Cahayag v CCC

Petitioner Dulos Realty was the registered owner of certain residential lots. On 20 December
1980, Dulos Realty obtained a loan from respondent CCC in the amount of F300,000. To secure the loan,
the realty executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the subject properties in favor of respondent. The
mortgage was duly annotated on the certificates of title on 3 February 1981. On 29 March 1981, Dulos
Realty entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Cahayag over the lot covered by TCT No. S-39775.
On 12 August 1981, Dulos Realty entered into another Contract to Sell, this time with petitioner Rivera
over the lot covered by TCT No. S-28335. Dulos Realty defaulted in the payment of the mortgage loan,
prompting respondent CCC to initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale was
held with CCC as the highest bidder. And affidavit of virtue of consolidation was annotated on the
corresponding titles, and the name of DUlos Realty were all cancelled and new TCT’s in the name of CCC
were issued. After the consolidation, Dulos Realty entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale and sold to
respondent Qua the same properties. The sale was duly annotated and new corresponding titles were
issued in the name of Qua. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale and other documents. The complaint alleged the petitioners were owners of the properties
in question by virtue of Contract of Sale individually executed in their favor. Respondents failed to file an
answer within the reglementary period. Subsequently they were declared in default. The RTC ruled that
the foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject lots, as well as the housing units was not valid. The CA
accordingly reversed and set aside the RTC decision, dismissed the case for lack of merit, and ordered
petitioners to surrender possession of the properties to Qua.

ISSUE: Whether or not contract of sale entered into by Dulos Realty with Baldoza is valid.

Ruling:

Under the law on sales, one cannot give what one does not have. Dulos Realty was no longer
the owner of the real property at the time of the sale. The court rules out ownership as a
requiredment for the perfection of a contract of sale. For all that is required is a meeting of the minds
upn the object of the contract and the price. Article 1434 of the CC provides that in case the seller
does not own the subject matter of the contract at the time of the sale, but the latter acquires title to
the thing sold, ownership shall pass to the buyer.

There was a calid sale, and there was no valid transfer to the title to Baldoza, since Dulos Realty
was no longer the owner at the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.

GO V. LOOYUKO

Facts:

Go filed a criminal case for estafa against Looyuko, alleging that the latter misappropriated the stock
certificates belonging to him by causing the transfer of the aforementioned stock certificates to
Looyuko’s name after receiving the same in trust from Go. Suring the pendency of the criminal case, the
prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of the
prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses.
This prompted Go to file a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess in jurisdiction by not allowing the
prosecution’s witnesses to testify for their case.

Issue: Did the trial court gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing the prosecution’s witnesses to
testify?

RULING:

Yes. The matter of deciding who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not for the defendant
or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. It cannot be overemphasized
that the trial court must accord full opportunity for the prosecution, more so in criminal cases, to
adduce evidence to prove its case and to properly ventilate the issues absent patent showing of
dilatory or delaying tactics. The reason is obvious: it is tasked to produce and adduce evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. Sans such evidence, a dismissal of the criminal case on a demurrer to the
evidence is proper. In the case at bar, there was no showing that the presentation of the three (3)
witnesses previously approved by the trial court would be dilatory and manifestly for delay.

First, the testimonies of of the witnesses would bolster and tend to prove whatever fact the
prosecution is trying to establish. Second, the superfluity of a testimony vis-a-vis what has already been
proven can be determined with certainty only after it has been adduced.

KATON V. PALANCA

FACTS:

Petitioner Katon contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan,
Palawan, had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition
upon his request and at his instance. However, Palawan authorities then favorably endorsed the request
of Respondent Palanca, together with some others, which resulted in the issuance of homestead patent
in Palanca’s favor in 1977 among others. In 1999, filed a petition which seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the Palanca et al. as well as the reconveyance
of the whole island in his favor. Palanca et al. filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court
dismissed Katon’s Complaint as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The petition was dismissed motu
proprio pursuant to the appellate court’s residual prerogative. The CA ruled that prescription had
already barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questions this dismissal. He submits that the CA
erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it
motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual
prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still
validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an
appellate court.

ISSUE:

Was the Court of Appeals correct in applying residual prerogative in dismissing a case motu proprio
based on prescription?

RULING: YES.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings
or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the
claim or action. xxx On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow
the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore,
on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to
dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.