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Contributors:
Richard Alston, Frances Berdan, Nick Fisher,
Susan R. Holman, Keith Hopwood, Stephen Mitchell,
Louis Rawlings, Hans van Wees, Michael Whitby

Duckworth
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The Classical Press of Wales
 3

CONDOTIIERI AND CLANSMEN

II Early Italian raiding, warfare and the state
,j
Louis Rawlings

What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence

delivered by anyone else? In the long run, enough to make the division
between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' force credible. Eventually, the per-
sonnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively,
more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and
with readier collaboration from neighbouring authorities than did the
personnel of other organisations. But it took a long time for that series of
distinctions to become established. Early in the state-making process,
many parties shared the right to use violence, the practice of using it
routinely to accomplish their ends, or both at once. The continuum ran
from bandits and pirates to kings via tax collectors, regional power
holders, and professional soldiers.
The uncertain, elastic line between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' vio-
lence appeared in the upper reaches of power ... The long love-hate affair
betwtien aspiring state makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the divi-
sion. 'Behind piracy on the seas acted cities and city-states,' writes
Fernand Braudel of the sixteenth century. 'Behind banditry, that terres-
trial piracy, appeared the continual aid oflords.' ... Many lords who did
not pretend to be kings, furthermore, successfully claimed the right to
levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers. (C. Tilly, 'War
making and state making as organised crime', 172-3.) 1

The relationship that powerful individuals had with their communities

in early central Italy of the sixth/fifth centuries BC, particularly with
respect to their conduct of warfare and raiding, could be described in
terms similar to those advanced above by Charles Tilly. Organised
crime, when performed by the leaders of communities, tends to ac-
quire the legitimacy of official policy, particularly when directed at
external targets, such as neighbouring polities or their prominent
citizens. The institutions of the state often became involved, especially
when the full resources of the community were needed to carry
through such policies, or to restrain them. Archaic Italy was a place

97
Louis Rawlings
where the boundaries between private and public. and individual and
state, were becoming more clearly defined. The introduction of vari-
ous forms of state apparatus, such as magistracies, law codes, and
voting assemblies, was accompanied by the physical manifestations of
urbanisation such as public religious and civic buildings. Yet aristo-
cratic power, built upon networks of kin and clients, also played an
important role in the formation of such communities in archaic Italy. 2
This paper argues that the current understanding of this process
could be advanced by attempting to explain the apparent contradic-
tions in the war-making of the early Roman state. The difficulties, as
they are presented in our surviving sources, can to some extent be
resolved if we understand how wars conducted by or on behalf of the
state occurred on a scale of intensities. 3 At its highest degree were the
conventional campaigns of armies involving a major commitment by
the citizen body; lower down but nevertheless on the same continuum,
came the personalised, even private, excursions of members of the
elite and their followers, supporters and kin, the legitimacy of whose
actions was significant enough for the state's religious organisations to
become interested. I shall begin the discussion by giving my view on
the nature of elite power and the role of kin and clients in early Italy
and by a brief discussion of the problem facing all enquiries into this
period: that of the value of the source material. Then I shall consider
how the phenomenon of bands and band leaders o'r condottieri (as some
scholars, using a late medieval Italian analogy, have termed these
semi-independent figures) might be reconciled with the picture of
state armies and how the state became involved to limit the power of
such individuals and their followers. 4
Clansmen
Organisations based on gentes, or clans, often also exploiting patron-
client relationships, feature in most Central Italian polities, although
most of our literary evidence inevitably is concerned with their exist-
ence in early Roman society. 5 In Rome, a gens could consist of
a number of familiae, each with a paterfamilias at its head. How far the
gens in early Rome had any real political identity is difficult to assess, as
much interpretation depends not only on how one perceives the
nature of politics in the Monarchy and the early Republic, but also on ·
how one interprets it in the late Republic. This is because much of our
evidence for Roman political life dates from the late Republic and,
although one must be very cautious in projecting back on to an earlier
period the system of a much later time, often there is little other
98
Condottieri and clansmen
evidence that is available for reconstruction. This is particularly the
case when considering the historical accOunts of early Rome produced
in the first century BC which, while looking back to the origins of the
Republic and before, are heavily influenced by the contemporary
political and social climate. While I am acutely aware of this situation,
this is not an appropriate place for a full discussion of the nature and
value of the evidence for early Roman politics, or even of the operation
of the gentes within it. I have therefore taken the line in this chapter,
which follows to a certain degree the position of Drummond, that
there was a fair amount of familiarity between gens members, and that
they were capable of co-operating if their common interests were
under threat, but that internal rivalries between individual familiae
would make consistent co-operation unlikely. 6 Gens responsibilities
and activities in our sources appear limited to common cult practices
and burial locations, the participation in some public festivals, such as
the involvement in the Lupercalia of the Quinctii and Fabii, and
limited inheritance rights. 7 When compared with the importance and
powers of the patres familiae, particularly those who were of senatorial
rank, it seems unlikely that the gentes should be considered a strong
political entity, but at least they should be credited with some self-
awareness.8 Moreover, clients appear to be attached to individual
patrons and not the gens. 9 Thus in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.10)
patrons are to be like fathers to their clients and, in the same passage,
~lie1:1ts contribute to the dowry of their patrons' daughters, and help
pay their patrons' ransoms. 10
While the religious, political, and economic power within a community
was focused on the elite as a whole, it was splintered into competing
interest groups of individuals who may well have used their personal
supporters and a range of methods for their own advancement. It is
therefore the position adopted in this analysis that aspirations and
activities of powerful individuals, and not clans, are the most signifi-
cant dynamic in these early societies, although clans do provide
a network of resources and contacts which can be turned to for the
building blocks of an individual's power and influence.
One of the most important aspects of elite control was over the scale
of warfare and the acceptable forms of violenc~ within, and external
to, the community. Warfare not only performs the function of provid-
ing security, defence, and vengeance for a community, but it also gives
status and real power to those successful in conducting it. Yet the
process of state formation leads to the curbing of private power structures
and institutions, while the development of community identity and
99
Louis Rawlings
awareness, which stems from the politicisation of its inhabitants, in-
creasingly interferes with those activities which are potentially
destabilising and threaten the continuity of the cOmmunity. 11
Source problems
A central problem is in interpreting the source material. The Romans
only began writing history with Fabius Pictor, who witnessed the
Second Punic War. Our main surviving narratives, Livy and Dionysius
of Halicarnassus, date from the Augustan period and derived their
information from those successors of Pictor who comprised the
'annalistic tradition'. Our main difficulty lies in understanding how
reliable the information transmitted by these annalists, the sources of
our sources, actually was. Moreover, it is clear that the speeches and
much of the actual narrative of particular events recorded in our
surviving narratives is composed for dramatic, didactic or even politi-
cal effect. This has led many scholars to despair of the value of much of
the literary evidence for the archaic period in Italy and to approach it
only with extreme scepticism. Their hypercritical position is succinctly
conveyed by the well known statement of Jacques Heurgon:
For a long time it has seemed that, when faced with any statement by
a Roman historian, sound method demands that one should a priori
reckon it false, work out in what circumstances it was invented, of what
later events it was a deliberate anticipation, and what public or private
interest it was intended to serve. 12
Arguments on the degree of unreliability of histo"rical writing often
focus on the rhetorical training of ancient authors and emphasise their
habit of persuading audiences sensitive to political and judicial oratory
through the use of skilful and dramatic embellishment, and even
inventio. 13 While these observations can contribute to an understand-
ing of the mind-sets of classical historians, their conceptual and cul-
tural outlook, and what they regarded as the history of early Rome, it
is often difficult to see how such critiques can contribute to the
understanding of early Rome itself.
Some additional information was collected by ancient grammarians
and antiquarians, whose interests in history were limited. Ironically
these might in places be of some value precisely because their selec-
tions are arbitrary and not based on reinterpretation of material for
historical, political or rhetorical purposes. However, care has to be
taken because their collection of material often removed it from its
original context, and this inevitably makes modern interpretation of
their evidence highly problematic.
100
Condottieri and clansmen
There are modern scholars who persist in attempting to use the
historical narratives to reconstruct a picture of early Roman and Ital-
ian society. We might term them the 'optimists' but most are not so
naive as to believe that the tradition is totally true in many places,
although this is often how the hypercritics would characterise them. 14
Instead, although they recognis~ that the histories of early Rome can
be -a valuable tool in uncovering the preconceptions and preoccupa-
tions of the historians and the society they lived in, they also argue that
there are important realities about the earlier society which can be
discovered through cautious investigation of the evidence by setting it
in a wider archaic context. They argue that it would be foolish to reject
any evidence out of hand, and that the burden of proving the
unreliability of such evidence should lie with the sceptic. Moreover, as
argued particularly by Cornell,
We should be careful to distinguish between the structural data [consist-
ing 'of a record of events set against a background of political, military
and social institutions, of which many decayed relics still survived in the
late Republic'] on which the surviving accounts are ultimately based and
the narrative superstructure within which those data are recounted,
interpreted and explained. 15
So assessing the social structures and, in this chapter, the type of
warfare (and the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by participating
groups), which predominated in the sixth and fifth centuries, is unde-
niably problematic, but worth attempting for the difficulties it reveals,
and the solutions offered by testing hypothetical models. For instance,
while there is no full account of how the Roman army fought in the
sixth/fifth centuries, the annalists believed it was directly related to the
reforms of Servius Tullius. He apparently divided the citizen body into
five classes based on wealth, but also differentiated by the weapons and
armour to be provided on campaign. Thus in Livy (1.42-3) the Servian
classes I, II and III essentially fought with hoplite arms, except that
members of class I armed themselves with the clipeus, while classes II
and III used the oval scutum. Classes IV and V were armed with
skirmishers' weapons. The conclusion of most ancient and modern
scholarship is that at some time the Roman army was organised as
a phalanx. 16 Indeed Diodorus mentions that,
in ancient times when they were using rectangular shields, the Etruscans
who fought with round shields of bronze in a phalanx, impelled them to
adopt similar arms and were thus defeated. 17
The Romans later adopted the manipular army, either after the
101
Louis Rawlings
introduction of pay in 406 BC, or during the Samnite wars. 18 However,
despite the readiness of our sources to show an evolution of military
armament and organisation, Rawson has pointed out that the annalists
in their battle accounts often perceive the action as taking place after
the manner of their own day .19 Maniples and cohorts are the opera-
tional units on the battlefield even for Etruscan phalanxes, and both
sides often use tela, thrown missiles, weapons which are not normally
associated with hoplite warfare. The Servian army described by Livy
and Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not seem to appear in their
accounts of the action. 20 However, there are some indications that the
pattern of warfare can be detected, and that the social organisation
and expectations .which govern how it was conducted may be
reconstructed. There also appear certain inconsistencies and problems.
How for instance do we interpret the Fabian disaster on the
Cremera in c. 4 79-4 77 BC? According to the tradition recorded in
Livy, the 306 members of the gens Fabia, accompanied by their retain-
ers, marched out to conduct a war against Veii while Rome's armies
were committed elsewhere. After a period of raiding Veientine terri-
tory, the Fabii were overwhelmed in battle near the river Cremera.
There are other versions that lay more, or less, emphasis on the
private nature of this undertaking, but how are we to deal with the
political prominence of the Fabii in the decade before this defeat,
particularly their string of consulships from 485-79 BC, and their dis-
appearance from the Fasti for 10 years afterwards? If we are inclined
to accept any historical reality behind the campaign - and the tradi-
tional number of 306 Fabii given in our sources and the synchronism
with Thermopylae have caused a justifiable sense of unease 21 - then we
ought to consider: (a) whether the tradition is correct in asserting that
a single clan was capable of conducting a war against the Etruscan,
and presumably hoplite, state of Veii; or (b) whether the Fabii were
conducting a private feud with the local Veientines, which led to
disaster when the regular army of Veii turned up and caught them oil
a raid; or (c) whether the Fabii were part of a much larger 'official'
army which was heavily defeated. 22
Perhaps one might speculate that the severe losses suffered by the
Fabii were in the case of (c) due to a collapse in the phalanx/battle line
at the point where they were stationed, and this might imply that the
early Republican legio was drawn up by gentes. This, of course, has no
basis in the tradition, which consistently talks of them falling into an
ambush, either on a raid, or when returning to Rome to celebrate
a gentilitial festival. 23 Nor does this model accord with what we are
102
Condottieri and clansmen
told of the evolution of the legion, which was initially organised by
Romulus from the three tribes (the Ramnes, Tities and Luceres) and
then, during the reign of Servius Tullius, the army was reorganised
into centuries and age groups. It appears that even before this
'centuriate reform', the military system of the Roman state had never
been based on families or clans. 24 One might argue that the earliest
Roman tribes and clans have a territorial overlap, indeed some tribes
appear to have gens names, such as the Fabia, Cornelia, Claudia,
Aemilia and Lemonia. 25 Such clans, through their domination of cer-
tain regions, may have indirectly contributed units to the army. But
even if this was originally so in the 'Romulean' army, the Cremera is
a post-Servian-reform campaign, and it would thus be necessary to
dismiss what we know of the military aspects of the centuriate reform
while accepting as more trustworthy, or more inherently likely, the
earlier, perhaps more primitive, organisation reported in the same
sources. 26 Rejecting one aspect of the tradition simply because it does
not fit with a belief as to how militarily sophisticated was the Roman
state in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, ought to be considered as
methodologically unsound. This discussion will instead be attempting
to create a model which integrates the apparent contradictions of the
Fabian campaign. It is the only known instance of all of the militarily
capable members of a single gens going to war together and suffering
such a disaster. Livy (2.49) also makes the point that the Fabii march
c:,ut with their cognati and sodales, so it certainly seems to be a private
affair.
It is clear then that preliminary questions ought to be how the
members of the elite organised their military power, and what their
military activities, aims, objectives were. Then one should consider
how the state regulated and controlled these activities and dynamics.
Condottieri
By looking at the activities of early Italian bands and band chiefs,
condottwri, I shall argue that the type of army that is fielded, and the
level of state involvement in a conflict, are related to the type of
warfare and the intensity of conflict. 27 Because this can vary from
cross-border (and even internal) feuding and opportunistic raiding
between local rival 'big men', to the state-threatening incursions of
'kings' and armies (e.g. Lars Porsenna), the attitude and involvement
of the state might also vary and be faced with a blurring of the distinc-
tions between private and public undertakings. One community's ban-
dit/raider problem may be another's nobles engaging in status and
103
Louis Rawlings
wealth acquisition. Are the armies fielded by states in central Italy
between c. 600-400 BC any different, except in scale, from the bands
we occasionally glimpse in our sources? In other words, what makes a
band incursion led by aristocrats into an army campaign conducted by
generals? Is it merely a cloak of convenience, a change in nomencla-
ture and, perhaps, an increase in the numbers of nobles and followers·
involved?
It is clear that prestige competition among members of the central
Italian elite was a social dynamic within states,.creating the conditions
that affected an individual's power and influence and capable ofbring-
ing about his rise or fall. However, such competition could also be
a mechanism for interaction between states. The power and status of
whole communities could be indicated by the ability of their elites to
out-do members of the aristocracies of rival communities, particularly
in war making. It is further manifested, for instance, in the ability of
members of the elite and their followers to move between communi-
ties, or even to carve out polities of their own. Am.polo noted that the
openness of Latin and Italian society to the horizontal mobility of
Italian elites was striking. 28 One could cite the examples of Lucumo,
who arrived in Rome to become King Lucius Tarquinius Priscus or, as
Am.polo does, Lucumo's father, Demaratus, who fled the Cypselid
Tyrants of Corinth with a large band of dependants and artisans to be
accepted within the elite of Tarquinii. 29 The stories of Appius Clau-
dius, Sextus Tarquinius and Coriolanus are also cases of outsiders who
were accepted into 'foreign' communities and into the social and
political circles of their new peers, and rose to command them. Each
one is informative in its own fashion, and is worth discussing briefly.
In 504 BC, according to Livy (2.16.5), the Sabine Attus Clausus,
finding himself hard-pressed by his turbulent rivals, and no match for
them, migrated to Rome taking a large number, (Dionysius 5.40.3
reports 5000), of his dependants and supporters. They were all given
citizen rights, settled across the Anio around Crustumerium, and Attus
was made a senator. So, through the success of his Sabine rivals, Attus
Clausus had moved with a personal retinue to another city where, as
Appius Claudius, he became integrated into the new Republican estab-
lishment. The region he was given to settle was directly on the path of
any Sabine attack, as apparently when in 496/5 BC a Sabine raiding
party was reported as having penetrated as far as the Anio (Livy 2.26;
cf. Livy 2.65 for 468 sc). This was the very year that Appius became
consul, and the annalists also state that the number of Roman tribes
was raised to 21 (i.e. by the creation of the Claudian tribe, although Livy
104
Condottieri and clansmen
2 .21 does not explicitly mention the name of the tribe here but cf. 2.15 ).
The case of Sextus Tarquinius is interesting because in Livy's
account he entered Gabii pretending to be a refugee from his father,
Tarquinius Superbus. He rose to prominence there by raiding Roman
territory with picked bands of men ( 1.53-4) and, having gained
a charismatic leadership of the Gabian military forces, he then killed
off leading aristocrats and delivered the city to his father. Despite the
dangers of relying on specific details of this account, (there are paral-
lels with the story ofThrasyboulus and Periander in Herodotus 5.92),
Sextus' rise is a classic example of how to become a tyrant, that is,
through the charismatic leadership of military force and the persecution
of potential rivals from among the aristocratic peer-group. 30
A further example is Coriolanus, who, so the story goes, had a large
followi_ng of companions gathered together for warlike gain. 31 Having
been driven into exile from Rome, he was accepted by the Volsci,
becoming their war-leader and bringing them to war against Rome
itself. He withdrew, not at the request of Roman ambassadors or
priests, but finally at the demand of his mother, Veturia and sight of
his wife, Volumnia. Stripped of its narrative superstructure this story
indicates a belief in the danger that a disaffected aristocrat could pose
to his original community, a danger which, in this case, might only be
stopped by his own kin. Other indications of this fear of powerful
aristocrats occur in stories where individuals were strollg enough to
pose such a risk using entirely their own resources. A well known and
often cited trio of condottieri are the Etruscan heroes, Aulus and Caeles
Vibenna along with Caeles' faithful companion Mastarna.
There are traditions that these individuals ruled Rome at some
point and the adventures ofVibennae and Mastarna seem well known
in Etruria. 32 The fourth-century Fran~ois tomb at Vulci depicts these
characters undertaking a heroic escape (with Mastarna shown freeing
Caeles) from a group of beardless youths and a bearded man, Gneve
Tarchunies Rumach (possibly Cn.Tarquinius of Rome). The term 'heroic'
is not inappropriate here since another painting in the tomb is a scene
from the Iliad: the sacrifice of Trojans at the funeral of Patroclus. 33
In the Lyon tablet recording a speech by the Emperor Claudius,
Mastarna is characterised as the most loyal companion of Caelius
Vivenna. 34 He took the remnants of Caelius' army from Etruria and
occupied the Caelian hill, perhaps, as Cornell speculates, in the way
Lars Porsenna is said to have occupied the Janiculum (although the
latter was outside the city). 35 While this may be an etymology, explain-
ing how the Caelian got its name, the point here is that this is not an
105
Louis Rawlings
army of Vulci the state, but the band of Caelius the individual. 36 The
companionship of Mastarna, who inherits his leader's band, shows the
nature of the relationship between leader and followers. As with the
Lapis Satricanus, an archaic inscription discovered at Satricum, which
is a dedication to Mars set up by the sodales, companions, of Poplios
Valesios (possibly the Publius Valerius Publicola of Rome, or a rela-
tive), these are personal, not state organisations. 37 The principal objec-
tives of these powerful individuals appear to be to dominate their
rivals, and hold cities for themselves. Perhaps also in this context the
story of Appius Herdonius is appropriate. According to Livy (3.15-18;
cf. Dionysius 10.14-17), in 460 BC Herdonius seized the Capitol with
an army of slaves and exiles 2,500 strong; the violent recapture of the
position apparently claimed the life of the consul P.Valerius Publicola.
The executions of Sp. Cassius (486 BC), Sp. Maelius (439 BC) and
M. Manlius Capitolinus (385 BC), could also indicate the fears of the
aristocracy, particularly in Rome, at the excessive influen.ce of certain
individuals with the commons, as well as the lengths the aristocracy
would go to in order to retain its collective influence once the Kings
had been expelled. 38
State armies I: The Servian reforms
The violent solutions mentioned in the preceding discussion occur
infrequently in our surviving sources' accounts of the early Republic.
This may be due to a limited survival of such events in the traditions,
or because the eai-ly Roman community was in some manner able to
limit tensions through its political and institutional structures. How
then were the increasing strength and complexity of state institutions
reconciled with the power of elites based upon more 'traditional'
activities (and backed by their preponderance of military might)?
Whether or not one accepts Claudius' belief that Mastarna was King
Servius Tullius, or that Mastarna is a nickname meaning leader (magis-
ter), it is clear that both figures were part of the same phenomenon of
aristocratic opportunism. 39 Servius Tullius, while perhaps not an aris-
tocrat, was sometimes claimed to be the son of Vulcan. 40 Asserting
divine parentage has been a device used by insecure rulers, often
upstarts and outsiders, in a good number of cultures. 41 Servius Tullius
is characterised by Livy (1.39-41) as the faithful sidekick ofTarquinius
Priscus who supplanted the latter on his death, displacing his son
Tarquinius. Servius Tullius may be regarded as an usurper, his kingship
was not ratified in the comitia curiata (Livy 1.42), but he is also
remembered in the tradition as a king who introduced wide-ranging
106
Condottieri and clansmen
reforms, not only to the army but also to the citizen body as a whole. It
has been cogently argued by Cornell that the purpose of Servius
Tullius' reforms was in fact anti-aristocratic, that this king acted more like
a Greek tyrant in the law-giving mould, while Tarquinius Superbus
received the opprobrium which most second generation tyrants expe-
rienced.42 Cornell's thesis is that, like the Cleisthenic reforms in Ath-
ens, the outcome of the centuriate reforms in Rome was a weakening
of the link between the aristocratic domination of the comitia curiata
and the army. This was achieved by basing the recruitment of the army
not simply on tribes, but on a complex association between tribes and
centuries. 43 Now when a legion was raised, a tribe was asked to contrib-
ute troops to each century of the classis, that is to the 40 centuries of
iuniores that made up class I, likewise for the centuries of the infra-
classem, classes II-V. Thus, even ifa clan dominated a particular tribe,
this system automatically watered down its military influence as its
members were dispersed through the centuries and mixed with
members of other tribes.
Cornell argues that the most developed form with the intricate
subdivisions of classes II-V probably came about at the same time as
the introduction of pay for the army in 406 BC, and with the need not
only to raise taxes to pay the stipendia, but to cope with the increasingly
specialised demands of warfare in the late fifth-century and beyond.44
In a wider context, these further refinements to an original Servian
~ystem would then be contemporaneous with the later years of the
Peloponnesian War, when there certainly was an increasing use of
military specialists such as peltasts, not only in Athens and Sparta but
throughout the cities of the Mediterranean.45 Cornell argues that the
system actually set up by Servius in the sixth century may have been
less developed, but it nevertheless had the effect of putting the hoplite
phalanx on to a regularised footing for recruitment. It also gave voting
power in the comitia centuriata to the hoplite class, at the expense of the
equites, whose centuries voted after the 80 centuries of class I, on
matters as important as the declaration of war and peace. So in Rome
under the late monarchy we may well have had a Greek style of
political and military organisation, populist and curtailing the poten-
tially destabilising activities of the elite.
Yet there are difficulties with the model. The first is the problem of
why, when the Kings were expelled, the aristocrats did not change the
system to ensure that they had a preponderance of voting power in the
assemblies. This problem appears partly to be created by Cornell's
(and Momigliano's) overlooking of Livy and, perhaps, over-emphasis
107
Louis Rawlings
on Cicero and Festus. These claim that the suffragia (who Momigliano
argues were the original six centuries of equites) voted after the first
class in the comitia centuriata, the implication being that the cavalry-
owning elite had to take a back seat in this assembly to the hoplite
classis. Livy, on the other hand, explicitly states: 'For the Equites were
called on to vote first; then the eighty first-class centuries .. .' 46 So in his
system the voting primacy of the elite does indeed continue, although
if they were unable to reach agreement with the first class then the
lower order centuries would be called to vote (Livy 1.43.11-12). It
could, however, still be argued that the elite had to accept that they
relied on the military power of the well-to-do and so had to leave the
political power of this class untouched. Yet if this was the case, why is it
that the underlying pattern of much of Roman Republican warfare up
to the last quarter of the fifth century BC resembled not hoplite war-
fare, but indecisive raiding and counter-raiding by Romans against the
hill tribes of the Volsci, Aequi, Sabines, and Hernici? Not only were
triumphs and ovations rare in the fifth century, compared with later,
but very often the hill tribes are reported to have returned annually. 47
It certainly puzzled Livy that these wars were so indecisive. Baffled, he
attempted to explain how the Volsci secured sufficient soldiers after
their many defeats:
it is probable that either in the intervals between the wars, as happens
now when we hold levies, successive generations of younger men were
used for these frequent renewals of war, or that the armies were not
always conscripted from the same tribes. 48
In this pattern of'neither peace nor war' the calling out of the phalanx
may well be ineffective, as the Athenians found to their cost in Aetolia
during 426 BC, if the enemy are using small-scale hit-and-run tactics. 49
Livy, referring to the Aequi, shows an awareness of the effectiveness of
such a style of fighting:
their own advantage ... was in raiding expeditions: for them, successful
warfare involved small units operating over a wide area rather than the
massed attack by an organised army. 50
Indeed cavalry w-ould be far more mobile, and thus more important
for catching raiders. 51 But if the hoplite phalanx was not necessary,
why leave the centuriate system in a form that gave the classis a great
deal of the voting muscle? Momigliano, perhaps in desperation, sug-
gested that the hoplite reform was delayed until later in the fifth
century to coincide with the codification of the Twelve Tables, and
Rome's more aggressive stance and renewed contact with the Etruscan
108
Condottieri, and clansmen
phalanx in the wars against Veii. 52 Later he changed his mind and
argued that a reform under the Kings had fallen into disuse under the
patrician oligarchy of the new Republic. 53 Not only are both these
theories unconvincing, they also still do not demonstrate why the
magister populi, the dictator and commander-in-chief of the Roman
army during times of crisis, was forbidden to mount a horse, or why
the magister equitum, who would have originally coQ).manded the cav-
alry, should be his subordinate. 54
State armies II: Etruscan phalanxes
Moreover, there is another more general problem which arises from
the relationship between political power, rights and privileges of the
hoplite class on the one hand, and their military contribution. Why
was it that a different socio-political system with an apparently client-
manned phalanx was able to exist in Etruria?
Momigliano lamented the lack of investigation of Etruscan patron-
client armies, which in the sixth century appear to have been hoplite
phalanxes, but which derive from (or create?) significant differences in
Etruscan cities from the social and political structures ofGreekpoleis or
even the closer Roman state. 55 The debate over when and how the
hoplite phalanx appeared in Etruria has been focused partly on the
date and distribution of hoplite equipment in the archaeological
record. 56 However, while it has been recognised, by Snodgrass, that
}:ioplite arms do not in themselves make a phalanx (for instance
a Bucchero oinochoe from Ischia di Castro depicts an individual in
what is clearly a hoplite helmet but with a bow), there is also an
understanding that the hoplite phalanx is intimately connected to the
growth of egalitarian social and ideological structures within the polis. 57
Its appearance is coupled with the development of an economically
independent land-owning class, which supersedes an aristocratic war-
rior ethos and style of fighting, and the monopolisation of resources
and political power by the elite. 58 The problem is that Etruscan armies
appear to be expressions of patron-client rather than polis-citizen
power as the armies of Porsenna and the Vibennae seem to show. 59
Also, according to Dionysius (9.54), the Etruscan army which met the
Romans at Veii in 460 BC 'was both large and brave, for the most
influential men from all Etruria had joined with their dependants'.
This led Momigliano to puzzle how this phalanx could have worked, and
how the Etruscan elite could have maintained its position in the face of
armed bodies of clients.60
Recently reference has been made to anthropological theories about
109
Louis Rawlings
the aggregative effect of warfare expounded particularly by Carneiro,
who argues that developments in warfare by one community create
a compulsion for neighbouring communities to adopt similar devel-
opments in order to preserve their power, or fall before the innova-
tion.61 In this system of 'peer-polity' interaction, inefficient military
conduct is liable to be fatal in the face of external aggression which is
better organised and more committed. Support for this model comes
from Snodgrass who argues that the military benefits of the phalanx
would not easily have been given up once adopted. 62 The introduction
of the p·halanx into Etruria and Rome, with the ideological and institu-
tional transformations which the Greeks found necessary to make it
work, would seem inevitable once Greek colonies and influences be-
came established in Italy. Diodorus' statement, that only when Rome
had adopted the phalanx from the Etruscans was it able to overcome
them, seems to illustrate similar sentiments to those in Carneiro's thesis. 63
However this is, in many ways, a rather simplistic evolutionary
model which assumes that warfare, at first aristocratic, and essentially
individualistic, transforms into something where the pitched battle of
two corporate phalanxes becomes the normal, if not the only, mode of
conflict which inhabitants of city-states conduct.
It may be that the employment of a phalanx on a battlefield cannot
in any realistic way be linked to the social structures of the community
employing it. This proposition, however, should be rejected, since it
leads to an interpretation that is overly focused on the technology of
hoplite equipment and the utility of the phalanx as a military forma-
tion. The conclusion would be that hoplite warfare was the best form
of warfare available to these societies and that its spread was merely
due to an adoption of the most militarily effective strategy and technol-
ogy by communities who were analysing their situation in a militarily
rational manner. Yet this flies in the face of the evidence produced by
examinations not only of hoplite warfare conducted by Hanson,
Vernant, Connor and others, but also the thinking and evidence of
military and social historians and anthropologists such as Andreski,
Keegan and Haas, on other societies' war-making. These scholars have
observed that the ideology and cultural programming of a society
determine the manner in which it conducts war. Such warfare may not
necessarily be militarily rational in our eyes, but nevertheless it can be
the dominant form. 64
The model
So, in order to maintain the connection between cultural expectations
llO
Condottieri and clansmen
and warfare, I would like to propose a more complex model where the
method of fighting which is selected depends on the context of the
conflict, its scale, intensity, and outcome and is governed by the cul-
tural and ideological expectations of the participants. I suggest that
aristocratic personalised military activities can exist side by side with
the community-wide commitment to campaign with an army of
hoplites, cavalry and light infantry. Indeed, while responses to aggres-
sion are generally proportionate, where the expectations of one group
are different from those of the other, there can be disproportionate
responses and an escalation of the conflict. An example of this type of
escalation might be seen in Livy (2.18) for c. 502 BC. Young Sabine
'rakes' abduct some Roman 'prostitutes (.. .cum per kudos ab Sabinorum
iuventute per lasciviam scorta raperentur... ) and the outrage this causes
escalates to the point where the first dictator is appointed. This en-
courages the Sabine elders to send legati who urge the senate not to
over-react to the lawlessness of reckless youths. 65 However, negotia-
tions break down and war is declared. Thus the whole community has
been held responsible for the action.s of a few and we would expect the
response, once war is declared, to be a conventional hoplite campaign.
Yet Livy states that no action was taken. This appears to be one of
those frequent instances of'neither peace nor war' (Livy 2.21 nee certa
pax nee bellum fuit). Another is the period of three years from the battle
of Lake Regillus to the swearing of the Foedus Cassianum between the
~omans and the Latins. It seems that, after all, the scale of response in
these cases is appropriate to the aggression. If, as at Regillus, a major
army of the Latin League, with Tarquin the Proud in tow, materialises,
then the classis is called out. Indeed the scale of this emergency is such
that a dictator, or magister populi, is appointed, which may, in this
context, mean that the whole populus is enrolled. 66 Its commanding
general would fight on foot in the phalanx as a symbol, perhaps, of the
solidarity of the whole community, and the cavalry led by the magister
equitum deferred to the crucial participation of the other sections of the
community at a time when the whole state was at risk. 67 Yet if the
threat is merely a raid, then a standard response found in our sources
is the counter-raid, admittedly usually led by a consul but often indeci-
sive, resulting only in the capture of booty and the burning of crops
while the opponents remain holed up in their oppida. 68
This may well serve to resolve the apparent problem that for much
of the fifth century Roman warfare is characterised by predatory
raiding and counter-raiding against the Volsci, Aequi and Hernici,
notwithstanding the fact that the Romans apparently adopted the
lll
Loui,s Rawlings
phalanx under the Kings, and may well have fought the battle of
Regillus in a 'conventional' manner. Rome may also have conducted
'conventional' wars against Veii, but it depended on the scale of the
conflict, the status of those involved and their objectives. 69
If we return to the most often cited example of a private war, the
Fabian war against Veii, we may now be able to understand why the
traditional Livian account has the Fabii marching out under _a Fabian
consul. 70 The suggestion that Livy, or his sources, exaggerated th~ role
of the gens Fabia in a defeat_of a Roman army, in order to explain their
disappearance from the Fasti, while possible, perhaps rejects too much
of the tradition. We can see that the annalistic accounts assume the
legality of the Fabian war but also its personal nature. This could not
be reconciled in the orthodox model of Roman warfare, where in the
development from the phalanx to a manipular army there is little
room for private bands. Yet it has been established that they existed.
We have also seen that fifth-century Roman warfare can be very unlike
traditional hoplite war, except in a few cases such as the set-piece
battles of Regillus, c. 496 BC, the Algidus, c. 431 BC, and presumably
the presence of the classis at Fidenae in 426 BC reported in Livy
(4.34.6). 71 The character instead is of low-intensity raid and counter-
raid, conducted by members of the elite (who may be consuls or
praetors) and their supporters, but which still needs the support of the
wider community and indeed is conducted on behalf of the state.
The state strikes back
How did the state attempt to exert control over such warfare, particu-
larly, as we have seen, when the wider community was liable to have
been held responsible for the actions of a few? A solution presents itself
when we turn to the activities of another Fabius.
According to Plutarch (Numa 12.5), when the Gauls besieged the
Etruscan city of Clusium, c. 390 BC, the Romans sent Fabius Ambustus
as an ambassador to mediate, but having received an unseemly answer
from the Gauls, he joined the Clusians, and in the subsequent battle
killed a Gaul in single combat. The Gauls then sent a herald to Rome
denouncing Fabius on three counts: violating a truce, breaking his
oath, and fighting before war was formally declared. Fabius' actions
can be seen as heroic, private and stupid, and this was apparently the
view of the Fetials who recommended that Fabius be handed over.
However he survived by appealing to the populace and gaining shelter
from them, while the Gauls returned in force and besieged Rome (cf.
Livy 5.36-7).
112
Condottieri and clansmen
Whether or not we accept the truth of this story, it is clear that
Plutarch (and Livy) believed that Ambustus had committed an injus-
tice which laid him open to extradition, and that the whole Roman
community might be held responsible for the crimes of any individual
it protected. Also that those who determined wh_ether the Gauls had
a legitimate claim were the Fetials - an important priesthood, indeed
important enough to have their advice ignored but still feature in the
story.
The fetiales appear to be a key factor in limiting private war. The
college of twenty fetial priests was remembered as having been formed
by Numa, or Tullus Hostilius, or Ancus Marcius. 72 The question of
which king is less important than the memory that it was a regal
institution. Its patrician life-members advised the Senate on international
law - ~pecifically to determine whether alliances had been broken and
on the offences of ambassadors (or towards them, Dionysius 2.72).
They had the ability to enquire into the transgressions of generals
relating to oaths and treaties, and to make the formalised and heavily
ritualistic demand for justice and restitution (Dionysius 2.72; Livy
1.32). If the demand for res repetundae was refused, they then informed
the Senate whether there was an obstacle to war, or whether each
ritual stage had been performed correctly, so that the Roman people
were permitted to wage a bellum iustum. If the Senate's subsequent
motion for war was approved by the comitia centuriata (and it was only
~ejected, so far as we know, in 200 BC after the exertions of the Second
Punic War (Livy 31.6)), then a fetial travelled to the enemy territory
and formally started the war by throwing a spear across the border
(Gellius 16.4; Livy 1.32). 75 They were also present at the making of
treaties (Livy 1.24). The concern for formulaic precision, a characteristic
of Roman religion, was apparent in the phrase uttered on the conclu-
sion of an agreement and indicates the desire to leave no loophole:
From these clauses, as publicly recited from the tablets, or the wax on
them, from beginning to end, without fraud, and have this day been
clearly understood, the Roman People will not be the first to depart. 74
The central concerns of the Fetial priesthood were therefore with
determining and ensuring the rightness of a cause. It may seem
obvious in a pursuit as risky as war that there was a need to believe that
the gods support those in the right. However there is an element not
only of religious, but also of social concern - there is a need to make
sure that the whole community understands that the war is just and
worth fighting, even if it is over the rustling of some nobleman's
cattle. 75
113
Louis Rawlings
The priests are clearly envisaged as representatives of the state. Livy
(1.32.6) records the speech of a fetial delivered before the offending
community: 'I am the public messenger of the Roman people.' (Ego
sum publicus nuntius populi Romani.) Both Dionysius (2.72.9) and
Plutarch (Numa 12.3) see their role as to keep the peace. They have the
, ;I
power to declare a potential war as unlawful, if the rituals are not
performed correctly, and indeed the Gallic trauma was caused by the
people ignoring the Fetials' ruling concerning Quintus Fabius the
ambassador who had fought the Gauls at Clusium (Plutarch, Numa
12.5). Moreover according to a fragment of Cicero, 'every war that has
not been declared and announced should be judged to be unjust and
impious.' 76 This seems like a crack-down on private wars. If there is
any foundation to the sources' belief in the legality of the private war
of the Fabii, and state support for their campaign against Veii, then
the public announcement by the Fabii that they would undertake it
(Livy 2.48 ff.), and the fact that they would be led by the Consul Caeso
Fabius, make some sense. We might speculate that such an announce-
ment would probably have helped to persuade the Senate and the
Fetials to permit the operation to proceed. The fetial system was
common to a number of other states such as Aequicoli, Alba Longa,
Ardea, the Falisci, and Lanuvium, who are remembered as maintain-
'I.1.'.;
ing the ius fetiale; Watson argues that this was a Latin institution
designed to maintain peace in the face of external powers. 77 Moreover
it appears to be aimed precisely at stamping out raiding, by instantly
escalating the situation to one of the threat of all-out war between
communities. 78 The fetial procedure involved the demand for restitu-
tion of men or animals seized and the handing over of the wrongdoer.
According to Servius, explaining the clarigatio (solemn demand for
redress), when Ancus Marcius saw the Roman people burning with the
love of wars and having a desire to wage war on peoples for no just
reason, and therefore saw that dangers might thereby be created, he
adopted the fetial law from the Aequicoli. 79 This seems targeted not
only at making sure that Rome was waging just wars for the punishing
of enemy incursions, but also seems to be a measure of social control
aimed at the Romans themselves. 80 It encourages the avoidance of
escalation in tit-f~r-tat 'wars', and is a restraint on initiating wars not
sanctioned by the Fetials. It attempts therefore to avoid the dangers of
unjust wars, not only in the religious aspects - the fear of the gods'
stipport for the enemy - but also the loss of control over becoming
embroiled in any violent dispute between Romans and foreigners.
The implication of groups of Fetials not only in Rome but other
114
Condottieri, and clansmen
cities might be that unsanctioned actions by individuals (and their
followers) could lead to the perpetrators being handed over to the
wronged community's Fetials; providing, that is, that they do not have
enough support within the community for the serious escalation that
i
would occur if they evaded capture. This is what happened in the case
of Fabius the ambassador when he appealed to the populace for
'
protection against the Fetials' recommendation. The moral of that
story is evident in the result at the Allia.
Even where the opposing state did not have Fetials, the Romans
appeared willing to hand over individuals whose actions they did not
endorse. 81 While most enemies may have regarded this attitude as not
entirely satisfactory, it is clear that for the Romans, the element of
control over their own citizens' international activities was not merely
a clqak of convenience. 82
Conclusion
There is a difference not only in scale but in legality and the prestige to
be gained between private and public wars. There is something more
to the armies of magistrates than to the bands of condottieri; the magis-
I trates go out with the theoretical support of the community, and can
draw on its resources. Moreover the target is not other aristocrats but
I
' the enemy community. The Iguvine Tables show an invocation against
the whole of an enemy's comµmnity, and the lustration will be carried
out on behalf of the whole populus of Iguvium against the Tadinate
state. Such a practice in Iguvium provides further evidence to indicate
that Rome is not unique in focusing the support and resources of the
State through a religious ritual and aiming it at a rival polity. 83
The Roman aristocracy of the early Republic was forced for its own
survival to divert some of its competition into less destabilising (and
p~rhaps less regulated) avenues, such as public building works. 84 Yet
our tradition shows that the aristocrats had ·not given up their
Homeric pretensions. The type of warfare conducted against the hill-
tribes was often low intensity, and for all intents and purposes brigand-
age, but when an escalation occurred, or an appeal. was made to the
fetial system, this ensured that any war initiated by the Roman people
would be fought on behalf of the community as a whole. This may be
a contributory factor in the success of Rome in its wars against some of
its neighbours in the late fifth and fourth centuries. The armies she
faced, while being as militarily advanced in formations and weaponry,
were sometimes led for private advancement, and thus were structur-
ally less able to recover from defeat, and from its attendant loss of
115
Louis Rawlings
prestige or of the leader in battle, than a republic whicb could replace its
magistrates and generals (consul with dictator if necessary), and mobi-
lise the full support of the community for what it labelled just wars. 85
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Keith Hopwood for drawing my attention to the article by
C. Tilly (1985) and to all those who commented on the paper, either at the
conference or later. Thanks especially to Tim Cornell, John Rich, Hans van
Wees, Guy Bradley, Adrian Goldsworthy, Anton Powell and Keith Hopwood,
who all read drafts of this paper and made helpful criticisms; nevertheless any
weaknesses and mistakes remain my own.
Notes
1 C. Tilly 1985, 169-191, 172-3.
2 See, for instance, A. Bedini 1978, 30-4; R. Ross Holloway 1994, 120, 192
nn. 5-8; the tomb finds at Laurentina, dating to the Orientalising phase
(c. 700-580 BC), suggest a burial hierarchy which may reflect gentilicial and/or
patronage groupings, where moderately wealthy burials are clustered around
very rich ones; see also T J. Cornell 1995b, 418 n. 9, for references to other sites.
3
An analogous discussion of scales of violence for Anglo-Saxon England
occurs in G. Halsall 1989, 155-7.
4
Examples of classical scholars using the tenn condott:ieri include J. Heurgon
1973, 145; M. Pallotino 1974, 96; R. Thomsen 1980, 163; and Cornell l995b,
143,428 n. 73. On the phenomenon of the condottiere in Late Medieval Italy
see G. Trease 1970; D.P. Waley 1975, 337-71.
5
This is implied for the Sabines since Attus Clausus and his followers leave
to come to Rome to form the gens Claudia at the beginning of the Republic
(Livy 2.16.5). The Etruscan cities of this period are believed to be dominated
by such structures, see B. D'Agostino 1991, 59-81, for discussion and esp. 59
n. l for references.
6
A Drummond 19896, 89-115; an example of a family at odds with itself is
the basis of the saga of the Tarquin dynasty. One only need recall L. Junius
Brutus' struggle not only with his uncle, L. Tarquinius Superbus (Livy
1.59 ff.), but the conspiracy of Brutus' own sons (2.3-5), and his rivalry with
consular colleague L. Tarquinius Collatinus (2.2), to see the problems
relatives can pose.
7 Livy 5.46.2 the Fabii had a continual obligation to perform certain rites on
the Quirinal; Festus (Paulus) 78L s.v. Faviani et Quintiliani; Festus 308L; Ovid
Fasti 2.377-8, Fabii and Quintilii; Twelve Tables 5.5; 5.7 limited claim to
intestate inheritance after possible claims by agnatic kin.
8
A. Drummond 1989a, 153-4, 206-8.
9
A. Drummond 1989b, 98 n.l, points out that the clients who follow the
Fabii, or Appius Claudius, are not necessarily the clients of the gens itself but of
individuals co-operating within the gens. He argues for a form of patronage
116
Condottieri and clansmen
which has at its heart an individualised patron-client relationship (a view
common to most contributors to that· volume), which had very little legal
compulsion, and might, therefore, be voluntary and even temporary in the
volatile context of aristocratic peer-group competition. He does, however,
suggest that there may well have been differing statuses of clientes, with the
poorer perhaps being more imposed upon, and more in need of the 'protec-
tion' of their patrons, than other more well-to-do clients.
10 See Drummond 1989b, 89-115, for a full discussion ofDionysius' under-
standing of patronage.
11 S. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger 1980, 42-77; T. Johnson and C. Dandeker
1989, 219-41, esp. 234 ff. Such institutions as the interregnum and.the patrum
auctoritas, as well as the limiting of magisterial offices to one year in the early
Republic, clearly demonstrate the desire of the aristocracy to put checks on
the power of individual members of the elite, although Guy Bradley (personal
comment) has suggested that its effect might be to enhance, albeit temporar-
ily, the power of those magistrates who have at their disposal the institutions
of the state.
12 J. Heurgon 1973, 247. See now the discussion by Grandazzi (1991).
13 .See for instance: T.P. Wiseman 1979; A.J. Woodman 1988.
14 For example: T.P. Wiseman 1996, 312, reviewing Cornell (19956), asserts
that: 'It is important for C. to believe that the later annalists did not invent
whole episodes.' Woodman (1988) takes a different line. By arguing for the
essential alienness of ancient conceptions about the writing of history, he
attacks those scholars who believe that notions of historical truth and the
spirit, even the methods, of enquiry have remained essentially unchanged
from classical historiography. He thus undermines the view that ancient
history should yield valid historical data when treated as if it was modern
'scientific' history.
15 T.J. Cornell 1986, 85.
16 E. McCartney 1917, 122-67; M.P. Nilsson 1929, 1-11; A. Momigliano
1963, 116ff. (Terzo contributo 1966, 593); AM. Snodgrass 1965, 116ff.;
Cornell 1995b, 183 ff., to cite but a few.
17 Diodorus 23.2.1, cf. DH 23 fragment 3; Athenaeus 6.273.
18 Livy 8.8.3, 406 Be; Sallust, Cotiline 51.3; Ined.Vat. FGrH 839 FI (vol. 3. C).
19 E. Rawson 1971, 13-31.
20 Livy 3.69 cohorts; 2.10.46; 49; 9.39 Etruscan tela; 2.19.52 Latin tela.
21 Livy 2.48-50; ServiusAdAen. 6.845; Dio 5.21.3; Zonaras 7.17. DH 9.15.3
claims they were accompanied by 4,000 followers. Drummond 1989a, 153 on
Cremera and Thermopylae.
22 The principal source for an 'official' campaign, Diodorus (11.53.6) noted
that certain Roman historians included the 306 Fabii in a Roman army of
unspecified size. Momigliano 1969 (Quinto contributo 1975, 328) suggested that
these Roman historians might have normalised the battle and so spoiled the
archaic features of it.
23 DH 9.19-21; Livy 2.50; Zonaras 7.17; cf. the parallel with the defeat of
a Spartan mora in 390 BC at Lechaeum by Iphicrates' peltasts, Xenophon. Hell
4.11-18.
117
Louis Rawlings
24
R.E.A. Palmer 1970, 3, 29-33, 82 and 152-6, argues that while the tribes
apparently did have an early military function, the thirty curiae, which it is
often assumed were dominated by kin-groups and brotherhoods of some
form, did not.
25
L.R. Taylor 1960, 3 ff.; Cornell 1995b, 174, who notes that of the twenty-
one earliest known tribes, the four urban tribes have clearly geographical
appellations, but only one (Clustumina) of the seventeen rural tribes does not
have what can be construed as a clan name. It refers to the region around
Crustumerium overrun in 499 BC. This conquered territory seems to have
been divided into the tribes of Clustumina and Claudia in 495 BC when Livy
(2.21) reports that the voting tribes were raised to twenty-one.
26 Thus Momigliano 1963 (Terzo contributo 1966, 597-8): 'The Servian order
must have fallen into abeyance in the obscure years of civil war and military
struggles which followed the end of the monarchy. One of the most precise
recollections of late tradition was the war that the Fabii and their clients
fought against the Etruscans about 475 BC. A war of this type would not have
been possible if the centuriate organization had been in working order.'
27
See above n. 3.
28 C. Ampolo 1976-7, 333-45.
29
Livy 1.34 Lucumo; Livy 1.34.2; DH 3.46.3-5; cf. Pliny NH 35.43.152,
Demaratus.
30 A contemporary parallel is the rise of Aristodemus of Cumae (DH 7 .6 ff.);
cf. also the career ofDionysius I; B. Gaven 1990, 50 ff.
31 DH uses hetairoi 7.21.3, Livy 2.33 might hint at a personal retinue when
relating that C. Marcius earned the cognomen Coriolanus when he and
a picked band of men .. .cum delecta militum manu captured Corioli. His career
as a band leader is further described in Plutarch Coriolanus 13.3, where he
raided Antium with a force of clients and volunteers. He secured booty in
slaves, cattle and corn which he distributed to his followers. DH. 7 .64.2-4
mentions an instance strikingly similar to the Fabian war against Veii. Marcius
offered to march against Rome's enemies with his own forces. Having ob-
tained permission from the consuls he called on his clients (pelatas) and philoi
and any citizens wishing to gain advantage from the general's good fortune
(tyche) in war and his valour (arete). His men were not told the objective (which
might indicate a surprise raid rather than a formal war), but they captured
much booty on the expedition which he· allowed them to distribute amongst
themselves. That leaders had the right to dispose of booty as they saw fit
manifested itself in the rights of magistrates in the Republican army of later
times: see I. Schatzman 1972, 177-205. The story of Marcius' distribution of
booty is consistent with the.competition for status among powerful individuals
in other similar societies as it would not only have enriched his followers, but
this generosity would have demonstrated his prestige and prowess in their
minds and those of the wider citizen body. My thanks to Tim Cornell for
drawing to my attention the passages of Dionysius and Plutarch cited here.
32 If Aulus Vibenna can be equated with Olus (Fabius Pictor fr.12 P
= Arnobius Adv. Nat. 6. 7) then the Chronicle of AD 354 (Chronica minora ed.
T. Mommsen, I.144; Frick I.114) recalls that, as king, Olus ruled Rome; see
118
Condottieri and clansmen
Cornell 1995b, 145,428 n. 76 for references. For Mastarna as king of Rome
see n. 34 below. Perhaps also Porsenna: Cornell 1995b, 144, suggests
Porsenna might be understood more easily as an independent war~lord, yet
his discussion 216-8 makes little attempt to use this theory; he instead rightly
concentrates on the possible wider political and military implications of an
attack on Rome by the King of Clusium; a detailed account of Porsenna is J .-
R. Jannot 1988, 601-14. According to Tacitus, Histories 3. 72 Porsenna actually
captured the city; c£ Pliny NH 34.139 on the humiliating terms imposed on
the Romans.
33 F. Messerschmidt and A. von Gerkan 1930, 62-163; F. Buranelli 1987;
discussion also occurs in A. Alfoldi 1965, 220ff.; F. Coarelli 1983, 43-69;
L. Bonfante 1978, 136-62.
34 J.L.S. 212: ... Servius Tullius, si nostros sequimur captiva natus Ocresia; si
Tuscos, Caeli quondam Vivennae sodalis fidelissimus omnisque eius casus comes,
postquam varia fortuna exactus cum omnibus reliquis Caeliani exercitus Etruria
excessit, montem Caelium occupavit et a duce suo Caelio ita appellitatum, mutatoque
nomine (nam Tusce Mastarna nomen ei erat) ita appellatus est, ut dixi, et regnum
summa cum rei p. utilitate optinuit.
35 Cornell 1995b, 144.
36 ibid.
37 C.M. Stibbe et al. 1980. J. Bremmer 1982, 133-47, argues that it cannot
be assumed that sodalic associations had any long term coherence.
38 Livy 2.41-2. DH 8.76-8 claims that the aristocracy feared not only that
Cassius aimed at tyranny but that he would be a new Coriolanus if allowed to
escape into exile; he had been the dictator victorious at Lake Regillus in 499
or 496 BC. According to Livy 4.13-5, Maelius had spent his own wealth on
famine relief and was suspected ofa coniuratio. Both Livy 6.11-2 and Gellius
17 .21.24-5 report that Manlius, saviour of the Capitoline from the Gauls, was
accused of populist policies which would lead to him aiming for the kingship.
In two of these cases, military prestige was combined with popularity among
the masses to create fears among the elite.
39 Mastarna = magister was first suggested by J.G. Cuno 1873, 669 n. 7, now
a widely accepted equivalence, see R. Thomsen 1980, 97 n. 183.
40 Thomsen 1980, 57-104, on his birth and status. Son of Vulcan, DH
4.2.1 ff.; Ovid Fasti 6.627-36; Pliny NH 36.204.
41 Cornell 1995b, 132-3, 202-3, for brief discussion and references.
42 For example: the well known moderation of Peisistratos and the harsh
rule of Hippias in Athens, Aristotle Ath.Pol. 19.1; also according to Diodorus
10.28 Theron, the tyrant of Acragas, was fair and law abiding, whereas his son
Thrasydaios was violent, murderous and subject to many plots. However he
remained in power until after a military defeat at the hands of Hieron, tyrant
of Syracuse, in 473/2 BC. The resultant loss of prestige led to his expulsion by
his subjects (11.53).
43 Cornell 1995b, 190 ff. See also the article of Smith (1997). which came to
my attention too late to be incorporated into this discussion.
44 Cornell 1995b, 189.
45 For fuller discussion seeJ. Anderson 1970; W.K. Pritchett 1974.
119
Louis Rawlings
46
Livy 1.43.11: Equites enim vocabantur primi,· octoginta inde primae classis
centuriae ... ; it is also possible, but by no means certain, that the centuriae
praerogativae mentioned at 10.22.1 are the 18 cavalry centuries; but see
Cornell 1995b, 196; also A. Momigliano 1969 (Quinto Contributo 1975, 318);
1967 (Quinto Contributo 1975, 635 ff.); 1966 (Qyarto contributo 1969, 377-94).
Cicero Phil 2.82 claims the suffragi.a voted after the first class, but how many
centuries here comprised the suffragia, or whether they should be regarded as
cavalry centuries, is not made explicit. Even Cicero De Rep. (2.22.39) and
Festus (p. 334 M = 452 L), who both refer to sex suffragia, do not explicitly identify
these centuries with the six Tities, Ramnes and Luceres priores posteriores.
47
Cornell 1989, 288-94.
48 Livy 6.12.2: Simile veri est aut interuallis bellorum, sicut nunc in dilectibus fit
Romanis, alia atque alia subole iuniorum ad bella instauranda totiens usos esse, aut
non -ex iisdem semper populis exercitus scriptos, quamquam eadem semper gens bellum
intulerit...
49 Thucydides 3.96-8.
50 Livy 3.2: Ae_guos populationibus incursionibusque meliores esse, et multas passim
manus quam magnam molem unius exercitus rectius bella gerere.
51 I. Spence 1993. Cavalry are depicted on the terracotta facade that
adorned the Archaic temple (c. 530 BC) at Velletri; see F.R, Fortunati 1986, 3-
11; L. Quilici and S. Quilici Gigli 1997, 53-61.
52 Momigliano 1938 (Quarto contributo 1969).
53 Momigliano 1963 (Terzo contributo 1966, 596-8).
54 Livy 23.14; Plutarch Fabius 4.
55 Momigliano 1963 (Terzo contributo 1966, 594 n. 100).
56 B. d'Agostino 1991, 65 ff., attempts a summary both of the debate and the
material evidence for hoplites in the seventh, sixth and fifth centuries BC.
57 A.M. Snodgrass 1965, 110-22; Bucchero oinochoe in P.F. Stary 1981, pl 7;
the Velletri terracottas depict galloping warriors in hoplite panoply wielding
swords and axes; they portray another potentially violent context for the
wearing ofhoplite equipment outside of the phalanx; see above (n. 46).
58 Much discussion of these aspects in a Greek context has occurred,
P. Cartledge 1977, 11-27; G. Cawkwell 1989, 375-89; P. Greenhalgh 1973;
A. Holladay 1982, 94-103; H. Lorimer 1947, 76-138; J. Salmon 1977, 84-
101; A.M. Snodgrass 1965, 110-22. See also AM. Snodgrass 1993, 47-61, for
a recent summary of the debate.
59 B. d'Agostino 1991 argues that the Etruscan evidence seems to indicate
that the old gentes of the Etruscan elite were able to restrict the power of the
middle class by retaining them as etera, roughly equivalent to Roman clientes,
but he does not clearly resolve how this occurred, or how the Etruscan
'gentilicial hoplite army' could have functioned as a social institution.
60 A. Momigliano 1963 (Terzo contributo 1966, 593-4), 'How the Etruscans
ever managed to combine an army of hoplites with their social structure
founded on a sharp distinction between nobles and clients I cannot imagine.'
61 R.L. Carneiro 1991, 87-102; also 1970, 733 ff.; A.M. Snodgrass 1986, 47-
58; T.J. Cornell 1995a, 121-34.
62
A.M. Snodgrass 1965, 122.
120
Condottieri and clansmen
63 Diodorus 23.2.1; cf. Ined. Vat. ch. 3; Athenaeus. 6.273.
64 V.D. Hanson 1989;J-P. Vernant 1974; W. Connor 1988, 3-29; A. Andreski
1954; J. Keegan 1993; J. Haas (ed.) 1990; also note that K. Heider 1970
presents a study of a culture with expectations about the aims of wars and the
methods of conducting battles that appear almost laughable to the modern
observer but which are the accepted norms of that culture.
65 Livy 2.18: Itaque legatos de pace mittunt. Quibus orantibus dictatorem
senaf:umque ut 'veniam erroris hominibus adul.Escentibus darent', responsum, 'ignosci
adulescentibus posse, senibus non posse qui bella ex bellis sererent'...
66 Livy 2.32-8; Momigliano 1969 (Quinto contributo 1975, 324) argues that
while the plebs were outside the classis they may have been drafted into the
army at moments of crisis. I take populus to mean every man of military age
who can be spared, not solely the heavy infantry classis, and this might suggest
why the First Aventine secession is effective, the plebs opt out of the populus at
a time of national emergency, and perhaps this occasion is the birth of the
term-populus plebesque; later use of the term: Livy 25.12.1 O; Cicero Pro Murena 1.1.
67 Drummond 1989a, 191.
68 Some examples in Livy 2.17; 2.48.4; 2.63 etc.; Halsall 1989 (169-74)
noticed a similar range of responses in early English warfare, distinguishing
between endemic, small scale, 'ritualised' war and more infrequent large scale
'wars of conquest'.
69 Thus Cornell 1989, 294-8, argues that ~here was a difference between the
city-state wars of Rome and Veii, compared to the primitive brigandage of the
Aequian and Volscian conflicts. He can discern military and political objec-
tives, but argues that the Fabian 'army' at Cremera is a manifestation of an
archaic form of social organisation on the verge of obsolescence. If, however,
Rome is capable of undertaking more 'primitive' predatory warfare when
appropriate against the hill-tribes, why not Veii? And why not both sides
against each other, particularly when tensions have not risen to the point
where either side feels the need to call out the phalanx?
70 e.g. P. Frezza 1946, 295-306; J. Heurgon 1959, 713-23; J.-C. Richard
1988, !526-53; also 1990, 245-62.
71 Even at such battles the cavalry may have had a significant contribution to
make. Although our surviving accounts perhaps reflect more the heroic and
aristocratic perspective of the sources used by the annalists. Momigliano 1957
(Secondo Contributo 1960) reiterated the discovery by scholars such as Niebuhr,
Macaulay and De Sanctis that the narratives of the battle ofRegillus primarily
concerned aristocratic horsemen and had a strikingly heroic quality. This also
seems to be the case in accounts of the battle by the Algidus c. 431, with the
exploits of individuals on both sides being celebrated, as does the winning of
the spolia opima by the consul, Aulus Cossus, in c. 437 BC. According to Livy
4.17-20 it was during a pitched battle ofVeii, Fidenae and Falerii against
Rome, that a Veientine King, Lars Tolumnius, (who was held ultimately
responsible for the murder of Roman ambassadors by the men of Fidenae that
caused the war), and his elite cavalry rampaged across the battlefield until
Cossus rode up and struck him from his horse. The consul then despoiled the
body, taking his head and fixing it on a spear, the sight of which made the
121
Louis Rawlings
Etruscans break. The epic tone of these battle accounts may derive from
carmina composed to celebrate the victories, Momigliano 1989, 88 ff.
72 Plutarch NUma 12.3; DH 2.72, Numa; Cicero De Republica 2.17.31, Tullus
Hostilius; ServiusAdAen. 10.4; Livy 1.32.5, Ancus Marcius. See now the study
by A.Watson 1993.
73 On doubts about the antiquity of the spearMcasting ritual see T. Wiedemann
1986, 4 78-90, although he accepts that the jurisdiction and expertise of the
fetiales over issues concerningfoedera could be very ancient.
74 Livy 1.24. 7: Ut illa palam prima postrema ex illis tabulis cerave recitata sunt sine
dolo malo utique ea hie hodie rectissime intellecta sunt, illis legibus populus Romanus
prior non deficiet.
75 Livy, 1.22, records that the war that led to the conquest of Alba Longa
began because of tit-for-tat cattle-raiding involving agrestes Romani (Roman
'rustics'). Both sides sent fetials to demand restitution, but, through a ruse,
the Alban fetials were delayed by Tullus Hostilius until the Romans had first
made their demand for redress. When finally the Albans claimed reparation
Tullus declared, 'Tell your King that the Roman King calls on the gods to
witness which of our two peoples was the first to refuse demand for redress
and dismissed its envoys, so that the guilty nation should suffer the oncoming
war's misery.' (Ad haec Tullius 'Nuntiate,' inquit, 'regi vestro regem Romanum deos
Jacere testes uter prius- populus res repetentes legatos aspernatus demiserit, ut in eum
omnes expetant huiusce clades belli. ').
76 Cicero, De Republica (2.17 .31 ): ... ut omne bellum, quad denuntiam indictumque
non esset, id iniustum esse atque inpium iudicaretur.
77 A. Watson 1993, 6 ff.
7 8 A point recognised by J. Rich 1976, 58, who argues that the rerum repetitio
was specifically targeted at raiding offences.
79 Servius, Ad Aen. 10.14: nam Ancus Marcius cum videret populum Romanum,
ardentem amore bellum, et plerumque inferre bella gentibus nulla iusta extante ratione,
et exinde periculi creare, misit ad gentem Aequiculanam et accepit ius fetiale ...
80 As Wiedemann 1986, 488, has also recognised.
81 e.g. Livy 9.5-10 on the Caudine forks; Cicero, De Officiis 1.310.9, Regulus
and Carthage; Velleius Paterculus 2.1.5, Mancinus Hostilius and Numantia;
Wiedemann 1986, 489-90. Sometime~ it worked the other way, with the
Romans' refusal of restitution as inadequate, Livy 7 .6. 7 Hernici; 8.39
Samnites' surrender ofPapius Brutulus. See]. Rich 1976, 109, on Q. Fabius'
embassy to Carthage in 218 BC related in Livy 21.18 and Polybius 3.20-1. In
this case it seems that Rome was prepared to accept that Hannibal had acted
on his own initiative and Carthage would be able to escape responsibility by
surrendering him.
82 Indicated also by the story in Cicero, De Officiis 1.40, that ten prisoners
sent to Rome by Hannibal were kept degraded and disenfranchised by the
censors for perjuring their oath by not returning to him. Cicero, Verres 2.49
argued that either Verres was breaking a clause of treaty in not requiring the
Mamertines to furnish a ship, or that all previous governors ought to have
been surrendered by the fetials to the Mamertines for enforcing a clause that
did not exist.
122
Condottieri and clansmen
83 J.W. Poultney 1959, 284-92. Although the translation and dating of the
texts are extremely problematic in places, the concern for formulaic precision
and repetition in order to leave no loophole in the curse is clear; Tabulum
Iguvium VIIa 9-13, invokes Prestota Serfia of Serfus Martius to evil (atero)
against the Tadinate state, Tadinate tribe (tote tarsinate trifo tarsinate), Tuscan,
Narcan and Iapudic name (tursce naharce iabusce nomne). It also subdivides the
Tadinate population into nerus and iouies and into positive and negative sub-
categories (thus: nerus sitir ansihitir iouies hostatir anostatir). Poultney 278-9
argues for an age distinction (elders holding and not holding office, young
men armed and unarmed) but what seems clear is the concern with covering
all relevant categories of Tadinate citizen; VIia 46-51 invokes Tursa Jovia
against the same categories and peoples, 'to terrify them, tremble them, cast
them down to Hondus, to Hola, overwhelm them with snow, overwhelm them
with water, deafen them with thunder and wound them, trample them under
foot and bind them' (tursito tremitu hondu holtu ninctu nepitu sunitu sauitu
preplohotatu preuislatu; Poultney 291-2).
84 Our sources record that in the first few years of the Republic a large
number of temples were vowed and built by members of the aristocracy:
Jupiter Capitolinus (509), Saturn (497), Mercury (495), Ceres (493) Castor
(484), implying not only strong religious feeling 3.nd lots of cash, and power,
among the elite, but also the availability for use of another avenue for
competition which the Kings had dominated previously.
85 When, for example, Lars Tolumnius, King of Veii (Livy 4.17-20) was
killed in battle by Aulus Cossus (who dedicated the spolia opima, which, Livy
claims, Augustus had personally examined and had even made out the name
of Aulus Cornelius Cossus Consul written on the dedicated linen corselet), the
. Etruscan army collapsed and fled.
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