C A M B R I D G E T E X T S IV T H E

HISTORY O F PHILOSOPHY

Stria edrrors
KARL AMERIKS
PrcfPsror of Philorophy ar the Uflizemirj, of hbtre Dame

DESMOND X I . CL.\RKE
Emerrtus Professor of Philosoph~at Uninirersitj, Coilrgp Cork
Eudemian Ethics
The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the
range, variety and quality of texts in the histoq of philosophy which are available in TRANSLATED A N D EDITED B Y
English. The series includes texts by fimiliat. names (such as Descartes and Kant) and
also hy less well-known authors. \\'hererer possihlr, texts a1.e published in complete and
BRAD INWOOD
unnhridycd lirrrn. and ~r.inslati~mrarc. speciall!. commissioned for the series. Each Liniuentty of Toronlo
volume ronlnins a crilici~lintroducti<~nioyrlhvr with a guide to further reading and RAPHAEL WOOLF
ilny nrrrrrilry yl~~ssi~l.ics ilnd I c x I L I . ~ ~a~)~.lT;1lus. 'l'h(l volumes are designed for student use
King's College London
ill llllclrryrll~lllilIri l l l l l 110~1y1.illl~ill~ Ic~c!. illill 9 i l l b ~01-interest
. not only to students
l ~ ) I I I ~ O 1 8 1 11 idc cl. I I I ~ ~ P I I C~I'I.c:I~cI.s
l ~ l ~ i l c , h # ) l ~Ill11 U in the historjafscience, the history
l l ~ o , l t n ~111111
) I I I C ltihl#aly) ~I'idci~h.

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
 C A \ ( B H I U G E U h I V L R S I T Y PRESS
Cambridge, S e w York. \lelbourne, \ladrid. Cape Town.
Singapore. Sio Paula, Delhi, Xlerico City

Cambridge Lnirersity Press

T h e Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cni SKL.L K

Published in the Lnited States of America by Carnbridg~.Lnirersit! Press, Pie\$ York

ar\r.cambridge.org
Informarion on this tirle: \r~x~.cambridgcorg/q78ojz1
lq8486

C Brad Inwood and Raphael \liaolf 2013

Contents
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutor! exception
and to the pra\isions of relevant collecrire licensing agreements. ,~lrknowledgements page vi
no reproduction of any pair may take place virhout
rhe writren permission of Cambridge Lni\ernity Press. Introductron vii
First published 2013 (,'hronology xxv
Further reading xxvii
Nofe on the text and translation

Eudemian Ethics
rinrurle. Book 1
Il:udcrninn ethics, English]
I.:~ldco~irn rthlcr / risrorle; translated and edired by Brad Inrrood, Hook rr
L ni\o\ir! <~l"lill-c,nta;Raphacl \\half, King's Collcgc London.
c cn>. (Cambridge terrr in rhe history of philosophy) Ihok nr
lncludca index.
078-a-p-19848.6 (Hardback) - Isex 978-o-jz~-1lr42-2 (Paperback)
Book rv
I . Erhics. I. Inaoad. Brad, edirol-, translator.
Hook v
11. \\oolf, Kaphael. editor, translator 111. Title.
ep'..ijljg zor3 I3ook vr
r711.3-dcz3
zu~zuzj87.+ t%ookvrr
~ s r x978-a-jz~-1gS18-6 Hardback I3ook vrrr
ss\ 978-a-511-rz1~2-z Paperback
(;/t~ssarj~
Cambridge Lnirersit) Press has no rerponsibilit? far thc pcrsistencc or
accuracy of LRLr far exrernal or third-parr) inrerner u.ebsires referred to /!Ides
in this publication, and does not guaranree that any conrent on such
wcbsires in. or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 Acknowledgements
In the long and sometimes labyrinthine process of translating the
Eudemian Ethics we have incurred several debts of gratitude that we
would like to record here: to Jennifer Whiting for discussion that
helped illuminate some tricky passages, particularly in Book v~r;to John
Cooper for letting us see his translation of portions of Book rr; and to
Anthony Price for encouragement and advice. Niko Scharer and John
MacCormick were kind enough to read through a draft of the whole
translation and offered many helpful suggestions, as did an anonymous
reader for Cambridge University Press. We're grateful to the series
editor Desmond Clarke for his painstaking and detailed comments,
which led to numerous improvements; his care and thoroughness have
been inraluahle to us in bringing the project to fruition. Finally, our
thanks go to Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press for patiently
overseeing the whole operation, and for her support throughout.
Introduction
The opening line of the Nicomachean Ethics introduces one of Aristotle's
best-known contributions to philosophy: 'Every skill and every enquiry,
and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some
good.' This captures an inspiring and optimistic view of human nature,
as does the equally famous opening of the Metaphysics, 'All human
beings by nature desire to know.' Striving for the good and striving
for knowledge are two of the key elements of Aristotle's profound view
of what is significant in the life of human beings. Less well known is the
emphasis Aristotle places on the role of pleasure, healthy pleasure at
least, in a good human life. And that view is featured in the opening
sentences of his other major work on happiness and successful human
living, the Eudemiun Ethics. Aristotle criticizes the wise old poet Theog-
nis for driving a wedge between what is pleasant and what is fine and
good. 'We should not agree with him. For happiness, being finest and
hest, is the most pleasant of all things.'
Aristotle's unexpected focus on the pleasantness of the happy life is
just one of the many significant, though often subtle, differences
between Aristo~le's two authoritative books on ethics, distinguished
since antiquity by the epithets 'Nicomachean' and 'Eudemian'. These
labels allude to his son Nicomachus and his famous student Eudemus of
Rhodes. T h e reason why these two labels were chosen to designate
tlristotle's two works on ethics, Aristotle's motivation for writing two
different books on the topic, and the relationships between them are all
issues mired in uncertainty and controversy. Each of these questions
demands proper discussion, but at the outset we want to draw attention
vii
 Introduction
to some important basic facts about Aristotle's Ezrdemiatz Ethics which
make it eminently worth reading and indeed studying with as much care
and attention as we routinely devote to the Nicomachean Ethics. First and
foremost, it is important to recognize that the Eudemian Ethics is a
complete treatment of happiness and the good human life, and in our
view it was probably the first one Aristotle wrote. And if this is so, then
it clearly demands our attention as a discussion of fundamental human
values written by one of the great philosophers of the western tradition.
But the nature of the work has been controversial, and so we should
begin with a bit of background.
T h e composition a n d transmission of t h e Eudemian Ethics
Until very recently the claim that the Eudemian Ethics is a complete
treatise would have been controversial, and in fact the present volume is
only the second translation into any language of the whole book as it has
come down to us from antiquity.' 411 earlier translations and to this day
all editions or the Greek text omit three central books of the Eudenzian
E:'rhi(rn on the grounds that they are also found in our texts of
thc N~,.on~~rr.l~r~rrifi.'/hics. These common books, Eudemian rv-vr and
, I I / I I I v \.!I, are identical in the two works. T h e reasons for this
1111usualstate 111' affnirs are not clear, though modern scholarship has
reccnrly made dramatic progress on the problem. It was only in 1971
tli;lt the eminent German philologist Dieter Harlfinger revealed that the
common books were in fact transmitted in a significant number of
Ii~ril~~mirr~~
Ethics manuscripts;' previously it had been believed that they
only appeared in their proper form in the Nicomachean Ethics and
that the scholars and scribes of antiquity simply cross-referenced the
Nicomachean books to fill in a gap in the Etidemiun Ethics, Once that
mistake was cleared up, it wasn't long before the English philosopher
Anthony Kenny established on objective grounds (using exhaustive,
computer-assisted analysis of the Greek style of the works) that the
common books must have been composed originally for the Eudemlan
' The first, by n r h o n y Kcnny, appeared in zorr
D. Harlfingcr, 'Die Uberlieferungsgcschichte der Eudemischen Erhik', pp. 1-50 of
C,~nrsriuihungen;ur Eudtmirrhert Erhlk, ed. P hlaraux and D. Hailfinger (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1971).
Erltirs, rather than li)r the Nicomachean work.3 Some interpreters and
scholars continue to suspect, not entirely without reason, that the
common books may have been somewhat revised for reuse in the
Nicomachean Ethics: and we suspend judgement on that relatively
minor issue. T h e crucial fact is that the common books, though they
helong to both of Aristotle's Ethics, are in their original conception
I'undamentally Eudemian in character.
Because of this unusual historical background, the modern reader of
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics needs to have a general view of its history
and the state of the text. As readers often notice, one of the striking
features of this work is its difficulty, especially when compared to the
Nicomachean Ethics. And the way the text has come down to us helps to
explain why this is so. Like virtually all texts from Graeco-Roman
antiquity, Aristotle's works come to us through a long history of copying
and recopying by hand, from the time of their original composition until
the advent of the printing press in the early modern era. But the
Eudemian Ethics had a particularly hard journey through history and
this affects its current condition. We need to put the Eudemian Ethics in
context.
Originally, Aristotle's philosophical works were of two kinds. Some
were published, that is, made available for a wider reading audience
during his lifetime and read routinely through much of antiquity. None
of these 'exoteric' or popular works survives today, though ancient
comments about them make it clear that they were elegantly written
pieces of philosophical literature. T h e other category of Aristotle's
writings consists of treatises that were written primarily for use in his
school, either as the basis for lectures or as 'working papers' for his own
use and for his fellow philosophers. All of the surviving works by
Aristotle fall into this category, including the treatises on ethics.
Aristotle's philosophical career had begun when he arrived in Athens
from his home in Macedon in the mid 360s BCE, at the age of about 18.
I3e came to study in Plato's school, the Academy. H e worked in the
' . 3 Ken"): The Ar~srorricanErhin (Oxford Lniuersiry Press, 1978).
* See, for example. H . Lorenr. 'Virrue of Character in Arisrorle's hifromachean Erhtrs', Oxford
Z ; J. Cooper 'NE ~ 1 1 . 1 - 2 :Introduction,
Siiidier in Aniienr Philompky 37 (2009) I ~ ~ - Z I also
hfethod. Puzzles', chapter I of Ansrorlr: .Vicorronoiksun Erhus, Book vn, ed. Carlo Katali (Oxford
Lni\ersity Press, 2009). p. 27, and H. Lorenz, 'XE v a q : Plain and Qualified Akrasia', chapter 3
of the same.
 Introduction
Academy for about twenty years, until Plato's death. We can be confi-
dent that he was an active member of the school and it is likely that some
of his earliest technical works have their origin in work that he under-
took before Plato died. Though Plato's influence on Aristotle was very
strong, he was by no means an uncritical follower and always came to his
own opinions on philosophical matters. Aristotle left Athens soon after
Plato's death, travelling and working in Asia Minor and in Macedon
(where he became tutor to Alexander the Great) for some time. Bp 335
BCE he was back in Athens and founded his own school, working
alongside his student and friend Theophrastus. After Aristotle died in
322 BCE,Theophrastus carried on his work in the school, known as the
Lyceum or the Peripatos (hence Aristotelian philosophers in antiquity
are often called 'Peripatetics').'
Although the history of his school is hard to document in detail, it is
clear that for several generations Aristotelian philosophers continued to
work in Athens and that in later antiquity his tradition was revived and
reinvi~orated.I)uring the first few centuries a number of works by his
litllr~werscrept into the collection of books by Aristotle, and there is still
tirli~~l;~rly tlcl~i~tc a11o11tthe detailed fate of his school treatises. But it is
ol~u~~tlsntly clri~rthat sonle version of his two major works on ethics was
~ii~wc-tl ~ period. (In addition to the Eudemian and
~ I I W I I t l r ~ r i nthis
, V ~ ~ ~ s ~ ~ r , rI:/l~ir.r
r ~ h r ~lhce ~ r ancient tradition illso preserves some minor
w~lrkrI I I I ethic* i l l ~ h ca ~ r p u sof' Aristotle's philosophical books, the
'(ircilt 1':tIiics' ( ~ ~ ~ I S~I W I ,oI r r l land
~ ~ ) the C'irturs und Vicrs. Neither of
these is h!. Aristotle himself3 though the Mugna Moralia has been
ilelknded as authentic.)
Like other works in the standard corpus of Aristotle, the text of the
Eudemian Ethics was transmitted in handwritten copies throughout
antiquity and the middle ages. T h e story of how the text of the Eudemian
Ethics got from Aristotle's own original to modern times is interesting
and important for modem readers to understand if they are to appreci-
ate the work today. By and large, the more popular an ancient work was,
the more handwritten (manuscript) copies survived past the end of the
middle ages to become the basis for our modern texts. Along the nay
two kinds of changes typically occurred. As in any hand-copying
For an avenieu of the school's history, see John Lynch, Arurotle'i School: .4 Study " f a Grrrk
Eduiarioni~lInirirulion (Berkele!; C4: Lnirersity of California Press, 1972).
process, errors of' tritnscri17tion crept in, different errors in different
manuscripts. 'I'hese inevitably multiplied over time as error-infested
~ e x t sbecame the basis for new copies, which in turn could introduce
liesh errors. At the same time, correction and editing were part of the
Ivocess in the ancient world, as they are today. T h e common stereotype
of the mechanical and mindless copyist is a misleading half-truth.
(:~)mmentators, editors and thoughtful scribes worked constantly to
improve their texts by reversing the inevitable errors as best they could,
oRen consulting manuscripts other than the one they were copying
l?om.
At this point the history of the Eudemian Ethic.7 becomes relevant to
the challenges of our modern text of the work. As Anthony Kenny
\liowed in 1 ~ ~ it 8is ,virtually
~ certain that the Eudemian Ethics, in its
complete eight-book form, was treated as the standard text of Aristotel-
ian Ethics from Aristotle's death in 322 BCE until the time of Aspasius,
~ u t h o rof the earliest surviving commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, in the
carly second century CE.We don't know as much as we would like about
the state of both versions of the Ethics, or about the rest of Aristotle's
treatises, in the three centuries after Aristotle's death.j Many seem to
have been left in an incomplete state, as is appropriate for the papers of a
working philosopher; others were evidently in a more finished form.
'l'he evidence we have about the condition of particular texts and the
lilr~nthey took in this period is conflicting and controversial, though as
Kcnny pointed out, one of our more reliable indications for the stare of
!he ethical works in the period includes mention of an eight-book
Ertdrmian Ethics and no reference to a Nicomachean ~ t h i c s . ~
I:or over four hundred years, then, the Eudemian Ethics must have
hccn treated with particular interest and care, since it was the standard
~ c x t But
. after Aspasius, Kenny has shown, the ten-book Nicomachean
1~111i~~r that we know today became the standard text and it was this
scrsion which has benefited ever since from the high level of scribal and
" I/,,,:Ir,rrot~i~anE t h k ~ ch.
, I . cspedally p p 29-36.
, .
l'l~rrcare variuua Irgnld, abuut lllc hisior) of Ariatutle'a uurkr during rhr Hcllenisric period.
(Inc rather exrreme view war thar they ueierirtuall? unknown duringrhe period. F H. Sandbach
.~rpoesfor this in Ansrorle nnd rhr Stoics (Cambridge Philological Socierh 198j). Far a more
~nlc~rurcd and up-to-date account of the evidence, see J. Barner 'Roman Aristotle', chapter I of
I%~lr,ri,~hro Topto 11 ed. Jonathan Barnes and 4liriam Griffin (Oxford: Clarendan Press, ,997).
* hcnny (.4nrrotclzan Elkirr, 1978),P. 18; the same source lints the Magna Moralta in two books,
u.11ic.h corresponds eracrly CO our ibfugna ~bluralio.
 Introduction
editorial care which the canonical version naturally received. Since then,
that is, for well over a thousand years, the manuscripts which form the
basis for our Nicomachean Ethics received editorial attention of very high
quality. T h e Eudemian Ethics, by contrast, inevitably suffered once it was
demoted. In manuscripts where both works were copied out there was a
tendency to omit the common books from the Eudemian version if it
follov.~ed the iVicomachean, and it seems likely that in copies of the
Eudemian Ethics the common books were sometimes corrected on the
basis of the version of those books preserved in the eventually superior
Nicomachean tradition.
The result of this rather complicated process (the details of which,
admittedly, are not agreed on by all scholars) is that the text of our
Nicomachean Ethics is in relatively good condition, as ancient texts go,
while much of the Eudemian Ethics is in considerably worse condition,
with gaps in the text rather more frequent than we would like and
corruptions of Aristotle's original wording that are often quite difficult
to repair. The brevity and somewhat choppy quality of the last book may
also he the result ofthis process. On the other hand, to the extent that
the common hooks ( E I I I ~ ~ ' IEtllics ~I~IO I could he and were corrected
IV-VI)
from the more attentively edited Nicorr~orheantradition, they are often
(.ilsier 10 rriid t l i i i ~ i tlie rest of the Errtlemian books. Book vrr is in
~i~wticul;~rly I,ail c~~nditioli. 'I'he only consolation for readers of the
I:rrrlr~rr~r~rrr
1:tlrics is the thought that all of that care devoted to editing
111e Nrr~~r~r~~rr~ht~rirt l:'lh~~.r in antiquity may in some cases have taken us
lilr~lieraway li.oni Aristotle's original words than we are in the Eudemian
l:'/hrr.r, t i ~ rall its difficulties. But here, as in the case of so many other
ancient texts, we shall probably never know for sure how far our modern
editions have strayed from their ultimate origins.
Though the status of the Eudemian Ethics as the original complete
version is virtually certain, we cannot he as confident about which
version of the Ethics came first in Aristotle's philosophical career as
we can about the original home of the common books. Kenn); for
example, was convinced that the Eudemian version was the later (as well
as the philosophically superior) work; but the majority view today is that
the Nicomachean Ethics is the later work. In our view the most important
issue is the philosophical relationship between the two versions of
the Ethics; developmental theories about how and why Aristotle's
views changed (to the extent that they did) are not only harder to
defend but also less important to the modern reader, whose proper
interest is in Aristotle's views about the good life.
T h e structure of the Eudemian Ethics
Now that we have a general sense of the nature of the Eudemian Ethics
iuid can be confident that the common books are an integral part of it,
we can turn to the question, what is the plan of the work? Let's begin
with a rapid, inevitably superficial, sketch. Aristotle deals first (in
Ikwk I) with happiness, its characteristics, how it can he acquired and
what kind of life conduces to it. T h e importance of virtue and wisdom
in the best life leads him to discuss those states at some length.
Hook r contains a certain amount of polemical argument against other
views, including the Platonic Form of the Good. Book n begins with a
survey of the good things in a human life; some are bodily, some are
cxternal to us and some are good features of our soul. It is the last of these,
goods of the soul, that merit closest attention, and the most important
good of the soul is virtue. The idea of a virtue (or an excellence, that being
another translation of the Greek word areti) is based on the notion of a
lilnction or use; things that have a proper function or use must also have
;In excellence - for they can perform their function, that is, be used, either
well or badly. Since the soul has functions and can perform them well or
Ilatlly (as our own experience makes all too evident) it must also be able to
11;1ve excellences, that is virtues; and activity in accordance with those
virtues just is the best thing in a human life, happiness.
.After relating this view to a range of widely held opinions (a common
lkature of Aristotle's philosophical method), he categorizes virtues
;iccording to the part of the soul to which they belong (r1.x.15). T h e
virtues that count most in human life are those of the distinctively
Iiuman part of the soul, reason; and these are divided into virtues of
character and virtues of intellect. Here too he is relying on an analysis of
lie soul into its functional parts. It may strike a modern reader as odd to
l ~ l kabout 'parts' of the soul, as if the soul were physical and divisible
i n 1 0 distinct components. Aristotle's language of parts, however, can be
rans slated into less physicalist language by matching his 'parts' with
~listinguishablemental acts or operations. In that sense one part of the
soul is rational in thut it cin think, plan and figure things out, the other
is r~tiunalin thut i t cnn ul~ilerstand and heed that kind of rational
xiii
 Introduction
thinking, though it cannot do the planning and analysis itself. This
division of the soul into a part which thinks things out and commands
and a part which obeys or disobeys (depending on whether it is well or
badly conditioned) is fundamental to Aristotle's (and Plato's) conception
of human virtue and the good life. In his account of the virtues Aristotle
works with one eye on Plato's theories about the soul and virtue, hut
always takes his ovfn independent position on the important issues.
Virtues of character are discussed first. In general terms they are
characterized as mean or intermediate states between extremes; they
have a special relationship with pleasure and pain and with habits, all of
which play important roles in character formation. The notion that an
intermediate state is intrinsically likely to be a good state is part of
traditional Greek wisdom. The maxim 'nothing in excess' goes a long
way back in Greek culture; it was even carved on the wall of Apollo's
temple at Delphi. T h e same way of thinking was encoded in the medical
arts and accepted by Plato too. But Aristotle gave 'the mean' a centrality
in his conception of the virtues of character which is quite distinctive.
Since the acquisition of virtue is Aristotle's central interest at this point
in the Eudemiun Ethics, the mean gets a prominent discussion (and this
leads him to include in tabular form a list of character virtues as
intermediate states hetween excess and deficiency). Before providing a
detailed discussion of various virtues of character, Aristotle lays an
important foundation for the acquisition of virtue in his detailed and
innovative discussion of voluntary and involuntary action (11.6-g), after
which he turns at 11.10 to the account of decision (prohairesis).
It is in Book 111 that Aristotle begins his survey of the virtues of
character. Here, as often, he is influenced by Plato's treatment. In the
Republic Plato had characterized the good human soul (as well as the
good city) as possessing four core or 'cardinal' virtues: wisdom, courage,
temperance and justice. Several of these virtues had also been the subject
of other Platonic dialogues: for example, temperance in the Charmides
and courage in the Laches. It is with courage that Aristotle begins his own
analysis of the virtues, before moving on to temperance (s#phrosunf),
at nr.z, a short discussion which nevertheless lays the groundwork
for later analysis of the relationship between desire and reason. He
continues with mildness in 111.3, great-heartedness in 111.4-j, magnifi-
cence in 111.6and a number of minor virtues of character in m.7. Aristotle
concludes the book with further reflections on character virtue as a
mean. Book rv is entirely occupied with an intricate analysis of the third
cardinal virtue, justice. Aristotle's analysis of justice is one of his finest
pieces of work and it has been highly influential in modern legal and
political theory.
The last of the set of four cardinal virtues developed in Plato's
Republic, which became the standard set for later ancient philosophy,
is rather different from the first three, which are all virtues of character.
Wisdom (phronisis) and expertise (sophia) are different, since they are
excellences of the strictly rational part of the soul, and so in Book v
Aristotle turns to the virtues of intellect. These are the last of the virtues
proper to be analysed, and intellectual excellence is exhaustively cat-
egorized; the detail and fineness of his distinctions are characteristic of
Aristotle's approach to philosophical problems. More than Plato, Aris-
totle draws a sharp line between theoretical and practical uses of the
intellect and the range and variety of excellences discussed in this book
is impressive.
By the end of Book v, then, Aristotle has covered, among other things,
the four cardinal virtues set out by Plato in the Republic and added some
characteristic elaborations and emphases of his own. We have already
noticed that temperance gets a relatively short treatment, something
perhaps explained by Aristotle's expansive interest in the problems of
self-control and the lack of it elsewhere in the Eudemian Ethics, and the
nlassive discussions of justice and the intellectual virtues - both of
which are also prominent in the Republic.
In the remaining three books Aristotle tackles some vitally important
;~~icillaryaspects of the happy life. Book vr begins with a focus on types
I I deficient
~ character (vice, failure of self-control and brutishness). The
greatest emphasis is on the topic of self-control and the failure of self-
control. These are themes that rely heavily on the earlier discussions of
voluntary action, decision and the relationship between intellectual and
:~l'Sectivestates of the soul. Aristotle is particularly concerned with what
Illlipens when we fail to do what we rationally plan or decide to do,
~lsuellyas a result of overwhelming desires. In his Protagoras Plato had
portrayed Socrates debating whether it was even possible that a firm
r.tlional resolution based on knowledge could be overturned by desire
i~ndAristotle was eager t o show how this obvious and frequent occur-
rence could be accounted Sor using his own account of how reasoning
;ind desire interact in human iiction. Hnok v1 concludes with a detailed
analysis of pleasure, something the reader has long been expecting given
the importance of pleasure in many parts of the previous discussion.
Given the prominence, early in the treatise, of pleasure as a component
of the good life, it is no surprise that Aristotle here defines pleasure as a
kind of activity of a healthy organism.
Book v11 is entirely devoted to the theme of friendship, clearly one of
the most important features of any happy human life. Plato had devoted
a dialogue, the Lj~sis,to the topic of friendship, but not untypically, the
participants are unable to reach a determinate conclusion about its
nature. Aristotle offers a more systematic treatment. Friendship comes
in three varieties. Some friendships are based on the utility that friends
can offer to each other, often asymmetrically; others are based on
pleasure; in its hest form, friendship between two people is based on
shared virtue and shared activities. This form of friendship raises a
vitricty of puxxles 1h;rt Arist~~tle discusses at considerable length. H e is
I)ilrticulnrly conccrncd I I I sort out the conflicting intuitions we might
Iluvc itl~out~ l t cvalue i~l'l'ricndshipto a virtuous person with the ideal of
C ~ I I I I ~ I ~ C~clf-sul'licic~tcy
IC
Ilr~r~k VIM,wlticlt ct~n~l)lrtcs the treatise, scrms somewhat fragmented
11ttd i~ ia certitinly unttsu;~ll,vshl~rt.I t is cunvenient to regard it as three
~ ~ ~ I I I ~CISISII IP~ S1111 I ~ ~ ~ S ~ C I I ~ I I C I I tollics
L I S (not in itself an unusual way
I A r i ~ ~ c l itrct~ises
~t 111 end). v11t.1 tackles the old Socratic
I~rol)lcntIII' ~ v h c ~ h evirtue r is ;I fi~rmof' knowledge, and is a kind of
corl~llar! I I I the discussil~nof the fjilure of self-control in Book m. In
v1ll.r Aristotle esplorcs the role of' guild fortune in a happy life, a
significant topic since some of the good things which contribute to a
happy life are indeed dependent on factors beyond our personal control.
T h e final chapter in the Eudemian Ethics provides the reader with a
general account of the ideal human character and the best condition of
human life, an all-inclusive virtue which Aristotle calls 'nobility' or 'the
fine and good'. T h e relation of this ideal to goods other than those of
character is then explored in two ways. True nobility is contrasted to the
kind of utilitarian understanding of virtue characteristic of Spartan
culture (in which virtue is valued for the sake of its role in providing
us with external and bodily goods). After a reminder that the happy life
consists in certain activities (which are pleasant because pleasure just is a
certain kind of activity - as explained in Book vr), the proper way of
relating to such bodily and external goods (including friends), which he
here calls 'natural goods', is laid down. T h e right amount is what our
rational decisions indicate it to be after due reflection and analysis;
rather surprisingly, the proper reference point for such decisions is
~ o d Aristotle
. explains what he means as follows ( v I u . ~ . I & I ~ ) :
Whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods (either goods of
the body or money or friends or other goods) will most effectively
produce contemplation of god, that is the best and this is the finest
limit; and whatever choice and acquisition of natural goods
impedes, either by deficiency or by excess, our cultivation and
contemplation of god, is base. And this applies to the soul, and it
is the best limit for the soul when one is least aware of the irrational
part of the soul as such.
'I'hus Aristotle concludes his treatise on the good life with a decisive
*tttement about the importance of reasoning about natural goods in
;tchieving happiness. H e clearly integrates a characteristic emphasis on
(Inimpeded action with his focus on mean or moderate states that avoid
rscess and deficiency, and in the conclusion of the Eudemian Ethics he
shows how human excellence depends on a recognition of the superior-
ity of the divine and its indispensable role in the constitution of the hest
Iturnan life.
Distinctive features of the Eua'emian Ethics
;\l;tn!. of Aristotle's works show signs of having been partially revised
ilnd touched up by Aristotle himself as his thoughts on a subject
~lcvrloped.H e wrote two versions of his Ethics, and there must have
I~rcna reason for him to compose a wholly new version rather than just a
rrvision of the old one. Scholars and philosophers who take an interest
I I I !lie full range of his ethical thought are bound to focus on the salient
clilltrences between the two versions of the Ethics, and probably have
(lone so since antiquity. For example, whoever wrote the Magna Moralia
\ r c ~ n sto have followed the Eudemian version closely while still turning
I I I the Nicomachean Ethics for some points; as clumsy as this author
\~~ttierimes seems to be, he evidently was thinking about the relation
I~ctweenthe two works. Even if we cannot be certain about Aristotle's
;~ctualmotivation for writing two versions of his ethics, or about the
11r~lerin which he wrote the works, it is still important to indicate some
xvii
of the more significant differences between them, though an adequate
account of these differences remains a project for serious and on-going
philosophical research.
Six general issues, all of them important for understanding Aristotle's
thoughts on the good life, suggest themselves in this connection:
I. The role of political science in relation to ethics.
2. The contributions of theoretical and practical reason in the happy life.
3. T h e nature of pleasure and its relationship to the goal of life (the telos).
4. The nature of friendship.
5. The nature of voluntary action.
6. Philosophical method.
I. The role of political science in relation to ethics: A reader who
approaches the Nicomachean Ethics after reading the Eudemian will
be struck first by a new emphasis on the importance of politics as an
overarching study, the master science which is authoritative and goal-
setting for those studies ranged under it, including ethics. Aristotle is
explicit on this point in N E 1.2 and at the end of the work he returns
again to political theory and to his research programme on the
natures of various political systems. T h e final chapter of the Nico-
machean Ethics as a whole addresses an important practical question
that had long been thought to be in the realm of statecraft and
political leadership. Considerations of politics are of course present
in the Eudemian version too, inevitably given Aristotle's conviction
that human beings are polis-dwelling animals by nature. But at no
point in the Eudemian Ethics does he make politics the overarching
and agenda-setting science that shapes how ethics is to be conceived.
In fact, where the issue arises in the Eudemian Ethics he assigns
the role of superordinate science to three disciplines taken together:
politics, household management, and phronFsis, i.e., wisdom, the
intellectual virtue which governs individual practical and ethical
decisions (1.8.20).
Rather, it is that for the sake of which, in the sense of the goal,
that is the best th~ngand the cause of what is subordinate to
it and the first of all things. Hence the good itself would be
this: the goal of all that is achievable by human action. This is
what falls under the science that has authority over all sciences;
this science is politics and household management and wisdom.
'l'hcsc stetes differ from 111ercsl in being of that sort. Whether
they differ at all from one another must be considered later.
When Aristotle raises the question of how these three disciplines
(politics, household management and wisdom) relate to each
other, he is referring ahead to the discussion in v.8 (a common
h~rok),where it is said that political science and wisdom 'are the
same state but their essence is not the same'. This partial identi-
lication of the three disciplines makes more sense in the Eudemian
context than it does in the framework of the Nicomachean view
that political science is superordinate to ethics.
2, The contributions of theoretical and practical reason in the h a p p ~life:
110th versions of the Ethics take complicated positions about the
contributions of theoretical and practical excellences to the happy
(or the most happy) life. The two versions share, of course, Aris-
totle's characteristically clean and sharp distinction between these
I W V kinds of intellectual virtue, but the way they handle the inevit-
able questions and problems is quite different. In N E x.7 theoretical
excellence is the highest virtue and its activity is the activity of our
hest component. Hence 'its activity . . . will be complete happiness'.
In x.8 we learn that practical wisdom contributes in a secondary way
to happiness. Commentators have always struggled to reconcile these
claims both with each other and with the rest of what Aristotle says
;\bout the good life. Arguably, the Eudemian Ethics (in vm.3) takes a
clearer vie^; though one that many will find exotic. We of course aim
to contemplate god, and our practical wisdom uses this aspiration as
a benchmark in carrying out one of its most important tasks, deter-
mining the appropriate level of commitment to non-intellectual
goods such as wealth, bodily well-being and friendship. The contem-
plative activity in question here does not seem to be the same as that
envisaged in N E x.7, where (as also in Metaphysics XII)contemplation
is god's own activity and god himself is a kind of paradigm of self-
sufficiency; it is that self-sufficient activity that human beings strive
for when they seek happiness by emulating god. In the Eudemiun
Ethics god is, rather, the object of contemplation for humans. This
idea of contemplating god is in some ways more conventionally
religious than what Aristotle offers in the Nicomachean Ethics and
Meroph)~sit'XII, hut i t is pcrh:~psless surprising if one thinks of Plato's
 views on god and of Aristotle's own Protrepticus. In Plato god serves
as a kind of ethical ideal, and 'becoming like god' is in several places
put forth as the highest human aspiration, with god functioning,
especially in the Timaeus, as a kind of supremely rational and
benevolent agent, a picture that seems quite in tune with the concep-
tion of god suggested in the Eudemian Ethics. Be that as it may, in the
latter work a e get a clearer and less vexing picture of how contem-
plation relates to the practical use of our reasoning capacities than we
do in the Nicomachean Ethics.
3. The nature ofpleasure and its relationship to the goal of l@ (the telos):
Probably the most well-known difference between the two versions of
the Ethics concerns their two quite differently articulated accounts of
pleasure, in Nicomachean X and Eudemian \.I. For the most part,
though, the discussion has been construed as an issue of internal
conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics, since Eudemian VI is a common
hook and also appears as h'icomachean VII.This awkward fact has led
to the generation of some unusually complicated theories about
Aristotle's understanding of pleasure. But here we see hour much
easier things are when the originally Eudemiun context of the theory
in the common books is taken into account. For in Eudemian VI
pleasure is defined as an activity of a certain sort, while in Nicoma-
chean X it is something which accompanies or supervenes on an
activity This subtle difference is just the sort of thing one might
expect when the same philosopher thinks twice about a complicated
and difficult issue, and it is in our view no accident that the Eudemian
Ethics has the theory it has. For in the Eudemian version happiness,
the goal of life, is a kind of activity, as is pleasure itself. And as we
have seen, the Eudemian Ethics opens, unlike the Nicomachean Ethics,
with an emphasis on the fact that the best is also most pleasant.
Whether this means that Aristotle could be construed as some sort of
refined hedonist (since the goal of life is a form of pleasure) is an
open question; anti-hedonists might find it an uncharitable sugges-
tion, but a hedonism of that kind would connect quite well with
commonly held views about the good life. Moreover Plato, whose
relation to pleasure was extremely complex, seems to have held, at
least in some works, that while not all pleasure was good, the good
life would, in a non-accidental way, be the pleasantest life for a
human being, and in broad outline the Eridemiun Ethics can be seen
as sympathetic to that view. It is, however, not difficult to account for
Aristotle's motivation to give a more refined version of the theory in
Nir.onzuchean X, where he is at pains to distance himself from
I,:udoxus (a friend and former colleague from Plato's Academy),
who seems to have been a genuine and unabashed hedonist who
anticipated in some respects the ethical hedonism of Epicurus in
the Hellenistic period.
J, The nature offriendship: Friendship is one of the most important
aspects of the good human life. In the Nicomachean Ethics the
iliscussion of friendship occupies nearly 20 per cent of the work
(Ijooks v111 and IX), and the proportion is about the same in the
I:'ridemian version, with all of E E VII dedicated to the topic. Both
versions are organized around Aristotle's fundamental division of
friendship into three categories: those that are focused on pleasure,
on utility, and on virtue or the friend for his or her own sake.
Similarly, hoth regard the ideal friend as another 'self', someone
who shares one's virtuous activities in such an intimate way that
our perception of the friend is a stimulus to or proxy for the kind
of self-perception which is ultimately most pleasant. Both versions
(11'the theory of friendship employ the insight that there is par-
ticular value in awareness of one's own good activities; and hoth
1)uzzle out the difficult issues raised by the fact that good people
arc supposedly more self-sufficient than others, and yet despite
[heir self-sufficiency they still need friends. There are many small
differences of emphasis between the Eudemian Ethics and the
.Yicoinachean discussion of friendship, but on at least two points
the differences seem significant. Generally the Nicomachean ver-
hir~nshows greater interest in the political side of friendship; it is
certainly discussed in Eudemian Ethics VII.IObut it is more preva-
lent in the N E , especially in ~111.9-10; moreover, the discussion
01 like-mindedness in 1x.6 is markedly more political than its
counterpart in the Eudemian Ethics. And when it comes to the
delicate issue of balancing one's own interests against those of a
friend, it is fair to say that the Eudemian Ethics is noticeably
more other-oriented and considerate of the friend's interests and
lkclings than is the N~i.~~rn[rl.hcun version.
5 . 7710 ~rurrrre~ / ' r o l r ~ ~ r er./i~nr:
~ r r r , ~'She
~ account which Aristotle gives in
Nicnmu~herrnLrhit,s III ol'llrr iloturu i~l'thcvoluntary is often thought to
 be one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis in his corpus.
Not only does an action have to be originated by the agent, but there is
also a vitally important additional condition to be met for an action to
be voluntary: if one is non-culpably ignorant of the relevant particu-
lars then the action ceases to be voluntary. The account of voluntari-
ness in Eudemian Ethics 11.6 is notably different; it puts much greater
emphasis on the need for the starting point or archiof the action to be
within the agent and here as elsewhere in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle
exploits examples and styles of thinking found in the Analytics more
than he does in the Nicomachenn Ethics. It is also north noting that the
very sophisticated account of decision (prohairesis) which charac-
terizes the Nicomuchean Ethics is developed in the Eudemian Ethics
less independently of other issues than it is in the N E . In general, the
second half of Eudemian Ethics II and the corresponding, equally
important parts of the ,Vicomacheun Ethics provide the reader with a
wealth of subtle, philosophically stimulating differences to ponder.
6. Philosophical method: It is typical of Aristotle throughout his corpus
to be very self-conscious about his philosophical method and to
remark overtly on the proper procedure for a given topic fairly often.
So it is that he makes some of his most famous remarks in the early
pages of the Nicomachean Ethics, such as his insistence in 1.3 that we
should demand from each field of study only the relevant degree of
precision and that exactness cannot be expected from political and
. ethical theorizing. This is not a problem, not just because no greater
degree of precision is on offer, but also because (as he sal-s in 1.4) one
does not need to understand the reason why in politics or ethics, as long
as the facts are clear enough to us from experience and upbringing;
indeed, this is one reason for the claim, characteristic of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics alone, that the audience for the subject should be
restricted to those with enough experience of life to benefit from the
analysis presented in the Ethics. T h e key factor here is that in the
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle thinks that only so much explanatory
precision is possible in this field. It is particularly striking that
he explicitly says in 1.4 that there are important points on which
knowing the explanation just doesn't matter. Given that Aristotle
was probably the most relentless philosopher in the ancient world
when it comes to seeking the reason why, this limitation on his
preferred method stands out sharply.
Hut in the Eudemiun Ethics the situation is very different in
~ l l ecorresponding methodological passage. Here is what he says in
l;/: 1,6:
In all these matters we must try to seek conviction through argument, using
rhc appearances as witnesses and example^.^ The best situation is that
everyone be in manifest agreement with what we are going to say; failing
that, that everyone should in some fashion agree, as they will do when they
lrlve had their minds changed. Each person has some affinity with the truth,
;ind it is from this that one must prove one's case on these issues in one way
or another. If we start from rvhat is truly but not clearly spoken, clarity will
hc won as we make progress, continually substituting what is more intelli-
gible for what is usually spoken of confusedly.
In erery field of enquiry, arguments made philosophically differ from
rl~osemade non-philosophically. Hence one should not, even when it
Comes to politics, regard as superfluous the kind of study that makes clear
not only what something is but also its cause. For such is the philosophical
ipproach in every field of enquiry. This does, however, require a good
~lcdof caution.
'l'he idea that philosophical progress is made by moving from what is
it~itiallyconfused to what is more intelligible is familiar from many
\vorlts in the corpus, especially Book I, chapter I of the Phjjsics. T h e
xtme connection to the importance of finding the cause, the reason
why, is made there (as it is in most places where the issue comes up).
So when the Nicomachean Ethics, at the corresponding point in its
on.n introductory remarks, goes out of its way to say that some basic
I;lcts don't invite or admit of causal analysis, it is hard to resist the
~lioughtthat this is a deliberate indication that Aristotle has had
\ r < , ~ ~thoughts
nd on a point of philosophical method. No doubt some
\r~lsiblereconciliation of the two discussions of method is possible,
IIIII it does seem tolerably clear that on yet another central philo-
\ophical issue Aristotle takes importantly different positions in the
\'~<.omacheunand Eudemian Ethics.
When reading the Eudemian Ethics we come face to face with a large
1111rnher of significantly but subtly different points of theory, philosoph-
iml procedure and emphasis. It would, for example, repay one's effort to
" ( on>prrr Arirroilr'r ~ n ~ r t h ~ ~ c l orcmarkl i l l in rhc Eukmien Ethics at v ~ . r . j .
l ~ ~ ~ i ~larer
xxiii
contrast the two critiques of Plato's Form of the Good or to compare the
--ay Aristotle engages with the iconic figure of Socrates in the two
works, or to study the different ways he exploits examples drawn from
geometry and the Anulytics. But for that one must read the Eudemian
Ethics with care and in its entirety. This is one reason why a complete
translation of the work has been needed.
Above all, presentation of the Eudemian Ethics with all its parts intact
helps one to realize that Aristotle wrote a hugely important work on
ethics not once, but twice, and that both works are masterpieces. Once
restored to its integral condition as well as can be done after centuries of
relative neglect, and translated for the modern reader, the Eudemian Chronology
Ethics will, we are convinced, emerge as a work of tremendous inde-
pendent value. When read in its own right, its subtle riches will provide All dates are BCE
contemporary readers with as much (or more) food for independent
reflection about the good life, happiness, virtue and human nature as ,\H4 Aristotle horn in Stagira in Chalcidice, the peninsula projecting
any other work preserved from antiquity. II.I~III Macedonia. His father, Nicomachus, was physician at the court of
A111yntas11, king of Macedonia. Aristotle may have spent some of his
t~l~ilillioodat the court

(117 'liavelled to Athens. Joined Plato's Academy

1.17 On the death of Plato, left Athens, probably because of difficulties

,lrlhing from his links with Macedonia. At the invitation of the Platonist
I lrrniias, travelled to Assos, of which Hermias was ruler. Married
I Irrliiias' adoptive daughter, Pythias

1.15 'li.avelled to Mytilene, and continued biological research begun at

\\\l13

I.lr A t the invitation of Philip I1 of Macedon, travelled to Pella and

I~t.c.~~iir
tutor to Philip's son, Alexander the Great

1 i s After a brief period in Stagira, returned to Athens. Established his

II\\II hchool, the Lyceum. Pythias died, having borne Aristotle one
~l.~t~ghter. Aristotle lived for the remainder of his life with a slave,
I Irl.l>yllis,who bore him a son, Nicomachus
323 On the death of Alexander, Aristotle was charged by anti-
Macedonians with impiety on the ground that a poem he wrote for
Hermias befitted a god, not a human being. This led Aristotle to leave
Athens for Chalcis

322 Death of Aristotle from a digestive illness

Further reading

'l'he works of Aristotle as a whole are available in The Complete Works of

I r i ~ o ~ l(thee revised Oxford translation) edited by Jonathan Barnes
(I'rinceton University Press, 1984). In that collection the common books
,Ire translated in the Nicomachean Ethics by W. D. Ross and J. 0.
I lrnlson, while the Eudemian books are translated by J. Solomon. In
111rl.oeb Classical Library series there are also different translators for
~ l l r Nicomachean or common books and the Eudemian books;
I I . Rackham is the Eudemian translator (London: Heinemann, 1935).
I i ~ rthe common (Nicomachean) books there are countless translations,
~ ~ ~ r l u dthe i n gexcellent version by Roger Crisp in this series (Cambridge
I tliversity Press, zooo) and the translation by Christopher Rou-e with
I ollllnentary by Sarah Broadie in Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford

I~liversityPress, 2 0 0 ~ ) .A partial translation (books I, n, vrrr) with

~ I i l ~ s o p h i c acommentary
l by Michael Woods is available in the
l :l;lrendon Aristotle series (second edition, Oxford University Press,
I I ~ I Anthony
~). Kenny has translated the Eudemian Ethics in its com-
11lr1cfhrm in the Oxford World's Classics series (Oxford University
I'rrss, 201 I ) , and that is the only other complete translation of the
I'rr,l~~r~riun Ethics available in any language. Since Aristotle's Greek is so
~lillicult,readers will benefit from parallel reading of important passages
I I I ilne or two other translations as well.
'l'here are very few commentaries on the Endemian Ethics in its own
ripll~,but the Eutlemian hooks have occasionally benefited from separate
wllol;lrly attention in foreign language works. For example, E Dirlmeier
I1;ls translated and o,mmen~ctlon the Errllemiun Ethics in the German
series Aristoteles: Werke in deutschev Ubersetzung (volume 7, Darmstadt: \'or many readers of Arinerlr an especially important feature of his
Wissenschaftliche, 1962) and V. Dkcarie has translated the Eudemian c~liicilworks is their a ~ n n r c t i o nto the movement in contemporary
books into French, with helpful notes, in Arirtote, i'thique ri Ezrdime 11111ral ~heorpcommonly labelled 'virtue ethics'. This theory, or family
(Paris: Vrin, 1978, 2007). There is an Italian translation by P. Donini, 111' ~heories,emphasizes the character of the agent as the key ethical

Etica eudemia (Rome and Bari: Laterza, zooj). concept, rather than the following of rules (a theory known as deontol-
For an excellent general discussion of Aristotle's ethical treatises, 11py) or the maximizing of welfare (consequentialism). Although this
including the fragmentary Protrefiticus, see 'Aristotle's Ethical Treatises' ~ n n l ~ ~isoarguably
k common to a large swathe of ancient philosophical
by Chris Bobonich in The BlackmeN Guide to Aristotle's A'i~omachean rthics, it is Aristotle above all to whom contemporary moral philoso-
Ethics, ed. R. Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell, zooh), and D. S. Hutchinson, ~ ~ l i e rwishing
s to develop a model of virtue ethics have looked for
'Ethics', in The Cambridge Companiorr to Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Cam- i~ispiration.Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness (Oxford University
bridge University Press, 1995). Earlier studies of the relationship I'l.css, 1993) and Intelligent Virtue (Oxford University Press, 201 I) -has
between Aristotle's two ethical treatises include C. J. Rowe The Eude- tlllne important work in connecting up Aristotle with current ethical
mian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Developn~eutofAristotle's ~llcoryin this vein, but readers will also want to explore On Virtue Ethics
Thought (Cambridge: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Soci- Iry.Rosalind Hursthouse (Oxford University Press, 1999) and two lively
ety, supplement no. 3, 1971) and, of course, Antbony Kenny's The collections of articles, Vjrtue Ethics (edited by Roger Crisp and Michael
Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford University Press, rgjX), discussed above. S ~ I I IOxford
~, University Press, 1997) and VIrtue Ethics Old and Nem
There is also a collection of fifteen papers on all aspects of the Eudemian (nlited by Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca YY: Cornell University Press,
Ethics, Untersuchuizgen zu Eudemischen Ethik (Berlin: D e Gruyter, r g j ~ ) , roe;). Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
edited by Paul ~Morauxand Dieter Harlfinger. More recently, there is an 1003) has been particularly influential in this area as well.
excellent collection of papers by David Charles, Christopher Rowe,
Mary Margaret McCabe, Jennifer Whiting and Friedemann Budden-
sieck, edited by Fiona Leigh: The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntarj~,
Friendslzifi and Luck (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
General treatments of Aristotle's ethical theory normally emphasize
the Nicomachean version, and so it is convenient for the reader to
consult the suggestions for further reading in Roger Crisp's translation
of the Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge University Press, zooo). It is
worth drawing special attention to Sarah Broadie's Ethics with Aristotle
(Oxford University Press, 1991), W. Hardie's Aristotle's Ethical Theor],
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), which is now out of print hut is
available online, and to two further books by Anthonj- Kenny: Aristotle's
Theory of the Will (London: Duckworth, 1979) and Aristotle on the
Perfect L@ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), and to The BlnckmeN
Guide to Aristotle's A'icomachean Ethics, edited by Richard Kraut
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). T h e collection Essajjs on Aristotle's Ethics,
edited by A. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980),
has several excellent chapters by various hands.

xxriii xxix

Note on the text and translation
T h e result of the chequered history of the composition and transmission
colnmon books. We have made these notes as brief as possible and in them
wr inevitably refer to the decisions and proposals made by editors of the
(ircck text, scholars who have made proposals about the text, and by
111l1er translators who have faced the same problems. For those who wish
I I I iiursue such issues, fuller bibliographical guidance and references can
I)r li~undin the introduction to the Oxford Classical Text of the Eudemian
I l r k ~ ~pp.
r , xr-xx, and in the suggestions for further reading given above.
lt'e have also included the standard reference numbers that corres-
111u1i1 to the page, column (a or b) and lines in the complete edition
111' :\ristotle produced by Immanuel Bekker in 1831 for the Prussian
:\c.ldemy Because Bekker printed the common books only in the
Tri.r~m(ir.heanEthics the common books bear page numbers from I 1z9a
I I 1;4b, which interrupts the sequence of Eudemian Ethics page

of the Eudeminn Ethics is that, when translating it, ure have had to deal 1111mbers assigned by Bekker (rz14a to 1249b). Inevitably, the numbers
not only with the rather different literary style of the work - more il~dicatingthe lines in each column of Bekker's text correspond only
compact and elliptical, with more use of the technical apparatus of 1.1111p1ily to locations in the English translation, but we trust that readers
Aristotle's logic, physics and metaphysics than the 1VIcomachean Ethics - \v1111 also consult the Greek text will he able to find their way around

but also with a markedly inferior textual tradition. We hope to have given 1111.translation without difficulty It is worth noting that the chapter

our readers some sense of the distinctive flavour of the Ezrdemian Ethics in 111111 section numbers within each book are a product of editorial practice

our translation, without, however, inflicting on them too much of the rillcc the Renaissance and do not reflect Aristotle's own divisions of
occasionally intractable quality of the original. When it comes to the state Ilk lest.
of the Greek text, the reader deserves some sense of hour ure have coped
with the unusual challenges posed by the EuilemIan Ethics.
In translating the Eudemian Ethics \re have worked in the main from two
published Greek texts. For the uniquely Eudemian books (1-111, VII-VIU)we
used the Oxford Classical Text edited by R. R. Walzer and J. M. Minga?;
published in rggr. This is a text which emends troublesome Greek rather
more often than it should, but nevertheless forms a better basis for
understanding what Aristotle originally wrote than any other published
version of the Greek text. For the common books (IV-vl) we used the
Oxford Classical Text prepared hy I. Bywater and first published in 1894.
In our translation we have often had to deviate from these editions,
especially for the exclusively Eudemian books. LVithout burdening our
readers with needless detail, we indicate in a note any place where we
deviate from the relevant Oxford Classical Text. It says a great deal about
the difficulties of the task that there are over IOO such deviations,
proportionately far more in the exclusively Eudemian books than in the

XXX
Eudemian Ethics
 Book I

1.1. I 'I'he poet' who declared his opinion at the god's site in Delos, 1 2 1 4 ~
i11sc:rihing it on the gateway of the Temple of Leto, distinguished the
) ( I I I the I ~ , fine and the pleasant as not all belonging to the same thing.
I lc wrote: 'Finest is what is most just, best is being healthy, most 5
~~lcasant of all is to attain what one desires.' We should not agree with
I ~ i t l l . For happiness, being finest and best, is the most pleasant of
ull things.
I . I .z There are many points of interest concerning each kind of object
LIIICI nature that create difficulty and need examining. Some of these 10
11crtnin only to our knowing, others pertain to the acquisition of the
~ ~ l ~ j and c c t to actions as well. 1.1.3 Regarding those that involve only
~l~corrtical philosoph~a e must state, when the right opportunity pre-
rrrnb itself, whatever is appropriate to the field of enquiry. 1.1.4 First,
I~~~ivcver, we must examine what living well consists in and how it is to be
,~t.l~ic\ed. '5
I)(I all who acquire this label get to be happy by nature, as with
1.1llncssand shortness and differences in skin colour? Or is it through
Ic.;~l.lling,happiness being a kind of knowledge? O r is it through some
+ I I I . ~ of practice? After all, people acquire many qualities not by nature or

Irt~rningbut by habituation; bad qualities if they are badly habituated, 20

KIIIICIqualities if they are well habituated. Or is it in none of these ways,
I I . j hut in one or other of the following: by the influence of some divine
It~rcc,like those people possessed by nymphs or gods, as if inspired; or
 Eudenzian Ethrcr
by luck, since many people claim that happiness and good fortune are
25 the same thing? 1.1.6 Evidently it comes to be present in people in all or
some or one of these nays. For pretty much everything one gets can be
attributed to these sources, since actions based on thought can be
30 grouped together with those that result from knowledge.
1.1.7 Ilappiness and the fine and blessed life might be found in three
things above all, namely those that are thought to be the most choice-
worthy: some say that the greatest good is wisdom, others that it is
virtue, and others that it is pleasure. 1.1.8 Some disagree about the
1z14b respective importance of these with regard to happiness, claiming that
one of them contributes more to it than another, some saying wisdom
does this as it is a greater good than virtue, others vice versa, and others
that pleasure contributes more than both of them. Also, some think that
the happy life is a product of all three, others of two, and others that it
j consists in just one of them.
1.2.1 Focusing our attention on these matters, everyone capable of
living by their own decision ought to lay down2 some aim for living
finely, be it honour or reputation or wealth or education, which they will
look to in the performance of all their actions, since not organizing one's
10 life in relation to some goal is a mark of great foolishness. 1.2.2\+'e must,
then, first and above all, determine, without haste or sluggishness, in
which of our goods living well consists, and which by their absence
prevent its attainment. The necessary conditions of health are not the
I5 same as health itself. 1.2.3 And the same point applies in man!- other
cases. Hence living finely is not the same as that without which living
finely is impossible. 1.2.4 Some of these kinds of conditions are not
peculiar to health or even to life but are common to pretty much
everything, both states and actions. For example, without participation
in breathing or being awake or movement nothing either good or bad
20 would accrue to us. Some things, though, are more peculiar to the
nature of the individual case, and one must not overlook these. Eating
meat and taking a walk after dinner are appropriate for maintaining good
phi-sical condition in a way different from the items just mentioned.
1.2.5 These are the causes of dispute about happiness, its nature and
25 the means to attain it. Some think that its necessary conditions are
Reading PI iherfhui. following a marginal annotation accepted b) Gigon
Book I
rhemselves constituents of happiness. 1.3.1 It would be useless to scru-
rinize every view that anyone holds about it. Many ideas occur to young
children and the sick and the mad that no sensible person would bother 30
10 challenge. What they need is not argument but either the maturity
that comes with age, or medical or civic correctives, medicine being no
less of a corrective than physical punishment. 1.3.2 Similarly there is no
need to investigate the views of the many. They speak arbitrarily about 1215a
pretty much everything, and in particular about happiness. On this topic
one should heed only the views of the wise. It would be strange to bring
argument to bear on people who have no need of argument but rather
need to suffer. 1.3.3And since there are puzzles appropriate to each field
ol'enquiry, evidently there are those concerning the greatest and best life
;IS yell. So these are the views that are worth examining, since a j
rrfutation of a disputant is proof of the opposing argument.
1.3.4 Moreover it is advantageous to be aware of such issues, in
particular with regard to the matters on which every investigation needs
I I I fi)cus, namely what are the possible sources of the fine and good life
(il' it is too presumptuous for one3 to speak of the 'blessed' life), and 10
uirh regard to the expectations of attaining it that decent people may
Il;lve in each case. 1.3.5 For if living finely depends on things that come
;~l~out by chance or by nature then many could not hope to achieve it,
since its acquisition is not up to them through their engagement or
cl'li~rt.If on the other hand it depends on one having a certain character I5
ill111 on the corresponding actions, then the good life would be more
witlespread and more divine, more widespread because more can share
I I I ir, more divine because happiness will be the province of those who
I?l.ingabout certain qualities in themselves and in their actions.
1.4.1 Most of the disputes and puzzles will be cleared up if one zo
~ w ~ ~ l ~defines e r l y how happiness ought to be conceived. Is it just a matter
1 1 1 ' one's soul having a certain quality, as some of the older sages have
~ I ~ o l ~ gOr h t ?is it that one must indeed have a certain quality oneself, but
111o1.e importantly so must one's actions? 1.4.2 Let us distinguish among zj
IIVCS. Some lives do not compete for this kind of success, but are
I I I I I . S L I ~merely
~ for the sake of the necessities: as, for example, those
' ~ (dilfrrinp li.onl rhc inrcrnlrd MSS rri,, the definite article) far the ro of the
Itrrltnp I l c k k c ~ . rot
l ),I:
IUettcininp IIIC ICX! ~ L ~ I C I l,C! ~ the O(:ll' 1~ r c ~ d i ~ S ~110,
i p~ C I I ~ C I ' I for the MSS ha.
 Eudemian Ethics
occupied with the vulgar arts, the arts concerned with money-making
and the mechanical arts. (By 'vulgar' I mean those practised only with
30 an eye to reputation, by 'mechanical' I mean sedentary and waged
labour, and by 'money-making' I mean retail trades related to buying
and selling.)
Since there are three things that rank as conducive to happiness,
the ones that were earlier described as the greatest possible human
goods,j namely virtue, wisdom and pleasure, 6 we see also that there
35 are three lives, chosen by all who have the means to do so - that of
121jb politics, that of philosophy, and that of enjoyment. 1.4.3 Of these,
the life of philosophy tends to be occupied with wisdom and con-
templation of the truth, the political life with fine actions (these
being the products of virtue), and the life of enjoyment with bodily
j pleasures. That is why, as was said earlier, different people recognize
different people as happy. 1.4.4 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, when
asked who was the happiest, said, 'none of those that you would
suppose, but one who would appear strange to you'. H e replied in
this manner because he saw that the questioner assumed it was
impossible for someone who was not grand and handsome or rich to
10 come by that title, whereas he himself perhaps thought that someone
who lived a life that was without pain and unblemished in matters of
justice, or who partook in some divine form of study, was as blessed as
any human can be said to be.
15 1.5.1 There are many other topics about which a good judgement is
difficult, but none more so than the very topic that most people think
is easiest and understood by everyone, namely which of the things in
life should be chosen and would satisfy our appetite if we managed to
obtain them. After all, many things come about that make people give
20 up their lives, for example disease, extreme pain or calamity; evidently,
in the face of these one might have chosen not to have been born in the
first place, if one had had that choice. I.5.2 In addition there is the life
one lives while still a child; no one of good sense could bear to regress
z j to that. 1.5.3 Moreover many things that involve no pleasure or pain, or
involve pleasure that is ignoble, are such as to make non-existence
better than living. 1.j.4 In general, if one included everything that
Reraining rhe XISS text deleted by the OCT. h See 1 . 1 , .
Book 1
everyone does and submits to, but does and submits to unwillingly
(because not for its own sake), and added on an unlimited amount of
time, one would not on account of these elements choose living over
not living.
1.j.5Nor indeed would anyone who was not completely slavish prefer 30
life merely for the pleasure of nourishment or of sex, if deprived of the
other pleasures that knowledge or sight or any of the other senses
pnlvide people with. I.5.6 It is evident that whoever makes this choice 35
~iiightjust as well have been born a beast as a human being. At any rate 1z16a
[he ox in Egypt, which is worshipped as the god Apis, is lavished with a
~ o o ddeal more of those sorts of things than many monarchs.' 1.5.7
Similarlq; one urould not choose life just for the pleasure of sleeping.
What is the difference between an uninterrupted sleep from first day till
Itst, for ten thousand years or any period you like, and living as a plant? j
'l'hat at any rate is the kind of life that plants seem to partake in, as do
Illhies too. In fact, once they first come into being in their mother they
urry on with their growth process, but sleep the whole time. 1.5.8 So it
i\ clear from these sorts of cases that what constitutes living well and the
y ~ ~ oofd life is eluding our investigation.
1.j.c)They say that Anaxagoras, when confronted with these kinds of 10
\r~~rries, and the question what would make coming into existence better
tlt;tn not, replied, 'contemplating the heavens and the order of the whole
~ll~ivrrse'. So he considered that it was for the sake of scientific know- Ij
h ~ l p c that life was worth choosing. 1.5.10 Those who regard
S;lrdanapallus as blessed, or Smindyrides the sybarite: or any of the
1111icl.swho live the life of pleasure, apparently place happiness in the
I illcpory of enjoyment. 1.5.1I Others would choose virtuous actions over
, I I I \ wisdom or bodily pleasure. Certainly there are some who do not simply zo
t I I I I I I ~ ~such
. actions to get a good reputation - they act even if they are not
po~illpto win esteem. 1.5.12 But the majority of politicians do not really
clrhcrvr the name; they are not politicians in strict truth. The politician 25
Ir 111tcwith the propensity to decide on fine actions for their own sake,
11111 1110stpeople take to this kind of life because of money and greed.
1 I I I ~ I ( , IKLISSCII(S
>~ supplement mollon,accepted by the OCT.
' I ~ I I > ) w r d n for luxurious living, the first a legendary king of Asr).ria, the second a norable
~pln,~t~nl.r.-rcckcr from the city of Sybaris whose inhabitants became synonymous with the punuir
"I hlxur).
 Eudemian Ethics
I.5.13 From what we have said it is clear that everyone conceives of
happiness by reference to three lives, that of philosoph!, that of politics,
30 and that of pleasure. Of these, the pleasure that is associated with bodily
enjoyments is far from obscure as regards its nature, its character and
the ways it is acquired. Hence there is no need to investigate what these
pleasures are, but instead whether or not they contrihute anything to
happiness, how they do so, and whether these are the pleasures that
should be connected with living f i n e l ~if in fact any pleasures should he
35 connected with such a life; or is it rather that one must share in
pleasures in some other way, and that the pleasures reasonably supposed
to give the happy person a life of pleasure, and not merely an absence of
pain, are different ones.
1.5.14 These matters must be examined later. But let us first
consider virtue and wisdom, the nature of each of them, and whether
40 they are constituents of the good life, they or the actions arising from
1z16b them. For if not everyone, then at least everyone worthy of mention,
connects them with happiness. 1.5.15 Now Socrates the elder"
thought that the goal was knowledge of virtue, and he would further
5 enquire into what justice is, and courage, and each of the parts of
virtue. It was reasonable that he did this, since he thought that all
the virtues were kinds of knowledge, so thar one turns out simultan-
eously both to know justice and to be just. After all one only has to
have learned geometry and building to be a geometer or a builder.
10 Hence Socrates used to investigate what virtue is, but not bow and
by what means it comes about. 1.j.16 His approach is applicable to
the theoretical sciences, since there is nothing more to astronomy or
to natural science or geometry than knowing and studying the nature
I j of the objects of these sciences. Of course there is no reason that
they should not also incidentally be useful to us for many of the
necessities of life.
1.j.17 But with the productive sciences, the goal is distinct from
knowledge and understanding. For example, health is the goal of
medicine, and good order or something of that sort the goal of political
The Socrates of Plaro's and lenophan's dialogues. Inventigarianr of the rirrues listed are found
in Plato's Republic and L a i h n ; rhe general issuc of rhe parrs of virtue is explored most clearly in
the Prningoror though ir arises in many dialogues including rhe Mtno and the Rrpuhlcc. The thesis
thar virtue is a form of knowledge is aired in Prorqorai and l t n o above $111.
Book I
science. 1.5.18 Now it is indeed a fine thing to know each fine thing. 20
Uonetheless, when it comes to virtue, knowing what it is is not the most
uluable point, but understanding what brings it about. For we do not
want to know what courage is, but to be courageous, nor to know what
justice is, but to be just, as we want to be healthy rather than understand
what being healthy is, and be in good physical condition rather than
understand what being in good physical condition is. 25
1.6.1 In all these matters we must try to seek conviction through
;xrgument, using the appearances as witnesses and example^.'^ T h e best
situation is that everyone be in manifest agreement with what we are
poing to say; failing that, that everyone should in some fashion agree, as 30
they will do when they have had their minds changed. Each person has
some affinity with the truth, and it is from this that one must prove
one's case on these issues in one way or another. If we start from what is
~rulybut not clearly spoken, clarity will be won as we make progress,
continually substituting what is more intelligible for what is usually
s l ~ ~ k eofn confusedly.
1.6.2In every field of enquiry, arguments made philosophically differ 35
li.oni those made non-philosophically. Hence one should not, even when
il comes to politics," regard as superfluous the kind of study that makes
1,lr;lr not only what something is but also its cause. For such is the
~ ~ l ~ i l ~ ~ s o p happroach
ical" in every field of enquiry. This does, however, 40
rvquire a good deal of caution. 1.6.3 Because it is the mark of the Izl.ja
~~l~ill)sopher to speak on the basis of an argument but never at random,
rollie people can get away with arguments that are extraneous to the
r1111jectand empty. 1.6.4 Some do this through ignorance; others are just
Iri~~lds. These arguments end up taking in even those who possess 5
nlirrience and practical ability, at the hands of people who neither
~~a~\scss, nor are capable of, systematic or practical thought. 1.6.5 This
It.~lil>ensto them through lack of education, which is just the inability
1,) distinguish arguments proper to a subject from those that are
1'rtr;Ineous.
"' l I lhr mcthadological remarks at vr.1.5.
" 111 ~prrhaps,'e\.en far those who pursue politics'. Aristotle has already idenriiicd in '5.13 the
I'<~IIII<.II
liW as one of the candidate goad human liver, along "6th that of philosophy and
I lere he saerres that politics can itself be studied philosophically, or as ue mighr ray
~>lv,~rilvr.
ua~~!ilic~tlly,
m enterprise to which he regards his own ethical writings an contributing.
" Ilrlininit!y the MSS ph~lorophonfor Friasche and Allan's philorophou accepted by the OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics
10 1.6.6 It is also a good idea to distinguish the causal explanation from
the fact that is being demonstrated, both because of what we recently
said, that one should not attend un~onditionally'~ to points that are
made by arguments but rather, in many cases, to the appearances (as
things are, whenever people are unable to refute an argument, they are
15 compelled to put their trust in what has been asserted); and because, in
many cases, what seems to have been shown by argument is true, but not
for the reason that the argument claims. For it is possible to demonstrate
a truth through falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.'4
1.7.1 Having made these introductory remarks, let us begin, as we
20 said, first things first, from what is not clearly stated, looking subse-
quently15 to discover clearly what happiness is. 1.7.2 Now happiness is
agreed to be the greatest and best of human goods. We say 'human'
because happiness might perhaps also belong to some other being
superior to human, for example god. 1.7.3 None of the other creatures
25 that are inferior in nature to humans has any claim to this title; no horse
or bird or fish is happy, nor any other being that does not, as the name
suggests, partake of something divine in its nature.16 Rather, one crea-
ture lives better, another worse, in accordance with some other kind of
participation in good things.
30 1.7.4 That this is how things are must be considered later." For now
let us state that some good things are achievable by human action, others
not. We put it this way because some things that exist have no share in
change, neither therefore do some goods.18These perhaps are the things
that are best by nature. And some things are achievable by action, but
35 only by beings superior to us. 1.7.5 Now the term 'achievable by action'
has two senses. Both the things for the sake of which we act, and the
things we do for the sake of these, involve action. For example, we place
We accept the emendation pantcis h>-Langerbeck for the MSS pantn.
I3
I4 See Prior Analytics 11.2-4, Posterzor Analytics 1.32.
'j We accept Solomon's emendation epeita for epi to.
I6 The Greek term for happiness (eudarmonia) is derived etymologically from words that mean
roughly 'having a good guardian spirit'. The Greek term daimfin means both a guardian spirit
and, more generally, a divinity.
I7 It is unclear which passage Aristotle refers to here, but for some relevant remarks on animal lives
see n1.2.g-12, v.7.4, Vr.5.1, vr.12.7, v1.13.j-6, vl1.1.12-13, v11.2.17.
'S These goods would not be achievable by human action since acting involves imparting change.
Good things that are exempt from change for Aristotle urould include god and (in a polemical
context, as at 1.8.17-19 below) Platonic Forms. Here we retain the MSS tcin agathrin for Russell's
praktrin agathbn acccptcd by thc OCT.
Book I
health and wealth among the things that are achievable by action, and
illso the things we do for the sake of these, the healthy and the lucrative.
(Iearly, then, happiness is also to be set down as the best of the things 40
[hat are achievable by human action.
1.8.1 So we must examine what the best is and how many senses it has. 1217b
'I'here appear to be three main views about this.19 Theyzo say that the
pood itself is best of all things and has the property of being both the
lirst of goods and the cause, by its presence, of other things being good; 5
1.8.2and that both these properties belong to the Form of the Good.
( I j y 'both' I mean being first among goods and being the cause, by its
I)rcsence, of other good things being good.) Goodness, they say, is
rspecially predicated truly of the Form, since it is by participation in
i t ilnd similarity to it that the other things are good; and it is first among 10
~oods.For if you eliminate that which is participated in, you eliminate
rtlso the things that participate in the Form, which are called good by
, piirticipating in it; what is first bears this relation to what is posterior.
l.H.3 So, they conclude, the good itself is the Form of the Good, and is in I5
Inct separate from the things that participate in it, as are the other Forms
rlS well.
1.8.4A thorough examination of this view belongs to a different kind
01' undertaking, one that is in the main necessarily more concerned with
tlii~lcctic,since arguments that are both destructive and general pertain
1 1 ) 110 other science than that. 1.8.5 But if one must speak succinctly
I I I ~ O U I these matters, let us say, first, that the notion that there is a Form 20
I I O I only of Good but of anything else whatsoever is dialectical and
rvl1l)ly. This has been examined in a variety of ways both in the
t*u)lcl.ic and in the philosophical works." 1.8.6 Second, even if one
I 11111plete1y granted the existence of Forms and a Form of Good, it
\ \ I I I I I ~ Ibe of no use either for the good life or for action.
1.X.7 What is good has many senses, the same number of senses as 25
\I I I ~ I I cxists has. As we have discussed elsewhere," what exists signifies
"' I I I C 111r.c~
vicurs are most likely that what is best is the Form of the Good; that it is the common
~ I I I I i11ii1
~ ~ , that it is the goal of human action. Aristotle summarizes his rejection of the first two
3 tl.\r\ ;II ~ . H . r gbelow and then moves on to advocate the third in the remainder of the chapter.
'"
, \ I I \ I I I I I C . most likely refers to Platonists.
" \\'hill r\;~ctlyAristotle intends by this contrast is unclear, but it may indicate a division between
\rl1611 I \ more popular and more specialized.
" ( Illrfly in thc (:cctegories.
 Eudemian Ethics
what a thing is, or quality, or quantity, or time, as well as what consists in
30 undergoing change or causing change. What is good is found under each
of these headings. Under substancez3 we find intellect and god, under
quality justice, under quantity due measure, under time the right
moment and, in the realm of change, what teaches and what is taught.
1.8.8 Hence, just as what exists is not some one thing in the cases
35 described, so too what is good is not one thing either; nor is there a
single science either of what exists or of what is good. Nor is it even the
job of a single science to study things that are called good in the same
category. Take, for example, the right moment or due measure. Different
sciences study different sorts of right moment, different sciences study
different sorts of due measure. For example, the right moment and due
measure in food are studied by medicine and gymnastics; in the practice
40 of war they are studied by generalship. In this way different spheres of
action are the subject of different sciences, so it would scarcely be the
province of a single science to study the good itself.
1z18a 1.8.9 Moreover, among things that are prior and posterior there is no
common thing over and above these, and one that is separate at that.
1.8.10 For then there would be something prior to what is first. For what
5 is common and separate is prior, because when what is common is
eliminated what is first is also eliminated. For example, if the double is
the first multiple, it will be impossible for there to be some separate
multiple predicated in common. For this will be prior to the double, or it
will turn out that the Form is the common thing - for example, if one
10 were to make the common thing separate. For if justice is good, and
courage, then there is, they say, something good itself, 1.8.11 the 'itself'
being attached to the common account. And what would this be except
what is everlasting and separate? Yet something that is white for many
days is no more white than something that is white for a single day.
Hence the good is no more good by being everlasting. Nor indeed is the
15 common good the same as the Form. For what is common belongs to all
things.
1.8.12 They ought actually to demonstrate the good itself in a contrary
manner to the way they do at present, which is to start from things that
are not agreed to possess the good and use these to demonstrate the
23 The same category that Aristotle called 'what a thing is' a few lines earlier
Book I
things that are agreed to be good: starting from numbers, they show that
justice is good and health is good. T h e latter, they explain, are structures
;~ndnumbers, goodness belonging to numbers and units, since the good 20
ilself is unity. 1.8.13 But they ought to start from agreed goods, such as
health, strength and temperance, and show that what is fine is found to
un even greater degree in unchanging things: since the former are a kind
ol' structure and stability, so too will the latter be to a greater degree, as
lliese qualities belong even more to them.
1.8.14 Moreover their demonstration that the good itself is unity, on 25
the grounds that that is what the numbers strive for, is hazardous. They
tlo not state clearly how the numbers strive for this, but too baldly assert
il. Besides, how could one suppose that appetite exists among things
[hat lack the property of being alive? 1.8.15 They ought to take more
rouble over this and not, without any argument, make claims that are 30
11ot easy to believe even with argument. And the assertion that all things
I liar exist strive for some single good is untrue. Each thing strives for its
own good - the eye for sight, the body for health, other things for other
floods in the same way.
1.8.16These are the difficulties that prevent there being some good
11hclfand it being of any use for political science. Instead, the latter has
I I own~ good, as do the other sciences too, such as good condition in the 35
t'ilhC of gymnastics. Moreover, there is the point recorded in the text:24
I 8 . I 7 the Form itself of the Good is either not useful to any science or is
11\cf\11 to all alike. Further, it is not achievable by action. 1.8.18 Similarly,
111ccommon good is neither the good itself, since it would belong even 1218b
1 1 , ;I paltry good, nor is it achievable by action, since medicine is
cc~~lccrned not with how to get any arbitrarily chosen attribute, but
11c1\v to get health, and the same applies to the other arts. 1.8.19 What
1s good has many senses (and part of it is fine); and some good is 5
,I( I~icvableby action, some not; the kind of good that is achievable by
I I IIOII,
~ in the sense of that for the sake of which,"j is not the one found
,1111o11gst unchanging things.
" I t 1 5 11ot clear whether Aristotle is referring to an earlier passage in the present treatise or a
111llrrr111 work, but this may be a way of underlining the point made at 1.8.7-8, and just repeated,
I I I ~ I I ri~cliscience has its own particular good. The Platonic Form must, if it is to be useful at all,
111.~lsrli~ tol all sciences (since it is supposed to be perfectly general); but that option does not
t ~ * l l r tllc
t . ~ structure of science, so it will be useful to none.
" ( I,, 1.7.5 1 1 " ' ~ ~ .
I1

Eudemian Ethics

It is clear, then, that neither the Form of the Good nor the common
good is the good itself that we are seeking; the former is unchanging and
unachievable by action, the latter changing but still unachievable by
10 action. 1.8.20 Rather, it is that for the sake of which, in the sense of the
goal, that is the best thing and the cause of what is subordinate to it and
the first of all things. Hence the good itself would be this: the goal of all
that is achievable by human action. This is what falls under the science
that has authority over all sciences; this science is politics and household
15 management and wisdom. These states differ from the rest in being
of that sort. Whether they differ at all from one another must be
considered later.26
Book 11
1.8.21 That the goal is cause of the things subordinate to it is shown by
the order of teaching. One demonstrates that each of the subordinate 11. I . I Next we must discuss what follows, taking a new starting point. All 1218b
things is good by having first defined the goal, since that for the sake of ~ o o dthings are either within the soul or external to it, and the more
which is a cause. For example, since being healthy is this particular 1-hoiceworthyof these are those within the soul, a distinction we also
20 thing, then this other thing will necessarily conduce to it. And what is make in the exoteric works.' For wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in
healthy is the cause, in the efficient sense, of health, but it is the cause of ~ h csoul, and some or all of these are considered by everyone to be the 35
the latter's existence not of its being good. 1.8.22 Moreover no one ~ o a lOf . those in the soul, some are states or capacities, others activities
demonstrates that health is good, unless one is a sophist rather than a ntld processes. 11.1.2 Let these distinctions be assumed and let it be
doctor (it is sophists who play with extraneous arguments); and the same ~lssumedfurther, concerning virtue, that it is the best disposition or
applies to any other starting point. ~ I ; I Ior~ capacity of each of the things that have some use or function.

2; With regard to the human good as goal and to the best of thin 'I'his is clear from induction, since we consider things to be this way in 1219a
achievable by action, we must examine how many varieties there are o r ~ l lcases. For example, a cloak has a virtue, since it has a function and
the best of all thing^,"^ since this is best. I I W and , its best state is its virtue. The same applies to a boat and a
Ilouse, and so on, and hence to the soul, since it has some function. 5
I ,et us assume that the better state has a better function. And, 11.1.3
26 See v.8. " Excluding ,411an's supplement kai, accepted by the OCT Iilal ns states are related to one another, let the functions that arise from
I I I C I ~ be so related. And let the function of each thing be its end. 11.1.4
So i l is evident from this that the function is better than the state. For 10
I IIC cnd, being the end, is the best thing, since it has been laid down that
\t11;11 is best and ultimate is the end, and all the other things are for its
NI~C So. it is clear that the function is better than the state and the
tli\l)osition. 11.1.5 But 'function' has two senses. Some things have a
I1111c.lionthat is over and above their use. For example, the function of
III(. 1)uilder's art is not building but a house, and the function of the art
l
I;

' II) 'nro~cric'Aristotle map refer to more popular works, written for an external audience rather
I I I ~ I for
~ I circulation in his own school. See also n. ZI to Book I above.
 Eudemian Ethics
of medicine is not healing or treating, but health. With other things,
their use is their function. For example, the function of sight is
seeing and the function of mathematical knowledge is studying.'
Hence, where a thing's use is its function, the use is necessarily better
than the state.
11.1.6 NOWthat matters have been determined in this way, let us say
that a thing has the same function as its virtue, but in a different way.
20 For example, the function of the shoemaker's art, and of shoemaking, is
a shoe. So if there is a virtue of the art of shoemaking and of an excellent
shoemaker, the function of this virtue is an excellent shoe; the same goes
for the other cases. 11.1.7 Moreover, let the function of the soul be to
make a thing be alive, and let the function of being alive be a using and a
25 being awake - sleep is a kind of idleness and rest. Hence, given that the
function of the soul and of its virtue must be one and the same thing, its
virtue's function would be an excellent life. This, then, is the complete
good, which is what happiness is.
11.1.8 This conclusion is clear from what we have laid down, namely
30 that happiness is the best thing, the ends are in the soul and the best of
goods, and the things in the soul3 are either a state or an activity. So
since the activity is better than the disposition, and the best activity
belongs to the best state, it is clear from what has been laid down that the
activity of the soul's virtue is the best thing. 11.1.9 And the best thing is
35 also happiness. Happiness, then, is the activity of the good soul. And
since happiness is something complete, and a life can be complete or
incomplete, and so too virtue (since it can be a whole or a part), and the
activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete, it follows that happi-
ness would be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete
virtue.
11.1.10 That our classification and definition of happiness are well
121gb formulated is supported by views that we all hold: (a) doing well and
living well are the same as being happy; (b) each of these, both life and
action, is a use and an activity, since a life of activity involves use of
5 things - the smith makes a bridle, the rider uses it; (c) one cannot be
Aristotle's point is that in the case of house-building or medicine there is a product over and
above the process that the practitioncr of the art utilizes, whereas in the case of perception or
3
function of these capacities.
a
theoretical knowledge such as mathematics, the activity of perceiving or knowing just is the
Reading ta en aut& with Susemihl for the M S S haute indicated as corru by the OCT.
Book II
happy for only a day, or if one is a child, or at every stage of life. That
is why Solon's injunction to call no one happy while alive, but only when
life is complete, is a good one, since nothing incomplete is happy; for it
is not whole.
11. I .I I Moreover virtue is praised because of deeds, and encomia are
given for deeds. It is those who win who are garlanded, not those who 10
;Ire capable of winning but do not do so. And one judges the quality of a
person from their deeds. 11.I . 12 Further, why is happiness not praised?
'I'he reason is that the other things are praised because of it, either by
heing referred back to it or by being components of it. That is why
I'elicitation, praise and encomium are all different. Encomium is a
speech about a particular deed, praise is for a person being like that in I5
general, and felicitation concerns the end.4
11. I . 13 This will clarify the puzzle that is sometimes raised, as to why
rncellent people are no better than base ones for half their life, given that
ill1 are alike when asleep. T h e reason is that sleep is the soul's idleness,
not its activity. 11.1.14 That is why, if there is some other part of the soul, 20
lilr example the nutritive part, its virtue will not be part of virtue as a
whole, nor will the body's virtue be: the nutritive part is more active
tlt~ringsleep, whereas the perceptive and desiderative parts are ineffec-
~ualthen. But insofar as these still have some kind of share in move-
tllent, even the dream images that excellent people have are better, 25
1111less brought on by illness or deformity.
11.1.15Next we must consider the soul, since virtue belongs to the
\oill, and not incidentally. Since we are looking for human virtue, let us
ilssume that there are two parts of the soul that share in reason, but do
1101 both share in reason in the same way. One does so by giving 30
c,ommands, the other because it is by nature such as to obey and listen.
I .rt us exclude any part that is irrational in some other sense. 11.1.16 It
111;lkesno difference if the soul is or is not divisible into parts; it still has
tlil'li.rent capacities, including those we have mentioned - just as the
(,onvex is not separable in a curve from the concave, nor is the straight 35
I~.ornthe white in a line. Yet the straight is not white, except incidentally
,11111 not in its own substance.
'
I'llc cnd: namely, happincss. 'l'llc (ircck fi)r fclicitation (eudaimonismos) is derived from the word
11111,)
(ruduiwlo~ir1).' 1 ' 1 1 ~ tllrcc ki~ltlsof'spccch contrasted here are discussed slightly more
IIII. Ili~l>l>iness
I I ~Rhrtoric I . Q , J J ,
 Eudemian Ethics
11.1.17 Any other part of the soul, for example the vegetative, has been
excluded. T h e parts we have mentioned are5 peculiar to the human soul.
Hence the virtues of the nutritive and generative part are not human
40 virtues. For if virtues belong to a human being qua human, reasoning
must inhere, as a starting point, and action must inhere too; but
122oa reasoning is a starting point not of reasoning but of desire and the
affections, 11.1.18 so a human must have these parts. And just as good
physical condition is composed of the virtues of the parts, so too is the
soul's virtue qua end.
11. I .19 There are two kinds of virtue, one of character and the other of
5 thought. For we praise not only the just but also the discerning and the
expert. We have laid down virtue or its function as praiseworthy; these
are not themselves active, but they do have activities. 11.1.20 Since the
virtues of thought are accompanied by reason, these sorts of virtues
belong to the part that has reason, which is the command-giving part of
10 the soul insofar as it has reason. T h e virtues of character belong to the
irrational part that by nature follows the part that has reason. We do not
n~entionas a certain sort of character that one is an expert or clever, but
that one is gentle or bold.
11. I -21 Next we must investigate, first, virtue of character - what it is
and (what amounts to the same thing) what kind of parts it has, and the
15 ways in which it is brought into being. We must make our search with
some grasp of the matter, as all who seek in other areas do, so as to try,
by working through what is expressed truly but unclearly, to arrive at
what is both true and clear. 11.1.22 AS things are, we are in a state
comparable to knowing6 that health is the best disposition of the body,
20 or that Coriscus is the darkest-skinned fellow in the marketplace. We
don't know what each of these is, but being in this state is of relevance
for our knowing what each of them is.
11.1.23 Let us first assume that the best disposition is brought about
by the best things, and that the best actions for each thing result from
25 the virtue of each. For example, the best exercises and food are what
bring about good physical condition, and the latter results in the best
exercise. 11.1.24 Moreover every disposition is brought into being and
Omitting Ross' supplement ouk accepted by the OCT.
Reading Spengel's supplement eideiimen before the MSS kai hugietan indicated as corrupt by the
OCT.
Book II
destroyed by the same things applied one way or another, such as health
by food, exertion and climate. This is clear by induction. Virtue, then, is
a disposition of this kind, which is brought about by the best movements 30
of the soul and which produces the best functions and affections of
the soul.
In addition the same things in one way bring virtue about, and in
another way destroy it; 11.1.25 and the use of it is related to the same
factors that cause it to develop or decay - those to which its best
disposition is related. An indication of this is that both virtue and vice 35
are concerned with pleasures and pains, since it is through these that
discipline works, being a form of treatment that is (as in other cases)
effected through opposites.
11.2.1 It is clear, then, that virtue of character is concerned with
pleasures and pains. Character exists, as the name signifies, because it
develops from habit,7 and a thing gets habituated as a result of a 1220b
pattern of conduct that is not innate, by repeated movement of one
sort or another, so that it is eventually capable of being active in that
way. We do not see this in lifeless entities: however many times you
hurl a stone upwards, it will never do this without being forced to.
11.2.2 Let character, then, be a quality of the part of the soul that is 5
irrational, but capable of following reason, in line with reason's ability
10 command.
11.2.3We must now specify the aspect of the soul in virtue of which
character traits possess the qualities that they do. They do so in relation
1 0 the soul's capacities for affections, with respect to which people are
~crmed'affective'; and in relation to its states, in respect of which people
~1.csaid to be affected in one way or another, or to be impassive, with
rcpard to these affections.' I0
11.2.4 Next comes the distinction, one of the ones that is well estab-
Il$hed, between affections, capacities and states. By 'affections' I mean
lliings like spirit, fear, shame, appetite, and in general things that are
I I ~ L I ; ~ accompanied,
II~ in their own right, by perceptible pleasure and
' 1'111. (ireck for character (ithos) is similar to the word for habit (ethos). Here we retain estiand hoti,
11c.lcrctlhy the O C T following Kusscll.
" I'l~rIcr~nshcrc translltctl ;IS 'i~l'l'cctions'(pnrhimata and pathi) derive from the Greek paschein
~ ~ ~ c i ~'tot lhei naftkctcd'
~ iltltl HO CIIII rcfi'r I ~ r ~ ~ l tto
l l any
y way in which a thing can be affected. In
l~hvcllologicalcontcxtn, O N hrrr, lllcv urr ~~liclr usctl by Aristotle to refer to what we might call
~ Rcniotio~~n.
J I U N U ~ ~ Ior
 Eudemian Ethics Book II

15 pain. 11.2.5It is not in virtue of these that a quality exists - the soul is boastfulness dissimulation truthfulness
just a f f e ~ t e d .Quality
~ depends, rather, on capacities. By 'capacities' flattery curmudgeonliness friendliness
I mean those in relation to which people are described as actively obsequiousness surliness dignity
experiencing affections - for example, being irascible, stolid, passionate, softness grimness staunchness
bashful, shameless. States are the causes of these affections being either conceitedness weak-heartedness great-heartedness Io
in accordance with or contrary to reason - for example, courage, tem- extravagance cheapness magnificence
20 perance, cowardice, indiscipline. unscrupulousness unworldliness wisdom
11.3.1 These matters having been determined, we must understand
that, in everything that is continuous and divisible, there is excess, 11.3.5 These affections and others like them occur in souls and they
deficiency and the mean, and these may be either in relation to each other are all spoken of in terms of either deficiency or excess. Irascible is the 15
or in relation to us. It occurs, for example, in gymnastics, in medicine, in one who gets angry more than one should and more quickly and at more
25 building, in navigation, as well as in any kind of action, whether or not it is things than one should; stolid is the one who is deficient in anger with
based on scientific knowledge and whether or not it is based on a craft. regard to object, time and manner. Reckless is the person who fails to
11.3.2 For movement is something continuous, and action is a movement. liar what one ought and when and how one ought, cowardly the one who
In all cases the mean relative to us is best, since this is what scientific Jkars even what one ought not to and at a time and in a manner that one
knowledge and reason prescribe. This is also what produces the best ought not to. 11.3.6 Similarly too the one who is appetitive and1" 20
30 state in all cases. This is clear through induction and argument, since excessive in all the relevant ways is undisciplined; insensible is the one
opposites destroy one another and the extremes are opposite to each who is deficient and has no appetite even for what is better and in
other and to the mean, the mean being each opposite in relation to the accordance with nature, but is as impassive as a stone.
other: for example, the equal is greater than the smaller and smaller than 11.3.7 T h e profiteer is the one who tries to get more from every
the greater. 11.3.3 Hence virtue of character must be related to certain hi~uation,the loss-maker is the one who never does so other than
35 means and be a certain mean point. One must therefore grasp what sort c ~ccasionally.T h e boaster is the one whose self-presentation goes beyond
of mean point virtue is, and the sorts of means that it is concerned with. 1111. facts, the dissimulator vice versa. 11.3.8 T h e flatterer is the one who 25
11.3.4We may grasp this by way of illustration; let each item be studied joins in praise more lavishly than is right, the curmudgeon less than is
in the following outline: t,i~lit.Excessive devotion to pleasing someone is obsequiousness;
11i;lkingthe occasional reluctant effort is surliness. 11.3.9 Further, the
O I I C who does not endure pain, even if it is better to do so, is soft; the one
irascibility stolidity mildness wlro endures all pain alike strictly speaking has no name, but is 30
recklessness cowardice courage tlcscribed metaphorically as hard, long-suffering and grim. 11.3.10 Con-
I 221 a shamelessness bashfulness modesty c.ci~edis the one who thinks too much of himself, weak-hearted the one
indiscipline insensibility temperance \\l10 thinks too little.
spite (unnamed) righteous indignation 111 addition, the one who over-spends on every outlay is profligate, the
profit loss justice I I I I C who under-spends is illiberal. 11.3.11 Similarly with the cheap and
5 profligacy illiberality liberality I I I C pretentious; the latter goes beyond what is fitting, the former falls 35

" Retaining allu puscher, dclcted by thc OCT following Rackham. 1 I.. thc MSS ho and kei rithrt. nidr of rpithum#tikos, deleted by the OCT.
I((3,1b~i~lin~

20
I
Eudemian Ethics
short of it. T h e unscrupulous person tries to get more in every way and
from every situation, the unworldly person does not do so even where
one ought. 11.3.12 Spiteful is the one who is pained at more successes
than one ought to be - the spiteful are pained by the success even of
40 those who deserve to succeed. The opposite character tends to have no
1221b name, but is inadequately susceptible to being pained even at the success
of the undeserving. H e is as open-handed as a glutton is towards food;
the other is grudging by reason of spite.
11.3.13 It is superfluous to add to the definition that one's relation to
j each affection must be non-incidental." No branch of knowledge,
theoretical or productive, makes this additional stipulation either ver-
bally or in practice; it is just a response to the dialectical quibbles in
the technical handbooks. 11.3.14 Let our definitions, then, be given
simply as above; more detail can be provided when we discuss the
opposite states.''
10 These affections themselves have various forms whose names distin-
guish them in terms of excess with regard to time or amount, or with
respect to the object that is producing the affection. 11.3.15 I mean, for
example, that a person is quick-tempered in being affected more swiftly
than one ought to be, fierce and hot-tempered in being affected more
intensely, bitter in having a tendency to nurse one's anger, aggressive
I5 and abusive in being led by one's anger to mete out retribution. 11.3.16
Gourmands, gluttons and drunkards are defined by the kind of food and
drink by which they have the capacity to be enjoyably affected beyond
reason.
11.3.17 One must be aware that some of the affections we have been
talking about cannot be placed under the heading of 'manner', if
20 'manner' is taken to be a matter of degree. For example, one is not an
adulterer by seducing married women more than one ought; there is no
such thing. Rather, the very act is a case of wickedness - the name of the
affection implies it has the quality of a vice. 11.3.18 Assault is a similar
'' Aristotle perhaps means, e.g., that one who felt no fear because unaware that t h v e was danger in
the offing u,ould not thereby be reckless, since here the lack of fear is merely incidental; but to
stipulate that the agent's relation to the affection must be non-incidental would be a response to
'quibbles', bq vhich Aristotle apparently refers to sophistic handbooks of the kind mentioned
(using similar terminology) at e.g. Rhetorzc 11.24.I I .
" Probably the virtues, tackled in more detail In Book 111, Aristotle so far hating only discussed the
vices at each extreme.
Book II
example. That is why people contest a charge, saying that they did have
intercourse but it was not adultery because they were unaware or were
coerced; or that they struck a blow but it wasn't assault. The same goes 25
for other cases of this kind.
11.4.1 With this understood we must next state that there are two
parts of the soul, and the virtues are classified in accordance with
rhese. There are the virtues of thought, which belong to the part that
has reason, and their function is the attainment of truth about how 30
things are or come into being; and there are the virtues of the part
hat is irrational but possesses desire (assuming the soul has parts, it
1 4 not every part that possesses desire). 11.4.2 Base and excellent
character must, then, consist in the pursuit and avoidance of certain
pleasures and pains. This is clear from the distinctions we have
made concerning affections, capacities and states. Capacities and 35
\tates are about affections, and affections are distinguished in terms
ol' pain and pleasure. 11.4.3 So from these considerations and from
our earlier proposals it follows that every virtue of character
c*oncerns pleasures and pains. For every soul is related to and
concerns those sorts of things that naturally make it worse or better. 40
11.4.4And people are base, we say, on account of pleasures and pains, 12229
I~ccausethey pursue and avoid them in a way one ought not to, or
I)ursue and avoid the ones one ought not to. That is why everyone
I c.~dilydefines the virtues as impassivity and calmness about pleasures
,111dpains, and the vices in opposite terms. 5
11.5.1 Virtue is taken to be the sort of state that enables people to
1)crli)rm the best actions and which best orients them towards what is
I~c+t;and the best and most excellent is what accords with correct
lr,i+oning. And this is the mean relative to us between excess and
tlcliciency. It is necessary, then, that virtue of character in each case 10
I + ,I mean point and has to do with certain means in pleasures and
I ) , I I I I + and in pleasant and painful things. 11.5.2 T h e mean point will
so~~lctirnes be found in pleasures (since there is certainly excess and
tlrliciency there), sometimes in pains, and sometimes in both -
c-lljoving oneself excessively is having an excess of pleasure, being I5
(-~cc\\ively pained is having an excess of the opposite, and this either
ullclualifiedly or in relation to some benchmark, for example, when
O I I C tloes not act the way most people do. But the good person acts
a h 0 1 1 ~ought.
23
 Eudemian Ethics
11.5.3Since there isr3a kind of state on the basis of which one who has
it will be such as to take on in some cases an excess, in others a
20 deficiency, of the same thing, it is necessary that states of vice are
opposite to one another and to virtue in the same way as these extremes
are opposite to one another and to the mean.14 11.5.4 Nonetheless it does
happen that while in some cases all the oppositions are quite manifest, in
others it is those on the side of excess, and sometimes it is those on the
side of deficiency. 11.5.5T h e cause of the discrepancy is that they are not
25 always at the same degree of disparity or similarity in relation to the
mean, but sometimes one may change more rapidly from excess, some-
times more rapidly from deficiency, to the mean state; and whoever is
further away from the mean seems more contrary to it.
For example, as concerns the body, when it comes to exercise, excess
30 is something healthier and closer to the mean than deficiency; when it
comes to diet, it is the other way round. 11.5.6 Hence too when it comes
to states of decision, those that are in favour of physical conditioning
will be more supportive of health in every choice - people who work too
hard in the case of exercise, people who are too strict in the case of diet.
In the case of exercise the slacker, not both extremes, will be contrary to
35 due measure and to the determination of reason; and in the case of diet
it will be the gourmand rather than the ascetic.
11.5.7This occurs because from the start our nature is not in all cases
distant from the mean in similar ways: we are less hard-working than
we should be, but more given to enjoyment. T h e same holds true of
40 the soul. 11.5.8We lay down as contrary to the mean that state in whose
direction we, and most people, are more likely to err, while the other
one escapes our attention as if non-existent, going unnoticed because
of its rarity. 11.5.9 For example, anger is opposed to mildness and
1222b irascible to the mild. Yet there is also excess in the direction of
gentleness and compromise and restraint of temper in the face of
physical provocation. But that kind of person is rare; everyone
l3 Omitting Dodds' supplement ouk, accepted by the OCT.
" Aristotle infers the contrariety of a given pair of vicious states from the presumed fact that there
is a single type of state that underlies the manifestation of both excess and deficiency. Aristotle's
thought may be that since vice is a genus, one must posit a single generic state, but since its
species are characterized by opposite extremes, there must be specific contrarj- states to
represent them. The CO-presenceof contrary vices in a single character is something Aristotle
goes on to emphasize at 111.7.13-14.
Book II
tends more in the opposite direction, which is why the spirited part is
not inclined to appeasement.
11.5.10 We have grasped the division of states, both excesses and 5
deficiencies, corresponding to the various affections, and of the states
opposed to these by which people are in accord with correct reasoning.
(What correct reasoning is, and what criterion we should look to in
expressing the mean, must be examined later.'') So it is clear that all
virtues and vices of character have to do with excess and deficiency of
pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains arise from the states 10
and affections we have discussed. 11.5.I I But the best state in each case is
the mean. It is clear therefore that the virtues will be either all or some
of these mean points.16
11.6.1 Let us, then, take another starting point for the enquiry that I5
li)llows. All substances are by nature starting points of a kind, which is
why each one is capable of generating many other substances of the same
lype - for example, a human can generate humans, and in general an
animal can generate animals and a plant plants. 11.6.2 But in addition to
[his a human is, alone among animals, a starting point of certain actions;
wc would not say that any of the other creatures acts. 11.6.3The starting 20
points that are of this sort - those that originate movements - are
~crmed'authoritative', most rightly so in the case of those things whose
~.c+ults cannot be otherwise, as perhaps where god is the starting point.
11.0.4With starting points that do not cause movement, for example in
~tl,~thematics, the authoritative factor is not present, though the expres-
+Ion is still used due to similarity. For in the mathematical case too, all 25
I tic theorems demonstrated would certainly change if the starting point
t Iiiinged, but they do not change themselves by one theorem refuting
~licother, except when a result refutes the hypothesis and thereby
~wovidesa demonstration.17 11.6.5 But a human being is the starting
I U I I I I ~of a certain kind of movement. For action is a movement.
.lust as in other cases, so too in the case of geometrical demonstra- 30
I Ions, the starting point is a cause of those things that exist or come into
I K . I I I ~ in virtue of it. 11.6.6 Assume that if a triangle has two right angles
" Scr ~111.3.12-17.
"' I'lic restriction of the virtues to some of the mean points is taken up at 111.7.10--12.
" \Vlicn a consequence derived from a hypothesis (as would-be starting point or principle) serves
111 ~.rfirtcthe hypothesis (for example, by being an impossibility), other consequences derived
hypothesis are thereby refuted, and so one consequence changes another.
1 1 . o 1 ~tllc
1
l
Eudemian Ethics
then it is necessary that a rectangle has four. It is then clear that the
cause of the latter is the triangle having two. And if the triangle were to
35 change, the rectangle must change too - for example, if the triangle
had three right angles, the rectangle would have six, and if the triangle
had four, the rectangle would have eight. And if it were not to change
but instead remains as it was, the rectangle must also remain as it was.
11.6.7 That what we are dealing with is necessarily so is clear from the
~nal'tics." For present purposes one can neither deny nor affirm it with
40 accuracy, except to the following extent: if nothing further is the cause
of the triangle being the way that it is, then it will be a starting point and
cause of all that follows from it.
11.6.8 Hence if it is possible for some things to be opposite to
the way that they are, this would also be true of their starting points,
1223a since what follows from things that are of necessity is also necessary, but
what follows from that which is not necessary may surely turn out in
opposite ways. And those things that are up to human beings are mostly
of this sort,19 and humans are themselves starting points of these. 11.6.9
5 Hence it is clear that all the actions for which a human is a starting point
and is authoritative can come about or not come about, and that the ones
whose coming about or not is up to oneself are exactly those over whose
existence or non-existence one is authoritative. Everything whose doing
or not doing is up to oneself is that of which one is oneself a cause. And
everything that one is a cause of is up to oneself.
10 11.6.10 Virtue and vice, and the deeds that derive from them, are
praiseworthy and blameworthy respectively. Praise and blame are not
given on account of what arises from necessity or chance or nature, but
for what we are the causes of ourselves. Where another is the cause, that
person is the subject of praise or blame. So it is clear that both virtue
and vice are concerned with what one is oneself a cause of, as starting
15 point of action. 11.6.11 One must then grasp the sorts of things that one
is a cause of as starting point of action. Now we all agree that one is
cause of all that is voluntary and in accordance with the decision of each,
and that one is not a cause of whatever is involuntary. Moreover
everything that is decided on is clearly also voluntary. So it 'is clear that
20 both virtue and vice would be in the realm of the voluntary.
18
See Posterior Analytics 1.2.
I9 Reading Fritzsche's ha for the MSS ho deleted by the 0<:'1:
Book II
11.7.1 We need therefore to grasp what is the voluntary and the
involuntary, and what decision is. Let us first consider the voluntary
and the involuntary, since virtue and vice are defined in terms of these.
11.7.2They might seem to belong in one of three categories, namely
what accords with either desire, decision or thought, the voluntary 25
being what accords with one of these, the involuntary being what is
contrary. 11.7.3 But desire in turn has three divisions, wish, spirit and
appetite, so these need to be distinguished, starting with what accords
with appetite.
11.7.4Everything that accords with appetite might seem to be volun-
tary, since everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced 30
is painful, as is everything one is compelled to do or to undergo. As
I l v e n u ~ "puts
~ it: 'Every thing compelled is by nature grievous'. 11.7.5So
if something is painful, it is forced, and if forced then painful. Now the
object of appetite is the pleasant, so everything painful is contrary to
appetite, hence forced and involuntary. Therefore what accords with 35
i~ppetiteis voluntary, since these are opposites.
11.7.6 Moreover every form of wickedness makes a person more
unjust, and lack of self-control is thought to be a form of wickedness.
Now the uncontrolled person is such as to act in accordance
with appetite and against reasoning, and is uncontrolled whenever
Ilc acts in accordance with appetite. But being unjust is voluntary.
I lcnce the uncontrolled person will be unjust through acting in accord- 1223b
illice with appetite. Therefore he will act voluntarily, and what accords
with appetite will be voluntary. After all, it would be strange if coming
I I I lack self-control made people more just.
11.7.7These points might indicate that what accords with appetite is
\oluntary. But one might draw the opposite conclusion from the
li~llowing.Everything that one does voluntarily one does wishing it so, 5
,11111 what one wishes is voluntary. But no one wishes what he thinks is
11;ltl. However, the one who lacks self-control does not do what he
\\ ishes, since to be uncontrolled is to act, because of appetite, contrary
I I I what one thinks is best. Hence it will turn out that the same
1)crson simultaneously acts voluntarily and involuntarily. But that is
11111wssible. 10
r
Eudemian Ethics
11.7.8 Moreover the self-controlled person will act justly, since self-
control is more of a virtue than failure of self-control, and virtue makes
people more just. Now one is self-controlled whenever one acts contrary
to appetite and in accordance with reasoning. Hence if acting justly is
I j voluntary, as is also acting unjustly (both of these seem to be voluntary,
and if one is voluntary then necessarily the other is), but if what is
contrary to appetite is involuntary, then the same person will at the
same time perform the same action voluntarily and involuntarily.
11.7.9 The same argument also applies to spirit. Self-control and the
20 lack of it seem to be related to spirit just as they are to appetite. What is
contrary to spirit is painful, and restraint is forced. So if what is forced is
involuntary, everything that accords with spirit would be voluntary.
Heraclitus too seems to say with reference to the strength of spirit that
it is painful to constrain it: 'It is difficult to fight against spirit; for the
25 price it pays is life'." 11.7.10But if it is impossible for the same person to
do the same thing voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time
regarding the same aspect of the matter, then what accords with wish
will be more voluntary than what accords with appetite and spirit. T h e
fact that we do many things voluntarily in the absence of anger and
appetite is evidence for this.
11.7.11 It therefore remains to investigate whether wishing and the
30 voluntary are the same thing. But this too appears impossible. We have
assumed, and it seems to be the case, that wickedness makes people
more unjust, and failure of self-control appears to be a kind of wicked-
ness. But if wishing and the voluntary are the same, the opposite will
follow; for no one wishes for what he thinks is bad, but people act badly
when their self-control fails. So if being unjust is voluntary and the
voluntary is what accords with wish, then whenever one's self-control
3 j fails one will no longer be unjust but will be more just than before losing
one's self-control. But that is impossible.
11.7.12It is therefore clear that the voluntary is not action in accordance
with desire, and the involuntary not action contrary to desire. 11.8.I That
it is not action in accordance with decision either is in turn evident
from the following. What accords with wish has been proven not to be
1224a involuntary; in fact everything that one wishes is also voluntary. All that
" A condensed version of Heraclitus Fragment B8j
Book II
has been shown is that it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing.
Now we do many things that we wish instantaneously; but no one makes a
decision that way.
11.8.2 If it was necessary for the voluntary to be one of these three, 5
namely what accords either with desire or decision or thought, and the
lirst two have been ruled out, it remains for the voluntary to be found
in some sort of action based on thought. 11.8.3 Taking our argument a
little further forward, let us complete our task of defining the volun-
tary and involuntary. What is and is not done by force seems to be
related to what we have been discussing. We say that what is forced is 10
involuntary and that everything involuntary is forced. Hence we should
lirst investigate the nature of force and how it relates to the voluntary
i111dinvoluntary.
11.8.4What is forced and compelled, and force and compulsion, seem
I O be opposed in the realm of action to the voluntary and to persuasion.
111 general we also speak of force and compulsion in the case of non- 15
llving things. We say, for example, that the rock moves upwards and the
lire moves downwards by force and compulsion, whereas what moves in
eccordance with its nature and its own intrinsic impulse is not said to do
so by force, nor yet voluntarily. T h e opposite condition has no name, 20
~lioughwhen something moves contrary to this we say it does so by
lorce.
11.8.5 Similarly we see in the case of living things, including animals,
I I I ~ I thatC ~ is done or undergone by force, whenever something is moved
Itom without contrary to its internal impulse. In non-living things the
sl,lrllng point is simple, but in living things it is multiple, since desire
,IIILI reason are not always in harmony. 11.8.6 So while the notion of force 2 j
1s slmple in the case of other animals, as in non-living things, since they
lilt h any opposition between reason and desire and live by desire alone,
I I I 1I1ecase of humans both are present, albeit at a certain stage of life,
I I ~ I I I I C Ithe
~ age at which we begin to attribute action to them. We don't
+ I I \ ~ h a the t child acts, or the animal, but only one who is already acting
I I I I thc basis of reasoning.
11 8.7 Everything that is forced seems to be painful, and no one who 30
~lorsmything by force enjoys doing so. That is why there is such
t O I I I roversy surrounding the self-controlled and the uncontrolled. Each
rltqtsIn virtue of having impulses that create a clash with himself, so it is
I)\ lorce, they say, that the self-controlled person drags himself away
29
 Eudemian Ethics
from his pleasurable appetites, since dragging oneself away in face of the
35 resisting desire is painful; while it is by force that the uncontrolled
person goes contrary to reasoning. 11.8.8 But the latter seems to have
less pain, since the object of appetite is the pleasant, and he enjoys
following it. Thus insofar as pain is lacking, the person who lacks self-
control is more voluntary and unforced. But persuasion is opposite to
force and compulsion; and the self-controlled person is motivated
towards what he has found persuasive, and proceeds not by force but
1224b voluntarily, whereas appetite does not motivate by persuasion, since
it has no share in reason.
11.8.9 We have said that it is only the self-controlled and the uncon-
trolled who are thought to act by force and involuntarily,"" and have
explained that the reason for this is a certain similarity with the idea of
5 force that applies in the case of non-living creatures. 11.8.10However, if
we add what was also brought to the definition in that case, the issue is
resolved. We say that whenever something brings about motion or rest
from without, contrary to a thing's internal impulse, there is force, and
whenever it does not, there is not. Now the self-controlled and the
uncontrolled are drawn on by the intrinsic impulse that is present in
10 them (they have both impulses), so that neither acts by force, but it is
because of these impulses that each would act voluntarily and not under
compulsion. 11.8.11 A starting point that is external and causes either
obstruction or movement contrary to impulse is, we say, compulsion, as
if one were to seize the hand of a person and use it to strike another in
opposition both to the wish and the appetite of its owner. But when a
starting point is from within, that is not a case of force.
I5 Moreover pleasure and pain are present in both cases. 11.8.12 T h e
person who exercises self-control feels pain when acting contrary to
appetite, but enjoys the pleasure given by the expectation that benefit
will later accrue, or accrues even now as he maintains his health. T h e
person who lacks self-control enjoys obtaining the object of his appetite
20 by his uncontrolled behaviour, but feels anticipatory pain arising from
the thought that he is doing something bad.z3 11.8.13 Hence there is
some reason to say that each acts by force, and that whether from desire
" Retaining akontes with the MSS, unlike the O C T which accepts the emendation to hekontes by
Allan and Kenny.
'3 Retaining the MSS kakon prattein for Russell's kakos ppraxein adopted by the OCT.
Book 11
or from reasoning each sometimes acts involuntarily. Each of the two
elements is separate and so they get driven out by one another. That is
why people transpose involuntariness to the soul as a whole, since they 25
see that sort of thing in its parts. 11.8.14 Now one can say this of the
parts, but the soul as a whole is voluntary in regard to both cases, those
who have and those who lack self-control. Neither of them is forced -
though a part of them may be - since we have both elements by nature.
Now reason is one of the natural starting points, in that it will be
present so long as one's development is allowed to take place and is not
stunted. Appetite is too, in that it arises and is present straight from 30
hirth. 11.8.15 We pretty much define what is by nature with reference to
these two criteria, that is, whatever arises for everyone as soon as they
are born, and whatever comes about for us when our development is
allowed to continue on, including grey hair, old age, and so forth. So in
a way both types of people act not in accordance with n a t ~ r e , "but ~ 35
without qualification each acts in accordance with nature, though not in
accordance with the same nature.
11.8.16 These, then, are the puzzles concerning those who have
i~ndthose who lack self-control, about whether both or one or the
other act by force, resulting in their either not being voluntary,
01. forced and voluntary at the same time; and if what is forced is
involuntary, their acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.
I low these puzzles are to be met is pretty clear from what has been said. 1225a
11.8.17But there is a way in which actions are said to be by force and
c,ompelled that is not a matter of reason and desire being at odds. This is
\\'hen people do something that they suppose is both painful and bad,
11111 that will result in a beating or imprisonment or death if it is not 5
(lone. They certainly say that these actions were done under compul-
sion. 11.8.18Or is that not so, but rather everyone does even these actions
\oluntarily, since it is possible for them not to do them and to endure
I l~oseconsequences?
11.8.19Moreoverz5 perhaps one might say that some of these actions
,II.~.
voluntary and some not. In all cases where it is up to oneself whether 10
s ~ ~ ccircumstances
h do or do not obtain, even those where one is not
tloing what one wishes, one is acting voluntarily and not by force. In
*' I<r;~dingSolomon's supplement p55 after prattei.
" I<rri~iningthe MSS eti in place of Russell's P adopted by the OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics
those cases where this is not up to one, one is acting by force in a way,
but not in an unqualified way, since although the action itself is not what
one decides on, what we do it for the sake of is something one decides
on: there is a distinction to be drawn even here. 11.8.20 Thus if one were
I 5 to kill someone to prevent them catching hold of you, it would be absurd
to say that this action was a case of being forced and compelled. The
consequences of not having acted have to be worse and more painful. It
is when one does something bad for the sake of good, or to avoid
something worse, that one will be acting by compulsion (albeit not by
force), or at any rate not by nature, and certainly involuntarily, since the
circumstances were not up to one.
20 11.8.21 That is why many suggest that even love is involuntary, as well
as certain fits of rage and natural conditions, in that they have a power
that goes even beyond one's nature. And we forgive their victims, as they
naturally overpower our nature. One would seem to be acting by force
and involuntarily more when one acts to avoid intense pain than to avoid
mild pain, and in general more when one acts to avoid pain than when
25 one acts to get enjoyment. Being up to oneself is, and is wholly reducible
to, what one's nature is able to bear. And what one's nature is not able to
bear and is not naturally within the domain of one's desire or reasoning
is not up to oneself, 11.8.22 That is why we do not say of those who are
inspired and who make prophecies, even though they create a product of
thought, that their saying what they said or doing what they did is up to
30 thermz6 11.8.23But neither of course is it due to appetite. Hence certain
thoughts and emotions, or the actions in accordance with such thoughts
and reasonings, are not up to us. AS Philolausz7 said, some arguments
are too powerful for us.
So if it was necessary to examine the voluntary and the involuntary,
35 and their relation to what is by force, let them be distinguished in this
way. It is those most obstructive to the voluntary who say that we act by
force and not v ~ l u n t a r i l y . ~ ~
11.9.1 This discussion is complete, but we have not been able to
demarcate the voluntary either with reference to desire or with reference
'6 Since a god was in control of them on the traditional view of inspiration and prophecy.
''
28
Philolaus of Croton: fifth-century Pythagorean philosopher.
Adopting Ross' conjecture legouscn h6s biii prattomen, all'ouch hekontes to give some sense to a
manifestly corrupt text.
Book II
to decision. It remains, then, to demarcate the role of t h ~ u g h t . " ~
11.9.2 Now the voluntary seems to be opposite to the involuntary, and 1225b
knowing whom one acts on or with what one acts or that for the sake of
which one acts (sometimes one knows this is one's father but isn't trying
to kill him but to save him, as happened with the daughters of P e l i a ~ ; ~ '
or one knows that what one is acting with is a drink, but thinks it is a 5
love-potion or wine, whereas in fact it is hemlock) - this is opposite to
being ignorant of whom one acts on and with what one acts and what
one is doing, due to ignorance and non-incidentally. What is due to
ignorance, of what and with what and on whom, is involuntary. There-
lire the opposite is voluntary. 11.9.3 Anything one does without ignor-
ance that is up to oneself not to do is necessarily voluntary, and the
voluntary is this. Everything that one does in ignorance and due to 10
ignorance is involuntary.
11.9.4Knowing and understanding have two senses: one is possessing,
rhe other using the knowledge. A person who possesses knowledge but
does not use it might in some circumstances be said to be justifiably
ignorant, in others unjustifiably, for example, if he failed to use it due to
negligence. Similarly one who did not even possess it might be blamed,
il'the knowledge that is lacking was simple or essential and the lack was I5
tlue to negligence or pleasure or pain. So these distinctions must also be
incorporated.
1,et the voluntary and the involuntary be distinguished in this fash-
ion, 11.10.1 and let us next discuss decision, after first raising some
~)roblemsin accounting for it. One might be unsure in what category 20
i t naturally belongs, what kind of heading one should place it under, and
tvliether or not what is voluntary and what is decided are the same thing.
11.10.2In particular there are some who claim, and it might seem so on
cwquiry, that decision is one or other of two things, either belief or
~lcsire,since both of these appear to be concomitants of decision.
11.10.3It is, however, evidently not desire, since it would then be 25
t.i~lierwish or appetite or spirit - every desire involves experiencing
O I I C of these. But even animals have spirit and appetite, though they
"' Srr 11.7.2for this trio of options.
'" 'I'lrc daughters of Pelias, legendary King of Iolcus, also known as the Peliades, were led by
Rlcdca, who wished her husband Jason to have the throne, to believe that their father's youth
w 1 ~ 1 1 tbe
l restored if he were cut up and boiled with some magic herbs. The Peliades proceeded
I I I chop him up into a cauldron, causing his unfortunate demise.
 F
Eudemian Ethics
lack decision. Moreover many decisions are made with no contribu-
tion from spirit or appetite, despite the fact that one has both. And
when people are in the midst of emotions, they do not so much
30 decide as hold out. Further, appetite and spirit are always accompan-
ied by pain, whereas many decisions are taken even in the absence of
pain. 11.10.4 But neither is decision the same as wish. People wish for
things even when they know they are impossible, for example, to be
the ruler of all humankind or to be immortal. But no one decides on
35 the impossible unless he is ignorant of that fact, nor, generally, does
anyone decide on what is possible if they believe that it is not up to
them to do or not do it. Hence this much is clear: what is decided
must be something that is up to oneself.
1226a 11.10.5 Similarly it is clear that decision is not belief either, nor
something that one simply thinks. What is decided is, after all, some-
thing that is up to one, but we have many beliefs about things that are
not up to us, for example, that the diagonal of a square is commensur-
5 able with its side.3111.10.6Moreover decision is not true or false, and so
it is also not a belief in virtue of which we end up thinking that we ought
to do or refrain from doing some action that is up to oneself.
T h e following point applies equally to belief and wish. 11.10.7 No
one decides on an end, but rather on what contributes to the end.
I mean, for example, that no one decides to be healthy; what one
decides is to take a walk, or to sit down, for the sake of one's health.
10 Nor does one decide to be happy; one decides to go into business, or to
run a risk, for the sake of happiness. In general a decision shows what
one decides to do, and that for the sake of which one decides to do it,
the latter being something for the sake of which one decides to do
another thing, while the former is what one decides to do for the sake
of another thing. 11.10.8 In contrast, what one wishes for is above all
15 the end, and one believes that one should be healthy or fare well. So
these points make it clear that decision is something different from
belief and wish. Wishing and belief are above all about the end, while
decision is not.
3' This geometrical, hence necessary, falsehood is also mentioned as an example of something that
cannot be known at Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b26. Here we retain the MSS summetron in place of
Russell's hoti asnmmetros adopted by the OCT.
Book 11
11.10.9 It is clear, then, that decision is neither wish nor belief nor
simply supposition. But how does it differ from these, and how does
it relate to the voluntary? This will at the same time elucidate what
decision is. 11.10.10 Now among the things that can either be or not 20
he, some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, whereas
it is impossible to deliberate about others because, although they are
capable of being or not being, their coming about is not up to us, but
some come about due to nature, others due to different causes, and 25
no one would attempt to deliberate about these unless he were
ignorant. 11.10.11 T h e things that can not only be or not be but that
people can also deliberate about are those that it is up to us to do or
not do.
That is why we do not deliberate about matters in India, or about how
to square the circle. T h e former are not up to us, and the latter is quite 30
ilnpossible to do. 11.10.12 Nor do we deliberate about all the things
i~chievableby action that are up to us (here too it is clear that decision
is not simply belief), though the objects of decision and action are
itlnong the things that are up to us.
11.10.13 Hence one might be puzzled as to why it is that doctors
tlcliberate about things they have knowledge of, whereas grammarians 35
tlo not. T h e reason is that error arises in two ways, in reasoning or, when
\VC are actually doing the thing, in perception. Now in medicine one
cm err in both ways, but in grammar only with regard to performance
11;lsedon perception; and if they start to reflect on that they will go on 1226b
, I , / infiniturn.
11.10.14So decision is neither belief nor wish, whether each individu-
41Ily or both together, given that no one instantaneously decides to act,
I N I I people do instantaneously form a belief that they should3" act or a
\\is11 to act. It is, then, based on both, since both are present when one 5
lll;tkes a decision. How it is based on these must be investigated. But in a
\v;ty the term itself gives us an indication. 11.10.15 Decision is choice, not
1111ilua1ifiedly so, but of one thing in preference to another;33 and this is
I I O I possible without reflection and deliberation. That is why decision is
1);lhc.don deliberative belief.
l' /\tl~)l)tingSusemihl's suggested supplement dein.
l' I )ccisil~n(prohairesis) is a compound of pro (in preference to, before) and hairesis (choice).
35
 Eudemian Ethics
10 11.10.16 Now one deliberates not about the end, since that is a given for
everyone, but about what leads to the end, whether this or that is condu-
cive, and when one has a view about that, how it will come about. We all
deliberate until we manage to bring the starting point of the process of
coming about into our hands. 11.10.17 If, then, no one makes a decision
15 without preparation and deliberation, doing so either34 in a better or a
worse way, and if one deliberates about what is up to us among those
means to the end that can either be or not be, clearly decision is a
deliberative desire for things that are up to oneself. We all wish for the
things we decide on, but it is not the case that we decide on all the things
we wish for. By 'deliberative' desire I mean one whose starting point and
20 cause is deliberation; the desire is a result of one's having deliberated.
11.10.18That is why decision is a feature neither of the other animals nor
of every phase of life or every human condition, since deliberation does not
so feature either, nor does a view about the reason why. Many may perfectly
well have a belief as to whether something should be done or not, yet not
25 arrive at this through reasoning. The soul's deliberative power is its
capacity to apprehend some cause, 11.10.19 since that for the sake of which
is one of the causes. Cause is a reason why, and that for the sake of which a
thing is or comes about is, we say, a cause. For example, collecting one's
money is a cause of one's walking, if one is walking for the sake of that. That
30 is why those who have no aim before them are not liable to deliberate.
11.10.20 Now if, of one's own accord and not due to ignorance, one
does or refrains from doing what it is up to oneself to do or not to do,
then one does or refrains from doing it voluntarily. But we do many of
these kinds of thing without deliberation or premeditation. So it follows
of necessity that everything that is decided is voluntary, but the volun-
35 tary35 is not decided, and that everything that accords with decision is
voluntary, but not all that is voluntary accords with decision. 11.10.21At
the same time these points also make it clear that legislators are right to
distinguish between actions36that are voluntary, those that are involun-
1227" tary and those that are premeditated. Even if they are not completely
precise, they are grasping the truth to some extent. 11.10.22 But we will
We retain the MSS reading e rather than the emendation el.
34
3j Omitting Bonitz's supplement hapan, accepted bq the OCT.
36 With hesitation we accept Ross' emendation po12maidn for the M S S p(ith?nicrtcin.
Book II
discuss this topic in our investigation into j ~ s t i c e . ~As
' to decision, it is
clear that it is not simply wish or belief, but belief and desire together,
when these come to fruition on the basis of deliberation. 5
One who deliberates always does so for the sake of something; there is
always some aim that the deliberator has for the attainment of which he
targets what is useful. It follows that no one deliberates about the end;
11.10.23this is rather the starting point and postulate, just like postulates in
the theoretical sciences (we discussed these briefly at the beginning, and 10
in detail in the ~nalytics).~' Everyone's deliberation, technical or non-
~cchnical,investigates what contributes to the end - for example, whether
one should wage war or not. 11.10.24True, at a previous stage there will be
the reason why, or that for the sake of which, one is deliberating - for I5
cxample, wealth or pleasure or whatever other such thing turns out to be
[hat for the sake of which. What the deliberator deliberates about, once he
Ii;~sconsidered the matter starting from the end, is how to bring what
conduces to it into his own hands, or what he himself can do to realize it.
11.10.25By nature, the end is always good, and this is what deliber-
illion is concerned with in particular cases - for example, a doctor might
tlrliberate about whether to give a drug, a general about where to pitch 20
i.ilnip. What is good for them is the end which is unqualifiedly best.39
11.10.26What, on the other hand, is contrary to nature and involves
c.c)rruption is not the good but the apparent good. T h e reason this
11i1l)pensis that some things cannot be used for anything other than
\I hat they are naturally made for - sight, for example, since it is impos-
\1l1lcto see what is not an object of sight. Nor can one hear what is not 25
1111 object of hearing. But with knowledge one can bring about even what
1s I I O ~an object of the relevant knowledge. It is not in similar senses that
I~ri~lth and disease are objects of the same knowledge; health is so in
r~cx.ordancewith nature, disease contrary to it. 11.10.27 Similarly wish
15 Ilg nature for the good, but contrary to nature it is also for the bad, 30
, I I I ~one wishes by nature for the good, but contrary to nature and by
c or.ruption, one can also wish for the bad.
\CC IV.~.
'"rr I'osierior Analyircs 1.2. The referent of 'at the beginning' is probably to the fresh start marked
II.~I,where the role of starting points in geometry is discussed.
II~
'" !\~,i\~otlc here alludes to his distinction between what is good without qualification and what is
y1w14ltill. someone, more fully explicated at v11.2.4-7.
37
F
Eudemzan Ethics
Now the destruction and corruption of each thing is not into some
arbitrary state, but into an opposite or intermediate one. It is not
possible to go beyond these, since error too does not find its way into
arbitrary states but into the opposite states in the case of what has
35 opposites, in fact into those opposites that are opposite in respect of
the relevant knowledge. 11.10.28It is therefore necessary that both error
and decision come about from the mean to its opposites, the greater and
the lesser being opposed to the mean.40 What causes this outcome is
40 pleasure and pain. T h e pleasant is such as to appear good to the soul, the
more pleasant such as to appear better, the painful is such as to appear
1227b bad, the more painful worse. 11.10.29This too makes it clear that virtue
and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. They are after all
concerned with the realm of decision, and decision is concerned with
what is good and bad and with what appears so; and pleasure and pain
are by nature of the latter sort.
5 11.10.30Virtue of character is both itself a kind of mean point and is
concerned throughout with pleasures and pains, while vice consists in
excess or deficiency and is concerned with the same things as virtue. It
is therefore necessary that virtue of character is a state that makes
decisions with regard to the mean point relative to us, in respect of
10 those pleasant and painful things by which someone is said to have, in
what they enjoy or are pained by, a certain sort of character - the lover of
sweet or bitter tastes, for example, is not said to have a certain sort
of character.
11.11.1 NOWthat we have made these determinations, we may say
whether virtue makes decision error-free, and the end correct, such that
one decides for the sake of what one ought; or whether, as some believe,
15 it makes one's reasoning correct. T h e latter, however, is what self-
control does, since on its own4' it keeps reasoning uncorrupted. But
virtue is different from self-control. 11.11.2 We must discuss these issues
later, since the explanation given by those who believe that virtue
provides correct reasoning is that self-control is that sort of thing, and
is in the realm of what is praiseworthy.
'"Aristotle applies his point that each type of good and bad operates along its own dimension to his
doctrine of the mean, the corruption of good decision resulting in a movement away from the
mean to its extremes.
'' We suggest autd in place of haute.
Hook I I
1 1 . 1 1.3 Let us discuss this after first raising some questions. It is 20
~ ~ ~ s s ifor b l eone's aim to be correct but for mistakes to occur about what
c*ontributesto the aim; and it is possible for the aim to be mistaken but
lilt. one to be correct about what will achieve that aim. It is also possible
li~rneither to be correct. 11.I 1.4 Which does virtue make correct, the aim
or the steps to realizing the aim? We affirm that it makes the aim correct,
~ilicrthe aim is not arrived at by deduction or reasoning. Let us, then, 25
I r ~ y down the aim as starting point. The doctor, after all, does not
i'onsider whether one should be healthy or not, but whether one should
1~1kewalks or not; the trainer does not consider whether one should be in
~ o o dshape or not, but whether one should practise wrestling or not.
1 1 . I I .S Similarly no other form of expertise concerns itself with the
rlitl. Just as in the theoretical sciences, the postulates are starting points,
NO in the productive sciences the end is a starting point and postulate. 30
( iiven that so-and-so needs to be healthy, such-and-such must obtain if
~ l i a tis to be the case, just as in the theoretical realm, given that a triangle
ih equivalent to two right angles, then such-and-such must be the case.
11. I I .6 The starting point of thinking, then, is the end, but the starting
11ointof action is where thinking terminates.
So if the cause of all correctness is either reason or virtue, then the
i,oI.rcctness of the end (though not of the means to the end) would, if 35
rrilson is not its cause, be due to virtue. 11.11.7T h e end is that for the
kahc of which, since all decisions are about something and for the sake of
hc~t~icthing. Now that for the sake of which is the mean, and virtue is the
( . ~ I I I ~ cof
' this, in that it decides what we act for the sake of4' (However,
tlrt.ision is not for the mean, but rather for those things that are for its
+ ~ ~ h c11.11.8.) Therefore, hitting upon everything that one must do for 40
111rsake of the end belongs to a different power.43Virtue is what causes 1228a
I II(. cnd of one's decision to be correct, 11.I 1.9 and this is why it is on the
Il,l\is of his decision that we judge someone to be of a certain character,
I v., we judge that for the sake of which he acts, not the act itself
11. I I . I O Similarly too vice makes its decisions for the sake of the
~~ly)osiite outcomes. So evidently no one is an excellent person if it is 5
'' \\I. .~c.ccptFritzsche's emendation tai, not adopted by the OCT.
" s1.c li~t.thcrv.12.8-10, where the other power (other, that is, than virtue) is described as
'IIr\c~.ncss',which can hc thc hasis for either wisdom or unscrupulousness depending on the
v~ltlvI I I ~ Cadopts.
 Eudemian Ethics

up to him to do fine things and refrain from doing shameful ones, but he
does the opposite. Hence, necessarily, both vice and virtue are voluntary,
since there is no necessity to do wicked deeds. 11.I 1.1I That too is why
10 vice is blameworthy and virtue praiseworthy: one is not blamed for
shameful and bad acts, nor praised for good ones, that are involuntary,
but rather for what is voluntary.
Moreover it is in reference to the decision rather than to the deed that
we bestow praise and blame on all (even though the activity of virtue is
more choiceworthy than virtue itself), since people do bad things even
Ij when compelled to but no one decides under compulsion. 11.11.12 And Book 111
further, it is because of the difficulty of discerning the character of the
decision that we are compelled to judge a person's character on the basis
111.1.1 We have stated in general terms that the virtues involve mean 1228a
of their deeds. 11.11.13 SO activity is more choiceworthy but decision is
points,' that they are concerned with decision, and that their opposites
more praiseworthy. This follows from what we have posited, and more-
are vices, and what these are. Now let us take the virtues individually 25
over agrees with the appearances.
and discuss them in sequence, beginning with courage.
111.1.2It is pretty much universally held both that being courageous is
about one's fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. Earlier, in our
list, we distinguished fear and recklessness as opposites," and in fact
these are in a way contrary to one another. 111.1.3 SO clearly those who 30
are described in terms of these states will likewise be contrary to one
another - the coward, who is described in terms of being more fearful
and less confident than one ought, and the reckless person, described in
tcrms of being such as to be less fearful and more confident than one
ought. This is where the term is derived from: the reckless person is 3j
named derivatively after recklessness.
111.1.4Courage is the best disposition with respect to fear and confi-
dence. One should be neither like the reckless, who display deficiency
with regard to the former and excess with regard to the latter, nor like
cowards, who do the same, except not in the same respects but the 1228b
other way around - they have a deficiency of confidence and an excess of
lkar. Hence it is clear that courage is the mean disposition between
recklessness and cowardice, this being the best.
111.1.5T h e courageous person seems to be mostly fearless, the coward 5
liaarful, and the latter seems to fear things whether many or few, great or

' WC accept Rackham's emendation to t'eisi.

' Strictly speaking what Aristotle contrasts at 11.3 above is recklessness and cowardice
 r
Eudemian Ethics
small, and to get frightened quickly and intensely, while the former does
so either not at all or slightly, slowly and infrequently, and in matters of
significant peril, enduring what is extremely fearful, while the coward
does not even endure what is slightly SO.
111.1.6What, then, are the sorts of things that the courageous person
10 endures? Firstly, is it what is fearful to himself, or what is fearful to
others? If the latter, one might say there is nothing impressive about
that. If the former, what is fearful to him would be multiple significant
perils.3 But fearful things are those that are productive of fear in the
individual person to the extent that they are fearful. If they are
intensely fearful, the fear produced would be powerful; if they are
slightly so, it would be light. It follows then that the courageous person
15 feels multiple significant fears, yet it seemed on the contrary that
courage made one fearless, and this means fearing little or nothing,
and slightly and slowly.
111.1.7 Perhaps, then, the fearful, like the pleasant and the good, has
two senses. Some things are pleasant and good without qualification,
20 others are such to some individual, but not unqualifiedly so; on the
contrary they are bad and unpleasant, like the things that are beneficial
to wicked people or pleasant to children insofar as they are children.
111.1.8 Similarly some things are fearful without qualification, others to
some individual. Of the things that are fearful to the coward qua coward,
25 some are fearful to no one,4 others mildly so. What is fearful to most
people, and to human nature, we say is fearful without qualification,
111.1.9 and it is with regard to this that the courageous person is fearless,
and these are the kind of fearful things that he endures. In one sense
they are fearful to him,5 in another not; they are fearful insofar as he is a
human being, but not fearful, or slightly so if at all, insofar as he is
courageous.
30 Still, these things are fearful, given that they are so to most people,
111.I .IOand that is why the courageous state is praised. It is like the case
of the strong or the healthy. They are not regarded as strong and healthy
because they cannot be worn down by, respectively, any toil or any
extravagance. Rather it is because they are either not at all or only mildly
Omitting Robinson's supplements oude and ei m? accepted by the OCT.
* That is, to no regular human being.
We do not accept Allan's supplement phainetai.
Book 111
affected by what would affect the majority of people or most people.
111.1.1I (NOW,the sickly and weak and cowardly are also affected by 35
afflictions to which everyone is vulnerable, only more quickly and to a
greater extent than most people.) hey,^ moreover, are in no way or only
slightly affected by what does affect the majority.
III.I . 12 One might wonder whether nothing is fearful to the courage-
ous person and whether he might never even become afraid. Or is it
perfectly possible that he does become afraid in the way described?
Courage is in conformity with reason, and reason bids us choose what 1229a
is fine. That is why one who endures fearful things without this being
due to reason has either abandoned his senses or is reckless. Only one
who is fearless on account of what is fine is also courageous. 111.1.13 So 5
the coward is afraid even of what one ought not to fear, while the
reckless person is confident even where one ought not to be. But the
courageous person is as one ought to be in both respects, and in this way
is a mean, since he has confidence and fear just as reason bids. But
reason does not bid him endure what is greatly painful and destructive
unless it is fine. 111.1.14T h e reckless person is confident about such
things even if reason does not so bid; the coward fails to be so even if 10
it does. T h e brave person is so only if it does.
111.I . I 5 There are five kinds of courage that are so called by analogy, in
that people endure the same things as the courageous but for different
reasons. One kind is civic courage, which is motivated by a sense of
shame. T h e second is military courage, which is the result of experience
and knowledge, though not, as Socrates claimed, knowledge of what is 15
~Ireadful,~ but of what can mitigate what is dreadful. 111.1.16Third is
what arises on account of inexperience and ignorance, whereby children
and the insane face whatever is bearing down on them, or sometimes
grab snakes. Another kind is generated by hope, where dangers are faced
b p people who have been lucky or are drunk - wine fills people with
good hope. 111.1.17 Another is due to irrational passion, such as love or 20
spirit. If one is in love one is reckless rather than cowardly, and one
cndures multiple dangers, as the tyrant-slayer in Metapontum did, or
" 'I'he healthy and strong and courageous. There is no explicit change of subject in the text (some
l11vc suspectcd a hcrc) but the reference seems clear enough.
' Scc Plato Protugorcrs .~Ootl, where Socrates concludes that courage is knowledge of what is
clrcadful and not tlrrutll\il.
 Eudemian Ethics
the legendary figure in ~ r e t e . 'It is the same with anger and spirited-
25 ness. Spiritedness can make you abandon your senses. That is why wild
boars seem courageous though they are not really so. They are like that
when they abandon their senses, and in any event are volatile, like the
reckless. III.I. I 8 Still, the courage of spiritedness is quintessentially
natural. It knows no defeat, which is why children are the best fighters.
30 111.I . 19 Civic courage, on the other hand, is a matter of law. But none of
these is courage in strict truth, though they are all useful for urging
people on in the face of danger.
III.I .20 We have spoken thus far about what is fearful in general terms,
but it may be better to make some more precise distinctions. Generally
speaking the fearful is what is productive of fear, and that in turn is
3 j whatever appears capable of producing pain that is destructive. Those
who anticipate some other type of pain might perhaps get a different
type of painful feeling, but it won't be fear. Examples would be what one
feels on foreseeing that one will experience the pain of jealousy, or the
sort of pain associated with envy or shame. 111.1.21Fear, on the other
40 hand, is restricted to the kind of pain that appears to be imminent and
122gb whose nature is capable of extinguishing life. That is why certain people
are very soft in some respects and still courageous, while some who are
hard and tough can be cowards.
III.I .22 Indeed it seems to be pretty much a distinctive characteristic of
courage for one to have a certain kind of attitude towards death and the
5 pain of death. Take two people, the first capable of enduring, in a rational
wily, heal and cold and other such discomforts that are lacking in danger,
but ti-agile and terrified in the face of death from no other feeling than its
sheer destructiveness; the second fragile in the face of those discomforts,
but impassive in the face of death. T h e first would be thought cowardly,
10 the second courageous. 111.1.23 In fact we talk about danger only in the
context of those kinds of fearful things that bring close the possibility of
destruction. Danger appears whenever they appear close.
We have, then, described the fearful things that we say courage is
concerned with as those that are capable of producing pain of a destruc-
I5 tive sort, provided that they are close rather than distant and are or
The first may be Antileon (Plutarch Moraba 76oc). The second may be Theseus, who was helped
in the myth by his lover Ariadne, daughter of Minos King of Crete, to slay the monstrous
Minotaur.
Book I11 l
appear to be of a scale that is proportionate to a human being. 111.1.24
There are some things that necessarily appear fearful to and cause alarm
in any human being. It is quite possible that not only heat and cold but
other forces too may be too much for us and for the states of the human 20
body. T h e same goes for the affections of the soul.9
Cowards and the reckless go wrong on account of their attitudes.
111.1.2j T h e coward thinks that what is not fearful is fearful, the reckless
person by contrast thinks that what is fearful is untroubling and that
what is extremely fearful is mildly so, whilst the courageous person 25
thinks exactly the truth. That is why it is not courageous to endure
fearful things on account of one's ignorance, for example, if one endures
an onrush of thunderbolts due to madness. Nor is it courageous if one
recognizes the size of the danger and faces it due to one's spirit, in the
wag that the Celts take up arms and go to meet the waves. On the whole
courage in barbarians is suffused with spiritedness.
111.1.26Some even endure danger because of other pleasures. Spirit, 30
after all, brings pleasure of a sort, since it comes with the hope of
revenge. Still, no one who faces death because of this or some other
pleasure, or to avoid greater pains, could justly be said to be courageous.
111.1.27 If dying were pleasant, many is the time that undisciplined 35
people would have died because of their lack of self-control. As things
are, though death itself is not pleasant, there are things that bring it
about that are, and many people knowingly tangle with it owing to their
lack of self-control. But none of these would be considered courageous,
however prepared they are to die. Nor is someone courageous if they die 40
to avoid hardship (as many people do). As AgathonIOputs it:
The lesser among mortals when worsted by hardship 1230a
Fall in love with dying.
So too the poets tell that Chiron, because of the pain of his wound,
prayed for death even though he was immortal."
111.1.28In similar fashion, those who endure dangers because they 5
Iiave experience are not courageous. That is the way in which perhaps
"Omitting Robinson's supplement enia accepted by the OCT.
"'I'ifth-century Athcnian tragic poet who features prominently in Plato's Symposium.His works
;ire now lost.
" (:hiron, a C:entuul., wur rccitlc~itilllywounded by Hercules with a poison arrow and relinquished
his immortt~lityI~ccu~lrr 01' lllc puill.
 Eudemian Ethics Book 111

111.1.33We have given a reasonably adequate account in line with our

most who serve in the army face them. T h e truth is quite contrary to
current approach of what sort of mean point courage is, what its objects 35
the view that Socrates took in holding that courage is knowledge.'" It
and causes are, and what the force of the fearful is. 111.2.r Next we must
is not because they know what is fearful that those who understand how
attempt to make some determinations concerning temperance and indis-
10 to shinny up the mast are untroubled; it is because they know how to
cipline. There are many senses in which one can be called undisciplined.
mitigate the dangers. Nor is courage the same as what makes a fighter
One who has not yet been disciplined or treated is undisciplined, just as
more confident; 111.1.29otherwise strength and wealth would be cour-
a thing that has not been divided is undivided, but is either capable or 1230b
age. As Theognis remarks: 'Every man is subdued by poverty.'I3 Clearly
incapable of being divided: both what cannot be divided, and what can
there are some cowards who nonetheless endure danger because of their
be but has not been, are undivided. 111.2.2 It is the same with indiscip-
experience, in that they do not consider it dangerous since they know
line, which applies both to one incapable by nature of accepting discip- 5
15 how to protect themselves. An indication of this is that when they don't
line and to those, such as children, who are by nature capable but have
think they have protection but danger is getting close, they do not stand
not been disciplined for errors in matters in which the temperate person
their ground.
acts rightly. People are described as undisciplined in this sense of
111.1.30Of all such reasons," it is facing danger from a sense of shame
indiscipline. 11~2.3But another sense refers to those who are hard to
that might appear most courageous. As Homer speaks of Hector facing
cure or altogether incurable by discipline.
the danger of confronting Achilles: 'A sense of shame laid hold of
20 'Polydamas will be the first to lay a reproach on me."6 This Although indiscipline has several senses, it is clear that the undisciplined 10
are concerned with pleasures and pains and that they differ both from one
is what civic courage is.
another and from other people in being disposed to these in a certain way. (We
111.1.31 But true courage is neither this nor any of those others,
outlined previously how indiscipline can be used in a metaphorical sense.18)
though it is similar to them, as is the courage of wild animals who rush
111.2.4 Those who are unmoved by the samer9 pleasures because of
against the hunter's blow because of their spirit. It is not because of
I heir insensibility are called insensible by some, and other similar sorts 15
prospective loss of face that we ought to stand our ground when afraid,"
of' names by others. 111.2.5 But that condition is not very familiar or
25 nor because of anger, or because we do not think we will be killed or
widespread, since there is a universal tendency to err more in the
because we have the means to protect ourselves - in these latter cases
opposite direction; susceptibility and sensitivity to such pleasures is an
one will not think that there is anything frightening.
innate feature of everyone. T h e other type is found primarily in comedy,
n1.1.32 Now all of virtue is connected with decision. We have said
in the shape of the boors who steer clear even of moderate and necessary 20
previously what we mean by this - virtue makes everyone choose for the
~jleasures.
sake of something, and this 'something for the sake of which' is what is
111.2.6 Since temperance is concerned with pleasures, it is necessary
30 fine. That being so, it is clear that courage too, being a virtue, will make
hat it is also concerned with certain appetites. So we need to identify
us endure what is fearful for the sake of something, and that will be due
I hese appetites, since the temperate person's temperance is not concerned
neither to ignorance (since virtue makes our judgements more correct)
M ith all pleasures and all pleasant things but, as is commonly held, with
nor to pleasure, but because doing so is fine. If it is not fine but crazy,
I WO perceptible sorts of pleasant thing, namely objects of taste and touch, 25
one does not endure danger, since that would be shameful.
, I I I C ~ in reality with the latter."" 111.2.7 Temperance is not related to

I 3 Theognis 177.
L3
See I . . j
I4 Retaining the MSS aiti6n. Spengel's andrec6n is adopted by the OCT. (H I ' l ~ creference intended here is controversial. It may be to material, now lost, that was once in n.3
I 5 This is not a line preserved in the manuscripts of Homer that have come down to us.
, ~ l ~ o r On
c. the metaphorical senses of 'lack of self-control' (ak~asta)see v1.4.
'6 Iliad xxrr, 100. Polydamas was a companion of Hector during the Trojan War. The taking on of "' I(ct;~iningthe MSS tas outas. Spengels' tautas tas is adopted by the OCT.
danger to avoid shame before one's peers exemplifies Aristotle's conception of civic courage. '" Scc rtr.z.9-12.
" Retaining the MSS phoboumenous. Russell's to phoberon is adopted by the OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics Book I11

One should therefore, broadly speaking, regard indiscipline as con-

pleasure from the sight of beautiful things, unaccompanied by sexual
cerned with objects of touch. 111.2.13 The undisciplined person is
appetite, nor to pain from the sight of ugly things, nor to pleasure and
likewise concerned with such objects. Bibulousness, gluttony, lechery, 20
pain from hearing what is harmonious or disharmonious, or from smell-
gastronomy and everything of that sort are all concerned with the senses
30 ing sweet or bad odours. No one is described as undisciplined for having
mentioned, and these are the categories into which indiscipline is
or failing to have those experiences. 111.2.8 At any rate, no one would be
divided. 111.2.14 NO one is called undisciplined for excessive indulgence
thought undisciplined for looking at a beautiful statue or a beautiful horse
in the pleasures of sight or hearing or smell; we criticize these failings
or human, or listening to a beautiful song, with a wish not to eat or drink
but without real reproach. Nor in general do we speak of indiscipline
35 or have sex, but just to look at beautiful objects or hear the singing - any
with regard to that in respect of which people are said to lack self-
more than those who were waylaid by the Sirens would."
control. Those who lack self-control are neither undisciplined nor 25
111.2.9 Temperance, rather, is concerned with the only two kinds of
tem~erate.'~
perceptible object that the other animals too happen to be sensitive to
111.2.15 One who has a deficient disposition for the pleasures that
and take pleasure and pain in, namely those of taste and touch." 111.2.10
virtually everyone must have a share in and enjoy is insensible (or
Towards the pleasures of other perceptible objects all beasts appear
whatever term should be used). One who indulges excessively is, by
1231a disposed pretty much equally insensitively, for example, regarding har-
contrast, undisciplined. 111.2.16By nature everyone enjoys these pleas-
monious sound or visual beauty. It is evident that they experience
ures, and conceives an appetite for them, without either being or being 30
nothing of any note through the simple act of looking at beautiful things,
called undisciplined, given that they neither enjoy themselves exces-
or listening to harmonious sounds, except perhaps by some freakish
sively when they find them nor get excessively pained when they do not.
5 accident. Nor are they sensitive with regard to good or bad odours,
'They are not insensible either, since they are not deficient in their
though certainly animal senses are keener than ours. 111.2.1I But even
enjoyment or pain, but if anything tend to excess.
with odours the ones they enjoy are those that please them not for their
111.2.17 Since there is excess and deficiency in these areas, it is clear 35
intrinsic qualities but for their incidental associations. By non-intrinsic
that there is also a mean point, and this is the best state and opposite to
I mean odours that we enjoy in anticipation or remembrance of things
130th of those. So if temperance is the best state, it would be the mean
10 like food and drink, while the pleasure we experience when we enjoy
point with regard to the sensory pleasures that we have mentioned the
food and drink is a different one, namely that of eating and drinking. By
undisciplined person being concerned with, a mean point between indis-
intrinsic I mean odours such as those of flowers. Stratonicusz3therefore
cipline and insensibility. Excess is indiscipline. T h e deficiency either 1z31b
nicely remarked that smells of the latter sort are beautiful, and of the
has no name or can be referred to by the names we have mentioned.
former sort pleasurable. 111.2.12Even with the pleasures of taste animals
111.2.18 We shall have to make more precise distinctions concerning
do not get excited by all of them, and not by those that are perceived on
(lie class of pleasures in our later discussion of self-control and lack of
the tip of the tongue, but with the throat, an experience more akin to
s~lf-~ontrol.~~
I 5 touch than to taste. That is why gastronomes pray, as Philoxenus the son
111.3.1 We must also understand mildness and fierceness along the 5
of Eryxis did, not to have a longer tongue but the neck of a crane.
s;une lines, since we see that the mild-mannered person is related to the
pain that arises from spiritedness, by being disposed to it in a certain
ray. We outlined, and contrasted with the irascible and fierce and savage
" The Sirens: mythological creatures whose song could lure unwary sailors to shipwreck. See
Homer Odyssey xn, 16j-zoo.
" Every animal, according to Aristotle, has at least the sense of touch (De Anzma I I . ~ ) but
, his point " 'l'hose who lack self-control, by contrast with the undisciplined, succumb to pleasures believing
is not that animals in general lack the other senses but that the) don't appreciate the objects of t l ~ l tit is better not to. See 11.7.7.
the other senses in their own right. Src v1.4.
Fourth-century Athenian musician.
 Eudemian Ethics
10 (all of these sorts belong to the same disposition), the servile and
meek.z6 111.3.2 These are pretty much the names given to those who fail
to rouse their spirit even against the things that one ought to, but are
easily trampled on and abject in the face of insults. In experiencing the
pain that we call 'spirit', the slow is contrary to the quick, the intense to
15 the slight, and the short-lived to the long-lived. 111.3.3 In this area, just
as in the others we spoke about, there is excess and deficiency. The fierce
person is the sort who experiences this feeling more quickly and more
intensely than one ought, for a longer time than one ought, on occasions
when one ought not, against the kinds of people than one ought not, and
20 against a large number of people. T h e servile person is the opposite.
Hence it is clear that there is also some mean between the imbalances.
111.3.4 Since, therefore, both of those other states were faults, it is
evident that the mean state between these is the decent one, operating
neither too early nor too late, neither getting angry with those with
whom one ought not to, nor failing to get angry with those with whom
25 one ought. Since the best state is mildness when it comes to these
feelings, mildness too would be a certain mean point, and the mild-
mannered person would be the mean of the fierce and the servile.
111.4.1 Great-heartedness, magnificence and liberality are also mean
points. Liberality is concerned with the acquisition and loss of wealth.
30 One who rejoices more than one ought at every acquisition, and is
pained more than one ought to be at every loss, is illiberal. One who
reacts less than one ought in both these cases is profligate. T h e one who
reacts to both as one ought is liberal. By 'as one ought', in this case as in
the others, I mean 'as correct reasoning bids'. 111.4.2 Those first two
characters are in excess and deficiency respectively, and where there are
35 extremes there is also a mean. That is best, and the best in each area is
one specific thing. So it is necessary that liberality too is a mean point,
between profligacy and illiberality, concerning the acquisition and loss
of wealth.
111.4.3We speak of wealth and the art of wealth creation in two senses.
There is use of a possession, such as a shoe or a cloak, that is intrinsic.
1232a Then there is the incidental use of it, not as when someone uses a shoe
'6 Aristotle has not put things precisely in these terms, but see the first group of items on his list of
virtues and vices at 11.3.4;and the discussion of anger at 11.3.14-1 j.
Book III
as a weight, but, for example, if they sell or hire it, where the shoe is
used as a shoe." 111.4.4The avaricious person is the one keen on money, 5
and money is about acquisition rather than incidental use. nI.q.5 T h e
illiberal might even be profligate about the incidental method of wealth
creation, since it is in the area of natural wealth creation that they seek
The profligate person is lacking in the necessities, while the liberal 10
person gives away any surplus. 111.4.6These types in turn have species
that are described in terms of more and less with regard to their
respective areas. For example, the miser, the skinflint and the profiteer
are all illiberal, the miser in not giving away money, the profiteer in
accumulating it from any source, and the skinflint in getting worked up
about paltry amounts. The keeper of false accounts and the fraudster are I j
also cases of those who commit injustice through illiberality. 111.4.7
Similarly, both the glutton for undisciplined expenditure and the person
who keeps no accounts because he cannot endure the pain of doing so
should be classified as profligate.
-
III.5 . 1 Concerning great-heartedness, one must determine its par-
ticular quality from the attributes of great-hearted people. T h e same 20
phenomenon occurs with great-heartedness as with other cases:
when features are up to a point related and similar we don't notice
when they diverge. 111.5.2 Hence at times opposites lay claim to the
same territory, profligacy to liberality, surliness to dignity, and reck-
lessness to courage. They are concerned with the same material and 25
irp to a point have an affinity. T h e courageous and the reckless are
both apt to face dangers, but the former in one way and the latter in
;mother, and that makes a huge difference. 111.5.3 We speak of the
great-hearted in accordance with the designation of the term, as
consisting in a certain greatness and strength of heart.29 Conse- 30
cluently the great-hearted are thought to resemble the dignified and
" Reading Susemihl's hupodfmati h& hupodtma.
,n 'latural' here seems to correspond to 'intrinsic' used a few lines earlier. One does not, according
to Aristotle, use money 'incidentally', selling or hiring it out, as one does other goods; using it
'~iaturally' - as money - is about acquisition of goods, and one might have an overly careful
('illiberal') attitudc towards that and an overly wasteful or profligate attitude towards creating
wcalth by s c l l i n ~or Ilirinp onc's goods. See also Aristotle's more elaborate discussion of the
iicquisition and unr 01' n c ~ ~ l tatl i I'r~litirs I, 1257a.
Or 'soul'. 'l'l~ctircck tcr111IM / I Y I I ~ , / I ~
l.
 Eudemian Ethics Book III

varies depending on what it is bestowed for: it is great not through the 20

the magnificent. Moreover3" great-heartedness even seems to be an
number or quality alone of those who bestow it, but because it is
aspect of all the virtues. 111.5.4 After all, correctly judging what is
bestowed for honourable reasons. In truth both positions of power and
great and small among good things is praiseworthy; and the great
the other good things are honourable and worth caring about only if
goods are thought to be those pursued by the possessor of the
they are truly great. Hence too there is no virtue without greatness. So,
35 best state regarding such matters, 111.5.5 the best state being great-
as we said,3Z of the virtues seems to make people great-hearted
heartedness. What virtue in each sphere does is judge the greater
concerning the respective object of each.
and the lesser correctly, as the wise person and as virtue would bid.
111.5.I I Nonetheless great-heartedness is an individual virtue over and 25
Hence all of the virtues will accompany great-heartedness, or it will
above the other virtues, so that we must also say that the person who
accompany all of them.
possesses this virtue is distinctively great-hearted. Some good things are
111.5.6 Again, it seems to be a mark of the great-hearted person to be
honourable, while others are as we distinguished above,34 and of these
disdainful. Every virtue makes its possessors disdainful of things that
sorts of goods some are truly great, others small; and of the former some
I Z ~ Zare ~ great contrary to reason; for example, in regard to dangers, the
people are worthy and hold themselves to be worthy; it is among them 30
courageous man thinks that it is shameful to consider any danger great
that the great-hearted person is to be sought.
and that even a large number of them is nothing to be afraid of. The
111.5.1~Necessarily there are four kinds of difference here. One can be
temperate person also is disdainful of great and numerous pleasures, the
worthy of great things and deem oneself worthy of them. Then there are
liberal person has a similar attitude to money. 111.5.7 This attitude seems
small things and one can be worthy of things of that size and deem
characteristic of the great-hearted person because there are few things
oneself worthy of them. Then there is the converse regarding each of
they care about, and these the important ones, and not because someone
them: one might be such as to be worthy of small things but deem 35
5 else thinks so. In fact the great-hearted man would have more time for
oneself worthy of great things, the goods that are held in high honour;
the views of even one excellent person than for those of a randomly
and one might be worthy of great things but deem oneself worthy of
selected crowd, as Antiphon, upon being condemned, remarked to
small things. 111.5.13 Now one who, though worthy of small things,
Agathon who had praised his defence ~ p e e c h . ~Disdain
' above all seems
deems himself worthy of great, is blameworthy, since it is foolish, and
to be the attitude particular to the great-hearted person.
no fine thing, to deem oneself worthy of getting what is contrary to one's
10 111.5.8 On the other hand, he seems to care nothing about the things
worth. It is also blameworthy if one, though worthy of such things, does
that other people care about - such as honour, life, wealth - except for
not deem himself worthy to partake in them, even though they are
honour. It would pain him to be dishonoured and ruled over by an
i~vailableto him. 111.5.14 What remains here is one who is opposite to 1233a
unworthy person. T h e receiving of honour is what delights him the
Iwth of these, in being worthy of great things and deeming himself
most. 111.5.9 He might therefore seem to be in a contradictory state.
worthy of them; he is such as he deems himself to be. This person is
15 Being especially concerned with honour, while being disdainful of the
praiseworthy, and a mean between those.
many and of reputation, seems not to go together. But in saying this we
111.5.15 Great-heartedness is the best disposition concerning the
need to make some distinctions. 111.5.10 T h e greatness and smallness of
i.lioice and use of honour and the other honourable goods, and it is with 5
honour has two dimensions. There is a difference between honour from
rcpard to this and not to what is useful that we grant this designation. At
a randomly selected crowd and honour from people of note. Honour also
t lie same time the most praiseworthy disposition is the mean. Clearly,
lien, great-heartedness too would be a mean. 111.5.16 Of the opposite
3" Reading Spengel's eti for the MSS hote, indicated as corrupt and followed by a lacuna in the
OCT.

I
3' Antiphon of Rhamnus: fifth-century Athenian politician and orator, condemned to death after 5 . 3 5 uhovc
" 1 1 1 111 tlic MSS hekasti deleted by the OCT.
" Hrlu~li~tip
the restoration of democracy for his involvement in establishing the oligarchy of the Four '' 111 tlic prccctling puru~tu~~li
Hundred in 411 BC. On Agathon see n. ro above.
 Eudemian Ethics Book III

fittingly great - on that sort of mean point - and who is desirous of

10 vices, just as we listed them, the tendency to deem oneself worthy of
that sort of pleasure, is magnificent. 111.6.3 One who tends towards
great things when one is not worthy of them is conceitedness; we call
greater expenditure of an inappropriate sort has no name,36 but an
conceited all those who think they are worthy of great things without
affinity with those whom some call vulgar and pretentious. For 1233b
being so. T h e vice that pertains to one who is worthy of great things
example, one who, when spending on the wedding of a loved one,
without deeming himself to be is weak-heartedness, since it seems to be
considered as fitting the sort of provisions that would be appropriate
the mark of the weak-hearted person to fail to deem oneself worthy of
for entertaining a group of near teetotallers, would, if wealthy, be
anything great despite the availability of that which would render that
cheap. On the other hand, one who welcomed the latter group in the
15 claim just. Necessarily, then, great-heartedness too is a mean, between
manner of a wedding-feast would, if it was not to enhance his reputa- 5
conceitedness and weak-heartedness.
tion or to gain political office, be something like pretentious. But one
111.5.17 The fourth of the types we distinguished is by no means
who spends as the situation deserves and in accordance with reason is
blameworthy, nor is he great-hearted, being concerned with nothing
magnificent, since what is fitting is in accord with desert - nothing that
that has greatness.35 He is neither worthy of great things nor deems
is contrary to desert is fitting.
himself worthy, and so is not opposite to the great-hearted. 111.5.18Yet
111.6.4 What is fitting, given that it is a mark of one who acts in
20 being worthy of small things and deeming oneself to be worthy of them
accordance with proper worth,37 must be so both for the occasion (for
might seem to be opposite to being worthy of great things and deeming
example, what is fitting for the wedding of a servant is different from 10
oneself worthy of them. But this person is not opposite, inasmuch as
what is fitting for that of a loved one); and for the subject, regarding the
he is not blameworthy either, since he is in accordance with what
size or kind of objective (for example, the mission that Themistocles
reason bids. He is the same by nature as the great-hearted person,
conducted to Olympia was not thought suitable for him given his
since both deem themselves to be worthy of that of which they are
lixmer lowly status, as it was for ~ i m o n )111.6.5
. ~ ~ But one who has a
worthy. 111.5.19 Indeed he might become great-hearted, given that he
random attitude towards proper worth corresponds to none of these.39
25 will deem himself worthy of that of which he is worthy. What, on the
I t is similar with liberality. Not everyone is either liberal or illiberal.
other hand, would the weak-hearted person have done, with great 15
111.7.I Pretty much every other praiseworthy and blameworthy state of
goods honourably available to him that he does not deem himself
i~haractertoo is about excesses, deficiencies and mean points that are
worthy of, if he had been only worthy of small things? H e would have
;~lttctive.Take, for example, the spiteful person and the one who rejoices
deemed himself worthy either of great things, and been conceited, or of
ill others' misfortune. In terms of the states after which these are named,
even smaller things. 111.5.20Hence it would not be called weak-hearted
spite is being pained at those who deservingly succeed; the emotion 20
if a resident alien did not deem himself worthy of high office but held
I~clongingto one who rejoices in others' misfortune does not have a
30 back, whereas it would be in the case of a well-born citizen who
n;tme, but the person who possesses this is manifested in rejoicing at
considered high office a great thing.
i~ndeservedfailure. 111.7.2 T h e mean of these is the one prone to feel
111.6.1 Magnificence too is concerned not with any action and deci-
~,ighteousindignation; what the ancients called righteous indignation is
sion, but, unless one is speaking metaphorically, with expenditure.
Without expenditure there is no magnificence, since magnificence is
"' :\ristotle did, however, in his list of virtues and vices at 11.3, give a name for the corresponding
35 what is fitting in adornment, and adornment does not arise from
chance expenditures but consists in exceeding the mere necessities. '/
\ -
-
ice extravagance (daban@;-'
, z 'U).
Ihading Bussemaker'sprattontos for prepontos in the MSS text indicated as corrupt by the OCT.
,!I . I'licmistocles and Cimon: two prominent fifth-century Athenian politicians. The extravagance
111.6.2 So the one who tends to decide on great expenditure for what is 111~ h lowly-born
c Thcnlisroclcs' cxpenditure at the Olympic Games was considered unseemly
1111.him as it was not fi)r tllc i~ristocraricCimon.
i at 111.7.1j Arint~lllrwill ohncrve that opposing tendencies can be found in the same
35 Reading Susemihl's echon o'n for the MSS ech6n and Richardson's et'dn acccptrd h) thc OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics
25 being pained at failures or successes that are undeserved, and rejoicing
at those that are deserved. That is why people believe that righteous
indignation is actually a god.40
111.7.3 Modesty is the mean point between shamelessness and bash-
fulness. T h e one who cares about no one's opinion is shameless. The
one who cares about everyone's alike is bashful. T h e one who cares
about the opinion of those who appear decent is modest. 111.7.4Friend-
30 liness is the mean point between hostility and flattery. T h e one who
readily and in all respects accommodates himself to the appetites of
others is a flatterer. T h e one who sets himself against all appetites of
others is a curmudgeon. T h e one who neither accepts nor resists every
pleasure, but goes along with what appears best," is friendly.
111.7.5Dignity is the mean point between surliness and obsequiousness.
35
T h e one who lives without regard for others, contemptuous,42 is surly.
T h e one who pays heed to others in everything, or even puts himself
beneath everyone, is obsequious. The one who is like this in some things
but not in others, and to those who are worthy ofit, is dignified. 111.7.6The
sincere and straightforward person, whom people call plain-dealing, is
the mean of the dissimulator and the boaster. The one who represents
himself, falsely and knowingly, as worse than he is, is a dissimulator.
1z34a T h e one who represents himself as better than he is, is a boaster; and
the one who represents himself as he is, is sincere and, to put it
H ~ m e r i c a l l sagacious.
~,~~ In general, the latter is a lover of truth and
the other two of falsehood.
111.7.7 Wit is also a mean point, and the wit is the mean between the
5 boor or the humourless and the buffoon. The relation between the boor
and the vulgar or the buffoon is analogous to the difference, in the case
of food, between the fussy eater and the voracious, where the former
accepts little or nothing and does SO with difficulty, while the latter
accepts everything readily. T h e boor accepts nothing funny except with
10 difficulty, the buffoon accepts everything readily. One ought to do
neither, but rather accept some jokes and not others, and in a rational
40 The force that the Greeks called Nemesis (here translated as 'righteous indignation') was
regarded by them as a deity, given, according to Aristotle, its character of being pained and
pleased by injustice and justice respectively.
4' Omitting Robinson's supplement panton accepted by the OCT.
1 "'Sccv.r.~-2.
4" Omitting the alla of the editio Aldzna accepted by the OCT.
43 See e.g. Iliad 111.203, Odyssej~111.52.
Book 111
way. That is the person of wit, 111.7.8and the proof is the same. Wit of
such a kind - not as we use the term m e t a p h ~ r i c a l l y-~ ~is the most
decent state; and the mean point is praiseworthy, while the extremes are
blameworthy. Now wit has two varieties: one consists in enjoying a joke, 15
even one directed at oneself, so long as it is funny, where even a jibe may
be included; the other consists in being able to produce things of this
kind. T h e two are not the same as each other, but they are both mean
points. 111.7.9 In fact the good judge of one who is able to produce the
sorts of things he will take pleasure in, even if the joke is on him, will be 20
the mean between the vulgar and the chilly. This criterion for wit is
better than prescribing that whatever is said should not displease the
butt of the joke no matter what he is like. It should rather please the one
who is at the mean point, since that is the person with good judgement.
111.7.10Though all these mean points are p r a i s e w ~ r t h y ,they
~ ~ are not
virtues, nor are their opposites vices, since they do not involve decision. 25
They all fall under the classification of affections, since each of them is a
certain affection. 111.7.I I But because they are natural they contribute to
the natural virtues. As will be discussed in what follows,46each virtue in
a way exists both naturally and, in conjunction with wisdom, otherwise. 30
111.7.12So spite contributes to injustice, since actions arising from spite
are aimed at others, and righteous indignation contributes to justice,
while modesty contributes to temperance, which is why people define
lcmperance under that heading, and the sincere and the false are
respectively sensible and foolish.
111.7.13T h e mean is more opposed to the extremes than the extremes
;we to each other, since the mean does not occur with either extreme, 1234b
whereas the extremes often occur with one another. Sometimes the
hclfsame people are brazen cowards,47 or profligate in some respects
; ~ n dilliberal in others, or in general irregular in a bad way. 111.7.14When
pcople are irregular in a good way, they turn out to be cases of the mean, 5
jince in a way the extremes are at the mean. The opposition between the
cstremes and the mean does not seem to be equal for both, but in some
( x e s it is to do with excess, in others with deficiency. 111.7.15 T h e
" Scc NE 1v.8.4 whcrc Aristotle remarks (disapprovingly) that people call buffoons witty.
l' Aristotle is referring t c ~thc utiltcs of character discussed in the present chapter, from 7.1
" 'l'llis type (the thr~c.v~t~/r~lsrlilrrully 'rrcklc~scoward') is characterized at NE I I I jb3z-3 as one
ul~oswilgguu LII~IILIIwlirti c'lrc.~criinlu~ic~rr l i t doesn't abidc real danger.
~ > c r l ~llut
 Eudemian Ethics

reasons for this are the first two mentioned:" rarity, for example of
10 those who are insensible to pleasures, and the fact that the side on which
we tend to err more seems more opposed to the mean. 111.7.16The third
reason is that what is more like the mean appears less opposed to it, as,
for example, with the relation of recklessness to courage or profligacy to
liberality.
We have adequately discussed the other praiseworthy virtues. Now we
must discuss justice.

48 See 11.j.43 and 111.2.5above. Here we retain the MSS prota. Fritzsche's proteron is adopted by
Book IV
the OCT.

1v.1.1 We must examine justice and injustice, the kinds of actions that I 12ga
they are concerned with, the kind of mean point that justice is, and what 5
it is a mean between. IV.I .2 Let our investigation use the same method as
our preceding discussions.
1v.1.3 Now we see that everyone wishes to speak of justice as the kind
of state that makes people inclined to do just deeds, to act justly, and to
wish for what is just. Injustice is spoken of in the same manner, as that
which makes people do injustice and wish for what is unjust. So let this 10
be laid down as our initial outline too.
1v.1.4 There is a disanalogy between kinds of knowledge and capaci-
ties on the one hand, and states on the other. It seems that with a
capacity or a kind of knowledge, the same one encompasses opposites,
whereas any state that is opposite to another does not encompass
opposites. For example, opposite outcomes do not result from health, 15
only healthy ones, since we say that someone walks healthily whenever
he walks as a healthy person would.
1v.1.5 Thus we often recognize an opposite state from its opposite,
and opposite states from their subjects. If good physical condition is
cvident, bad physical condition becomes evident too; and good physical 20
condition becomes evident from the things that promote it, and vice
\ersa. If good physical condition is firmness of flesh, then bad physical
condition must be looseness of flesh, and what promotes good
~)liysicalcondition must be what produces firmness in the flesh.
 Eudemian Ethics Book IV

IV.I . 14 T h e law also enjoins us to perform the actions of the brave, 20

1v.1.6 It follows for the most part that if one opposite has several
such as not breaking ranks or fleeing or throwing down one's weapons;
25 senses, the other one does too. If justice does, for example, then so will
the actions of the temperate, such as not committing adultery or rape;
injustice. 1v.1.7Justice and injustice do seem to have several senses, but
and the actions of the mild, such as not hitting or abusing others.
this gets overlooked because the alternative meanings are closely related.
Similarly too with the rest of the virtues and vices, the law ordains the
By contrast an ambiguity is clearer when the terms are far apart, the size
former and prohibits the latter, correctly when laid down correctly, less 25
of the difference being readily apparent; for example, the term 'key' is
well when carelessly conceived.
30 ambiguous between the bone underneath the neck of animals' and what
1v.1.15 Now this form of justice is complete virtue, not however
one uses to lock doors.
without qualification but in relation to other people. That is why justice
IV.1.8 Let us then grasp the ways in which a person may be said to be
is often thought to be the supreme virtue, and 'neither Evening star nor
unjust. It seems that both the law-breaker and the person who seeks
Morning star is so w o n d r ~ u s ' .And
~ we affirm the old saying: 'Justice 30
more than his share and has no regard for equality are unjust; so evidently
contains within it all of virtue t ~ g e t h e r ' .It~ is complete virtue to the
both the law-abiding person and the one who respects equality will be
highest degree because it is the use of complete virtue. And it is
just. Justice is then what is lawful and what is equal, while injustice is what
complete because one who possesses it has the capability to use virtue
I 129b is contrary to law and what is unequal. 1v.1.9Since the unjust person seeks
not just on one's own behalf but in relation to others. Many are capable
more than his share, he will be interested in goods; not all goods, however,
of using virtue in their own affairs, but lack this capability in their
but those that are a matter of good and bad fortune, since these are always
dealings with others. rv.1.16 That is why Bias'j remark 'rule reveals the 113oa
good without qualification, but not always good for a given individual.
man' is well put. To be a ruler automatically involves having dealings
j These are what people pray for and pursue, but they ought not to. Rather
with others and being concerned with the community. IV.I . 17 For the
they should pray that unqualified goods be good for them" and then
same reason - that it relates to others - justice, alone among the virtues,
choose the things that are good for them.
is also thought to be another's good, since it does what is in the interest 5
1v.r.10 The unjust person will not always choose the greater share; he
of another, whether ruler or as~ociate.~ IV. I . 18 Hence while the worst
will also, in the case of things that are bad without qualification, choose
person is the one who behaves wickedly towards himself and his friends,
the lesser. It is because the lesser evil is regarded as good in a way, and
the best is the one who uses virtue not in his own interest but in
one seeks more than one's share of what is good, that he is still regarded
another's interest, since that is the hard thing to do.
10 as seeking more than his share. IV.I.II What he has no regard for is
1v.1.19 So this form of justice is not a part of virtue but the whole of
equality, and this trait encompasses both aspects.
virtue; and the injustice that is its opposite is not part of vice but the 10
1v.1.12 Since the law-breaker was unjust and the law-abiding person
whole of vice. 1v.1.20 The way in which virtue differs from this form of
just, clearly everything that is lawful is in a sense just. What is deter-
justice is evident from what has been said. They are the same, but their
mined by legislative art is lawful, and we say that each case of this is just.
essence is not the same. Insofar as it relates to another it is justice;
I j 1v.1.13Everything that the laws proclaim aims at serving either the common
insofar as it is that sort of state unqualified, it is virtue.
interest of all, or the interest of the best or of those in power, or accords with
some other such criterion. So in one sense we call just that which promotes
and protects happiness and its constituents for the citizen body.
' A quotation from Euridipes' lost play .Melanippe.
Theognis 147.
' Bias of Priene, sixth ccntury, was one of the Seven Sages, renowned for his virtue.
T h e collar-bone or clavicle, the term for which in Ancient Greek was a word that also meant " Aristotle may wcll Iii~vcin mind here Thrasymachus' notorious claims in Republic r that justice is
'key'. K ~ I . , he identifies with the ruler at 338d; and that it is the good of
the intercst of tlir N ~ I . O I I which
For the distinction between what is good unqualified and what is good for one scc v11.z.4-7, another, in trlrll i~lc~llilir(lwit11 tlic intercst of the stronger and the ruler, at 343c,
VIIl.3.9-I I .
 Eudemian Ethics Book TV l
but not everything contrary to law is unequal. That being so, it is also
1v.2.1 We are, however, looking for the justice that is a part of virtue -
the case that what is unjust and injustice in the one form differ from
15 there is one, so we claim; similarly with injustice as a part of vice. 1v.2.2
those in the other form, as parts and as wholes respectively. This present 15
Here is an indication that this is so: in other forms of vice the agent does
form of injustice is a part of injustice as a whole, and so too justice is part
injustice, but in no way seeks more than his share. Examples are the
of justice as a whole. So we need to discuss both justice as a part and
throwing down of one's shield due to cowardice, abusive speech due to ill-
injustice as a part, and what is just and what is unjust similarly.
temper, or a failure to use one's wealth to help others due to illiberality.
rv.2.10 Let us, then, leave to one side the justice that corresponds to
20 But when one seeks more than one's share, it is often not due to these sorts
the whole of virtue, and its injustice, the former being the use of virtue 20
of vices, still less to all vices, but to a specific sort of wickedness (since we
as a whole, the latter the use of vice as a whole, in relation to another. It
find it blameworthy) and injustice. 1v.2.3There is, then, a kind ofinjustice
is clear too how the corresponding forms of what is just and what is
that is different from but part of the whole, and something unjust that is
unjust must be defined, since pretty much the majority of legal ordin-
part of the totality of injustice contrary to the law.
ances that are enacted flow from virtue as a whole. The law lays down a
1v.2.4 Moreover if one person commits adultery to make a profit
way of life with each virtue and each form of wickedness in mind. 1v.2.I I 25
25 and gain extra, while another in the grip of his appetite does so by
Those ordinances that are passed into law concerning education for the
spending money and incurring losses, the latter would be considered
common interest are conducive to virtue as a whole. We must determine
undisciplined rather than being after more than his share; the former,
later whether the education of the individual in virtue of which a man
however, would be considered unjust but not undisciplined, evidently
becomes unqualifiedly good belongs to political science or some other
on account of the profit. 1v.2.5 Again, with all the other forms of
field, since perhaps it is not in every case that being a good man is the
injustice there is always a reference back to some form of wickedness,
same as being a good c i t i ~ e n . ~
30 for example, to indiscipline in the case of adultery, to cowardice in the
rv.2.12 With regard to justice as a part and what is just in accordance with 30
case of abandonment of one's comrade, to anger in the case of assault;
this, one variety has to do with the distribution of honour, or money, or any
but with ill-gotten gain there is no reference to any form of wickedness
other resource that is divisible among those who share in the community. It
except injustice.
is here that one finds inequality or equality between one person and
1v.2.6 Hence it is clear that there is a form of injustice that is a part
another. Another variety has to do with rectification in transactions.
distinct from the whole, with the same name, 'injustice', since its
1v.2.13This in turn has two aspects. Some transactions are voluntary, some I I3 Ia
113ob definition falls within the same genus. Both after all operate in the
involuntary. Examples of the voluntary sort are selling, buying, lending,
sphere of one's relations to others, but the one is concerned with honour
pledging of security, borrowing, depositing and hiring. They are called 5
or money or security, or whatever single name we might have that
voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary. Of the
encompasses all of these, and is brought about by the pleasure of
involuntary sort some are done by stealth, for example, burglary, adultery,
gain, whereas the other concerns everything that the good person is
false testimony; and some by force, such as torture, imprisonment,
5 concerned with.
1v.2.7 It is clear, then, that there are several forms of justice, and that homicide, robbery, wounding, violent or abusive language.
there is a particular form distinct from virtue as a whole. We must grasp rv.3.1 T h e unjust person does not respect equality, and what is unjust 10
is unequal. Clearly, then, there is some mean between unequal shares,
what it is and its character. 1v.2.8What is unjust has been distinguished
rv.3.2 and this is what is equal. In any sort of action that pertains to what
as both what is contrary to law and what is unequal, what is just as both
is more or less, there is also what is equal. 1v.3.3 So if what is unjust is
10 what is lawful and what is equal. The more general form of injustice that
we spoke about earlier corresponds with what is contrary to law. 1v.2.9
What is unequal is not the same as what is contrary to law, but it differs
'I'he difrcrcnrc Iirtwrr~lu )~clotlnl:ln , ~ n d good citizen is discussed at Poltrtcs rlr.4.
as part differs from whole. Everything that is unequal is contrary to law,
 Eudemian Ethics
unequal, what is just will be equal. This is something agreed by all
without argument. And since what is equal is a mean, what is just would
I5 be a kind of mean. Now what is equal involves at least two items. IV.3.4
What is just must therefore be both a mean and equal, in relation to
something and for certain parties. Insofar as it is a mean, it is between
certain points, these being the more and the less; insofar as it is equal, it
implies two items; and insofar as it is just, it relates to certain parties.
1v.3.5 What is just must therefore have at least four components. The
20 parties for whom things turn out to be just are two, and the items in which
they deal are two. 1v.3.6T h e equality of the parties and of the items will be
one and the same. As the latter - the items - are related to one another, so
too are the former. If the parties are unequal, they will not have equal
shares, and this is the origin of fights and accusations, where either equal
parties have unequal shares or unequal parties have or are allotted
25 equal shares. 1v.3.7 This is additionally clear from considerations of desert.
Everyone agrees that what is just in distributions should be in accordance
with some sort of desert, but not everyone talks about the same sort of
desert. Democrats see it as a matter of being free born; oligarchs see it as
wealth or, in some cases, as noble birth; aristocrats see it as virtue.
1v.3.8 What is just, then, is a kind of proportion. T h e notion of
30
proportion does not apply only to number as consisting of abstract units
but to number in general. Proportion is equality of ratios, and requires
at least four components. IV.3.9 It is evident that discrete proportion has
four components, but so too does continuous proportion, since one
I 131b component is treated as two and mentioned twice, as, for example, when
the relation between line A and line B is the same as that between line
B and line C. Line B has been mentioned twice, so if it is put down twice
the terms of the proportion will be four.
1v.3.10 What is just has at least four components too, and the ratio is
5 the same, both the parties and the items being divided similarly. 1v.3.11
Thus as A is to B, so is C to D; and hence by alternation B is to D as A is
to C. It also follows that one totality (AS-C) is related in the same
proportion to the other (B+D). This is the pairing that the distribution
creates, and if it is put together like this, the pairing is just. 1v.3.12 The
10 coupling of term A with term C and of term B with term D represents
what is just in distribution. This form of justice is a mean, while what is
unjust is what is contrary to proportion, since what is proportionate is a
mean and what is just is proportionate.
Book IV
~
1v.3.13 Mathematicians call this kind of proportion 'geometric'. In
geometric proportion totality is to totality as each term of a pair is to the
other term. 1v.3.14 This kind of proportion is not continuous, since I5
there is no single numerical term that applies to the person and the item
distributed alike. Justice of this sort, then, is what is proportionate, while
what is unjust is what is contrary to proportion, where what comes about
is a greater and lesser share respectively. This is what also happens in
actions, since the person committing an injustice gets more of what is
good and the person done an injustice gets less. 1v.3.15 In the case of 20
what is bad it is the other way round, since the lesser evil is reckoned as a
good in comparison with the greater evil. 1v.3.16T h e lesser evil is more
choiceworthy than the greater, what is choiceworthy is good, and what is
more so is greater. 1v.3.17 This, then, is one form of justice.
1v.4.1 T h e remaining one is rectificatory justice, which has to do with 25
transactions both voluntary and involuntary. 1v.4.2 This justice has a
different form from the previous one. Justice concerned with the distri-
bution of common goods is always proportionate in the way we dis-
cussed. Indeed when a distribution takes place from public funds it will 30
be in the same ratio that the individual contributions had to one another.
What is unjust, as the antithesis to this form of justice, is what is
contrary to proportion.
1v.4.3But in transactions, though what is just is something equal, and
what is unjust is unequal, the applicable proportion is not geometric but I 132a
arithmetic. It makes no difference if a decent person has defrauded a
worthless one or vice versa, nor if it was a decent or worthless person
who committed adultery. T h e law looks only to the deficit resulting
from the harm and treats the parties as equal regarding who committed 5
the injustice and who was done the injustice, who did the harm and who
suffered it.
1v.q.4 Hence the judge tries to equalize the inequality resulting from
this form of injustice. When one party is assaulted and the other
commits the assault, or even where one commits murder and the other
is the murder victim, an unequal division is brought about by the deed
and its corresponding effect. T h e judge tries through assessing loss to 10
restore equality by subtracting from the gain. 1v.4.5 Generally speaking
one does talk in such cases, even if it is not always the appropriate term,
of the gain accri~ingto the assailant, for example, and the loss suffered
hy the victim. 1v.4.OIlut at least when the effect is measured, it is called
 Eudemian Ethics
loss and gain in each case. Hence what is equal is a mean between the
15 greater and the lesser, the gain and the loss being the greater and the
lesser in opposite ways: a gain when there is greater of a good or lesser of
an evil, a loss when it is the opposite. What is equal is a mean between
these, and this we say is just. Thus rectificatory justice would be the
mean between gain and loss.
1v.4.7 That is why whenever people have a dispute they resort to the
20 judge. Going to the judge is going to justice, since the judge aspires to
be, as it were, living justice. T h e judge is sought as a mean, and some
call judges mediators, as if in aiming at justice they are aiming at the
mean. 1v.4.8 What is just, then, is some mean, if the judge is too. T h e
25 judge restores equality, as if there were a line divided into unequal
segments. T h e amount by which one segment exceeds half the line is
removed and added to the shorter segment. When the whole is divided
in half, that is when people say that they have what is theirs, in getting
what is equal, 1v.4.9 the latter being a mean between the greater and the
30 lesser in accordance with arithmetic proportion. Hence the term for
'just' in Greek is dikaion because it represents a dichotomy, as if one
should say dikhaion; and instead of dikastts for judge, dikhast~s.
111.4.10 Whenever an amount is subtracted from one of two equal
portions and added to the other, the latter exceeds the former by twice
that amount, since had the amount been subtracted but not added on,
I 132b there would be an excess only by a factor of one. So the larger portion
exceeds the mean by a factor of one, and the mean exceeds the portion
subtracted from by a factor of one. IV.4.11 This, then, is how we will
rekognize what needs to be subtracted from the portion that has more,
and what needs to be added to the portion that has less. T h e amount by
which the larger portion exceeds the mean must be added to the smaller
5 portion, and the amount by which the mean is exceeded must be
subtracted from the largest portion. 1v.4.12 Let AA', BB' and CC' be
three lines of equal length. Let segment AE be subtracted from AA',
and segment C D be added to CC', so that the whole line DCC' exceeds
10 EA' by C D plus CE It will then exceed BB' by CD.
1v.4.13 These terms, gain and loss, come from the realm of voluntary
exchange, where having more than what was one's own is called
gaining and having less than one had at the start is called losing, for
15 example in selling and buying and all the other activities to which the
law has given sanction. 1v.4.14 Whenever what one has through these
Book IV
activities turns out neither more nor less but as they were, people say
that one has what is one's own and has made neither a loss nor a gain.
Hence in the case of the involuntary, what is just is a mean between a
kind of gain and loss, the having of an equal amount both before and 20
after the event.
1v.5.1 Some also think that what is reciprocal is unqualifiedly just, as
the Pythagoreans claimed. They would define without qualification
what is just as to be in a reciprocal relation with another. 1v.5.2 But
reciprocity does not fit with either distributive or rectificatory justice,
1v.j.3 even though people tend to read Rhadamanthys' conception of 25
what is just this way too: 'If one suffered what one did, straight would
justice be." But reciprocation has too many discrepancies. 1v.5.4 For
example, if a public official strikes someone, he should not be struck in
return, whereas if someone strikes a public official he should not only be
struck but punished too. 30
1v.5.5 Moreover the voluntary is very different from the involuntary.
1v.5.6 Still, the glue in commercial associations is this sort of justice, but
reciprocity that accords with proportion rather than with strict equality.
After all, it is reciprocal action that binds the city. People either seek to
return ill for ill, otherwise it looks like slavery, or good for good, 1133a
otherwise there is no giving in exchange, and it is this exchange that
binds people together. 1v.5.7 That is why they put the temple of the
Graces in a prominent place, to ensure reciprocal giving, since that is
the mark of grace.9 One should perform a service in return if one has 5
been graced with a favour, and conversely take the initiative oneself in
being gracious towards another.
1v.5.8 What creates reciprocal giving of the proportionate kind is
linkage of diametric opposites. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a
house and D a shoe. The builder needs to get from the shoemaker the
work of the latter, and give to the latter a share of his own work. If there 10
is, first, proportionate equality, and secondly reciprocation, then these
terms will be met. Otherwise, there is no equality, and nothing binds
them together, since it may well be that the work of one is of greater value
than the work of the other, and they therefore need to be equalized.
H Hesiod, fr. 280.
" The Graccn or (,'l~rtr~tc~v wrrr il trio of goddesses associated particularly with beauty and joy, their
namc dcriviiil( lioiii 111s- IIIILIII I h[tris ('~rscc'or 'gratitude').
 Eudemian Ethics Book IV

1v.5.14 In this situation, then, equalization is required, and if there is 10

I5 1v.5.9 This applies to the other crafts as well. They would not have
no present need, currency serves with regard to future exchanges to
survived unless what the producer produced was the same in quantity guarantee that if need does arise exchange will take place, since the
and quality as what he, as consumer, received, both in quantity and
person who brings currency is necessarily in a position to get things.
quality. Association does not arise from two doctors, but from a doctor
True, currency itself can be in the same position, since its purchasing
and a farmer, and in general from occupations that are distinct and power does sometimes fluctuate. Nonetheless it tends to be relatively
unequal. But they need to be equalized, so that all the elements of an
stable. Everything therefore needs to have been priced, since in that way 15
20 exchange must somehow be commensurable. rv.5.10 That is the purpose
there will always be exchange, and if the latter, then association. Cur-
of currency, which turns out in a way to be a mean. It provides a measure
rency brings about equalization by making things commensurable, since
for all things, and hence, in a case of excess and deficiency of value, a
it functions as a measure. Had there been no exchange there would have
measure for how many shoes are equivalent to a house or some food. As
been no association; had there been no equality there would have been
builder is to shoemaker, so must the number of shoes be to a house or
no exchange; and without commensuration there would have been no
some food; without such measurement there will be no exchange or
equality.
25 association, and it will occur only if there is some sort of equality.
Of course it is impossible for things that are so different to turn out
1v.5.1I Everything must therefore be subject to a single measure, as
truly commensurable, but in relation to need this can be achieved to a 20
we said earlier. In reality this is need, which holds everything together. If
sufficient degree. 1v.5.15 So there must be some single entity whose role
no one needed anything, or did so in dissimilar ways, there would be no
is presupposed, and that is why we call it currency: it makes everything
exchange, at least not of the same kind. By agreement currency has
commensurable, since currency is the measure of everything. Let A be a
30 become, so to speak, the exchangeable symbol of need. That is why it
house, B ten minae," and C a bed. Let A be half of B, if a house is worth
has the name of 'coin', because it exists not by nature but as a matter of
five minae or the equivalent, and the bed (C) be one tenth of B. It is then 25
coinage,'' and it is in our power to alter it or make it worthless.
clear that the number of beds equivalent to one house is five, 1v.5.16and
1v.5.12Reciprocation will occur when there is equalization, so that as
clear that this is how exchange took place before currency existed, since
farmer is to shoemaker, so the shoemaker's product is to the farmer's.
there is no difference between five beds and the price of five beds, in
1133b But these terms should not be brought into the proportional schema
return for a house.
once the exchange takes place - otherwise one of the extremes will have
1v.5.17 We have said what injustice and justice are, and with these 30
both excess amounts - but when the parties are still in possession of
defined it is evident that just action is a mean between doing injustice
their own product. This is how they get to be equals and associates,
and having it done to one, since the former is having more than one's
because this kind of equality can be brought about in their case. Let A be share and the latter is having less. Justice is a sort of mean point, though
5 a farmer and C some food, and let B be a shoemaker and D the latter's
not in the same way as the other virtues are, but because it aims at a
product as equalized. If reciprocation had not been possible to achieve in
mean, while injustice aims at the extremes. Justice is the virtue in 1134a
this way, there would have been no association. accordance with which the just person is said to be disposed to act
rv.5.13 That people are bound together by need as if it were a single
for what is just on the basis of decision, and to be disposed to make
entity is shown by the fact that when one party has no need of the other,
distributions, whether between himself and others or between third
or neither has need of the other, there is no exchange. This is what
parties, in such a way that no more of what is choiceworthy goes
happens when one person needs something that the other has, for
ro him than to his neighbour - vice versa in the case of what is
example wine, but what they can offer is only a grain export licence.

'O Aristotle is pointing to the etymological connection in Greek between nomismu (currency or I I , .I'hc minu wur u uttll of c.\trl.rncy cquivalcnr to one hundred drachmas.
coin) and nomos (custom or convention).
 Eudemian Ethics
5 detrimental; instead, there is proportionate equality, and the same
applies to distributions between third parties.
1v.5.18 Injustice by contrast acts for what is unjust, namely excess and
deficiency, contrary to proportion, of what is beneficial and harmful.
T h e reason why injustice is excess and deficiency is precisely that it aims
10 at excess and deficiency - for oneself excess of what is beneficial without
qualification, and deficiency of what is harmful; in allocations between
others, the case is similar overall but the contravention of proportion
may affect either party. In a case of injustice what is less than the mean is
having injustice done to one, what is greater is committing injustice.
1v.5.19 Let our account of the nature both of justice and of injustice be
I5 given in this manner, and similarly, in general terms, of what is just and
unjust.
1v.6.1 It is possible for someone to do injustice without yet being an
unjust person. So what is the character of unjust actions that are
committed by one who is in fact unjust with regard to some given type
of injustice, such as a thief, an adulterer or a robber? Or is this not the
20 way to capture the difference? Someone might after all sleep with a
woman in full knowledge of who he is sleeping with, but through
passion rather than under the aegis of a decision. 1v.6.2 One is commit-
ting an injustice, then, but is not an unjust person - for example, one
commits a theft without being a thief, or adultery without being an
adulterer, and so on.
1v.6.3 We earlier described the relation between reciprocity and just-
25 ice. 1v.6.4 But one should not overlook the fact that the object of our
enquiry is both unqualified justice and civic justice. T h e latter is a
feature of people who share their lives with a view to self-sufficiency,
who are free and equal in either proportionate or absolute terms. Those
for whom these conditions do not hold cannot have mutual civic justice,
30 but only an analogous form of justice, since there is still justice for those
who have law regulating them. Law exists amongst those for whom there
is such a thing as injustice, since legal judgement is the determination of
what is just and unjust. And where there is injustice, there is unjust
action, though it is not universally the case that illjustice exists where
there is unjust action.
Unjust action is allocating to oneself more than one's share of
35 unqualified good things, and less of unqualified bad things. 1v.6.5 That
is why we allow not a person but reason to rule; a person rules for
Book IV
himself and becomes a tyrant. T h e ruler is a guardian of what is just, 1134b
and if so, of what is equal. 1v.6.6 He is not regarded as having more than
his share, if indeed he is just, given that he refrains from allocating to
himself more than his share of what is unqualifiedly good, but only the
amount that is proportional to him. In this way his efforts are for others 5
and that is why they say that justice is another's good, as we mentioned
previously. I' 1v.6.7 H e needs, then, to be given some sort of recompense,
in the form of honour and prestige. It is those for whom such rewards
are insufficient that become tyrants.
1v.6.8What is just for a master of slaves or for a father is not the same
as the above forms of justice, but similar. There is no injustice in relation 10
to things that are unqualifiedly one's own. A chattel, and a child until it
reaches a certain age and becomes independent, is so to speak a part of
oneself, 1v.6.9 and no one decides to do harm to oneself. Hence there is
no injustice in relation to oneself, nor therefore is there civic injustice or
justice, since these were a matter of law and existed amongst those
whose nature it was to be governed by law, namely those who have an 15
equal share in ruling and being ruled. That is why justice applies more
in relation to one's wife than to one's children or chattels, and is
domestic justice. But this is not the same as civic justice.
rv.7.1 There is both a natural and a conventional aspect of civic
justice; the natural aspect has the same force everywhere and does not
arise through something's being deemed right or not, whereas the 20
conventional aspect concerns what initially makes no difference, but
becomes right or wrong once it is enacted - for example, that the ransom
for a prisoner of war be one mina, or that a goat rather than two sheep be
sacrificed; and so too with enactments to cover particular cases such as
the sacrifice to Brasidas13 and the subjects of special decrees.
1v.7.2 Some think that all matters of justice are of the conventional
sort, on the grounds that what is natural is what is unchanging and has 25
the same force everywhere, as fire burns the same here and in Persia,
whereas they see what is just as changing. 1v.7.3 Things are not like this,
though there is a sense in which they are. Perhaps among the gods there
" See ~ vI.. 17 above.
" Brasidas was ;I Sl~,lt.tiingeneral killed in 422 BC in the course of securing victory over the
Athenians nt hhc llilllle 111' Aniphipolis during the Peloponnesian War. H e was subsequently
t I1on~)urctlh y A~lll)l~ilrol~n
w111igu~ilcsand sacrifices.
I
 Eudemian Ethics
is no change at all. But for us too there is something that is natural, and
30 although everything is subject to change, nonetheless the distinction
between what is and what is not natural remains. 1v.7.4 In the realm of
what can be otherwise, it is clear what sort of thing is natural and what
sort of thing is not natural but conventional and by agreement, even if
both sorts are still subject to change. The same distinction will fit in
other cases too. T h e right hand is superior by nature, and yet it is
possible for everyone to become ambidextrous.
35 1 ~ ~ 7What . 5 is determined as just by agreement and for the parties'
1135a advantage are comparable to measures. T h e measures for wine or corn
are not the same size everywhere, but are larger where they are bought
and smaller where they are sold. Similarly, just arrangements of human
rather than natural origin are not the same everywhere, since consti-
j tutions are not the same either, even though only one constitution is
everywhere best by nature.14
1v.7.6A11 matters of justice that are conventional stand as universals to
their particulars, since for each individual convention, being a universal,
there are many corresponding actions. IV.7.7 There is a difference
between an unjust proceeding and what is unjust, and between a just
10 proceeding and what is just. What is unjust is so by nature or ordinance,
and an unjust proceeding is precisely that at the moment it is commit-
ted, but not before then, when it is merely unjust. The same goes for a
just proceeding, though the more general term is 'just act', while 'just
proceeding' signifies the rectification of an unjust proceeding. We must
examine later with regard to the individual conventions the character
and number of their kinds, and the character of their objects.15
I5 1v.8.1 Given that things are just and unjust as described, one acts
unjustly or justly when one does them voluntarily When one acts involun-
tarily one does neither injustice nor justice except incidentally, since
people can do things that are incidentally just or unjust. 1v.8.2 But unjust
and just acts are marked off in terms of what is voluntary and involuntary.
20 When it is voluntary, it attracts blame, and by the same token it is then
an unjust act. Hence without the addition of the voluntary it will be
something unjust but not yet an unjust act.
'4 In the polztzcsAristotle argues that the best constitution is an aristocracy, literally rule by the best
(i.e. most virtuous) people.
'5 No discussion corresponding to this description has come down to us.
Book IF'
1v.8.3 By 'voluntary' I mean what we discussed before,^^ namely what-
ever one does that is up to one, done knowingly and without being mistaken
about the victim, the instrument or the outcome of the act, for example, 25
whom one hit, what one hit them with, and what the outcome was; each of
these aspects must be neither incidental nor by force. For example, if
someone seizes your hand and uses it to hit someone else, you are not
acting voluntarily since the act was not up to you. Or it could be that the one
you hit is your father, and you were aware that it was a man and one of those
present, but not that it was your father. The same sort of distinction must 30
be applied to the outcome and to every aspect of the action.
What one does, then, either in ignorance or, if not in ignorance, when
it is not up to one or is compelled, is involuntary. There are many things
that occur by nature that we do or undergo where the involuntary and 1135b
the voluntary are not at issue, such as ageing or dying. 1v.8.4 In matters
of injustice and justice alike there is also the notion of the incidental.
Someone who returns a deposit involuntarily because of fear should not 5
be said to have done what is just or acted justly except incidentally.
Similarly one should describe a person who fails to return a deposit
because he was compelled not to and therefore acted involuntarily as
committing an injustice and doing what is unjust only incidentally.
1v.8.j Some voluntary actions we perform as a result of decision, and
some we do not. The actions that result from decision are those that 10
received prior deliberation, the actions that do not are those that did not.
1 ~ 8 . Now
6 there are three kinds of harm that can take place in inter-
actions. Harms committed in ignorance are errors, and these happen
when the person affected or the act performed or the instrument or
what the action is for is not what the agent supposed. He did not think
that he was striking a blow or that this implement was what he was doing
it with or that this was the person being struck or that this was what the
action was for, and it transpired that what the action was for was other 15
than he thought - if, for example, he intended not to injure but to
goad - or the person affected, or the implement used, was other than he
thought.
1v.8.7 When harm arises contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a
misfortune; when it could have been reasonably expected but was
111
Scc ri.0 itl,ovr.
 Eudemian Ethics
without malice it is an error. Error occurs when the causal origin is
20 within the agent, misfortune when it is outside him. 1v.8.8 When one
acts knowingly but without prior deliberation - for example, because of
spirit or other passions that inevitably or naturally befall human beings - it is
an unjust act. Those who commit these sorts of harms and errors commit
injustice, and they are unjust acts, but nonetheless the agents are not thereby
unjust or bad people, since the harm was not caused by their wickedness.
25 When, however, the act results from decision, then the agent is unjust
and wicked. 1v.8.9 That is why it is fair that acts of spiritedness are not
judged as acts of premeditation, seeing that it is not the one who did it
from spirit who originated the action, but the one who roused his anger.
rv.8.10 Moreover there is no dispute here about whether the event
happened or not, but about its justice, anger being a response to
perceived injustice. It is not like what occurs in business transactions,
30 where there can be disputes about what happened, and necessarily one
or other of the parties is wicked, unless the dispute arises through
forgetfulness of what happened. In the present case the parties agree
about what was done, but are in dispute about whose side justice is on
(though one who planned the action is hardly ignorant of this) - one
party thinks he has been treated unjustly, while the other denies this.
1136a 1v.8.11 But one who causes harm on the basis of a decision to do so is
committing injustice. It is with regard to these sorts of unjust act that
one who does injustice is an unjust person, assuming there is a violation
of proportion or equality. Similarly too a person is just whenever he acts
justly on the basis of decision. But to act justly one needs only to be
5 acting voluntarily. 1v.8.12 Some involuntary acts are pardonable but
others are not. Those errors that are committed not simply in ignorance
but because of one's ignorance are pardonable, whereas those that are
committed not because of one's ignorance but in ignorance caused by
some unnatural or inhuman passion, are not.
10 1v.9.1 One might wonder whether being done injustice and doing it
have been adequately defined, firstly concerning whether the truth is as
Euripides' strange lines suggest:17
'My own mother I killed, to tell it in brief'
'Willing were you both, or both unwilling?'
I' The lines are a fragment of Euripides' lost play Alcmaeon.
Book IV
Is it really true that one can be unjustly treated voluntarily, or is it rather 15
that this is always involuntary, as acting unjustly is also always volun-
tary? And is it always one way or the other, or sometimes voluntary and
sometimes involuntary? 1v.9.2 A similar question applies to being justly
treated, given that acting justly is always voluntary. Consequently it is
reasonable that in either case the opposite is qualified consistently, and 20
being unjustly treated is always either voluntary or involuntary, as is
being justly treated. But it would seem strange in the case of being justly
treated too, if it were always voluntary, since some people are justly
treated involuntarily.
1v.g.3 Next, one might also be puzzled as to whether one who has
suffered what is unjust is always treated unjustly, or whether what
applies to doing also applies to suffering, since in both ways it is possible 25
to participate in what is just incidentally. The same evidently applies to
what is unjust too, since doing unjust things is different from acting
unjustly and suffering unjust things is not the same as being treated
unjustly. It is similar with acting justly and being treated justly. One 30
cannot be treated unjustly without someone acting unjustly or be treated
justly without someone acting justly. 1v.g.4 But if acting unjustly is
simply harming someone voluntarily; and if voluntarily means knowing
to whom one is doing it, with what and how; and if the person who lacks
self-control voluntarily does harm to himself, then he would be volun-
tarily treated unjustly and it would also be possible to treat oneself
unjustly. This too is one of the things that are puzzled over, whether
unjust treatment of oneself is possible. 1v.9.5 Moreover one might, 1136b
because one lacks self-control, be voluntarily harmed by another
voluntary agent, so that it would be possible to be unjustly treated
voluntarily. Or is our definition of voluntary harm incorrect, and
should we add to the requirement that the agent knows to whom,
with what and how, that he is acting against the person's wishes?
111.9.6 Then one might be harmed and suffer unjust things voluntarily, 5
but no one is unjustly treated voluntarily, since no one, not even the
person who lacks self-control, wishes that; such action is contrary to
their wish. No one after all wishes for what he does not think is
excellent, and the person who lacks self-control fails to do what he
thinks he should.
1v.g.7 Onc who gives away his own possessions, as Homer says 10
Glaucon clitl l o I )ionlcrlcs, 'Gold for bronze, a hundred oxen's worth
 Eudemian Ethics
for nine',Is is not being treated unjustly, since the giving is up to him,
whereas being unjustly treated is not up to one, since there has to be an
agent of injustice. 1v.g.8 It is clear, then, that as far as being unjustly
I5 treated is concerned it is not voluntary.
Two of the questions that we have decided to discuss still remain: Is
the one who distributes a greater share than is merited the doer of
injustice, or the one who gets that share? And is it possible to treat
oneself unjustly? 1v.g.9 If the former alternative is possible and it is the
distributor rather than the possessor of the greater share who acts
unjustly, then if someone knowingly and voluntarily assigns a greater
20 share to another than to himself, he is treating himself unjustly. Indeed
this is what well-behaved people are thought to do, since the decent
person is inclined to take less.
But perhaps the issue is not so simple. After all on this scenario one
has a greater share of a different good, such as reputation or plain
nobility. We can further resolve the question in terms of our definition
of acting unjustly. T h e agent here undergoes nothing that is contrary to
his own wish, so it is not the case on these grounds at least that he is
25 treated unjustly. T h e most that can happen is that he is merely harmed.
1v.9.10 It is also evident that though the distributor of the greater
share may act unjustly the recipient does not always do so. T h e person
who acts unjustly is not the one to whom what is unjust belongs, but
rather the person whose role it is to do this injustice voluntarily. This is
the starting point of the action, and it is located in the one making the
distribution, not in the one receiving it.
30 1v.9.1I Moreover 'doing' has many senses. There is a sense in which
inanimate objects can kill, as can a hand or a slave when ordered to, but
these do not act unjustly even though they do what is unjust. 1v.9.12
Again, if someone makes a judgement in ignorance, he does not act
unjustly by the terms of legal justice, nor is the judgement unjust,
though it is in a sense, since legal justice is different from justice in
its primary form. If the unjust judgement is made knowingly, however,
1137a the judge himself is getting more than his share, either of favour or
revenge. 1v.g.13 Thus the one who makes an unjust judgement for such
reasons has more than his share exactly as if he had partaken in the
'' Iliad vr 236.
Book IV
proceeds of the injustice. And in fact one who had assigned some land
on that condition would have received not land but money.
1v.g.14 People think that whether they commit injustice is up to them, 5
and so suppose that being just is also easy. But that is not the case. It is
easy and up to one to sleep with one's neighbour's wife, or hit a
bystander, or slip a bribe into someone's hand, but to do such things
from a certain state of character is neither easy nor up to oneself 1v.9.I 5
Similarly people also suppose that discerning what is just and what is
unjust requires no expertise since it is not hard to understand what the 10
laws are talking about, though that is not what is just except incidentally.
But knowing the manner in which deeds are performed and distribu-
tions are made so as to be just, that is a greater task than understanding
what produces health, though even there while it is easy to know what
honey and wine and hellebore are, and cautery and surgery, knowing 15
how, and for whom, and when to use these resources to bring about
health requires all the accomplishment of a doctor.
1v.g.16It is for this very reason that people think acting unjustly is no
less the mark of the just person than acting justly, since the just person
would be no less capable than others, in fact even more so, of performing
each kind of unjust act.19 Certainly, he could sleep with a woman or hit a 20
bystander, as the courageous person could throw down his shield, turn
tail and run for the hills. Rut in performing these actions one does not
thereby count as a cowardly or unjust agent, except incidentally; rather
it is a matter of what state one is in when performing them. So too being
a doctor and a healer is not a matter of whether one does or does not
perform surgery, or administer drugs, but the way one does it. 25
1v.g.17 What is just pertains to those who have a share of the things
that are good without qualification, and who can have an excess or
deficiency of these. For some, perhaps the gods, for example, there is
no such thing as an excess of them; for others, namely the incurably
bad, no share at all is beneficial; any amount does harm. But for others 30
they are beneficial up to a point. That is why justice belongs in the
human realm.
1v.1o.1 T h e next stage of our discussion concerns equity and what is
equitable, and the way they relate to justice and what is just respectively.
"' Aristotle niily Iriivr in ~iiintlhcrc certain paradoxical arguments in Plato to this effect (see
R ( ~ I I L / I /I,~ .!,!,!c
I. ,!\ ~ I I /,/ I ~ / ~ I , ,\Ittlor
I~ 3 7 3 376b).
P
Eudemian Ethics
Upon examination these appear neither straightforwardly the same in
35 kind, nor different. Sometimes we praise what is equitable and the man
I 137b of that character, in such a way that we even transfer it, in place of good,
to other qualities we praise, indicating that what is more equitable is
better." Sometimes, though, if we follow out the argument, it seems
strange if what is equitable, as something counter to what is just, should
be praiseworthy. Then either what is just is not excellent, or what is
5 equitable is not just, if it is different from it. If they are both excellent,
they are the same.
1v.10.2 These are roughly the claims that cause puzzlement about
what is equitable. Yet in a way they are all correct and not mutually
inconsistent. What is equitable is just by being better than a certain sort
of justice, but it is not by being a different kind of thing that it is better
10 than what is just. T h e same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while
both qualities are excellent what is equitable is better.
1v.10.3 What creates the difficulty is that what is equitable is just, but
not in the legal sense; rather, it is a rectification of legal justice, 1v.1o.4
the reason being that all law is universal but there are some matters
1 5 about which one cannot speak correctly in universal terms. In cases
where it is impossible to speak correctly when one must speak univer-
sally, the law considers what holds for the most part, without being
unaware of the error. Nor indeed is it thereby any less correct, since the
error lies not in the law or the legislator but in the nature of the case,
such being inevitably the stuff of practical affairs. 1v.1o.5 So whenever
20 the law speaks universally but something occurs on the point that is
contrary to the universal, then it is right, insofar as the legislator left
something out and erred by speaking in unqualified terms, to rectify the
omission by reference to what the legislator himself would have said if
he were present at the scene, and would have legislated had he known
the details.
1v.1o.6 That is why the equitable is just, and superior to one sort of
25 justice, not to justice without qualification but to the error that arises
when no qualifications are made. This too is the nature of the equitable,
to be a rectification of the law insofar as the latter is deficient because of
its universality. That is also the reason that not everything is regulated
'"T h e term epieikk is also used idiomatically as a synonym for 'good', and when Aristotle does so
we generally translate it as 'decent'.
Book IV
by law; some things are impossible to legislate about, hence decrees are
needed. 1v.10.7 T h e measure of what is indefinite is itself indefinite, like 30
the lead measure used by builders on Lesbos that adapts itself to the
shape of the stone and does not stay rigid. That is the role of the decree
in relation to particular circumstances.
1v.1o.8 It is clear, then, what the equitable is and that it is just and
superior to a certain form of justice. It is also evident from this who the
equitable person is. It is the one who is disposed to decide on and do 35
these sorts of things, and who is not a stickler for justice in the pejorative 1138a
sense but is prepared to be flexible even with the law on his side. This
state moreover is equity, and it is a sort of justice rather than some other
kind of state.
IV.I I . I Whether or not it is possible to treat oneself unjustly will be
clear from what we have said. There are some matters of justice that are 5
ordained by law in line with every type of virtue. For example, the law
does not enjoin the killing of oneself; and the things it does not enjoin it
forbids. IV.I I .2 Moreover, whenever one voluntarily does harm that is
not retaliatory, in contravention of the law, one acts unjustly ('voluntar-
ily' here means that one knows who one is harming and what one is
using). But someone who kills himself in a fit of anger does so contrary 10
to correct reasoning, and this the law does not allow. He therefore does
injustice, but to whom? 1v.11.3 IS it not to the city rather than to
himself? After all he suffered his fate voluntarily, and no one voluntarily
is treated unjustly. That is why the city in fact imposes a penalty, and
why a certain dishonour attaches to the person who does away with
himself, on the grounds that he has treated the city unjustly.
IV.I I .4 It is, further, impossible to treat oneself unjustly in the sense in
which the unjust agent is merely unjust and not completely base. (This 15
is different from the other case, since one can be unjust in the same way
as one is a coward, that is, without possessing comprehensive vice and
acting on that basis when one commits injustice.") If it were possible,
that would mean the same thing could be simultaneously subtracted
from and added to the same person, but that is impossible. What is just 20
or unjust always necessarily involves more than one person.
" Aristorlc rckrs, IICI.C111111 ill tlic PI.CV~OUS scntcnce, to his differentiation of particular from
gcr~cri~l
ji~~tic,c
dt I!' J . I ~II)o\c-,
F

Eudemian Ethics Book IV

rv.11.5 Moreover, acting unjustly is voluntary, based on a decision,
and involves taking the initiative, since the person who does the
same thing in return as he had done to him is not considered to be
acting unjustly. But to treat oneself unjustly would be simultaneously
to have done to one and do the very same things. And unjust
treatment of oneself would entail that one could voluntarily be treated
unjustly.
certain relationship of mutual justice here comparable to that between
ruler and ruled.23
1v.11.10 Let this be the manner of our determinations about justice
and the rest, that is. the virtues of character.
Aristotle may be thinking of the idea put forward in Book rv of Plato's Republic that justice and
23

injustice consist in a respectively harmonious and disharmonious relationship between the three
1v.11.6 In addition to these points, there is no acting unjustly apart parts of the soul dependent on whether or not reason rules, though the division of the soul given
25 from the specific forms of unjust action, but no one commits adultery here by Aristotle into simply a rational and irrational part is more in line with his own moral
psychology, and he is at pains to stress that such a relationship can only be regarded as a
with his own wife or housebreaks through his own wall or steals his own derivative, and not, as in Republic IV,the primary form of justice.
possessions. In general terms, the idea of treating oneself unjustly is
refuted by reference to the specification we made concerning being done
injustice ~oluntarily."~
IV. I 1.7 It is evident too that both being done injustice and doing it are
30 base, since in the former case one has less than the mean and in the latter
one has more; compare what produces health in the case of medicine, or
good conditioning in the case of gymnastics. Nonetheless doing injustice
is worse, since it implies vice and is blameworthy, and complete and
unqualified vice at that or, given that not every voluntary unjust act
implies an unjust character, nearly so. Being treated unjustly, on the
35 other hand, involves no vice or injustice on the subject's part. 1v.11.8 So
in itself being unjustly treated is less base, and although there is nothing
1138b to prevent it being incidentally a greater evil, that is of no concern to
science, which declares that pleurisy is a greater affliction than a
stumble, notwithstanding that the latter might turn out to be greater
5 incidentally, should a fall resulting from the stumble lead to one's
capture or death at enemy hands.
IV.I I .g Only metaphorically and by analogy is there such a thing as
justice not to oneself exactly but to certain aspects of oneself, and not
justice of every sort, but only of the sort that concerns a master of slaves
or the head of a household, since this is the sort of relation in which the
10 part of the soul that has reason stands to the irrational part. It is in view
of this that there is thought to be such a thing as injustice to oneself,
since with these parts there is the possibility of something being done
that is contrary to their own desires. Hence there is thought to be a

" See rv.9.54 above.


Book v
I 138bv.1.1 Since we have in fact already said that one must choose the mean,
20 and not the excess or the deficiency, and since the mean is as correct
reasoning says it is, let us make some distinctions here. In all the states
discussed, just as in other matters, there is a target which the rational
person looks to as he intensifies and relaxes, and there is a defining limit
for the mean states, which we say lie between the excess and the
25 deficiency, being in accordance with correct reasoning. v.1.2 Now this
claim is true, but not at all clear. For in other concerns governed by
knowledge it is true to say that one ought to labour and to ease off
neither too much nor too little, but moderately and as correct reasoning
30 indicates. But assuming that this is all one has, one would be none the
wiser about how to treat the body if one were to say 'what medicine and
the medical practitioner dictates'. v. I .3 That is why when it comes to the
states of the soul this claim, though true, is not enough, but there must
also be distinctions about what the correct reasoning is and what its
defining limit is.
v.1.4 When we distinguished the virtues of the soul we said that
1139a some were virtues of character and some virtues of thought. We have
dealt with the virtues of character; let us now discuss the others, after
first saying something about the soul. v.1.5 Earlier, then, it was said
that there are two parts of the soul, one rational and the other
5 non-rational. Now we should make a similar division with regard to
the rational part, and let it be postulated that there are two rational
parts, one by which we contemplate the kinds of existing things whose
starting points cannot be otherwise and the other by which we contem-
plate things which admit of being otherwise. For corresponding to
Book V
objects which differ in kind there are also parts of the soul, different in
kind, which naturally correspond to each kind of object, if it really is the 10
case that they have knowledge in accordance with a kind of similarity
and suitability. v.1.6 Let one of these be called 'scientific' and the other
'calculative'; deliberation and calculation are the same and no one
deliberates about things which do not admit of being otherwise. Conse-
quently, the calculative is a single, distinct part of the rational part. v. I .7 I5
One should, then, get a grasp of what the best state of each of these
rational parts is. For this is the virtue of each and the virtue is relative to
its proper function.
v.2.1 Now there are three things in the soul which are authoritative
over action and truth: perception, insight and desire. v.2.2 Of these,
perception is not a starting point for any action, which is clear because
beasts have perception but do not participate in action. What assertion 20
and denial are in thought, pursuit and avoidance are in desire. So since
ethical virtue is a state involving decision and since decision is a
deliberative desire, for these reasons it is necessary that the reasoning
be true and the desire be correct, if indeed the decision is excellent; and 25
the reasoning must assert the same things as the desire pursues.
So this form of thought is also truth in action. v.2.3 T h e good and
bad conditions of theoretical thought, rather than of practical or
productive thought, are truth and falsehood. That is the function of
every thinking capacity. But for the capacity that involves both action
and thinking it is truth in agreement with correct desire. v.z.4 At any 30
rate, decision is the starting point for action - the source of motion
rather than what it is for the sake of - whereas desire and reasoning for
the sake of something are the starting point for decision. That is why
decision does not occur without insight and thought nor without a
state of character. For doing well and its opposite in action do not 35
occur without thought and character, v.2.5 Thought on its own sets
nothing in motion, but thought for the sake of something, thought
directed at action, does. This kind of thought is also the starting point 113gb
for productive thought, since everyone who produces something does
so for the sake of something. A product is not an end in an unqualified
sense (but only relative to something and of something), whereas an
action is, since doing well is an end and desire is for this. That is why
decision is either insight desiring or desire thinking; and a human 5
being is a starting point of' this sort.
 Eudemiun Ethics
v.2.6 Nothing in the past is an object of decision (for example, no one
decides that Troy has been sacked) since no one deliberates about the past
either, but rather about the future and the contingent; what is past does
not admit of not having happened. So Agathon was right:
The only thing that god is deprived of
Is to undo what has been done.
Truth is the function of both of the intellectual parts of the soul. And so
for both parts the virtues are those states on the basis of which each is
most apt to attain truth.
v.3.1 Beginning from the beginning, let us go back over these issues.
15 Let the factors in virtue of which the soul attains truth in assertion and
denial be five in number: craft, scientific knowledge, wisdom, expertise
and insight. For the soul can get things wrong in virtue of belief and
opinion.
v.3.2 If we are to be precise about the matter and not be swayed by
mere similarities, it will be immediately clear what scientific knowledge
20 is from the following. We all believe that what we know scientifically
does not admit of being otherwise; but as for things which admit of
being otherwise, when they are out of sight we cannot tell if they are the
case or not. Therefore, what we know scientifically is necessary, and
consequently it is eternal. For everything which is necessary without
qualification is eternal, and eternal things are ungenerable and indes-
25 tructible. v.3.3 Moreover, all scientific knowledge is thought to be
teachable and what is known scientifically is learnable. All teaching is
based on things known beforehand, as we also say in the Analytics;' for
some teaching is through induction and some by syllogism. Induction is
a starting point for the universal as well, but syllogism is based on
30 universals. There are, then, starting points which are the basis for a
syllogism but cannot be established by a syllogism; so there is induction.
v.3.4 Therefore scientific knowledge is a state that is concerned with
demonstration, with the further specifications that we make in the
Analytics.' When one has a kind of conviction and has familiarity with
the starting points, then one knows scientifically - if these are not better
35 known than the conclusion, then one will have scientific knowledge only
incidentally. Let this be our specification of scientific knowledge.
See Posterior Analytics 1.1. Posterior Analytics 1.2.
Book v
v.4.1 What admits of being otherwise includes objects produced and I 14oa
actions done. Production and action are distinct (we are confident about
this also on the basis of exoteric arguments). v.4.2 Consequently it is also
the case that the state which is practical and accompanied by reason is
distinct from the productive state accompanied by reason. Accordingly, 5
neither of these is included in the other; action is not production and
production is not action. v.4.3 Since house-building is a craft and
essentially a productive state accompanied by reason, and since there
is no craft which is not a productive state accompanied by reason nor
any such state which is not a craft, 'craft' and 'productive state accom- 10
panied by true reason' are the same thing.
v.4.4 Every craft deals with coming to be and with contriving and
considering how to bring into being a thing that admits of being and not
being and whose starting point lies not in the thing produced but in the
producer. For craft's objects are not things which exist or come to be
necessarily, nor are they natural objects - these have their starting point 15
in themselves. v.4.5 Since production and action are different, craft
must be about production rather than action. And in a way chance
and craft deal with the same things, as Agathon also says, 'Craft
cherished chance and chance craft'. v.4.6 So craft, as has been said, is 20
a productive state accompanied by true reason, while absence of craft is
its opposite, a productive state accompanied by false reason, both
dealing with what admits of being otherwise.
v. 5.1 We might get a grasp of wisdom as follows, by considering who 25
we say the wise people are. It seems that the wise person can deliberate
well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some
particular domain (such as what contributes to health and strength)
but about what contributes to living well in general. v.j.2 An
indication of this is that we refer to people being wise about something
particular when they calculate well about what conduces to a particular 30
excellent end in matters not governed by a craft. Hence the good
deliberator would also be wise in general. v.5.3 No one deliberates about
what cannot be otherwise, nor about things that don't admit of being
done by oneself. Consequently, if scientific knowledge is accompanied
by demonstration and there is no demonstration of things whose starting 3.5
points can he otherwise (for all of them admit of being otherwise), and
if it is iml~ossil~lc to deliberate about things which exist necessarily,
then wisdonl woultl 1101 he scientific knowledge or craft; not scientific 1140b
 I
Eudemian Ethics
knowledge because what is subject to action admits of being otherwise,
and not craft because action and production are different in kind. v.5.4
5 So the remaining possibility is that wisdom is a state of truth, accom-
panied by reason, which takes action with regard to what is good and bad
for a human being. T h e goal of production is different and would not
belong to action. For doing well is, in its own right, the end.
v.5.5 This is why we think that Pericles and people like him are wise,
because they are able to consider what is good for themselves and what is
10 good for human beings in general. We take the view that householders
and political leaders are of this sort. This is also why we call temperance
by this name, because it preserves ~ i s d o m v.5.6
. ~ Such is the sort of
belief it preserves, since pleasure and pain do not corrupt and pervert
15 every belief, for example that the triangle does or does not have angles
equal to two right angles, but rather beliefs about action. For the starting
points of actions are the reasons for the actions, and to someone who has
been corrupted by pleasure or pain there doesn't immediately seem to
be a starting point, nor does it seem that he should choose and do
everything for this reason and because of this. For vice corrupts one's
20 starting point. Consequently it is necessary that wisdom is a true state
accompanied by reason concerned with action with regard to human
goods.
v.5.7 In fact, crafts have a virtue but wisdom does not. And in a
craft one prefers the person who makes a voluntary mistake, whereas
when it comes to wisdom it is the opposite, as is the case with the
25 virtues. So it is clear that wisdom is a kind of virtue and not a craft.
v.5.8 Since there are two parts of the soul which are rational, wisdom
would be the virtue of just one of them, the part dealing with
opinion. Both opinion and wisdom deal with what admits of being
otherwise, but wisdom is certainly not just a state accompanied by
reason. An indication of this is that this kind of state can be forgot-
30 ten, but wisdom cannot.
v.6.1 Scientific knowledge is a belief about universals and about
things which exist of necessity, and there are starting points for what
is demonstrated and for all scientific knowledge, since scientific know-
ledge is accompanied by reason. Hence the starting point for what is
Siphrosunt, temperance, is derived from words meaning 'preserve' and 'wisdom'
Xh
Book v
known scientifically could not be the object of scientific knowledge, craft
or wisdom. For what is known scientifically is subject to demonstration, 35
and the others deal with objects that admit of being otherwise. Nor
is it theoretical expertise which governs them, since it is characteristic of I 141a
the expert to be able to demonstrate some things. v.6.2 So if the states by
which we attain truth and are never wrong about things which do not
admit of being otherwise (or even about things that do admit of being
otherwise) are the following: scientific knowledge, wisdom, theoretical 5
expertise and insight; and if it cannot be any of the three (I mean, these
three: wisdom, scientific knowledge, theoretical expertise), then the
remaining possibility is that it is insight which governs the starting
points.
v.7.1 In the crafts we attribute expertise to those who are most precise
in their crafts, such as Phidias (an expert stone carver) and Polyclitus the 10
sculptor, in this case indicating nothing by the term 'expertise' except
excellence in the craft. v.7.2 But we also think that some people are
expert in general rather than in some particular field or in any other way
(as Homer says in the Margiteq4 'the gods did not make him expert with 15
the sceptre nor the plough nor in any other respect'). So it is clear that
expertise would be the most precise form of knowledge.
v.7.3 Therefore an expert person must not only know what follows
from the starting points but also must attain the truth about the
starting points. Consequently theoretical expertise would be insight
plus scientific knowledge, scientific knowledge of the most valuable
objects, which possesses, as it were, its capstone. For it is strange for 20
anyone to think that politics or wisdom is the most worthy form of
knowledge, unless human beings are the best thing in the universe.
v.7.4 If what is healthy and what is good are different for humans and
for fish, while what is white and what is straight are always the same,
then everyone would say that expertise too is constant, while wisdom
varies. For people say that wisdom is what does a good job of con- 25
sidering all matters that concern oneself, and one will entrust those
matters to the wise. And that is why they even say that some beasts are
wise, those, that is, which clearly have some planning capacity over
their own lives.
+ A pocm i~~tc'iln~~ctl
111 1 I I I I ~ ~
in~ the
I . ancient world, now regarded as non-Homcric
 Eudemian Ethics
I t is also clear that expertise and political science won't be the same.
30 For if people claim that knowledge of what is beneficial to themselves is
expertise, then there will be many forms of it, since there is not a single
expertise about what is good for all animals, but rather the good differs
for each one - unless it is also the case that there is just one form of
medicine for everything that exists. And if the claim is that humans are
I 141b better than all other animals, it still doesn't make a difference. For there
are other things which are much more divine than human beings, such
as, most visibly, the entities from which the cosmos is constructed.
v.7.5 From what has been said it is clear that theoretical expertise,
scientific knowledge and insight have as their objects what is most
valuable by nature. That is why people say that Anaxagoras, Thales
5 and men like them are expert but not wise, since they see that they are
ignorant about what is advantageous to themselves, and people say that
they know things that are exceptional, amazing, difficult and divine -
though useless, because what they seek are not human goods. v.7.6 But
wisdom concerns human goods and the things about which deliberation
10 is possible. For we say that this, good deliberation, is above all else the
function of the wise person; and no one deliberates about what cannot
be otherwise or about things which do not have an end; and this is the
practical good.
T h e unqualifiedly good deliberator is the one who aims in his
reasoning for the best achievable good for human beings. v.7.7 And
15 wisdom is not directed solely at universals but must also be cognizant of
particulars. For it is directed at action and action deals with particulars.
That is why some people who do not have knowledge, especially those
with experience, are better able to get things done than those who do
have knowledge. If someone knows that light meats are easy to digest
and healthy but doesn't know which meats are light, then he won't
20 produce health; but someone who knows that poultry is light and5
healthy is more likely to do so. And wisdom is about actions, so it needs
both forms of knowledge - or particular knowledge even more. Here too
there would be an architectonic form of knowledge.
v.8.1 Political expertise and wisdom are the same state but their
25 essence is not the same. v.8.2 As it relates to the city, the
5 Unlike the OCT we retain the MSS reading koupha kai.
88
Book v
architectonic application of wisdom is 'legislative' and in its applica-
tion to particulars it gets the generic label 'political'. And this is
practical and deliberative, since a decree is what gets acted upon,
because it is the final stage. That is why people say that only these
people participate in political life, since they are the only ones who 30
take action in the way that craftsmen do. v.8.3 When it is applied to
oneself and to the individual it is thought especially to be wisdom;
and this gets the generic label 'wisdom'. T h e components of the
other form of it are household management, legislative expertise, and
political expertise; and of political expertise part is deliberative and
part is judicial.
v.8.4 To be sure, knowing something for one's own benefit is a
form of knowledge, but there is a lot of disagreement on the issue.
People think that someone who has knowledge about and spends time 1142a
on himself is wise, whereas those involved in politics are thought to be
meddlers. Hence Euripides wrote:6
How could I be wise? I had the opportunity to live without
meddling,
Numbered among the crowd, taking no special role in the army .
Those who are exceptional and take on a greater role . . .
For people pursue what is good for themselves and they think this is
what they should do. This view is the source of the belief that these
people are wise. But it may be that personal benefit is impossible
without a mastery of household management and without political 10
expertise. Furthermore, it is not clear (and so needs investigation)
how one ought to manage one's own affairs. v.8.5 An indication of this
claim is that there can be geometers, mathematicians and experts in
things of that kind who are young, whereas it is thought that a wise
person cannot be young. T h e reason for this is that wisdom involves
particulars, and particulars are known on the basis of experience, but a 15
young person does not have experience, since experience takes a lot of
time to acquire.
v.8.6 One might also investigate why it is that a boy can become a
mathematician but not a theoretical expert nor a natural philosopher.
Surely it is because mathematical objects exist by abstraction, whereas
" In his lour I ' l ~ ~ l/c/rr
r,~ l
 Eudemian Ethics
-
the starting points for the other things are derived from experience;
20 young people talk about the latter but don't really believe it, whereas
the definitions of mathematical objects are manifest. v.8.7 Moreover,
in deliberation mistakes can be made either with regard to the
universal or with regard to the particular - one can be wrong about
the fact that all heavy water is bad or about the fact that this water is
heavy.
v.8.8 It is plain that wisdom is not scientific knowledge. For wisdom is
25 about the final stage, as has been said, since what gets done is of this
sort. v.8.9 And it is opposite to insight, since insight is of the definitions,
of which no account can be given, whereas wisdom concerns the final
stage, which is not subject to scientific knowledge but to perception -
not the perception of the special senses but the kind of perception by
which we perceive that the final stage in mathematical reasoning7 is a
30 triangle. For that is just where things come to a halt. (This is a case of
perception rather than wisdom, but a different kind of perception.)
v.9. I Enquiring and deliberating are different; deliberating is a type of
enquiring. We should also understand what good deliberation is,
whether it is a form of scientific knowledge or opinion, or good guess-
work or some other kind of thing. v.9.2 Now it certainly is not scientific
knowledge, since people do not enquire about things that they know;
1142b good deliberation is a type of deliberation and the deliberator is
enquiring and calculating. But it is also not good guesswork, since good
guesswork does not require reasoning and is quite fast, whereas people
deliberate for a long time and there is a proverb that says 'one must act
5 quickly on one's deliberations, but deliberate slowly'. v.9.3 Again,
quickness of wit, being a sort of good guesswork, and good deliberation
are different.
Nor indeed is good deliberation any kind of opinion. But since the
person who deliberates badly makes a mistake and the one who does it
well deliberates correctly, it is clear that good deliberation is a form of
10 correctness, though not correctness of scientific knowledge or opinion.
In the first place there is no correctness of scientific knowledge (since
there is no error either), and with regard to opinion correctness is truth.
At the same time everything that is an object of opinion has already been
7 Unlike the OCTwe retain the MSS reading en toi.~math~matikois.
Book V
determined. But good deliberation does not occur without reasoning.
Hence the remaining possibility is that it is correctness in thought; the
latter is not yet an assertion (opinion is not an enquiry but is already a
form of assertion), and the deliberator is enquiring and calculating, 15
whether he is deliberating well or badly.
v.9.4 But good deliberation is a kind of correctness in deliberating.
Hence we must first enquire what deliberation is and what its object is.
Since 'correctness' has many meanings, good deliberation is obviously
not every kind of correctness. For the uncontrolled man or the base man
will, if he is c l e ~ e rattain
, ~ his objective on the basis of reasoning. Hence
he will have deliberated well, but he will thereby have gotten a very bad 20
outcome; however, to have deliberated well is thought to be something
good, since good deliberation is the kind of correctness in deliberation
which achieves a good outcome.
v.9.j But one can also achieve the objective through a false syllo-
gism and thereby achieve what one ought to do, but not via the
proper path since the middle term is mistaken. As a result it is not
yet a case of good deliberation if one thereby achieves what one ought 25
but not via the proper path. v.9.6 Moreover, it is possible for one
person to hit upon the objective after lengthy deliberation, while
someone else does so quickly. Therefore, that too is not yet a case
of good deliberation, which is a form of correctness in getting what is
useful and doing so via the proper path, and as one ought, and when
one ought. v.9.7 Moreover, one can have deliberated well without
qualification and also have done so relative to a certain end. C'nquali- 30
fied good deliberation is the one that gets it right with regard to the
unqualified end; qualified good deliberation gets it right relative to a
certain end.
If, then, to have deliberated well is a mark of wise people, then good
deliberation would be correctness about what is beneficial with regard to
the end, about which wisdom is a true belief.
v. 10.I Discernment and good discernment, in virtue of which we say I 143a
that people are discerning and good at discerning, are not completely the
same as scientific knowledge and opinion (for then everyone would be
H Accepting, with lictin!, Ross' emendation ei deinos. It is nevertheless possible that the correct
rcatling is ~ C I I I , \vli;~tcvcr rcading is chosen the translation of this scntence is loose and
dcpendn hcuvily 1111 Ihr nclinc of llrc vcrh protithctoi.
 Eudemian Ethics
discerning); nor are they one particular branch of scientific knowledge
(as medicine is about what is healthy and geometry is about magni-
5 t u d e ~ ) For
. discernment is not concerned with things that always exist
and never change, nor is it about just any contingent thing; rather, it is
about the things that we might puzzle over and deliberate about. That is
why it has the same objects as wisdom, but discernment and wisdom are
not the same thing. v.10.2 Wisdom gives commands, since its aim is what
one should do or not do, while discernment merely makes judgements -
10 discernment and good discernment (and being discerning and being
good at discerning) are the same.
Discernment is not a matter of having or acquiring wisdom. v.10.3
But just as learning is said to be discernment when it employs know-
ledge, so too when we use belief to judge what someone else says about
I5 the things that wisdom addresses it is said to be fine judgement (good
judgement is the same as fine judgement). v.10.4 And the term 'discern-
ment', in virtue of which people are good at discerning, is derived from
discernment in the case of learning, since we often say that learning is
discerning.
V.I1.1 What is called 'understanding' is that in virtue of which
we say that people are forgiving and have understanding for
20 another; it is correct judgement about what is decent. Here is an
indication of this. We say that a decent person is most likely to
be forgiving; decency is being forgiving about some matters and
forgiveness is a form of understanding based on a correct judgement
about what is decent. And the correct judgement is the one that
arrives at the truth.
25 v.11.2 All these states point in the same direction; and this makes
sense. For we attribute understanding, discernment, wisdom and insight
to the same people when we say that they have understanding and
insight and that they are wise and discerning. For all of these capacities
30 deal with the final stages and the particulars. One is discerning and
understanding (or forgiving) in virtue of one's capacity for judgements
about the matters that the wise person deals with. For a sense of what
is decent in one's dealings with others is common to all good people.
v.1 1.3 And everything that is subject to action belongs among particu-
lars, i.e., the final stages. It is these things that the wise person has to
recognize, and discernment and understanding deal with what is subject
35 to action, i.e., what is final.
Book V
v. I I .4 Moreover, insight is directed at what is final in both directions,
since there is insight (and not reasoning) about the primary terms and
the final ones. One kind of insight tracks demonstrations which involve I 143b
terms that are unchangeable and primary; the other kind is occupied
with action-oriented demonstrations which involve the final stage, the
contingent, and the other premise, these being the starting points of that
for the sake of which one acts. Universals emerge from particulars, so 5
v.11.5 it is of these that one has to get perception, and this perception is
insight. That too is why these things seem natural, and while no one
seems an expert by nature, people do seem to possess understanding,
discernment and insight by nature. v.11.6 An indication of this is that we
think that these states go with different times of life, and a particular
time of life is characterized by insight and understanding, since nature is
the cause. As a result one ought to attend to the undemonstrated 10
assertions and opinions of people who are experienced and older, or
wise, no less than we attend to proven propositions. For they see
correctly since they have the eye of experience.
v. I I .7 We have now stated what wisdom is and what expertise is, what I5
each of them actually deals with, and that each of them is a virtue of a
distinct part of the soul. v.12.1 But one might be puzzled about them
with regard to how they are useful. After all, theoretical expertise won't
contemplate any of the things which make a human being happy (since it 20
does not consider any coming-to-be); wisdom does have this feature, but
what does one need it for? - if in fact wisdom is the state that considers
what is just and fine and good for a human being, and if these are the
things that a good man typically does, but nevertheless simply knowing
them does not make us any more liable to do them, since the virtues are 25
states. T h e same point applies to things connected to health and good
physical condition (not the conditions said to produce health and
good condition but those that result from it): for we are no more liable
to act accordingly just because we possess medicine or gymnastics.
v.12.2 And if we don't call someone wise for this reason but rather for
the sake of coming to be something, then wisdom would be of no use to
those who are already excellent. Nor would wisdom be of any use to those 30
who do not have it, since it won't make any difference whether they have it
or just obey those who do possess it; hence we would be in a satisfactory
condition, just as we are with regard to health - for even though we
want to be healthy we do not study medicine. v.12.3 In addition, it would
 Eudemian Ethics
seem strange if wisdom, being inferior to theoretical expertise, were
35 authoritative over it (for in every case the state which produces something
is in charge and gives the orders). We should discuss these questions,
I 144a since to this point we have only stated the puzzles. v.12.4 Let us say first
that these states must be choiceworthy in their own right, since each is
certainly the virtue of its own part of the soul, even if neither of them
accomplishes anything. v.12.5 Next, they do accomplish things, not in the
way that medical knowledge brings about health but in the way that health
5 brings it about. That is how theoretical expertise causes happiness, since
expertise is a part of complete virtue and by being possessed and by being
active it makes a person happy.9 v.12.6 Further, the effect is achieved by
way of wisdom and ethical virtue. For the virtue makes the goal correct
and wisdom produces what conduces to the goal. The fourth part of the
10 soul, the nutritive part, does not have a virtue of this kind; it is not up to
that part to do or not do anything.
v.12.7 When it comes to dealing with the claim that wisdom makes us
no more liable to perform fine and just actions we have to back up a little
and start again, from the following starting point. We say that some
i body set blindly in motion winds up going down hard, since it can't see
I 5 people are not yet just, although they perform just actions: for example,
there are people who do what is prescribed by the laws either involun-
tarily or in ignorance or for some other reason, but not for its own sake;
nonetheless they do what they should do and what the virtuous person
must do. In the same way, it seems, it is possible to do things while in a
certain condition so that one really is good. I mean, for example, doing
things through decision and doing so precisely for the sake of what one
20 is doing. v.12.8 At any rate, virtue makes the decision correct, but the
doing of what is needed to implement the decision is attributable not to
virtue but rather to some other capacity. We have to focus on these
matters and make a clearer statement. v.12.9 There is a capacity which
25 we label 'cleverness' and it is such as to be able to do the things which
conduce to the goal one has set and to actually achieve it. If the aim
is fine, the cleverness is praiseworthy; and if base, then it is unscrupu-
lousness. That is why we say that both wise people and the unscrupulous
are clever." v.12.10 Wisdom is not the same as this capacity, but it
cannot exist without this capacity.
Reading tbi echesthai poiei kai tai energein eudaimona.
'O Following Rowe in reading kai <tour> panourgous.
Book V
This 'eye' of the soul does not acquire its condition in the absence of 30
virtue, as we have said already and as is obvious. For lines of reasoning
about what is to be done do have a starting point: one thinks, 'since the
end, i.e., what is best, is such and such' - whatever it happens to be (for
the sake of argument let it be a randomly chosen end). But the end is not
apparent to anyone except the good person, since wickedness distorts 35
things and makes people fall into error about the starting points for
actions. So it is obvious that one cannot be wise without being good.
V.13.I Let us again investigate virtue. Virtue is actually in roughly the I144b
same situation: as wisdom is in relation to cleverness (similar, but not
the same) so too natural virtue is in relation to virtue proper. Everyone
thinks that every state of character exists, in a way, by nature. Right from 5
birth we are just and temperate and brave, etc. But nevertheless we look
for something else, what is good in the strict sense, and think that these
characteristics have a different standing. After all, natural states are
present in children and beasts, but without insight they are obviously
harmful. So much seems a matter of observation, that just as a strong
10
where it is going, so too in this case. v.13.2 But if one gets insight to
accompany natural virtues then it makes a difference in one's actions.
That is when the state of natural virtue, similar though it is, becomes
virtue in the proper sense. So just as in the domain of opinion there are
two forms (cleverness and wisdom), so too in the domain of character I5
there are two: the one is natural virtue and the other is virtue proper,
and virtue proper requires wisdom.
v.13.3 That is why some people say that the virtues are forms of
wisdom; Socrates was in a way investigating virtue correctly, but in
another way he was wrong. H e was wrong in that he thought that all the 20
virtues were forms of wisdom, but he was right to claim that they
require wisdom. v.13.4 Here is an indication: even now when people
define virtue they all add, after describing the state and its object, 'in
accordance with correct reasoning'. And 'correct' means in accordance
with wisdom. In a way everyone seems to have a hunch that this sort of 25
state, a wise state, is virtue. v.13.5 But we have to go a bit further. Virtue
is not just a state 'in accordance with correct reasoning' but one that is
'accompanied by correct reasoning'; and in such matters it is wisdom
which is correct reasoning. So Socrates thought that the virtues were
forms of reasoning (since he thought that they were all forms of
 Eudemian Ethics
30 knowledge), whereas we think that they are accompanied by reasoning.
v.13.6 So it is clear from what has been said that it is not possible to be
good in the proper sense without wisdom, nor wise without ethical
virtue.
But in this way one could also refute the argument that might be
deployed dialectically, to the effect that the virtues can be separated
from each other given that the same person is not best suited by nature
35 for them all, with the result that he will have already acquired one virtue
but not yet acquired another. This is possible, in fact, for the natural
virtues but it is not possible for the virtues with reference to which one
145a is said to be good without qualification. For they will all come about at
the same time as wisdom does, and wisdom is unitary. v.13.7 And it is
obvious that even if wisdom were not bound up with actions one would
need it just because it is the virtue of its part of the soul, and also
5 because without wisdom no decision will be correct, any more than it
would be without virtue. T h e one gives it the end and the other makes it
do what conduces to the end.
v. 13.8 But it is certainly not authoritative over theoretical expertise nor
over the better part of the soul, in the same way that medicine is not
authoritative over health, since it does not make use of it but rather sees to
it that it should come to be. It gives orders for its sake but does not give
10 orders to it. Again, it is as though one were to say that politics rules over
the gods on the grounds that it gives orders about everything in the city."
rr
Compare ~111.3.
Book VI
v1.1.1 Next we must make a fresh start and say that when it comes to 114
character states there are three kinds to be avoided: vice, lack of self-
control and brutishness. For two of them the opposite is obvious; one of
them is called virtue and the other is called self-control. But when it
comes to the opposite of brutishness it would be most fitting to call it
superhuman virtue, a kind of heroic and divine virtue - as Homer 20
portrays Priam saying about Hector that he was exceptionally good
'and he did not seem to be a child of mortal man but rather of a
god'.' v1.1.2 So if, as people say, humans can become gods through an
excess of virtue then the state which is the counterpart to brutishness 25
would clearly be of this sort. For just as a brute beast has neither virtue
nor vice so too a god has neither. The condition of a god is something
more honourable than virtue and the other is a different kind of vice.
VI.I.3 Since the occurrence of a 'godlike' man is rare - this is the term
customarily used by the Spartans when they admire some man
intensely; they say he is a 'gawdlike'" man - in the same way a brutish 30
man is also rare among human beings. It happens most often among
barbarians but some cases also occur as a result of disease and deformity.
We also use this word as a term of abuse for those humans who are
excessively vicious.
v1.1.4 But we should discuss this sort of disposition later; we 35
have already discussed vice. We need to discuss lack of self-control
and softness and indulgence, as well as self-control and toughness.
' Homer, Ilzad xxrv, 258-9.
In the Splrrln dialect, the term is setos; thc Attic Greek form is rheros
 Eudemian Ethics
1145b We shouldn't suppose that each of these is concerned with the same
states as virtue and wickedness, nor that they are a different kind
altogether. v1.1.5 As in the other cases, we must set down what appears
5 to be the case and, after first puzzling through those appearances, we
must display all the reputable beliefs about these conditions, or if not all
then most of them and the most important ones. We will have done a
sufficient job at this if the difficulties are dissolved and the reputable
beliefs remain.
v1.1.6 Self-control and toughness are thought to be excellent and
10 praiseworthy traits, while lack of self-control and softness are base
and blameworthy; the same person is self-controlled and inclined to
stand by his reasoning, and also it is the same person who lacks self-
control and abandons his reasoning. T h e uncontrolled man knows
that what he does is base but does it because of passion, while the
self-controlled man knows that his appetites are base and, because of
reason, does not follow those appetites. People say that the temper-
15 ate man is self-controlled and tough; some say that all men of the
latter sort are temperate, while others do not. Some say indiscrimin-
ately that the undisciplined man is uncontrolled and the uncon-
trolled undisciplined, while others say they are different. v1.1.7
Sometimes people say that the wise man cannot be uncontrolled,
but sometimes they say that there are people who, despite being wise
and clever, are uncontrolled. Furthermore, people are said to be
20 uncontrolled with respect to spirit and honour and profit. Anyway,
this is what is said.
v1.2.1 One might be puzzled as to how one can behave without self-
control if one has the right beliefs. Some people, at any rate, say that if
one has knowledge one cannot do so, since it would be strange if when
knowledge is present (as Socrates thought) something else is in control
25 and drags it around like a slave. Socrates used to resist the argument
completely on the grounds that there was no such thing as a lack of self-
control: for no one acts contrary to what is best when he believes that he
is doing so, but rather does so out of ignorance. At any rate, this line of
argument is manifestly in disagreement with what appears to be the
case, and one needs to investigate the state the agent is in, whether it is a
30 result of ignorance and what manner of ignorance is in play. For
obviously the person who acts without self-control does not think about
doing so prior to being in that state.
Book VI
v1.2.3 Some people agree with parts of this argument and disagree
with others; they agree that nothing is stronger than knowledge but
don't agree that no one acts contrary to what he has decided is better;
for this reason they say that it is despite his opinion rather than despite 35
his knowledge that the man without self-control is controlled by pleas-
ures. v1.2.4 But if what does the resisting were in fact opinion and not
knowledge (and not even a powerful belief, but rather a weak one, as I146a
happens with people who are unsure about something), then we would
forgive him for not standing by those beliefs in the face of powerful
appetites. But there is no forgiveness for wickedness nor for any other
blameworthy state of affairs. v1.2.5 So if it is wisdom that does the
resisting, what then? Wisdom is, after all, the most powerful factor. 5
But this would be a strange state of affairs. For then the same person
would be at the same moment both wise and uncontrolled and no one
would say that a wise person would willingly perform the worst actions.
Moreover, it was shown above that the wise person is the sort who acts,
since he deals with the final stages,3 and he has the other virtues too.4 10
v1.2.6 Further, if being self-controlled involves having strong and
base appetites, then the temperate man will not be self-controlled nor
will the self-controlled man be temperate. For the temperate man is free
of excess and also will not have base appetites. But the appetites of the
self-controlled man must be strong and base. For if they are good then
the state which prevents him from following those appetites is base, so as
a result self-control will not be excellent in every case. But if they are 15
weak and not base, then self-control is not impressive, and if they are
base and weak then it is insignificant.
v1.2.7 Further, if self-control makes one able to stand by every
opinion, then it is bad; for example, if it also makes one stand by a false
opinion. And if lack of self-control makes a man abandon every opinion,
then there will be a good lack of self-control, as in the case of Sophocles'
Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes, who was praiseworthy because he did 20
not stand by what Odysseus persuaded him to do, since he was pained at
telling a lie.
v1.2.8 Further, the argument of the sophists is a source of puzzle-
ment. Since they are willing to use paradoxes to refute people (so that
Ir
Eudemian Ethics
they can come off as clever when encountering them in discussion)
25 the argument they advance becomes a puzzle. Our thought is tied up
when, because the conclusion is not congenial, it isn't willing to stick
to it; but it cannot make progress owing to its inability to solve the
argument. v1.2.9 Now one such argument leads to the conclusion that
intemperance plus a lack of self-control is virtue. For due to the lack
of self-control one does the opposite of what one thinks, and one
30 thinks that good things are bad and that one should not do them, so
that one will do the good things and not the bad things. v1.2.10
Furthermore, someone who acts out of conviction and on the basis
of decision when he pursues pleasures would seem to be better than
someone who does so not as a result of reasoning but because he lacks
self-control - for he would be easier to cure since he could be won
over by persuasion. T h e man who lacks self-control is covered by the
35 old saying, 'when you choke on water, what do you wash it down
1146b with?' For if he did what he did because he was persuaded, then he
would have stopped if he were persuaded otherwise. But as it is, he is
persuaded of one thing and nevertheless does the other. v1.2.11
Further, if self-control and the lack of it are found in every area
of life, who is uncontrolled without qualification? No one is uncon-
trolled in every respect; but we do say that some people are
5 uncontrolled without qualification. v1.2.12 At any rate, the puzzles
turn out to be roughly like this. Some of them need to be eliminated
and some can be left as they are. For the solution of a puzzle is a form
of discovery.
v1.3.1 First, then, we must enquire whether those who act without
self-control do so knowingly or not and, if knowingly, in what way.
Next we must establish what sorts of things the uncontrolled and self-
10 controlled are concerned with. I refer to the question of whether they
concern every pleasure and pain or only certain defined sorts of pleasure
and pain, and about whether the self-controlled man and the tough man
are the same or different. Similarly we need to investigate the other
questions that are linked to this enquiry.
15 v1.3.2 The starting point for the investigation is the question
whether the self-controlled and the uncontrolled are distinguished
by what they are concerned with or by how they deal with things.
I mean whether the uncontrolled man is uncontrolled just because he
deals with certain kinds of thing; or, alternatively, because of the way in
Book v1
which he deals with things; or by neither of those on its own, but
because of both. Next, we must investigate whether lack of self-control
and self-control deal with all objects or not. For someone who is
uncontrolled without qualification does not deal with all objects, but 20
rather with precisely the objects that the undisciplined man deals with;
and he is not uncontrolled without qualification by being in an
unqualified relationship to those objects (for then lack of self-control
would be the same as indiscipline) but rather by being in this particu-
lar relationship to them. T h e undisciplined man is drawn to those
objects by a decision, holding the view that one ought always to pursue
the present pleasure, while the uncontrolled man does not think this
but pursues it anyway.
v1.3.3 With regard to the suggestion that it is true opinion rather
than knowledge which is violated when people act without self-control, 2j
that makes no difference to the argument. After all, some people who
hold opinions are not at all unsure of themselves, but believe that they
have precise knowledge. v1.3.4 So if one supposes that those who hold
an opinion are more likely to act contrary to their beliefs than those
who know, because of the weakness of their conviction, then there will
be no difference between knowledge and opinion on this point, since 30
some people are just as firmly convinced about what they believe as
others are about what they know. T h e case of Heraclitus illustrates this
point.
v1.3.j We speak of knowing in two ways (both the person who has
knowledge but is not using it and also the one who is using it are said to
know). So it will make a difference whether we are dealing with someone
who has knowledge of what he ought not to do but isn't focusing on it,
or someone who is focusing on it. T h e latter does seem strange, though 3j
not the former. v1.3.6 Further, there are two kinds of premises. So there I 147a
is nothing to prevent someone from acting contrary to his knowledge if
he has both premises but is using the universal premise and not the
particular. For it is the particulars which get acted on. Furthermore,
there are two different universals. One applies to the person and the 5
other to the object. For example, that dry things are beneficial for every
human being and that one is oneself a human being, or that this sort of
thing is dry. But whether this thing here is of that sort, this is the kind of
knowledge that one either does not have or does not activate. These
modes of distinction make an astonishing difference to the issue, so that
 Eudemian Ethics
seen one way there is nothing strange if the man acting without self-
control has knowledge, but seen another way it is puzzling.
10 v1.3.7 Further, human beings can have knowledge in another way in
addition to the ones mentioned. For we observe that under the heading
of 'having but not using knowledge' there is a condition which is
different from the one just discussed, such that in a way one has
knowledge and in another way not; for example, the condition of some-
one sleeping, raving mad or drunk. But this is the state of those who are
1.5 in the grip of passions. For fits of rage, erotic appetites and other similar
states manifestly change the body as well, and in some cases people are
even driven mad. So it is obvious that we should claim that the uncon-
trolled are in a condition similar to these people. v1.3.8 T h e fact that
they can say things that depend on knowledge indicates nothing; after
20 all, people who are in the grip of these passions can also utter proofs and
lines of Empedocles, and people who have just learned something string
together the claims but do not yet know, since it has to fuse with them
and this takes time. So we should suppose that the uncontrolled make
statements just as actors on stage do.
V I . 3 . 9 Further, one could also consider the cause of failures in self-
25 control from the perspective of natural philosophy. One kind of opinion
is universal, but the other concerns particulars, over which perception is
authoritative. And when they combine to form a single opinion, neces-
sarily in this case the soul asserts the conclusion and, in the case of
opinions about doing things, it acts at once. For example, if one ought to
30 taste everything sweet and this thing here, one of the particulars, is
sweet, then necessarily someone who is able to do so, and is not
prevented, actually does so immediately. v1.3.10 Thus whenever the
universal opinion is in the soul and prevents him from tasting, and
so is the opinion that everything sweet is pleasant and that this
here is sweet (and this opinion is active), and when the appetite is
35 actually present, then the first opinion says to avoid this but appetite
draws it on, since it can set in motion each of the parts.5 T h e result is
1147b that one behaves without self-control in some sense because of reason
and opinion; but this is an opinion that is opposed to right reasoning
only incidentally rather than in its own right. v1.3.11 It is the appetite
An alternative translation, preferred by some scholars, is 'each of the parts ciln sct us in motion'.
Book VI
which is opposed to correct reasoning, not the opinion. Consequently,
this too is why brute beasts are not uncontrolled, because they do
not have a universal view but only imagination and memory of the 5
particulars.
v1.3.12 AS to how the ignorance is eliminated and the uncontrolled
agent gets his knowledge back again, the account is the same as the one
that applies to the drunk and the sleeper; it is not peculiar to this
condition; and we should learn this account from the natural philoso-
phers. v1.3.13 And since the final premise is an opinion about something 10
perceptible and is authoritative over the actions, the uncontrolled man
either doesn't possess it while he is in this condition or he has it only in
the sense that having it doesn't involve knowing but merely saying it,
like the drunkard reciting lines of Empedocles. And since the final term
is not universal and not tied to knowledge in the way that the universal
is, we also seem to get the result that Socrates was looking for. VI.3.14 1.5
For the experience does not occur when what seems to be knowledge in
the proper sense is present and it is not this which is dragged about
because of passion, but only the perceptual sort. Let this be all we have
to say about whether or not one can knowingly act without self-control
and in what sense it is possible to do so knowingly.
v1.4.1 Next we should discuss whether there is someone who lacks 20
self-control without qualification or whether all who lack it do so in a
particular way; and if there is such a person, with regard to what is he
uncontrolled. It is clear, then, that the self-controlled and the tough and
the uncontrolled and the soft are engaged with pleasures and pains.
v1.4.2 Some sources of pleasure are necessary and others are in them-
selves choiceworthy but admit of excess. Bodily sources of pleasure are 25
necessary - I mean the sorts of things that involve nutrition and sexual
activity, that is, the kinds of bodily sources of pleasure that we claimed
were the focus of indiscipline and temperance; the others, however, are
not in fact necessary, though they are choiceworthy in themselves -
I mean, for example, victory, honour, wealth and these sorts of good and 30
pleasant things. Accordingly, we do not say that those who go beyond
their own internal correct reasoning with respect to the latter are
uncontrolled without qualification; we say instead that they are uncon-
trolled with respect to money or profit or honour or spirit - just not
uncontrolled without qualification. This is because they are different
and only ci~lled'uncontrolled' because of a similarity, like the Olympic 35
 Eudemian Ethics
1148a victor who was named Human - in his case the general definition was
only a little different from the one peculiar to him, though it was in fact
different.6
Here is an indication. Lack of self-control is blamed not just as a
mistake but also as a form of vice, either without qualification or in
some particular way, but none of the people we've been discussing is
5 blamed in this way. ~ 1 . 4 . 3Rather, among those involved with bodily
enjoyments (the ones we say are the focus for the temperate and
undisciplined man), we call uncontrolled the ones who excessively
pursue pleasures and avoid sources of pain (things like hunger, thirst,
heat, cold and all the feelings associated with touch and taste) not as a
result of decision but contrary to their own decision and thought; we
10 call them uncontrolled not with some proviso, because they focus
on some particular objects, such as those of anger, but just without
qualification.
VI.4.4 Here is an indication: people are called soft with regard to these
pleasures and no others. This is why we group together the uncontrolled
man, the undisciplined man, the self-controlled man and the temperate
I5 man (but none of the others) because they are all in a way focused on the
same pleasures and pains. These people are focused on the same things
but not in the same way; some decide in favour of them and some don't.
That is why we are more inclined to call undisciplined someone who
pursues excesses (or avoids moderate pains) with no appetite or a mild
20 appetite than someone who does so because of a strong appetite. What,
after all, would the first one do if he also had a robust appetite and
powerful pain when faced with the lack of necessities?
v1.4.5 In accordance with our earlier classification, some appetites and
pleasures are fine and excellent in kind (some pleasures being naturally
25 choiceworthy), some are opposite to these, and some are in between (for
example, money and profit and victory and honour); and with respect to
all such things and the intermediates people are not blamed just because
they experience them or have an appetite for them or like them but
rather because they do so in a particular way, i.e., to excess. That is why
we blame all those who are dominated by or pursue something that is
30 naturally fine and good, contrary to their reasoning, like those who are
The reference is to a boxer named 'Human' ('Anthropos' in Greek), who was of course also a
human.
Book VI
more devoted to honour than they should be, or to their children and
parents. These things too are good and those who are devoted to them
are praised; but still even in these cases there is an excess - if someone
should fight even against the gods like Niobe or be like Satyros, nick-
named the Fatherlover, who seemed, when it came to his father, to be 1148b
excessive in his ~ t u p i d i t y . ~
At any rate, there is no wickedness when it comes to these objects, for
the reason given, because each is naturally and on its own account
choiceworthy; but excesses with regard to them are base and to be
avoided. v1.4.6 Similarly we do not speak of a lack of self-control with 5
regard to them, since lack of self-control is not only to be avoided, but it
is also blameworthy. Because of the similarity of their condition we do
apply the term 'lack of self-control', adding that it is in a particular
respect - just as we do when we speak of a bad doctor or a bad actor,
whom we would not call bad without qualification. So just as in these
cases we do not call them bad without qualification, because each of
these conditions is not vice, but only resembles it by analogy, in the same 10
way it is clear that in the other case one should hold that the only self-
control and lack of self-control are those states which concern the same
objects as temperance and indiscipline. With regard to spirit we apply
the terms due to similarity. That is why we specify 'uncontrolled with
respect to spirit' just as we do with honour and profit.
v1.5.1 Some things are pleasant by nature, of which some are 15
unqualifiedly so and others in accordance with the types of animals
and human beings there are. Some things are not pleasant by nature, but
of these some become pleasant as a result of deformities, some as a result
of habituation, others because of wicked natures; so it is possible to
observe, in connection with each of these kinds of pleasure, correspond-
ingly similar states. v1.5.2 I am referring to brutish states, such as the
female who, they say, cut open pregnant women and ate their foetuses; 20
or the sorts of thing in which, they say, some wild men around the Black
Sea take pleasure (some of them enjoy raw meat, others human flesh,
and others farm their children out to each other for partying); or what
' Kiobe boasted that her great number of children made her superior to Leto, mother of Apollo and
Artemis, for which T.cto had her divine offspring punish Niobe with the death of her children.
Satpros wils 11rc1s1likcly ;I k i n g or son of a king, who deified his father.
10s
 Eudemian Ethics
they say about ~ h a l a r i s .v1.5.3
~ These are brutish, but others arise
25 because of diseases and in some people because of madness too, like
the man who ritually slaughtered and then ate his mother, and the man
who ate the liver of his fellow slave; others are diseased states caused by
h a b i t ~ a t i o n ,such
~ as plucking one's own hair out and chewing one's
nails and furthermore chewing coals and dirt, and in addition to these
the disposition to have sex with other males. For some these conditions
30 come about by nature, for others by habituation, as in the case of those
who are abused in childhood. VI.5.4 In the case of those for whom the
cause is nature, no one would say that they lack self-control - any more
than they would say this of women just because they are passive rather
than active when having sex. Similarly for those who are in a diseased
state because of habituation.
v1.5.5 At any rate, having each of these conditions is outside the scope
1149a of vice, as is brutishness too. But whether someone who is in this kind
of condition is in control or is controlled by something else, this is
not unqualified lack of self-control, but rather lack of self-control by
similarity; just as someone who is in this condition with regard to fits of
temper can be said to be in this state relative to that passion but should
not be said to lack self-control.
5 Every excess of folly, cowardice, intemperance and crabbiness, can be
either brutish or diseased. v1.5.6 The man who was by nature such as to
fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, had a brutish form of
cowardice, while the man who was afraid of his pet weasel was diseased.
10 And some fools are thoughtless by nature, living like animals by percep-
tion alone (such as some remote barbarian tribes), while others are so
because of diseases (such as those which produce seizures) or diseased
forms of madness. v1.5.7 Some of these conditions one can sometimes
merely have but not be controlled by (I mean, for example, if Phalaris
I5 controlled his appetite for eating a child or for unusual sexual pleasures);
it is also possible to be controlled by them and not just to have them.
v1.5.8 So just as with wickedness, one form of it is said to be
human wickedness without qualification, while another has an added
A sixth-century Sicilian tyrant most notorious for the bronze bull in which he roasted his
enemies alive; but here given as an example of more general moral depravity.
9 Omitting i with and Rowe.
Book V1
qualification, that it is brutish or diseased, but is not the unqualified
form, in the same way lack of self-control clearly can be either brutish or
diseased, but the unqualified form is only that which corresponds to 20
indiscipline on a human scale.
VI.5.9 So it is clear that self-control and the lack of it only concern
the objects of temperance and indiscipline, and that for other objects
there is another form of the lack of self-control, one which is so called
by an extended usage and not without qualification. v1.6.1 Let us also 25
note that failure of self-control with regard to spirit is less shameful
than failure with regard to the appetites. For spirit seems in a way to
listen to reason, but to mishear it, like hasty servants who rush off
before they hear everything their master says and then botch the
instructions; and like dogs who start barking as soon as they hear a
noise, before they find out whether it is a friend. This is how spirit, 30
because of its hot and hasty nature, listens but does not hear the
command and so rushes off to take revenge. Reason or the imagination
indicates that there has been a case of aggression or disrespect, and
then spirit reasons that it should go to war over this sort of situation
and immediately gets angry. But if reason or perception merely says 35
that something is pleasant, appetite rushes off to enjoy it. So spirit 1149b
follows reason in a way, but appetite doesn't. Therefore appetite is
more shameful. For the man who fails to control his spirit is in a way
defeated by reason, while the other is defeated by appetite and not by
reason. v1.6.2 Furthermore, we are more likely to forgive if people
follow natural desires, since we also do so with the kinds of appetites 5
that are shared by everyone, just insofar as they are shared. Spirit and
bad temper are more natural than appetites for excess and for what is
not necessary, as in the case of the man who defended himself for
beating his father by saying, 'well, he beat his own father and he beat
his before him and', he said, pointing to his son, 'this boy will beat me 10
when he grows up; it's a family tradition'. And a man who was being
dragged out by his son told him to stop at the door, since that was how
far he had himself dragged his own father.
v1.6.3 Furthermore, those who form plots are more unjust, and the
spirited man does not form plots, nor does spirit. Rather, it is out in the
open. Appetite, on the other hand, as they say about Aphrodite, 'belongs I5
to the deceit-weaving daughter of Cyprus'; and Homer refers to the
'embroidered belt' as an 'allurement which steals the mind of a man, no
 Eudemian Ethics
matter how soundly he thinks'.'" So if lack of self-control of this kind is
more unjust and more shameful than the kind associated with spirit,
20 then it will be lack of self-control without qualification and, in fact, it
will be vice, in a sense. v1.6.4 Furthermore, no one commits an outrage
because he is in pain but everyone who acts in anger acts because of
pain, while someone who commits an outrage acts with pleasure. So if
things are more unjust when it is especially just to be angry at them,
then this applies to lack of self-control with regard to appetite, since
outrage is not a matter of spirit.
v1.6.5 So, it is clear that failure of self-control with regard to appetite
25 is more shameful than that which concerns spirit, and that self-control
and failure of self-control are concerned with bodily appetites and
pleasures. v1.6.6 But when it comes to these we should understand the
differences among them. As we said at the outset, some of them are
natural and human, both in their type and in their magnitude, while
others are brutish, and yet others come about because of deformity and
30 disease. Temperance and indiscipline only apply to the first case, which
is why we do not say that brute beasts are either temperate or undiscip-
lined except in an extended sense, and only if some species of animals as
a whole differs in some way from other species, in proneness to outrage,
aggression or gluttony. For although such a beast does not make deci-
35 sions or reason, it has deviated from nature, just like madmen among
1150a humans. v1.6.7 Brutishness is less significant than vice, but more
frightening. For the better part has not been corrupted, as it is in the
case of a human being, but rather it is just absent. So it is like comparing
5 what lacks a soul to what has a soul and asking which is worse. T h e
badness of something that does not possess a starting point is always less
harmful, and insight is a starting point. So it is like comparing injustice
to an unjust person. In different ways each is worse. For a bad human
being could cause infinitely more harm than a brute beast.
v1.7.I With respect to the pleasures of touch and taste, and the related
10 pains, appetites and avoidances, we have previously" specified that they
are the focus of indiscipline and temperance; one can be so disposed as
to be overcome even by those that most people could master and one can
also be so disposed as to master even those that most people are
I0 Iliad xlv 214, 217. " See 111.2.6-13.
Book V1
overcome by. When it comes to pleasures, the one is self-controlled and
the other lacks self-control; when it comes to pains, the one is soft and
the other is tough. T h e condition of most people is intermediate, even if 15
they do tend more towards the worse states. ~ 1 . 7 . 2Some pleasures are
necessary and some are not (also, necessary to a certain extent), but
excesses are not necessary, nor are deficiencies, and the same goes for
appetites and pains; someone who pursues excesses in pleasure or
pursues pleasure to excess, and does so as a result of a decision,'" for 20
their own sake and not because of any of their consequences, is undis-
ciplined. This man must be unrepentant, with the result that he is
incurable. For an unrepentant man is incurable. Opposite to him is the
person who is deficient in this regard, and the intermediate person is
temperate. Similarly too for the person who avoids bodily pains not
because he is defeated by them but as a result of a decision. VI.7.3 Of 25
those who act in this way without a decision, one is drawn on by pleasure
and the other because he is avoiding the pain that results from appetite;
hence they differ from each other. Everyone would think that doing
something shameful without appetite or with a weak appetite is worse
than doing it because of a powerful appetite; and worse if someone hits
another when he is not angry than if he hits him in anger. (For what would 30
he have done if he were angry?) That is why the undisciplined man is
worse than the man who lacks self-control. Of the states we have dis-
cussed, then, one is more a form of softness and the other is indiscipline.
VI.7.4 T h e self-controlled man is the opposite of the man who lacks
self-control; and the tough man is the opposite of the soft one. Being 35
tough consists in resisting and self-control consists in controlling, and
resistance is different from control, just as not being defeated is differ-
ent from victory. That is why self-control is more choiceworthy than
toughness. VI.7.5 The man who is deficient with regard to things that 115ob
most people are able successfully to resist is soft and self-indulgent.
Self-indulgence is a form of softness - this kind of man drags his cloak
to avoid undergoing the laborious discomfort of lifting it, and though he
acts like an invalid he doesn't think he's a miserable wretch (though he 5
certainly seems like one). v1.7.6 It is the same with self-control and lack
of self-control. It isn't surprising if someone is defeated by strong,
 Eudemian Ethics
excessive pleasures or pains, but rather we forgive such a man if he tried
to resist, like Philoctetes in Theodektes' play, when he was bitten by the
10 snake; or Kerkyon in the Alopa of Karkinos;13 and like those who try to
suppress a burst of laughter but wind up cackling out loud, as happened
to Xenophantus. But if someone is defeated by and unable to resist the
pleasures and pains that most people can resist, not because of some
natural, generic defect or disease (as, for example, Skythian kings are
15 soft because of their heredity, and as the female differs with regard to
the male) - this is surprising. VI.7.7 As well, an unduly playful person
seems to be undisciplined but is in fact soft. For play is a form of
relaxation, since it is a pause, and the unduly playful person is excessive
in his devotion to this.
v1.7.8 Lack of self-control is partly a matter of being precipitate, and
20 partly a matter of being weak. Some people have deliberated but then
because of passion don't stand by the decisions they have reached, while
others are drawn on by passion because they didn't deliberate. Some
after all, like those who can't be tickled because they tickled the other
person first, perceive in advance, see in advance, and wake up them-
selves and their reasoning in advance, and so they are not defeated by
25 passion, whether it is pleasant or painful. Quick-natured people and
those with a lot of black bile are especially prone to be uncontrolled in
the precipitate manner. They don't wait for reason, being prone to
follow the way things appear, some because of their hastiness and some
because of their intensity.
30 v1.8.I As we have said, the undisciplined man is unrepentant, since he
stands by his decision; but everyone who lacks self-control is repentant.
That is why the facts are not as suggested in our statement of the
puzzle.'4 Rather, it is the undisciplined man who is incurable and the
uncontrolled man who is curable. For a wicked character resembles
chronic diseases like dropsy and tuberculosis, but failure of self-control
is like proneness to seizures. The former defect is continuously present
35 and the latter is not. Lack of self-control and vice are altogether different
in kind. T h e vicious man is unaware of his vice, but one who lacks self-
1151a control is aware of that fact. v1.8.2 Among the uncontrolled, those who
abandon their reasoning are better than those who possess reason but
I3 Both playwrights mentioned here by Aristotle have no surviving works
I4 See vr.2.10.
Book VI
don't stand by it; the latter are overcome by a weaker passion and are not
devoid of prior deliberation as the others are. T h e uncontrolled man is
like people who get drunk quickly on a small amount of wine (that is, 5
less than for most people). v1.8.3 It is at any rate evident that lack of
self-control is not vice (except perhaps in a way), since the one is
opposed to decision and the other in line with decision. But nevertheless
they have similar practical consequences; as with Demodocus' criticism
of the Milesians ('the Milesians aren't stupid but they do what stupid
people do'),15 so too uncontrolled men aren't unjust but they will behave 10
unjustly.
v1.8.4 Since the uncontrolled man is not the sort to pursue through
conviction bodily pleasures that are excessive and in conflict with
correct reasoning, while the other kind of man has conviction, since
he is just the sort to pursue them, the former can easily be changed by
persuasion but the latter cannot. For virtue and vice respectively pre- 15
serve and destroy the relevant starting point, and in actions the goal
is the starting point (as hypotheses are in mathematics). Neither in
mathematics nor here is it reasoning that gives instructions about the
starting points; rather, there is a virtue, either natural or the result of
habituation, which yields the correct opinion about the starting point.
T h e temperate man is of this character and the undisciplined man the 20
opposite.
v1.8.5 There is a kind of man who, because of passion, abandons
himself, contrary to correct reasoning; this man is controlled by passion
so that he does not act in accordance with correct reasoning, but not so
controlled that he is the sort who is convinced that he ought to pursue
such pleasures without restraint. This is the man who lacks self-control;
he is better than the undisciplined man and not unqualifiedly base. For 25
what is best in him, the starting point, is preserved. There is also an
opposite kind of man, one who stands by and does not, on account of
passion, abandon correct reasoning. It is clear from these considerations
that the one is a good state of character and the other bad.
v1.9.1 So then, is the self-controlled man the one who stands by just
any reasoning and any decision, or the one who stands by a correct 30
decision? And is the uncontrolled man the one who fails to stand by just
I)crnotl~tci~n\Y,IN &II I I I V I lj.0111 I xros, an island ncur Milctus, home of thc Milesians.
 Eudemian Ethics
any decision and any reasoning, or the one who fails to stand by sound
reasoning and a correct decision? This is the puzzle that was raised
earlier. Or is it incidentally that the one stands by and the other doesn't
stand by just any decision, while in itself the distinction is about
succeeding or failing to stand by true reasoning and the correct deci-
35 sion? If someone chooses or pursues one thing for the sake of another, he
1151b pursues and chooses the latter in itself and the former incidentally. By
'in itself' I mean without qualification. So there is a sense in which one
man stands by and the other man abandons just any opinion, but
without qualification it is the true opinion.
v1.9.2 We call 'stubborn' those who are inclined to stand by their
5 opinion; they are hard to persuade and it is not easy to get them to
change their mind. They are somewhat similar to the self-controlled
man, as a squanderer is similar to the generous man and the reckless
man is similar to the bold man; but they are in many respects different.
For the self-controlled man resists being changed by passion and appet-
10 ite, since he will in fact be easily persuaded when it is relevant. But the
stubborn fail to be changed by reason, since what has seized them are
appetites and many of them are drawn on by pleasures. v1.9.3 T h e
opinionated, the ignorant and the boorish are 'stubborn' - the opinion-
ated because of pleasure and pain, since they are pleased by their victory
15 if they aren't persuaded to change their view and pained if their own
positions are nullified, like legal decrees; hence they are more like the
uncontrolled man than the self-controlled. v1.9.4 There are some people
who do not stand by their resolutions, but not because they lack self-
control; for example, Neoptolemus in Sophocles' ~hiloctetes.'~ And yet
it was because of pleasure that he did not stand by his resolution, but the
20 pleasure was a fine one. For in his eyes telling the truth was something
fine, and he had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie. Not everyone who
acts because of pleasure is undisciplined or base or uncontrolled, but
only someone who acts because of a shameful pleasure.
v1.g.5 There is also a kind of person who takes less pleasure in
25 bodily matters than he should and doesn't stand by his reasoning; the
self-controlled man is midway between him and the man who lacks
self-control. For the uncontrolled man fails to stand by his reasoning
l6 See also ~ 1 . 2 . 7 .
Book VI
because of something more, but this man does so because of something
less. But the self-controlled man stands by his reasoning and doesn't
even change because of a different line of reasoning. If self-control is in
fact an excellent thing, then both of these opposed states of character
must be base, and that is just what seems to be the case. But since one of 30
these states is apparent in few people and rarely, it turns out that just as
temperance seems to be opposed only to indiscipline so too self-control
seems to be opposed only to lack of self-control. v1.9.6 Since mere
similarity is the basis for many claims, the 'self-control' of the temperate
man results from similarity. For the self-controlled man is such as to do 35
nothing contrary to his reasoning due to bodily pleasures and so is the
temperate man; but the one experiences and the other does not experi- I 152a
ence base appetites; the one is such as not to feel pleasure contrary to his
reasoning and the other is such as to feel pleasure in that way but not to
be dragged around by it. ~ 1 . 9 . 7The uncontrolled and the undisciplined
are similar, but different; both pursue bodily pleasures but one thinks he 5
ought to do so and the other does not.
v1.1o.1 Nor is it possible for the same person to be wise and uncon-
trolled at the same time, since we have shown that the wise person is also
excellent in character. v1.10.2 Further, one is not wise just by knowing
but also by being such as to act. But the uncontrolled man is not such as
to act. Nothing prevents a merely clever man from lacking self-control; 10
hence the reason why it sometimes seems that certain people are wise
but uncontrolled is that cleverness differs from wisdom in the way
stated in our first discu~sion;'~ they are close from the point of view
of reasoning but differ with respect to decision. v1.10.3 T h e uncon-
trolled man is certainly not one who knows and is focused on what he
knows but rather is like someone who is asleep or drunk. He acts 15
voluntarily, since in a way he knows both what he is doing and why,
but is not a bad person. For his decision is decent; hence he is half-bad.
He is not unjust, since he is not a plotter - one kind of uncontrolled man
isn't the sort to stand by his deliberations and the other kind has too
much black bile and doesn't deliberate at all. T h e man who lacks 20
self-control resembles a city which passes all the resolutions that it
should and has good laws, but never uses them, as in the joke of
" Scc v.1z.q 10.
1 Eudemian Ethics
l
I ~ n a x a n d r i d e s : ''it~ was the will of the city - but the city cares not for its
1 own laws'; v1.10.4 but the bad man is like a city which uses its laws,
although the laws it uses are bad.
25 Self-control and the lack of it turn on what goes beyond the condition
I of most people. T h e self-controlled man stands by things more than
most people can manage, and the uncontrolled man less. T h e kind of
I
lack of self-control which those afflicted with black bile have is easier to
l
I cure than the kind possessed by those who deliberate but don't stand by
1 their reasoning, and the kind which arises from habituation is easier to
30 cure than the kind rooted in nature, since habit is easier to reconfigure
i than nature is. After all, the reason why even habit is hard to deal with is
because it comes to resemble nature, just as Evenus says:19 'Friend, I say
it is long-standing practice and in the end this certainly turns into
nature for men.' v1.10.5 We have now stated what self-control is, what
35 the failure of self-control is, what toughness is, what softness is, and how
I
I
these states of character are related to each other.
l
I I 52b VI. I I. I
It is the job of the political philosopher to consider pleasure and
I
pain, since he is the master-builder of the goal that we look to when we
say of each thing that it is bad or good without qualification. ~1.11.2
Furthermore, it is also necessary to conduct an investigation into pleas-
I 5 ure and pain. For we posited that virtue and vice of character concern
i pains and pleasures and most people say that happiness is accompanied
t/
by pleasure, which is why they also use the term 'blessed', deriving it
from the word 'joy'."O
VI.I 1.3 Some people think that no pleasure is good, either in itself or
incidentally, on the grounds that the good and pleasure are not the same
10 thing. Others think that some are good but most are bad. There is,
moreover, a third position: even if all pleasures are good nevertheless it
is impossible that what is best should be a pleasure.
vr.11.4 Generally, then, it is not good because every pleasure is a
perceptible transition towards a natural state, and no transition is the
same in kind as its goals; for example, no act of house-building is
15 the same in kind as a house. Furthermore, there are the following
18
Fourth-century comic poet. I9 Evenus of Paros: fifth-century poet and philosopher.
Makarios from khairein.
Book VI
points: the temperate man avoids pleasures; the wise man pursues a
pain-free condition rather than pleasure; pleasures are a hindrance to
the exercise of wisdom, and the more pleasant they are the more of a
hindrance (for instance, the pleasure of sex - no one could think at all
while having sex); there is no craft of pleasure, though every good is a
product of craft; children and brute beasts pursue pleasures. VI.11.5 As 20
to the claim that pleasures are not all good, it's because there are
pleasures that are both shameful and subject to blame, and because
they cause damage; for some pleasures lead to diseases. T h e claim that
the best is not a pleasure is made on the grounds that pleasure is a
transition rather than a goal. This, at any rate, is roughly what gets said
about pleasure.
v1.12.1 It will be clear from what follows that these claims do not
establish that pleasure is not good nor that it is not what is best. First,
25
since 'good' has two senses (in one sense, what is good without qualifi-
cation, in the other, what is good for a particular person), both natures
and states will be treated correspondingly, and therefore changes and
transitions likewise. Of the pleasures that are thought to be bad, some
will be bad without qualification but not for a particular person; in fact, 30
they may be choiceworthy for that person, while some may not even be
choiceworthy for that person except at some moment or for a short time,
and not without qualification. Some are not even pleasures but only
seem to be, that is, all those which accompany painful medical treat-
ment, as in the experiences of sick people.
111.12.2 Furthermore, since the good consists either of an activity or a
state, those processes which restore us to a natural state are incidentally
pleasant. In the case of appetites, the activity is a feature of the residual 35
natural state, since there are pleasures that do not accompany pain and
appetite, such as the activities of ~ o n t e m ~ l a t i o nwhen
, ~ ' one's nature is I 153a
not at all in need. An indication of this is that people do not experience
the same pleasure when their natural state is being replenished as when
it has been restored; rather, when it has been restored they experience
what is pleasant without qualification whereas when it is being replen-
ished they even experience the opposite sort, enjoying things that are 5
acidic and bitter, none of which is pleasant by nature or without
" WC rcr;~intire hlSS t.c;~dingrpnrrKetcu, contrary to the OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics
qualification. Hence they are not pleasures either. For as pleasant things
stand in relation to one another, so too do the pleasures that are derived
from them.
v1.12.3 Furthermore, it is not necessary that something else be better
than pleasure, as certain people say that the goal is better than the
10 transition to it. Not all pleasures are or are accompanied by transitions;
some are activities and a goal. And pleasures do not arise when the
transitions are merely occurring, but rather when people make use of
their capabilities. Also, a goal is not always something distinct from
transitions, but only distinct from the transitions which lead to the
fulfilment of the nature. That is why it is not right to say that pleasure
is a perceptible transition, but rather one should say that it is an activity
I5 of the natural state and one should put 'unimpeded' in place of 'percep-
tible'. Some people hold that it is a transition, on the grounds that it is
good in the proper sense; for they think that activity is a kind of
transition, whereas it is in fact something different.
v1.12.4 As to the claim that pleasures are bad because some pleasant
things bring disease, that is the same as saying that some healthy things
are bad because they are bad for money-making. So in this sense both
20 are bad, but this does not mean that they are actually bad, since even
study is sometimes harmful to one's health. v1.12.5 Neither wisdom nor
any other state is impeded by the pleasure derived from its own exercise;
only pleasures from other sources do that. T h e pleasures from studying
and learning will actually enhance studying and learning, v1.12.6 As to
the point that no pleasure is the product of a craft - that is a sensible
25 result, since there isn't a craft for any other activity either, but rather for
the capacity. Even so, both the perfume-maker's craft and that of the
chef are thought to aim at pleasure. v1.12.7 As to the point that the
temperate man avoids pleasures and the wise man pursues a pain-free
life, and that children and brute animals pursue pleasures, all these are
30 defused by the same consideration. For we have explained how it is that
pleasures are good without qualification and how it is that they are not all
good. Brute beasts and children pursue the latter sort and the wise man
pursues freedom from the pain of these, i.e., the pleasures accompanied
by appetite and pain, the bodily ones (that is the kind in question) and
excesses of them, the pleasures with regard to which the undisciplined
man is undisciplined. That is why the temperate man avoids these
35 pleasures, since in fact there are pleasures of the temperate man as well.
Book VI
v1.13.1 Moreover, it is agreed that pain is something bad and to be 1153b
avoided. One kind is bad without qualification and another kind is bad
because it is a hindrance in some respect. That which is opposite to what
is to be avoided, insofar as it is something to be avoided and bad, is good.
Therefore it is necessary that pleasure be something good. T h e refuta- 5
tion offered by Speusippus, comparing the way the larger is opposite to
the smaller and also opposite to the equal, does not work. H e would not,
after all, say that pleasure is essentially bad. v1.13.2 And the fact that
some pleasures are bad in no way prevents what is best from being a kind
of pleasure; the same also applies to knowledge, though some kinds of
knowledge are bad. And if it really is the case that there are unimpeded
activities of every state, then whether happiness is the activity (provided
that it is unimpeded) of all states or of some one state, maybe it is even a 10
necessary conclusion that it is this which is most choiceworthy; and this
is pleasure. T h e result would be that what is best would be a kind of
pleasure, even though most pleasures might turn out to be bad without
qualification.
And this is why everyone thinks that the happy life is a pleasant life
and they weave pleasure into happiness, for good reason. For no activity 15
is complete when it is impeded, and happiness is something complete.
This is why the happy man stands in need of bodily goods and external
goods, and also of luck so that these won't be impeded. VI.13.3 Those
who claim that someone who is tortured on the wheel or who falls prey 20
to the greatest misfortunes is happy, provided that he is good, are, either
intentionally or unintentionally, talking nonsense. v1.13.4 And because
there is this need of luck, some people think that good fortune is the
same as happiness, though it is not, since good fortune too, when it is
excessive, is an impediment and at that point it is perhaps no longer
appropriate to call it good fortune. For the limit relevant to it is its 25
contribution to happiness. v1.13.5 And the fact that all brute animals and
humans pursue pleasure is an indication that it is in a way the best thing.
'No claim is completely undone if many folks make it . . .'"2 v1.13.6 But
since the same thing, whether it is a nature or a state, is not and is not
thought to be the best for all, they also do not all pursue the same 30
pleasure, though all do pursue pleasure.
'' Hcsiod, I l b r l . ~r111rl I)ul,v, 763 4.
 Eudemian Ethics
But maybe they are really pursuing not the pleasure they think they
are pursuing nor even the one they would say they are pursuing, but the
same pleasure, since all things have by nature a divine component. But
the bodily pleasures have successfully laid claim to the term 'pleasure',
35 since they are encountered most often and all people have a share
in them; so since they only know this kind they think that only this
1154a kind exists. v1.13.7 It is also clear that if pleasure and its activity are not
good it will not be possible for the happy man to have a pleasant life. For
if it really isn't good, why would one need it? So it would be possible
for the happy man to live a painful life. For pain will be neither good nor
5 bad if pleasure too is not. So why would one avoid pain? And the life
of the good man would not be more pleasant unless his activities too are
more pleasant.
v1.14.1 Those who say that some pleasures are very much worth
choosing - for example, pleasures that are fine, but not bodily pleasures
and the ones the undisciplined man is focused on - need to consider,
10 regarding bodily pleasures: v1.14.2 why are the pains opposite to them
bad? Good, after all, is the opposite of bad. Or is it that the necessary
pleasures are good in the sense that what is not bad is also good? Or are
they good to a certain extent? For those states and changes which do not
allow for an excess of what is good also don't allow for an excess of
15 pleasure; but the ones that do allow for it can also have an excess
of pleasure. There is an excess for bodily goods and a man is base
because he pursues the excess, not just the necessary pleasures. After
all, everyone enjoys fine foods, wine and sex in some way, but not
necessarily in the proper way. But it is the opposite with pain. One does
20 not avoid only excessive pain, but pain altogether. For pain is not
contrary to excess, except for someone who is pursuing excess.
v1.14.3 We not only have to say what is true but also to give an
explanation of the false view, since this contributes to conviction, and
25 when it becomes clear why a plausible view looks true but is not, this
reinforces confidence in the true view. Hence we have to say why
bodily pleasures seem to be more choiceworthy. v1.14.4 First of all,
then, it is because they drive out pain. And since it is seen as the
remedy for pain, the extremes of pain induce people to pursue exces-
30 sive pleasure and, in general, bodily pleasure. T h e remedies are intense
(that is precisely why they are pursued) because they appear alongside
their opposite. In fact pleasure seems to be not excellent for
Book VI
the following two reasons I have already mentioned: some of them are
the actions of a base nature (either by birth, as the nature of a brute
beast, or by habituation, for example the natures of base men); others
are remedies for a deficiency and it is better to be in a good state than
to be getting into such a state; and these come about when things are 1154
brought to completion, and hence they are incidentally good.
v1.14.5 Furthermore, some pleasures are pursued for their intensity
by those who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures; such people
will even make themselves thirsty. At any rate, when they are harmless
the situation is not criticized, but when they cause harm it is base. For 5
they don't have other things to enjoy and many people regard what is
in between as painful because of their nature. An animal is always
labouring, as the natural philosophers also testify; they claim that
seeing and hearing are painful but, so they say, we are already used
to it.23~1.14.6Something similar is true of young people who, because 10
they are growing, are in a condition like that of drunks; and youth is
pleasant. Those naturally afflicted with black bile are always in need of
curative pleasures; their body due to its blending is constantly in a
painfully agitated state and they are always in a condition of intense
desire. And pleasure drives out pain, both the pleasure opposed to the
pain and also any random pleasure, provided it is strong enough. This 15
is why such people become undisciplined and base. VI.14.7 But there is
no excess of pain-free pleasures, since they are directed at objects that
are pleasant by nature and non-incidentally. By incidentally pleasant
things I mean those that are curative; the fact that their curative effect
comes about when there is a surviving healthy part still active is the
reason why it seems to be pleasant. But naturally pleasant objects are 20
those which bring about the action of the relevant sort of nature.
v1.14.8 No one same thing is always pleasant, because our nature is
not simple; rather, there is in it something distinct, in virtue of which we
are destructible; so if one of the two parts is acting, then it is contrary to
nature for the other part of our nature; and when they are equally active,
then what is done seems to be neither pleasant nor painful. For if 25
something had a simple nature then the same action would be most
pleasant for it all the time. That is why god always enjoys one simple
'3 Aristotle's student and collaborator Theophrastus attributes a view that sense-perception is
accompanied by pain to the Presocratic philosopher Anaxagoras.
 Eudemian Ethics

pleasure. For there is not only an activity of change but also an activity of
not changing, and pleasure is more present in rest than in change. As the
30 poet says, change is pleasant for all, because of a kind of defect. For just
as a bad man is readily changeable, so too the nature which needs change
is a bad nature, being neither simple nor decent.
v1.14.9 We have discussed self-control and the lack of it, and pleasure
and pain, what each of them is and how it is that some of them are good
and some bad. It remains to discuss friendship as well.

Book v11

VII.I.IWe must investigate friendship, what it is and what qualities it 1234b

has; who is a friend, and whether friendship is a term used univocally or
in many ways; and if it is used in many ways, how many; and also how 20
one should interact with a friend and what the justice associated with
friendship is. This investigation is no less important than the investi-
gation of what is fine and choiceworthy in character traits. v11.1.2 For it
is a particular function of the political art to produce friendship; and
people say that virtue is useful for this reason, since those who are 25
treated unjustly by one another cannot be friends to each other. v11.1.3
Moreover, we all say that justice and injustice have a particular bearing
on friends; and we think that the same man is both1 good and a friend,
and that friendship is a state connected to character. And if one wants to
bring it about that people not commit injustice it is a good idea to make
them friends to one another,' since true friends do not commit injustice. 30
v11.1.4 But it is also the case that if they are just they will not commit
injustice. Consequently justice and friendship are either the same thing
or nearly so.
~ 1 1 . 1j . In addition, we hold that a friend is one of the greatest
goods and that friendlessness and isolation are most dreadful, since
our whole life and our voluntary associations are bound up with friends.
For we pass our days either with members of our household, or with our 123ja

Retaining kai of the manuscripts.

I r e understand dokez to be governingpoiisai and accept either allt!lolois or allilous (the emendations
of Casaubon and Bekker) for the MSS all' eis.
 Eudemian Ethics
relatives, or with our companions, or with our children, parents or our
wife. v11.1.6 And the private justice that deals with our friends is the
only one that is up to us, while that which involves other relationships is
subject to legislation and is not up to us.
5 v11.1.7 There are many puzzles about friendship. First, there are the
ones raised by those who invoke extrinsic considerations and make
overly general claims. Some think that like is dear to like, which is the
basis for saying: 'God always brings like to like', 'Birds of a feather flock
together', and 'Thief knows thief, wolf knows wolf'.3
10 vr1.1.8 Natural philosophers even organize the whole of nature by
taking as a starting point the observation that like goes to like (which is
why Empedocles also said that the dog was sitting on the tile, because
they were very alike4). So some people say this about what is dear, VII.1.9
15 but others say that an opposite is dear to its opposite, on the grounds
that the object of passion and appetite is dear to everyone and that what
is dry does not have an appetite for the dry but rather the wet. That is
the basis for 'earth has a passion for the rain' and 'change is sweet for all'
(and change is change to the opposite). And the similar is hostile to what
is similar. For 'potter is angry at potter' and animals which rely on the
same food source are enemies to each other.5
20 VII. I . 10 So this is the degree of discrepancy between these opinions.
Some hold that the similar is dear and the opposite is hostile ('the less is
always enemy to the more and it initiates a day of h~stility').~ v11.1.11
25 Moreover, even the locations of opposites are separate, while friendship
is thought to bring things together. But others say that opposites are
dear, and Heraclitus criticizes the poet who said 'I wish that strife were
eliminated from among gods and men" (for there would not be any
harmony if there were not high and low notes, nor would there be any
animals without male and female, which are opposites).
30 v11.1.12 So there exist these two views about friendship, which are
overly general and so greatly opposed to each other. But there are also
Roughly equivalent to the familiar taunt 'It takes one to know one'. The first quotation is from
Homer's Odyssey (xvrr, 218), the sources of the other two are unknown.
Presumably in colour.
The first quotation is from an unknown play of Euripides, the second his Orestes 234, and the
third Hesiod, Works and Days zg.
Euripides, Phoenician Women, 539-40, ' The quotation is from fIorncl.'s Iliarl xvrll, 107.
Book VII
other views, which are obviously more relevant and germane to the
appearances. Some think that base people cannot be friends, but only
the good. Others think that it is strange if mothers don't love their
children (for love is obviously present even in wild animals - VII.I . 13 at
any rate, they choose to die on behalf of their offspring). v11.1.14 And 35
others think that only the useful is dear. An indication of this is that
everyone pursues what is useful and gets rid of what is useless, even
when it is part of themselves - as the elder Socrates said8 when he
discarded spit and hair and nail clippings. We also throw away useless
body parts and ultimately our body, when it is dead; for the corpse is
useless. On the other hand, those who have a use for the dead body 1235
preserve it, as in Egypt.
vr1.1.15 All these views seem to be in conflict with each other. For the
like is useless to what is like it, and opposition is very remote from
likeness, and what is opposite is utterly useless to its opposite (for 5
opposite tends to destroy opposite). v11.1.16 Moreover, some people
think that it is easy to acquire a friend, while others think that the
opportunity to recognize a friend is very rare and that it is impossible to
do so unless misfortune comes along, on the grounds that everyone
wants to appear to be a friend to those who are doing well. v11.1.17 And
others think we shouldn't even put our trust in those who stand by
others amidst misfortunes, on the grounds that they are deceivers who 10
are just pretending: by associating with the unfortunate, they aim to
acquire their friendship when they recover their fortunes.
v11.2.1 We must adopt a theory that will at the same time give us an
optimal account of the views held about these matters and also
resolve the puzzles and conflicts. We will get this result if the 15
conflicting views are set out in a reasonable way. For an account of
this kind will be in particularly close agreement with the appearances.
And it turns out that the conflicts survive if what is said is true in one
way and not true in another.
v11.2.2 There is also a puzzle about whether what is loved is the
pleasant or the good. If we love what we have an appetite for (and 20
passion is most like this, for every 'passionate lover always feels love'9)
and appetite is for the pleasant, then in this respect the object of love is
Xenophon Memorabilia 1.z.j3-4. Euripides, Trojan Women I o j I .
 Eudemian Ethics
the pleasant; but if what we love is what we wish for then it is the good.
And the pleasant and the good are distinct.
25 v11.2.3 On these points and others related to them we must attempt to
make distinctions, taking this as our starting point: the object of desire
and wish is either the good or the apparent good. That is why the
pleasant is an object of desire (for it is an apparent good): some people
believe that pleasure is good, while to others it appears good even if they
believe that it is not, since appearance and belief are not in the same part
of the soul. v11.2.4 It is, however, clear that both the good and the
pleasant are dear.
30 With this distinction made, we must make another assumption. Some
good things are good without qualification and others are good for a
particular person but not without qualification. And the same things are
good without qualification and pleasant without qualification. For we say
that what is beneficial for a healthy body is good for a body without
35 qualification; but we do not say this about what is good for a sick body
(for example, medication and surgery). v11.2.5 Similarly, what is pleasant
for a healthy and sound body is pleasant for a body without qualifica-
tion; for example, seeing in the light rather than in the dark is pleasant
for someone with healthy eyes, yet it is the opposite for someone with
eye disease. And it is not the wine enjoyed by someone whose palate has
been ruined by excessive drinking that is more pleasant (since those
people adulterate it with sour wine), but rather the wine which is
1236a pleasant to uncorrupted tastes. v11.2.6 T h e situation is similar with the
soul, and it is not what children and wild beasts find pleasant but rather
what mature people find pleasant. At any rate, if we remember both we
fi,
I*
choose the latter. v11.2.7 T h e relationship of a base and foolish person to
5 a decent and wise one is like the relationship of a child or a wild beast to
a mature human being. What is pleasant for them is what matches their
states - and for the latter that is good and fine things.
! '
li
v11.2.8 Things are said to be good in several ways; we say that one
thing is good because it is of a certain quality, and another is good
because it is beneficial and useful. Likewise, in respect of what is
pleasant, some things are pleasant without qualification and good with-
10 out qualification, while some are pleasant for a particular person or are
apparent goods. Therefore, just as we can choose something and love it
on the basis of either of these considerations in the case of inanimate
things, so too with a person. We choose and love one perrron because he
Book VII
I
is of a certain quality and on account of his virtue, and another because
he is beneficial and useful, and yet another because he is pleasant and on
account of pleasure. He becomes a friend whenever, being loved, he 15
loves in return and when both people are aware of this situation.
v11.2.9 So there must be three kinds of friendship; and they are not all
friendship in the same sense nor species of one genus, nor are they
completely homonymous1" either. For they are said to be friendships
with reference to one particular and primary kind of friendship, as with
the term 'medical'. We say that a soul, a body, an instrument and a
procedure are medical, but the primary instance is medical in the proper 20
sense. v11.2.10 What is primary is that whose account applies to us. For
I example, a medical instrument is the one that a doctor would use,
1I whereas the account of the instrument is not in the account of the
doctor." At any rate, in every case we seek what is primary. v11.2.1I
And because the universal is primary people assume also that the
primary is universal, but this is false. Consequently, when it comes to 25
friendship as well they cannot account for all of the appearances. When
one account does not fit they suppose that the other kinds are not
I friendships - whereas they are, but not in the same sense. v11.2.12When
I:
the primary kind of friendship does not fit, they deny that the others are
!
in fact friendships, on the assumption that since it is primary it would be
universal. v11.2.13 But there are many kinds of friendship. This was 30
something asserted above, since three senses of friendship were distin-
guished, one with reference to virtue, another with reference to the
useful, and another with reference to the pleasant.
~11.2.14 Of these kinds of friendship, the commonest is the one based
on what is useful - people love each other because they are useful and 35
just to that extent, as the proverb says: 'Glaucus, a man is a friend as
I
long as he fights as an ally' and 'the Athenians no longer recognize the
Megarians'.I2 v11.2.15 The friendship based on pleasure is characteristic
of the young, since they are keenly aware of pleasure. This is why
friendship is unstable among the young. When their characters change
I0
That is, completely unrelated. 'Homonymous' in Aristotle's terminology describes things that
ha\-e a name, but no account, in common. See Categories I .
" Actual15 it is the other way around, though Aristotle does not complete the thought here. The
account of 'doctor' is invoked in the account of the medical instrument (but not vice versa).
Comparc thc discussion of what is kath' hauto at Posterior Analyttcs 1.4, 73a34-bj.
'l The sourcc of' thcsc quotations is unknown.
125
 Eudemian Ethics
1236b as they grow up so too do their pleasures, v11.z.16 But the friendship
based on virtue is characteristic of the best people.
From this it is clear that the primary friendship is the reciprocal
friendship and reciprocal decision among good people. For what is loved
is dear to the one who loves it and someone who loves in return is also
5 dear to the one who is loved.'3 v11.2.17 This kind of friendship is found
only among human beings (for they alone are aware of decision), but the
other kinds are also found among wild beasts; and usefulness is even
apparent to some small degree between tame animals and humans and
between tame animals and each other, as Herodotus says that the plover
10 is useful to the crocodile14 and as diviners talk about the gatherings and
separations of birds. v11.z.18 And base people could be friendly to each
other on account of usefulness and on account of pleasure, v11.2.19 but
because they do not have the primary form of friendship people say that
they are not friends, since one base person will treat another unjustly
and those who are treated unjustly are not friends with each other.
I5 v11.2.20 But they are in fact friends with each other, just not in the
primary sense of friendship, since nothing stops them from being
friends in the other two senses. People stick together even when they
are harmed by it, because of pleasure, insofar as they lack self-control.
v11.2.21 And those who love each other on account of pleasure are also
not thought to be friends when the issue is investigated with precision,
because it is not the primary kind of friendship. That kind of friendship
20 is stable and pleasure friendship is unstable. But it is, as has been said, a
friendship, just not that kind; rather, it is derivative of it.
v11.2.22 At any rate, to say that a person is a friend only in that one
sense is to do violence to the appearances and in the end one must make
paradoxical statements. But it is impossible for all of them to be
friendships in accordance with a single account. v11.2.23 So what
remains is this: in a sense only the primary kind is friendship, but in
25 another sense all are, not homonymously and in a merely chance rela-
tionship to each other, and also not in accordance with a single form, but
rather with reference to a single form.
v11.2.24 Since (a) the same thing is good without qualification and
pleasant without qualification and at the same time, provided that there
'3 Retaining the MSS reading against the OCT and Fritzsche.
l4 Herodotus, H~srories11.68.
Book V11
is no impediment, and (b) the true friend and the friend without
qualification is the primary friend, and (c) the friend worth choosing
for his own sake is of this kind (and he must be so, for if one wishes good 30
things for someone for his own sake then one must also choose that he
continue to exist),15 ~11.2.25the true friend is also pleasant without
qualification. That is why friends in any sense are thought to be
pleasant.
~11.2.26Again, we must make further distinctions on this issue. For
there is a challenge. Is it what is good for oneself that is dear or is it
what is good without qualification? And is actively liking someone 35
accompanied by pleasure, so that it is the likable that is pleasant? We
have to bring both points together, since things which are not good
without qualification but could turn out bad are worth avoiding.16 And
what is not good for oneself is nothing to oneself, but what we are
seeking is this, that what is good without qualification should be good
in this way. v11.2.27 For what is good without qualification is worth
choosing and what is good for oneself is worth choosing for oneself. 1237a
These things should harmonize - and that is what virtue brings about.
T h e political craft is in charge of this process, so that those not yet in
this state will acquire it. As a human being, one is well placed to make
progress (for things good without qualification are by nature good for a
human being); v11.2.28 and so is a man rather than a woman and a 5
person with natural talent rather than someone without. But it is by
way of pleasure that the progress is made; and17 it is necessary that
what is fine should be pleasant. But when these things diverge, then
one isn't yet completely excellent, since it is possible for lack of self-
control to intrude. T h e divergence of the good from the pleasant in
one's emotions just is lack of self-control.
v11.2.29 Consequently, since the primary form of friendship is in 10
accord with virtue, the friends themselves will also be good without
qualification - and not because they are useful, but in another manner.
For what is good for an individual and what is good without qualification
are distinct, and it is the same for states of character as it is with the
useful: v11.2.30 what is useful without qualification is different from
Accepting Spengel's emendation (hat for has) and following Kenny for the sense of the passage.
6
I
\ire accept Jackson's emendation kaka an p6s ttuchir.
" Not accepting Ross' emendation, as does the OCT.
 Eudemian Ethics
15 what is useful for particular individuals, just as training is different from
being treated by drugs.18 So too for the state of character (human
virtue). v11.2.31 Suppose that human beings are excellent by nature;
the virtue of someone who is excellent by nature is good without
qualification, but the virtue of someone who isn't is good only for
himself. ~11.2.32 It is also the same for the pleasant. One must be careful
20 here and consider whether there is friendship without pleasure and how
it differs from a friendship with pleasure. We must also consider what
liking someone depends on: is it because the person is good (even if he
isn't pleasant), rather than because he is pleasant (even if he is)? Since
there are two senses of liking,19 is it because it is good that actively liking
seems to be accompanied by pleasure? ~11.2.33Clearly, it is similar to
what happens in science: current study and learning are experienced
25 with particular pleasure; it's the same when we recognize people we
know. T h e same explanation applies in both cases. At any rate, what is
good without qualification is pleasant without qualification and it is
pleasant for the people for whom it is good. v11.z.34 That is why similar
things automatically enjoy each other and a human being is the most
pleasant thing for another human being. So since this is so even for an
30 incomplete person, obviously it applies to a completed person too. And
the excellent man is complete.
If actively liking is a reciprocal decision about mutual recognition that
is accompanied by pleasure, it is clear that, put generally, primary
friendship is a reciprocal decision on things that are good and pleasant
without qualification, because they are good and pleasant. v11.2.35
Thisz0 friendship is the state which makes possible this kind of decision.
35 Its functioning is an activity and this is not external but is in the person
who loves, whereas the functioning of every capacity is external to it -
for it is either in something else or qua something else. That is why
loving is an enjoyment but being loved is not. v11.z.36 Being loved is the
activity of the lovable but loving is also the activity of friendship. Loving
c8
The words kalon toiouton seem to be corrupt. We translate the text as repaired by Rackham on
the basis of Jackson's emendation.
I9 The two senses are liking someone in actuality (i.e., sharing activities with a friend) and being in
the state of liking someone, even without doing anything with him.
'O We prefer the reading hauti, found in the majority of manuficript~,t ~ b(rut?, which is prcferrcd by
the OCT.
Book V11
occurs in living things, but being loved also occurs in inanimate objects,
since even inanimate objects can be loved.
v11.2.37 Since actively loving is to interact with the person loved as a 40
friend, and a friend is loved by his friend as a friend and not insofar as 1237b
he is musical or medical, the pleasure from a friend is in virtue of
himself and this is the pleasure of friendship. For he loves him, not
because he is someone else. So if he does not enjoy him insofar as he is
good it is not the primary form of friendship. v11.z.38 Nor should any 5
incidental factor provide an impediment greater than the satisfaction
derived from his goodness. What about someone who smells very bad?
He gets left out. H e is appreciated owing to our good will, but he
doesn't live with us.
~11.2.39SO this is the primary friendship, on which all are agreed.
Because of it the others are thought to be kinds of friendship, but it is
also the cause of dispute on the matter. Friendship is thought to be 10
something stable and only the primary kind is stable. For the result of
settled judgement is stable and the right judgement is produced by
things which do not come quickly or easily. v11.2.40 Without confidence
friendship is not stable and confidence takes time. As Theognis says,"'
you must put people to the test:
You could not learn the mind of man or woman I5
Until you try it out, like a beast of burden.
And it takes time to become a friend, but people want to be friends and
it is this sort of state which most often passes itself off as friendship.
VII.2.41 When they are eager to be friends they think that they don't just
want to be friends but really are, because they perform all the usual 20
services of friendship for each other. But it turns out in friendship just
the way it does in other spheres. People don't become healthy just
because they want to get healthy, and so too even if they want to be
friends they still aren't immediately friends. ~11.2.42Here's an indica-
tion. It is easy to slander those who are in this state and haven't been
tested. They aren't easy to slander on matters about which they have 25
given each other the chance to be tested, but on other matters people are
convinced when slanderers provide evidence. ~11.2.43 At the same time
it is clear that this kind of friendship couldn't arise among base people.
 Eudemian Ethics
A base person and one of bad character is suspicious of everyone, since
he measures others by himself. That is why good men are more easily
30 deceived, unless they have become suspicious because they have tested
others. v11.2.44 And base people choose natural goods instead of their
friend and none of them loves a person more than he loves things. Hence
they aren't friends. For this is not the sense of 'friends' possessions are
shared' - the friend is assigned to the things and not the things to the
friends.
35 ~11.2.45SOthe primary kind of friendship does not arise among a lot
of people, because it is hard to test many, since you would have to live
with each one. And one should not make a choice about a friend in the
same way as about a cloak. v11.2.46 Still, in all matters people think that it
is a mark of good sense to choose the better of two things: if one has been
wearing an inferior cloak for a long time and has not yet worn a better
40 one, one should choose the better. But we do not choose in place of an old
1238a friend someone not known to be better. For you don't get a friend without
testing and that is not a one-day matter; it takes time. That is the source of
the maxim about the peck of salt.""
VII.2.47 At the same time it's not enough that he be good without
5 qualification, but he also has to be good for you if he is really going to be
a friend to you. For a man is good without qualification by being good,
but he is a friend by being good for someone else; and he is both good
without qualification and a friend when both of these coincide, so that
what is good without qualification is the same for someone else - and
even if he is not excellentz3 without qualification he can be good for
someone else because he is useful. ~11.2.48 Being a friend to many at the
10 same time also stands in the way of being a friend. For it is impossible to
be active towards many at the same time.
VII.2.49 From these considerations it is clear that it is right to say that
friendship is something stable, as happiness is something self-sufficient.
T h e poet was right to say, 'nature is stable and money is nofZ4v11.2.50
15 (but it is much better to say this of virtue than of nature); and it is right
to say that time reveals who is loved, and that misfortunes are more
Namely, that if you haven't shared meals together you don't know each other well enough to be
genuine friends.
"3 We accept Fritzsche's emendation spoudaios for spoudatdi.
24 Euripides, Electra 941.
Book VII
revealing than good fortune. That is when it is obvious that 'friends'
possessions are shared'; for only friends choose a person instead of the
presence and absence respectively of the natural good and natural bad
things which are the material of good and bad fortune. vn.2.51 And
misfortune reveals those who are not real friends but are friends because 20
of chance utility. But time reveals both, for even the useful man doesn't
become evident quickly - although that is more the case for the pleasant
man, not even the man who is pleasant without qualification is revealed
quickly. People are like wines and food. Time quickly shows that some
of them are pleasant, but when they have been around for a longer time
they become unpleasant, not sweet; and the same applies to people. 25
What is pleasant without qualification should be determined by the goal
and by time. ~11.2.52 Most people would agree with this, and not only on
the basis of the effects, but in the same way as they call one drink
sweeter than another; it is not because of its effects that they decline to
call a drink sweet, but because it is not consistently sweet, although at 30
first it fools them.
~11.2.53So the primary friendship, the one because of which the
others are called kinds of friendship, is friendship according to virtue
and due to the pleasure of virtue, as we said earlier. T h e other kinds of
friendship are also found in children and wild beasts and in base people.
Hence the proverb, 'age-mates enjoy each other's company' and 'bad
men bond with each other because of pleasure'. VII.2.54 For base people 35
can even be pleasant for each other, not insofar as they are base or
morally neutral, but like two musicians, or if one is a music lover and the
other is a musician; and insofar as all people have some good, so too they
suit each other in this respect. v11.2.55Again, they could be useful and
beneficial to each other, not without qualification but relative to what
they have decided on, not insofar as they are basez5 or morally neutral.
~11.2.56 It is also possible for a decent man to be a friend to a base man. 1238b
The base man could in fact be useful for the purpose that the excellent
man has decided on, but while the excellent man could be useful for the
purpose that the uncontrolled man has decided on, the excellent would
only be useful for the base man with regard to the decision that accords
with nature. And he will want good things, wishing without qualification 5
'' Accepting I3onitz's and Richards' supplements for a manifestly corrupt text (with Rackham).
 Eudemian Ethics
for things which are good without qualification, but wishing for what is
good for him hypothetically (insofar as poverty or diseasez6 might be
good for him) and these he would wish for for the sake of what is good
without qualification, like the familiarz7 example, drinking medicine -
he does not wish for it except for the sake of the particular outcome.
v11.2.57 Again, in these ways those who are not excellent could also be
10 friends to each other. One might be pleasant to another not insofar as he
is base but insofar as he shares a common interest, for example, if he
were a culture lover, or again insofar as there is something decent in
everyone (that is why some of them might even enjoy associating with an
excellent man); or insofar as they adapt to each person. For all people
possess something of the good.
15 vr1.3.1 So there are three kinds of friendship, and in all of them there
is a sense in which friendship is said to be in accordance with equality.
For in a way even the friendship of virtue-based friends depends on
equality of virtue; vn.3.2 but there is another distinction in these cases,
which goes with superior virtue, like that of a god compared to man.
20 This is a different kind of friendship (and in general so is that between
ruler and ruled), just as there is also a different form of justice in such
cases, where there is proportional, not arithmetic equality. A father's
friendship with his son is in this category, and so is that of benefactor to
beneficiary; and there are differences among these too. VII.3.3 The
friendship of father to son is different from that of husband to wife;
25 the latter is that of ruler to ruled, the other that of benefactor to
beneficiary. In these friendships reciprocal loving is either not present
or not in the same way. vrr.3.4 For it would be ridiculous if someone
were to criticize god on the grounds that god's reciprocal love for us
does not match our love for god, or were to criticize the ruler in the
same way. A ruler is supposed to be loved, rather than love; or to love in
30 a different way. VII.3. j And there is no difference between the pleasure
taken in his own possessions or his child by someone who is self-
sufficient and the pleasure taken by a needy person in what he acquires.
v11.3.6 It is the same way both among utility friends and among
pleasure friends. Some of them are friends on the basis of an equality
and some on the basis of a superiority. That is why those who think of
26 Retaining the MSS readings. " Retaining auto of thc MSS.
'32
Book VII
their friendship as being equal criticize their friends if they are not just 3j
as useful and helpful as they themselves are; this applies to pleasure
too. vr1.3.7 And it is obvious in the case of erotic relationships, for this
is the reason why they often quarrel with each other: the pursuer is
unaware that the parties do not have the same motivation for their
ardour. That is why Eunikos wrote, 'this is the sort of thing the beloved
might say, but not the lover7.But lovers think that they have the same
motivation.
vr1.4.1 So, as has been said, there are three kinds of friendship (virtue 1239a
friendship, utility friendship and pleasure friendship); and they are
further divided into two, some based on equality and some on
superiority. vr1.4.2 Both relationships are forms of friendship, but only 5
those whose relationship is based on equality are friends, since it would
be strange if a grown man were friends with a boy, but he certainly loves
him and is loved in return. Sometimes the superior party is supposed to
be loved, but if he feels love for the other he is criticized for loving
someone unworthy. For he is assessed by the worthiness of his friends
and in light of a certain kind of equality.
v11.4.3 So some are unworthy of being loved to the same degree
because they are too young, and others because of one's virtue or family 10
background or some other such point of superiority. People always think
it right for the superior person to love less or not at all, whether the
superiority is in utility, pleasure, or virtue. v11.4.4 At any rate, when the
degree of superiority is small one gets quarrels, unsurprisingly; although
sometimes a small discrepancy has no impact, as when you are weighing I5
wood, but there is an impact when you are dealing with gold. But people
are bad judges of what counts as small; their own good points seem big
because they are close at hand but someone else's seem small because
they are remote. v11.4.5But when there is a very big difference, then (as
is right) not even the inferior parties seek to be loved in return or at least
not to the same degree - as though one should expect it from a god!
v11.4.6 It is at least clear that they are friends when the relationship is 20
based on equality, but it is possible to love someone back without being
friends.
v11.4.7 It is clear too why people pursue friendship based on superior-
ity rather than friendship based on equality. In this way they can at the
same time be loved and maintain superiority. That is why some people
put a higher value on a flatterer than on a friend. For the flatterer 25
 Eudemian Ethics
provides the semblance of both to the person he flatters. Men who love
honour are the most vulnerable to this, since being admired amounts to
superiority. v11.4.8 By nature some people are prone to friendship and
others are lovers of honour. It is the person who takes more pleasure in
loving other people than in being loved who is prone to friendship; but
30 the other sort is more the type who loves honour. At any rate, someone
who takes pleasure in being admired and loved is devoted to being
superior, but the person prone to friendship is devoted to the pleasure
of loving someone else. For it is necessary that one do so by being
active."' Being loved is something that happens to you, since one can be
loved without noticing it, but one cannot be unaware that one loves
someone else. v11.4.9 And loving is more closely connected to friendship
35 than being loved is, whereas being loved is connected to what is lovable.
Here is an indication: if a friend cannot achieve both, he would prefer to
recognize the other than to be recognized - as women (like Andromache
in Antiphon's play) do when they give their children away to others. For
wanting to be recognized seems to be for one's own sake and to be aimed
40 at experiencing, rather than doing, something good; but recognizing the
other is for the sake of doing and loving. v11.4.10 This is why we praise
1239b people who stand firm in their love for those who have died, since they
recognize the other but are not recognized.
So, we have stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how
many modes there are (three), and that there are differences between
j being loved, being loved reciprocally, and being friends (both those
based on equality and those based on superiority).
v11.5.1 But since, as we said at the outset the term 'friend' or
'dear' is also used more universally by those who include extrinsic
factors, some saying that what is like is dear and some saying it is the
opposite, we must also discuss their relationship with the aforemen-
10 tioned kinds of friendship. v11.5.2 Likeness is referred both to the
pleasant and to the good. For the good is simple and the bad is variable.
And the good man is always similar and his character does not change,
while the base man and the senseless man change radically between
morning and night. v11.5.3 This is why base men, unless they make a
We accept the emendation esti for the MSS' enesti but do not think that it is ncccssary to supply
<philein> with Robinson (though that is the right sense).
z9 See vr1.1.7-12.
Book VII
pact with each other,30 are not friends, but quarrel. And a friendship 15
which is not stable is no friendship. So in this way what is alike is dear,
because what is good is alike, and in a way this also applies to pleasure
friendship, since the same things are pleasant for people who are alike,
and by nature each thing is itself pleasant to itself. v11.5.4That is why
the voices, conditions and pastimes of kindred people are most pleasant
to each other, and the same goes for the other animals. It is in this way 20
that base people too can love each other. 'The bad bonds with the bad in
pleasure.'
VII.5.5 But the opposite is dear to its opposite as being useful. For
what is like is useless to itself. That is why a master needs a slave and a 25
slave needs a master, and a husband and wife need each other; what is
opposite is pleasant and an object of appetite, since it is useful - not
because it constitutes the goal but because it contributes to it. For when
one gets what one has an appetite for one has the goal and does not
desire the opposite - for example, hot desiring cold and dry desiring
wet. VII.5.6 In a way too friendship for the opposite is for the good,3' the 30
parties desiring each other because of the mean. Like tallies, they desire
each other because in this way a single mean is created from the pair.
VII.j . 7 Again, the desire is incidentally for the opposite, but in itself it is
for the mean state, since opposites do not desire each other but the
mean. If those who are extremely cold are heated, they settle in to 35
the mean, and if people who are overheated get cooled, likewise. It's
the same too in other cases. Otherwise they will be always in a state of
appetite and not in the mean. v11.5.8 But someone who is in the mean,
without appetite, is enjoying what is naturally pleasant, while the others
enjoy everything which deviates from one's natural condition. VII.5.9 40
T h e same pattern obtains also for non-living things, but loving comes
about when it occurs in living things. That is why people sometimes 1240a
enjoy what is dissimilar; for instance, stern people enjoy those who
are witty, and energetic people enjoy those who are laid-back. Under
each other's influence they both settle in to the mean. VII.5.10 So,
incidentally (as I have said), opposites are dear and that is because of
the good.
'"We retain the manuscript reading sumballoszn.
'' We do not think that Robinson's supplement <phzlca> is needed, but the sense is right
 Eudemian Ethics
5 So we have now said how many kinds of friendship there are and what
the differences are which determine who are called friends, who are said
to do the liking and who to be liked, both in such a way that they are
actually friends and also when this isn't the case.
v11.6. I T h e question whether or not one is a friend to oneself requires
a major investigation. Some people think that, more than anything else,
10 each person is a friend to himself and they use this as a criterion for
judgements about the friendship one has with one's other friends. In
light of the arguments and the things that are believed to be character-
istic of friends, there are some contrasts between friendship with oneself
and friendship with others, and other features which are obviously
similar. v11.6.z In a sense it is friendship, by analogy, but not friendship
without qualification. For being loved and loving occur between two
15 separate parties. That is why one is a friend to oneself more in the sense
in which we have said how it is that someone who lacks or has self-
control acts voluntarily or involuntarily (in that the parts of his soul have
a certain relationship to each other), and similarly for all such cases:
whether someone is a friend or an enemy to himself and whether
20 someone commits injustice against himself. For all of these occur
between two separate parties. v11.6.3 In fact, insofar as the soul too is
in a sense two things, these cases do occur, in a way; but insofar as they
are not separate things these cases do not occur.
One's condition in relation to oneself is the basis for distinctions
among the other ways of being friends which we regularly use while
investigating these matters in our discussions. For we believe that a
friend is someone who wishes good things (or the sorts of things he
25 thinks are good) for someone, not for his own sake but for that person's
sake. v11.6.4 In another way, one would most be thought to love a person
if one wishes that he should exist, for his sake not one's own, even if one
doesn't confer goods on him, let alone existence. v11.6.5 In another way,
it is the person with whom one chooses to live, just for the sake of their
30 company and not for any other reason; for example, fathers choose that
their children should exist, but they live with other people.
v11.6.6 All of these views clash with each other. Some people think
that they are not loved if the other party doesn't wish good things for
them, others if the other party does not wish that they should exist,
others if the other party does not wish to live with them. v11.6.7 Again,
we will register it as a mark of affection that someone shares in the
Book VII
suffering of another, not for some other reason (like slaves with regard to
their masters, who act cruelly when in pain) but for their sake, like 35
mothers with their children and the birds who share each others' sorrow.
v11.6.8A friend is especially eager not just to share in his friend's pain,
but to share the very same pain as well, if possible (for example, sharing
thirst when he is thirsty); or if not, to get very close to it. v11.6.9 T h e
same thing applies to being pleased. It is a mark of friendship that one is
pleased not for some other reason but on account of the other person, 1240b
because he is pleased.
Again, things like the following are said about friendship: 'equality is
friendship' and 'true friends are one soul'. v11.6.10All of these refer back
to the individual. For the individual wishes for good things for himself
in this manner, since no one benefits himself for an extrinsic reason, or 5
to earn gratitude; nor qua individual does he even claim that he did
anything. For someone who advertises that he is a friend wants to seem to
be a friend, not to be one, v11.6.1I Above all, spending time together and
living together and sharing pleasure and pain and indeed being 'one
soul' and not even being able to live without each other but instead 10
dying together - this is how it is for the individual. Maybe he even
associates with himself.
All of these things are features of the good person's relationship to
himself. v11.6.12 But in the wicked person, as in the uncontrolled person,
there is disharmony. That is why people believe that the bad person can
even be his own enemy. Insofar as a person is one and undivided, he is an 15
object of desire for himself. v11.6.13That is what the good person and the
virtue-based friend are like, since the wicked person is not one person but
many, and over the course of the same day he is different and capricious.
As a result, a person's friendship towards himself is referred to his love for
the good. It is because he is in a way similar to himself, and an individual,
and good to himself, that he is thereby a friend to himself and an object of 20
desire for himself. That is what a person is like by nature, whereas the
wicked person is unnatural. v11.6.14But the good person does not rebuke
himself in the moment, the way the uncontrolled person does; nor does
his later self rebuke his former self, the way a repentant person does; nor
does his prior self rebuke his later self, as someone who breaks a promise
does. v11.6.15 (In general if we have to make distinctions like the ones used
by sophists, it's like referring to 'Coriscus' and 'excellent Coriscus'. It is 25
obvious that the amount of excellence in them is the same.) When people
 Eudemian Ethics
criticize themselves they are killing themselves. But everyone believes that
he himself is good. And the person who is good without qualification
seeks to be a friend to himself too, as has been said, because he has two
30 things in himself which naturally tend to be friendly and are inseparable
from each other.
v11.6.16Hence, in the case of human beings, each person seems to be a
friend to himself, but in the case of the other animals this is not so; for
example, a horse does not seem good3* to itself, and so is not a friend.
But this is also not the case for children, until they become capable of
decision, since only then is their insight at odds with their appetite.
35 v11.6.17 And friendship with oneself resembles friendship among kin. In
neither case is it up to the people in question to dissolve the friendship,
but even if there is disharmony they, in the one case, still have to be kin
to each other, and in the other case the person still has to be one
individual as long as he lives.
It is clear, then, from what has been said how many senses of 'being
friends' there are and that all forms of friendship are referred to the
primary form.
1z41a vn.7.1 It is germane to our enquiry to consider like-mindedness and
good will. Some people believe that they are the same thing, while others
believe that they are interdependent. Good will is neither altogether
different from friendship nor the same. v11.7.2 Friendship is divided into
5 three types, and good will does not fall within utility friendship or
pleasure friendship, since if one wishes for good things for someone
because it is useful, one would be wishing that not on account of him but
on account of oneselc and people believe that, like friendship, good will
is not for the sake oP3 the person who feels the good will but for the sake
of the person for whom he feels it. And if good will were a feature of
pleasure friendship, then there would also be good will for inanimate
10 objects. So it is obvious that good will is a feature of character friend-
ship. v11.7.3 But wishing is all that is required of the person who feels
good will, whereas a friend also has to act on what he wishes for. Good
will is the starting point for friendship, and every friend has good will
but not every person who feels good will is a friend. T h e person who
3' We prefer Ross' emendation (accepted by Kenny) to that of Ricckhcrs (in the OCT).
33 Accepting Jackson's emendation of eunoia to heneka.
138
Book VII
merely feels good will is like a beginner, which is why it is the starting
point of friendship but not friendship itself.34
<. . .> for people believe that friends are like-minded and that the I5
like-minded are friends. v11.7.4 But the like-mindedness of friendship
does not deal with everything, but only with the actions of the like-
minded parties and the things which pertain to their living together.
And it is not merely like-mindedness in thought or in desire (the
thinking part and the appetitive part are opposites, just as in 20
the uncontrolled person the appetitive part is in disharmony with the
thinking part), but one must also be like-minded in decision and in
appetite. v11.7.j Like-mindedness occurs among good people; base
people, at any rate, both decide on and have an appetite for the
same things but still harm each other. v11.7.6 And it seems that like-
mindedness is not univocal any more than friendship is. Rather, the
primary and natural kind is excellent, which is why it is not possible for 25
base people to be like-minded; but there is another kind according to
which even base people can be like-minded whenever they both decide
on and have an appetite for the same things. v11.7.7 They have to desire
the same things in such a way that it is possible for both to get what they
desire; if they desire the sort of thing which both cannot have, then they
fight. But like-minded people do not fight. 30
v11.7.8 Like-mindedness also occurs when the same decision is made
about ruling and being ruled, not each deciding on himself but both
deciding on the same one. Like-mindedness is political friendship. Let
this be a sufficient account of like-mindedness and good will.
vr1.8.1 There is a puzzle about why those who benefit others love 35
their beneficiaries more than the beneficiaries love their benefactors; the
opposite of this is what seems to be just. v11.8.zOne would suppose that
this happens because what is useful and personally beneficial ensues -
something is owed to one party and the other must pay it back. But it's
not just that this happens; it is also natural that it should occur. v11.8.3 40
For activity is more choiceworthy and here the ~ r o d u c and
t the activity 1241b
stand in the same relation: the beneficiary is, as it were, the product of
the benefactor. This is why animals too display concern for their
offspring, both to produce them and to preserve them once they are
" Thcre is a lacuna in the text here.
I39
 Eudemian Ethics
5 born. v11.8.4 Fathers certainly feel more love for their children (and
mothers even more than fathers) than their offspring do for them. The
children in turn love their own children more than they love their
parents, because activity is best. And mothers feel more love than
fathers because they think that the children are more their own product -
they assess the product by the difficulty and the mother suffers more
during birth.
10 Let this be our account of friendship with oneself and friendship
among a group.
v11.9.1 Justice is believed to be a form of equality and friendship to
consist in equality (unless the maxim 'equality is friendship' is mis-
guided). All political regimes are a kind of justice, since they are a
15 community, and everything that is common comes about through justice;
hence there are as many kinds of justice and community as there are of
friendship; they all border on each other and have virtually the same
differentiating characteristics. v11.9.2 The relations of soul to body, of a
craftsman to his tool, and of a master to his slave are all similar. There is
20 no community between them, since there are not two things, but just the
one, and the other belongs to the one. Nor is the good separable for each
of them, but the good of both is in fact the good of the one for whose sake
the other exists. For the body is a natural tool and a slave is like a separated
part and tool of the master, and the tool is, as it were, a lifeless slave.
25 VII.9.3 The other communities are part of the communities of the
city, for example, the community of phratries or religious groups,35 or
commercial associations. And all political regimes exist together among
members of the household, both the correct regimes and the deviant
forms. (It is just the same in musical scales as it is in political regimes.)
30 v11.g.4 Monarchy is the regime of the father, aristocracy the regime of
husband and wife, while brothers have a constitutional regime. T h e
deviant forms are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy.
v11.9.5 Since some equality is arithmetic and some proportional, there
35 will also be different forms of justice, of friendship and of community.
T h e community of a constitutional regime and friendship among com-
panions are arithmetic, since they use the same standard of measure-
ment. But the aristocratic form of community (the best) and the
A 'phratry' or 'brotherhood' was a clan or sub-division of a Greek tribe. The religious groups
('orgeones') were associations usually dedicated to worshipping a particular deity.
Book VII
monarchical form are proportional. For it is not the same thing that is
just for the superior and the inferior, but rather what is proportional.
The friendship of father and son is similar and in communities there is 40
the same pattern.
~ I 10.
I . I We say that there are friendships among kin, among comrades, 1242a
and in a community (so-called political friendship). Friendship among
kin takes many forms, one like that of brothers, another like that between
father and sons. There is proportional friendship, like that of a father, and
arithmetic friendship, like that among brothers. T h e latter is very close to 5
the friendship among comrades, since they too compete for privileges.
~11.10.2Political friendship exists because of utility above all else.
People seem to come together because they are not self-sufficient,
though they would also have come together just for the sake of living
together. But only the friendship of a political regime and its deviant
form go beyond being friendships and are also communities based on 10
friendship. The others are based on superiority. v11.10.3 The justice of
utility friendships is most properly just, because it is political justice.
A saw and its craft come together on a different basis, not for the sake of
a common goal (for they are like an organ and the soul) but for the sake
of the user of the tool. v11.1o.4And it turns out that the tool needs to be 15
taken care of, with the kind of care that is right for the work, since the
tool exists for the sake of the work; and what it is to be a drill is twofold,
the more important sense being the activity of drilling. T h e body and a
slave, as we said above, follow this pattern.
v11.1o.5 To investigate how one should associate with a friend is to
investigate a certain kind of justice. Indeed all of justice taken as a 20
whole has a bearing on friendship. Justice is relative to certain people,
that is, to those with whom we have something in common and a
friend has something in common (family in some cases, daily life in
others). For a human being is not only a political animal but also one
who forms a household. Unlike other animals, a human being does not
mate from time to time with just anyone, male or female; v11.1o.6but 25
in a special sense human beings are not solitary animals, but prone to
forming a community with those with whom they have a natural
kinship. So there would be community and a kind of justice, even if
there weren't a city. And a household is a kind of friendship. v11.10.7
So there is a relationship between master and slave, the same as that
between craft and tools and between soul and body, but such 30
 Eudemzan Ethzcs
relationships are neither friendships nor forms of justice, but they are
analogous to them (just as the healthy too is not just, but analogous to
it);36 v11.10.8 but the relationship of wife and husband is a utility
friendship and a community. T h e friendship of father and son is the
same as the relationship of god to human and benefactor to beneficiary
35 and, in general, that of the natural ruler to the natural subject. v11.10.9
And the egalitarian relationship of brothers to one another is the most
like comradeship.
For I was never shown by him to be illegitimate
But Zeus, my ruler, has been declared to be common father
To us both.37
40 This is a claim made by those who are seeking equality. Thus it is in the
household that we first see the origins and sources of friendship, polit-
ical regimes and justice.
1242b VII.IO.IO Since there are three kinds of friendship (based on virtue,
utility and pleasure), and each of these has two different forms (some
friendships of each type are based on superiority and some based on
5 equality), and since what is just in each of them is clear from the
debates,38 in friendship of superiority the proportionate value is
claimed, but not directly - rather, the superior person claims what is
inversely proportionate: the contribution of the inferior is related to the
10 superior's as the superior's value is related to that of the inferior. T h e
relationship is like that of ruler to ruled. VII. 10.I I And if not, at least he
claims a numerically equal assessment. (In fact, this also happens in
other associations. Sometimes their shares are numerically equal and
sometimes there is a ratio. If they contributed a numerically equal
15 amount of money then they take a numerically equal share, but if it's
unequal then their take is proportionate.) vn. 10.12 The inferior, on the
other hand, reverses the proportion and makes the connection diag-
onally." But in this way the superior person would seem to be worse off
36 Aristotle is thinking of the comparison between health and justice in Plato's Republic.
3' Sophocles fr. 688 Nauck.
38 This sense is yielded by either of the two plausible emendations (amphisbitisedn,
amphisb?tithent#n).
39 The superior party claims he should contribute in inverse proportion to his superiority; the
inferior party claims he should be recompensed in proportion to his contribution, thus linking
'diagonally' the superior's worth with the inferior's contribution.
142
Book VII
and the friendship and association would be a public service. So one has
to find some other basis for equalization and for setting up the propor-
tion. v11.10.13 And this is honour, which comes naturally to the ruler 20
(compared to the ruled) and to a god. The profit has to be equalized
with the honour.
Political friendship is the equal kind. v11.10.14 And political friend-
ship is based on utility; just as cities are friends to each other, so too are
citizens. 'Athenians no longer recognize Megarians' and it is the same 25
with citizens, when they aren't useful to each other; their friendship is a
cash-in-hand transaction. VII. 10.15 Here too there is ruler and ruled, but
the relationship is not by nature nor is it monarchical but occurs in
rotation, and not for the purpose of benefactions, like a god, but to 30
create an equality in the good and in public service. Political friendship
in fact tends to be based on equality. v11.1o.16 And there are two forms
of utility friendship, one legal and the other based on character. Political
, friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do.
That is the source of 'a friendly man gets his wage'.40 VII.10.17 When it 35
is by agreement, this is political and legal friendship. But when
people entrust things to each other:' then it tends to be based on
character and to be comradely. That is why there are accusations most
I
of all in this form of friendship, the reason being that it is contrary to
nature. Friendship based on utility and friendship based on virtue are
in fact different, but in this case the parties want to have both things 40
at the same time: they associate with each other for the sake of utility,
but they base the friendship on character since they are decent people. 1243a
And so since they trust each other they do not base the friendship
on law.
I
VII.10.I 8 Overall, of the three kinds, most accusations arise in utility
friendship. For virtue does not provoke accusations, and pleasure friends
i
give and receive pleasure and then move on; but utility friends do not 5
break up immediately if their interactions are comradely and not merely
.d
legal.42VII.10.19 Nevertheless, the legal form of utility friendship is also
free of accusations, since there is a legal resolution based on money (this
is the basis for measuring equality), while the form based on character is
voluntary. That is why sometimes there is a law that people whose
"O Hesiod, Works and Days, 370. 'I We accept Richards' hautois for the OCT's autois.
"'WC accept thc general sense posited by Rackham, but do not think his emendation is required.
 Eudemian Ethics
association is based on this sort of friendship must not bring lawsuits
10 over voluntary contracts; and rightly so. For it is not natural for good
people to bring suit and these people make contracts as good and
trustworthy people. VII.IO.ZOAnd in this kind of friendship the basis
for the accusations brought by each side is unclear, since their trust is
based on character and not on law.
15 v11.10.21 There is certainly a puzzle about how to decide what is just:
should it be by looking to the magnitude of the object offered as a
benefit or to what it was like for the beneficiary? It can be like what
Theognis 'a small thing for you, goddess, but for me it is great'.
20 And it can also turn out the opposite way, as in the saying, 'it is a joke for
you but death for me'. This is the source of the accusations. ~11.10.22
One party claims recompense as though he's done a great service,
because he did it for someone in need or for some other such reason,
recounting how much impact it had to the other party's benefit but not
what it meant to himself; but the recipient does the opposite, stating
how much it was for the other fellow but not how much it meant to
25 himself. v11.10.23 At other times unclarity results even if the situation is
reversed. The first party states how little it benefited him, while the
other party emphasizes how great an impact it had. For example, if
someone runs a great risk and confers a drachma's worth of benefit, one
party emphasizes the degree of danger and the other the amount of
money. It is just like in the case of repaying a loan; here too there are
30 quarrels about the value. The first party assesses the value at the time of
the loan and the other considers the current value, unless they make a
stipulation on the matter.
v11.10.24 So political friendship looks to the agreement and the object,
while character-based friendship looks to the decision made. Conse-
quently, this is also more a matter of justice and justice is a feature of
friendship. T h e cause of quarrels is that character-based friendship is
35 more fine but utility friendship is more essential. v11.10.25 They start
out as character friends, being friends because of virtue. But when the
results are detrimental to their own interests then they are unveiled
as being different. For most people pursue what is fine when they
already have a surplus and they pursue the finer kind of friendship on
43 Theognis Elegy 1.14.
Book VII
the same basis. v11.1o.26 Hence it is clear how to determine these cases. 1243b
If they are character-based friends one must look to their decision to see
if it is fair and make no further assessment for either party at the
expense of the other. But if they are utility friends and political friends,
they agree according to what would be profitable. If one party says it's 5
one way and the other says it's the other, then it's not right to spout fine
words, since repayment has to be made; and similarly in the other case.
v11.10.27But since they did not make a stipulation that it was to be done
on the basis of character then someone has to make a ruling and neither
of them should cheat by pretending. T h e result is that each has to put
up with his luck. vn.10.28 But it is clear that character-based friendship
depends on decision, since even if someone who was benefited greatly 10
did not repay because of inability, but only in accordance with his
ability, that's fine. Even a god puts up with receiving sacrifices
according to the worshipper's capacity. v11.10.29 But if someone says
that he cannot pay any more, this won't be enough for a seller or for
v11.10.30 Many accusations arise in friendships for parties whose 1.5
relations are not straightforward, and it is not easy to see what is just.
For it is difficult to measure a relationship that is not straightforward by
some one factor, as happens in the case of love affairs. v11.10.31 One
party pursues the other as being pleasant to live with, and the other
sometimes wants him for the sake of utility. But when the pursuer gets
over his passion and changes in response to the change in the other, then 20
1
they both calculate the quzd pro quo, as when Pytho and Pammenes
!/ disagreed44 and in general when teacher and student disagree (for
knowledge and money cannot be measured by a single factor), and as
I the doctor Prodicus disagreed with the man who paid him a fee that was
too small, and as the musician and the king disagreed, VII.IO.32 the king
associating with the musician as being pleasant and the musician with 25
the king as being useful. When the king had to pay, he represented
himself as being pleasant, and said that just as the musician had pleased
with his song so he himself had also provided pleasure to the musician
by making him promises.
44 P! tho ma) refer to the Bqzantlne rhetorician and ambassador of Phlllp of Macedon, Pammenes
to the renowned Theban general under whose care Philip uas placed when sent In h ~ youth
s as a
hostage to Thebes
I45
 Eudemian Ethics
vn. 10.33 Nevertheless here too it is obvious how one should make the
determination. For here too one must make a measurement by a single
30 factor, not by a single term but by a ratio. One must measure by what is
proportionate, just as measurement is carried out in a political commu-
nity. How, after all, will a shoemaker have commercial relations with a
farmer if their products are not equalized by p r o p o r t i ~ n a l i t VII.IO.34
~?~~
For those whose relationships are not direct, the proportional is the
measure. For example, if one party complains that he has given expertise
and the other party says that he has given him money, what is the ratio of
35 expertise to wealth?46And then what is it that was given for each? If one
party gave half of the lesser amount and the other gave some tiny
l
fraction of the greater, it is clear that the latter is being unjust.
v11.1o.35 Here too the quarrel is right at the beginning, if one party
says that they got together on the basis of utility and the other denies it,
saying that it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.
1z44a VII.II.I When it comes to the good and virtuous friend, we should
consider whether we should provide him with useful services and help
him out, or whether we should do so for someone who is also able to
reciprocate. This is the same problem as whether we should prefer to
benefit an excellent man or a friend. v11.11.2 If someone is a friend and
5 also excellent, perhaps it is not a very difficult question, as long as one
does not overestimate the one factor and underestimate the other, doing
a lot for him as a friend and a modest amount for him as a decent man.
But otherwise many problems arise, such as if one person was a friend
but won't be in the future, while another will be but isn't yet; or if one
person was a friend but is not now, while another is now a friend but was
not one before and will not be in the future.
10 v11.11.3 But the first problem is harder. Perhaps Euripides had a point
when we wrote, 'words would be a fair price for your words, but he who
provided action shall be repaid with action'.47 Moreover we do not owe
our father everything; some things are owed to our mother, even though
the father is superior. After all, not all sacrifices are made to Zeus, nor
15 does he receive all the honours, but only some. VII.I 1.4 So perhaps some
45 Cf. 1v.5.
Accepting Bonitz's emendation t i sophia for t t i sophiii and Richards' emendation plouton for
plousion.
47 Fragment 890 Nauck.
Book VII
things are owed to the useful person and other things to the good
person. For example, if he gives food and the necessities we do not have
to live with him; and you do not owe someone to whom you owe a shared
life the things that you get not from him but from the utility friend. But
the people who do that, and inappropriately give everything to someone
they have a passion for, they are just worthless.
All the markers of friendship mentioned in our discussions are in a 20
way indicators of friendship, but not of the same kind of friendship.
v11.11.5It is a mark of a utility friend and a benefactor and, in fact, of a
friend of any sort to wish to provide what is good for the other person
(this definition of friendship is not a special indicator); it is a mark of
one kind of friend to wish that the other should exist, of another kind of
friend to wish to live with the other, and of a pleasure friend to share the 25
other's pain and pleasure. vr1.11.6 All these markers of friendship are
predicated in accordance with some form of friendship, but none of
them applies to friendship as a unity. Hence there are several markers
and each of them seems, though in fact does not, to belong to friendship as a
unity; for example, the decision about the other person's existence. To be
sure, the superior party and benefactor wishes his own product to exist; and
one also has to repay the gift to the person who gave you your existence, but 30
one does not have to live with that person - rather, with a pleasant person.
v11.11.7 Some friends commit injustice against one another. For they
love the objects more than they love the one who possesses them. That is
also why they are friends to the possessor48 (just as the man chose the
wine because it was sweet, and wealth because it was useful) because he
is more useful. That is just why the friend gets angry, on the grounds
that the choice placed more value on the goods than on himself Such 35
friends make accusations; they are looking for a good person now, but
before they looked for a pleasant or useful person.
~11.12.1We must also investigate self-sufficiency and friendship and 1244b
how their capacities are related to each other. One might wonder whether,
if someone were to be self-sufficient in all respects, he will have49.. . a
I friend: is a friend sought in connection with a need, or not? Or will the
good man be the most self-sufficient? If the virtuous person is happy, why 5
UTeaccept Rackham's attractive emendation philoi kakeinrit for the corrupt text here.
*" Or: he will he able to. At this point there is in the manuscripts a gap long enough to have
conraincd u fkw words and n e do not know how the phrase estai toutoi was originally completed.
'47
 Eudemian Ethics
would he need a friend? For it is not a feature of a self-sufficient person to
need useful people nor people to give him pleasure nor a chance to live
with someone else. H e is good enough company for himself. vn.12.2 This
is especially clear in the case of a god, where it is obvious that since he
needs nothing he also won't need a friend, nor is there anything which a
10 god could ever be in need of. So too the man who is happiest will least of
all need a friend, except to the extent that it is impossible for him to be
self-sufficient. v11.12.3 So necessarily the person whose life is best will
have fewest friends, and these should be reduced to even fewer. H e must
not strive to acquire friends and should look down not just on utility
I 5 friends but also on those who are worth choosing to live with. VII.12.4 But
even in this case it would seem to be evident that a friend is not for the
sake of utility and assistance, but that the virtue friend is the only friend.50
For when we are in need of nothing then we all look for people to join us
in our pleasures and for beneficiaries rather than benefactors. We make a
20 better selection when we are self-sufficient, which is when we especially
need friends who are worth living with, than if we are in a state of want.
~11.12.5We must investigate this puzzle. Perhaps one aspect of it is
well put but another aspect is missed because of the juxtaposed
arguments. This is clear if we grasp what a life of activity is and that
25 it is the goal, v11.12.6 Obviously it is perceiving and knowing, so that
living together is perceiving together and knowing together. For each
person, the most choiceworthy thing is to perceive oneself and to know
oneself,jl and that is why everyone has an innate desire to be alive. For
we should specify that living is a kind of knowing. v11.12.7 So if one
30 were to sever it and treat knowledge all on its own and not5' as
We accept the reading all' ho rather than all' ou.
5' The wording here is ambiguous, which reflects the state of the text. In 'perceive oneself and
know oneself' the pronoun 'oneself' could be either subject or object of the verbs in question.
The OCT prints to hautou aisthanesthai kai to hauton gnorizein, following the second hand in the
Marcianus and Bonitz; this makes 'oneself' the object. We prefer, however, to auton aisthanesthai
kai to hauton gnorizein, following the minor and insightful emendation by Aryeh Kosman
('Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends', Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004) p. 138); this makes
'oneself' the subject and we regard this as the better interpretation. We are grateful to Jennifer
Whiting for extensive discussion of this textual problem and others in this chapter.
52 We do not follow the O C T here in supplying to hauton. The text is very difficult, crabbed, and
likely corrupt. We assume a supplement like gign6skein tina ti. A different textual supplement rnt
<touto> would yield the sense 'and not as this', i.e., as simply knowing and not as thereby a160
living, but we think the contrast intended (whatever the text may havc hcen) is between knowing
in the abstract and the specific case of a particular person knowing II particular thing. We are
grateful to Jennifer Whiting for discussion of this difficult ~ U N N U N C .
14u
Book VII
someone knowing something (but this is not noticeable in the way
we've written it up in the argument, although in fact it is possible
that it might be noticed), it would be no different than someone
else knowing instead of oneself; and that is like someone else living
instead of oneself. But it is plausible that perceiving and knowing
oneself is more choiceworthy. One must combine two points in the 35
argument, that living is choiceworthy and that the good is, and on this
, basis they must possess the same thing, i.e., this kind of nature.53
v11.1z.8 So if it is always the case that, when there is a pair of columns 1245a
, of this sort, one of them is always lined up with the choiceworthy; and
the object of knowledge and the object of perception are there because,
to put it generally, they participate in the nature of the determinate,
so that wishing to perceive oneself just is wishing that oneself be 5
determinate - since, then, we are not an object of knowledge or
perception just in our own right but rather by participation in the
capacities that are involved in knowing and perceiving (for, when
perceiving, one becomes the object of perception in this way and to
this extent, insofar as one is antecedently perceiving and in the manner
and place in which one is perceiving; and when knowing one becomes
' the object of knowledge); consequently one wishes always to live 10
because one wishes always to know and this is because one wishes
oneself to be the object of knowledge.
! v11.12.9From a certain point of view it might seem silly to choose to
live with others. First, in the case of things we also share with other
animals, such as eating and drinking together, what difference does it
make, if you leave aside conversation, if we do these things when close
together or far apart? But if it is sharing in just any old conversation then 15
it is a similar situation. At the same time it is not possible for friends
who are self-sufficient either to teach or to learn. For if one is learning
one is not in the proper condition, and if one is teaching then one's
friend is not in the proper condition - and friendship entails being in the
same condition. v11.12.10But on the other hand, it does seem to be the
case that one should choose to live with others, and we all participate in
j3 Again we depart from the emended text in the OCT; the transmitted text is impossible, and we
suggest to auto autois for to auto tois in the manuscripts. We take to auto as being in apposition
with tPn toiautin phusin. It is impossible to be certain about the correct text here. We are grateful
to Jcnnili.r Whiting for discussion of this passage.
 Eudemian Ethics
20 good things with greater pleasure when in the company of friends -
insofar as it pertains to each person to share in as good an object as
possible; vn. 12.I I but some participate in bodily pleasures, others in
listening to music, others in philosophy. A friend should have the
experience simultaneously (which is why the poet says 'distant friends
are a heavy burden') - consequently they should not be apart when it is
25 going on. This is why sexual passion is thought to be similar to
friendship. Lovers yearn to live together, but not in the way they really
ought to, but rather with an eye to sense-perception.
v11.12.12 So these are the claims made by the argument as it puzzles the
matter out, but the facts are clearly such that the aporetic argument
somehow throws us off course. We must investigate the source of what
30 is true about it. v11.12.13A friend tends to be, as the proverb says, another
Heracles, another self. But they are sundered and it is hard for all features
to occur in one individual. By nature a friend is what is most kindred, but
one is similar in body and another similar in soul, and within each
group one is similar in respect of one part, another in another. But
35 nevertheless the friend tends to be a sort of separated self. v11.12.14 So
perceiving a friend is, necessarily, a matter of perceiving oneself, in a way,
and knowing oneself, in a way. Hence it makes sense that sharing base
pleasures and living with one's friend should be pleasant, since at the
same time there is always a perception of him,54 but it is even more so
with the more divine pleasures. The reason for this is that it is always
1245b more pleasant to contemplate oneself engaged with a better good. Some-
times this is a passion, sometimes an action, and sometimes something
else. If what one contemplates is oneself living well, and one's friend also
doing likewise, and being active in the shared life, then it is a sharing of
the elements of the goal in the highest degree. Hence it is contemplating
j together and feasting together.55These kinds of association seem not to
focus on mere nourishment and the necessities of life, but on the enjoy-
ments. ~ I I12.15
. But each person wishes to share a life engaged with the
goal which he is able to achieve. And if that isn't possible, they choose
most of all to benefit friends and be benefited by them.
j4 We accept the MSS reading ekeinou rather than Robinson's emendation haurou.
j5 We do not accept the supplement <dei> printed in the OC1: nor the supplcmcnt gar in the next
sentence (de would be a more plausible supplement than gur). 'l'hr atuccilro Rcntcnce structure
which results is plausible in this context.
1 so
Book VII
f So it is clear that one actually ought to live together and that everyone 10
d very much wishes to do so, and that the happiest and best person is most
1:
of all in this condition. But that it did not seem to be the case in the
argument, this too turned out to be reasonable, though the argument
I
made true statements. For the solution does not emerge by putting
together the juxtaposed argument, even though it is true. Its claim is
that since god is not such as to need a friend someone like god does not 15
either. v11.12.16 Yet by this argument the good man will not even think.
For this isn't god's good condition, but he is in such a good condition
that he does not think of anything except himself. T h e reason is that for
us being in a good condition depends on something else, while, as for
god, he himself just is his own good condition.
v11.12.17 That we seek and pray for many friends, while saying at the 20
same time that 'if you have many friends you've got none' - both of
these are correct statements. Granting that it is possible to live with
many people at the same time and to share perception with them, doing
so with as many as possible is most choiceworthy. But since it is very
difficult to do so, the activation of our shared perception must take place
within a quite small group. ~ I I12.18
. Hence it is not only hard to acquire
..'' many friends (since you have to put them to the test of experience)56 but 25
it is even hard to interact with the ones we have.
And sometimes we wish the object of our affection to be absent if it
means that he will be doing well, while at other times we wish to share in
the same things; wishing to be together is a mark of friendship. When it
is possible to be together and to do well everyone chooses it. But when
they are not possible at the same time, it is perhaps like when Heracles' 30
mother chose for him to be a god rather than to stay with her and be a
slave to Eurystheus. v11.12.19 One might in the same way repeat the
Spartan's joke, when someone told him to call on the Dioscuri for help
in a storm.j7 It is thought to be a mark of the person who feels affection
to keep others from sharing in one's troubles and a mark of the person 35
who is the object of affection to wish to share in them; and it turns
out that both of these positions are reasonable. For it ought to be the
case that to a friend nothing is as painful as his friend is pleasant;
jh Cf. V I I . Z . 4 j .
j7 T h e Spartan must have said something indicating that since he was in trouble he didn't want to
invtrlvc thcm in his troubles.
 Eudemian Ethics
v11.12.20 and it is thought that one ought to choose what is not in one's
own interest. That is why people prevent their friends from sharing in their
troubles (since it is enough if they alone do the suffering), so that they don't
1246a seem to be looking out for their own interests and choosing pleasure even at
the cost of a friend being in distress. But there is also the point that it is
easier for them if they are not alone in bearing the hardships.
5 v11.12.21 Since doing well and being together are both choiceworthy, it
is clear that being together along with a lesser good is more choiceworthy,
in a way, than being apart along with a greater good. But since it is not
clear how much impact being together has, people disagree straight off
about this and think that sharing everything together is a mark of
friendship just as they also say that eating together is more pleasant than
eating alone, even if the menu is the same. Others, however, don't wish to
share everything, on the grounds that, if you take the point to an extreme,
they would have to agree that those doing extremely badly together are
better off than those doing extremely well on their own.
10 v11.12.22 When it comes to misfortunes too the situation is similar
to this. Sometimes we wish our friends not to be present or to feel
distress, when they aren't going to make things better. But at other
times it is very gratifying that they be present. T h e basis for this
conflict too is quite reasonable. It comes about for the reasons given
I5 above, and because without qualification we try to avoid seeing a
friend in pain or being in a bad condition (as we do with ourselves
too); but seeing a friend is pleasant, just as is any other very pleasant
situation, for the stated reason, and especially when he is not in poor
health if one is so oneself. v11.12.23 Consequently, whichever of these
is more pleasant tips the balance on whether or not one wishes the
20 friend to be present. This is also what happens with inferior people,
and it occurs for the same reason: they strive especially that their
friends should not do well nor be absent,58 if they themselves are
doing badly. That is why lovers sometimes kill their beloved when
they kill themselves, thinking that otherwise they would feel their
25 own suffering more keenly - as someone who can recall that he was
once better off feels it more than if he believed that he had always
been doing badly.
58 We accept the emendation by Rackham.
rsz
'
,
Book v111
VIII. 1.1 One might wonder whether it is possible to use each thing both 1246a
for its natural purpose and otherwise - and this either in itself1 or, on
, the other hand, incidentally. For example, an eye;' one might use it to
see or also otherwise, to mis-see, by displacing it so that one object
appears as two. Both of these use it as an eye, because it is an eye, but 30
'
there is another, incidental use; for instance, if it were possible to sell it
or to eat it. v111.1.2So too for knowledge. One can use it genuinely and
also to make a mistake; for instance, when one voluntarily writes incor-
rectly3 one uses one's knowledge as ignorance,4 as when one twists one's
'
hand out of place; and dancing girls sometimes use their feet as hands 35
i and vice versa.
v111.1.3 If all virtues are forms of knowledge it would also be possible
to use justice as injustice and one would then commit injustice by
performing unjust acts on the basis of justice, as one can also perform
ignorant acts on the basis of knowledge. But if this is impossible,
it is obvious that the virtues would not be forms of knowledge. And if 1246b
it is not possible to be ignorant on the basis of knowledge, but only to
make a mistake and to perform the same actions as are done on the basis
of ignorance, then certainly one will also not do anything based on
justice as though it were based on injustice. But again, if wisdom is 5
knowledge and something that is true, then it too will behave in the same
We do not think that the supplement h& is necessary for the sense here.
" The MSS have i here, ~ h i c his puzzling; we suspect that it is a mistake and omit it in our
translation.
Omitting the nun of PC. Walzer's supplement <kai> seems unnecessary.
l
Eudemian Ethics
way. It would then be possible to act foolishly on the basis of wisdom
and to make the same mistakes as a fool would make. But if the use of
each thing as what it is were simple, then in acting that way people
would also be acting wisely.
vr11.1.4 At any rate, for other forms of knowledge it is a distinct
10 authoritative knowledge that produces the distortion. But which form
is authoritative over the one that has authority over all others? It can no
longer be knowledge or insight. And it is certainly not virtue either,
since it is using virtue; the virtue of the ruling element makes use of the
virtue of the ruled element. v111.1.5So what is it? Or is it the way that
lack of self-control is said to be a vice of the irrational element in the
soul, and also the uncontrolled man is said to be a kind of undisciplined
15 man who retains his insight? But assuming that if his appetite is
powerful it will produce distortion and the uncontrolled man's wisdom
will reason perversely, then it is clear that if there is actually virtue in
this element and ignorance in his reason, in this case they will reverse
their functions - so that it will be possible to use justice unjustly and
badly and to use wisdom unwisely, so that the opposite results will also
20 occur.5 For it would be strange if, on the one hand, when wickedness
gets into the irrational element it should pervert the virtue in the
calculative element and make it ignorant, but on the other hand when
there is ignorance in it6 the virtue in the irrational element should not
pervert this ignorance and cause it to make wise and appropriate
judgements. (And conversely, wisdom in the rational element will cause
the indiscipline in the irrational element to act temperately - that is
25 what self-control seems to be.) So it will be possible to act wisely on the
basis of ignorance.
v111.1.6 These results are strange, especially the notion that one
can behave with wisdom on the basis of ignorance; for we do not see
this in any of the other forms of knowledge - just as indiscipline
perverts medical or grammatical knowledge but if it is the opposite7
it does not pervert ignorance, because there is no excess present in
30 it. Rather, it is virtue in general which has this relationship to vice.
Accepting with Rackham the MSS reading hfiste kai tanantia, rather than the emendation printed
in the OCT.
We do not accept the supplement proposed by Susemihl here, though it is accepted by Robinron
and printed in the OCT.
We do not accept Robinson's conjectural supplement h i aretr' in line 29.
Book VIII
T h e just man can in fact do everything that the unjust man does;
and in general, the ability to do things includes the ability not to do
them.
VIII.I .7 So it is clear that human wisdom is accompanied by having the
irrational element in a good condition; and that the Socratic point is
correct, that nothing is stronger than wisdom. But his claim that 35
wisdom is knowledge is not correct. For it is a virtue and not knowledge,
but rather some other type of cognition.
v111.2.1Not only do wisdom and virtue produce well-being, but the
fortunate, we also say, fare well - as though good fortune produces well- 1247a
being and the same results as knowledge does. Therefore we must
consider whether the fortunate and unfortunate are so by nature or
not, and how matters stand on this issue. v111.2.2 For we can see that
some people are fortunate. Though foolish, they get many things right, 5
things in which fortune holds sway. Besides, even where a craft is in play
there is nevertheless a big role for fortune (for example, in military
leadership and in navigation). So, are these people fortunate on the basis
of some disposition? Or are they the sort who achieve fortunate out-
comes not because they are themselves of a certain sort? As it is, it is
thought that this happens because certain people are so by nature; 10
v111.2.3 and nature makes people to be of a certain sort and they are
special right from birth - people are fortunate and unfortunate just as
people have blue or brown eyes, because this particular part is of this
particular character.'
v111.2.4It is clear that it is not by wisdom that they get things right.
Wisdom, after all, is not irrational; rather, there is a reason why it does
what it does; but the fortunate could not explain why they get things 1.5
right, for then it would be in virtue of a craft. v111.2.5 Again, they are
obviously foolish -not that they are fools on other matters. (And there is
nothing strange about this. For example, though Hippocrates was a
geometer he also seemed to be an idiot and a fool on other matters
and so, on a commercial voyage, he lost a lot of money to the customs
men at Byzantium; they say it was due to n a i v e t ~ . ~
But
) they are foolish 20
in the matters in which they have good fortune. vn1.2.6 For in
We follow Spengel's emendation, accepted by Rackham, rather than the more elaborate emend-
ation of the OCT.
" 'l'hcrc is no nccd to follow Allan in deleting this clause.
 Eudemian Ethics
l commercial navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate; rather, it
l
is like the way dice fall - one fellow gets nothing and another rolls six,''
in accordance with his natural good fortune.
Or, as they say, is it because they are loved by a god and so getting
I 25 it right is something external? For instance, a badly built ship some-
times has a better voyage not because of itself, but because it has a good
captain. Does the fortunate man in this way have a divinity as hzs good
captain? v111.2.7 But it would be strange for a god or a divinity to love
that sort of man rather than the best and the most wise.
30 If, then, necessarily one gets things right either by nature or by
l insight or by divine supervision, and if two of these are not the case,
then it would be by nature that the fortunate are fortunate.
vn1.2.8 But on the other hand, nature is the cause of what is the same
always or for the most part; and fortune is just the opposite. So if
success contrary to expectation seems to be the mark of fortune (indeed,
if someone is fortunate it is by good fortune), then its cause would not
be the sort of thing which is also the cause of what is the same always or
35 for the most part. v111.2.9 Again, if one succeeds or fails in virtue of
being such and such a person (as, for example, it is in virtue of being
blue-eyed that he is not sharp-sighted) then it is not fortune but nature
which is the cause. So he is not fortunate but, as it were, naturally gifted.
Hence one should say this, that those whom we call fortunate are not so
because of fortune. Thus they are not really fortunate. For it is those for
whom good fortune is the cause of good things who are fortunate."
1247b If this is so, will it turn out that fortune doesn't exist at all? Or that it
exists but is not a cause? But in fact it must exist and be a cause. So it
will in fact be a cause of good or bad things for various people.
v111.2.10 If we are to eliminate it altogether and say that nothing
5 happens by fortune, and instead we say that fortune is a cause because
I although there is in fact a different cause we fail to see it (that is why in
l giving a definition of fortune they posit that it is a cause obscure to
human reasoning,'" on the supposition that it is a certain sort of nature) -
this, then, would be a further issue.
I" We accept Jackson's emendation, which was inspired by a medieval Latin translation.
" Accepting Jackson's emendations to eutucheis and hosois.
" Aristotle uses similar language at Physics 2.4 (196bs-6) and Metaphysics K 8 (1065a33-34). This
definition of tuch2 is attributed to Anaxagoras and the Stoics at Actius 1.29.7. Hence Ross
suggested plausibly that this is Anaxagoras' definition (scc ROSN1t)30, on Ph)~sics196bs-7).
Book VIII
But we see that some people are fortunate just once; so why wouldn't 10
they also get it right again and again for the same reason?13After all, the
same cause yields the same effect. So this will not be a characteristic of
fortune. v111.2.I I But whenever the same result follows from causes that
are undetermined and unspecified, then something good or bad does
befall a person, but there is no knowledge about it derived from
experience, since otherwise certain people would learn how to be
fortunate; or indeed all forms of knowledge would, as Socrates said, I5
be cases of good fortune.14 v111.2.12 So what is to prevent this sort of
thing happening to someone many times in succession, not because he
is a person of a certain sort, but like one for whom the dice always
fall favourably?
Well now: are there not in the soul impulses, some based on reasoning
and others based on irrational desire? And are the latter not prior? For if 20
appetitive desire for the pleasant is natural then it is by nature that
everything'j would proceed towards the good. v111.2.13 So assume that
some people are naturally gifted (in the manner of singers who do not
have knowledge of how to sing). They have a good nature in this sense,
and they are impelled without reason in accordance with nature, and
they have an appetite for what they should and when they should and as
they should. Then these people get things right even if they are in fact 25
foolish and irrational - in the same way as the others will sing well even
though they are unable to teach singing. People of this sort, who without
reason get things right for the most part, are fortunate. Therefore the
fortunate would be so by nature.
~111.2.14Or does good fortune have many senses? After all, some
things are done on the basis of impulse and a decision to act, while 30
others are not but are done in the opposite way. And we say that those
who get things right in matters where they seem to reason badly 'get
lucky'. And we also say the same thing if they wished for something
l
different from or lesser than the good which they actually achieved.
v111.2.1j SO, it is possible that those people were fortunate because of
nature; for their impulse and desire, being directed at the proper object, 35
got it right even though their reasoning was childish. And these people,
when their reasoning seemed not to be right but desire itself, since it was
'" With Woods, we follou the emendation of Jackson as modified by Dirlmeier.
IJ Aristotle rcfcrs to Euthydemus q g d . I5 Allan's emendation seems unnecessary
 Eudemian Ethics
right, was the cause of the success, were saved by their desire^^ (though
sometimes people have again reasoned thus on account of appetite
and met with misfortune). vr11.2.16 But in the other case, how will
good fortune follow from natural giftedness of desire and appetite?
1248a Nevertheless, either good fortune here and in the other cases are the
l same or there are several kinds of good fortune and two forms of
1 fortune.
v111.2.17 Since we observe that some people enjoy good fortune
I
5 contrary to all knowledge and correct reasoning, it is clear that the cause
of good fortune is something else. But is that good fortune or not, in
virtue of which17 one has an appetite for the things one should and when
one should, wherers human reasoning would not be the cause of the
good outcome? That for which appetite is at any rate naturalr9 is not
altogether devoid of reasoning, but it gets corrupted by something.
10 v111.z.18 So good fortune seems to occur, because fortune is the cause
of things contrary to our expectations and this really is contrary to our
expectations, since it is contrary to our knowledge and to what is
universal. But, as it seems, it does not actually depend on fortune,
though that is why it seems to. v111.2.19 Consequently, this argument
does not demonstrate that good fortune is by nature, but rather that not
all those who seem to be fortunate get things right because of fortune
but that some do so because of nature. Nor does it show that fortune is
15 in no respect the cause of anything but only that it is not the cause of all
the things of which it seems to be the cause.
v111.2.20 But one might wonder about this, whether fortune is the
cause of the very fact that one has an appetite for what one should and
when one should. Or would fortune in that case be the cause of
everything? It would certainly be the cause of thinking and deliberating,
I
( given that one does not deliberate after prior deliberation and deliberate
l 20 again about that deliberation, but there is a starting point. Nor does one
! think about thinking before thinking, and so on to infinity. So thought is
1 not the starting point for thinking, nor is deliberation the starting point
for deliberating. So what else could it be except fortune? Hence every-
thing happens because of fortune.
111
16
T h e text here is very uncertain. Like Woods, we follow Dirlmeier's emendation closely.
'7 We read hit, a trivial emendation by Fritzsche.
18
I9 We accept Jackson's emendation hou Re.
We accept Jackson's hat for to.
158
Book VIII
Or is there some starting point which does not have a distinct external
starting point, which can do this kind of thing because it is that sort of
thing? v111.2.21This is what we are looking for: what is the starting point 25
of change in the soul. And what it is is clear. In the universe the starting
point is god and so too in the individual. For the divine in us in a way
sets everything in motion. v111.2.22And the starting point for reason is
not reason but something greater. So what could be greater even than
knowledge and insight except god, virtue being the instrument of
insight? It is for this reason, as I have been saying for a long time, that 30
they are called fortunate who, whatever they have an impulse for, get it
right even though they are irrational, and for them there is no benefit in
deliberation. They have the kind of starting point which is greater than
insight and deliberation - the others have reason, but do not have this,
nor do they have divine inspiration - but they cannot deliberate.
VIII.2.23 They succeed despite being irrational. Prophecy is rapid for 35
these wise experts, and one must suppose that it all but comes from
reasoning, though some get it from experience, some from being accus-
tomed"" to consulting oracles in their enquiry. These abilities come
about because of god." This too sees the future and present well,
especially in those whose reasoning is disengaged. That is why the
melancholic and those given to vivid dreams can prophesy; the starting 40
point seems to be stronger when reason is detached in this way.""
Compare how the blind recall better because, being detached from 1248b
dealing with visible things, their power of recollection is stronger.
v111.2.24SO it is clear that there are two forms of good fortune, the
one divine - which is why the fortunate man seems to get things right
because of god; and this is the man who is prone to be correct in 5
accordance with his impulses, while the other is the one who goes
against his impulses. But both are irrational. T h e former is a continuous
sort of good fortune, while the latter is not continuous.
v111.3.1We have spoken previously about each particular virtue and
since we have separately distinguished their capacities we should also
make articulations about the virtue which is composed of them, which 10
10
\Ye omit te, following the medieval translation.
l' WC do not accept Spengel's emendation to thezoz.
11
LVc follow Jackson's suggestion of hout6s for houtos
159
 Eudemian Ethics
we already referred to as 'n~bility'.'~v111.3.2It is obvious that whoever is
going to genuinely earn this appellation must have the particular virtues.
Nor can it be otherwise in any other domain; for no one is healthy in the
15 body as a whole but not in any part of it; rather, it is necessary that all
parts or most parts and the most important ones should be in the same
condition as the whole.
v111.3.3 T h e good and the noble are distinct not only in name but
also in themselves. For of all goods, the ones which are worth choosing
20 for their own sakes are goals, but of these, the fine are all those which
are praiseworthy on their own account, v111.3.4 since the actions they
generate are praiseworthy and so are they themselves: justice, both
itself and the actions based on justice, and temperate actions (for
temperance too is praiseworthy). But health is not praiseworthy, since
neither is its product. Nor is acting strongly praiseworthy, since
25 strength is not. They are good, but not praiseworthy. v111.3.5 This
point is clear by induction for the other cases too. At any rate, the good
man is the one for whom things that are good by nature are good. For
the competitive goods and those which are thought to be greatest
(honour, wealth, the bodily excellences, good fortune and power) are
30 good by nature, but they can be harmful to some people because of
their dispositions. If one is foolish or unjust or undisciplined one
would get no benefit from making use of them, just as a sick man
would get no benefit from the diet of a healthy man, nor would a man
who is weak and crippled get benefit from the adornments of one who
35 is hale and whole. v111.3.6 But one is noble because goods that are fine
are his on their own account and because he is the sort who does fine
actions also for their own sake. And the goods that are fine are virtues
and virtuous actions.
v111.3.7 There is a political disposition like the one which the
Spartans and other such people have. It is a disposition of the following
40 kind. There are people who think that they should possess virtue,
'3 Kalokagathia, a compound word made up of the term kalon, fine, beautiful, etc., and agathon,
good. In this chapter it is important to remember that 'nobility' stands for the compound 'fine
and good' as this often affects the run of the argument. The backward reference to the term
kalokagathia is puzzling, but there is no reason to change the text. The term is found at Po1itir.s
12591334 and in the Nicomachean Ethics (1124a4, I I ~ ~ ~ IasOwell
) , as in spurious works. It is not
unusual in fourth-century BCE prose; Aristotle may here be referring to works of his own that WC
no longer possess or to oral statements.
Book VIII
but only for the sake of natural goods. Hence they are good men
(since the natural goods are good for them), but they do not have
nobility. For they do not possess fine things on their own account, but
all those who do possess them on their own account also decide on noble
things. Not only that, but things that are not naturally fine but are
natural goods are fine for them. v111.3.8Goods are fine when the aim in
acting and choosing them is fine. That is why the natural goods are fine
for the noble man. For the just is fine and this in the sense of what
accords with worth; this man is worthy of these things. VIII.3.9 What
suits him is also fine, and these things (wealth, high-born status and
power) are suitable for him. Consequently for the noble man the same
things are both advantageous and fine. But for most people there is a
discrepancy here. Things which are good without qualification are not
good for them too, but they are good for the good man; but for the noble
man they are also fine, since he performs many fine actions on their own
account. v111.3.10But he who thinks that he ought to possess the virtues
for the sake of external goods performs fine actions only incidentally.
Hence nobility is complete virtue.
v111.3.1I We have, as well, discussed pleasure, stating what it is like
and how it is good and that things which are pleasant without qualifica-
tion are also fine and that things which are good without qualification
are pleasant. And pleasure occurs only in acting, which is why the truly
happy man will also live most pleasantly and why it is not pointless for
people to value living pleasantly.
v111.3.12 Since even a doctor has a limit to which he refers when
determining which body is healthy and which not, and the extent to
which he should perform each procedure (if it is done well the body is
healthy, and if it is done too little or too much the body is not healthy) - in
the same way, when dealing with actions and choices about things which
are good by nature but not praiseworthy, an excellent man must have a
certain limit for the possession, choice and avoidance of money (how
much or how little) and of the fruits of good fortune. v111.3.13Earlier on
this was specified as being 'as reasoning indicates'. But this is like saying
in matters of nutrition that it is 'as medicine and its reasoning indicate': it
is true, but not clear.24
 Eudemian Ethics

v11r.3.14 One must, then, as in other domains, live with reference to

the commander and with reference to the disposition and activityz5 of
the commander, as a slave must live with an eye to that of his master and
each must live with reference to the appropriate commanding element.
10 vr11.3.15 Since human beings too are by nature composed of a com-
mander and a commanded, each person would also have to live with
reference to his own commanding element. This has two aspects. For
the art of medicine and health are commanding elements in different
ways (the former is for the sake of the latter). This is how it is with Glossary
1 5 regard to the contemplative. God is not a commander in the sense of
giving orders but as that for the sake of which wisdom gives orders. And Our aim has been to make the translation comprehensible to readers unfamiliar with
'that for the sake of which' is double (the distinction has been made Greek, and so we hale not been mechanically consistent in our choice of terminology.
But some may find helpful a short list of some of Aristotle's more technical terms and
elsewherez6), since god is in need of nothing. v111.3.16 So, whatever how we have translated them in most contexts.
choice and acquisition of natural goods (either goods of the body or
money or friends or other goods) will most effectively produce contem- akolasza indiscipline
plation of god, that is the best and this is the finest limit; and whatever nkrasza lack of self-control, failure of self-control
20 choice and acquisition of natural goods impedes, either by deficiency or
boul?szs wish
dzanoza thought, thinking
by excess, our cultivation and contemplation of god,27 is base. vr11.3.17 doxa reputation, opinion, belief
And this applies to the soul, and it is the best limit for the soul when one enkrateta self-control
is least aware of the irrational part of the soul as such. epzstimi scientific knowledge, science
Let this be our account of the limit for nobility and of the aim served epzthumza appetite
25 by goods without qualification. ergon function, deed
hekouszon/akous~on voluntary/involuntary
kalos fine, handsome
kalos k'agathos noble
'5 We accept Richards' emendation of kata to kai.
26 See Metaphysics 12.7,107zb1-4; Physics 2.2, 194a35-6; De Anima 2.4, 41 5bz-3. logzsmos reasoning
27 We do not think that Robinson's addition 'in us' is necessary; nor do we think that to theion logzstlkon calculative
should be substituted for the MSS' ton theon, as Robinson proposes twice in this section logos argument, reason(ing), account, principle
(accepted by the OCT). nzeson, mesotis mean, mean point
nous insight
orexzs desire
pathos affection, feeling, passion
phaulos base (occasionally, bad)
skopos aim
sophza, sophos (theoretical) expertise, expert
sophrosune? temperance
spoudazos excellent (occasionally, good)
suneszs, sunetos discernment, discerning
telos end, goal
theorza contemplation, study
thumos spirit, spirited part
 Index

contemplation, 7 excess, 20-2, 49,104-5

Coriscus, 137 of bodily goods, I 18
courage, 41-7 see also mean
as conformity aith reason, 43 exoteric works, I I
states analogous to, 43-4 expertise, 84,879
cowardice, 21
see also courage fear, see courage
craft, 84,8j,I 16 fear of death, 44
crane, 48 fearful things, 42-3
Crete, 44 fierceness, 22,49-50
crocodile, 126 flattery, 21,56,134
curmudgeonliness, 21,56 force, 27,29-37.
currencl, 689 forgiveness, see understanding
C?prus, 107 friendliness, j6
friendship, 121-52
Index decision, 27,289,33-7,46,73-4,83 and justice, 140-2
deficiency, 20-z,49 and self-sufficiency 147-jI
see also mean and superiority, 13j,143
Achilles, 46 aristocrats, 64 deliberation, 35,88,90-1 as based on equality, 132
action arts, 6 Delos, 3 as stable, 130-1,13j
as distinct from production, 85 mechanical, 6
democrats, 64 based on pleasure, 12j
as end, 83 money-making, 6 based on utility, 125-6,141-2
Demodocus, I I I
starting-point of, zj assault, 22,6j desire, 23,27-8 based on virtue, 131
things achievable by, I I Athenians, 125,143
as related to decision, 37 development of, 129-30
activity, 40,139,148-9 authoritative, 25-6
dialectic, I I household as, 141-2
and pleasure, I I 5 dignit?; j6 in misfortune, 123,Ij2
happiness as activity, 16 barbarians, 45,97 kinds of, 125-6,133,142
Diomedes, 7j
adultery, 22,62,65 bashfulness, see modesty
Dioscuri, I jr of base people, 126
affections, 23,57 beasts, see animals, non-human
discernment, 91-2 of like to like, 122-3,134-5
Agathon, 45,52,84 belief; as related to decision, 37
disposition, I j,18-19 of opposites, 13j
Alop5, I 10 benefactors and beneficiaries, 139-40 as opposed to activity, 16 political friendship, 141-2,145
ambiguity, 60 beneficial, see useful dissimulation, 21,56 primary kind of, 125-32
Analytics, 10, 26,37,84 Bias, 61 together and apart, Ij2
drunkenness, 22,43,49,113,119
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 88 bibulousness, see drunkenness toward oneself, 136-8
Anaxandrides, I 14 black bile, 110, 114,119 true friendship as pleasant, 126-31
education, 4
Andromache, 134 blame, 72,104 who is a friend to whom, 130
and praise, see praise and blame Egypt, 7,123
animals, non-human Empedocles, I 22 with manq; I 51
association among, 149 blessedness, j-6 encomium, 17 function; as related to virtue, I 5-16
courage of, 46 boastfulness, 21,56 end
differences from human beings, 29,36,87-8 boorishness, see wit and decision, 34,36-7 geometry, 8,2j
having no share in happiness, 10 Brasidas, 71 and wisdom, 8j-6,96 Glaucon, 7j
love for offspring, 123 brutishness, 106,108 enjoyment, 6,7 Glaucus, 12j
not friends to themselves, 138 building, 8,I j,67-8,I14 equality gluttony, 22,49
not truly temperate or intemperate, 108 Byzantium, I j5 and friendship, 13j goal, 14,116
pleasures of, 48,116,124 and justice, 63-71 see also end
sharing one another's sorrow, 137 cause, 26,36 equity, 77-9 god or gods
Antiphon, 52,134 Celts, 4j error and good fortune, 156
Aphrodite, 107 character, j as distinct from misfortune, 73-4 as a starting-point, Zj,I 59
Apis, 7 virtue of, 18-25 in decision, 389 as not subject to change, 71,119
appetite chef, I 16 Eunikos, 133 contemplation of, 162
and good fortune 158 Chiron, 4j Euripides, 61,74,89,122,146 godlike condition, 97
and self-control 99,104-5,I I j,122 choking on water, loo Eurystheus, I jI having no excess of goods, 77
and temperance, 47-9 cleverness, 94,I 13 Evening Star, 6I having no need of friends, I j~
as part of desire, 27-8 compulsion, 29-32 E\-enus, I 14 superiority of, 132,145,148
aristocracy, I4*I conceitedness, 21
 Index Index

good, 11-14 involuntariness, see voluntariness meekness, 49-50 and pain, 6, 19, 23, 25, 30-1, 38
and the useful, 124-5 irascibility, 21 Megarians, 125, 143 as a good, I 14-20, 161
bodily and external, I 17-18 hletapontum, 43 as relating to temperance and indiscipline,
Form of the Good, 11-14 judge, 66 mildness, 49-50 47-9
greatest human goods, 4, 6, 10 justice, 3, 6, 8, 28, 57, 59-81, 121, I32 Milesians, I I I bodily, 7, 103, 118-19, 110
real and apparent, 124 and friendship, I4&2 misfortune; as distinct from error, 73-4 life of, 6, 7, 8
with and without qualification, 60, 124, and the law, 60, 70, 78-9 modesty, 56 of the mind, 7
160-2, 127 and the voluntary, 72-6 monarchy, 140-1 with and without qualification, 42, 105,
good fortune, 4, I j 5-9 as a mean, 63-70 murder, 6j 115-16
good will, 138 as a part of virtue, 62-3 see also friendship based on pleasure
gourmands, 22 as complete virtue, 61 nature plover, 126
Graces, 67 as virtue directed toward others, 61 action in accordance with, 31 political
grammar, 35, 154 civic, 70 and good fortune,, I 56 life of politics, 6, 8
great-heartedness, 5 1-4 distributive, 63-5, 76 natural purpose, I 53 political art, 121
grimness, 21 natural and conventional, 72 things pleasant by, 10j-6, I 19 political expertise as distinct from
reciprocal, 67-9 what cannot be borne by, 3 2 , q j wisdom, 88-9
habit, 19 rectificatory, 6j wish contrary to, 37 political friendship, 139, 141-2
habituation, 3 necessity, 26 political science, 13, 63, 88
happiness, 8, 16-17, 34 Kerkyon, I 10 and scientific knowledge, 84 the political philosopher, 114
and pleasure, I 14 knowledge Neoptolemus, 99, I 12 Polyclitus, 87
as belonging to human beings, 10 and lack of self-control, 103 Piiobe, ~ o j Polydamas, 46
divergent views of, 3 and the voluntary, 33 nobility, I 59-62 possibility and deliberation, 3j
divine nature of, j having and using, 101-2 numbers, 13 praise, 38, 78, 160
harm, 65-6, 74-5 Socrates on virtue and, 8 and blame, 26, 40, 53-4, j7
health, 8-9, 11,13,16,18,24,34,37,59,77,93~ obsequiousness, 21 of affections, 57
116, 129, 160 lack of self-control, 27-9, 49, 97-114, 127 see also dignity pretentiousness, 21, j j
see also medicine and knowledge, 103 Odysseus, 99 Priam, 97
Hector, 46, 97 as distinct from indiscipline, 100-1 oligarchs, 64 prior and posterior, I I
Heracles, I 58-9 considered from the perspective of natural Prodicus, 14j
Heraclitus, 28, 101, 122 philosophy, 102-3 pain production, 8 j
Herodotus, 126 qualified and unqualified, 104 and appetite, 34 profligacy, 21, 50-1
Hesiod, 67, 122, 143 with regard to spirit, 107-8 and courage, 44-5 proportion
Hippocrates, I 55 lechery, 49 and force, 27, 29-30 and justice, 64-9
Homer, 46,75, 87,97, 107, 122 Lesbos, 79 and spirit, 28, 34 arithmetic, 6 j
honour, 4, 52-3,71,98, 134 Leto, 3 as something bad, 117 geometric, 65
and lack of self-control, 103 liberality, 50-1 freedom from, 6, 115, I 16 punishment, j
hostility, see friendliness like-mindedness, 139 see also pleasure Pythagoreans, 67
humourlessness. see wit liking and being liked, 128, 133-4 Pammenes, 145 Pytho, 145
loss-maker, 21 Peliades, 33
ignorance love, 32, 43, 133, 150 Pericles, 86 reason; courage as conformity with, 43
and the involuntary, 33, 36, 73-4 loving and being loved, see liking and being liked Persia, 71 recklessness, 21, 41
Socrates on ignorance of what is best, 98 Phalaris, 106 see also courage
illiberality, 21, 50-1 magnificence, 54-j Phidias, 87 reputation, 4, 7
impulse, 30 Margites, 87 Philoctetes, I 10 Rhadamanthys, 67
India, 3j mathematics, 16, 25, 65, 89-90 the play of Sophocles, 99, I 12 righteous indignation, j 5-6
indiscipline, 21, 47-9, 62 mean Philolaus, 32 ruling and being ruled, 52, 61, 71, 132
as distinct from lackof self-control, 100-1, I 10 courage as a, 47 philosophy
see also temperance great-heartedness as a, 53-4 argument in, 10 Sardanapallus, 7
injustice, 60 in friendship, 13j life of, 6, 8 Satyros, I o j
and character, 70 justice as a, 63-70 Philoxenus, son of Eryxis, 48 science
towards oneself, 79-81 mildness as a, 50 plants, 7 productive, 8
see also justice temperance as a, 49 pleasure, 7 scientific knowledge, 7, 39, 84,
insensibility, 21, virtue in general as a, z+z, 2 3 - ~ ~ 3 8j ,j-8,82 and appetite, 27, 4779 86-8
insight, 84, 87-8 medicine, 5, 8, 13, 16. 3.5, 30. 82. 115, 125, I54 and courage, 45 theoretical, 8
intellect, 12 see also health
 Index

self-control, 38 temperance, 4 7 9 , 57
as a mean, 108 see also indiscipline Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
lack of, see lack of self-control Thales, 88
Theodektes, I 10 Titles published in the series thus far
servility, 49-j0
sex, 48, 103, 115, "8, 150 Theognis, 3, 46, 61, 129, 144 Aquinas Disputed Questions on the Virtues (edited by E. M. Atkins and Thomas Williams)
shabbiness, 21 thought, 27, 29
practical or productive, 83 Aquinas Summa Theologise, Questions on God (edited by Brian Davies and Brian Leftow)
shamelessness, see modesty
shoemaking, I 6, 67-8 virtue of, 18, 82-3 Aristotle Eudemian Ethics (edited by Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf)
sincerity, j6 tickling, I 10 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (edited by Roger Crisp)
Sirens, 48 touch, sense of, 48-9 Arnauld and Kicole Logic or the A r t of Thinking (edited by Jill Vance Buroker)
Skythians, I I O toughness, 98,
Augustine On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings
slaves and slavery, 67, 71, I40 Tray, 84
tyrants, 71 (edited by Peter King)
sleep, 17
Smindyrides the Sybarite, 7 Augustine On the Trinity (edited by Gareth Matthews)
Socrates understanding, 92 Bacon The New Organon (edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne)
on courage, 43, 46 unscrupulousness, 22
Berkeley Philosophical Writings (edited by Desmond M. Clarke)
on knowledge and good fortune, 157 unworldliness, zz
useful, 124-j Boyle A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (edited by Edward
on the impossibility of lack of self-control,
B. Davis and Michael Hunter)
98, 103
on the useful and the useless, 123 vice Bruno Cause, Principle and Untty and Essays on Magic (edited by Richard Blackwell and
on virtue and knowledge, 8, 95-6 as corrupting the starting-point, 86, I I I Robert de Lucca with an introduction by Alfonso Ingegno)
softness, 21 as unknown to the vicious man, I 10
Cavendish Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (edited by Eileen O'Neill)
Solon, 17 as voluntary, 39-40
virtue, 4, 6, 38-40, 46, 52-3, 61, 121 Cicero On Moral Ends (edited by Julia Annas, translated by Raphael Woolf)
sophists, 99, 137
Sophocles, 99, I 12 and vice, 26-7 Clarke A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings (edited by
soul as constituent of the good life, 8 3 Ezio Vailati)
activity of, 16 as related to wisdom, 95-6, 153-5 Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics (edited by J. M. Bernstein)
deliberative capacity of, 36 of character, I 8-25
of thought, 18, 82-3 Condillac Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (edited by Hans Aarsleff)
function of, 16
goods of, I j see also friendship based on virtue Conway The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (edited by Allison
rational and irrational parts of, 23, 82-3, voluntariness, 26-37 P. Coudert and Taylor Corse)
154-5 and involuntariness in transactions, 63, Cudworth A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of
virtue of, 17-18, 82-3 66-7
Freewzll (edited by Sarah Hutton)
Spartans, 151, 160 and justice, 72-6
Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy, with selections from the Objections and Replies
spirit, spiritedness, 45, 50, 74, 98
and lack of self-control, 103, 107-8 weak-heartedness, 21 (edited by John Cottingham)
spitefulness, 22, j5 see also great-heartedness Descartes The Ifirld and Other Writings (edited by Stephen Gaukroger)
starting-points, 25-6, 37, 84 wealth, 4, I I, 50-1 Fichte Attempt at a Critique o f A l l Reuelation (edited by Allen Wood, translated by
and god, I jg wickedness, 22,
as unnatural, 137 Garrett Green)
corrupted by vice, 86, I I I
preserved by virtue, I I I qualified and unqualified, 106 Fichte Foundations of L!atural Right (edited by Frederick Neuhouser, translated by
state, 15-16, 19-20 wisdom, 4, 6, 7, 8 4 , 8 5 9 6 , 1 5 3 4 Michael Baur)
best as produced by the mean, 20 and lack of self-control, 99, I 13-14 Fichte The System of Ethics (edited by Daniel Breazeale and Giinter Zoller)
stolidity, 21 as constituent of the good life, 8-9, 93-5
in deliberation, 8j 3 6
Gveek and Roman Aesthetics (edited by Oleg V. Bychkov and Anne Sheppard)
Stratonicus, 48
substance, 12, z j wish, 27 Hamann Philosophical Writings (edited by Kenneth Haynes)
suicide, 79, I 52 wit, 5&7 Heine On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany and Other Writings (edited
surliness, 21 by Terry Pinkard, translated by Howard Pollack-Milgate)
see also dignity Xenophantus, I 10
Herder Philosophical Writings (edited by Michael Forster)
syllogism, 84 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (edited by Vere Chappell)
youth
taste, sense of, 47-8 and inexperience, 89-90 Humboldt On Language (edited by Michael Losonsky, translated by Peter Heath)
temper and pleasure friendship, 125, 133 Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings (edited by Dorothy
hot, 22 Coleman)
quick, zz Zeus, 142, 146
Hume A n Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (edited by Stephen Buckle) Nietzsche Untimely Meditations (edited by Daniel Breazeale, translated by
Kant Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic Point of View (edited by Robert B. Louden with an R. J. Hollingdale)
introduction by Manfred Kuehn) Nietzsche Writings from the Early Notebooks (edited by Raymond Geuss and Alexander
Kant Critique of Practical Reason (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction by Nehamas, translated by Ladislaus Lob)
Andrews Reath) Kietzsche Writingsfrom the Late Notebooks (edited by Riidiger Bittner, translated by
Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals 2nd edition (edited by Mary Gregor and Kate Sturge)
Jens Timmermann, with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard) Novalis Fichte Studies (edited by Jane Kneller)
Kant Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (edited by Michael Friedman) Plato Meno, Phaedo (edited by David Sedley and Alex Long)
Kant The Metaphysics ofMorals (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction by Roger Plato The Symposium (edited by M . C. Howatson and Frisbee C. C. Sheffield)
Sullivan) Reinhold Letters on the Kantzan Phzlosophy (edited by Karl Ameriks, translated by James
Kant Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings (edited Hebbeler)
by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer) Schleiermacher Hermeneutics and Criticism (edited by Andrew Bowie)
Kant Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 2nd edition (edited by Gary Hatfield) Schleiermacher Lectures on Philosophical Ethics (edited by Robert Louden, translated by
Kant Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings (edited by Allen Louise Adey Huish)
Wood and George di Giovanni with an introduction by Robert Merrihew Adams) Schleiermacher On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (edited by Richard
Kierkegaard Concbding Unscientzfic Postscript (edited by Alastair Hannay) Crouter)
Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling (edited by C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh) Schopenhauer Przze Essay on the Freedom of the Will (edited by Giinter Zoller)
La Mettrie Machine M a n and Other Writings (edited by Ann Thomson) Sextus Empiricus Against the Logicians (edited by Richard Bett)
Leibniz New Essays on Human Understanding (edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Scepticism (edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes)
Bennett) Shaftesbury Characteristics of Men, Munners, Opinions, Times (edited by Lawrence
Lessing Philosophical and Theological Writings (edited by H . B. Nisbet) Klein)
Locke on Toleration (edited by Richard Vernon) Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments (edited by Knud Haakonssen)
Malebranche Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (edited by Nicholas Jolley and Spinoza Theological-Political Treatise (edited by Jonathan Israel, translated by Michael
David Scott) Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel)
Malebranche The Search after Truth (edited by Thomas M . Lennon and Paul Voltaire Treutzse on Tolerance and Other Writings (edited by Simon Harvey)
J. Olscamp)
Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings (edited by Muhammad Ali Khalidi)
Medieval Jewish Philosophical Writings (edited by Charles Manekin)
Melanchthon Orations on Philosophy and Education (edited by Sachiko Kusukawa,
translated by Christine Salazar)
Mendelssohn Philosophical Wn'tings (edited by Daniel 0 . Dahlstrom)
Newton Philosophical Writings (edited by Andrew Janiak)
Nietzsche The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings (edited by
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman)
Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil (edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman)
Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (edited by Raymond Geuss and
Ronald Speirs)
Nietzsche Daybreak (edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, translated by
R. J. Hollingdale)
Nietzsche The Gay Science (edited by Bernard Williams, translated by Josefine
Nauckhoff)
Nietzsche Human, All Too Human (translated by R. J. Hollingdale with an introduction
by Richard Schacht)
Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra (edited by Adrian Del Caro and Roherr B. Pippin)