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[G.R. No. 46039. August 30, 1938.

]
ELIAS ESGUERRA, Petitioner, v. SIXTO DE LA COSTA,
FACTS:
3 information were filed 3 times against the accused for crimes of Chasity.
The first filing was dismissed due to the reason that it was filed by a wrong party or in this case was the
chief of police of Cainta Rizal. The second filing was also dismissed when The judge presiding over the
Court of First Instance directed preliminary questions to be offended party Luzonica Zapanta and the latter
stated that she was more than seventeen years but less than eighteen. In view thereof, the judge
dismissed the case and canceled the bond posted by the petitioner, with the costs de oficio. According to
the order, the dismissal by the judge was based upon the doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeals in
People v. Cosme Mapotol published in the Official Gazette of May 20, 1937. A 3rd information was filed,
with the same offense of abuse of chastity defined and punished by article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was in this last case where counsel for the petitioner answered in writing that the latter is in double
jeopardy and asked for the dismissal of the case because the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
a speedy trial and was the victim of malicious and arbitrary persecution. By order of November 15, 1937
the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and this denial brought about the present petition.
Accused invoke the presence of Double Jeopardy and right to Speedy Trial, as he was already pleaded not
guilty in the second filing and the case was dismissed.

Issue:
Won the Petitioner is Correct

Ruling:

Yes, his contentions are tenable

The petitioner had already made his plea of "not guilty" to the complaint as well as to the information
filed by the fiscal in the Court of First Instance based upon said complaint, wherefore, upon the dismissal
of criminal case No. 10198 by the Court of First Instance, upon the ground that the complaint was
defective because signed by the father of the offended party and to by the latter, the petitioner was
placed in jeopardy and he can not again be prosecuted for the same facts constituting the same offense.
The Solicitor-General alleges that the order of dismissal is null and void because it was entered by the
court motu proprio without any motion from any of the parties. We do not believe that this circumstance
alters the legal effects of the order of dismissal. The fact is that the case was dismissed without the
petitioner’s consent, after a valid and sufficient complaint was filed which conferred jurisdiction upon the
court and before final judgment was entered therein

Article III, section 1, No. 17, of the Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused is
entitled to have a speedy and public trial. If the petitioner was indeed guilty of the offense imputed to
him, he was at any rate entitled to a prompt and public trial free from arbitrary and vexatious delays. It
has been repeatedly held that there is a positive remedy for cases of violation of the constitutional right
of the accused to a speedy trial. An accused who is deprived of his fundamental right to be tried promptly
is entitled to ask that he be released, if detained, or that the case against him be finally dismissed.
PEOPLE VS SALICO

84 PHIL 722

FACTS

This an appeal by the provincial fiscal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros
which, upon the petition of the defendant before the latter has presented his evidence, dismissed the
criminal action against the defendant charged with homicide on the ground that the fiscal was not able
to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or that the town
or municipality of Victorias in which it was committed is within the Province of Negros Occidental.

the lower court erred in not taking judicial notice as it ought to of the political subdivisions or
municipalities of the Province of Occidental Negros, that is, that the municipality or town of Victorias was
within that province, and therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros. Juan Jardiman, the principal witness for the prosecution.

ISSUE

Whether this appeal would place the defendant in double jeopardy.

RULING

NO. IT DOES NOT

By the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in
jeopardy

Section 9, Rule 1138 basically states that when a defendant when a defendant has been convicted or
acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, upon
a valid complaint or information by a court of competent jurisdiction and after he has pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. But when the case id dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action
in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason
that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.

The appeal by the prosecution in the present case would not place the defendant in double jeopardy. As
a necessary corollary of the above conclusion that the defendant not been in jeopardy in the court below,
because the case was dismissed upon the defendant's own motion, this appeal by the prosecution would
not place the defendant in double jeopardy, since a person who has not been once, cannot be put twice
in jeopardy.

DISMISSED
PEOPLE VS DECLARO

170 SCRA 143

FACTS:

As a result of a traffic accident that occurred at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 7, 1980 at
Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan, Edgar lbabao was charged for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in a complaint that was filed on September 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit
Court of Malinao, Aklan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1028-N wherein a certain Crispin
Conanan was the offended party. On October 1, 1980, an information for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence was filed against the same accused in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1421 with one Eduardo Salido as the offended party. This second case arose
from the same incident.

Upon the arraignment of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1028-N before the inferior court on October 7,
1981, he entered a plea of not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. Both the
offended party and the prosecuting fiscal, however, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice. Counsel for the accused thus verbally moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of interest on
the part of the prosecution. This motion was granted. A motion for reconsideration of the said order was
filed by the fiscal on January 27, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order dated May
27, 1983. The case was, therefore, set for trial. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused, the inferior court issued another order dated August 30, 1983, dismissing the case anew.

Thus, this petition filed by the private prosecutor with the conformity of the provincial fiscal. The
petitioner assails the order of dismissal dated March 23, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 1421. Petitioner argues
that double jeopardy has not set-in in this case

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy

RULING:

No. The dismissal is with consent of the accused, hence a waiver of his right against double jeopardy. In
the present case, the accused was duly notified that the case was set for hearing on January 19, 1983. On
said date of hearing neither the complainant nor the fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first
date of hearing after arraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have
instead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in court

It has been held in numerous cases that dismissal is equivalent to acquittal only if grounded on
insufficiency of evidence or denial of speedy trial which is not in this case. The dismissal in the first case
was grounded on lack of interest on part of the prosecution, thus, it is not equivalent to acquittal, and
such dismissal was with express consent of the accused, hence, the second case cannot fall under double
jeopardy. In the first place, the court should have not dismissed the first case as the failure of the
prosecution to appear only happened once. The court should have given them another day in court as
how the accused is given the opportunity to be heard.
GARCIA VS DOMINGO

53 SCRA 143

Facts:

In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon
Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.

The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial even on Saturday on the
chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request.(as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many
cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).

On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner judge order should be
reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.

Held:

Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.

There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants
the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public
morals."

It does not transgress the right of the accused to PUBLIC TRIAL when it was held in the chamber of the
judge as there is no showing that public was excluded. Also, as opined by J.Black in his masterly case,
requirement for public trial is satisfied if the accused could have his friends, relatives and counsel present
at the trial. Hence, right to public trial was not violated in this case. And even if to consider it in violation
of their right to public trial, as held in another case by the SC, if accused offered no objection to it during
trial, his right is deemed waived.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .


OZAETA VS CA

179 SCRA 800

FACTS:

In an action for damages arising from alleged infringement of patent, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City rendered a decision requiring petitioner to pay private respondent P200,000.00 for actual damages,
P50,000.00 exemplary damages, P10,000.00 attorney’s fees plus the costs of the suit.

Petitioner appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals, and when petitioner was required to file the brief,
on June 5, 1987 he filed a motion for extension of time to file brief in the said Court and this was granted
in a resolution dated June 18, 1987 giving him a period of sixty (60) days from June 5, 1987 or until August
4, 1987 within which to file his brief.

In a resolution dated July 30, 1987, private respondent was required to file its comment to the motion
within ten (10) days from notice. Said comment was filed on August 29, 1987 to which petitioner filed a
counter-comment and private respondent was required to file a reply.

On January 27, 1988 a resolution was issued by the appellate court denying the motion to suspend
proceedings, a copy of which appears to have been received by petitioner on January 30, 1988. A motion
for reconsideration dated February 15, 1988 was filed by petitioner to which an opposition was filed by
private Respondent. On March 7, 1988 the motion was denied, copy of said resolution was received by
petitioner on March 11, 1988. On March 15, 1988 petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30)
days within which to file brief on the ground that counsel is practising alone and he had other cases to
attend to. This was denied in a resolution dated March 22, 1988. A motion for reconsideration thereof
was filed by petitioner. On April 13, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to admit appellant’s brief attaching the
same to the motion. On April 18, 1988 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner
to file the brief on time and denied the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 22,
1988. A copy of said resolution was received by petitioner on April 21, 1988 on which date private
respondent filed a manifestation and motion to strike out the motion to admit brief and the attached brief
in the same case.

Petitioner then filed on April 22, 1988 an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated April
18, 1988. The motion to admit brief of petitioner was denied in a resolution dated April 22, 1988. On May
5, 1988 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s omnibus motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering the appealed judgment final and executory for
failure of petitioner to file the appellant’s brief within the required time.

RULING:

NO. The petition is devoid of merit.


From the foregoing set of facts there can be no question that petitioner and his counsel were grossly
negligent. Knowing that the period within which to file the brief was to expire on August 4, 1987, they
should have filed a motion for extension of time within which to file the brief or a suspension of time
within which to file the same pending resolution of the motion to suspend the proceedings in the case.
However, instead of taking any of these steps they assumed that the filing of the motion to suspend
proceedings automatically suspended the running of the period within which to file the brief, an
assumption that is not supported by the Rules or any other authority.

The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More so in this case where petitioner
not only neglected to file the appellant’s brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an
extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
MACALI VS REVILLA AND OCAMPO
48 PHIL 751
FACTS

This is a proceeding instituted by Arsenio Macali against the Honorable Eulogio P. Revilla, Judge of First
Instance of Bulacan, Buenaventura Ocampo, in which he prays that an order of mandamus be issued
ordering the respondent judge to allow the appeal filed by the petitioner on December 1, 1925, and to
forward to this court the record of criminal case No. 4438, People of the Philippine Islands vs. Arsenio
Macali, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for a review of the judgment entered therein.
The respondents, in answer to the complaint, admit all the facts therein set forth and as a special defense
allege that the petitioner had waived his right to appeal and had began to serve his sentence surrendering
himself to proper authorities for the execution of the judgment and stamping his thumb mark on the order
of commitment of his person to the Director of Prisons. The bare facts resulting from the pleadings and
from the oral argument of counsel for both parties are the following: October 29, 1924, the respondent
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance of said province a complaint against the
herein petitioner Arsenio Macali, accusing him of the crime of murder. On November 18, 1925 the said
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan after obtaining the permission of the court amended the said complaint
changing the crime of murder for that of homicide. On being arrainged upon the amended information
on November 18, 1925 and at the suggestion of his attorney petitioner pleaded guilty. Immediately
thereafter the respondent judge, Honorable Eulogio P. Revilla, rendered judgment sentencing the
petitioner to seventeen years four months and one day reclusion temporal with the accessories of the law
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency on account of the nature of the principal penalty, ; but when dealing with an ignorant person
without the lest amount of education as the herein petitioner who at the mere suggestion of his attorney
pleads guilty to a grave crime, such as homicide and waives his right to appeal from a judgment whereby
he is sentenced to suffer the afflictive penalty
Issue:

w/o accused waived his right to appeal

ruling:

No it does not
The waiver of the right to appeal like the plea of guilty must be voluntary that is to say the accused must
understand the significance and the meaning of his act, as also the consequences deriving therefrom. If
in pleading guilty to a grave crime such as homicide, in waiving his right to appeal from a heavy sentence,
such as one depriving him of his liberty for seventeen years, four months and one day, and ordering him
to pay an indemnity of P1,000, in surrendering himself to the authorities because he could not find
bondsman and in stamping his thumb mark in the order of mittimus, the herein petitioner did so, without
knowing the full significance nor the meaning and consequences of such acts, due to his ignorance and
lack of instruction, it cannot properly be said that he voluntarily renounced his right to appeal, and that
he submitted himself voluntarily to serve the sentence imposed upon him; wherefore the said judgment
did not become final and subject to execution and since the fifteen days fixed by law for perfecting an
appeal in criminal cases had not elapsed, the trial court has jurisdiction to admit the appeal filed by the
petitioner.However as the petitioner has pleaded guilty and was sentenced without any trial, this court
cannot review his case.
People vs ang gioc
75 phil 366

FACTS
Respondent Ang Gioc, with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of
frustrated murder in the CFI of Manila. respondent was released on bail. After a protracted trial, Ang Gioc
and Sio Go, were found guilty and Sentence to 12 years and one day of cadena temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,100.
Respondent and his sureties were notified to appear before the court on March 28, 1928, for the reading
of the sentence. But because of respondent’s failure to appear, the trial judge ordered his arrest and the
confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release.

The order of arrest could not be served because RESP had, allegedly, escaped to China. Bondsmen were
given 4 months to locate RESP, but failed. Between 1928 and 1941 several warrants were issued for RESP’s
arrest, but all attempts to arrest him proved futile because he could not be found.
nearly thirteen years from the date fixed for the reading of the sentence, he was arrested. He was brought
before the court and the sentence was read to him and later appealed to the Court of Appeals. RESP was
allowed to file a bond for his temporary release.n perfecting the record on appeal, it was found that the
stenographic notes taken during the trial were not transcribed and that the two stenographers who took
the notes were already dead. Other stenographers could not transcribe the notes because the deceased
had used systems known only to themselves.
Respondent petitioned the CA to remand the cause to the court below for a new trial. SolGen moved for
the dismissal of the appeal. CA decided to remand the case to the court below for a new trial. From the
affidavits and other documents submitted by RESP in support of the petition for bail pending the appeal,
it appeared that Ang Gioc was not a fugitive from justice.

ISSUE
WON CA had jurisdiction to remand the case for a new trial?

NO, The accused has the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a
constitutional, right.

All these rights (constitutional and statutory rights) have been recognized and established in order to
make sure that justice is done to the accused, and no more. They were not intended to enable the accused
to defeat the very ends of justice. When, through cunning or malice, he succeeds in thwarting the course
of the law, he should not be heard to complain if, as a result of his own misconduct, he is deemed to have
waived rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed. An accused person must suffer the legitimate
consequences of his own wrongful acts.

This right of appeal is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases.
He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him.
Ang Gioc was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the sentence, but failed to
do so. When an order was issued for his arrest, the warrant could not be served on him because he could
not be found. Upon his failure to appear for the reading of the sentence, the trial court declared
the confiscation of the bond filed by Ang Gioc, and later issued the corresponding order of execution. The
court’s action amounted to a judicial declaration that Ang Gioc was a fugitive from justice, and such
declaration cannot, after the lapse of nearly thirteen years, be controverted by proof aliunde.

The law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. Thus, the CA acquired no jurisdiction
of the appeal filed by RESP, except to dismiss it. CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it remanded
the case to the court of origin for a new trial.

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