RULE 40 The right of appeal is a purely statutory right; it is not an inherent right.
The right to
US v. GOMEZ JESUS
DOCTRINE:
The right of appeal is a purely statutory right; it is not an inherent right. The right to
appeal was not at common law, and it is not now, a necessary element of due process
of law.
Here, Gomez cannot argue that Act No. 310, the basis for revoking his license, is void
for not providing an appeal. The law has vested the Board with the power to determine
the qualification and the competency of an individual to practice medicine. Moreover,
the decision of the Board is appealable to the Director of Health, such already constitute
due process of law.
FACTS:
Gomez Jesus’ medical license was revoked by the Board of Medical Examiners after
he was found guilty by the courts of violating the Opium Law.
While his license was revoked, he still kept on practicing medicine. Thus, he was
charged and found guilty of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of Sec. 8
of Act. No. 310 of the Philippine Commission.
Now on appeal, Gomez argues that the Legislature exceeded its authority in conferring
upon the Board of Medical Examiners the right to revoke his license.
It is also contended that the law provides no appeal from the decision of the board to
the courts, and is, for that reason, void. In addition, that the statite confers judicial power
upon the Board.
ISSUE:
Whether Act. No. 310 is void for not providing for an appeal to the courts, thus, depriving
Gomez of due process.
RULING:
No, it is not void because the State has the right to regulate professions.
A law is not necessarily invalid, if it provides a remedy for those affected thereby, simply
because it does not provides for an appeal to the courts. Due process of law is not
necessarily judicial process.
The legislature may confer upon persons, boards, officers, and commissions the right
to finally decide may questions affecting various interest of the people of the state. If a
remedy is granted, the law will be valid, even though no appeal to the courts is provided.
appeal was not at common law, and it is not now, a necessary element of due process
of law.
Many executive officers, even those who are are regarded as purely ministerial officers,
act judicially in the determination of facts in the performance of their duties, and in so
doing "they do not exercise judicial power," as that phrase is commonly used, and as it
is used in the Organic Act in conferring judicial power upon specified courts.
Here, while there is no remedy of an appeal to the courts, the law provided for an appeal
to the Director of Health. While the board acts judicially in the determination of facts in
the performance of their duties, they are in no way exercising judicial power. The law
vested upon the board, the power to determine whether Gomez, or any person for that
matter, is qualified to practice medicine. Therefore, the decision of the lower court is
affirmed.
GONZALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Jose T. Gonzales and Jaime M. Flores were both candidates, with two others,
for the position of vice-mayor of the City of Butuan in the November 10, 1959 elections.
After votes were canvassed, Flores was proclaimed elected by a plurality of 222 votes
over Gonzales. Within the statutory period, Gonzales filed with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan an election protest contesting Flores’ proclamation, alleging
irregularity in the conduct of the election.
Trial court: Jose T. Gonzales duly elected vice-mayor of the City of Butuan.
Flores filed an amended notice of appeal wherein he stated his intention to appeal to
the CA.
Gonzales filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that section 178 of the Revised Election Code does not confer the right to appeal from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance upon the parties to an election contest for the
position of vice-mayor and municipal councilor.
CA: promulgated a minute resolution denying the plea of dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the case may be appealed.
RULING: No. An appeal to a higher court, being merely a statutory right and not
ordinarily a necessary part of due process, may only be taken when the law so provides
(Aguilar & Casapao vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; Duarte vs. Dade, 32 Phil. 36).
The right to appeal being purely statutory, the parties cannot, even by mutual
agreement, confer such right when the same does not exist by statutory authority
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1957 Ed., pp. lxii-lxiii)
Since the law (Section 178, Republic Act 180) does not provide for appeal in contests
for the position of city vice-mayor, no appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court will lie from a decision of the Court of First Instance in contests for said position
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Where, however, the only issues involved in election protests for the offices of vice-
mayor and city councilor are of law, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the
decision of the Court of First Instance is permissible.
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. vs. SURIO
DOCTRINE: The NLRC has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA
Administrator involving disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims
involving employer-employee relationship. Here, the petitioners should have appealed
the adverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.
The right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws,
which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it
is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by
which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved. This is why we
consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is available
only if granted by law or statute. (ito lang yung feeling kong related sa Rule 40, yung
general principle about appeals. Pinilit ko lang hanapan ng connection. 😊)
FACTS: Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner
Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they
experienced delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments,
and were not paid for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained about the
vessel’s inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their
repeated requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On December 19,
1993, when MT Seadance docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil,
representatives of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and
found the wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing
negotiations between the ITF and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents
wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the
immediate repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-
repatriated respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of
discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance
and Adjudication Office of the POEA. During the pendency of the administrative
complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-
employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters. The
jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA
Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Relying on the 1991 POEA
Rules, petitioners filed a partial appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining
that respondents should be administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they
were on board MT Seadance.
The NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Commission has
no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator involving disciplinary
actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor
Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-employee
relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from decisions
arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in the Commission.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding that the matter of
inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the public respondent.
Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA involving
such cases.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the
POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions against private respondents.
RULING: NO, NLRC has no jurisdiction.
Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the
POEA s decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents
was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its
Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money
claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the
law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character
involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the
POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving
such workers.
Petitioners position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to
the review of the POEA’s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has
no support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application
unless the contrary is expressly provided, or unless the law is procedural or curative in
nature, there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act
No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA s decision on petitioner’s disciplinary action against
respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing
or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v.
Vda. De Mangubat, when it:
Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues. They may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
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Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioner’s complaint by virtue of the case being then
still pending or undetermined at the time of the law’s passage, there being no vested
rights in rules of procedure. They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to
ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint
was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its
implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their
appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment
rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the
right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired. Conversely and by analogy,
an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes
into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided
by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal
from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the
taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the
procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with
and resolved. This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in
character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect
of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary
of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.
JOSE ALMEDA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: As may now be too familiar, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one
who seeks to avail of this right must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly
discharge of judicial business.In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances
warranting their relaxation, they must remain inviolable.
Facts:
Jose Almeda was the registered owner of Lot No. 312 situated in San Pedro,
Laguna. Subsequently, he sold portions thereof to various individuals. Adjacent to Lot
No. 312 is Lot No. 308 registered in the name of the late Gregorio Espeleta, father of
respondents Teresita, Gregorio Jr., Ignacio and Violeta Espeleta.
On 19 January 1990 a portion of Lot No. 308 denominated as Lot No. 308-B was sold
by Gregorio Espeleta to spouses. Mercado. Later, Almeda instituted the present action
for quieting of title, annulment of sale and/or reconveyance with damages against the
Mercado spouses,heirs of Espeleta and RD of Calamba, praying that the deed of sale
in favor of Mercado spouses be declared null and void, and that they and/or the heirs
of the deceased Gregorio Espeleta be ordered to reconvey the lot to petitioner.
Almeda alleged in his complaint that sometime in 1989 he discovered that the technical
description of Lot No. 308 inadvertently included 6,407 square meters of his Lot No.
312. For this reason, he requested the surveyor to conduct the survey to rectify the
error. Consequently, the surveyor prepared a subdivision plan delineating the disputed
portion as Lot No. 308-A. He then insisted that Lot No. 308-A was part of Lot No. 312
The pre-trial was first set on 20 May 1993, RD moved for a resetting, which was
granted, and the pre-trial was again transferred to 18 June 1993. Respondents' counsel
moved for postponement of the hearing because of a professional commitment in
another court. The motion was also granted but the trial court, quite erroneously, reset
the pre-trial conference for the same date, 18 June 1993.
On the scheduled pre-trial on 18 June 1993 respondents and their counsel failed to
appear. Thus, they were declared as in default and the court scheduled the
presentation of petitioner's evidence ex-parte on 20 August 1993. However, on motion
for reconsideration, without objection from petitioner's counsel, the default order was
lifted and the pre-trial was set anew on the same date originally scheduled for the
reception of petitioner's evidence, i.e., 20 August 1993. Later, due to many reasons
and intervention, the trial court reset the pre-trial for the last time to 24 February 1994,
on which date Almeda and his counsel failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
declare petitioner non-suited and his complaint dismissed, and set the hearing on the
counterclaims of respondents ex-parte.
Mercado spouses posits that they bought the property in good faith and for value, and
that a complete technical description was inscribed in its title which was corroborated
by the Espelelat’s
Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents and ordered Almeda to pay
moral damages and litigation expenses incurred by the respondents
Almeda claimed that he learned for the first time about his having been declared non-
suited when he received the decision against him. He therefore moved for
reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified of the pre-trial as the signature
appearing on the registry return receipt was fake although his counsel remembered
having affixed his signature on the expediente regarding the scheduled pre-trial and
jotted down the date on an envelope or a document but failed to transfer it to his daily
time calendar. Almeda further averred that he was not furnished copy of the order
declaring him non-suited. Attached to his motion were his and his counsel's affidavits
of merit.
But the trial court brushed aside their assertions and held that copy of the 24 February
1994 order was duly received by Almeda and his counsel as shown by the registry
3
return receipts. On 6 December 1994 their motion for reconsideration was resultantly
denied.
On 23 December 1994 petitioner filed a notice of appeal. But on 16 January 1995 the
trial court disapproved the appeal for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. On 19 April 1995 his motion for reconsideration was
denied.
CPM in CA – also denied on the ground that the requirement regarding perfection of
an appeal within the reglementary period was not only mandatory but jurisdictional such
that petitioner's failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment
final
Issue: Whether Almeda can still appeal the case?
Ruling: NO
Almeda admits that his notice of appeal was filed five (5) days late but explains that his
former counsel who took over from another former counsel must have overlooked its
due date.
The period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute,
particularly Sec. 39 of BP 129 which provides -
Sec. 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, That habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from x x x x
Obviously, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed
by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the
effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Public policy and sound practice
demand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite
date fixed by law.
Exception to this is only when there is the existence of highly exceptional
circumstances. However, we cannot extend the same liberality to the present case
because, as in Bank of America, NT & SA just cited, its factual settings do not even
come close to those extraordinary circumstances that have justified a deviation from
an otherwise stringent rule. (Namatay kasi doon yung lawyer) The timeliness of an
appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.
A careful scrutiny of the records readily discloses the lack of merit in petitioner's reason
for the late filing of his notice of appeal. It was only after the notice had been filed that
he effected a change of counsel. Once again we stress that a lawyer has the
responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal.
Although the notice of pre-trial conference appears to have been received by somebody
else for petitioner and that the signature on the registry return receipt was not his, the
fact is that he and his former counsel who was then handling his case were duly notified
in open court much earlier, or specifically on 12 November 1993, of the resetting to 24
February 1994. Hence, there was no reason at all for him to complain about lack of
notice.
As may now be too familiar, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks
to avail of this right must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of
judicial business.In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their
relaxation, they must remain inviolable.
YBANEZ V. CA
DOCTRINE: (walang na-mention re:Rule 40)
Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.
Here, there is nothing in the records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction. Chiefly, Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of an appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners appeal from the adverse
decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its
appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law.
As to the second ground, the kind of fraud that justifies the annulment of a judgment is
extrinsic fraud. This refers to some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or
was used to procure judgment without a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic
fraud refers to acts outside the trial. It must be distinguished from intrinsic fraud which
refers to acts of a party at a trial which prevented a fair and just determination of the
case and which could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of
the case. Examples of intrinsic fraud are falsification and false testimony.
Similarly, the RTC decision iwas not attended by extrinsic fraud. We find nothing, either
act or conduct on the part of private respondents, that may have prevented petitioners
from presenting their case to the court. Indeed, the record is bereft of any iota of
evidence that could show the contrary.
4
FACTS:
In December 1984, petitioners spouses Victor Warlito V. Ybañez and Virginia A.
Ybañez, as vendors, entered into a Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage and
With Right of Repurchase over a mortgaged 400 sq. m. parcel of land in favor of private
respondents spouses Avelino P. Ifurung and Virginia F. Ifurung, as vendees. The
agreed three-month period expired without petitioners exercising their right to
repurchase the subject property. Private respondents, through counsel, demanded that
petitioners surrender the possession of the subject property and vacate the premises
in accordance with the deed of sale, only to be unheeded. Thus, in 1992, private
respondents filed an ejectment suit against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC). Summons were issued and served by substituted service thru Engr. and
Mrs. Nomer Ybanez.
As a result of petitioners failure to file an answer, the MTC, in accordance with Section
6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, motu propio rendered judgment in
favor of private respondents. Petitioners appealed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, and premised the same on the alleged lack of valid service of summons
over their persons. They asserted that service of summons to Engr. and Mrs. Nomer
Ybanez is improper and invalid since petitioners, as early as 1988, have left for abroad,
although it is uncontroverted that the latter spouses (Engr. and Mrs Nomer Ybanez)
were found residing at petitioners last known address. The appeal did not prosper.
Petitioners thereafter filed a notice of appeal signifying their intention to appeal the
judgment to the Court of Appeals which was denied due course by the RTC on the
ground that it is not the proper remedy - the correct recourse being the filing of a petition
for review. The Ybanez then filed a motion for new trial before the RTC. RTC denied
the motion and the decision having attained finality, issued a writ of execution and
caused the entry of judgment.
Apparently, in a desperate move, on May 2, 1994, petitioners filed another action - a
petition for annulment of judgment of the RTC before respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners assailed the validity of the substituted service of summons over their
persons in the MTC ejectment case, an issue well settled in their appeal before the
RTC. Likewise, petitioners attacked the RTC jurisdiction to modify and affirm on appeal
the MTC decision and further contended that private respondents obtained the
judgment by default against the petitioners by means of extrinsic fraud.
However, respondent court stressed that the RTCs decision is not void since, by asking
for affirmative relief through their appeal and motion for new trial before the RTC,
petitioners were effectively barred from questioning the validity of the substituted
service of summons, as well as the RTCs jurisdiction over their persons. On the issue
of extrinsic fraud, respondent court ruled that there was no extrinsic fraud to warrant
the annulment of the MTC and RTC judgments. Dissatisfied, but without filing a motion
for reconsideration for no apparent reason, petitioners filed the instant petition stressing
that t]his is a petition for certiorari, both under Rule 65 and Rule 45, Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
(1) whether or not the substituted service of summons over the persons of the
petitioners in the ejectment case was valid to vest the MTC jurisdiction over their
persons, and
(2)whether or not the judgments of the MTC in the ejectment suit and of the RTC on
appeal were obtained by means of extrinsic fraud to warrant their nullification.
RULING: Both YES.
1st Issue:
Respondent court acted inadvertently when it set aside the RTC ruling relative to the
validity of the substituted service of summons over the persons of the petitioners in the
MTC level. We must not lose sight of the fact that what was filed before respondent
court is an action to annul the RTC judgment and not a petition for review. Annulment
of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. There is nothing in the
records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked jurisdiction. Chiefly, Section 22
of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests
upon the RTC the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of
petitioners appeal from the adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC)
was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce,
its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond
cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
Corollarily, it is inappropriate for respondent court to reverse the RTC ruling that there
was proper and valid substituted service of summons over the persons of the
petitioners. Petitioners properly assigned this issue and, in fact, it was exhaustively
argued in their appeal, albeit without success. They subsequently failed to seasonably
question the soundness of the RTC ruling before respondent court via a petition for
review. As it stands, therefore, the ruling of the RTC that substituted service of
summons was validly effected has long acquired finality. Raising this long settled issue
in the annulment case could very well be petitioners device and technique to acquire a
fresh opportunity to assail this ruling, a chance they already lost because of their failure
to seasonably file a petition for review. This scheme is highly irregular and may as well
constitute misuse of court processes. In addition, it stultifies and renders asunder the
principle, well embedded in our jurisprudence, that a judgment properly rendered by a
court vested with jurisdiction. like the RTC. and which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Judgments of courts become final at some
5
definite time fixed by law and that parties, like the petitioners, should not be permitted
to litigate the same issue/s over again.
2nd Issue:
MTC judgment was not obtained by extrinsic fraud to warrant annulment. Respondent
court amply explained extrinsic fraud and applied the same in this wise:
The kind of fraud that justifies the annulment of a judgment is extrinsic fraud. This refers
to some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure judgment
without a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud refers to acts outside the
trial. It must be distinguished from intrinsic fraud which refers to acts of a party at a trial
which prevented a fair and just determination of the case and which could have been
litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. Examples of intrinsic
fraud are falsification and false testimony.
The petitioners argued that the private respondents committed extrinsic fraud when
they did not inform the trial court that they (private respondents) have not assumed the
mortgage of the property in question. Applying the definition stated earlier, the fraud
supposed to have been committed does not amount to extrinsic fraud. The omission
was done within the trial or the litigation process, particularly in the complaint for
ejectment filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court. If such omission were fraudulent, it
would have constituted intrinsic fraud which could have been determined in the
adjudication of the case. As such, even if it were proven, the supposed fraud does not
justify the annulment of the judgment.
Similarly, the RTC decision was not attended by extrinsic fraud. We find nothing, either
act or conduct on the part of private respondents, that may have prevented petitioners
from presenting their case to the court. Indeed, the record is bereft of any iota of
evidence that could show the contrary.
NOTE: (baka maitanong ni sir re: Res judicata)
Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues therein should be laid to
rest. Rule 39, Sec. 49 Paragraph (b) of ROC is referred to as bar by former judgment.
It is a concept in which the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used and
has the following concurring requisites, namely: (1) the former judgment or order must
be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after
a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of
the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
While Paragraph (c) is the less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. This concept, which applies in this
case, refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or necessarily included therein.
Otherwise stated, conclusiveness of judgment precludes relitigation of a particular fact
or issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action. With the validity of the substituted service of summons having been settled in
the RTC and having long acquired finality, petitioners are now precluded to relitigate
the same issue. Litigation must have and always has an end. If not, judicial function will
lose its relevance.
SMI FISH INDUSTRIES, INC., AMADO C. SANTERO, JR., vs. NLRC
DOCTRINE: Respondent NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents, thereby modifying the decision of the labor arbiter
awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. As pointed out by Presiding
Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier in her partial dissent, since private respondents did
not appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter, they are presumed to be satisfied with
the adjudication therein. Accordingly, with the finality of the decision as to private
respondents, the issue of payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement has been
laid to rest. It is a well-settled procedural rule in this jurisdiction, and we see no reason
why it should not apply in this case, that an appellee who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in
the decision of the court below. The appellee can only advance any argument that he
may deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is
being disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such is required to strengthen the
views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may be considered
by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but
not for the purpose of modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him
other affirmative reliefs.
6

FACTS: On March 30, 1987, private respondents filed separate but identical complaints
for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, illegal lay-off,
underpayment, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest days,
night-shift differential, 13th month pay, (ECOLA), service incentive leave pay, and
damages. Petitioners denied all the foregoing charges and claims. A joint decision was
rendered by the aforenamed labor arbiter ordering the Payment by Petitioners to
Private respondents of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s pay for every year
of service and full backwages without qualification or deduction for a period not
exceeding three (3) years in the total amount of P153,476.23 in lieu of reinstatement.
On December 22, 1988, petitioners appealed the aforestated joint decision to the
NLRC, disputing the findings of the labor arbiter that they violated the security of tenure
of private respondents. As already stated, a resolution was promulgated by the NLRC
affirming that joint decision of the labor arbiter, but with a modification setting aside the
payment of separation pay and ordering petitioners to reinstate private respondents to
their former or equivalent positions with backwages, including ECOLA, 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay, equivalent to three (3) years, without loss of privileges,
seniority rights and other benefits. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the individual private
respondents despite their acceptance of the decision of the labor arbiter ordering
payment of separation pay.
HELD: YES. Respondent NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents, thereby modifying the decision of the labor arbiter
awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. As pointed out by Presiding
Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier in her partial dissent, since private respondents did
not appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter, they are presumed to be satisfied with
the adjudication therein. Accordingly, with the finality of the decision as to private
respondents, the issue of payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement has been
laid to rest.
It is a well-settled procedural rule in this jurisdiction, and we see no reason why it should
not apply in this case, that an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision
of the court below. 8 The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem
necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being
disputed. He can assign errors on appeal if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the
appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for
the purpose of modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other
affirmative reliefs.
UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORP VS CA
Doctrine:
As a rule, findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal, provided, they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial
evidence. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions, as when the findings of facts
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; or the
appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court. Here, the apparent
conflict between the findings of the appellate court and that of the trial court is due to
the fact that evidence was presented ex parte in the lower court while the evidence of
the private respondents was presented only on appeal. Hence, the trial court decided
the case on the basis solely of the evidence of the petitioner while the respondent court
reached a decision with the advantage of weighing and analyzing both the evidence of
the petitioner and the private respondents. Thus, bearing in mind these facts and in the
absence of any showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the records, such findings must stand and be admitted as final and conclusive.
Facts:
On December 15, 1962, private respondents Rafael Verendia, Teodoro Galicia and
Marcelina Galicia purchased from petitioner Universal Motors Corporation two (2)
Mercedez Benz trucks at a cash price of P33,608.27 each payable within ninety (90)
days.
The private respondents made several payments which were applied to the principal,
interest and to the expenses incurred in executing and registering a deed of chattel
mortgage in favor of petitioner. For failure of the private respondents to pay the cash
price, their account was re-scheduled to allow them a period of thirty (30) months within
which to complete the payments. Private respondents executed a promissory note in
favor of the petitioner covering the re- scheduled account. But despite repeated
demands, the private respondents failed to comply with their foregoing undertaking, so
that the petitioner commenced a complaint for the recovery of the unpaid balance
among others with the CFI.
Private respondents admitted the principal allegations except that they insisted that
their outstanding account was only the amount of P28,911.10 as of October 31, 1965,
not P40,945.31. The petitioner then filed a motion for summary judgment, but the same
was denied by the lower court. When the case was called for hearing, neither the private
respondents nor their counsel appeared despite due notice, hence upon motion of the
petitioner's counsel, petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On its ruling,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. After re-hearing, the same was
ruled in favor of the petitioner.
7
From said decision, private respondents interposed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in exonerating private respondents from any liability to petitioner.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioner submits that the findings of the CA were erroneous for the following reasons:
1) that in the answer filed by private respondents, they expressly admitted that they
were indebted to petitioner; 2) that private respondents declared that there was no
necessity for plaintiff to retain services of counsel as defendants never ran away from
a valid obligation; 3) that the principle of estoppel is applicable to private respondents,
therefore, their admission is binding upon them and they may no longer deny the same,
much less claim overpayment. In sum, the petitioner stresses that where there is
ambiguity in a questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the doubt should be
resolved to sustain the trial court.
Private respondents insist that all the arguments of petitioner actually require the court
to examine and contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
Private respondents emphasize that the task of examining documentary proofs or
exhibits is a task for the Court of Appeals and not this Court. Private respondents stress
that this case does not fall within the exceptions where the Supreme Court can review
on appeal the final and conclusive findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
We already stressed that in the case of Bustamante v. Hon. Court of Appeals that "(a)s
a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions, as when the
findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; or the appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court.
Furthermore, only question of law may be raised on a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of
the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Barring,
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand for the Supreme Court is not expected or required
to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
The respondent court opined that the record consisting of both the oral and
documentary evidence presented in the case outweighed the findings of fact of the trial
court. The apparent conflict between the findings of the appellate court and that of the
trial court is due to the fact that evidence was presented ex parte in the lower court
while the evidence of the private respondents was presented only on appeal. Hence,
the trial court decided the case on the basis solely of the evidence of the petitioner while
the respondent court reached a decision with the advantage of weighing and analyzing
both the evidence of the petitioner and the private respondents.
Bearing in mind these facts and in the absence of any showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, such findings must stand and
be admitted as final and conclusive. Thus, respondent court committed no error in
reversing the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint in favor of the
private respondents.
PNB VS PEREZ
Doctrine: The notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place
of the pre-trial and to require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time
prescribed by the rules. Its absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent
proceedings null and void. Absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes of a violation of
a persons constitutional right to due process.
In the case at bar, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing on March
8, 2006 and required PNB to prepare and complete x x x a statement of account. The
said order does not mention anything about a pre-trial to be conducted by the trial court.
Facts: Spouses Perez obtained a revolving credit line from PNB, which was secured
by several chattel mortgages over palay stocks inventory and REM over real properties.
Spouses Perez defaulted on their financial obligations prompting PNB to institute extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings over the chattel mortgages and REM. Sheriff instituted
a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale for the mortgaged properties by public auction. The
Spouses applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, but was denied due
to their failure to appear together with their counsel. During the pre-trial the spouses
also failed to appear, but they argued that they filed a motion for postponement, but
this was denied by the court, and accordingly dimissed the case.
Spouses filed several motion for reconsideration but it was all denied by the RTC.
Spouses appealed the decision of RTC before CA. On the first decision, CA denied the
appeal on the ground that it is a failure on the part of the spouses to appear on the pre-
trial despite given notice, but later reversed its decision by granting the appeal by
reason of substantial justice.
8
The pre-trial was set by the RTC, but the PNB failed to receive a copy, in which case
the spouses were allowed to adduce evidence and considered the hearing as a pre-
trial conference. PNB filed an MR but due to some reason such motion was not filed in
court within the reglemantary period, hence the court concluded that the Decision
already became final and executory by operation of law. Trial court issued an order of
execution and demand payment from PNB.
PNB filed a petition for relief from judgment because the failure to submit the MR is due
to mistake or excusable negligence, but that was denied. PNB appealed before CA, tha
latter issued a TRO for the implementation of the execution. Despite of that TRO,
spouses perez were able to garnish several amounts from PNB’s account. In lieu of
that PNB filed a supplemental petition for certiorari. CA granted and ruled that notice of
pre-trial is mandatory and the pre-trial order, which allowed the presentation of Spouses
of evidence ex-parte issued by the RTC is void.
Issue: Whether or not notice of pre-trial is mandatory? [Kasi friends walang issue about
rule 40 sa case, it was not even mentioned talaga so I chose this issue kasi sya ung
pinaka main issue sa case na related sa rem. Tama ung case based sa syllabus]
Ruling: YES.
Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure unequivocally requires that the
notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. It is
elementary in statutory construction that the word shall denotes the mandatory
character of the rule. Thus, it is without question that the language of the rule
undoubtedly requires the trial court to send a notice of pre-trial to the parties.
More importantly, the notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and
place of the pre-trial and to require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the
time prescribed by the rules. Its absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all
subsequent proceedings null and void. Absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes of
a violation of a persons constitutional right to due process.
In the case at bar, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing on March
8, 2006 and required PNB to prepare and complete x x x a statement of account. The
said order does not mention anything about a pre-trial to be conducted by the trial court.
CITIBANK v. SABENIANO
DOCTRINE:
Perfection of appeal is governed by Rule 41 Sec 9, as well as its effects. The perfection
of the appeal and its effects pertains only as to the party who filed such appeal.
Here, both parties sought a review with the SC, however, Modesta, in filing directly with
the SC, sought an extension to file the Petition for Review, which was, however, not
acted upon. This resulted to the decision of the CA becoming final due to the failure of
Modesta in filing such Petition. While on the other hand, it could not be binding as to
Citibank and FNCB for they filed their own separate appeal.
FACTS:
Modesta Sabeniano was a client of Citibank and FNCB. She claims that she has
substantial deposits and money market placements with Citibank and FNCB, that the
refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements
despite repeated demands.
When Modesta failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank,
the latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate Modesta's outstanding loans with
her deposits and money market placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and
the Deeds of Assignment executed by Modesta in favor of Citibank.
Failing to reach a compromise agreement in the pre-trial, the case proceeded with the
presentation of evidence. The RTC rendered decision which the CA affirmed in its
decision dated, March 26, 2002.
From the CA’s decision, Modesta, instead of filing an MR, filed directly with the SC a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, docketed as GR 152985.
However, the SC did not act on the motion and the period to appeal continued to run
and expired, to which the SC issued a resolution, dated Nov 13, 2002, declaring 152985
as terminated and ordered the clerk of court to inform the parties.
Meanwhile, on Nov 20, 2002, the CA issued the Resolution modifying its decision, to
which Citibank appealed to the SC, docketed as GR 156132.
In 156132, Modesta filed a an Urgent Motion for the Release of the Decision with the
Implementation of the entry of judgment. Modesta argues that the decision of the CA
had already been final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the CA had been rendered final and executory by the resolution
of the SC in Modesta’s motion, docketed as 152985.
RULING:
Yes, it has been final and executory as to Modesta only.
The perfection of appeal is governed Sec. 9 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
9
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading in the appellate court
upon timely filing, and that is the time that the case before such appellate court shall
commence, much in the same way a case is initiated by the filing of a Complaint before
the trial court. The Petition for Review establishes the identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and relief sought from the appellate court, and without such Petition,
there is technically no case before the appellate court.
Here, it should be pointed out, however, that the Resolution dated Nov 13, 2002
referred only to GR 152985, Modesta’s appeal, which she failed to perfect through a
filing of a Petition for Review within the prescribed period. The declaration of the SC in
the resolution would bind Modesta solely, and not as to Citibank and FNCB who filed
their own separate appeal, 156132, this, would mean that Modesta on her part, should
be bound by the findings of fact and law of the CA, including the monetary amounts
consequently awarded to her by the CA in its March 26, 2002 decision, and she can no
longer refute any part thereof.
The Motion filed by Modesta seeking the extension of time to file her Petition for Review
does not serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such motion merely
presents the important dates and justification for the additional time requested for, but
it does not go into the details of the appealed case.
BOTE VS. VELOSO
FACTS: On September 21, 1951, Pedro T. Baello (Baello) and his sister, Nicanora
Baello-Rodrgiuez (Rodriguez), filed an application for registration of their property in
Caloocan City with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal consisting of 147,972 square
meters. Thereafter, the land was successfully registered under their names.
On July 27, 1971, the lot was subdivided into Lot A and Lot B, in favor of Baello and
Rodriguez respectively.
On December 3, 1971, Baello died intestate leaving thirty two (32) surviving heirs while
Rodriguez died intestate on August 22, 1975 without issue.
The subject property was included in the Dagat-Dagatan Project launched in 1976 by
the then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos. Sometime thereafter, armed military personnel
forcibly evicted the caretaker of the heirs of Baello and Rodriguez from the property,
destroying the residential structure and the fishponds thereon. Thereafter, the National
Housing Authority (NHA), as the government agency tasked to undertake the Dagat-
Dagatan Project, took possession of the property preparatory to its subdivision and
awarded the lots to chosen beneficiaries.
After the fall of the Marcos regime, the heirs of Baello executed, on February 23, 1987,
an extrajudicial partition of their share of the property.
On August 18, 1987, the NHA filed a complaint with the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
120 (Caloocan RTC), for the
expropriation of the subject land. Baello and Rodriguez heirs filed separate motions to
dismiss the complaint (expropriation) of NHA.
RTC: Granted on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action. NHA
appealed.
CA: Affirmed RTC ruling. Case was elevated to the SC which denied due course to the
petition in a Resolution dated May 3, 1993. The Resolution attained finality in an Entry
of Judgment dated July 7, 1993.
On November 5, 1993, the NHA filed another complaint against the Baello and
Rodriguez heirs with another RTC
of Caloocan, this time for the declaration of nullity of the OCTs. Case was dismissed
on the grounds of estoppel and res judicata. Appealed to CA, denied. SC, on August
24, 2004, denied NHA’s appeal of the CA decision.
On August 12, 1985, one Gloria Veloso (Gloria) was awarded a residential lot at the
Dagat-Dagatan Project for the price of PhP 37,600 as evidenced by an Individual Notice
of Award dated August 12, 1985. Thus, Gloria constructed a two (2)-storey house on
the property awarded to her and resided therein until 1991. In 1995, Gloria leased the
house to Loreto Bote (Bote) from October to December. Bote executed a Promissory
Note undertaking to pay Gloria Veloso and her husband Robert Veloso (spouses
Veloso) the amount of PhP 850,000 on or before March 31, 1996 as purchase price for
property. Bote failed to pay.
Spouses Veloso filed a Complaint at Marikina RTC, against Bote for Sum of Money
and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property with Damages
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Spouses Veloso appealed and interposed for the first
time their status as builders in good faith and are, thus, entitled to possession of the
house that Gloria built.
CA partly granted and modified decision of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether spouses Veloso, for failure to raise the issue of their being in good
faith before the trial court, are precluded from raising the issue for the first time on
appeal.
RULING: Yes. Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court limits the questions that may
be raised on appeal:
Section 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal.― Whether or not the appellant
has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of
errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and
which is within the issues framed by the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 359SCRA 480 (2001), the Court
clarified this provision of the Rules of Court stating that, “It is settled jurisprudence that
an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.” This principle forbids the parties from
changing their theory of the case. The “theory of the case” is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as: A comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement of principle and facts,
conceived and constructed for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree of a court
in favor of a litigant; the particular line of reasoning of either party to a suit, the purpose
10
being to bring together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence and to correlate
them in a way that produces in the decision maker’s mind a definite result or conclusion
favored by the advocate. x x x Nevertheless, such rule admits of an exception as
enunciated in Canlas v. Tubil, 601 SCRA 147 (2009), to wit: As a rule, a change of
theory cannot be allowed. However, when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may give
due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein.
The issue of whether or not the spouses Veloso were builders in good faith is a factual
question that was never alleged, let alone proven. And as aptly stated by the spouses
Veloso themselves in their Appellant’s Brief dated May 23, 2001, “under Article 527 of
the Civil Code, good faith is even always presumed and upon him who alleges bad faith
on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.” Understandably, Bote did not
present such evidence before the trial court because good faith was not an issue then.
It was only on appeal that the spouses Veloso belatedly raised the issue that they were
builders in good faith. Justice and fair play dictate that the spouses Veloso’s change of
their theory of the case on appeal be disallowed and the instant petition granted
SMALL CLAIMS
NEYPES vs. CA
DOCTRINE: A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. This fresh period rule shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice
of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, etc. filed an action for annulment of judgment
and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,
Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen (respondents).
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of
the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the RTC issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the CA,petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22,
1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only
five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the CA, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules. It held further: Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was
correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and
in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.
Petitioner filed MR but it was denied by the CA.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the lower courts erred in ruling that the words “final order” in Sec.3, Rule 41
of the ROC refers to the (first order denying their petition) dated Feb. 12, 1998 instead
of the (last order denying their MR) dated July 1, 1998 a copy of which was received
by petitioners through counsel on July 22, 1998.
(2) WON the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
Ruling:
(1) YES, the lower courts erred. The order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
(2) YES, the notice of appeal was file on time.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
11
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which the Court already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
CRISOLOGO VS DARAY
Doctrine: Inaction to a notice of appeal does not result to losing the right to appeal.
Upon filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket fees the appeal is perfected.
The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court. The function of the
notice of appeal is merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the
right to appeal, and not to seek the courts permission that he be allowed to pose an
appeal.
Facts:
Jesus G. Crisologo charged respondent Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, in her capacity
as Acting Presiding Judge of RTC Br 19 in Digos City, with Gross Misconduct, Undue
Delay in Rendering a Decision or Order and Gross Ignorance of the Law of Procedure
relative to the denial of the Motion for Intervention filed by complainant in Civil Case
Nos. 3220 and 3387 respectively entitled Marina Crisologo, Jr. vs. Victor Callao and
Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. and Salvador Crisologo vs. Marina Crisologo, Jr. and Rural
Bank of Tagum, Inc.
As found by the Report of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), the
following circumstances prompted the complainant to file this administrative complaint:
(facts kung bakit nag complaint si Jesus)
Marina Crisologo, the sister of the Jesus had a pending case before RTC Br 19
against Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. (RBTI) and others involving a property. The parties
of the case pending the cases submitted to Compromise Agreement. In said
compromise agreement, Marina, Jr. and Salvador ceded full ownership of the subject
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22236, including all
improvements found thereon, in favor of RBTI.
On February 13, 2004, soon after being informed of the existence of the compromise
agreement, complainant Jesus and his sister Carolina C. Abrina, moved to intervene
in the civil cases alleging among others that the property in litigation involves the
Crisologo familys ancestral home and they are co-owners of the subject property
together with Marina, Jr. and their other siblings, that property was in the name of
Marina in trust only. They were represented by Atty. Ta-asan, but was change to
Atty Crisologo, her entry appearance was noted by the court.
Respondent Judge denied complainants motion for intervention the Compromise
Agreement had already been entered into and to allow the intervention will unduly
delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, particularly so that the
instant cases began almost a decade ago in 1995. She also denied the MR and
approves the compromise agreement.
However, the copies of the order and notice was sent to Atty. Ta-asan instead of Atty.
Crisologo who is complainants counsel of record.
On November 3, 2004, RBTI moved for the execution of the decision on compromise
agreement and prayed, for the immediate ejectment of the plaintiffs, in the subject
property.
On November 4, 2004, complainant was informed by his brother Ramon Crisologo,
who is one of the occupants of the subject property, about RBTIs motion for
execution. Thus, on November 5, 2008, complainant, accompanied by Atty.
Crisologo, lost no time and proceeded to RTC-Branch 19 to inquire about the hearing
schedule of RBTIs motion for execution, and was surprised to learn that his MR has
already been denied and that the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. On Nov. 08, they immediately filed an Urgent Manifestation and Notice of
Appeal decrying the lack of notice to him of the trial courts and appealing the denial
of his motion for intervention to the Court of Appeals. On the same date, complainant
12
 also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent Judge in the civil
cases on the ground of lack of impartiality.
When respondent Judge failed to act on his notice of appeal, complainant filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Judge gave due course to complainants
motion for voluntary inhibition and voluntarily inhibited herself in the civil cases, but
refrained from acting on complainants notice of appeal. It was only on March 15,
2005, that complainants notice of appeal was acted upon by Judge Carmelita Sarno-
Dav[i]n, the newly appointed presiding judge of RTC Branch-19.
On July 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision finding grave abuse of
discretion in the denial of complainants motion for intervention to warrant the
issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus in favor of complaint.
(THIS IS FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT)Respondent Judge in her comment denied and
refuted the charges in the complaint. She contended that the failure to furnish
complainant, through his counsel of record, Atty. Crisologo, with a copy of the Order
denying his motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the denial of his motion for intervention,
as well as of the decision on the compromise agreement, was unintentional and brought
about by an honest oversight on the part of her court personnel, who mistakenly sent
copies of the court processes to complainants previous counsel, Atty. Ta-asan, Jr.
Thus, respondent insisted that she could not be made administratively liable for gross
misconduct on account of such omission absent a clear showing of bad faith.
(UNDUE DELAY) For the charge of undue delay in passing upon complainants notice
of appeal in light of her voluntary inhibition from hearing the civil cases. She pointed
out that she could no longer be expected to pass upon complainants notice of appeal
after she had voluntarily inhibited herself.
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW) Lastly, respondent asserted that the denial of
complainants motion for intervention was prompted by the prevailing factual
circumstances of the civil cases since the case was pending for a decade and for the
interest of justice the compromise agreement between the original parties is proper.
Note: Sa Investigating Justice in CA Level it was found na administaruve liable si Judge
for Undue delay and gross ignorance of the law, dun lang sa gross misconduct di liable
because)
Issue: Whether the Judge is administratively liable?
Ruling: NO
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or
administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts
in good faith.
However, the judges inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render
them administratively liable. When the law is so simple and elementary, lack of
conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [ In any case, to
constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order
or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, such decision, order or act must be
attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to
the court the full easure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. There
is no doubt that respondent was cognizant of the rule on intervention, and she complied
with it in good faith. In fact, respondent has explained that she denied the motion for
intervention because it would only delay, to the prejudice of the original parties, the civil
cases which had already been pending for almost a decade. Respondent maintains
that she sincerely believed that the rights of the complainant would be better protected
in a separate action.
The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient judicial remedy exists.
Complainant erroneously thought that when respondent failed to act on his notice of
appeal, he lost his right to appeal the courts order denying his motion for intervention
and that his only remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the CA which he, in fact,
filed. He failed to consider that a partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfectedas to him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and upon payment
of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court. The
function of the notice of appeal is merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was
availing of the right to appeal, and not to seek the courts permission that he be allowed
to pose an appeal.
The trial courts only duty with respect to a timely appeal by notice of appeal is to
transmit the original record of the case to the appellate court. The court is given thirty
(30) days from the perfection of the appeal within which to transmit the record.
BADILLO VS. TAYAG
13
DOCTRINE:
APPEALS; DOCKET FEES: In appeals from the MTC to the RTC, failure to pay the
appellate docket fees within the fifteen-day reglementary period bestows on the
appellate court a directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal.
Payment of appellate fees from the RTC to the CA and from the CA to the SC is
mandatory according to the Rules. The payment of the appellate docket fee is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the
decision or final order appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal
was filed at all.
Here, the case involves an appeal from MTC to RTC.
When the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2000 -- two days before the
appeal period lapsed it perfected its appeal and the MTC thereby lost its jurisdiction.
The MTC therefore acted without jurisdiction in issuing the May 23, 2000 Order and the
May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution.
FACTS: Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case docketed as Civil
Case No. 263-94 in the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, entitled Spouses Oscar
and Haydee Badillo v. Triad Construction and Development Corporation and National
Housing Authority. In its February 1, 2000 Decision,[9] the MTC ordered the NHA to
vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof to petitioners; to pay rental for
its use and occupation at the rate of P10 per square meter per month; and to shoulder
the attorneys fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.
Upon receipt of the February 1, 2000 Decision of the MTC, the NHA filed a Notice of
Appeal with the same court on February 24, 2000. The NHA, however, did not pay the
appellate docket fees within the reglementary period. Consequently, petitioners filed
with that court a Motion for the immediate issuance of a writ of execution and
demolition. They contended that because of the NHAs failure to pay the appellate
docket fees within the prescribed period, the MTC Decision became final.
MTC: For failure of the National Housing Authority to comply with the requirements laid
down under Section 5 of Rule 40 as regards the payment of docket fee and for its failure
to comply with Section 19 of Rule 70 in regard to the payment of the supersedeas bond,
the execution of the judgment rendered in this case has become a ministerial duty of
the court in view of the mandatory nature of said requirements.
Thereafter, the Writ of Execution was actually issued by the MTC on May 30, 2000.
Pursuant thereto, the sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment of NHAs funds in the
Landbank of the Philippines. The bank, however, refused to release the garnished
amount.
On June 9, 2000, the NHA filed a Motion to set aside the Writ of Execution and the
Notice of Garnishment. The Motion was, however, denied by the MTC in its June 23,
2000 Order.
The NHA paid the appellate dockets fees only on June 29, 2000 -- four months late. It
simultaneously filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, assailing the MTCs May 23, 2000 Order and May
30, 2000 Writ of Execution.
RTC: The NHA was able to perfect its appeal on time despite its nonpayment of
appellate docket fees, according to the ruling of RTC Branch 79. The NHA as a
government-owned corporation was presumed to be always solvent and thus exempt
from filing a supersedeas bond, which would stay the immediate execution of a forcible
entry case. With the perfection of the appeal, the MTC lost jurisdiction to issue and
enforce the Writ of Execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NHA perfected its appeal to the RTC Bulacan despite failure to pay the
docket/appeal fee within the 15 day period provided for in Section 5, Rule 40 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULING: YES.
Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with an original charter. As a general rule, however, such corporations --
with or without independent charters -- are required to pay legal fees.
An exception to this rule is when such corporations perform governmental functions.
Here, the NHA is mandated by PD No. 757 to develop and implement a comprehensive,
integrated housing program for the greatest number of people. Thus, to be able to
perform its governmental functions, the housing agency is vested with sovereign
powers. Such powers include, among others, the exercise of the right of eminent
domain or the right to acquire by purchase privately owned lands for purposes of
housing development, resettlement, and related services and facilities.
Furthermore, under the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, the NHA, in
cooperation with other government units and agencies, is mandated to identify and
acquire lands for socialized housing for the underprivileged and the homeless.
14
Notably, it was in its performance of this governmental function to provide mass housing
that the NHA was sued by petitioners.
Nonetheless, in appeals from the MTC to the RTC, failure to pay the appellate docket
fee within the fifteen-day reglementary period bestows on the appellate court a
directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal.
Here, when the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2000 -- two days before
the appeal period lapsed it perfected its appeal and the MTC thereby lost its jurisdiction.
The MTC therefore acted without jurisdiction in issuing the May 23, 2000 Order and the
May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution.
(Baka maitanong)
Note: SUPERSEDEAS BOND: There is a rationale for requiring a losing party to file a
supersedeas bond in order to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an
ejectment case. Such bond is required to assure the payment of damages to the
winning party in case the appeal is found frivolous.
EXEMPTION: When the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages
or even an appeal bond, either directly or indirectly through its authorized officers—
because it is presumed to be always solvent.
As in this case, the provable rents or damages incurred by NHA, a government-owned
or controlled corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines.
Hence, NHA is exempt from posting a bond.
UNIVERSAL FAR EAST CORPORATION vs. CA
DOCTRINE: The SC held that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the order of
execution pending appeal because the motion for execution was filed before Ching had
perfected his appeal and it was resolved before the trial court which on Ching's appeal
and elevated the record to the Appellate Court (See sec. 23, Interim Rules). The
revamp law and its Interim Rules do not require that the motion for execution be
resolved within the fifteen-day period. It should be noted that under the Rules of Court,
where appeal is by record on appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction upon approval of
the record on appeal and appeal bond.
FACTS: This case is about an execution pending appeal under the Interim Rules and
the Judiciary Reorganization Law. The corporation received a copy of the decision on
January 14, 1983. Three days later, or on January 17, it filed a motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that Ching was insolvent and his appeal would be
dilatory. It offered to post a bond. The motion was served on Ching on January 17. It
was set for hearing on January 19, 1983 but it was not then heard because on that date
the Presiding Judge and other Judges were in conference with the Chief Justice
regarding the judiciary revamp (p. 230, Record). It was reset for March 4, 1983. Ching
asked for 15 days extension from January 19 to file his opposition.
In the meantime, Ching, who received a copy of the decision on January 12, 1983, filed
his notice of appeal on January 27 or on the 15th day. He mailed his opposition on
February 3, 1983. On March 4, the motion was heard. Ching was given five days to file
a rejoinder to the corporation's reply but he did not file any rejoinder. Instead, he filed
on March 23 a manifestation wherein he contended that under Section 9, Rule 41 of
the rules of Court the trial court had no more jurisdiction to grant execution pending
appeal because his appeal had long been perfected.
The trial court granted the execution pending appeal on May 30, 1983, or more than
four months after Ching's appeal was perfected, on the ground of Ching's insolvency.
It required the corporation to post a bond in the sum of P280,866.72. The trial court
ordered execution in its order of June 4, 1983. Acting on Ching's notice of appeal dated
January 27, 1983, the trial court in its order of June 10, 1983 directed the elevation of
the record to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The record was actually elevated on
August 30, 1983.
Ching assailed the execution pending appeal in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed on June 13, 1983 in the Appellate Court, which in a decision dated July
8, 1983, set aside the order of execution on the ground that, having been issued after
the perfection of the appeal, the trial court had no more jurisdiction over the case. The
corporation appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the TC has jurisdiction to issue the order of execution pending
appeal.
HELD: YES. The SC held that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the order of
execution pending appeal because the motion for execution was filed before Ching had
perfected his appeal and it was resolved before the trial court which on Ching's appeal
and elevated the record to the Appellate Court (See sec. 23, Interim Rules). The
execution pending appeal has to be a part of the records to be elevated to the Appellate
Court.
Said motion could not have been dispatched by the trial court within the reglementary
fifteen-day period for appeal because respondent Ching himself asked for an extension
of fifteen days to file his opposition. As already noted, he filed his opposition on
February 3, 1984 after the perfection of his appeal. He did not question the trial court's
jurisdiction
It may be argued that the trial court should dispose of the motion for execution within
the reglementary fifteen-day period. Such a rule would be difficult, if not impossible, to
15
follow. It would not be pragmatic and expedient and could cause injustice. Hurried
justice is not always authentic justice. The motion for execution has to be set for
hearing. The judgment debtor has to be heard. The good reasons for execution pending
appeal have to be scrutinized. These things cannot be done within the short period of
fifteen days. The trial court may be confronted with other matters more pressing that
would demand its immediate attention.
The revamp law and its Interim Rules do not require that the motion for execution be
resolved within the fifteen-day period. It should be noted that under the Rules of Court,
where appeal is by record on appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction upon approval of
the record on appeal and appeal bond (Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court). That may take
place long after the expiration of the thirty-day reglementary period for appeal.
ESTELLA VS CA
Doctrine:
The record on appeal as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal has been eliminated
under Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) and Sections
18, 19 and 20 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. Since the appellate court based its
outright dismissal of petitioners’ appeal on the non-transmittal of the record on appeal
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, then clearly, said
dismissal was erroneous.
Facts:
Rosario N. Concepcion was the original owner of the disputed residential land with a
three-door apartment thereon. Concepcion sold the property to herein petitioners who
registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila. However, petitioners failed to
secure a new tax declaration or assessment in their name, for which reason said
property remained for taxation purposes in the name of vendor Concepcion.
Seven years after, the City Treasurer of Manila, Jesus Calleja, sent to the declared
owner on record, meaning Concepcion, a first notice of tax delinquency covering the
second and fourth quarters of 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. Since no
payment was made after the first notice, a final notice which included her 1977 tax
delinquency was sent giving her another ten (10) days to settle her account. Despite
the final notice sent, no payment was made. Consequently, as a warning, the City
Treasurer sent Concepcion a notice of publication stating therein that the notice would
be published in the Times Journal and Balita after which if said property still remained
delinquent of taxes, it would be sold at public auction.
In the public auction held, the Sta. Cruz property was awarded to herein private
respondent Ricardo Perez as the highest bidder. After the auction sale, another notice
was sent to delinquent taxpayer Concepcion informing her of her right to redeem the
property pursuant to Real Property Tax Code. The one-year period having lapsed
without any redemption, Perez registered the certificate of sale with the Register of
Deeds of Manila and had it annotated at the back of TCT.
In a letter, the RD of Manila advised petitioner to surrender their TCT for the purpose
of annotating the certificate of sale in favor of Perez. Petitioner-spouses replied that the
tax sale was without legal basis and that they were never delinquent in the payment of
the realty taxes. Petitioners sued private respondents, City Treasurer Calleja, the
members of the Auction Bidding Committee and the Register of Deeds of Manila for
quieting of title, annulment of public auction sale, certificate of bill of sale, transfer
certificate of title, damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.
RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner. Petitioners received a copy of the
decision and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court ordered the records of the case
forwarded to th Intermediate Appellate Court. But up to the time when private
respondent Perez filed his motion to dismiss the appeal of petitioners on June 3, 1986
or after a period of one (1) year, one (1) month and twenty-two (22) days from April 11,
1985, no records were received by the appellate court.
In the assailed Resolution, the CA granted respondent’s motion to dismiss appeal for
failure of the appellants (petitioner) to prosecute.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of petitioner on the ground of
non-transmittal of the record on appeal.
Ruling: YES.
The record on appeal as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal has been eliminated
under BP Blg. 129 and Section 18-20 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which were
already in force when CA handed down its dismissal resolution. The provision provides
that: “Sec 39: No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof,
the entire record shall be transmitted; Sec. 18: Elimination of record on appeal and
appeal bond.—The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with…; Sec 20:
Procedure for taking appeal.—An appeal x x x from the regional trial courts to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order
appealed from.”
Since the appellate court based its outright dismissal of petitioners’ appeal on the non-
transmittal of the record on appeal pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules
of Court, then clearly, said dismissal was erroneous.
This Court is puzzled as to how the appellate court could have overlooked such a major
innovation introduced in the 1980 Reorganization Act and in the Interim Rules which
did away with the requirement of a record on appeal, the notice of appeal being
sufficient for the purpose. Be that as it may, the appeal by petitioners should have been
disallowed for a different reason: petitioners’ gross inaction for a period which exceeded
one year.
Conceding to the point that it is the clerk of court who is primarily responsible for seeing
to it that the records of appealed cases are properly sent to the appellate court without
delay (and having failed to do so subjects him to administrative liability), it behooves
the litigants to be more vigilant of their rights. They should take it upon themselves to
16
call the attention of the trial court as to any delay in action over their cases. The rule
that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute his appeal with reasonable diligence is
still a sound rule. He cannot simply “fold his hands” and say that it is the duty of the
clerk of court to have his case promptly submitted to the appellate court for the
disposition of his appeal.
BANTING VS MAGLAPUZ
Doctrine: See ruling.
Facts: An ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC against Spouses Banting by
the Sps. Maglapuz. Complaint alleged that spouses Maxima Reyes paid rent to Sps.
Maglapuz for the use of the property of the latter, but after a month Sps. Reyes stopped
paying rent. Sps. Maglapuz demanded the Sps. Reyes to pay rent and vacate the
property. No payment was made hence the Sps. Maglapuz filed this case against Sps.
Reyes impleading Sps. Banting with whom Spouses Reyes entered into a partnership
for the operation of a grocery store on the subject property. Sps. Reyes argued that
Sps. Maglapuz have no cause of action against them for their possession of the subject
property is lawful as it is based on a contract of lease executed in their favor by one
named Carmencita dela Cruz, allegedly the rightful owner of the property. MeTC
rendered judgment in favor of Sps. Maglapuz. Petitioner appealed the decision before
the RTC, which was dismissed for failure to comply with the order. RTC ruled that he
delay in filing the memorandum on appeal was due to the inexcusable negligence of
both counsel and clients who were given sufficient notice to file memorandum but, for
lack of coordination, failed to do so.
Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA but it was dismissed. Their MR was
denied.
Issue: Whether the CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Review of Petitioners?
[Friends wala ding issue dito about Small Claims, Section 24, tama naman ung case
based sa syllabus]
Ruling: YES.
Appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 filed with the CA is the appropriate remedy
from decisions or final orders issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Section 1 of Rule 42 reads:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file
a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals x x x. The petition shall be filed
and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or
of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. x x x.
An order of the RTC dismissing an appeal from a decision of the MeTC for failure of
appellant to file a memorandum on appeal is one such final order. It is appealable by
petition for review under Rule 42.
In the instant case, the November 21, 2002 and January 7, 2003 RTC Orders dismissed
petitioners Appeal from the August 13, 2002 MeTC Decision for their failure to file a
memorandum on appeal. These orders were therefore appealable by petition for review
with the CA. The Notice of Appeal petitioners initially filed was clearly erroneous.
Petitioners sought to rectify their error by filing the Petition for Review with the CA on
February 24, 2003. The question then is whether such recourse would prosper.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, we fixed a uniform period for appeals filed under Rules
40, 42, 43 and 45. Specifically, we set the period to appeal at 15 days from notice of
the decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is seasonably filed from the said decision or final order, within a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, petitioners should have filed the Petition
for Review on February 5, 2003. To recall, petitioners received notice of the November
21, 2002 RTC Order on December 4, 2002. Even before that, however, they were able
to file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on December 2, 2002. This was denied
by the RTC in its January 7, 2003 Order. Notice of said Order was received by
petitioners on January 20, 2003. Hence, they had a fresh period of 15 days or until
February 5, 2003 to file a petition for review. As it were, however, petitioners filed
instead a Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2003. Such mode of appeal under Section
2 (a) of Rule 41 was faulty. Recourse to it did not toll the running of the period within
which to file a petition for review. It is axiomatic that a fatally defective or erroneous
appeal or motion will not toll the running of a period to appeal. A detour from the proper
course of an appeal will not earn for the errant party a fresh start.
GONZALES v. GONZALES
DOCTRINE:
The nature of Sec. 7 (b) Rule 40 as regards the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal is
jurisdictional in character, or is designed for the protection or benefit of the appealing
party, and is mandatory. It should be filed within the required period. Parties are not
prohibited as adopting on appeal their memorandums in the lower courts, but such
should be manifested within the petiod required.
Here, Quirino failed to file its memorandum of appeal but instead filed a motion to
consolidate cases. When the RTC ordered the dismissal of the appeal, it was only on
Quirino’s MR that he manifested the intention to adopt his position paper with the MTC
as his memorandum. Thus, such was filed out of time.
17
FACTS:
Filomeno Gonzales filed an ejectment case against Quirino Gonzales. The MTC ruled
in favor of Filomeno.
In its appeal to the RTC, it ordered Quirino to submit a memorandum which shall
discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, that the failure to file shall cause the
dismissal of the case. Quirino instead filed a motion to consolidate the case with the
one she instituted with the QC RTC for annulment.
Filomeno filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the judgment of the MTC,
which was later granted.
The RTC ordered the issuance of the writ. The appeal of Quirino was dismissed for
the failure to file a memorandum.
In its MR, Quirino’s counsel explained the failure to file a supersedeas bond and prayed
that he be allowed to file his memorandum, or since he had fully discussed Quirino’s
position in the memoranmudm filed before the MTC, that he be allowed to just adopt
the same as Quirino’s memorandum of appeal. The MR was denied by the RTC. The
CA, however, reversed the RTC’s decision.
Filomeno argues that the CA had overlooked the significant fact that when Quirino
manifested her intention to adopt the position paper filed before the MTC as her
memorandum in the RTC, the RTC had already issued an order dismissing Quirino’s
appeal and long after the period to file a Memorandmu on Appeal has expired.
ISSUE:
Whether it was right for the CA to reverse the order of the RTC.
RULING:
No, the CA was wrong when it reversed the order of the RTC.
Sec. 7(b) of Rule 40 states:
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court,
a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the appellant’s Memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal
In rule of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings,
or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected is mandatory.
In appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant’s brief is mandatory for the
assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the merits. This is because
on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or
memorandum will be considered except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no
power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over
the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity
to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to
legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court (citation omitted). In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right
to appeal must play by the rules.
Nothing in Sec. 7 Rule 40 prohibits the adoption of a party’s position paper earlier filed,
such option must be manifested to the court a quo during the period within which to file
the required memorandum of appeal.
Here, Quirino was the appellant, it was obligatory upon him to file the memorandum of
appeal so that the RTC could pass on the specific issues presented and argued in the
appeal as to the errors of the lower court. However, he failed to comply with the orders
of the court, and the period of filing had elapsed. Having failed to do so, the RTC could
not pass upon such errors. While Quirino is not prohibited from adopting his position in
the MTC as his Memorandum with the RTC, his manifestation to adopt such
memorandum was done after the RTC had issued its order dismissing the appeal. In
fact, said manifestation was contained in the same pleading praying for the
reconsideration of the RTC’s order of dismissal.
HERRERA VS. BOLLOS
FACTS: Teodora Bollos commenced a civil case for forcible entry against Eddie
Herrera. Bollos alleged that through stealth and strategy and taking advantage of the
absence of Bollos, Herrera entered and occupied her Sugarland located at
Camandagan, Maninyon,
Bayawan, Negros Oriental.
Eddie Herrera, denied the allegations against him maintaining that he entered and
occupied a lot owned by Conrado Bollos, a brother of Teodora’s father, Alfonso.
Further, Herrera said that his occupation of the property was not through stealth or
strategy but by virtue of a contract of lease executed between Conrado Bollos, as
lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is Tijing’s overseer on the land.
18
As a consequence, the complaint was twice amended, first, on March 23, 1994 to
include Ernesto T. Tijing as a party-defendant and much later on October 4, 1995, this
time to implead Conrado Bollos as an additional defendant.
Trial court: Dismissed for plaintiffs’ failure to make-out a forcible entry case because of
lack of jurisdiction
Court of Appeals: Affirmed ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second
amended complaint impleading a new defendant filed beyond one year from
dispossession alleging a case of forcible entry in the original action.

RULING: No. Resolving the issue, we emphasize the basic rule that jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. “What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted
In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ complaint, both original and amended, contains sufficient
allegations constituting an action for forcible entry. Thus, the complaint alleged prior
physical possession de facto which the defendants disturbed by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, against the will or without the consent of the plaintiffs,
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for forcible entry.

19