PEOPLE vs GOZO [53 SCRA 476] (G.R. No. L-36409) Oct.
26, 1973Principle of second from the express provisions of the treaty."Thus, the Philippine jurisdictional
Sovereignty as Auto-LimitationFacts:
Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales,convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales,
requiring a permit from themunicipal mayor for the construction or erection of a
building, as well as any modification,alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She
questions its validity, or at the very least, itsapplicability to her, by invoking due
process citing the case of
People v. Fajardo
. She contendthat her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the
American armed forceslocated inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of OlongapoCity and therefore shall be exempted from the
Municipal Ordinance No. 14.
Issue:
WON the property of the Appellant shall be exmpeted from the application of the
MunicipalOrdinance.
Ruling:
Yes. The appellant’s contention
that because her property was located within the naval baseleased to the American
armed forces located inside the United States Naval Reservation, shemust be
entitled of the exemption from complying with the ordanance was given no
merit.Though the property yielded within the Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine
that thePhilippines still possesses the sovereignty over that area
– approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
given the record that it is still a partof its territory. Thus, it can still enforce its
administrative jurisdiction by virtue of its governmentinstrumetalities which the
people sojourning to that territory must always adhere andrespect.Citing the case of
Reagan vs CIR it states that,
“By the Agreement, it should be noted,
the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction incertain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency.The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of thePhilippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but notexclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictionalrights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
right might be diminished but will never disappear. Thismanifests
the principle of Sovereignty as auto-limitation
, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence."WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969
is affirmed insofar as it found theaccused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.14, series of 1964 and sentencing her
to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency, and
modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is thesubject matter
of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of thisdecision
within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will
thatportion of the appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against
the accused.
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case
3010 final for lack of an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The
project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5
lots denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July
31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge
Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares
and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc.
Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The
Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for
violating the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article
14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints
filed against Asuncion.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts
unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs.
When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the
finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and
his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer
the subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US
and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which
sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated
because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act
of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that
the public officers cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or
intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn
on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd
parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge
realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF: AN RE! HAR"E#, JOHN SHERMAN $n% A RIAAN "AN E& E&SHOUT,
petitioners, vs.
HONORAB&E COMMISSIONER MIRIAM EFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AN EPORTATION,
respondent.
In February 1988 agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
apprehended the accused in their residences by virture of Mission Order issued by
then Commission Miriam Defensor Santiago. he three accused !ere among the
""suspected a#ien pedophi#es$ 1% opted for se#f deportation !hi#e the others !ere
re#eased due to #ac& of evidence. On#y the three accused have chose to face the
deportation proceedings.During the raid$ 'ndre! (arvey !as foud to be !ith t!o young
boys$ )ichard !as !ith t!o na&ed boys inside the room !hi#e *an De# +shout admitted
that the t!o chi#dren have been in his care and #ive,in for -uite sometime.In March
1988 deportation proceedings !ere constituted for their being undesirab#e a#ien.
Subse-uent#y$ !arrants of arrest !ere issued by Commissioner Santiago against the
three accused for vio#ation of Section %$ /0 and / of the Imigration 'ct and Sec
9 of the 'dministrative 'ct. he three accused then 2#ed petition for bai# !hich !as
denied by the Commissioner. his resu#ted to the 2#ing for petition for !rit of
habeas corpus and cha##enging the authority of the Commissioner to issue !arrant
and detain the three accused pending the determination of the probab#e cause
Issue:
3hether or not the !arrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner is va#id 4
Held:
5es the !arrant issued by the Commissioner of Immigration is va#id. Section % of
the Immigration 6a! empo!ers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue !arrants for
the arrest of overstaying a#iens is constitutiona#. he re-uirement of probab#e
cause$ to be determined by the 7udge$ does not e tend to deportation
proceedings. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character$ summary in
nature and need not be conducted strict#y in accordance !ith the ordinary court
proceedings. It is essentia# ho!ever$ that the !arrant issued by the Commissioner
sha## give the a#ien su cient information about the charges$ re#ating the facts
re#ied upon. Denia# of the commission to grant bai# is a#so in order since in
deportation proceedings$ the right to bai#s is not a matter of right but a discretion
on the part of the Commissioner of Immigartaion. he deportation proceedings do
not parta&e the nature of a crimina# action$ the constitutiona# guarantee to bai#
may not be invo&ed against a#iens in the deportation proceedings