COLLECTION LATOMUS

Fondee par M. RENARD en 1939

Continuee par J. DUMORTIER-BIBAUW
et C. DEROUX (directeur honoraire)
Dirigee par D. ENGELS
VOLUME 355

Hans BECK, Martin JEHNE, and John SERRATI (eds.)

1
Money and Power
in the Roman Republic/

ISBN 978-90-429-3302-6 .
D/2016/0602/55

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Roman War Finances in the Age of
the Punic Wars 1
Bruno BLECKMAmf
War need not always be the father of all things. In Roman history, however, the
connection between public organization and the demands of warfare on other
areas is evident. It is thanks to the Punic Wars that the Roman Republic created
a silver currency, established overseas provinces, built a fleet, established mar-
itime interests, and acquired the ability to supply and feed large armies for long
periods and on several fronts - an ability that explains the creation of the Roman
Empire independently of advances in tactics and weaponry. The importance of
money and power is omnipresent in the period of history in which the Roman
republic founded an empire that surpassed all other ancient powers in complexity
and size. During this phase of rapid expansion of Roman power, the investment
of resources and money again and again brought profits that far exceeded the
original capital. Despite periods of great loss during the First Punic War from
218-216, this recipe for success functioned fairly consistently over the longue
duree. It explains not only Rome's imperial success, but also the (quite fragile)
solidarity of the nobility, which was less the product of a common ethos than
of participation in the permanent expansion of military power and economic
resources. The finances of the rival hegemonic power, Carthage, relied on the
same mechanism of wartime profit but gradually diverged from this policy due
to the need for greater liquidity to pay mercenaries. 2 The mechanism of wartime
profit in Carthage, however, would falter in the event of military defeat. Tiris is
illustrated especially by the mercenary rebellion after the First Punic War, when
the Carthaginian government paid the price of funding war by speculating on
booty that it ultimately failed to materialize.
Beyond such extremely generic comments, Roman income and expenditure
in the age of the Punic Wars can only be sketched in outline, neglecting nuinerous
1 Translated by J. DILLON.
2 Cf. PoL. 6.52.5 and Droo. 29.6. This difference explains why the Carthaginians
minted considerably more money than the Romans during the first two wars. The Romans
also, however, certainly paid mercenaries, such as Celtic or Celtiberian auxiliary troops
(ZON. 8.16.8 und POL. 2.7.10; PLU., Cat. Mai. 10.2). The difference between Rome and
Carthage thus grew only gradually. LIV. 24.49.8 seems to represent the hiring of merce-
naries in 213 as an unusual novelty.
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF THE PUNIC WARS 83
unspecified qualifications and unanswered questions, some of which will be
addressed in this brief overview. 3 Despite calculations such as those made by
T. Frank or P. Marchetti, which explain Roman war finances in the form of a
precise budget with income and expenses, there are considerable grounds for
caution that must be acknowledged. 4 Such a historical model, first of all,
requires that one optimistically accept the numbers given in the ancient historio-
graphical sources, above all Livy, as a genuine record of balances and war
expenses. The history of war finances in such studies is thus always connected
to questions of source criticism however the problems are virtually insurmount-
able. Primarily, the question as to the reliability of the statements concerning
the number of legions raised must be addressed. For instance, whether it was an
army of eight legions or only an augmented four-legion army that fought at the
Battle of Cannae affects the total volume of finances that can be estimated for
the war. For the critical year 215, Livy, who relies on the largely invented mil-
itary narratives of the late annalists, 5 relates a fictitious battle (the Battle of
Grumentum), at which Ti. Sempronius Longus, consul of 218, is given com-
mand over equally fictitious troops. 6 A large portion of the legions raised in 214
owe their existence to a mechanical doubling in Livy's source. 7 The falsifications
of the annalists prevent us from detemrining anything certain about the number
of legions that were or were not retained in sexvice during winter in wartime,
and this is of no small consequence for war expenses. 8
Skepticism of a simple model of income and expenditure is appropriate not
only with respect to the extant numbers. The formulation of "income" and
3 See the current synthesis by NAco DEL HoYo 2011. The excellent synthesis in
CADIOU 2008 handles an abundance of the problems related to financing the Second Punic
War in Spain.
4 FRANK 1933: 61~68 on the First Punic War and the table on p. 95 on the Second
Punic War; MARCHETTI 1978a. Frank's collection of materials, however, remains of lasting
value.
5 Examples would include the victories at Ilutergeia and futibili (LIV. 23.49.9-11 and
13), the non-existent battle at Capua (LIV. 25.4.12), a fictitious victory of Claudius Nero
at Grumentum (Lrv. 27.41.1A2.13) and more of the same.
6 Cf. LIV. 22.37.10-11 with SEIBERT 1993: 236, n. 61. The fundamental skepticism
of the number of legions in Livy, articulated by GELZER 1964, is in my opinion justified.
Contra MARCHETTI 1978a: 8 and 141, n. 7.
7
SEIBERT 1993: 254, n. 5 with bibliography.
8 ROSENSTEIN 2004: 36f. considers the measures of 215, when some of the legions at
Nola were sent home, to have been a necessary exception and believes that legions nor-
m~lly wintere~ where they were deployed; cf. also SEIBERT 1993: 238. One can agree
with Rosenstem 2004: 43, that the need to work the fields at home should not have been
a reason to dismiss the soldiers. On the other hand, simply the exigencies of provisioning
the army could explain why it was difficult to keep the legions in the field over the long
tenn. For the First Punic War, it is surely correct to assume that the legions were
deployed only for a short campaign, a few weeks during the summer, which goes toward
explaining part of the rushed strategy of the period.
84 BRUNO BLECKMANN
"expenditure" supposes that perhaps not all income flowed directly into the
aerarium, the central treasury, but that some kind of central oversight or admin-
istration existed. The fact that the Senate had actually achieved such power of
control by the late second century 9 does not necessarily mean we may assume
something similar for the age of the Punic Wars. Not only the annalistic sources
used by Livy, but even Polybius sketches a picture of the Punic Wars generations
after the events; he presumes mechanisms of control that were created, in part,
after the Second Punic War as well as a highly developed set of regulations, and
the means to enforcing them, such as can be observed in other areas under the
jurisdiction of the nobility during the same period. 10
However, even during the second century, the Senate's control over war
finances was far from absolute. The fact that it was impossible to distinguish
between private and public spheres of war finance is exemplified by the case of
war booty, which, during the age of the Punic Wars, constituted a considerable
portion of Rome's income. 11 There was no strict division between the private
booty of the general and the public booty of state, regardless of how praeda and
manubiae exactly differ. 12 The distribution of booty was left primarily to the
general's discretion and perhaps also - as in the case of the. ~ooty Manlius
Vulso seized from the GalatianS - the outcome of later pohtlcal and legal
wrangling. If a general made war booty available to the state, the funds were
not necessarily deposited into the central treasury. 13 Booty could also be dis-
tributed directly among the people, as was done by Duilius. 14 Money could also
be distributed to soldiers on site or kept and spent to finance one's own cam-
paign, which is what occurred with the 600 talents that Scipio found in Carthago
Nova and transferred to his quaestor. 15 Exceptionally, under Fabius Cunctator,
9 POL. 6.13.
10 Centralized finances were also a way of keeping increasingly autonomous military
commanders under control; see CADIOU 2008: 511.
11 Booty constituted a very significant part of income at the time of th~ 1:1111ic War~.
In the (problematic) summary of FRANK 1933: 95, it am_ounted to 65 ~lhon denaru,
equal to the 65 million collected in tributum or approximately one fifth of the total
income of the Roman state in the period from 218 to 201.
12 Cf the opposed positions of SHATZMAN 1972b and CHURCHILL 19~9., Even if ?Wnu-
biae were supposed to belong to the public, not p~vate, sphere, Ch~rchdl ~ analys1~ also
clearly shows that the general ultimately could dispose of manubiae at his own d1scre~
tion when he considered it useful.
13 Contra CADIOU 2008, ZoN. 9.3 does not provide evidence that the Scipios sent
booty back to Rome. The exact opposite is the case. In contrast to the other participants
in the war, the Scipios sent only worthless pieces of booty, namely children's dice, back
to Rome. The rest was dispersed immediately on site.
14 BECK 2005: 221. Booty was distributed to individual soldiers at the triumph of
Cn. Manlius Vulso (Lrv. 39.7.2), at which each soldier received 42 denarii; see also
Liv. 40.16.9. For the third century, see e.g. EUTR. 3.16.1.
!5 POL. 10,19,1. According to Appian (Hisp. 4.23), gold, silver, and ivory were duly
sent to Rome.
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF TI-IE PUNIC WARS 85
the proceeds from the sale of captives were deposited in the public treasury, but
this detail was probably introduced by the annalists to exalt Fabius as the sup-
posedly ideal general. 16 Scipio gave the captives from Carthage Nova to his
tribunes to distribute to the soldiers, apparently for private resale. 17 Moreover,
the sources tend to describe booty only as the result of significant undertakings
by the army, so that only exceptionally do we glimpse at ·the numerous raids
made by marauding soldiers on their own initiative, who neither surrendered
their plunder to the aerarium nor made it available for the provisioning of the
troops. 18
Further haziness looms: remarkably, the exact amount of the stipendium
that a Roman soldier received during the Punic Wars, despite its crucial impor-
tance, is not attested in the sources. Instead, we must content ourselves with
Polybius' statement, relevant to c. 150 B.C., that soldiers received two (Attic)
obols per day, the interpretation of which has been extensively discussed. 19
Payment was probably also irregular, and, during the First and Second Punic
Wars, may often have been left unpaid, not only in crisis periods such as
around 215, for which Livy (24.18) reports the soldiers patriotically did with-
out pay. The timing of the mutiny at Sucro 20 - the year 206, when after the
expulsion of the Carthaginians no serious military engagements were expected
in Spain - may suggest that the demand for previously unpaid wages might
have occurred, above all, when other lucrative sources of income such as booty
or donatiua dried up. 21 It is also unclear how the cost of provisions was calcu-
lated against the legionary stipendium. Under the Empire, part of the pay of a
professional soldier was deducted for provisions guaranteed by the state, espe-
cially grain. 22 Polybius's account clearly suggests that this was essentially also
16
Ernrn.. 3.16.1: uiginti quinque milia hominum captiuorum uendidit, praedam mili-
tibus dispertiuit, pecuniam hominum uenditorum adfiscum rettulit. Cf OROS. 4.18.5.
It is probably historically correct that part of the booty was brought to the aerarium
though not in the way described by the Livian tradition; cf. Pw., Fab. 22. '
17
See WELWEI 2000: l!Of. on POL. 10.17.6-14 and 19.8 (cf. Lrv. 26.47.1-3).
18
Ll'I'..
26.6.3 on the plundering of Bruttium by Roman soldiers, who are represented
as followmg the bad example of others: postremo Romani quoque milites iam contagione
quadam rapto gaudentes, quantum per duces licebat, excursiones in hostium agrosfacere.
FRANK 1933: 81 gives only a global estimate of 10,000,000 drachms for booty from
small locales t~at would have been deposited in the central treasury. The enormous
booty that Laehus, for example, seized during his raids in Africa (Lrv. 29.4.6) is omitted
from Frank's survey.
19
On the interpretation of PoL. 6.39.12 see BOREN 1983: 437-442. On the question
whether Polybius presumes Attic drachms, see PEDRONI 2001 against the view of Lo
CASCIO 1982. On the amount of the stipendium in the third century, see BOREN 1983:
455-458. ·
20
PoL. 11.28.3-6; LIVY 28.5.6.
21
Thus CADIOU 2008: 496. In general on compensation for the lack of booty with
payment of the stipendium, see BOREN 1983: 432f.
22
BOREN 1983: 435; IIERZ 2007.
86 BRUNO BLECKMANN
true for the armies of the Republic. 23 Payments of cash would have made little
sense when soldiers were serving in areas where it could not be used. 24 More-
over, part of their pay could have been met from income obtained on site and
not sent by the central administration. 25 The dispatch of large amounts of cash
from Rome is less plausible than the assumption that payment was kept on
the books as a soldier's basic need, and that this basic need was satisfied at
the discretion of the general as the financial situation permitted. 26 The mutiny
at Suero could be explained by the fact that Scipio had accommodated the
soldiers' demands for payment only for his own campaigns, while the total
from the preceding years was left unpaid. 27
Even if the Roman state usually provided grain directly, this does not mean
that all the costs of war were met in cash; on the contrary, allies or communities
in the war zone, for example, could be commanded to supply grain. In individ-
ual cases, but presumably seldom during the Punic Wars, allies were even paid
23 POL 6.39.15.
24 Napoleon's Grande Annee encountered similar supply problems in the sparsely
urbanized regions of White Russia.
25 Cf e.g. Lrv. 28.25.9, 28.34.11, and 29.3.5, where money for the soldiers' pay is
extracted from Spanish communities. CADIOU 2008: 499 attempts to qualify the first
passage with reference to POL. 11.25 and argues that only the amount of the outstand~g
stipendium payments, which normally were paid directly by Rome, was colle~te? m
Spain. One of Cadiou 's central theses is that the stipendium was always, and on pnnc1ple,
paid from Rome out of the aerarium, and that money was transported from Rome to the
annies in order to accomplish this. There were more ideological than material reasons
for this, namely so one could impress upon the soldiers that they were Roman citizens;
the stipendium that was paid by the central administration from the tributum or, after
168, from other income of the Roman people, will have demonstrated "[la] persistance
d'une certaine conception de l'armee civique." CADIOU 2008: 509 supports this central
thesis with reference to Cic., Prov. 28. Yet the special situation faced by Caesar, who
could have arranged for the payment of soldiers' wages without relying on the aerarium,
should, in my opinion, be interpreted differently. It was only because Caesar's legions
had been raised illegally that he required that their citizen status be legitimated ex post
facto by the payment of their wages from the aerarium. For citizen annies of the Second
Punic War, though, these problems of legitimation were irrelevant; there was no need to
confirm one's citizen status by payments from the aerarium. The decentralized and far
more practical way of paying the stipendium with resources found on site raised no
special questions.
26 In contrast to CADIOU 2008: 495, who holds that it was impossible to calculate the
stipendium and booty together: "II est done raisonnable de penser que les differents
postes de la fiscalite militaire etaient plus etanches qu'on ne l'a dit. Le ge~eral ne pou-
vait pas interchanger a sa guise les fonds precisement calculule et foum1s en vue du
stipendium avec le produit du bu tin." The passages discussed are from Sallust and
Cicero thus different rules would have applied during the time of the Punic Wars.
27 Cf. PoL. 11.28 (speech of Scipio): "It is clear to me that you are frustrated because
I haven't paid you your wages, but that was not my fault. During my time in office, you
always received your wages in full. But if you are still owed by Rome, because what has
long been owed you has not yet been made good ... "
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN TIIE AGE OF THE PUNIC WARS 87
for supplying grain, so even further costs might be incllrred. 28 It is, at any rat~,
clear that the uncertainties of supplying grain would have made attempts to
keep balances pointless, even if accurate figures were available.
T~e fluctuating needs of providing the anny with grain also leave it an open
quest10n how much revenue the aerarium had to generate at the beginning of a
campaign. If tributum really was the payment of one-tenth of one percent of
one's property value, total revenue would have been unpredictable and varied. 29
It is possible and even probable that the total amount needed to finance a camM
paign was determined by the consuls in advance and then distributed to individual
~nits,_ not according to the number of taxpayers, but according to larger units,
1.e. tnbes an~ centuries; the tribuni aerarii were responsible for collecting the
amount and hable for the sum. 30 In these cases, naturally, it remains unknown
wh~t~er the tribuni ~erarii were held to their pledges and had to make good on
def1c1ts by surrendenng their property. In some cases, the tributum, which was
by no means collected every year, had the character of a more or less voluntary
loan ra~er than a tax. Repayment from war booty may have been frequent. 31
Dependmg. on_ wh~ther the expenses from direct taxes were compensated by the
generous d1strtbutton of booty or not, the total budget of the Roman state might
~e comple~ly different. In terms of income, one also must reckon with poten-
hally profitable currency manipulation, which often occurred in pre-modem
states as a kind of hidden tax and is attested explicitly by Pliny for both the First
and Second Punic Wars, although the details are problematic. 32
It is likewise unknown to what extent the central administration in Rome
calculated the revenue from the provinces under its control in addition to the
income from citizens. The provincials in Spain were systematically taxed during
the later second century at the earliest, 33 but one may assume that provincials
28
On the practice of having Roman officials and soldiers purchase grain, e.g. in Thes-
saly an~ Apuliaduring the second century, see ERDKAMP 1998: 105 and 112. On payment
for gram, Lrv. 36.2.12.
29
See NICOLET ~976a: 213-215. In greater detail on the general problem, NICOLET
1976b. Contra e.g. NACO DEL Hoyo 2005: 381-383. In favor of Nicolet's thesis is the
fact ~at the_ eisphora in Athens, which became a regular tax only in 347, functioned in
precisely this way, as for example the first eisphora of the Peloponnesian War where
the Athenians set a sum of 200 talents (Tuuc. 3.19.1). '
30
NicoL~T 1976a: 214-216 with reference to the implications of D. H. 4.19.1-4.
On the p;oe1~phora -~ystem, cf. NICOLET 219, who thus also intelligibly explains the role
of the tnbum aeraru.
31
Attested for Manlius Vulso: LIV. 39.7.4-5. See BURAsELIS 1996: 165f.; NAco DEL
J:Ioyo 2005: 374. The repayment of tributum by Papirius Cursor is presumably ficti-
tmus; cf. LIV. 10.46.5.
32
_ FLIN., Nat. 35, 45. Cf. NICOLET 1963. FRANK 1933: 81f. also considers the manip-
ulation of the currency a form of special income.
33
On the date when regular taxation was introduced in Spain, see NAco DEL HOYO
2005: 379; connected with Tiberius Gracchus by RICHARDSON 1976.
88 BRUNO BLECK.MANN
were irregularly taxed at least in an improvised fashion to support the Roman
army even. earlier. One must also distinguish such payments from occasions
which Roman generals financed and supplied the army with raids and plunder-
ing, usually against enemies but also sometimes against neutral parties. The
campaign of L. Veturius and Q. Caecilius in 206 was limited to just such a
plundering raid, 34 whereas that of Laelius in Africa was meant to prepare
the ground and find the finances for the "proper" invasion which was to be
conducted by Scipio. The question as to what extent the armies in Spain were
supplied by pillaging the countryside' has been the object of scholarly contro-
versy. Some scholars interpret the saying of Cato, Bellum se ipse alet, as a break
from previous practice and infer that the Spanish armies previously had drawn
their grain supply from Italy. 35 However, Cato may only intend a contrast with
his immediate predecessors in office after 197 B.C. In general, with respect to
the provision of grain, one will have had to consider numerous variables. Grain
from Rome was necessary especially at the beginning of a campaign. In the
interest of their own success, the commanders setting out from Rome would
ensure that all possible resources at home were tapped to outfit their campaigns,
but part of the necessary provisions, such as fodder for horses and firewood,
could only be obtained at their destination; the theater of war itself. Such
advance provisioning and financing were not always possible. After Cannae, the
propraetors T. Otacilius and Cornelius Mamula in Sicily and Sardinia waited in
vain for pay and supplies from the central administration in Rome; instead they
received the instructions to provide for the fleets and armies themselves. 36
Since there was no hostile territory in these provinces that could be plundered,
the problem was solved by a (hardly) voluntary gift from Hiero and by the
allegedly well-meaning contributions of Sardinian cities. 37
Once legions were in the field, on the other hand, they could dispense with
grain and money from Italy. The fact that only in 215 the Scipio brothers
requested that the state provide for the anny 38 may illustrate that a year earlier,
in 216, it had been possible to support the army on the land, while at least part
of the troops in Spain in 217 .were still supplied from Italy. 39 Sometimes ship-
ments and payments from Italy were supplemented by provisions and money
collected in the theater of war itself. This was true, for example, of Scipio's
34LIV. 28.11.12-15.
35For this interpretation of LIV. 34.1.12, see e.g. ERDKAMP 1995: 170; ERDKAMP
1998: 95. See also CADIOU, 2008: 579-583, who emphasizes Cato's tactical motives for
his campaign, which were to deprive the enemy of local resources.
36 LIV. 23.21.1-5.
37
Cf. LIV. 23.21.
38 LIV. 23.48.4-5.
39 This is true anyway of the force with P. Scipio that reached Spain in 217 (cf. Liv.
22.22.1-2). The report about the extraordinary success of the Scipios in 216 (LIV. 23.26-
29) warrants considerable skepticism; cf. SEIBERT 1993: 220-223.
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF THE PUNIC WARS 89
army in Sicily. Scipio had supplied his army grain from Sicily, but prepared
for the offensive in Africa with grain from Italy. 40 The broad claim that "most
often grain was sent from Rome" 41 in provinces like Spain may thus need qual-
ification.
During phases of war when the armies maintained themselves by contribu-
tions, quartering, and plundering in the field, "income" was generated, but it
certainly was not registered centrally. Frank estimates gross income under the
rubric "loans, contributions, supertaxes etc.," which include income generated
by plundering raids, at 117 million denarii, but he anives at this figure only
because he needs to balance his table of total income and expenditure; he thus
requires this boldly estimated sum on the income side. In reality, most individ-
ual entries cannot be determined. The extent of grain provisioning and cash
payments that the Romans required, for example, from Sicilian cities to conduct
the land war on Sicily during the First Punic War is completely unknown. 42
The age of. the Punic Wars witnessed the development of a monetized econ-
omy and the introduction of precious metal coinage. The numismatic evidence
alone, however, does not give an all-around satisfactory explanation of how war
finances and the new coinage were connected, even if the now securely dated
introduction of the denarius provides us with one sure piece of information.
Thus it remains unclear how local issues in Spain were related to the presence
of Roman armies on campaign. 43 Silver didrachms from Emporion make up the
majority of the hoard finds, 44 while denarius payments for the Spanish troops
are scarcely attested for the period of the Second Punic War, and this situation
remained essentially the same until the war against Sertorius. 45 Since a donative
40
LIV. 29.1.14.
41
BoREN 1983: 458, who refers to LIV. 34.9.12f. and LIV. 40.35.4 with respect to
Spain. Cadiou argues similarly. Even if one correctly assumes, with Cadiou, that the con-
quered part of Spain was taxed from the beginning of the Roman presence, it is still most
probable that this tax was exacted in the form of grain deliveries. Livy's evidence, in my
opinion, pertains only to the contrast with the situation in the most recent years before.
42
For the analogy to the campaign of Manlius Vulso in Galatia, about whom Livy
and Polybius provide some detailed information, see. ERDKAMP 1998: 14. On the hazi-
ness surrounding this kind of war financing, cf. ERDKAMP 1998: 15: "The distinction
between plunder, confiscation, requisition and purchase is therefore not very clear." Cities
were commanded sometimes to provide cash and supplies at the same time, as in the case
of Abdera (LIV. 43.4.9) during the Third Macedonian War (100,000 denarii and 50,000
modii of grain), which will hardly have been an isolated case; cf. ERDKAMP 1998: 98. The
claim by FRANK 1933: 64 concerning the supply of the Roman anny in Sicily, "There
was not much foraging in Sicily; Rome either bought grain in Sicily or sent it from
Rome," is problematic; the passages from Polybius that he cites (1.18.11; 1.52.5 and 8)
do not really support this conclusion. See contra Rom 1999: 295f., and BLECKMANN
2002: 60f. with further literature.
43
E.g. drachms from Emporion,
44
CRAWFORD 1985: 87.
45
CRAWFORD 1985: 91.
90 BRUNO BLECKMANN
was paid to Spanish troops in bronze still in 179 BC, Cadiou has conjectured
that wages were paid in bronze during the Second Punic War. 46 The communis
opinio, however, infers from the issue of denarii that soldiers were provided
with silver money as remuneration for campaigns. 47 It is possible that the first
denarius issues served above all to facilitate the division of booty. The assump-
tion that the first denarii were minted immediately after the capture of Capua,
where. an extraordinarily rich sum of precious metals was procured, might sup-
port this claim. 48
The finances of the period of the First and Second Punic Wars constituted a
bundle of improvised measures and a complex system that nonetheless func-
tioned well enough, on the presumption of continual success, so that the out-
fitting and provisioning of the annies were normally guaranteed. Only in excep-
tional cases do we hear of emergencies related to the pay and supplies of the
anny. The sources, moreover, let us glimpse at only a fraction of the persons
involved in the complex process of financing war. Usually only the generals are
known, while nothing is said about other individuals. We can only speculate
that wars were undertakings supported by private investment, from the consul
or from clients of Roman or Italic origin, and bound up in personal assets. The
use of one's private property in the service of imperial ventures was a tradition
of ancient polis culture. 49 Even in Athens, which possessed very sophisticated
central treasuries, the real costs of war far exceeded the numbers listed in the
official budget. In Rome, a successful campaign might also give a member of
the nobility and his adherents long-term influence in Roman-politics; one might
need to guarantee such success by offering one's own person or property within
a network of friendships. The irregular appointment of young Scipio African.us
to the Spanish command, with which he had to save the influence of his house
after severe defeats, must have depended on the massive support of clients and
friends, who must have provided at least part of the supplies that he brought to
Spain. 50
46 CADIOU 2008: 518f. on LIV. 40.59.2.
47
Cf BoREN 1983: 455 with reference to PLIN., Nat. 33.45.
48 SzAIVERT 2008: 165-170. KONDRATIEFF 2004 assumes that precious metals were
minted for the purpose of distributing booty already by Duilius.
49
Cf. Tttuc. 6.32.5 on private investment in the Sicilian Expedition (trans. M. HAM-
MOND': "Anyone computing the combined public and private expenditure on this expe-
dition would have found that in total a vast sum of money was leaving the city. Public
costs were not only the expense already committed but also the funds sent with the
generals. Private money had been spent by individuals on their own equipment and by
the trierarchs on their ships, with more costs to come: add to that the pocket money for
a long campaign which everyone would have taken over and above their state pay, and
all that servicemen or merchants had with them on board for trading purposes."
50
On Scipio's decision (which the late annalists make virtually impossible to recon-
struct) to remain legally priuatus (Dm fr. 47.40), see BECK 2005: 338-340; BLOSEL 2008.
Scipio brought 400 talents, the provenance of which is indeterminate; cf. PoL. 10.18;
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF THE PUNIC WARS 91
The fixation of the historiographical tradition on the collective history of
Rome leaves few traces of how private players bore the financial burdens of the
state at their own risk. An episode from the year 217 -· the refusal of the senate
to pay ransom money promised by Fabius Maximus - perhaps shows that the
Senate controlled finance in many areas, just as Polybius (6.13) claims. 51 The
fact that Fabius nonetheless paid the ransom from his own property illustrates,
however, the peculiar fusion of public and private finances that make calculat-
ing a total balance of war expenditure impossible. 52 That the property of private
individuals could meet the needs of an entire anny on a narrowly circumscribed
field for at least one campaign is illustrated by the unusual and chance account
of Busa, a female member of the Italic elite, among whom numerous families
rose to join the nobility in the third century. 53
While these two cases show how private property might be sacrificed in
emergencies, private property was also· used to make a profit. This encompasses
the various sb.ades of war entrepreneurialism, which was of greater importance
in the wars waged by ancient city states than is generally assumed. Scattered
cases of war entrepreneurs are identifiable in Carthage, for example, where one
Hannibal "the Rhodian" is found acting as the captain of a ship at his own
expense and peril. 54 The Athenian trierarchies of the fourth century were by
no means always only the losing proposition of patriotic citizens obligated to
perform the liturgy; on the contrary, they could be so profitable that they were
sold at auction. The profit derived primarily from the opportunity to undertake
plundering raids (sylan). A war entrepreneur like Timotheos utilized capital in
a complex system of loans of all kinds and plundering campaigns. 55
Naval warfare under the Roman Republic must have generated analogous
cases, as may be inferred from some late notices. Already at the beginning
of the First Punic War, private interest in plunder was decisive, dictating the
resolution of the rich majority of the comitia centuriata to declare war on
APP., Hisp. 4.18. Livy relates that Scipio received the command because no one else was
prepared to take it over (LIV. 26.18.4-11; APP., Hisp. 4.18), but one may conjecture that
Scipio received the command because he was prepared to make significant material
investments in the campaign. Whether the army of volunteers he brought with him to
Spain came from his own clients is unknown; see, however, POL. 35.4 on the younger
Scipio.
51 NAco DEL HoYo 2005: 376 on LIV. 22.23.7-8.
52 The details of the transaction seem of dubious authenticity. Fabius would have
sold an estate and from the proceeds paid the ransom money for the remaining Romans.
According to this report, Fabius would have had to pay 2.5 Roman pounds of silver for
each of the 247 remaining Romans.
53 Lrv. 22.52.7, 22.54.4-5. Although with great difficulty, Busa ultimately provides
for 10,000 men. ERDKAMP 1998: 164, n. 22 is highly skeptical of Busa's historicity, but
see FRONDA 2010: 65 on Busa and Canusium.
" POL. 1.46.4-47.10. Cf AMELING 1993: 134-137.
55
On which cf. DEM. 51.13; Ps.-DEM. 24; Ps.-D. 48 and EICH 2006: 439-444.
92 BRUNO BLECKMANN
Carthage. 56 The importance of war entrepreneurialism becomes clear especially
in the last years of the war - only if, however, one corrects Polybius' account
with the alternative tradition that is available.
Polybius gives the impression that Roman resources were utterly exhausted
at the end of the war; recourse to the private wealth of prominent, patriotic
citizens who provided ships for the fleet of Lutatius Catulus was only an emer-
gency solution. 57 This characterization is probably inaccurate as after the defeat
at Drepana, Rome had abandoned the costly naval war, an action which the
tribunes of the plebs had criticizes for its riskiness. The commanders of the land
army meanwhile, without any restrictions, fell back on the rich resources of Sicily,
which had been available to them since the 40s almost in their entirety. The
expenses necessary to finance the legions and man the cities were balanced by
gifts from Hiero and by the contributions of numerous Sicilian cities paid in kind.
War fatigue and exhaustion, in contrast to the dramatic, psychologizing picture
painted by Polybius, 58 were thus probably kept in check on the Roman side.
Lutatius Catulus had to rely on private citizens for his campaign probably
not because the treasury was completely empty and no public resources were
available, but rather because the outfitting of a fleet had been prohibited by law
after the catastrophic loss of several fleets. 59 Military operations at sea in this
period, the 40s of the 3rd century, despite the prohibition on naval watfare, did
not come completely to a halt. Raids by privateers proved far more successful
and incidentally maintained Roman maritime expertise. 60 This somewhat plau-
sible scenario wins a certain credibility over the alternative tradition (especially
in Cassius Dio/Zonaras).
The business negotiations to outfit ships on the eve of the Battle of the Aegates
Islands, as well as the advancement of supplies to the army and the credit busi-
ness, are developments of war entrepreneurism observable already in the Greek
world. One difference from the Greek world could be the fact that the hierarchical
structure of Roman society tied war entrepreneurs to the clientelae of the great
nobiles. That explains, for example, why the interests of negotiatores and ship
owners influenced Roman policy so decisively in the third century. 61
56 PoL. 1.11.2 (with misunderstandings concerning the majority in the comitia centu-
riata).
57
POL. 1.59.6.
58
PoL. 1.58.7-9.
59 For the details of the ban on naval warfare, see BLECKMANN 2002: 177-185; on
the outfitting of Lutatius Catulus' fleet, see BLECKMANN 2002: 205-214.
60 Known from ZoN. 8.16.3 and 8. On a Roman pirate ship active in the eastern
Mediterranean in the 40s, cf. PLU., Arat. 12.5.
61 PoL. 1.83.7-8 (500 merchants who traveled from Italy to Carthage); (the murder
of negotiatores by Teuta). Only very few ship owners will have personally traveled
overseas; cf. C1c., Verr. 2.5.154 (P. Granius as ship owner from Puteoli). In certain
cases, ownership of the ship was shared; cf. Pw., Cat. Mai. 21.5-6 on this system of risk
minimization, and in general o'ARMs 1981: 33-44.
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF THE PUNIC WARS 93
For the Second Punic War, Livy in particular provides information about the
behind the scenes financial and organizational efforts of war entrepreneurs. The
tendency of the annalists toward realistic invention, projecting later conditions
anachronistically onto earlier times, makes it difficult to evaluate Livy's detailed
depiction of financial operations during the Second Punic War. His account,
however, clearly suggests that the importance of private financiers :fluctuated
dramatically.
As the conflict over Saguntum escalated, business ambitions were placed in
privateering and profit from supplying provisions overseas. Such voyages must
have been anticipated for the military operations against the Carthaginian pos-
sessions in Spain and in Africa itself, in other words, the commands entrusted
to the consuls of 218. These campaigns were planned as large naval operations.
In addition to the consular rumies, Sempronius Longus was provided a fleet of
160 ships; Cornelius Scipio, a fleet of 60 ships. 62 The same parties who had
risen to prominence at the end of the First Punic War may have made sufficient
investments to accompany these armadas or to undertake privateer raids in their
wake. Such a background could most convincingly account for the lex Claudia
de naue senatorum, passed in 218. This law addressed precisely the question of
private investments in privateer and transport ships. 63 It is clear that senators
were eager to participate in such ventures, but the (perhaps only slight) majority
in the popular assembly apparently found this combination of political decision-
making and private interest inappropriate. 64
These hopes evaporated after the great defeats at the battle against Hannibal.
The precarious financial situation after the Battle of Cannae described by Livy
is corroborated by the reduction of the silver content of contemporary coin
issues. 65 Compulsory measures were introduced to finance the armies, yet pri-
vate capital continued to play a part. In the Spanish theater of war, the anny
allegedly was supplied with grain and clothing by nineteen patriotic persons,
who stipulated two conditions: that they be exempt from military service and
that the state covers risk of loss, to the enemy or in the event of storms. 66
E. Badian argues that a system of public contracts was established already
by the time of the Second Punic War, whereby the state paid large sums of
money to companies of military contractors for the provisioning of the army.
Badian conjectures that the isolated cases mentioned by Livy are only the tip of
62
LIV. 21.17.5 and 8. Private investors may also have participated in Laelius' pirat-
ical operatinos (LIV. 29.1.14, 29.3.6~5.l). For general plundering by fleets during the
Second Punic War, see L1v. 29.26.1.
63 ELS'IER 2003: 187-190 (No. 57).
64
LIV. 21.63.4 reinterprets the moral by assuming that material gain was altogether
unbecoming a senator. See contra, the passages collected by n'AR.Ms 1981: 20 (PLu., Cat.
Mai. 21.8; PoL. 6.56.1-3 etc.).
65
ZoN. 8.26 with NICOLET 1963: 417ff.
66 LIV. 23.49.i-4.
94 BRUNO BLECKMANN
the iceberg, since the majority of contracts would have fallen within the norms
of the public contracting system and received no further notice. 67 Later schol-
arship, however, has rejected the theory that the army was supplied by private
contractors as an anachronism that projects the conditions of the Late Republic
and even the Early Modem period onto the age of the Punic Wars. 68 The pro-
vision of grain and clothing in advance of payment by private citizens demon-
strably falls outside the normal structures in place to supply the Roman army.
The extensive grain deliveries that helped prepare Scipio's invasion of Africa, 69
for example, were imposed on dependent allies. Also, in other attested cases,
the supply of grain and provisions for the anny during the Middle Republic was
undertaken directly by the commanders. 70 This does not mean that Livy's
reports all derive ultimately from annalistic inventions. On the contrary, every
means of supplying the army with grain was an option. Within a wide range
of possibilities, grain could have been provided by a private company as an
emergency measure. Such an action would attest to the importance of war entre-
preneurs when a crisis demanded an improvised response.
Such businessmen are more easily identifiable in the famous episode con-
cerning Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi, 71 which is often erroneously connected
with the patriotic army suppliers of 215. 72 M. Postumius and T. Pomponius
Veientanus allegedly committed fraud by deliberately sinking defective ships
loaded with defective cargo and then charging the public treasury for grossly
exaggerated losses. The incident resulted in a trial against M. Postumius. Some
details of this story, especially the introduction of an established class of publi-
cani, are definitely anachronistic; others are simply absurd. The value of the
cargo, in particular, could have been checked before the ships set sail. It is also
doubtful whether the fraudulent machinations of a ship owner would have
won extensive public support, as Livy alleges. The fate of T. Pomponius, on
the other hand, is interesting: a year before the trial against Postumius, he was
captured by the Carthaginians while raiding the tenitory of the Lucanians. 73
67 BADIAN 1972.
68 ERDKAMP 1995: 168f. argues against the supposition that "large scale contractors"
were systematically involved in the provision of grain. He rightly observes (p.170) that
the provisioning of the army is not one of the tasks of the societates in Polybius' account
(6.17). See also ERDKAMP 1998: 114.
69 LIV. 29.36.3.
'° Cf BOREN 1983: 458f.; ERDKAMP 1995 and ERDKAMP 1998: especially 105-112
on the responsibility of legates and other officers for the purchase of grain.
71 LIV. 25.3, 8-5,1.
72 E.g. NICOLET 1974: 991 and 996; ERDKAMP 1995: 169; ERDKAMP 1998: 114
(M. Postumius is "one of these publicani"). BADIAN 1997: 240 (German edition of
Badian 1972 with an appendix) notes the same misunderstanding in his own work.
73 Lrv. 25.3.9: T. Pomponium Veientanum, quern populantem temere agros in Lucanis
ductu Hannonis priore anno ceperant Carthaginienses. The position of a praefectus
socium (25.1.3) who acts on his own initiative is presumably fictitious. NICOLET 1974 :
ROMAN WAR FINANCES IN THE AGE OF TI-IE PUNIC WARS 95
This is clear evidence that the financiers of the Second Punic War had main-
tained their ties to piratical war entrepreneurs.
Ship owners were indispensible in wartime for transport 74 and, occasionally,
for the provisions themselves, but such initiatives were not without their
conflicts - which may provide the background for the episode related by Livy.
This was particularly true when public compensation for private service had to
be negotiated. In an economy in which transactions in precious metal money
had reached only a primitive level, it must have been extremely difficult to
strike a balance.
The introduction of the denarius after a phase of extreme scarcity of precious
metal shows that the capture of Capua, Syracuse, and Tarentum vastly improved
the liquidity of the Roman state. War loans became good business for entrepre-
neurs. Livy attempts to give the reader the impression that these loans were acts
')
of great patriotism; his account, however, makes it clear enough that the lenders
counted on turning a serious profit. 75 In the ten years since the compulsory
fiscal measures imposed on the citizens in 210, Rome's economic situation had
changed completely. Nicolet explains this transformation as a process whereby
a tax system that relies heavily on the elite (typical for antiquity) transforms
into a kind of business relationship that permits a tiny group of privileged per-
sons to undertake lucrative, speculative enterprises. 76 However, if one takes
Livy's passages on the period after 218 into consideration it is clear that this
group of privileged persons had existed from the start but had previously
remained in the background during dangerous times for opportunistic reasons.
War entrepreneurs and speculators, whose business had become very sophis-
ticated during the period since the First Punic War, were prepared to make
advances to the state only on exorbitant terms, so that the state was forced to
collect money from citizens by means of compulsory fiscal measures. Only
when the prospect of profit improved at the end of the Second Punic War were
investments forthcoming.
Groups of investors even appear to have helped steer the course of events.
Buraselis has argued very plausibly that investors' concerns about the repay-
ment of public loans decisively influenced the controversial decision to renew
military operat~ons in the Second Macedonian War. 77 However, the financial
991, who considers Pomponi us Veientanus and Postumius equestrian publicani, remarks,
"11 est int6ressant de voir en sa personne la rencontre d'une vocation militaire et d'une
activit6 financihe." Livy 29.1.16 gives further notice of private acts of violence in the
war zone: Graeci res a quibusdam lta!ici generis eadem ui, qua per bellum ceperant,
retinentibus concessas sib ab senatu repetebant.
74
ERDKAMP 1998: 59 asswnes that the Roman state itself possessed a "fleet of cargo
vessels," but this seems impossible to verify.
75 NICOLET 1976a: 224ft.
76 NICOLET 1976a: 227f.
77
BURASELIS 1996.
96 BRUNO BLECKMANN

interests of war entrepreneurs seem to have influenced political decisions

already at the end of the First Punic War. When Lutatius Catulus attempted to
have his treaty with Carthage ratified in Rome, he was opposed not only by
noble rivals who wanted a successful command of their own, but potentially
also by the first census class, who were disappointed by the profit from the
battle of the Aegates Islands and hoped to acquire more booty in Africa. 78
The revision of the terms of the treaty, which raised the war indemnity, better
protected the interests of this class of investors and facilitated the profitable
return on the contributions to the fleet that Lutatius Catulus had promised
them. 79
In conclusion, one may say the following about the finances of the First and
Second Punic Wars. It is virtually impossible to describe Roman war finances
at the time of the Punic Wars according to a model of income and expenditure.
Rome possessed, at best, only an incipient central oversight or control of
finance. The payment of soldiers' wages from the aerarium and centrally col-
lected tributum constituted only a fraction of the real costs of war. Roman
finance flowed primarily through many smaller, decentralized circulation systems.
The Romans continually improvised and reacted sometimes more, sometimes
less effectively to local conditions. Furthermore, the greatest burden was borne
by allies and dependent provincials at and around the theater of war. Private
capital, however, played a prominent part. The Roman war machine could not
have functioned without the complementary and even crucial support of private
capital in outfitting fleets, provisioning the army, and in advancing cash and
war loans. Private entrepreneurs took on a variety of roles, appearing as pirates
and ship owners in the First and at the beginning of the Second Punic War,
and as lenders in the final years of the Second, when new, lucrative business
opportunities opened up with the introduction of Rome's own precious metal
currency. It is fair _to conjecture that their opinion canied some weight in the
political decisions of the third century.

78 ZON. 8.17.5-6.
79 PoL. 1.63.2-3,

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