
associated with donations, while the belief that any aid is futile is nega-
tively associated with donations. However, these effects are weak, and
they are only statistically significant in the British and German surveys.
Since measures of the efficacy or futility of aid do affect giving, dona-
tions seem to be an instrumental behavior, not simply the ego booster
described by the negative state relief model. However, there are a number
of respondents whose donations were not accurately predicted by the
model. We cannot rule out the negative state relief model or warm glow
giving as explanations for their behavior.
Controls: Religiosity, Ideology, Education and Information. An analysis

of donations to overseas charities in American states indicated that
church membership was negatively related to giving. 63 The present analy-
sis actually finds very strong positive effects of religiosity in France and
Germany. The effect in the UK is much weaker, and not statistically sig-
nificant. This cross-national difference may result from the structure of
overseas charities in the three nations. In Germany, fully two-thirds of
donations to overseas charities are funneled through church-based
organizations. The French pattern is similar, with Catholic organizations
providing a large proportion of private aid. In the UK, many relief and
development charities have long shed their religious affiliations. These
institutional differences are mirrored by patterns of donations among the
general population.
63. Ribar and Wilhelm, "Charitable Contributions."

Leonard Ray 411
Ideology has a small impact in Germany where rightist self-placement

is weakly related to donation to overseas charities. This is the inverse of
the American pattern where leftist (liberal) ideology was found to cor-
relate with donations. 6 The meaning of the left-right ideological scale is,
however, somewhat different in the two nations. There are no ideology
effects in either France or the UK.
Education was found to be positively associated with donations in the
American context. The present analysis finds no systematic relationship
between education and donations for France and the UK. For Germany,
the relationship is actually negative. As years of schooling increase, the
propensity to donate decreases.
As expected, information about the third world was positively associ-
ated with donations in the UK and Germany. In France the effect was
positive, but quite weak. The overall (indirect) impact of information
levels was, however, much higher than these regression parameters
would suggest, since much of the effect of information is mediated
through self-interest, moral duty, and concern for the third world.
One final observation concerns the overall effectiveness of these
models in predicating reported donations. Predictive power in a logistic
regression cannot be measured as the proportion of variance explained
(RZ).Instead, one can compare the predictive accuracy of the model with
the accuracy of a null model. For example, in France, 45 percent of
respondents reported donating. If for every respondent we were to
simply guess that individuals did not donate, we would be correct for 55
percent of the respondents. The model predicts correctly 73 percent of
the cases in France, a marked improvement over guessing. Results are
similarly good for Germany. In the UK, where 75 percent of respondents
reported donating, the model is far less useful, correctly predicting only
about 77 percent of the cases for an overall increase in accuracy of only
17 respondents. This striking difference may also be a function of the
structure of British overseas charities. If these secular charities are
soliciting the bulk of their donations through televised appeals rather
than institutional links (as would be the case for religious organizations)
then British donations may correspond more to the negative state relief
model. If individuals are donating in order to quell their unease after a
televised appeal, then their behavior will be far less predictable.
64. Ribar and Wilhelm, "Charitable Contributions."

412 WhyWe Give
VI. Conclusion
Both the social psychologicaland economic literaturessuggest useful
hypotheses about the determinantsof monetarycontributions.Moral
obligation and concern were powerful and consistent motivations of
donations. Somewhatunexpectedly,perceivedself-interestalso played
an importantrole in motivating donations. The findings account for
variationin the strengthof these motivationsas well. Notions of deserv-
ingnessand responsibilityare systematicallyassociatedwith feelings of
moral obligationwhileconcernfor otherstendsto dependmore on feel-
ings of solidarityand directcontacts. Informationand an awarenessof
tradelinks with the thirdworld were importantcausesof the belief that
aid is in the self-interestof the developedworld. If altruisticbehaviorcan
be motivatedby a combinationof perceivedself-interestand moral or
empatheticconcerns, then any simple dichotomous categorizationof
behavioras either "egoistic" or "altruistic"may distortthe complexity
and varietyof human motivations.
The analysis here also shows that other-interestedaction involves
rationalselectionof efficient meansto attaingoals. The perceivedeffec-
tivenessof aid in general,or of privateaid in particular,stronglyinflu-
encesan individual'spropensityto donateor supportaid. Onemustcon-
cludethat manyrespondentstake a consequentialistview of theirobliga-
tion to aid the thirdworld. This findingjustifies the emphasis,found in
many aid appeals, on the use of donated funds to make demonstrable
improvementsin the lives of recipients.
Finally, the interactionof individualsdepartsmarkedlyfrom tradi-
tional models. Actors in a theoreticalworld of complete information
may attempt to predictone another'sbehavior and exploit it through
such responses as free riding. In our uncertainworld, the actions of
othersseem to serveas cues to guide behaviorratherthan be regardedas
strategiesto be counteracted.Socialpsychologicaltheoriesof the "diffu-
sion of responsibility"portray individualsas calculatingeconomizers
minimizing effort spent helping others. Instead, individuals may
economizeon attentionand cognitiveenergy,reactingto a situationby
emulatingthe responsesof others. This suggeststhe need to reevaluate
theoriesof the strategicinteractionsbetweenindividuals.In the absence
of perfect information,a standard"rationalchoice" account of indi-
vidual behaviorthat ignoresthe social constructionof individual'scog-
nitive environmentis at best incomplete.
These findingssuggestthat organizationswhich solicit and distribute
overseasaid shouldemploycognitiveas well as emotionalappeals.Infor-
mation and beliefs about the causes of the needs of others are strongly
relatedto concernand moral obligation, and in turn to increaseddona-

Leonard Ray 413
tions and support for aid. The idea that donors also benefit from aid
deserves greater stress. Aid appeals that focus only on guilt or flattery,
and not on education about the causes of poverty or the benefits of aid,
are ignoring important factors that increase our willingness to aid those
in need.
Appendix: Survey Instruments

This is the text of the Eurobarometer survey instruments used in this
paper.
DependentVariable
ReportedDonations:
Q.236 Have you, duringthe last coupleof years,givenhelp to an organization
concernedwith the Third World by giving money or help in another
way?
1. Yes 2. Noa
Motivations
MoralObligation:
Q.219 We have a moralduty to help them. b
Self Interest:
Q.221 It is in our own interestto help them. b
Concern:
Q.177 How muchhaveyou thoughtaboutthe problemsof poorcountriessuch
as those in Africa, South America, Asia, before? Have you thought
about them a lot, quite a lot, a little, or almostnever. (Responseswere
recodedto rangefrom 0= almostneverto 4 = quite a lot.)
Determinantsof Motivations:Moral Obligationand/or Concern

ColonialHistory:
Q.211 In formertimes the fact that they werecolonies held back their devel-
opment.b
Exploitation:
Q.212 They areexploitedby the developedcountriessuch as our own. b
Laziness:
Q.213 They do not reallywantto work. b
CulturalTies:
Q.174 Here is a list of differentregionsof the world. Whichamongthem do
you think are . . those with whom we have historical and cultural
links? c

414 Why We Give
Personal Contact:
Q.227 Besides what you have been able to read in the newspapers or see on
television, what personal experience have you had of Third World coun-
tries? (Respondents were scored 1 point for each form of personal con-
tact mentioned.)
Information Level:
Q.178 Have you recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio, or on
T.V. anything about Third World countries?
1. Yes 2. Noa
Determinants of Motivations: Self Interest

Impact on Developed World:
Q.230 Do you feel that in the next ten or fifteen years, what happens in the
Third World countries, their political situation, their economies, their
population growth will in some way affect our lives in (country)? b
Importance of Trade:
Q. 172 Here is a list of different regions of the world. Which among them do
you think are ... those with which it is worthwhile for us to trade? c
Raw Materials Dependence:
Q.176 Here is a list of different regions of the world. Which among them do
you think are ... those who possess raw materials which are essential to
our economy? c
Fear of Competition:
Q.218 They are beginning to compete with us with their own products. b
Contextual Variables
Number of NGOs Helping:
Q.239 Here is a list of organizations whose aim is to provide help for Third
World countries. Which among these have you heard about? (Respon-
dent was scored 1 point for each organization known.)
Number of Aid Sources:
Q.231 As far as you know, do the Third World countries receive help ...
-from (your country government)
-from the European Community
-from interational organizations like the United Nations
-via business and industrial investments
-from voluntary organizations
(Respondents were scored 1 point for each source named.)
Relative Efficacy of Private Aid:
Q.233 Of these five [aid sources listed in Q.231 above], which one do you think
gives the most useful help to these countries?
Futility of Aid:
Q.222 No matter what is done to help them they will never succeed in escaping
from a situation of poverty. b

Leonard Ray 415
IncomeQuartile:
Q.272b Respondent'sfamilyincome,recodedinto quartiles.1= lowestquartile,
4= highestquartile.d
Religiosity:
Q.258 Independentlyof whetheryou go to churchor not, would you say you
are ...
1. A religiousperson
2. Not a religiousperson
3. A convincedatheiste
Ideology:
Q.255 In politicalmatters,people talk of "the left" and "the right." How
wouldyou place your viewson this scale? 1 = left, 10= right.
Education:
Q.261 How old wereyou whenyou finishedyour full-timeeducation?
aResponseswererecodedso that yes/agree= 1, no/not agree=0.

t'hese questionswere part of a suite of questionswith the following preface:"Many
thingsweresaid and heardabout ThirdWorldcountries.For eachof the followingstate-
ments,wouldyou like to tell me if you agreecompletely,agreeto some extent,disagreeto
some extent, or disagree completely." Responseswere recoded so that larger values
reflectedgreateragreement.
CRespondents werescored1 pointeach for SouthAmerica,Africa,India/Pakistan,South-
east Asia, China, MiddleEast.
dRespondentsrefusingto respondto this questionwereassignedthe meanvalueof 2.5.
eResponsesrecodedso that religiouspersonsscore 1, all othersscore0.


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Northeastern Political Science Association

Why We Give: Testing Economic and Social Psychological Accounts of Altruism

This content downloaded from 27.251.198.2 on Sat, 30 Nov 2013 04:03:32 AM

Altruisticbehaviorposes a challengeto prevailingmodels of individu-

LeonardRay is a Professor of Political Scienceat Binghamton

Polity Volume XXX, Number3 Spring 1998

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"Private foreign aid," aid provided by non-governmental organizations

Generally, voluntary agencies have little accurate information

1. OECD Development Assistance Committee, Development Co-operation: Efforts

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The "enlightened guesses" made by NGOs tend to focus on either posi-

7. Lissner,ThePolitics of Altruism,p. 131.

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being of an "other" has been the defining mark of altruism in much of

This content downloaded from 27.251.198.2 on Sat, 30 Nov 2013 04:03:32 AM

thropists somewhere in the middle with their "quasi-altruistic" behavior.

19. Alfie Kohn, TheBrighterSide of HumanNature:Altruismand Empathyin Every-

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validity refers to the applicability of research findings to individuals not

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economic actors. Social psychology has devoted much of its attention to

II. Economic Accounts of Giving

Altruism may seem difficult to reconcile with traditional economic ac-

Altruism as Narrow Self Interest

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Altruism as Other-Interested Behavior

If altruistic behavior cannot be reinterpreted as self-interested, then self-

27. See Louis M. Imbeau, Donor Aid-The Determinants of Development Allocations

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analysis to explore the implications of various assumptions about utility

The Strategic Dilemma I: The Collective Action Problem

Both economic approaches presented above-uncovering egoistic bene-

Private voluntary transfers are efficient as long as there are only

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ticipation, might decide not to contribute (taking a free ride at the

Caveat I: Aid as a Private Good

While the well-being of individuals in poor countries may be a public

33. Arthur Blaser, "Developmentand the PVO: Incentivesfor Participation,"in

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about factors that impede or encourage charitable contributions, it is

m. Social Psychology and Helping Behavior

There is a sizable literature on helping behavior in the field of social

Psychological Accounts of Helping

38. For a discussionof this approachsee JeffreyObler, "PrivateGivingin the Welfare

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Research focusing on the role of personal norms holds that individuals

39. See ShalomH. Schwartz,"NormativeInfluenceson Altruism,"Advancesin Social

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tion of helpingbehavior,44and claim that empathizingwith a personin

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StrategicInteractionII: Diffusion of Responsibility

CaveatII: Bystandersas Cue Givers

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failure to respond to the "victim," which impedes helping behavior.

TheNegativeState Relief Model: A Null Hypothesis

52. Piliavin, "Costs, Diffusion, and the Stigmatized Victim."

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IV. Hypotheses about Individual Donations to NGOs

Several hypotheses about individual decisions to donate to an inter-

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HypothesisII: Moral Duty

Hypothesis III: Concern

HypothesisIV: CollectiveAction/Diffusion of Responsibility

Impacton DevelopedWorld .161 .248* .293*

Colonial History .099 .120* .139***

Self Interest .337* uk .072 f, .377* uk